LETTER TO JOHN H. BUCHANAN, JR. FROM ROBERT M. GATES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 146
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: April 27, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/08/13:
CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
(Please do not remove)
=V cpc;
C~j 0,0
Gl".!3 /806 ~~
SUBJECT:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/08/13:
CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
STAT
STAT
FOR
I-79M 610 USEEDI-REViOUSNS
IO
T
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SueJecT. (Optional) Response to John Buchanan, Chairman, People for the American Way,
declining invitation to attend 13 June 1988 conference
FROM: John L. flelgerson No. OCA 88-1300
Director of Congressio
-
-
-
oA?
24
AP
P
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building) COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
INITIALS b whom, Draw a line atrois column after each comment.)
R?t IVE4 FO WAR9ED
William Baker
Director of Public
2
.
Executive Registry
APR
5'
Executive Director
7 APR 190
7. Deputy Director of
tr
C
l I
t
lli
en
a
n
e
gence
9? Return to Director of
Congressional Affairs
10.
12.
13.
14.
1S.
CC
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
s Central Apncv
2 7 APR 1988
Mr. John H. Buchanan, Jr.
Chairman
People for the American Way
2000 M Street, Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Mr. Buchanan:
I very much appreciate your inviting me to participate in
your People for the American way conference on 13 June 1988.
You have picked a challenging and important subject for
discussion. Unfortunately, my schedule will not permit me to
attend. Thank you again for thinking of me.
Sincerely,
/s/ Re10Qrt M. Gates
Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
STAT
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
ER (Ref ER 1604x-88)
- D/PAO
1 - D/OCA
1 - OCA Record
1 - DD/HA/OCA
1 - OCARead
DD/IIA/0 :dpt (22 Apr 88)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/08/13 : Igo /Z~J)
(IA-RnP9nr;n1'~F Rnngnnnn,~nn,~c)
De
Rnnu NO RI III nim CvTCKIQI^L
lassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for
Release 2012/08/13: ellee....n
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Z4%r,..IJ i v m oAi-KL AmLAT
ROUTING SLIP
STAT
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
}{
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
D/PAO
x
15
D/ ERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
18
19
20
21
22
TO:
o 9 Rk 9 a a V, pev dcJ- , e ' - . ' ' ) ^N r\
VLe
T2VS\
~e
STAT
r/L' ~Jrn~ I, t 1
19Ipr68
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13 :
CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
9 ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDSBT
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
X
w encl
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
18
19
20
21
22
Executive Secretary
19 Ar 68
Dar.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13 :
CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
///~merKanWc
The non-partisan constitutional liberties organization.
April 11, 1988
The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
I am writing to invite you to participate in People For the
American Way's conference on government secrecy and the Congress
entitled, "Does Congress Have a Need to Know?" It will be held
in the Russell Senate Caucus Room from 11:30 am until 2:00 pm on
Monday, June 13, 1988.
Last December, People For the American Way released a
comprehensive study entitled Government Secrecy: Decisions
Without Democracy (a copy is enclosed). It documents a rise of
lifetime publication restrictions on current and former federal
employees; a dramatic increase in the classification of
documents; the growth of 400% over seven years in the Pentagon's
"black budget"; new restrictions on the free flow of scientific
and research data; and the proliferation of National Security
Decision Directives.
We at People For the American Way are concerned about how
this trend effects citizens' ability to be informed participants
in their government, and whether it compromises our system of
checks and balances. These issues are especially important in
the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair and in this election year
as the agenda for a new administration is debated.
The primary focus of the conference will be a panel
discussion on Congress's "need to know" and the limits on
Executive decision-making under our constitutional system. I
would like you to serve on the panel. Your vast experience and
knowledge would be bring an invaluable perspective to the
discussion.
Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute will be
the moderator. William Colby, Rep. Lee Hamilton, Rep. William
Dickinson, and Scott Armstrong of the National Security Archive
have agreed to participate on the panel. Others we have invited
are Sen. George Mitchell, Clark Clifford, and Cokie Roberts of
National Public Radio.
The panel will be the centerpiece of the conference. It is
structured to provide ample opportunity for discussion and
7 '
2
FP-'
j
2000 M Street. NW. Suite 400. Washineton. n_C_ 20036 [phone] C
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
debate. We are not asking for prepared speeches. Instead, the
moderator will pose questions for you and your colleagues'
response and comment. You will be free to debate among
yourselves, questioning and challenging each other. As the
discussion develops, the moderator will draw out different points
of view and raise new issues, but the primary focus of the panel
will be set by you and your fellow panelists.
We have reserved the Russell Caucus Room in the Russell
Senate Office Building for the event. Once again, the date is
Monday, June 13, 1988 from 11:30 until 2:00 pm. We expect an
audience of over 250 government officials, congressional staff,
research institution specialists, scholars, and information
specialists. We anticipate C-SPAN coverage and national press
attention. The proceedings from the conference will be published
and distributed widely to the media and the public.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any
questions or suggestions about the conference, or if we can be of
assistance. Thank you for your consideration.
JHB:DCC:me
Enclosures
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
GDVERNME
DECISIONS
WIIHOUI
Preface by
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 12012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9 T
g w`. ROtiTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
p
2
DI )d
3
EXDIR .,,
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
D/PA
x
15
ERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
18
19
20
21
22
e
,
v
~
0, W.
j
1 h - e
~a
L
vyL ~P/'eeK 1- 1"f c`1 y1 P
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
~~~~merKan
64
The non-partisan constitutional liberties organization.
April 11, 1988
The Honorable Robert M. Gates
Deputy Director of Intelligence
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
I am writing to invite you to participate in People For the
American Way's conference on government secrecy and the Congress
entitled, "Does Congress Have a Need to Know?" It will be held
in the Russell Senate Caucus Room from 11:30 am until 2:00 pm on
Monday, June 13, 1988.
Last December, People For the American Way released a
comprehensive study entitled Government Secrecy: Decisions
Without Democracy (a copy is enclosed). It documents a rise of
lifetime publication restrictions on current and former federal
employees; a dramatic increase in the classification of
documents; the growth of 400% over seven years in the Pentagon's
"black budget"; new restrictions on the free flow of scientific
and research data; and the proliferation of National Security
Decision Directives.
We at People For the American Way are concerned about how
this trend effects citizens' ability to be informed participants
in their government, and whether it compromises our system of
checks and balances. These issues are especially important in
the aftermath of the Iran-Contra affair and in this election year
as the agenda for a new administration is debated.
The primary focus of the conference will be a panel
discussion on Congress's "need to know" and the limits on
Executive decision-making under our constitutional system. I
would like you to serve on the panel. Your vast experience and
knowledge would be bring an invaluable perspective to the
discussion.
Norman Ornstein of the American Enterprise Institute will be
the moderator. William Colby, Rep. Lee Hamilton, Rep. William
Dickinson, and Scott Armstrong of the National Security Archive
have agreed to participate on the panel. Others we have invited
are Sen. George Mitchell, Clark Clifford, and Cokie Roberts of
National Public Radio.
The panel will be the centerpiece of the conference. It is
structured to provide ample opportunity for discussion and
2000 M Street, NW, Suite 400, Washington, D.C. 20036 [phone]
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
debate. We are not asking for prepared speeches. Instead, the
moderator will pose questions for you and your colleagues'
response and comment. You will be free to debate among
yourselves, questioning and challenging each other. As the
discussion develops, the moderator will draw out different points
of view and raise new issues, but the primary focus of the panel
will be set by you and your fellow panelists.
We have reserved the Russell Caucus Room in the Russell
Senate Office Building for the event. Once again, the date is
Monday, June 13, 1988 from 11:30 until 2:00 pm. We expect an
audience of over 250 government officials, congressional staff,
research institution specialists, scholars, and information
specialists. We anticipate C-SPAN coverage and national press
attention. The proceedings from the conference will be published
and distributed widely to the media and the public.
Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any
questions or suggestions about the conference, or if we can be of
assistance. Thank you for your consideration.
JHB : DCC : me
Enclosures
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
t
I
1 4
Amencan
The nonpartisan constitutional liberties organization.
GOVERNME
DECISIONS
WIIHOUI
DJMII!RIY
VP
Preface by
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
"A popular Government without popular
information, or the means of acquiring
it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a
Tragedy-, or perhaps both. Knowledge will
forever govern ignorance: And a people
-,-,h* nAvk%MLv!r-vNm Governors. must
arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
p
DECISIONS
WIIHOUI
~FMO,CRACY
by
Steven L. Katz
Preface by
Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
L Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
A publication of
People For The American Way
2000 M Street, Suite 400
Washington, D.C. 20036
[phone]
People For The American Way
is solely responsible for the
contents of this publication.
? Copyright 1987 by People For The
American Way. All rights reserved.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
Acknowledgements
Several individuals provided valuable assistance in reviewing this report. David Cohen
emphasized the impact of secrecy on decreasing the political efficacy of citizens. Tony
Podesta addressed the ways in which secrecy undercuts the role of elected officials in
our representative form of government. Gary Bass and David Plocher were particularly
helpful in understanding the White House Office of Management and Budget. Deep
gratitude must also be extended to those in government who provided valuable assistance
and insight. These individuals are career government professionals who are dedicated to
the principle of maintaining an informed citizenry in a democratic society.
Recognition must also be given to the staff of People For the American Way.
Especially important contributions resulted from the foresight and guidance of Melanne
Verveer, the editing of Nancy Stella, the invaluable and artful work of Jill Craig in
producing this report, the technical editing of Timmy Napolitano and Nadine Wesoski, and
the assistance of Maria Pica.
People For the American Way is most grateful for the generous support it has
received from the Field Foundation, the Benton Foundation, and the Deer Creek
Foundation.
It is also essential to acknowledge several other public interest organizations.
Many of these groups have pioneered the territory of excessive government secrecy and
have worked to make our government more accountable and responsive. In many cases,
the public education goals of People For the American Way pursued with this report has
been made possible by the efforts and achievements of these organizations: Access
Reports, Advocacy Institute, American Association for the Advancement of Science,
American Civil Liberties Union, American Library Association, American Newspaper
Publishers Association, American Society of Newspaper Editors, Center for Defense
Information, Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc., Common Cause, Constitutional
Research Institute, Data Center, FOIA Inc., Government Accountability Project, National
Academy of Sciences, National Newspaper Association, National Security Archives, OMB
Watch, Project for Military Procurement, Public Citizen, Reporters Committee for a Free
Press, Society for Professional Journalists.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Table of Contents
PREFACE by Arthur Schlesinger, Jr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
FOREWORD by John H. Buchanan, Jr.. . . . . .
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY . ............ . ... .. .. .. . .. . . . . v
1. OPENING OUR EYES TO SECRECY .. . ... ... .. .. . . . .. . . .1
Superpower Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Secrecy Unchecked . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
2. THE PRESIDENT'S "SECRET LAWS" .....................5
"National Security" Can Be Used To Hide National Policymaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Secrecy Promotes Fugitive Policy Making . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Secrecy Defeats The Checks and Balances System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Secrecy Defeats Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
3. "NATIONAL SECURITY" : PASSWORD FOR SECRECY. . . . . .. . . 13
Classifying Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Above Top Secret? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Classified Spending: The "Black Budget" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
4. GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: SWORN TO SECRECY . .. .. .. . . 27
Executive Branch Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Nondisclosure Agreements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Prepublication Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
5. R E S T R I C T I N G S C I E N T I F I C AND A C A D E M I C FREEDOM . . . . . . . 35
Science and Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Controls on Campus: Academic Freedom . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6. STOPPING THE PRESSES ........ .... . .. .. ... .. .. . . . 47
Grenada, Spies, and Libya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Distrust and Disclosure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
7. CITIZEN ACCESS: THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT.. .. . 51
What the Freedom of Information Act Does . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
How the Freedom of Information Act Benefits Society . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
The Reagan Administration "Onslaught" Against the FOIA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
The Future of the Freedom of Information Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
8. POLICY POWERHOUSE: THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT ..... 59
AND BUDGET
OMB Control of Government Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60
OMB Control of Government Regulations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS .... ... .. . .. . .. . . 73
Recommendations for Candidates for President . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
Recommendations for the United States Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
NOTES ........................................83
APPENDICES ....................................105
A. National Security Decision Directives
B. National Security Decision Directive 159, "Covert Action Policy
Approval and Coordination Procedures"
C. Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (Standard Form 189)
D. Prepublication Review Agreement (Form 4193)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
Preface
By Arthur Schlesinger, Jr.
Secrecy is the bane of democracy because it is the enemy of accountability. The framers
of the American Constitution designed a system of government intended to bring power
and accountability into balance. The secrecy system, as it has been nurtured by the
executive branch over the last forty years and with special zeal over the last seven
years, is the indispensable ally and instrument of the Imperial Presidency.
Now no one can question the right of the state to keep certain things secret.
Weapons technology and deployment, diplomatic negotiations, intelligence methods and
sources, military contingency plans are among the areas where secrecy is entirely
defensible. Secrecy is defensible too in certain domestic areas: personal data given the
government on the presumption it would be kept confidential -- tax returns, personnel
investigations and the like; and official decisions that, if prematurely disclosed, would
lead to speculation in land or commodities, preemptive buying, higher governmental costs
and private enrichment.
But the contemporary state has extended the secrecy system far beyond its
legitimate bounds. In doing so, the target is far less to prevent the disclosure of
information to enemy governments than to prevent the disclosure of information to the
American Congress, press and people. For governments have discovered that secrecy is a
source of power and an efficient way of covering up the embarrassments, blunders, follies
and crimes of the ruling regime.
When governments claim that a broad secrecy mandate is essential to protect
national security, they mostly mean that it is essential to protect the political interests
of the administration. The harm to national security through breaches of secrecy is
always exaggerated. The secrecy system has been breached since the beginning of the
republic -- from the day in 1795 when Senator Mason of Virginia enraged President
Washington by giving the secret text of Jay's Treaty to the Philadelphia Aurora, or the
day in 1844 when Senator Tappan of Ohio enraged President Tyler by giving the secret
text of the treaty annexing Texas to the New York Evening Post. No one has ever
demonstrated that such leaks, or the publication of the Pentagon Papers either, harmed
national security. No one can doubt that these disclosures benefited the democratic
process.
The republic has survived great crises -- the War of 1812, the Civil War, the
First and Second World War -- without erecting the suffocating structure of secrecy the
Reagan administration proposes today. One wonders what greater crisis justifies the
extreme measures taken and contemplated by the Reagan administration since 1981. The
consequences for American democracy of the cult of secrecy may be dire. For the
secrecy system not only safegaurds the executive branch from accountability for its
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
incompetence and its venality. Worse, it emboldens the state to undertake rash and
mindless adventures, as the Iran-contra scandal sadly reminds us. "Though secrecy in
diplomacy is occasionally unavoidable," wrote James Bryce, who was not only an acute
student of comparative government but also a distinguished diplomat, "it has its perils ....
Publicity may cause some losses, but may avert some misfortunes."' Perhaps President
Reagan will one day regret that the press had not exposed his secret intentions toward
Iran in time to block his ill-considered policy, as President Kennedy regretted that the
New York limes had not played up its story on the exile invasion of Cuba. "If you had
printed more about the operation," he told a limes editor, "you would have saved us
from a colossal mistake."
Because the secrecy system is controlled by those on whom it bestows prestige
and protection, it has long since overridden its legitimate objectives. The religion of
secrecy has become an all-purpose means by which the American Presidency seeks to
dissemble its purposes, bury its mistakes, manipulate its citizens and maximize its power.
This People For the American Way report by Steven L. Katz is a meticulous and
dispassionate account of the growth and widening reach of the secrecy system and of the
danger it poses to American democracy. It is not too late for Congress to bring the
secrecy system under control and redress the balance between presidential power and
presidential accountability.
The issue is hardly new. "Executive secrecy," John Taylor of Caroline, the
philosopher of Jeffersonian democracy, wrote in 1814, "is one of the monarchial customs,
plausibly defended, and certainly fatal to republican government ... How can national self
government exist without a knowledge of national affairs? or how can legislatures be
wise or independent, who legislate in the dark upon the recommendation of one man?"
December 1987
New York
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
GOVERNMENT SECRECY:
DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Foreword
By John H. Buchanan, Jr.
Chairman, People For the American Way
During 1987, Americans celebrated the 200th anniversary of a system of government
where "we the people" rule.
From our nation's founding, we have understood that an informed citizenry is
essential to a democracy. Only an informed citizenry can debate public issues, hold
elected officials accountable for their actions, and offer meaningful consent to the
actions of their government.
Over the years, Americans have supported the principle of a free flow of
information and ideas. During my own years in Congress, we enacted the Freedom of
Information Act, which both symbolizes and protects the people's right to know what
their government is doing in their name,
In recent years, however, a curtain of secrecy has fallen over many activities of
our government. For many of us, the Iran-contra scandal was a rude awakening as we
learned of secret actions by a shadow government operating from the White House
basement. But the headlines of 1987 are just a small part of the larger story of the
growth of excessive government secrecy -- secrecy that denies Americans the information
we need about our government and our entire society.
In this report, People For the American Way tells the story of the
institutionalization of secrecy throughout the federal government. This is the story of
unprecedented controls on information: not only on defense and foreign policy issues
where legitimate secrets do need to be protected but on a host of topics vital to our
daily lives, from toxic wastes to occupational hazards, from new technology to the health
of our children.
The report warns that excessive secrecy could become a permanent part of our
government -- unless the people take notice and their elected officials take action. And
this report offers an action agenda to reverse the institutionalization of secrecy and
restore the American tradition of open government.
Most importantly, this report makes clear that the American people are being
denied the information we need to participate in our political system and to hold our
elected officials accountable for their actions. Instead of the free and open debate that
is the essence of the American way, our system is increasingly characterized by
"decisions without democracy": actions taken unilaterally by the Executive Branch and
kept secret from Congress, the news media, and, ultimately, from the people.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
iv FOREWORD
I sincerely believe that a citizenry better informed about the decisions of
government is essential to the preservation and strengthening of our democratic values
and our constitutional system. Only as informed citizens are we empowered to assume our
rightful role as the masters, not the servants, of government.
December 1987
Washington, D.C.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Executive Summary
Government secrecy affects the lives of all Americans. In today's complex world, what we
don't know can hurt us. The importance of secrecy to the security of our nation is
undeniable; however, excessive government secrecy is a serious national problem. Indeed,
it has been expanded without regard to constitutional protections and has been used to
restrict and circumvent the very laws that Congress passed to promote an informed
citizenry and a responsive government. The result, increasingly, is a government shaping
our society and our lives through decisions without democracy.
This report demonstrates that government secrecy involves the unlimited
executive authority to control resources and activities both inside and outside the
government. Such authority is unilaterally exercised to control governmental and social
institutions upon which we depend. Excessive secrecy is not a victimless practice; it
affects individuals and the future of our democratic institutions.
The Iran-contra scandal enabled Americans to see that the arrangements created
at the highest level of government in pursuit of "national security" have consequences
for our republic. The president secretly authorized arms sales to Iran that violated our
nation's laws and foreign policy -- and contradicted the president's public pledge not to
make deals with terrorists. Most disturbing is the fact that official U.S. policy was
apparently created and implemented without the president's knowledge.
These events, however, were born from a secrecy system that is well established,
virtually unchallenged by Congress, and given considerable deference by the courts. The
years 1981-1987 stand as the most recent chapter in the development of secrecy which
provides the executive branch with more power and less accountability than any other
branch of government.
The National Security Council, which quietly marked its 40th anniversary in 1987,
has been extensively utilized by President Reagan to issue more than 200 "secret laws"
on national policy matters. Congress has virtually no knowledge of the issuance of any of
the orders. Even in the case of pertinent national security matters, the appropriate
committees of Congress are not informed. These have included orders that: in 1981 first
sent funds for covert training of Nicaraguan rebels to Argentina; in 1983 authorized
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) training and support of secret counter terrorist squads
in the Middle East for the purpose of "preemptive strikes;" in 1985 authorized agencies
other than the CIA, such as the National Security Council, to engage in covert
operations; and in 1986 authorized the Libyan "disinformation" campaign.
In achieving our nation's greatest military build-up during peacetime, the Reagan
administration has shrouded much of the expansion, and many of the problems, in
secrecy. In what is known as the Pentagon's "black budget," highly classified spending
for secret weapons programs has increased from $5 billion in 1981 to at least $22 billion
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
vi GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY
for 1988. Congress has been almost powerless to stop the expansion of secret spending
even though increasing evidence points to waste of taxpayers' dollars through
mismanagement, fraud, and abuse.
The growth of secrecy can be traced to the exercise of virtually unilateral
presidential power in such areas as information classification, when, for example,
documents are stamped "Top Secret" or restrictions such as secrecy contracts are imposed
on government employees.
Since 1981 the already overloaded classification system has grown by almost two
million new 'documents annually. This increase reverses the 30-year trend toward
narrowing the classification criteria and systematizing declassification. The president has
also taken unprecedented action authorizing "reclassification" of publicly released
documents. Government officials have demanded the return of materials from individuals,
libraries, and other institutions around the country. While information classification is
essential for protecting vital secrets, overclassification overloads the system and defeats
the effectiveness and integrity of such protection.
The Reagan administration's obsession with secrecy has also led to mandatory
secrecy contracts for millions of government employees, many of whom have no access to
classified information. Hundreds of thousands of others, including Cabinet officials, are
subject to lifetime censorship agreements requiring government review of any writings or
speeches even after they have stopped working for the government. These requirements
infringe upon First Amendment rights, allow government officials to censor embarrassing
or dissenting views, filter and narrow public debate, and prevent government and the
people from learning from past mistakes. The expansion of these restrictions, in some
cases unprecedented even during the most xenophobic periods in American history, has
created a bureaucracy of secrecy that threatens to isolate the government from the
governed.
While secrecy is often a shapeless force, its pervasiveness has become
disturbingly clear in the growing gap between authority and accountability. Whether the
subject has been information policy in general or specific regulatory issues about health
and safety, the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) has become the
Reagan administration's policy power base. OMB has instituted policies which increase
secrecy and has conducted its own activities in secret.
The opening for such activity came as the result of a law passed by Congress to
decrease wasteful paperwork volume in government, but President Reagan used OMB's
powers under the act in ways beyond the boundaries set by Congress. President Reagan
granted OMB unprecedented authority to control the content and the volume of all
government publications, to set the information collection policies of all federal agencies,
and to rewrite almost all federal regulations and studies.
The enormous role that OMB has been given in government between 1981 and
1987 is evidenced by the application of OMB's authority to oversee activities affecting
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
the daily lives of Americans. By 1986 a White House report showed that OMB was
reviewing and rewriting a diverse range of regulations in areas in which it had no
expertise. These included civil rights, mental retardation, and cancer risks.
For three years, OMB delayed plans of the Department of Health and Human
Services to place warning labels on aspirin about the fatal link between aspirin and Reye
Syndrome, a life threatening condition following influenza and chicken-pox in children.
Government and private medical experts concluded that 30 percent of 1,200 cases of Reye
Syndrome reported annually were fatal. OMB officials responded instead to aspirin
manufacturers, with whom they had met privately, who feared commercial loss if warning
labels became required.
OMB's review of federal studies of occupational illness have also perpetuated
health risks to citizens. Reports of birth defects and miscarriages associated with the use
of video display terminals (VDTs) on computers by women led a federal agency to
propose the first major scientific research project to examine this health issue.
Approximately 10 million American women sit at VDTs every day. OMB thwarted the
planned study, substituting a modified version submitted by industry representatives that
omitted many of the questions essential to measuring the relationship of stress at work
and problems of fertility.
No one is surprised to learn that government is powerful. However, it is
disturbing to discover that the exercise of so much power is characterized by secrecy.
OMB bypasses federal laws specifically enacted to provide citizens with knowledge of and
access to government decision-making. While positioned close to the president, OMB
operates from deep within an already inaccessible bureaucracy. Just as in other improper
uses of government secrecy, OMB has avoided accountability and undercut the checks and
balances of our constitutional system. It has made decisions without democratic input and
has protected private interests, often negotiating behind closed doors.
The bureaucracy of secrecy has made citizens the lowest priority of those who
"need to know." When information is not disclosed to the public, however, our
government has failed to exercise its best means of maintaining the public trust.
Since 1981 the government has imposed unprecedented restrictions on
information. Through attacks on the Freedom of Information Act, controls on the media,
and interference with scientific and academic freedom, the government has sharply
limited the free flow of information in our society.
The Freedom of Information Act, the only right to government information that
the public can enforce in court, has enabled Americans to live safer and healthier lives
and to govern themselves more economically and efficiently. Nonetheless, that law has
been subject to administration attacks between 1981 and 1987. For example, the
administration has increased the ability of the defense establishment and law enforcement
agencies to deny access to records. Recently, President Reagan announced he would soon
try to limit access to scientific information.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
The Reagan administration has repeatedly pressured the news media to either
alter or kill certain articles, even when the information had been previously published.
The CIA has threatened to prosecute major newspapers and magazines for espionage. The
FBI has told former government employees that they should not publish newspaper
articles commenting on current events. The potential for creating the equivalent of an
"Official Secrets Act" in the United States has been greatly increased by these actions
and may result from the prosecution of government employees who unlawfully disclose
information -- not to foreign powers or their agents but simply to the press. In Grenada,
the press was kept off the battlefield, and the public was forced to rely on official
Defense Department accounts. The public was manipulated by a "disinformation" campaign
aimed at derailing Libya's President Gadhafi.
Outside the walls of government, secrecy has become the catchword to cover
many activities well beyond anything understood as "national security." There has been an
increasing trend toward controlling information that does not originate with the
government, but rather in the academic and scientific communities. Government
censorship agreements have been imposed on certain scientists and university professors
as part of the procedure in awarding federal grants. Military authority has been extended
by President Reagan to control access to unclassified computerized information belonging
to corporations, universities, and private libraries. Officials from several agencies have
forced private scientific conferences to exclude foreigners and stopped the presentation
of hundreds of papers on scientific subjects. In each instance the information at issue
was neither classified nor government property.
At universities and colleges across the country, government controls restrict
teachers and students from exercising academic freedom and threaten to hinder
intellectual inquiry. The government has asked universities to conduct surveillance of
foreign students at U.S. colleges and universities regarding their course work and use of
library materials, laboratory equipment and computers. In some cases, it has restricted
college course enrollment to "U.S. citizens only," denied immigration visas to foreigners
coming to study or teach, and sought deportation of tenured professors.
It is incumbent upon a democratic government to maintain policies permitting broad
citizen access to information and wide dissemination of information. The public also has a
responsibility to demand that government fulfill these democratic ideals. The urgency,
however, should be addressed by the president, Congress and government officials.
Those in government who are in the best position to make changes must deepen
their commitment and seek to make our system more accountable and more responsive.
Respect for the law must be reinstituted as the highest of priorities. The executive
branch must work closely with Congress to improve procedures and safeguards concerning
the creation, notification, and accountability of covert activities. A thorough review must
be conducted of secrecy measures and presidential power, from "national security" to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
decision-making affecting health and safety -- from the CIA to OMB. Present policies for
secrecy contracts for federal workers, government censorship, overclassification of
information, interference in our nation's libraries and universities, and much more must
be reversed. Practical considerations such as improving information classification
management and accountability of government, especially in an electronic information age,
must be immediately addressed. These and many other specific recommendations are
presented and addressed to presidential candidates and members of Congress.
Lastly, all citizens must continue to utilize the laws and processes available to
become well-informed about government activities and to participate in the democratic
process. U.S. Supreme Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes stated that majorities are
prone to "sweep away all opposition." Governments strongly prefer acquiescence to
dissent, but the test of democracy is not the ability of government to arrogate power to
itself. Secrecy poses many questions for the people of the United States, the most
important of which is whether Americans will acknowledge the demands of maintaining a
democracy.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Chapter 1
Opening Our Eyes
To Secrecy
Government secrecy in the United States requires the special attention of all Americans.
It is a subject we have come to know best in moments of national crisis: official secrecy
too often displaces important constitutional protections and democratic values. When
major decisions and actions are shrouded in secrecy they can profoundly affect the
character and stability of our government as well as the quality of our lives.
Nonetheless, we are both unprepared and surprised when our government is made to
account in the sunlight for questionable activities it has conducted in the dark.
The manner in which Americans experience secrecy reflects how little we know
about its purpose and effect. An American pilot is shot down over the jungles of Central
America -- we discover a clandestine White House operation in Nicaragua. An Iranian
arms dealer becomes angry -- we learn of a secret White House arms deal with Iranian
terrorists. During the Iran-contra hearings which followed, we learned that the director
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) was planning to create a secret government
within the government -- described by Oliver North as an "off-the-shelf, self-sustaining,
stand-alone entity that could perform certain activities on behalf of the United States."1
The truth is that official secrecy is not best, or solely, understood in terms of
misdeeds on a grand scale. Forced to consume large doses of small facts, we learn very
little about the underlying potential in our government for such problems that are likely
to reoccur.
Secrecy is a fact of government. It is a normal practice; however, it can be
applied for both legitimate and wrongful purposes. While it would be unrealistic to deny
the importance of secrecy to the security of the nation, excessive secrecy undercuts our
democracy and may be used to violate the procedures and rights guaranteed by the
Constitution. National security is not very well served when official secrecy is used to
exclude top advisers or to cover up questionable activities, thwart the checks and
balances system of government, avoid accountability and permit waste and abuse, hinder
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
scientific and technological progress, suppress intellectual and academic freedom, and
restrict public debate.
Why should Americans want to know more about government secrecy? In our
nation, citizens are the governors and the governed. It is our responsibility to understand
government, and to the extent that secrecy is a factor or an obstacle in that process, we
need to be informed. Citizens need to know about the authorization and application of
secrecy as well as ways of detecting and preventing its misuse.
In celebrating the Bicentennial of the Constitution in 1987, we are especially
mindful of the ideas important to the earliest champions of American democracy. James
Madison once poignantly declared:
A popular Government without popular information, or the means of
acquiring it, is but a Prologue to a Farce or a Tragedy; or perhaps both.
Knowledge will forever govern ignorance: And a people who mean to be
their own Governors, must arm themselves with the power which
knowledge gives .2
SUPERPOWER SECRECY
In the aftermath of World War II, the atomic bomb became the "winning weapon." It was
the means to becoming a superpower and the greatest object of secrecy in government.
Congress placed military and civilian agencies in charge of its development, while its use
was determined largely by the president.
The superpower presidency was thus inaugurated; nuclear politics permanently
fused together "national security" and the traditional foreign policy and defense authority
of the president. Full realization of this power required new institutions and operational
arrangements. The political climate foreshadowed the Cold War -- secrecy was
preeminent. Not unlike the effect of an atomic blast, the federal landscape was
permanently altered.
The strong executive branch that emerged forty years ago established the modern
institutions and systems of government secrecy in America. These include the protection
of new technology and resources through the Atomic Energy Commission and the
Invention Secrecy Act; executive branch administration of defense and national security
through the Department of Defense, the National Security Council, and the information
classification system; intelligence, counterintelligence, surveillance, and covert operations
through the Central Intelligence Agency and the National Security Agency.3
Americans may be familiar with one or more of these components of secrecy in
our government. Most, however, remain unaware that a bureaucracy of secrecy exists,
wields enormous power and produces decisions without democracy.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
SECRECY UNCHECKED
The secrecy system has expanded rapidly within four decades. There has been little
challenge from Congress, considerable deference by the courts, and almost no awareness
by citizens.
Each of the three co-equal branches of government engages in some type of
secrecy, but not with equal scale, scope, or authority. In our courts, documents can be
sealed but only by judges. Trials are presumptively open to public observation. In
Congress, "executive sessions" are closed to the public, and secret government documents
are received in such meetings -- but only senators and representatives may authorize
these closed gatherings to occur.
In the executive branch, the president authorizes thousands of federal employees
to create millions of secret documents; billions of dollars are put into a "classified"
budget and are approved with little detailed review by the entire Congress or citizens.
The president's Office of Management and Budget, which has control of federal
regulations, studies, and statistics, has reduced access to government information and
ignores federal laws requiring public notice of decision making. The Iran-contra scandal
has been the most recent cause of national crisis for Americans, and we are especially
mindful that secrecy has provided the executive branch with more power and less
accountability than any other branch of government.
The president can secretly pursue policies which the public might not support if
asked. These bypass Congress and the citizenry and bypass our constitutional system.
Conducting a "secret war" in Central America illustrates this problem. Three months after
President Reagan first entered office in 1981, he authorized the CIA to conduct covert
activities in Nicaragua .4 Several months later, the president authorized secret training of
Nicaraguan rebels in Argentina. The training was funded by millions of dollars in U.S.
support .5 Public knowledge of these policies might have prevented the Iran-contra
scandal.
Noted historian Garry Wills, writing in 1987 in honor of the Bicentennial of the
Constitution, wrote that:
The wartime justification of secrecy used to be: the citizens must be
kept in the dark to keep the enemy from knowing what one's country is
doing and taking action on that knowledge. The modern presidency takes
the old means and makes it the end: the citizens are kept in the dark
about what the enemy already knows .6
What purposes justify secrecy? How much information should be kept secret?
How long should it be kept secret? When does secrecy undercut democracy? When does
secrecy violate constitutional guarantees? Americans have the right to ask these
questions, and have a need to know the answers!
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
The value of an informed citizenry cannot be overemphasized in a democratic
society. As Thomas Jefferson reminded us:
I know of no safe depository of the ultimate powers of society, but the
people themselves; and if we think them not enlightened enough to
exercise their control with a wholesome discretion, the remedy is not to
take it away from them, but to inform their discretion by education.'
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
Chapter 2
The President's
"Secret Laws"
A window through which to view the problems of excessive secrecy is the series of
directives termed the president's "secret laws" by Rep. Jack Brooks (D-TX), Chairman of
the House Government Operations Committee. The concept of a "secret law" in America
conflicts with every basic notion of democracy under the Constitution, and yet such laws
exist. They are created by the president as national security directives and have been
issued through the National Security Council (NSC) by each president since President
Truman.' In 1976, a special Senate committee studying presidential power concluded:
In recent years, the National Security Action Memorandums of Presidents
Kennedy and Johnson and the National Security Action Directives of
President Nixon represent a new method for promulgating decisions, in
areas of gravest importance. Such decisions are not specifically required
by law to be published in any register, even in a classified form; none
have prescribed formats or procedures; none of these vital Executive
decisions are revealed to Congress or the public except under irregular,
arbitrary, or accidental circumstances.2
President Reagan has designated these "national security decision directives,"
(NSDDs). He has used NSDDs to authorize an array of activities which included the
Libyan disinformation campaign3 and the use of Presidential Findings by agencies other
than the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), such as the NSC, to conduct covert
operations.4 In 1987, the public learned that in 1983 President Reagan had authorized,
through an NSDD, CIA training and support of secret counter terrorist squads in the
Middle East to be used for "preemptive strikes "5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
As of June 24, 1987, President Reagan had signed and issued at least 280 NSDDs
[Appendix A]. Today, as in years before, Congress remains uninformed about the issuance
and content of these directives. No complete list of them is publicly available because
the National Security Council claims that such a list of the president's NSDDs is
classified. One public requester seeking unclassified information about an NSDD received
the following response from the National Security Council: "The NSC has no publications
program and, most of the information in our files is classified and, therefore unavailable
to the public."6 These directives illustrate some of the problems which exist on a much
wider scale in the government secrecy system.
"NATIONAL SECURITY" CAN BE USED TO HIDE
NATIONAL POLICYMAKING
"National security" can be invoked to shroud many decisions concerning United States
policy and activity, hiding these from congressional and public view. In this regard,
President Reagan defined the NSDDs which he issues through the National Security
Council:
This series shall be used to promulgate Presidential decisions
implementing national policy and objectives in all areas involving
national security.7
Indeed, NSDDs issued by President Reagan involve a variety of national policies
for which responsibility is shared by Congress and which affect various existing statutes.
An examination of approximately 50 NSDDs reveals their application to many national
policies: civil defense, world economic summits, telecommunications, commercial satellites
and space vehicles, resettlement of Indochinese refu8gees in the United States, production
and handling of nuclear materials, and terrorism. Other NSDDs issued by President
Reagan have involved measures affecting millions of the nation's civil servants and have
been viewed as both extreme and unconstitutional approaches to government. These have
included, for example, NSDDs requiring government employees to sign secrecy contracts,
agree to lifetime government censorship of any writing they seek to publish, and to
undergo periodic lie-detector tests .9
NSDDs that involve the United States militarily in other countries are especially
worthy of scrutiny. They demonstrate unaccountable use of presidential power and
potentially damaging consequences for the nation. By secretly engaging our nation in
military activity, the president jeopardizes the essential support of Congress and the
American public. Recent examples include U.S. operations in Nicaragua and the
surrounding region and military preparations for the invasion of Grenada.
In July 1983, President Reagan issued NSDD 100, "Enhanced U.S. Military Activity
and Assistance for the Central American Region." The president achieved three military
goals with NSDD 100: U.S. military activity in Nicaragua, military training in El Salvador,
and placing U.S. forces in the Caribbean three months before the October 1983 invasion
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
of Grenada. In addition, the president required that the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of State, without revealing the secret law or fully disclosing the
administration's plans, persuade Congress and the public to support the administration's
actions. President Reagan stated in NSDD 100:
The increasing threat to U.S. national interests in Central America
requires that we strengthen our diplomatic and security efforts in the
region. The consolidation of a Marxist-Leninist regime in Nicaragua,
committed to the export of violence and totalitarianism, poses a
significant risk to the stability of Central America. Our ability to
support democratic states in the region, and those on the path to
democracy, must be visibly demonstrated by our military forces.
A program of expanded U.S. military activities and exercises both in the
Caribbean Basin and on the Pacific coast of Central America will
commence as soon as possible.
The Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense will prepare a
coordinated legislative, diplomatic, and public affairs strategy that
supports these initiatives.10
The Iran-contra scandal reflects the serious consequences of secretly planned
U.S. military involvement in which Congress and many government foreign policy
professionals are kept ignorant of preparations. More importantly, it reveals the potential
for secret development of U.S. foreign policy -- one perhaps contradicting and
superseding publicly proclaimed policy.
SECRECY PROMOTES FUGITIVE POLICYMAIGNG
The problem worsens where such secret laws are fugitive instruments for policymaking,
mobilizing executive branch personnel and federal resources in ways that conflict with
national policy and may violate our laws.
NSDDs that sustain covert activity abroad by the United States merit especially
careful examination. While covert activity may be necessary in certain situations, it must
be conducted in accordance with procedures for informing Congress and only as necessary
to protect America's vital interests.
The use of NSDDs for covert operations occurred very early in the Reagan
administration, initiating what has been called the president's "secret war" in
Nicaragua." In November 1981, President Reagan, in response to a proposal by CIA
Director William Casey, issued NSDD 17 establishing a $19 million CIA covert operation in
Nicaragua and authorizing the CIA to recruit a force of 500, to be supplemented by at
least 1,000 Nicaraguan rebels being trained in Argentina.12 In 1987, reports indicated that
NSDD 17 directed an estimated $50 million to Argentina to train Nicaraguan rebels.13
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
ALTERED DOCUMENT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
THE PRESIDENT'S "SECRET LAWS" 9
The Iran-contra scandal demonstrated that covert operations are vulnerable to
the abuse of authority, secret development of questionable American foreign policy, and
misrepresentation of United States interests. Foremost among the instruments of secrecy
authorizing these activities was a single NSDD issued by President Reagan. It contravened
the president's own public policy on covert action, embodied in the president's executive
order on covert action which explicitly limited "special activities" to the CIA.14 Nonethe-
less, the National Security Council engaged in secret activities in the Middle East and
Central America, and bypassed the required reporting of covert operations to Congress.
National Security Decision Directive 159, entitled "Covert Action Policy Approval
and Coordination Procedures" was issued by President Reagan on January 18, 1985
[Appendix B]. It has two important components. First, President Reagan authorized
agencies other than the CIA, such as the National Security Council, to undertake covert
operations by virtue of a Presidential Finding. A Finding is a document signed by the
president, required by law, granting intelligence agencies permission to undertake specific
covert operations. Findings are required by law specifically so that covert activities are
accountable through the president. Second, President Reagan exempted a broad range of
covert activities by agencies other than the CIA from being labelled covert action. This
provision functions as an escape clause because it eliminates the need for a covert action
Finding, and eliminates the requirements for reporting to Congress.
Specifically, NSDD 159 was central to White House arms-for-hostages transactions
with Iran, allowing the National Security Council to mount a covert operation and
directing that it be excluded from the law requiring that it be reported to Congress. The
arms sale to Iran was a radical departure from ongoing U.S. policy -- an arms embargo
had been in effect since the Shah was deposed by the Ayatollah Khomeni. In fact,
Secretary of Defense Weinberger and Secretary of State Schultz opposed the secret law.
Secretary Weinberger stopped a June 1985 attempt to issue an NSDD establishing
essentially the same plan. Nonetheless, the "Covert Action Finding Regarding Iran" was
signed by the president, prompting shipment to Iran of 4000 TOW antitank missiles, spare
parts for radar systems purchased by the Shah and other military equipment. The CIA
played an integral role, serving as a conduit for three shipments of more than 2000
missiles in 1986.16 The new arms sale effort violated current prohibitions on such
transactions set in U.S. foreign policy and the Arms Export Act.17
The second application of NSDD 159 for fugitive U.S. policymaking was its use
by Oliver North and others who did not want their covert activity in Central America to
be reported to Congress. North and others interpreted the president's directive to mean
that a Presidential Finding was not required. North's interpretation was based on an
escape clause in NSDD 159, in which President Reagan states:
However, the provision of routine support in the form of personnel,
funds, equipment, supplies, transportation, training, logistics, and
facilities by Government components other than the CIA to support a
covert action shall not in itself be considered a separate covert action
by the supplying agency.18
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Essentially everything the NSC and its "enterprise" did in Nicaragua can be
included in the above list of "routine support." Relying on the above provision in NSDD
159, the result, however, was that the NSC operation was not considered a covert
operation, Congress was uninformed, and the NSC's secret war in Nicaragua continued. It
was only at a later date that a veteran CIA official, accustomed to the use and intent of
Presidential Findings for accountability of covert operations, required that one be
obtained from President Reagan. During the Iran-contra hearings in the summer of 1987,
former National Security Advisor John Poindexter claimed that he destroyed the only
copy of the Finding ultimately obtained to authorize NSC operations in Central America.
The NSC, however, continued to insist that it was not accountable. On July 13, 1987, the
following exchange occurred between U.S. Senator George Mitchell (D-ME) and Oliver
North:
Senator Mitchell. Since the law requires that before any covert action
could be conducted, the President must specifically authorize it, since
you've testified that you conducted a covert operation, and since you've
further testified that the President neither designated the National
Security Council to conduct covert operations nor did he make a Finding
authorizing this covert operation, what was the legal basis for your
activities with respect to this covert operation?
Oliver North: The National Security Council staff is not included within
the constraints that are depicted in either the executive order [on
covert operations] or the NSDD [159] as an intelligence agency. And
thus, in neither case does the law provide that the president had to do
what you are saying he had to do.18
SECRECY DEFEATS THE CHECKS AND BALANCES SYSTEM
The secret laws reflect the extent to which the president and the executive branch
exercise unreviewable authority and escape accountability. Regardless of the relationship
of such directives to current policy, Congress has virtually no knowledge of their
issuance; even in the case of pertinent national security matters, the appropriate
committees of Congress are not informed. Even specific requests from Congress, seeking
to fulfill its intelligence oversi ht responsibilities under the law, have been ignored by
current and past administrations.9
These points were underscored at a 1987 hearing of the House Government
Operations Subcommittee. The chairman of the Oversight and Evaluation Subcommittee of
the House Select Committee on Intelligence, Congressman Anthony Beilenson (D-CA):
What I have to say about NSDDs, as they are called, will be brief. It is
based on an incomplete understanding of this form of Presidential
decision. That is because the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
does not receive copies of NSDDs.20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
SECRECY DEFEATS ACCOUNTABILITY
The lack of congressional access to NSDDs creates special problems of accountability.
Even when these laws are discovered and Congress, for example, calls for partial or
complete revocation, the executive branch continues, undetected, to implement its original
plans.
The problem is put in perspective by the more conventional system of
presidential proclamations and executive orders. These are issued according to a
numerical accounting system and by law must be published in the Federal Register and
reproduced in the Code of Federal Regulations 2' Furthermore, while confidential or
classified executive orders have been issued and not published, they are accounted for in
the numbering system. Congress, particularly its intelligence committees, has been granted
access to these records. This system is particularly useful to ensure that executive orders
that have been rescinded are in fact "off the books." 22
Two recent examples illustrate that the same is not true with the NSDDs. Even
when the president has promised to rescind a particular NSDD program, there is no way
to monitor such action.
National Security Decision Directive 84. NSDD 84, "Safeguarding National Security
Information," was issued by President Reagan in 1983 as a major policy initiative of the
administration to stop unlawful disclosures of classified information by government
employees. Its requirements include a secrecy contract for certain government employees,
possibly every Cabinet official, pledging lifetime government censorship of all writings.
The directive was publicly revealed as a Department of Justice memorandum. U.N.
Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick refused to sign her lifetime censorship contract, which was
presented to her by the State Department as she prepared to leave her U.N. post.23
Congress, government employees, and the public reacted negatively to the plan.
On February 15, 1984, President Reagan agreed to suspend the lifetime
censorship provision of NSDD 84 -- but the practice in fact widened. Unknown to
Congress, the Reagan administration had already been using a censorship contract
developed by the CIA 24 NSDD 84 had merely revised this contract and extended its
application throughout the government.
President Reagan interpreted suspension of the censorship portion of NSDD 84 in
the narrowest possible terms: refrain from using the revised censorship contract. The
president then continued a widespread program of censorship agreements using the
original CIA contract. In September 1986, the General Accounting Office revealed several
startling statistics resulting from a study that did not even include the Central
Intelligence Agency or the National Security Agency: 11 agencies alone reported 290,000
government workers had been required to sign the lifetime censorship contract because of
access to intelligence information, and the policy continued in numerous agencies ranging
from the Agency for International Development to the Securities and Exchange
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Commission.25 The practice has also been extended to hundreds of government
contractors and university research scientists who have received federal grants. Thus,
executive branch practice has been a far cry from rescinding the censorship program.
Moreover, Congress could not hold the president to his word: NSDD 84 remains
effectively intact today.
National Security Decision Directive 145. NSDD 145, "National Policy on
Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems Security," was issued by
President Reagan in 1984 to govern the security of telecommunications and computerized
information systems. It set unprecedented restrictions on access to computerized
information that is not classified and is held not only by the federal government but also
by private companies, libraries, and universities. Furthermore, the president gave the
enforcement authority for the new policy to a highly secretive military entity -- the
National Security Agency.
Public awareness of this directive, a very technical subject area, occurred almost
by accident: the resignation of former White House National Security Advisor John
Poindexter for his role in the Iran-contra scandal. Although the directive was known to
a small number of exceptionally well-informed citizens, public awareness of NSDD 145
heightened during the investigation of Poindexter's final days at the National Security
Council. Among the orders and directives that drew attention was a Poindexter
memorandum that was the Reagan administration's first attempt to implement NSDD
145.26
Congress, librarians, scientists, information companies, and concerned citizens
reacted quickly and demanded withdrawal of the Poindexter memorandum. The reasons for
concern were obvious: awesome reach beyond the government, its military authority, and
questionable constitutionality. Congress also responded with legislation to address the
legitimate needs for computer security, creating more reasonable controls and supplanting
NSDD 145.27
In this case, the administration was eager to disassociate itself from Poindexter
and withdrew the implementing memorandum on March 17, 1987. While NSDD 145 appears
to be dormant, strong evidence exists that another implementing memorandum will be
produced.28
National policymaking, fugitive policy instruments, and the lack of accountability
for action authorized by the president are troubling qualities of National Security
Decision Directives and presidential power. By using the National Security Council to
create unreviewed policies, the president has ignored our constitutional system of
separation of powers and checks and balances. However, the use of such directives and
the propensity for excessive secrecy is an institutional problem. It is not unique to the
Iran-contra affair or the Reagan administration, and it is not likely to disappear in 1988.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
NATIONAL
SECURITY
Chapter 3
"National Security":
Password for
Secrecy
"National security" is a policy term that is frequently invoked, but rarely reduced to a
set of discernible principles. The power of national security cannot be denied. However,
it is a formidable justification to be overcome by citizens who demand greater
government accountability and strive to engage in informed public debate.
National security is a high-stakes concept when applied and produces losses equal
in proportion to its accomplishments. In several misdirected White House policies,
Americans have observed how often secrecy -- justified by "national security" -- isolates
executive action from public scrutiny and from the exercise of good judgment.
At his sentencing for perjury, former Nixon aide Egil Krogh, chief of the White
House "plumbers" unit during Watergate, expressed these thoughts about burglarizing the
office of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist:
I see now ... the effect that the term "national security" had on my
judgment. The very words served to block critical analysis. It seemed at
least presumptuous if not unpatriotic to inquire into just what the
significance of national security was ... The discrediting of Dr. Ellsberg,
which today strikes me as repulsive and an inconceivable national
security goal, at the time would have appeared a means to diminish any
influence he might have had in mobilizing opposition to the course of
ending the Vietnam War that had been set by the President. Freedom of
the President to pursue his planned course was the ultimate national
security objective.1
A national journalist commented in 1987 that President Reagan has "cheapened
the concept of national security" because an obsession with information security makes
the president unable to distinguish between vital secrets and other information.2 If
everything is made secret in the name of national security, the meaning and integrity of
the concept is endangered.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
We have seen this to be true in the use of National Security Decision Directives.
Overall, the list of areas in which the current administration has aggressively used
national security to justify excessive secrecy is regrettably a long one:
' Information classification and reclassification.
' Unprecedented classified defense and intelligence spending.
' Secrecy contracts and lifetime censorship of writings of some government
employees.
' Controls on the press.
' Toughening of information access laws.
s Restriction of access to non-government data banks.
* Reducing of publication and dissemination of government information.
' Restricting of scientific and academic freedom.
' Ideological censorship of foreign visitors.
CLASSIFYING INFORMATION
Information classification is most familiar to Americans as the system used to stamp
government information, documents, and records "Top Secret," "Secret," or "Confidential."
It originated in the 1800s with our nation's military in order to safeguard such
information as weapon designs, the layouts of installations, and the construction of ships.
Since World War II, it has grown steadily as a instrument of the president and the
executive branch for controlling information throughout the federal government. It has
become the greatest means of achieving government secrecy in America.
Information classification is technically an internal government system, created
by executive order of the president, restricting access to information to federal
employees with a "need to know." The practice and the consequences, however, are much
broader.
It includes layers of classification that some say are above "Top Secret," but
which the government says are merely special clearances, not classifications. The
classification system governs the length of time information remains secret and the
extent to which persons within the government and the public have access.
Statutes establishing parallel restrictions on information include the Atomic
Energy Act, the National Security Act, and the Invention Secrecy Act. The National
Security Act, for example, requires the Director of Central Intelligence to "protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure." It is the presidential
security classification system, however, that is used to actually implement these statutory
secrecy requirements.
The staggering power of the classification system results from its basis in
presidential authority and the scope of its widespread use throughout the executive
branch and the federal government. Since 1981, for example, an average of 15 million
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
documents have been classified annually by at least 7000 government officials. This power
is significantly reinforced by the inertia of Congress and the deference of the courts.
Presidential authority for the creation and operation of the classification system began
with a single defense statute but now rests more broadly on Article II of the
Constitution. In 1940, President Franklin Roosevelt issued the first executive order
setting classification policy. Reflecting earlier classification arrangements, it was a purely
military policy, and Roosevelt claimed authority under a defense installations law.
Truman followed suit in 1950.4
By 1951, the superpower presidency was emerging. President Truman looked to
broader authority for classifying information -- "the authority vested in me by the
Constitution and statutes, and as President of the United States."5 He cancelled all prior
orders including his own and extended classification well beyond traditional defense
matters to agencies throughout the federal government.
Considered by many to be the high-water mark of classification breadth, Truman
authorized almost every agency in the federal government to classify information.
Following the precedents of authority and practice, almost every successive president
since Truman has issued his own executive order on information classification.6 These too
have transcended traditional military matters, extending into the realms of national
security, defense, foreign policy, and law enforcement. They have for the most part,
however, successively limited the criteria and discretionary power of the Truman order.
From President Eisenhower through President Carter, however, new information
classification orders reflected a trend toward limited classification and a system of
integrity. Policies achieving these goals have included:
* Narrowing the criteria for classification.
* Reducing discretionary authority of government personnel for classification.
s Reducing the volume of classification.
s Creating schedules for systematic declassification.
In the Pentagon Papers case, the Supreme Court had to determine whether
President Nixon's control over information extended to stopping publication of classified
documents in the New York Times. Justice Potter Stewart, in a concurring opinion,
reminded Americans that:
When everything is classified, then nothing is classified, and the system
becomes one to be disregarded by the cynical or the careless, and to be
manipulated by those intent on self-protection or self-promotion. I
should suppose, in short, that the hallmark of a truly effective internal
security system would be the maximum possible disclosure, recognizing
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
that secrecy can best be preserved only when credibility is truly
maintained.?
No existing classification policy has ever been perceived as a perfect one, especially by
succeeding administrations. Even reformers who advanced the trend towards a policy more
rational in scope and application may be faulted in some ways. However, the Reagan
policy is widely viewed as reversing a desirable trend away from overclassification. It has
marked a return to a classification policy of indefinite scope, unreviewable authority, and
decreased accountability in the executive branch.
President Reagan has increased the total volume of classification as much as 10%
annually, a fact attributable to the president's classification policy and his enormous
military build-up. Reversing a thirty-year trend, President Reagan has increased the
criteria for classification; widened the discretionary authority of government personnel to
classify information; de-emphasized declassification; and in an unprecedented action has
authorized the government to reclassify documents previously released to the public.
Increasing classification. Statistics are the beginning of the story. Classification
during the Reagan administration has increased steadily on an annual basis .8 As stated by
Congressman Glenn English (D-OK), Chairman of the House Government Information
Subcommittee, "The history of classification policy for thirty years has been a history of
continual circumscription of classification authority. This trend of narrowing classification
authority was not broken until the promulgation of E.O. 12356 by President Ronald
Reagan in 1982."9
Classified Government Documents
1979.1985
25
24
c
E ^
U) U c
23
2
C)-?
E
;
!
O
18
E
17
Z
16
15
14
1981 1982
Year
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Expanding classification criteria. Massive military build-up during the Reagan
administration has been a major factor in the significant increases in classification, but
another contributing factor has been the president's expansion of the criteria for
classification. When President Reagan entered office, the prevailing classification policy
had addressed the tendency toward overclassification, in part, by identifying specific
categories of information subject to classification. Earlier orders simply based
classification on the prospective damage that might result from disclosure. President
Reagan added three new categories and modified an existing one.
Widening discretionary authority for classification. President Reagan also widened
the discretionary authority for classification. Under the executive order issued by
President Carter, the policy had been -- when in doubt, don't classify.10 The Reagan
order requires that when in doubt, do classify! 11 The emphasis on classification has
allowed low-level officials to continually increase the volume of classified information.
Although subject to higher review, the volume of documents becomes unmanageable,
review is delayed, and overclassification results.
De-emphasizing declassification. President Reagan also de-emphasized
declassification, reversing a long-standing presidential policy. Since President Kennedy,
each successive administration had maintained a system and schedule for automatically
downgrading and declassifying information.12 Congressional hearings held prior to the
issuance of the Reagan order revealed the particular importance of a declassification
system, according to one scholar, to conducting reliable historical research:
To understand the relationships between the individuals, institutions, and
ideas which encompass political, diplomatic or military history, the
historian needs not one document or even 10 documents, but an array of
information from a broad spectrum of sources. Therefore, the ideal
declassification process for historical research is the very kind of
orderly declassification which this draft Executive Order will now
eliminate.13
Despite these and other concerns, President Reagan eliminated existing
declassification schedules, as well as the policy of systematic declassification and
downgrading of information within federal agencies. In its place, the Reagan order limits
"systematic" review to such departments as the National Archives, which has little
control over information of timely importance in areas such as health, safety, or the
environment.14 In addition, requirements for "mandatory review" leading to
declassification are conditioned upon outside requests for information. Lastly, the
mandatory review section exempts from declassification a wide range of "[i]nformation
originated by a President, the White House Staff, by committees, commissions, or boards
appointed by the President, or others specifically providing advice and counsel to a
President or action on behalf of a President."15 Documents related to the mandate and
work of the Tower Commission, created by President Reagan to probe the Iran-contra
affair, are within this category.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Authorizing reclassification. President Reagan is the first president to authorize
the reclassification of previously released information. Earlier orders included strict
prohibitions against reclassification.16 The Reagan order permits reclassification of
information that has been declassified and released to the public if it is determined in
writing that (1) the information requires protection in the interest of national security
and (2) the information "may reasonably be recovered."17 The order also places
reclassification control within the purview of the Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO), which oversees implementation of the classification order on behalf of the
executive branch. However, the ISOO has considered the reclassification statistics too low
to report.
Reclassification, however, is not merely a matter of degree or statistical
significance. It reflects the power of the government, as well as the tension between
national security and the First Amendment. The government argues that retrieval
authority must exist where declassification mistakes have been made or, for example,
where sudden shifts in international events may make information sensitive again. First
Amendment specialists argue that the government has been given too much power to
"plug history," restrict public debate, and arbitrarily recall documents to official secrecy
status even though many persons outside of government may have already seen them.
In 1981, the Reagan administration was already "rattling the saber" of
reclassification before its new executive order became final. At that point, the Carter
order, which expressly prohibited reclassification, was still in effect. Substituting power
for law, the Justice Department demanded the return of declassified copies of documents
it had released more than two years earlier to James Bamford, author of the first
thorough profile of the highly secret National Security Agency.18 Pursuant to a Freedom
of Information Act request, the Criminal Division of the Justice Department had supplied
Bamford with a summary about whether the NSA or the CIA had violated criminal
statutes in conducting certain types of electronic surveillance.
The Justice Department could not yet legally reclassify the document and instead
told Bamford that "the declassifier lacked the requisite authority under the Executive
Order to effect the 'declassification.'"19 When Bamford cited the Carter executive order,
prohibiting reclassification, as grounds for denying the Justice Department's
reclassification demands, he was threatened with legal action, as well as a variety of
other threats, if the information was ever published 20 Subsequently, however, the
government vacated its retrieval effort but did secure materials at a private research
center where Bamford had conducted research.
In another case, the CIA attempted to reclassify material from a book written by
former employee Ralph McGehee, a 25 year veteran of the agency. The information had
appeared in other publications and had been subject to rigorous CIA review and
subsequent approval in an earlier draft manuscript in 1980. The work was resubmitted
because the author was rewriting and revising it for an interested publisher. The
information included the identity of a publicly known CIA training facility in Virginia,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
the size and training received by the author's CIA training class in the 1950s, and
personnel procedures from that period.21
Later in 1981, the National Archives, in conjunction with the Department of the
Air Force, attempted to retrieve declassified copies of Air Force records released to a
researcher writing a book on U.S.-Israeli relations. Its approach was to request a "loan-
back" of 47 pages for purposes of reproduction and record keeping. A second letter
assured the researcher that the materials would be returned immediately, and he returned
the documents. A month later, the National Archives claimed that declassification
mistakes had been made, and proceeded to withhold 11 pages and delete liberally from 7
pages of the materials. The researcher threatened legal action against the Archives and,
in the controversy that followed, the Archives admitted that it had misled the researcher.
The materials were returned to him in their entirety.22
Since the Reagan order became effective in 1982, reclassification has been
successfully enforced in the courts in the only court case to arise thus far. The National
Security Agency pursued reclassification of material held in the library of a private
educational institution. The library houses the private papers of several former federal
officials once prominently involved in national defense. The NSA was specifically
interested in a collection of papers on the subject of cryptology, or secret codes,
donated by a former NSA employee who was a leading authority on the subject. The NSA
had not only reviewed the documents for release, but also "provided for secure shipment
of the collection to safeguard the materials and facilitate the in transit insurance
arrangements."23 Some of the materials had been used by author James Bamford in his
book The Puzzle Palace about the NSA. Unaccustomed to public attention and seeking
greater control of cryptographic information, NSA personnel visited the library and
demanded removal of 33 key documents from public availability.
The NSA was challenged in court by a distinguished group of educational
organizations led by the American Library Association, but the court deferred entirely to
the NSA. Experts in the field believe that the court actually increased the government's
reclassification power -- simply requiring it to assert a national security interest in a set
of documents. However, the executive order contains a two-part standard for proper
reclassification. In addition to the existence of a national security interest, the
"information," and not merely particular documents, must be reasonably recoverable. 4
The court did not address this issue, and since the information appeared in thousands of
copies of The Puzzle Palace, its reasonable recovery was unlikely.
Reclassification is also believed to exist in another situation, when the government
classifies documents and records that had been declassified or scheduled for
declassification but not publicly released. The Information Security Oversight Office does
not believe that this is reclassification.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
20 GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY
This view is not shared by others, including Congressman Glenn English (D-OK),
Chairman of the House Government Information Subcommittee. Congressman English
illustrates his point by citing a General Accounting Office (GAO) report he used in
investigating drug smuggling. The GAO report had the following history: it was published
in 1975, classified at the request of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and
given an automatic declassification date of May 30, 1980. In 1982, however, after
President Reagan created reclassification authority, "a request for a copy of the GA.O.
report was made under the Freedom of Information Act. At the time of the request,
D.E.A. reclassified the report and notified GA.O. in November 1982. GA.O., in turn,
notified all recipients that the report was reclassified."25
Whether or not this is truly "reclassification" as specifically authorized by
President Reagan, its frequent occurrence is made likely by two other provisions of the
Reagan order: (1) elimination of a system for automatic downgrading and declassification
and (2) increased authority for lower-level officials to classify documents after a FOIA
request is received 26 Since the Information Security Oversight Office does not consider
this to be reclassification, the extent of such activity has never been evaluated.
Agency officials too often forget that government can best serve the public interest by
keeping the people's trust and dispelling distrust by supplying the most current
information available. These goals are undercut by unjustifiably increasing the volume of
classified information and the duration of its protection.
Overclassification is an inherent problem in the executive branch. On the one
hand, management of government information is a massive task. On the other hand,
essentially all authority to classify or declassify rests with the same officials. The
responsibilities to both manage and control disclosure become confused, and the executive
branch often tries to protect its own territory, place itself above accountability, and
control information for political or other self-serving reasons.
Overclassification has prevailed regardless of the reforms a president institutes
to decrease unnecessary classification. President Carter, for example, expressly required:
? Balancing the public's interest in access to information against the need to
classify for national security reasons;27
28
* Placing equal emphasis upon classification and declassification.
Nonetheless, a 1979 study by the General Accounting Office29 reported the
prevalence of overclassification at the largest classifying agency, the Department of
Defense. GAO reported that:
* Information not related to national security was classified.
* Information was classified inconsistently.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
? Information that lost some of its sensitivity was not downgraded.
? When there was a doubt about the level of classification, a higher level of
classification was assigned.
Action by the Reagan administration shows the unobstructed reach of the
executive branch, and the interagency rivalries involved in controlling information. On
April 29, 1986, senior administration officials, including the Director of the Arms Control
and Disarmament Agency and an assistant secretary of defense, testified in a public
Senate hearing about a hotly debated question: Are the Soviets violating two treaties
that limit the size of underground nuclear explosions?
The Reagan administration insisted that the Soviets were not "likely" in
compliance. The Pentagon supported the administration's view, but the government's Arms
Control Agency did not. Leading government laboratories found strong evidence that the
Soviets were in compliance. The CIA determined that its previous estimates of Soviet
nuclear tests were too high30
Shortly after the Senate hearings, the Pentagon contacted the Senate Armed
Services Committee and indicated that portions of the public testimony, as well as
certain questions by Senators, were classified. The Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, however, had sent the Senate committee a letter stating that no deletions were
necessary on security grounds. When the Senate report was published in 1987, the
challenged questions and answers were deleted. In addition, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, which held hearings on the same subject, also bowed to Pentagon requests to
modify the substance of testimony of senior military officials 31
Over the years, many recommendations to reduce overclassification and place
controls on unchecked power have traveled through Congress and the executive branch.
Reforms have been sought through new executive orders on classification 32 Particular
concern has been raised over the fact that increased espionage may result from the
unmanageable amounts of information that is classified 33
The urgency to address the overclassification problem remains, and the findings
bear repeating. Classifying too much information:
' Causes excessive government secrecy.
' Obstructs public disclosure of government information and knowledge of
government activity.
' Creates an unmanageable volume of information for effective security controls,
efficient cost-management, and adequate declassification.
' Adversely effects decision-making by decreasing access to information within and
between federal agencies.
' Jeopardizes the protection of information that truly warrants classification.
' Breeds mistrust between Congress and the administration, with the likelihood
that claims of executive privilege will lead to a constitutional clash.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
ABOVE TOP SECRET?
Executive Orders since the one issued by President Eisenhower in 1953 have allowed only
three classification levels: "Top Secret," "Secret," and "Confidential." However, secret
classifications above "Top Secret" have also been thought to exist. Senior government
officials have, over time, given credence to this belief.
In 1968, for example, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was investigating
the 1964 alleged North Vietnamese attack on U.S. ships known as the Tonkin Gulf
incident. Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara was testifying but declined to answer a
question about radio intercepts.. His answer would have revealed that U.S. intelligence
sources knew that North Vietnamese patrol boats were about to attack the U.S.S. Turner
Joy. McNamara explained that he could not respond to the question because, "Clearance
is above Top Secret for the particular information involved in this situation." One
bewildered Senator then asked, "I thought Top Secret was Top Secret?"34
In the years since, the debate over what are today termed "special access
programs" has heightened significantly. These terms refer to specialized codes and
markings within the classification system. The government explains these as clearance and
routing mechanisms for sending information rather than classification of information. At
least since President Nixon, executive orders on classification have recognized the right
to create "special departmental arrangements."35 President Reagan's executive order
specifically recognizes "Special Access Programs" as part of the classification system 36
In earlier days, the government's use of special markings may have been better managed
and more precise. For example, the State Department may have placed routing marks on
an overseas cable sent to organizations such as NATO or to a particular allied nation.
Even today, the system includes many specialized arrangements which range from simple
routing marks to narrowly defined clearance codes for technical information. For
example, a recent advertisement in the Washington Post for computer operators listed
37
clearances required for applicants: "TOP SECRET SI/TK-POLY-SCI a plus!"
Today a multiplicity of code words are operative for an extensive number of
special access programs and projects involving the "compartmentalization" of classified
information. These are used extensively for national security and defense purposes,
particularly for weapons systems research and development as well as for intelligence
activities and covert operations. Defense analysts, members of Congress, and others have
stated with increasing frequency that such secret classifications lead to abuses. Secret
classifications defy oversight and accountability, permit waste and fraud, and allow for
cover-up of unlawful activity. Evidence of these abuses has been discovered in projects
ranging from defense spending38 to ille al government programs helping Nazi war
criminals immigrate to the United States. More recently, special access arrangements
were used for many communications related to the Iran-contra scandal.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
There remains, however, great uncertainty as to the number and uses of the special
access programs in the U.S. government. President Reagan has required all agency heads
to "establish and maintain a system of accounting for special access programs." The
president also grants "nondelegable access to all such accountings" to the director of the
oversight office for information classification 40 However, this authority apparently has
never been exercised, and no information has appeared about special access programs in
the six annual reports prepared for President Reagan by the Information Security
Oversight Office.
Part of the problem is the breadth of institutional secrecy under President
Reagan. Defense development and intelligence activities are the two major areas using
special access programs. The Reagan order grants sole and complete authority for
intelligence special access programs to the Director of Central Intelligence. As a result,
in order for overseers to investigate those programs, the CIA Director must grant
permission, and the auditors must survive the CIA's lengthy clearance process.
The experience of the General Accounting Office (GAO) illustrates the problems
associated with ensuring accountability. In 1987, the director of GAO's national security
and international affairs division stated that he had about 12 auditors cleared for special
access programs. In 1986, GAO had only "a small handful, two or three, maybe, and that
was up from zero before that."41
Demands for more information about special access programs are met with
arguments that too many auditors will make the information less secure. However, the
estimated volume and evidence of abuse of such secret classifications has drawn attention
to the subject. In 1987, a journalist investigating the subject of classified defense
spending stated that he believed that at least 10,000 special access programs existed.42 In
1986, GAO conducted a study of the implementation of a presidential directive requiring
lifetime censorship contracts for government employees whose work involves certain
special access programs. GAO learned that 21 agencies, led by the departments of
Defense, State, and Justice, maintained special access programs, and the report did not
even include the CIA or the National Security Agency.43 Reflecting on the widespread
use of special access programs, GAO also reported that hundreds of thousands of
government employees must sign secrecy contracts because their work involves special
access programs.44
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
CLASSIFIED SPENDING: TIE 'BLACK BUDGET'
The widest application of special access programs, and a subject of much current scrutiny
and controversy relates to secret or classified defense spending. Popularly called the
"black budget," classified defense spending in the Reagan administration has increased
from $5 billion in 1981, to at least $22 billion for 1988.45 One investigator who
broadened cost factors to include classified sections of military operations and personnel
budgets (e.g. the National Security Agency employs an estimated 50,000-60,000 employees,
but these figures and the NSA budget are classified) produced a higher figure of $35
billion.46 The Stealth bomber, estimated to be the Pentagon's costliest weapon system in
history, is one of the "black budget" items. The Pentagon's 1988 "black budget" proposed
a list of 200 items 47
Addressing this issue, Senator Paul Simon (D-IL) pointed out: "When we realize
that the 'black budget' for fiscal year 1988 equals one-third of the deficit reduction
target we need to reach this year, then I hope we can also agree that change must occur
in this critical area.?48
Classified spending is proposed by the Department of Defense in two categories:
(1) project labels are given, but the costs are not revealed, and (2) projects are listed in
code names, but the costs are revealed. The first situation is believed to account for $11
billion, one-half of the 1988 "black budget."49 Examples include the Air Force's Advanced
Cruise Missile (ACM) and the Army's "Project Sierra." Illustrative of the second category
are three Air Force listings that amount to $8.2 billion: "Special Programs," "Special
Update Programs," and "Selected Activities." Another Air Force entry includes an anti-
radiation missile, labeled "Tacit Rainbow," which conducts a search-and-destroy mission
while airborne.50
The problems of accountability and oversight of the "black budget" result from a
double-punch of classified spending and special access programs. For classified spending,
Congress permits certain agencies to use "certificates" instead of conventional vouchers
that show precisely how agencies spend their funds. As a result, the General Accounting
Office cannot perform a full-scale audit even though billions of dollars are spent 51
In addition, the courts have been very protective of agencies such as the CIA
that operate in almost total secrecy. Constitutional challenges have been waged to gain
access to CIA classified finances for violating Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution
which requires that a "regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures
of all public Money shall be published from time to time." Rejecting this argument, the
Supreme Court in 1973 determined that citizens lack judicial standing to challenge
classified spending, reasoning that relief is available through the electoral process.52 In
1977, a federal court determined that a single congressman also lacked standing to
determine the use of public funds for illegal CIA activities.53
Improving accountability and oversight is an important responsibility of Congress.
The "black budget" and the breadth of attendant special access programs has never been
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
as extensive as it is today, but Congress has not ventured very far toward reforms in
these matters in past years. Today, however, an effort is beginning, and the evidence of
a need for more scrutiny includes considerations of inefficiency, waste, and fraud.
The defense industry is famous for delays and cost overruns, and observers fear
that these problems run rampant in the "black budget" where virtually no checks and
balances operate. One staunch defender of the Reagan military build-up, Senator Dan
Quayle (R-IN) has argued unconvincingly that because of less oversight, "black programs
are the most efficient programs we probably have "54 However, former Deputy Defense
Secretary David Packard, the chairman of the president's Blue Ribbon Commission on
Defense Management, stated the reverse: "The interesting thing we found is that not all
of those programs are well managed, either. So our investigation didn't quite support the
theory that if you classify a program, it's automatically managed better."55
Fraud is also a serious problem. In 1986, there were three criminal convictions
involving research and development for the supersecret Stealth bomber. In one case, an
engineer working for Northrup Corporation on the Stealth project was convicted of
defrauding the contractor of $600,000. A congressional investigative subcommittee has
predicted that it will uncover kickbacks involving "the theft of several millions of dollars
over the course of four or five years."56
National security is not well served by overclassification of information, the lack of
accountability of government officials or misuse of taxpayers dollars. Nonetheless, as a
password for secrecy, national security has been used by the executive branch to
perpetuate such harmful practices in our government. Congressional and public support
are essential requirements for major U.S. policy and action, yet today Congress remains
on the periphery, and citizens are given the lowest priority of those who "need to
know." In the executive branch, the president is responsible, yet all too often remains
unaccountable for excessive secrecy. The abuse of the concept of "national security" to
justify anything the government wants to keep secret has fostered a bureaucracy of
secrecy that threatens to isolate the government from the governed.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
2. In accordance with Executive Order 12333, the
Central Intelligence Agency shall
conduct covert
When the provision of
essential to the conduct of a covert ac, ion
that support
S E C R E T
Chapter 4
Government
Employees:
Sworn To Secrecy
Since entering office in 1981, President Reagan has redefined federal information policy
in terms of information security. In addition to issuing a restrictive information
classification policy, a more visible and corollary policy has been to control the
communications of government employees to the outside world. This has included major
policy initiatives imposing secrecy agreements, lifetime prepublication review, controls on
press contacts, and polygraph testing of employees. Crucial to the president's
administrative regimen of controls has been the approval of an increasingly more
conservative judiciary. In recent years, the constitutionality of executive branch measures
has been upheld by the courts, further encouraging the expansion of government controls.
EXECUTIVE BRANCH CONTROLS
Information security is a legitimate concern in the management of vital secrets. It is an
especially compelling issue at a time when information classification has been increasing
significantly. It is, however, particularly discouraging to learn that more information is
being locked up and more communication controls are being imposed on people
experienced in government.
Two of the strongest Reagan measures to control communication have been
issued as National Security Decision Directives (NSDDs). These are NSDD 84,
"Safeguarding National Security Information," issued on March 11, 1983, and NSDD 196,
"Counterintelligence/Countermeasure Implementation Task Force," issued November 5,
1985. Federal workers at all levels of government, including Cabinet officers, are affected
by these orders.
National Security Decision Directive 84, designed to protect national security
information, was released by the Justice Department shortly after it was signed by
President Reagan.' In fact, NSDD 84 had been developed by an interagency team
convened by Attorney General William French Smith at the request of the president's
Assistant for National Security Affairs, William P. Clark. The group consisted of leading
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
officials and legal authorities at the departments of Justice, Defense, the Treasury, and
Energy as well as the Central Intelligence Agency.2
NSDD 84 imposed four new requirements:
(1) All federal employees with access to classified information must sign a
nondisclosure agreement, pledging never to disclose classified information to
which they had access.
(2) Federal employees whose work involves intelligence-related special access
programs, "Sensitive Compartmented Information" (SCI), must sign a contract
pledging lifetime prepublication review.
(3) Federal agencies shall set rules for media contacts with agency personnel.
(4) Federal agencies may require lie detector tests in investigations of unauthorized
disclosures of information.
The prepublication review provision attracted public attention when departing
U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick refused to sign it. She was presented with the
secrecy contract by State Department security officials. Kirkpatrick defended her refusal
to sign the agreement, saying "it binds you not to write, not even from unclassified
material that may have come to you in the course of your work in the State Department.
It is an extraordinary document. You could never write after signing it."3
NSDD 196, also an unpublished directive, was issued by President Reagan in 1985.
It sought to reduce espionage by requiring periodic lie detector tests of government
employees and contractors. Those affected by NSDD 196 include agency employees, as
well as cabinet officials whose work involves special access programs, particularly the
Sensitive Compartmented Information access programs. It was Secretary of State George
Shultz who first drew public attention to this order when he reacted by stating, "the
minute in this government I am told that I am not trusted is the day that I leave."4
The following discussion focuses upon the nature and scope of secrecy
agreements concerning nondisclosure of information and lifetime prepublication review.
NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENTS
The nondisclosure agreements required by NSDD 84 demonstrate the unlimited breadth
and power of government controls on communication in our society. The "Classified
Information Nondisclosure Agreements (Standard Forms 189 and 189A)" [Appendix Cj apply
to 3.5 to 4 million government employees and contractor employees whose work involves
access to classified or "classifiable" information.5 When this requirement was first set,
almost one-half the federal work force was estimated to have security clearances.6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
0987 E.R$+r-O
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
The 1986 annual report to the president by the Information Security Oversight
Office reported that 69 federal agencies have implemented the directive .7 The Air Force,
for example, stated that 765,000 Air Force military and civilian officials had signed the
nondisclosure agreement.8 The number of Pentagon employees who have signed the
agreement is placed at 1.5 million .9 Another means of visualizing the application of the
agreement is simply by calculating the number of federal employees and contractors with
clearances for classified information. In 1986, the GAO determined from a study of 41
agencies, excluding the CIA and the National Security Agency, that "about 2.2 million
federal and 1.4 million contract employees held security clearances at the end of 1985."10
The consequences of violating the terms of the nondisclosure pledge are indeed
strong, even though its national security purpose is obvious enough to clearly emphasize
compliance. However, the government states in the nondisclosure agreement and in
related guidelinesil that its enforcement powers include:
* Injunctive relief to prevent disclosure.
s Penalties for security violations and revocation of security clearance.
? Administrative sanctions (including job transfer and firing), financial penalties,
and "initiation of criminal prosecution against an individual, if approved by the
Department of Justice."
In 1987, members of Congress called upon President Reagan to withdraw the
nondisclosure agreement, citing serious constitutional problems with the directive.12 First
Amendment violations may result because the agreements restrain free speech, including
an impermissible burden on the right to petition the government. Similarly, it is believed
that the agreements conflict with so-called "whistle-blower" laws, which give government
employees the right to cite "mismanagement, a gross waste of funds, an abuse of
authority, ... a substantial and specific danger to public health or safety," or illegality.13
Lastly, there is strong concern about the indefinite standard of "classifiable information"
which gives the government great control, especially considering the president's exclusive
authority to set the boundaries of classified information, to limit declassification, and to
engage in reclassification of information.
Initial progress has been made to reduce the scope, ambiguity, and repercussions
of the nondisclosure agreements. In August 1987, the Information Security Oversight
Office informed the Air Force that its practice of requiring all employees to sign
nondisclosure pledges, including at least 150,000 with no access to secrets, was not the
intent of the administration.14 In addition, the administration has instructed agencies--
temporarily -- not to withdraw the security clearances of employees who refuse to sign
the nondisclosure agreements.15 Legal action challenging the constitutionality of the
mandatory secrecy agreements has been taken by the National Federation of Federal
Employees which represents an estimated 150,000 federal workers and the American
Federation of Government Employees which represents approximately 700,000 federal
workers.16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
The lawsuit is particularly focused upon the term "classifiable." On August 11,
1987, the administration released a new definition "classifiable," which it believed
clarified the term by defining it as information that was classified but had not been
designated as such. While it is recognized that some derivative use of classified
information may not have been labeled as such, the concept of classifiable, even under
the new definition, would allow the government to make unilateral decisions to classify
whenever a query or request for the information has been made. Some in Congress
believe that such a policy constitutes a broader form of predisclosure and prepublication
review by the government.
PREPUBLICATION REVIEW
In the past, intelligence agencies, relying upon statutory authority to "protect
intelligence sources and methods from unauthorized disclosure,?17 have been the primary
entities requiring prepublication review. Employees involved in covert intelligence
operations have routinely had their speeches and writings reviewed for content that
discloses classified information without authorization. The Supreme Court determined that
this practice was constitutional in 198018 and that even unclassified material was subject
to review.19
Prepublication review has been a practiced method of controlling information at
the CIA. For example, the editor of Periscope, the publication of the Association of
Former Intelligence Officers, has stated: "Everyone who writes for my publication is
bound by a contractual prepublication review agreement by some agency or department of
the federal government. Many writers worry about the lawyers determining whether it's
libelous or suitable to print. We worry about the lawyers after we get through the
publication review process."20
The prepublication review agreement required by NSDD 84 was, in fact, a revised
version of the CIA's Form 4193 [Appendix D]. Congress reacted strongly in opposition to
NSDD 84, particularly its lifetime censorship program. Temporary statutory restrictions,
lasting 5-6 months, were placed on implementation of the prepublication review
requirements by any agencies so as to allow time for congressional review.21 On
February 15, 1984, shortly before the congressional restraints ended, President Reagan
agreed to suspend the prepublication provisions of NSDD 84, and National Security
Advisor Robert McFarlane issued a suspension order "to all agencies affected by NSDD
84."22
The practice of- imposing prepublication review requirements on government
workers was, nonetheless, widened. Unknown to Congress, the Reagan administration had
already been using the CIA's lifetime censorship contract, Form 4193, as a "boilerplate"
secrecy contract throughout the government. The General Accounting Office reported that
at the end of 1983, excluding the CIA and the National Security Agency, 23 agencies had
required 119,000 employees to sign Form 4193. "An unknown number of former employees
also have signed the agreement. The Department of Defense estimated that, of 156,000
military and civilian employees who had signed agreements, about 45,000 were former
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
employees" who had been reassigned to work no longer involving highly classified
information.23
President Reagan interpreted suspension of the lifetime censorship provision of
NSDD 84 in the narrowest possible terms: not implementing a revised Form 4193 contract.
The General Accounting Office conducted another study and concluded that in 1985 the
number of employees required to sign Form 4193 had risen to 300,000. The most
astounding figure reported by the GAO was that in addition to lifetime censorship
agreements prepublication review regulations applied to an estimated 3.5 million federal
employees '4 As part of the August 1987 lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the
nondisclosure forms, the American Federation of Government Employees is also
challenging the constitutionality of the Form 4193 lifetime censorship contract.'
Prepublication review poses important constitutional questions not only regarding
possible First Amendment violations but also about the way in which Americans can learn
about their government. Issues to consider include whether:
s Political debate will be filtered.
* Information will be subject to broad manipulation or censorship.
s Officials of the current administration will be put in a position to censor former
officials.
? Timely publication of opinion pieces and articles in newspapers will be delayed.
? An extensive bureaucracy will develop around lifetime censorship.
The effects of prepublication review include its potential impact on the most
important officials of every administration: cabinet officers. From the president on down,
all cabinet officers have access to the type of information that triggers lifetime
censorship contracts. This means that many books and articles they write about their
experience and issues to which their experience lends insight will be subject to
censorship by the government.
The impact of such restraint was illustrated during congressional hearings on
NSDD 84. There, the chairman of the board of Time, Inc., listed the books and articles
by former senior officials that would have to undergo government censorship. The list
included books and magazine articles by former officials including: three presidents, a
Joint Chief of Staff, chairman of the board, three secretaries of state, a director of
central intelligence five ambassadors, and important aides, including Watergate burglar
G. Gordon Liddy.
Our need to ensure that the voices of former government employees can be
expressed to policymakers was underscored in 1987 by meetings of former cabinet
officials. On September 26, 1987, seven former Defense secretaries gathered to discuss
United States policies ranging from nuclear arms to the Persian Gulf. The group
discussion, taped for public television, found both "peril and promise" for the United
States.27 If prepublication review had been required of these officials, the program would
have had to be approved by the government. Another example of the value of public
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
debate involving former policymakers was a reunion of former Kennedy administration
officials. On March 5, 1987, marking the 25th year since the Cuban Missile Crisis, former
cabinet members and staff from the Kennedy administration gathered. Those present
included former Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, former Secretary of the Treasury
C. Douglas Dillon, and former Under Secretary of State George Ball. For one week, these
former officials and other important aides to President Kennedy met with scholars and
policy experts to publicly reflect on "those '13 days' when the world seemed to tremble
on the brink of nuclear apocalypse." As stated by Harvard professor Richard Neustadt,
addressing the small group of Kennedy alumni: "You are the only people we have access
to who have had to face the problems of escalation in a nuclear crisis. You are the only
people there are to talk to about your perceptions, your feelings, your concerns. For any
future leader who has to face the prospects of a crisis escalating out of hand, you have
valuable lessons to offer."28 The Reagan administration prepublication review measures,
however, would jeopardize the availability of such information to future administrations
and generations.
While President Reagan's efforts to control information and communication has at
times been protested by Congress and the public, it has received less opposition from the
courts. The Supreme Court's 1980 decision in the U.S. v. Snepp case29 is the most
powerful enforcement tool the government now possesses. However, the government has
used the decision, which required a CIA employee to submit to prepublication review, to
impose censorship agreements on federal workers in a variety of agencies. The Snepp
case involved a former CIA agent who published a book criticizing U.S. practices during
the Vietnam War. The Court held that Snepp had violated his agreement by not providing
the CIA "an opportunity to determine whether the material he proposed to publish would
compromise classified information or sources." Furthermore, the Supreme Court awarded
damages to the government in the form of a "constructive trust," into which Snepp was
required to "disgorge the benefits of his faithlessness."
Federal intelligence agencies, acting on the expanded power they perceive has
been endowed by the courts, have begun to threaten and prosecute past and present
employees under espionage law. In one case, the National Security Agency (NSA) had a
warning delivered by the FBI to two former Air Force communications intelligence
specialists who had written an article for the Denver Post challenging the Reagan
administration's account of the Soviet downing of Korean Air Lines Flight 007. In the
warning, the NSA reminded one author of his "secrecy agreement with the agency," and
told him that his "disclosure is technically a violation of the Espionage Act and any
further disclosures should be cleared with the NSA."30
Espionage law, however, is now clearly operational against misanthropic
government employees not only for disseminating information to foreign agents, as was
intended by those perfecting the law, but also for disclosing information to the press. In
the 1985 U.S. v. Morison case,31 a government employee was convicted of violating an
espionage law32 for "willfully" communicating to a British military journal, Jane's Defense
Weekly, copies of photographs taken by a reconnaissance satellite. He was also convicted
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
of violating another _provision of the espionage law for having kept intelligence
documents at his home.'"
The Supreme Court may make a final determination in the Morison case in 1987.
However, three important concerns have surrounded the case:
(1)
There has been a rush in recent years by the courts to give the espionage
statutes the broadest possible application.
(2) Congress did not intend the espionage statutes to extend to publications as well
as specific agents and foreign governments.
(3)
The United States will have the equivalent of an "Official Secrets Act" if the
Supreme Court upholds the conviction.
The above controls on government employees are extraordinary measures of
information security that unwisely displace constitutional guarantees and democratic
values. These restrictions on communication and information in our society have the
potential to further isolate our government from accountability, to remove responsibility
for policies and activities from elected officials, and to undercut the ability of citizens
to engage in informed debate about their nation.
Prepublication review contracts, nondisclosure agreements, and extension of
secrecy controls through the courts between 1981 and 1987 have a disturbing similarity to
policies during the McCarthy era of the 1950s. That was a period of heightened fear and
distrust of those outside government. Officials stigmatized citizens and arrogantly
displaced constitutional guarantees. Today, loyalty oaths are replaced by secrecy
contracts; information disclosure is defined in terms of "leaks," and the espionage law is
wielded by government officials beyond the intent of the law. Government employees are
sworn to secrecy.
These practices threaten to erect a wall between government employees,
Congress, citizens, and the press. Never before have First Amendment guarantees of
Americans been conditioned upon government employment to this extent.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
Chapter 5
Restricting
Scientific and
Academic Freedom
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY
Scientific and technological developments in the United States have prompted government
concern about the "dual use" of technology by the military and civilians. A leading
physicist put this development into perspective: "Nikita Khrushchev is supposed to have
commented that the buttons on a soldier's pants represent an important military
technology, since they free his hands to hold a rifle."
National security controls on the scientific, technological, and academic
communities have had a long history in the United States because of the use of atomic
and nuclear technology for weapons. Thus, in 1946, Congress enacted the Atomic Energy
Act .2 It established a category of protected information called Restricted Data, and today
virtually all information related to nuclear weapons and nuclear energy is "born
classified."3
In 1951, Congress enacted the Invention Secrecy Act which allows the
Department of Defense to review patent applications, impose a secrecy order, and block
an invention's use in the civilian sector .4 Earlier authority for this activity dated from
the World War I era. Today, however, secrecy orders are permissible even where the
government has no property interest or right in the invention.
Despite these and other statutory controls, as well as the massive classification
system, the government is pursuing more aggressive measures. Increasingly, U.S. defense
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
policy, foreign policy, and trade policy are combined through a single national security
interest to control scientific communication and the free exchange of ideas.
Edward Teller, an outspoken physicist and considered the "father of the hydrogen bomb,"
said: "Secrecy is not compatible with science, but it is even less compatible with
democratic procedure."5 Scientific and technological advancement result from multiple
postulations, experiments, and conclusions, as well as verifications, from many sources
around the world. The "science race" is best visualized as the Olympic relays where
runners from many nations pass a baton to begin the next lap -- instead of a lone
climber scaling Mt. Everest.
An excellent illustration of the situation may be found in the recent advances in
superconductor technology, believed to revolutionize existing technology from electrical
generation to computers. The race started in Zurich and culminated in Houston, Texas.
Notably, the Houston team was led by a Chinese-American working with other Chinese-
born scientists, most of whom are not U.S. citizens.6
Ironically, and sadly, these successes have led to increased government controls.
On July 25, 1987, the Reagan administration announced that it was denying all foreign
officials permission to attend a major superconductivity conference sponsored by the
White House and the Department of Energy.? On July 28, 1987, President Reagan
addressed the conference and announced an eleven-point "Superconductivity Initiative"
that included: changes in the Freedom of Information Act to withhold "commercially
valuable" scientific information and "strengthening the patent laws," which means
increasing the government's power to impose secrecy orders on patents.8
A leading physicist said in response that superconductivity "has been an
international project from the start. The openness here has been just astonishing. That is
why the advances have come so fast. If we start closing the doors now, the United
States stands to be a very big loser."9
In such actions, the government has extended the "dual use" theory beyond national
security to such areas as economics or, in the current parlance, "competitiveness." As in
the past, singular events have triggered expanded controls on scientific communication
beyond reasonable boundaries. In 1979, it was the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In
1987, it is the illegal transfer of technology by Japanese and Norwegian companies to the
Soviets to make quieter submarines. One scientist placed the issue in perspective by
stating:
I have no wish to minimize the irresponsibility of the Toshiba/Kongsberg
actions. But let me suggest that the greatest threat to our military
security is not from unscrupulous corporate executives, or inadequate
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
RESTRICTING SCIENTIFICAND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 37
export regulations or Soviet espionage. The danger is that Mr. Gorbachev
is beginning to recognize why it is that they have been compelled to
rely so heavily on technology purloined from the West.
The Glasnost reforms in the Soviet Union are aimed at emulating the
open system that has given us our technological advantage. The final
irony of the silent Soviet submarines would be for the United States to
move toward the sort of restrictions that have held back the Soviet
Union.10
Do increased U.S. restrictions on access and activity of foreigners help or hinder
the competitiveness of American industry? While it is clear that the United States is a
point of origin for much technology transfer, the situation is not as unbalanced in favor
of foreign countries as some would argue.
Strong evidence shows that foreign students, engineers, and scientists are playing
an integral role in the success of American industry. Nonetheless, the Reagan
administration's restrictions on technology transfer often cause corporations to forego
this talent pool. A vice-president at Monsanto Corporation states: "Sometimes you fight
to get them because they're the best. Other times it's just too much hassle." Many large
corporations still make the effort. At Rockwell International Corporation's main research
center, 60 of 300 scientists are foreign. The restrictions on technology transfer are a
formidable hurdle to overcome. General Electric's chief scientist, Roland W. Schmitt, has
said: "So far we've lucked out in that a significant number of those foreign nationals
have decided to stay. The United States has many research centers, including our main
facility at G.E., that would have been dead in the water had they not been available ?11
Increased governmental concern over militarily useful information reaching the Soviets
and other adversaries has received equal attention from American scientists. In 1982, the
National Academy of Sciences (NAS) issued a report, Scientific Communication and
National Security, which found that, while there is a "substantial transfer" of U.S.
technology to the Soviet Union, "very little" was attributable to open scientific
communication.12
President Reagan acknowledged the NAS conclusions and then proceeded to
expand the secrecy-security controls on scientific and technological research conducted
with federal grants or contracts. In late 1982, President Reagan issued a National
Security Study Directive calling for a special panel to develop policies to control
scientific information.13 In September 1985, the president issued National Security
Decision Directive 189, "National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical and
Engineering Information," calling for use of the classification system to "control
information generated during federally funded fundamental research in science, technology
and engineering at colleges, universities and laboratories." The directive ordered all
agency heads to initiate classification of such information prior to the award of grants,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
contracts, or cooperative agreements, and "periodic review" of grants, contracts, and
agreements for "potential classification."14
The Reagan administration's initiative to control scientific, technological, and
engineering information extended well beyond the atomic energy laws or the classification
system. Target authorities have included: the Arms Export Control Act of 1976,
administered by the State Department through the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations; and the Export Administration Act of 1979 (extended in 1985), administered
by the Commerce Department through the Export Administration Regulations. The
application of the Export Administration Act not only covers international exchanges of
information in the form of documents, records, and papers but also restricts access of
foreign nationals to information in the United States. The application of these authorities
relies upon the Militarily Critical Technologies List, prepared and maintained by the
Defense Department. In an unclassified version, this list is 212 single-spaced pages. The
Defense Authorization Act of 1984 also gave the Secretary of Defense authority to
withhold technical information under the control of DOD from disclosure under the
Freedom of Information Act.15
The information increasingly subject to secrecy controls is neither classified
information, nor is it always government owned. Instead, the indefinite national security
concept is used to restrict scientific communication, attendance at professional
conferences, enrollment in university classes, access to university laboratories and
computers, access to computerized information, and the ability of foreign intellectuals to
come to the United States.
A brief chronology, compiled from publicly available sources, helps illustrate the nature
and extent of national security controls imposed on the scientific and academic
community:
1980: Department of Commerce forced American Vacuum Society, organizer of a small
international meeting on magnetic bubble memory devices, to rescind invitations
to certain foreign nationals. In a phone call, the Commerce Department
threatened to fine the Society and imprison its president, stating that an agent
was on hand to arrest him.16 The Society wrote invitees in Hungary, Poland, and
the Soviet Union rescinding the invitations. Scientists en route from the People's
Republic of China were admitted to the meeting subject to signing an agreement
not to "reexport" information to any national from a list of 18 countries.17
1980: Department of State stopped nine Soviet citizens from traveling to a conference
on lasers, electro-optical systems, and inertial confinement fusion organized by
the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers and the Optical Society of
America.'-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
1982: U.S. Customs officials seized a shipment of computer science textbooks which a
U.S. professional society was shipping to Japan.19
1982: U.S. Customs officials confiscated the luggage of five visiting Chinese scholars,
removing scientific journals, classroom notebooks, thesis and lecture materials,
slides, innocuous computer software, and rock music cassettes 20
1982: Department of Commerce and Department of Defense officials forced the
withdrawal of more than 100 of 700 papers at the twenty-sixth Annual Technical
Symposium of the Society of Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers.21
1984: Department of Defense and National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) jointly sponsored a professional conference with the American Ceramics
Society on composite materials but restricted attendance to "U.S. citizens
only.- 22
1984: The International Traffic in Arms Regulations were implemented by the American
Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics to restrict non-U.S. citizens from
attending certain composite materials sessions at the Institute's conference. Proof
of citizenship required a birth certificate, naturalization papers, U.S. passport, or
voter registration card.23
1984: The Society for the Advancement of Material and Process Engineering closed
conference sessions on metal matrix and carbon-carbon to non-U.S. citizens.
About 20 percent of the Society's 5,000 members are foreign nationals.24
1985: The Department of Defense required cancellation of a special session of the
Society for Photo-Optical Instrumentation Engineers, organized by one of its
members at a military base, stating that such presentations could not be made in
open session. Ultimately, 28 of the 43 proposed papers, revised under DOD
review, were presented in closed session, attendees were required to sign an
agreement controlling dissemination of export-controlled DOD technical data.
1986: The Pentagon oversaw the selection of papers for presentation at the Linear
Accelerator Conference. Initially, 13 were refused clearance, and after an appeal
3 papers were still banned 25
1987: The U.S. Army obtained a secrecy order from the Patents Commissioner when an
Israeli mathematician, working in Israel, requested a U.S. patent for an invention
involving "zero-knowledge proofs." Cryptological applications of proofs have
occurred, but new discoveries are generally considered as advances in theoretical
science. Withdrawal of the secrecy order was forced because the government is
not permitted to classify work that foreigners do in their own country._
1987: President Reagan and the Department of Energy barred foreign officials from
attending a national conference on superconductor technology.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Particularly because of the growth of the electronic information age and
computers, the government has accelerated efforts to control access to
telecommunications and computerized information. It is an especially important subject
area because it involves the government's right to control information that is neither
classified nor government property. Instead, it includes data bases belonging to private
corporations, universities, and libraries.27
The concern over access to such information pertains, as President Carter stated
in 1977, to materials "that would be useful to an adversary." The problem is a genuine
one, but there is great difficulty in balancing legitimate protections with necessary
freedoms. The potential for moving our nation towards a "national security state" is
nowhere greater than in allowing the government to extend its control over information
or maintain surveillance over practices regarding the use of telecommunications or
computerized information.
Federal arrangements for protecting the information must be reasonably designed
to ensure public accountability, and not simply to create another institutional form of
secrecy. Under President Carter, for example, telecommunications information policy
included classified and "unclassified, but sensitive," information. The Defense Department
was made responsible for information related to national security. Importantly, the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Secretary of Commerce was responsible for non-national security and unclassified
systems, particularly for private sector information security needs 28
Under President Reagan, however, the scope of the government's control of
telecommunications and computerized information has been increased, and the mechanisms
to do so are more secret. In 1984, President Reagan issued National Security Decision
Directive 145, eliminating the counterpart authorized by President Carter in 1977. By
definition, President Reagan emphasizes information as "sensitive, but unclassified." The
boundaries of government control have been extended beyond government property or
even reasonable national security concerns. The arrangements for protecting the
information, notably including the property of private corporations, and universities, has
been centralized in the military, specifically the highly secretive National Security
Agency.
In the National Security Council directive implementing NSDD 145, former
National Security Advisor John Poindexter stated that the scope of "sensitive, but
unclassified information" now subject to government control would include:
Other government interests ... related but not limited to the wide range
of government or government-derived economic, human, financial,
industrial, agricultural, technological, and law enforcement information,
as well as the privacy or confidentiality of personal or commercial
proprietary information provided to the U.S. by its citizens 29
The Poindexter memorandum announced the creation of a new unit within the
National Security Agency and described the NSA's responsibilities as:
to include all computers and communications security for the Federal
Government and private industry ... including non-national security
sensitive information.
The potential impact of NSDD 145 in the private sector is staggering. By 1986
the Information Industry Association reported that there were 3200 electronic data bases
available worldwide through 486 on-line information services. Seventy percent of these
data bases are produced in the United States, and all but two of the 20 largest data base
companies are U.S. corporations.30 In 1986, one of the nation's largest electronic
publishers, Mead Data Central, was visited by officials from the Air Force, the FBI, and
the CIA. Mead Data Central has clients in 46 countries, and its information is entirely
unclassified. Nonetheless, the government stated its desire to monitor Mead's clients and
limit their access to information. In June 1987, Columbia University was visited by two
FBI agents who told its library administrators that it wanted them to report on the use
of materials by foreign nationals in the school's science libraries.31
These activities reflect how aggressively the Reagan administration has
implemented its policy. The Columbia University visit is notable because three months
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
earlier, in March 1987, the Poindexter memorandum implementing NSDD 145 was officially
withdrawn by National Security Advisor Frank Carlucci.
In Congress, legislation passed the House supplanting NSDD 145 while creating
effective computer security policies. If passed by the Senate, the law would provide a
more limited definition of "sensitive" information and would remove the National Security
Agency from its policy development and enforcement role. Instead, responsibility for
policies within the federal government, as well as civilian agencies and the private
sector, would be in the hands of the Department of Commerce and the National Bureau
of Standards.32 In the meantime, NSDD 145 is intact, and both White House and Pentagon
proposals for implementation are expected during the remainder of the Reagan
administration.33
CONTROLS ON CAMPUS: ACADEMIC FREEDOM
On college and university campuses across the United States, the restrictions discussed
above are felt by many scientists. In addition, there have been prepublication review
contracts, controls on foreign scholars, course enrollment by foreign students and their
computer access, and immigration restrictions on foreign visitors. These distinct controls
strike at the heart of academic freedom. In some cases, the relationship to national
security is questionable, in others it has been nonexistent.
Prepublication review agreements in academia revisit the controls imposed by President
Reagan under National Security Decision Directive 84. The directive's provisions for
lifetime prepublication review applied to university researchers because certain research
grants are government-sponsored. The same experience has occurred in universities as in
federal agencies -- prepublication contracts have been imposed despite President Reagan's
agreement in 1984 to rescind that portion of NSDD 84. In addition, the practice of using
prepublication review in science-related government grants has led to a trend in other
government-sponsored university research contracts in areas involving neither military
nor classified information.
Prepublication review in the academic community raises several unique problems,
including elimination of the valuable expertise and insight that the academic community
often provides to government. Such insight is denied in three ways: (1) . former
government officials are prevented from further exploring the areas in which they have
worked after they leave government to take university positions; (2) current government
officials can thwart criticism of their practices and policies by deciding that information
should never be publicized; and (3) government censorship generally will filter the debate
in academic forums, greatly diminishing an essential value of universities.
Adding to these concerns is the growing number of federal agencies requiring
prepublication review contracts. Most troubling is the fact that these limitations are
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
required where the information is not only unclassified, but outside the scope of national
defense concerns.
A Harvard University report identified several such instances in which
prepublication review has been required or proposed:34
* Department of Housing and Urban Development: "Study on Changing Economic
Conditions of the Cities."
* Health Resources and Sciences Administration: "Workshop for Staff of Geriatric
Education Centers."
* National Institute for Education: "Education and Technology Centers."
* Environmental Protection Agency: "Conference on EPA's Future Agenda."
* Food and Drug Administration: "Development of a Screening Test for Photo-
carcinogenesis on a Molecular Level."
* National Institutes of Health: "International Comparison of Health Science
Policies."
* Department of the Air Force: "Measurement of Lifetime of the Vibrational Levels
of the B State of N2."
RESTRICTED ACCESS: COURSES, COMPUTERS, AND COLLEAGUES
Just as federal agencies have sought to regulate areas of scientific communication, so too
has the government asserted power to control teaching activity. These government
actions have startled the academic community and, while some have refused to accept the
restraints imposed by government, many feel that there is no alternative. The following
are some examples of these governments actions since 1981:
1981: Department of State asked officials at major universities to cooperate in
prohibiting visiting students from the People's Republic of China from engaging
in research and studies in certain scientific and technological areas. The request
would have required close personal surveillance of student activities.35
1981: Department of State imposed restrictive conditions on a Hungarian engineer's
scheduled stay at Cornell University to study electronics. The visit was
cancelled 36
1982: Department of Commerce concerns caused the National Library of Medicine to
deny nationals from Communist countries on-line access to its MEDLINE service,
a computerized index of articles appearing in some 3,000 medical and biomedical
journals 37
1984: A college course at the University of California at Los Angeles was restricted to
"U.S. Citizens Only." It was determined that lecture materials concerned
unclassified technical data appearing on the Munitions Control List regulated by
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations. 38
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
unclassified technical data appearing on the Munitions Control List regulated by
the International Traffic in Arms Regulations.38
1987: The FBI established a "Library Awareness Program" within its national counterin-
telligence effort. The FBI program seeks the assistance of college and public
librarians in creating surveillance records on library use by foreigners. By
September 1987, FBI officials had visited approximately 20 libraries in the New
York area.39
Controls on access to computerized information have been the subject of a
special initiative by the Reagan administration. This issue reexamines National Security
Decision Directive 145 issued by President Reagan in 1985, creating military authority to
control access to "sensitive, but unclassified, information."
Although implementation of the directive has been in abeyance since March 1987,
it is expected to be revitalized, and its application would be wide ranging. Intended to
improve computer security the directive affects unclassified information not only in the
possession of the government, but in universities and libraries.
In addition to access controls the government may place on foreign students, scientists,
and scholars at universities, one of the strongest measures used has been to deny
immigration visas. This has been done using the ideological exclusion provisions of the
McCarran-Walter Act,40 a McCarthy-era immigration law enacted over the veto of
President Harry Truman.
The Act has been used by several administrations to exclude and deport foreign
visitors invited to lecture or teach at universities and colleges in the United States. The
law reflects a xenophobic period in American history, when unwise compromises of
important democratic freedoms were made. The denial of rights in this case is to
Americans, whose First Amendment rights include hearing and judging ideas for
themselves, rather than allowing the government to serve as censor.
In 1972, the Supreme Court interpreted the McCarran-Walter Act to deny a visa
to Ernest Mandel, a Belgian journalist and Marxist theoretician invited to speak at
Stanford University in 1969. Mandel had described himself as a "revolutionary Marxist" on
his visa application in 1969 as well as on two previous applications allowing successful
visits to the United States in 1962 and 1968. The 1969 visa was denied on the grounds
that his "1968 activities while in the United States went far beyond the stated purposes
of his trip ... represent[ing] a flagrant abuse of the opportunities afforded to him to
express his views in this country."41 The Supreme Court rejected claims made by
American university professors who claimed they had a right to hear and communicate
with foreigners. Since Mandel v. Kleindienst, a disturbingly long list of visa denials have
been implemented against visiting scholars and speakers. In addition, there have been
deportation proceedings against tenured foreign-born professors.42 Congress is currently
trying to change the law to terminate the government's authority to deny visas or deport
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
States simply because of their political affiliations, in this case allegedly with communist
groups. The Court upheld a U.S. Court of Appeals decision saying that if the State
Department wanted to bar foreign visitors invited to speak in the United States, it must
certify to Congress that the visitors would constitute a threat to national security.44
The Reagan administration has been notable for its use of the McCarran-Walter
Act to ban foreign visitors to prevent Americans from hearing views the administration
does not support. The administration claims that its actions are authorized under
provisions of law that grant broad foreign policy powers as well as provisions that
authorize visa denials on the basis of membership of or affiliation with certain political
organizations. Particular instances have involved visa denials to:
? Hortensia Allende, widow of Salvadore Allende, Chile's last democratically elected
president. Mrs. Allende was invited to speak by the Archdiocese of San Francisco
and Stanford University and would have made comments critical of current U.S.
policy in Chile.
* Nicaraguan Interior Minister Tomas Borge, who was invited to speak and would
have criticized President Reagan.
* Former Italian General Nino Pasti, a former NATO official, who was invited to
speak and would have been critical of U.S. missile deployment in his homeland
and Western Europe.
s Farley Mowat, Canadian naturalist and author of Never Cry Wolf, and Italian
playwright Dario Fo.
As noted American author Kurt Vonnegut stated in testimony before a Senate
subcommittee considering elimination of these restrictions:
No other nation has a law like our First Amendment. But then again no
other Western bloc country has anything quite like the McCarran-Walter
Act. We have damaged our own reputation while gaining nothing with
enforcement of this law. It is the free exchange of ideas, no matter how
outrageous, that has made us strong. I don't think we have to be afraid
of any idea. We are very good at testing them when given a chance.45
Government restrictions on scientific, academic, and intellectual freedom pose
some of the most serious problems for the future of our nation. Free exchange of ideas
serves as a practical requirement for scientific and technological advancement.
Government secrecy measures, however, interfere with meeting this basic requirement.
The academic community is an essential forum for independent learning, thinking, and
debate. Our nation values the education of its children and their preparation for a world
of uncertainties. Nonetheless, government secrecy measures have inhibited the intellectual
prosperity of our nation's colleges and universities and have begun to isolate teachers
and students from their colleagues and counterparts around the world.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Government infringement upon First Amendment guarantees augment the practical
handicaps resulting from excessive government secrecy in the scientific, technological,
and academic communities. Efforts to stop the public presentation of scientific papers,
that are neither classified or government property -- yet are prohibited from public
presentation -- pose serious problems under the Constitution. The government's use of
export and import laws to justify such action creates a heavy burden of proof, as yet
unmet, regarding the proper use of these laws. When the government decides to deny a
visa to a visiting scientist, scholar, or writer, it is violating the First Amendment rights
of Americans to decide for themselves the value of ideas expressed by such persons. The
many instances of government interference from 1981 to 1987 reflect the capacity of our
government for unilateral action. The strength of our democracy and the future of our
nation, however, require a more limited and well-balanced role of government.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Chapter 6
Stopping
The Presses
The United States is in the midst of an evolving "information age," when policies about
information become decisions about the future of society itself. These decisions are most
keenly felt by Americans regarding their daily forum and source of information: the
press. Despite the rights that allow Americans to navigate the maze of government
agencies to acquire documents and records, it is the press that regularly and
systematically brings most information to the public's attention.
The role of the press has produced a complex and tense working relationship
between the news media and the executive branch. President Kennedy launched the
modern media presidency by being the first to use the live television press conference as
a communication tool of the White House. Other presidents have lacked President
Kennedy's telegenic quality, but the role of the media in general has, nonetheless,
expanded.
In recent years, Americans have witnessed the power of information, the
dynamics of its control, and its capacity for truth as well as manipulation. President
Nixon was well known for his distrust of the press which he converted into presidential
power to broaden control over information. Nixon's unsuccessful attempt to obtain a
court order to stop the New York Times from publishing the Pentagon Papers remains a
landmark in history.
President Reagan has been equally distrustful of the press and appears to be
willing to compromise First Amendment freedoms. The Reagan administration has planned
and implemented an aggressive agenda of controls on the press and for most of Reagan's
tenure as president has simultaneously tried to disarm and manipulate the news media. In
the wake of the Iran-contra scandal, some may say that the administration is getting its
just desserts, but scorn will not erase past practices or uproot policy. As in any
presidency, many events take place that cannot be simply wished away.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
48 GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY
GRENADA, SPIES, AND LIBYA
THE INVASION OF GRENADA
In October 1983, furor over national security controls on communication reached its
highest level since the Pentagon Papers when President Reagan ordered a news blackout
during the invasion of Grenada. The threat was made to shoot any U.S. reporters who
tried to reach the island on their own. Coverage of the initial stages of the assault was
selectively provided by the Defense Department's own public relations personnel.'
In May 1986, President Reagan telephoned the publisher of the Washington Post,
Katherine Graham, and urged her not to _publish an article about intelligence-gathering
operations involving American submarines. The president's phone call belied a stronger
administration effort. Within days, CIA Director William Casey threatened to prosecute
the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Washington Times, Newsweek, and Time
magazine for publishing information about U.S. intelligence gathering operations. He
alleged that the news organizations had violated a section of the espionage law, enacted
in 1950 but never applied. Discussions between the administration and the Washington
Post in May 1986 marked the sixth time in a twelve-month period that government
officials had pressed the newspaper to withhold or alter an impending article.3
In a case now before the Supreme Court, the Reagan administration is pursuing
an unprecedented application of our nation's espionage laws to news publishers.' In the
past, the espionage laws have applied only to disclosure of information to hostile foreign
governments and their agents. Many believe that if the Reagan administration is
successful before the Supreme Court, the United States will essentially have created an
Official Secrets Act. Even if the person who disclosed the information is never identified,
the mere publication of information would be prohibited and punishable. A newspaper or
any other media in which the information appears could be held criminally liable.
In October 1986, it was revealed that a White House disinformation campaign against
Libyan leader Moammar Gadhafi had been perpetrated in the U.S. and world news media.
It had been authorized by President Reagan through use of a National Security Decision
Directive issued in mid-August 1986, seeking a "regime change" in Libya. The president
directed the CIA to mount a campaign of "disinformation" to make Gadhafi think that a
second U.S. attack or a coup d'etat was imminent.5 President Reagan justified the action
by contending it was legitimate if it made Gadhafi "go to bed at night wondering what
we might do. "b
While the press is often the subject of government criticism, the government
uses the media extensively and, as the Libyan case illustrates, is capable of extensive
manipulation of the facts.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
DISTRUST AND DISCLOSURE
A 1987 study by the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press has identified more
than 135 actions by the Reagan administration aimed at restricting public and media
access to government information and intruding on editorial freedom.7
The Reagan administration's distrust of the press has been central to a wide
array of information controls that are spread throughout society. It has shaped federal
information policy in terms of "information security" and defined information disclosure
as "leaks."
Control of information has been the emphasis of the information policy of the
Reagan administration. In 1986, White House spokesman Larry Speakes defended reducing
presidential news conferences and the administration's tightening of controls on
information to the media, saying: "I don't know a corporation ... that doesn't try to
control the message that goes to the public ... that's the way the game is played."8
However, public office and democratic government have greater requirements of trust and
accountability to the citizens than do corporations, and there are no shareholders waiting
in the wings, assisted by squads of lawyers, ready to file a lawsuit.
The Reagan administration has exerted unprecedented control over information
available to the press, creating secrecy-security policies throughout government. National
Security Decision Directive 84, issued in 1983, not only clamps down on employees by
imposing secrecy agreements, but requires of all agencies that: "Appropriate policies shall
be adopted to govern contacts between media representatives and agency personnel."9
Other incidents have occurred lately throughout the agencies. In September 1983,
for example, the Commerce Department placed new restrictions on journalists. It imposed
a "lock-up" on reporters being given a view of a major report on durable goods before
the official release time -- they were required to sit in a locked room without access to
a telephone.10
In 1985, a State Department bureau chief barred staff members from talking to a
New York Times reporter, Leslie H. Gelb, who once headed the office. The new bureau
chief also removed a photograph of Mr. Gelb from the waiting room wall. A note in large
handwriting was placed in the picture frame reading:
Removed For Cause. The P.M. Director, 1977-1979, did willingly, willfully,
and knowingly publish in 1985 classified information the release of which
is harmful and damaging to the country. -1
Gelb had written an article on U.S. contingency plans to deploy nuclear weapons in
certain foreign countries. Part of the information had already appeared in the
international press. The New York Times story included information that the plan had
been prepared without notifying officials of the recipient countries.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
In 1986, the FBI formed a special team of agents to investigate disclosures of
"sensitive" information to news organizations. Among the cases being investigated, FBI
agents were trying to track down the source of a New York Times article about the
alleged role of Panamanian army commander Gen. Manuel Antonio Noriega in international
drug trafficking and illicit concealment of funds.
In recent months, the president's preoccupation with leaks has led to a volley of
charges exchanged between the executive branch, witnesses in the Iran-contra hearings,
and Congress. Lt. Col. Oliver North went so far as to justify lying to Congress because
he felt that its Members and staff could not be trusted to withhold information from the
press) A recent study by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence concluded that
about two-thirds of the disclosures of classified information came from the executive
branch. The study examined eight prominent newspapers, and determined that 98 of 147
such disclosures were perpetrated by anonymous sources within the Reagan
administration.14
The value of a free press in the United States cannot be overemphasized. The
press has successfully kept the public informed, despite the difficulty of obtaining from
our government even information that is not officially secret. The news media possesses
unique resources to appraise the public of government actions, and is essential as a
forum for public debate. The institutional nature of government secrecy in the United
States, and the continued growth of our government in general, require a strong and
independent source of information.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Chapter 7
Citizen Access:
The Freedom of
Information Act
In addition to the controls that allow the government to restrict the flow of information
handled by government employees, contractors, and specific sectors of society, such as
scientists, the government also imposes controls upon the general public. The principal
instrument governing the disclosure of information about the federal government to the
public is the Freedom of Information Act.
Many Americans may be familiar with the existence of the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) but remain uncertain as to its use. The Freedom of Information
Act has allowed the public to learn about many activities of the federal government. The
results have enabled Americans to live safer and healthier lives and to govern themselves
more economically and efficiently.
WHAT THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT DOES
Enacted in 1966, the Freedom of Information Act stands alone as the legal basis for
public access to records of federal agencies. The FOIA gives all persons this access
right, enforceable in court, except to the extent that such records are specifically
protected from disclosure.' Examples of key exemptions to the Act's rule of disclosure
include classified information and commercial trade secrets. It is encouraging to note that
since the enactment of the FOIA many states have enacted a similar open information
law.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
executive branch. Its support in Congress has always been bipartisan. Democrats and
Republicans together created the law and, in 1974, passed crucial amendments over the
veto of President Gerald Ford.
From its earliest days of passage through the present, the FOIA has reflected
constant push and pull of the separation of powers between Congress and the
HOW THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT BENEFITS SOCIETY
The contributions of the Freedom of Information Act to American society have been
significant. The use of the FOIA by the public and the press has had a positive impact
on government efficiency and spending, and on the health and safety of citizens and has
promoted essential principles of democracy. The following are important examples of the
use of the Freedom of Information Act in ways that have benefited our society. Freedom
of Information Act requests have uncovered:
Atomic Energy Commission:
Department of Defense:
Department of Justice:
An eleven-year Atomic Energy Commission study of cancer
rates of 30,000 workers in "Plutonium City," an atomic
bomb facility in Hanford, Washington, during World War
II, was publicly disclosed for the first time in 1978. The
Department of Energy, superceding the Atomic Energy
Commissioner, abandoned the study in 1975, citing the
"imminent retirement" of the chief scientist. The
scientist's retirement date was six years later. The study
was shelved because of the extensive findings directly
linking work at "Plutonium City" with increased cancer
rates among workers .2
Federal audits of the top ten defense contractors showed
that between 1974-1975, these contractors charged the
Department of Defense for $2 million in lobbying costs
and $2.5 million in entertainment costs. New Pentagon
policies were subsequently established to end such
charges .3
In 1986, Department of Justice records revealed political
favoritism in awarding a $622,905 grant for domestic
violence prevention to a controversial group with no
background or expertise in preventing family violence. An
inquiry into the propriety of the grant was launched by
the Criminal Justice Subcommittee in the House of
Representatives .4
Federal Bureau of Records revealed secret operations of Cointelpro against
Investigation:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Records and documents revealed covert FBI investigation
of public interest groups, including Physicians for Social
Responsibility.
Documents revealed extensive intelligence files were
compiled for more than 50 years on many distinguished
American writers including: Carl Sandburg, William
Faulkner, Edna St. Vincent Millay, Pearl Buck, Ernest
Hemingway, John Steinbeck, Archibald MacLeish, Thomas
Wolfe, John Dos Passos, and others .5
Food and Drug Previously undisclosed test results showed the presence
Administration: of a cancer-causing chemical in hundreds of liquor
products sold in the United States. These included
bourbons, sherries, and fruit brandies. Canada already bans
dozens of liquor products for this reason.6
Data that the Food and Drug Administration held linked
an arthritis drug to severe liver damage that resulted in
dozens of deaths. The drug in question, Oraflex, was
removed from the market amidst allegations that the FDA
had rushed through the approval.?
Transcripts and records from a Fertility and Maternal
Health Advisory Committee revealed a 1987 FDA deregula-
tion recommendation to delete birth defect warnings from
progestational drugs and that the FDA reached its
decision using an improperly designed study and ignored
authoritative birth defect research .8
Internal Revenue A 1973 IRS survey of compliance with federal tax laws
Service: revealed extensive evasion by small businesses coupled
with non-detection by the IRS. The survey detailed that
33% of all small businesses (i.e. with assets less than $1
million) were underpaying taxes; 28% went entirely
undetected by the IRS. A statistic for 1969 showed that
small businesses had underpaid $641 million in federal
taxes. Disclosure led to improvement of IRS enforcement
and increased attempts to recover back taxes .9
National Aeronautics and Federal audits of NASA revealed to the public for the
Space Administration: first time a history of poor management at NASA. These
disclosures revealed agency mismanagement and waste of
billions of dollars. Experts have concluded that
mismanagement, detailed in federal audits, severely hurt
the space program and is directly linked to safety
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
problems that culminated in the Challenger explosion and
the death of seven astronauts. In 1987, a Pulitzer Prize
was awarded to the New York Times for investigative
reporting that used the FOIA.10
National Institutes of A study was conducted for the NIH showing a clear
Health: connection between the administration of certain
medications to mothers during childbirth and the
impairment of brain development. At the time of the
study, 95% of all births in the United States were
medicated. Disclosure revealed that government review of
the study eliminated key findings, diluted the author's
conclusions, and prevented publication in a medical
journal. The study was unpublished when obtained."
A study conducted by the House Government Information Subcommittee reported
that over 400 cases like those cited above were reported in the news media between 1972
and 1984.12
THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION'S "ONSLAUGHT"
AGAINST THE FOIA
Despite these disclosures that protect our lives and improve our government, President
Reagan has led the effort to prevent greater executive branch accountability by the
public and Congress. Since 1981 Reagan administration officials have called the Freedom
of Information Act a "highly overrated instrument" and have worked to decrease the
rights of citizens granted by the Act and increase the government's power to withhold
information.13
In the past seven years, President Reagan's initiative has changed the shape of
the Freedom of Information Act, with attacks on several fronts, employing an array of
methods:
1982: President Reagan's executive order on information classification granted agency
officials authority to classify and reclassify records upon review of a FOIA
request.
1984: President Reagan and CIA Director William Casey persuaded Congress to pass the
CIA Information Act, broadening the CIA's ability to exempt its operational files
from FOIA disclosure.
1984: The Defense Authorization Act of 1984 gave the Secretary of Defense authority
to withhold DOD technical information from FOIA disclosure.14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
CITIZENACCESS: THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATIONACT 55
1986: The Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1987 was used as vehicle for the passage of the
Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986. These amendments increased the
ability of the FBI and other law enforcement agencies to withhold records and
gave the Office of Management and Budget new authority to set guidelines and
fee schedules for the Freedom of Information Act.15
1987: The Office of Management and Budget issued uniform FOIA fee schedules and
guidelines.16
1987: The Department of Justice issued a memorandum imposing guidelines and
requirements for implementation of OMB fee schedule and guidelines.17
1987: President Reagan issued an executive order giving corporations increased power
to review materials requested for release under FOIA and that may be exempt
from disclosure under Exemption 4.18
Changes in the law, particularly concerning law enforcement, fee guidelines, and
business notification, merit further discussion.
Freedom of Information Act amendments passed as part of the comprehensive drug
control legislation in 1986 reflect a particular legislative tactic -- the use of other
statutes to dilute the Freedom of Information Act. It is a particularly effective tactic
because omnibus legislation, such as the drug bill in 1986 or the trade bill in 1987,19
carries immense political momentum, and new provisions can be easily added and buried.
In technical terms, the amendments provide limited exemptions for records that
"could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings, would deprive a
person of a right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication, could reasonably be expected
to disclose the identity of a confidential source, or could reasonably be expected to
endanger the life or physical safety of any individual."20 The main forces behind the
amendment affirm the broader design of the changes. Senator Orrin Hatch (R-UT),
President Reagan's chief advocate in Congress for strengthening government control of
information and weakening the Freedom of Information Act, believes the changes will
considerably enhance the ability of Federal law enforcement agencies
such as the FBI and the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency] ... and greatly
enhance the ability of all Federal law enforcement agencies to withhold
additional law enforcement information.21
Justice Department officials who lobbied hard for the amendments were quoted as
saying the amendments "make real changes."22 Senator Hatch bluntly described the
meaning of the new law enforcement provisions, stating "there likewise should be no
misunderstanding that they will logically operate as exclusions -- not mere exemptions
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
to be applied whenever the special circumstances specified in them are found by the
agency to exist."23
Agencies will no longer have to review their files when information is requested
on subjects including FBI records on foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and
international terrorism. These are the very files, however, that have revealed highly
questionable surveillance and covert operations involving the antiwar movement, as well
as legal, political, and public interest groups. A recent example is the discovery of a
1982 FBI operation inside the Physicians for Social Responsibility.
FEE WAIVERS, SCHEDULES, AND GUIDELINES.
These changes affect the often debated subject of the cost of government information to
the public. Some believe that government has a responsibility to inform its citizens, and
that citizens should not be charged a separate cost to ensure that this responsibility is
fulfilled. Counter arguments are made that government information costs include not only
printing and publication but also searching for and reviewing records pursuant to FOIA
requests, as well as subsequent litigation costs. In many ways it reflects the continual
tension between Congress and the executive branch over control of the federal
government. Recent changes do not offer much hope that the dilemma has been resolved
or that the public will be better off.
The Office of Management and Budget Fee Schedule. The Office of Management
and Budget's (OMB) fee schedule and guidelines add to the ever-increasing power of the
agency under the Reagan administration. However, Congress saw OMB as an alternative
to the Justice Department, whose recent guidelines have been viewed with dissatisfaction
by congressional overseers.
Among the concerns about the OMB guidelines is that they set wholly new
definitions of "news media," "educational institutions," and "commercial use." Congressman
Glenn English (D-OK), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Government Information,
believes that OMB "approached its responsibilities in good faith," but strongly disapproves
of many of the definitions and suggests that OMB may have overstepped the law that
limited its role to writing a uniform schedule of fees.
English has termed OMB's definition of news "broad, vague, and useless." He
believes OMB invites agencies to evaluate the news value of information and that
Congress specifically rewrote part of the law to remove agencies from such an editorial
position.24 "Educational institutions" are defined in a way that hinders scholarly and
scientific research reliant upon government records. Unfortunately, the combined effect
of the broad OMB definitions and the "advisory" Department of Justice memorandum have
already been invoked to deny fee waivers for educational research. Furthermore, these
denials illustrate the power that low level government officials now wield to determine
what is and is not in the public interest. For example, the Department of the Air Force
recently denied a fee waiver to a professor researching U.S. involvement in Southeast
Asia. The Air Force stated:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
We do not believe that there is a genuine public interest in the
documents you have requested. Secondly, we seriously question the value
to the public of these records ... Since there have been voluminous
books and studies previously published on Southeast Asia, we do not feel
the records will meaningfully contribute to the public development or
understanding of the subject. The value at best may be marginal.
Individual scholars, according to OMB, must have a fee waiver request presented
under some official authority of their institution. In one recent denial of a fee waiver,
the Department of Defense told a tenured history professor, who had requested a fee
waiver on university letterhead: "Future requests on behalf of [name of university],
should indicate such, so that the University's ownership of records provided and possible
publication royalties are recognized."26
The planned sale of a report, booklet, or book based on information sought in a
FOIA request will taint it as a "commercial use" and vitiate the possibility of a fee
waiver -- but according to one agency, so does a professor's teaching salary! The
Department of the Air Force recently denied a fee waiver to a college professor stating:
The fact that you intend to use the information in your college classes
is not a relevant factor because as a college professor you are paid a
salary and, therefore would derive monetary benefit from the
information requested.2'
Lastly, the guidelines specifically exclude independent scholars and students --
those not affiliated with an educational institution -- from qualifying for the fee waiver.
Department of Justice Memorandum. The Justice Department Memorandum, "New
FOIA Fee Waiver Policy Guidance," advising agencies on implementation of the OMB
guidelines, was not required by law, requested by Congress, or solicited by a single
federal agency. Instead, it reflects the continued determination of the Reagan
administration and Justice Department to press for restriction of the Freedom of
Information Act as they have for the past seven years.
The Justice Department enters the area of FOIA, without any authority to issue
binding guidance, and undercuts the very intention of Congress in giving responsibility
for developing fee guidelines to OMB. On the meaning of the "fee waiver standard,"
addressed by OMB in a single sentence, the Justice Department devoted 12 single-spaced
pages of advice.
Congressman English, in a letter asking the Attorney General to withdraw the
memorandum, stated:
Let there be no confusion about the congressional intent. Congress
rewrote the FOIA fee waiver rules in order to make more people eligible
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
libraries, and other requesters would find it easier to qualify for fee
waivers. This change in the FOIA was an integral part of a package of
amendments that included raising the fees for a narrowly defined class
of commercial users of the FOIA ... Whether the Justice Department
likes it or not, that is the intent of the amended FOIA 28
President Reagan issued Executive Order 12600, "Predisclosure Notification Procedures For
Confidential Commercial Information," on June 23, 1987. Its purpose is "to implement the
section of the President's Competitiveness Initiative seeking to better protect intellectual
property."29 Intellectual property is a legal term for inventions, formulas, designs,
methods, processes, and writings, as well as scientific, literary, and musical creations and
even computer programs, for which property rights are created through patents,
copyrights, trademarks, and trade secrets.
The Freedom of Information Act already exempts the disclosure of trade
secrets,30 and Federal agencies have generally given corporations notification of the
release of submitted records, and often the chance to challenge the FOIA request.
Because the Reagan executive order has only been in existence a short time, its impact is
not yet known.
Concerns about the order, however, include: direct presidential action amending
the Freedom of Information Act, avoiding the legislative and public hearing process; the
potential for broadening the trade secret exemption to information that is neither a
"trade secret" nor "intellectual property;" the ability of corporations to prevent disclosure
simply by stamping everything submitted as "confidential commercial information;" and the
ability of corporations to delay timely release of information valuable to the public.
THE FUTURE OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
The Freedom of Information Act, after twenty years of operation, remains the single
statutory mechanism granting an enforceable right of public access to government
records. The Act has served effectively as an instrument and a symbol of open
information policies in our democratic society. In recent years we have witnessed an
onslaught of attempts to weaken the access rights of citizens, and increase the power of
government to control the flow of information. As the original passage and improvements
of the Freedom of Information Act have shown, access to information is not a partisan
issue. Opponents of the Act must be required to substantiate their claims and not simply
attack the Act as a source of problems originating elsewhere, or as a means of limiting
access to information. Changes in the law must be carefully balanced with its enormous
benefit to American society, especially for the oversight and accountability of
government.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
IF -
13311111
Chapter 8
Policy Powerhouse:
The Office of
Management
And Budget
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is best known to Americans as former home
to David Stockman, President Reagan's first OMB director. Stockman and the Reagan
administration were able to transform OMB into one of the most powerful, yet secretive,
agencies in the government. What makes a lesser known federal office the source of so
much controversy and turbulence?
Despite its roots in the old Bureau of the Budget, which OMB superceded in
1970, OMB's role in the government is much broader than number crunching. In 1986,
Congress stepped back to view OMB's dimensions. In the report that followed, Office of
Management and Budget: Evolving Roles and Issues, Congress cited "95 statutes, 58
executive orders, 5 regulations and 51 circulars which reflect OMB's operational
authorities."' The subjects covered by these measures are all-encompassing, from arms
control2 to water resources.3
The controversy and turbulence surrounding OMB has been about the exercise,
growth, and secrecy of OMB's extraordinary control over the federal government.
Congress acted to increase OMB's authority to improve the efficiency of the federal
government. Then President Reagan expanded these new responsibilities beyond the
intent, and consent, of Congress. During the Reagan administration OMB has been
reinvented as the power base of the executive branch. As Congress observed in its study,
OMB operates under the guise of a federal management agency, but it exhibits a
"persistent confusion between management and control."
OMB's control and its ability to manipulate the bureaucracy has led to increased
government secrecy as both an end and a means. The opening for such activity came as
the result of the Paperwork Reduction Act, passed by Congress to decrease wasteful
paperwork volume in government, but President Reagan used OMB's powers under the Act
in ways beyond the intended boundaries set by Congress. President Reagan granted OMB
unprecedented authority to control the content and the volume of all government
publications and to set the information collection policies of all federal agencies.5 The
result: less information is available to fewer people about government.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
As a means, President Reagan has endowed OMB with authority to rewrite
federal regulations and studies, but the process has been conducted secretly. In 1985,
disturbed that President Reagan had created a "superagency," Congressman John Dingell
(D-MI), Chairman of the House Energy and Commerce Committee, stated:
While Congress expected everyone to play by the same rules, the OMB
has rewritten the rules to give itself a special advantage. It engages in
secret communications with agency officials and outside parties, leaving
other interested parties on the sidelines watching a different game. A
regulation may be blocked through OMB's clandestine intervention at the
behest of a particular industry while limiting the presentation of
opposing views by other industry representatives and the general public
who might benefit from the proposed rule. This secret process is simply
incompatible with a regulatory review process purportedly designed to
promote rationality in decision making.6
OMB bypasses federal laws specifically enacted to provide citizens with
knowledge of and access to government decision-making. In general, OMB reaches from
behind the curtain of government into the lives of Americans. OMB is a subtle and
complex force that makes unrestrained use of unaccountable power.
OMB CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT INFORMATION
The Reagan administration's action at OMB reflects a pattern throughout the government
of reduced flow of information to the public. It seems that only the justification used in
other areas of government has shifted, from "national security" to "cost/benefit." The
consequences of secrecy remain the same: defeating the accountability of officials and
agency activity, thwarting the checks and balances of our government, and undermining
the democratic process. The Reagan administration assault against public service
information began in 1981. It was significantly advanced in 1985 through the issuance of
a comprehensive information management policy entitled OMB Circular A-130 7
Implementation of this policy has emboldened executive branch control of government
publications, information collection and dissemination, and privatization of government
printing. It has also undercut protections and rights guaranteed by law and decreased the
effectiveness of government programs.
The free flow of information in a democracy is essential to maintaining an informed
citizenry, as well as helping people improve the quality of their lives. Government
publications have historically been an important source of public information. These
materials are relied upon by Americans to learn about their government, to be advised on
health and safety matters, and to discover job and educational opportunities, as well as
to become educated on other issues affecting their lives.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
When President Reagan entered office in 1981, government publications were
immediately targeted as an expendable resource. The president quickly expanded OMB's
limited budgetary authority to review government publications8 and initiated a campaign
to reduce government information as part of a "war on waste." Few would argue that
government programs cannot be improved, but the emphasis in this case was not to
create better information resources -- simply less. President Reagan kicked off the new
OMB campaign by stating:
The federal Government is spending too much money on public relations,
publicity, and advertising. Much of this waste consists of unnecessary
and expensive films, magazines, and pamphlets .9
As the new "information czar," OMB established stringent controls on federal
agencies. It declared a moratorium on new periodicals, pamphlets, and audiovisual
products; required OMB review and approval of plans to publish such materials in the
future; and mandated use of OMB publication control systems.10
OMB's publications policy terminated the availability of much information of
public importance. In 1982, OMB issued its List of Publications Terminated and
Consolidated by Agency, in which 2,000 publications were dropped.11 One government
publications librarian assessed the damage, stating:
Well-known government titles have ceased publication since the
moratorium. Some of them can be verified among 2,000 titles announced
in OMB's List of Government Publications Terminated and Consolidated
by Agency. Others have simply failed to appear in print. No
announcement was needed for reference librarians to notice that the
annual Handbook of Labor Statistics failed to arrive on schedule in 1982,
but it was not immediately apparent that it had ceased publication. It
gradually became clear that numerous federal statistical sources had been
terminated.12
OMB steamed ahead despite strong opposition by the nation's librarians and
others. By 1984 a second OMB report claimed reduction of 3,848 government
publications.13 One private, nonprofit group, OMB Watch, created to monitor the actions
of OMB, determined that "over 43% of all federal publications were affected by the
campaign against waste."14 The "waste" included publications on such wide ranging
subjects of public concern as income taxes, drug abuse, automobile safety, and radioactive
fallout. Some of these were:
A Woman's Guide to Social Security
Emergency Management
Handbook of Labor Statistics
Health Resources Statistics
Housing and Urban Development Trends
Oil Pollution Abstracts
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
Poison Control Center Bulletin
The Car Book
The Right To Read
Unemployment Rates for State and Local Governments
Your Housing Rights
OMB's systematic efforts to cut back publications have continued to grow,
snowballing into more comprehensive controls on information. In 1985, OMB issued an
expanded "Government Publications" policy, increasing the frequency of OMB review of
agency publication policy to every year, and expanding the types of materials subject to
OMB scrutiny.16
OMB's control of government publications demonstrated its ability to block a direct
communication channel between government and the public. However, OMB's control
extends deep into all the information functions of federal agencies. The following is a
list of ways in which this is accomplished. Records are maintained by agencies to help
determine whether the government and others in society are complying with air safety,
environmental, civil rights, or consumer protection laws. Information collected about
specific government programs increases effectiveness in programs ranging from
immigration reform to drug enforcement. Surveys are conducted by agencies to better
administer government programs for public health care delivery, agriculture, or heat and
fuel needs. All such information is especially important to concerned citizens and
nonprofit groups that fill gaps in public policy by helping Congress formulate programs.
OMB's control of information is strong evidence that policies about information are
decisions about the very nature of society itself.
OMB action in March 1987 reveals its central role in determining whether government is
responsible for informing its citizens and taxpayers. Bridging the areas of government
publication and information policy are the very regulations that determine how
information is printed and distributed.
For the Reagan administration, government printing is a primary target of its
drive for "privatization," shifting functions of government to the commercial sector. Like
other recent OMB stratagems, privatization has been pursued without considering its
effect on government responsibilities. Government and commerce differ in many obvious
ways. Foremost is the fact that public needs must be met efficiently but should not be
conditioned upon profitability.
OMB's effort to privatize government information has been advanced in
regulations that undercut the system created in law more than fifty years ago.17 That
system requires federal printing to be performed by the Government Printing Office
(GPO) under the auspices of the congressional Joint Committee on Printing. Congressman
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Major Owens (D-NY), who was a professional librarian before entering Congress, in 1987
stated:
The benefits of this requirement as it has been implemented over the
last 68 years has been invaluable: it has rid Government printing of the
corruption with which it was once plagued, assured that printing is
carried out as economically and efficiently as possible, provided universal
public access to Government publications through the GPO-administered
depository library system, and given Congress the powerful oversight
tool it needs to preserve the free flow of Government information to the
public.18
OMB's manipulation of federal regulations has, in this case, usurped these
requirements supplanting benefits and reforms. OMB also permitted certain provisions to
be issued as final rules without any opportunity for public comment. In particular, the
new regulations remove the requirement that federal agencies obtain approval of the
Joint Committee on Printing in Congress before transferring printing to commercial firms.
Without centralized review, the government printing operation will be less efficient. While
the government will be expected to print and publish, it will be both unable to plan and
uncertain of personnel and budgetary needs. OMB has substituted "private" policy for
public policy, dismantling the government's information infrastructure.
OMB's control of information collection affects the determination of whether government
and others in society are complying with the law. OMB wields the power simply to tell
agencies to stop collecting such information. The areas range widely from worker safety
to fair housing opportunities. In most cases, OMB lacks the expertise to understand the
importance of the information or the consequences of its disapproval.
OMB, for example, decreased assurances of a safe workplace for Americans in a
January 1987 decision about information collection. Wood dust exposure in wood
manufacturing factories has been linked to increased risks of nose, throat, and stomach
cancer. The Department of Labor's Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)
had recently stepped up its effort to determine the need for new worker protection
regulations. In January 1987 OMB ordered OSHA to stop visiting wood and wood product
manufacturers to make necessary evaluations, terming them "unapproved information
collection."19
In another matter of occupational safety, OMB changed regulations dealing with
mine workers' safety by scaling back safety record-keeping requirements. The Department
of Labor's Mine Safety and Health Administration had sought to record defects in "self-
propelled" mining equipment such as trucks and loaders. In 1984, the Mine Safety and
Health Administration reported that between 1980 and 1983, 154 deaths and 10,000
injuries were attributable to accidents involving such equipment. This information ensures
that defects are not overlooked, that necessary repairs are made, and that maintenance is
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
performed regularly. OMB, however, wanted to leave the responsibility up to the mining
companies, requiring only a signed certification that inspections have occurred2?
Compliance with civil rights laws has also been affected by OMB decisions that
reduced the effectiveness of agencies responsible for stopping housing discrimination as
well as those working to increase the number of minority-owned businesses in the United
States. In 1985, OMB issued a decision barring the Veterans Administration and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) from collecting information that
the two agencies use to remedy housing discrimination and administer civil rights
programs. The information included the race, sex, and ethnic background of applicants
for home mortgage insurance. One HUD official stated, "This is no casual effort by OMB,
it's a concerted action. The surest way to stop [civil rights] enforcement is to remove
information about who is in the programs."21 Pressure from a group of federal agencies
and Congress forced OMB to reverse its decision 22
Also in 1985, another OMB decision meant that compliance with the Equal
Employment Opportunity laws by television stations throughout the country became less
certain. OMB disapproved of Federal Communications Commission (FCC) annual reporting
requirements on the race and sex of employees of cable television stations.
In another interference with the FCC, the administration moved towards
achieving its goal of eliminating the Fairness Doctrine, the rule that broadcasters must
give equal time to opposing views of controversial issues of public importance. OMB
disapproved of FCC forms used to notify political candidates of their right to respond to
TV and radio station editorials 24 FCC compliance with the Fairness Doctrine was
diminished, a goal which the administration championed throughout 1987.
Information is, collected by federal agencies to evaluate public needs and to improve the
effectiveness and responsiveness of government programs. OMB, however, can choose to
undermine these programs simply by disapproving of information collection.
Communities that suffer from chronically poor economic conditions or severe
economic dislocation may be prevented from improving their lot in life. In June 1987,
OMB disapproved of a plan by the Department of Commerce's Economic Development
Administration to evaluate local technical assistance projects it has provided in the past.
The systematic evaluations could have indicated the progress of such programs, as well as
targeted areas of continuing need 25
An effort to increase the utility of federal reports on medical policy and reviews
of medical treatments and devices for nearly one million medical professionals was
undercut by OMB in June 1987. The Food and Drug Administration (FDA) publishes its
Drug Bulletin three to four times annually and it serves as an important forum for
government and the medical community. Rapid medical advances and improvements in
health care practices have raised important questions about the scope and utility of the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
FDA publication. FDA decided to conduct its first readership survey in 15 years. OMB's
disapproval of the survey forced FDA to continue making relatively uninformed editorial
and budget decisions about the publication.26
In 1985, the Indian Health Service tried to pursue a recommendation from
Congress for improving its community-based outreach program for Native Americans.
Congress has fought to maintain funding levels for the program despite President
Reagan's efforts to phase it out. Congress recommended that the Indian Health Service
set up a systematic evaluation of service delivery problems to the Native American
communities. It was an attempt to resolve problems of geographic isolation, lack of
access to health service facilities, and inadequate emergency services. OMB disapproved
of the evaluation and information collection plan, referring in part to "apathetic
respondent behavior."27
These and other examples demonstrate OMB's ability to manipulate federal
programs, undermine the intent of laws, and decrease the protections and rights of
citizens. OMB's activities in these areas involve technical and often complex matters
which the public cannot ordinarily understand or resolve. OMB's review process is
inaccessible, and its rulings are difficult to challenge even by agencies which have
expertise in the areas concerned.
OMB CONTROL OF GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS
It has been no secret that President Reagan has made deregulation of industry a priority
of his presidency. However, two facts are virtually secret: (1) OMB is the
administration's most subtle and powerful agent in reducing the number of government
regulations; and (2) OMB uses its authority to rewrite regulations. Central to this
authority has been the issuance of two executive orders by President Reagan, E.O. 12291
and 12498, which gave OMB the power to effectively control agency decisions 28 Simply
stated, since OMB controls federal regulations, OMB controls the laws. Regulations are
the engines of federal law, determining the behavior of institutions and industries, and
the strength of protections and rights 29
OMB's role in shaping life in America has been permeated by secrecy. Its
unaccountable power and unreviewable authority are an unsuitable environment for
decision-making in a democracy. In 1986, a Senate investigation of OMB's interference
with agency regulations reached the following conclusions about the impact of President
Reagan's expansion of OMB's authority:
Executive Orders 12291 and 12498 together effectively exert a "cradle to
grave" influence over the agency rulemaking process and there is
widespread concern that the secrecy and delay imposed by OMB
compromise the principles of openness and fairness under which agencies
strive to develop their regulations 30
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
In several instances these practices have caused OMB to perpetuate serious
health risks in society, in others OMB has substantively altered regulations despite its
lack of expertise in the subject area. A regulation affecting an airline may seem
impersonal, but a regulation affecting a drug or a hazardous substance is not. In 1986, a
federal court ruled that the government's unlawful delay in issuing regulations governing
storage of hazardous waste in tanks was caused by OMB. The court further stated that:
The use of E.O. 12291 to create delays and to impose substantive
changes raises some constitutional concerns. Congress enacts
environmental legislation after years of study and deliberation, and then
delegates to the expert judgement of the EPA Administrator the
authority to issue regulations carrying out the aim of the law. Under
E.O. 12291, if used improperly, OMB could withhold approval until the
acceptance of certain content in the promulgation of any new EPA
regulation, thereby encroaching upon the independence and expertise of
EPA. Further, unsuccessful executive lobbying on Capitol Hill can still be
pursued administratively by delaying the enactment of regulations beyond
the date of a statutory deadline. This is incompatible with the will of
Congress and cannot be sustained as a valid exercise of the President's
Article II powers.31
OMB's interference with regulations to decrease human health risks is nowhere more
apparent than in the case of the fatal link between aspirin and Reye Syndrome
(pronounced "rye") in children. In June 1982, the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) announced its proposal to use radio advertisements and place warning
labels on containers of aspirin warning parents of the possible dangers. OMB, positioned
by the Reagan executive order to review the proposed regulation, chose to ignore
authoritative medical findings by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control (CDC) and experts
in the field of rare diseases, siding instead with the aspirin industry to prevent the
labeling. Within five months of the proposed HHS campaign, OMB placed a phone call to
the Secretary for Health and Human Services who withdrew the proposed regulation for
further study.32
Strong evidence supported the need for preventive measures in 1982, if not
earlier. Reye Syndrome is a life threatening condition that may follow influenza or
chicken pox infections in children. At the end of 1981, the CDC, the Public Health
Service facility in Atlanta, reported that an estimated 1,200 cases of Reye Syndrome
occurred annually, and the death rate was 30% for reported cases. Permanent brain
damage and other problems may occur even if the affected child does not die. However,
Reye Syndrome is difficult to diagnose because its symptoms are easily confused with
other illnesses, including meningitis, encephalitis, or even drug overdose hallucinations.33
Four studies conducted between 1978 and 1981 by the state health departments of Ohio,
Michigan, and Arizona provided the most convincing evidence of a fatal link between
aspirin use by children and Reye Syndrome. The Ohio study alone showed that children
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
who came down with Reye Syndrome were ten times as likely to have taken aspirin as
those who did not contract the disease.34
The CDC reports prompted the Surgeon General, Dr. Everett Koop, to issue an
advisory cautioning against the use of aspirin for children with influenza or chicken pox.
The Surgeon General was joined by the CDC, the Food and Drug Administration, and the
American Academy of Pediatrics in urging the government to warn parents and physicians
of potential dangers.
OMB, however, chose to listen to aspirin manufacturers, who met with OMB
officials privately, and estimated that the industry could lose $100 million in sales. The
aspirin makers commissioned their own study which concluded, amazingly, that there was
no relationship between aspirin and Reye Syndrome. The FDA and even OMB's own
analysts rejected these conclusions.35
OMB's final decision on warnings was not made, however, by its analysts but by
its regulatory affairs chief. Ignoring all authoritative scientific evidence, affirmations of
the fatal link between aspirin use in children and Reye Syndrome by the White House
Office of Science and Technology Policy, and even OMB's own statisticians, the
regulatory affairs chief told the Secretary of Health and Human Services to withdraw the
proposed warnings. The decision was based on a conversation with the OMB official's
wife, a pediatrician who did not accept the scientific conclusions, and the intense
lobbying by the aspirin industry.36
Since 1982, the evidence supporting warning labels has increased. In 1983, the
New England Journal of Medicine reported that Reye Syndrome was 10 to 20 times more
common than doctors had believed. 7 In 1984, another study by the U.S. Centers for
Disease Control concluded that children suffering from influenza or chicken pox were 12
to 25 times more likely to contract Reye Syndrome if treated with aspirin, than those
who were not 38 In 1984, 190 cases of Reye Syndrome were reported, 26% of them were
fatal, and many survivors suffered brain damage.39 Finally in 1985, the aspirin industry
entered into an agreement with the Department of Health and Human Services to issue
warning labels and public service announcements against aspirin use for flu or chicken
pox in children. The industry remained reluctant, however, to state the relationship of
aspirin to Reye Syndrome. If OMB had not interfered many children could have been
saved from the fatal and permanently disabling effects of Reye Syndrome.
A second example has been OMB's interference with the Environmental Protection
Agency's proposed ban on certain asbestos products and uses. Asbestos is a known
cancer-causing material used in buildings for insulation, floor and ceiling tiles, paints and
joint compounds. EPA was supported in its efforts by scientific studies demonstrating the
harmful effects of asbestos. Following an lengthy investigation, Congress acted to remove
asbestos from schools and other public buildings.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
In order to preserve commercial interests in asbestos, OMB disagreed with
Congress and the EPA. OMB delayed its review of the EPA proposed ban for many
months, stating that "cost/benefit" standards had not been met. According to this
standard, OMB created a "discounting human lives saved" concept in order to decrease
the value of the benefits of asbestos regulations, as weighed against the costs of the
regulation to the industry. As stated by House Energy and Commerce Chairman John
Dingell (D-MI) in a thorough review of OMB interference with EPA asbestos regulations:
Under this discounting approach, the OMB's cost-benefit analysis of the
proposed asbestos regulations computes human life at a base value of $1
million -- and then discounts that value over the 30 to 40 year latency
period for asbestos-related cancer. This arbitrary and callous discounting
methodology would reduce the value of life to a figure as low as
$22,500, thereby undervaluing the benefits of health and safety
regulations and thwarting the regulation of many toxic substances
evaluated under the cost-benefit criteria of Executive Order 1229140
While the problem of public exposure to asbestos persisted, OMB worked secretly
to undercut EPA's ban. OMB met twelve times with representatives from the asbestos
industry,41 and was particularly responsive to officials from Canada, where asbestos is a
major export product. In 1986, it was revealed that the director of OMB's regulatory
review office met secretly with Canadian officials to assure them of OMB's intent to
undercut the ban. In a subsequent communication, the OMB official stated that OMB
"remains opposed to [the] banning and it will actively work toward this end in [the]
regulatory process."42
In another example, the delay and burden of passing OMB's "cost/benefit" test posed a
continued risk to human lives from chemically treated fruits and vegetables. In 1985, the
Food and Drug Administration proposed regulations banning certain uses of sulfites which
had led to twelve deaths. During a lengthy delay posed by OMB's "cost/benefit" review, a
44-year old woman died after eating sulfite-treated food in a restaurant 43
At a 1986 Senate hearing on OMB policy making, Senator Carl Levin (D-MI),
Chairman of the Subcommittee on Governmental Affairs, stressed that, "These are obvious
life and death decisions. Who's making these decisions has been hidden from the
public."44
OMB's power and control over the federal government is unprecedented. It is
especially ironic that an administration so outwardly committed to "decentralizing" the
federal government has centralized its power at OMB so quickly. Within one month of
entering office, President Reagan empowered OMB to oversee regulations proposed by
federal agencies, requiring agencies to conform with OMB's "cost/benefit" analyses and
gave OMB broad authority over the content and fate of regulations.45 In 1985, through
an order implemented by then OMB official Douglas Ginsburg, President Reagan made
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
OMB responsible for the regulatory program of the federal government 46 As Congress
observed in its comprehensive 1986 report:
The Reagan Administration's designation of OMB's Office of Information
and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) as its central clearance arm for
regulatory policy capitalized on a national mandate for regulatory relief
and set in motion -- administratively -- the most sweeping reform of
the regulatory process in 35 years 47
Since 1981 the requirement that agencies adopt OMB's substantive
recommendations has permitted OMB to rewrite agency regulations and supplant them
with the administration's own policies. The White House's commitment to this process was
boldly demonstrated when Congress threatened action in 1986 to eliminate the OMB office
responsible for regulatory review. OMB Director James Miller III pledged that, if
Congress eliminated OMB's office for reviewing and rewriting regulations:
We will do it in the White House. If [you take] the office out of the
White House, we will do it in the Justice Department. If you take the
office out of the Justice Department, we will do it in Commerce.`
Just what does OMB do that it refuses to stop? An analysis of OMB regulatory
review from 1981-1986 by OMB Watch, revealed that ten federal agencies have been
subject to the harshest OMB action. In these agencies, 30%-40% of the regulations
proposed have been either altered or not approved by OMB49 The top ten agencies on
the "OMB Hit List" include:
s Department of Labor
? Department of Education
? Department of Housing and Urban Development
s Department of Health and Human Services
* Department of Commerce
$ Department of Transportation
s Environmental Protection Agency
Small Business Administration
Department of Energy
? Veterans Administration
Is it possible for a federal agency, created and staffed for overseeing
management and budget issues, to evaluate the substance of regulations at these and
other agencies? The 700-page Regulatory Program issued by the White House shows that
by 1986 OMB was reviewing and rewriting a diverse range of regulations in areas which
it had no expertise. These included civil rights,50 mental retardation,51 and cancer 52 In
addition to lacking expertise in these and other subjects, OMB's activity remains
unaccountable, and its business is conducted in virtual secrecy.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
OMB's authority to review proposed regulations is coupled with its authority over other
proposed agency activity including federal studies and surveys. Such studies can range
from air quality to welfare reform, and often have a important impact on improving the
quality of the environment, the safety of the workplace, and the assurance of a good
standard of living. Just as in the regulatory area, OMB has the power to rewrite,
redesign, or simply reject proposed studies. Many observers believe that OMB's
interference with federal studies constitutes a more egregious abuse of its authority than
in the regulatory area 53 This is because it prevents the government from identifying new
developments and problems, many of which are within the scope of protections required
by law.
OMB's review of vital studies related to health and the environment have come
under especially sharp criticism. In 1986, Congressman Ted Weiss (D-NY), Chairman of a
House subcommittee investigating OMB review practices, found that OMB was:
seven times more likely to reject or revise studies with an environmental
or occupational health focus than to reject or revise studies that
focused on infectious or other diseases. In addition, studies focusing on
reproductive health hazards were more likely to be rejected by OMB
than were other types of studies.54
In 1987, scientists from the Harvard School of Public Health examined OMB's
review of 51 studies proposed by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control during 1984-1986.
The report concluded that OMB's review process was:
poorly documented and often demonstrated a dismaying ignorance of the
fundamentals of science and public decisionmaking ... the health policy
implications are serious; OMB is clearly interfering with the substance of
CDC research. OMB has delayed, impeded, and thwarted governmental
research efforts designed to answer public demands for information on
serious public health questions.55
OMB has abused its authority by rejecting and delaying timely and important
studies. It has bowed to pressure from affected industries while failing to incorporate the
findings of authoritative researchers and specialists. Most distressing, however, are the
human consequences of OMB's actions. The most compelling evidence comes from specific
cases of OMB review.
OMB's review of federal studies in the area of occupational illness has had
especially important consequences. In 1984-85, OMB rejected four studies of occupational
health hazards. Three were resubmitted and eventually approved contingent on adopting
OMB's changes.56 Occupational health hazards cause the death of an estimated 100,000
Americans annually, and cause sickness among 400,000 more.57 Health risks to pregnant
women in the workplace are a particularly growing concern. Recent statistics show that
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
63% of married American women are employed during the year before giving birth. More
than 300,000 of these women work in occupations where they risk exposure to substances
known to cause birth defects.58
Study of Video Display Terminals. One controversial OMB decision concerns a study of
the reproductive health hazards to women using video display terminals (VDTs) on
computers. Congress reported that "approximately 10 million American women use VDTs
every day making this a very important issue to American workers."59
The National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) had been
planning a study of women using VDTs since 1982. The study was triggered by reports of
birth defects and miscarriages associated with women's VDT use, and the federally funded
study was planned as the first major scientific research endeavor to examine this health
issue.
The study design was completed in 1985, but OMB refused to approve it. NIOSH
amended the study to meet OMB's concerns but in 1986 OMB responded by offering a
conditional approval only if 69 questions were omitted. Many of the questions were
essential to measure the existence of stress at work and problems of fertility.
Congress became alarmed at OMB's interference with the NIOSH study and, after
a thorough investigation, found many disturbing aspects of OMB's review of the VDT
study: OMB's redesign of the study conflicted with established methods for evaluating
occupational stress; OMB had adopted design changes to reduce the potential impact on
the corporation whose workers were to be studied; the target corporation had provided
OMB with a new design by two consulting scientists, neither of whom specialized in
occupational stress or women's health; and one of the target corporation's consulting
scientists later stated that their conclusions did not support the changes proposed for
the NIOSH study.
Study of Infant Mortality Rates. A second case involves the issue of infant mortality
rates in the United States and illustrates the unresponsiveness of government to address
important problems because the decisions are placed in the hands of OMB. In 1984, the
Children's Defense Fund, analyzing census records determined that the earlier trends of
lower infant mortality rates had failed to continue in recent years. In order to further
explore the problem, the Public Health Service proposed a study of the relationship
between federal funding cuts and infant mortality rates. The proposed study sought to
determine whether maternal and child health and nutrition programs were inadequately
funded and a cause of higher infant mortality rates in some states. The administration
had challenged the Children Defense Fund's findings when first released, attributing them
to statistical fluctuations. In 1985, OMB disapproved the Public Health Service study
under its regulatory review powers, as a significant regulatory act that was "inconsistent
with the Administration's policies."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
The enormous role which OMB has been given in government between 1981-1987 is
evidenced not only by the breadth of authority, but by its application to everyday
concerns to Americans. It may seem ironic that such power has been centralized in one
White House office by a president who has promised the nation a "new federalism" of
decentralized government. The behavior of OMB has shown that nothing could be farther
from the truth.
No one is surprised to learn that government is powerful, but it is disturbing to
discover that so much power has been exercised in secrecy. While positioned close to the
president, OMB operates from deep within an already inaccessible bureaucracy. Just as in
other improper uses of government secrecy, OMB has avoided accountability and undercut
the checks and balances of our constitutional system. It has made decisions without
democratic participation, and has protected private interests, often negotiated behind
closed doors.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
Conclusion and
Recommendations
Government secrecy affects the lives of all Americans. In today's complex world, what we
don't know can hurt us. The importance of secrecy to the security of our nation is
undeniable; however excessive secrecy is a serious national problem. It permeates most
policies under the guise of making our nation secure and effects controls over a vast
array of people and practices well beyond the traditional realm of national security.
Moreover, government secrecy has become increasingly institutionalized throughout our
government without any sensitivity or attempt to reconcile it or balance it with
democratic values. Indeed, it has been expanded without regard to constitutional
protections and has been used to restrict and circumvent the very laws that Congress
passed to promote an informed citizenry and a responsive government.
When secrecy is used to bypass the consensus of Congress and citizens, then our
constitutional system is also bypassed. When information is not disclosed to the public,
the government has failed to exercise the best means of maintaining the public trust and
dispelling distrust. When government activity is conducted in secret to prevent public
opinion from mobilizing, it is virtually ensuring that once mobilized, public opinion will
oppose the activity.
Secrecy often seems to operate as a shapeless force, but it can regularly be
identified in its consequences. Today it is seen in an unrestrained use of unaccountable
power to restrict information, control communication, escape public scrutiny, and restrict
public debate. Our nation's stability is weakened by covert actions pursued with
indifference to the law, "confidential" spending involving billions of dollars, and decisions
affecting human health and safety made in isolation by officials who possess authority
but no expertise in the substance of the regulations.
The years 1981-1987 -- the eve of our Constitution's bicentennial -- stand as the
most recent chapter in our nation's history when the confidence of Americans in their
government has been shaken because citizens are given the very lowest priority among
those who "need to know."
It is incumbent upon a democratic government to maintain policies permitting
citizens to have broad access to information, and wide dissemination of information. The
public also has a responsibility to demand that government fulfill these democratic ideals.
The urgency, however, remains in the government, where policies improving our
democratic system and reducing institutional secrecy can be achieved by the president
and by Congress. For this reason, the recommendations presented here are addressed to
presidential candidates and members of Congress.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
74 GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CANDIDATES FOR PRESIDENT
RESPECT FOR THE LAW IN
GOVERNMENT
In this year of the Bicentennial of the
Constitution, it is important that the
president, government officials, and
citizens rededicate themselves to respect
for the law as the highest of priorities.
Indeed, the president must
demonstrate respect for the law in the
operation of government. The president is
required by the Constitution to "faithfully
execute the laws of the United States."
To reduce excessive government secrecy,
execution of the law requires compliance
with the laws including: accountability in
areas ranging from covert operations to
wasteful spending; citizen access to
information; constitutionally protected
rights of expression and association; and
congressional oversight of the executive
branch and its agencies.
The executive branch must work
closely with Congress to improve
procedures and safeguards concerning the
creation, notification, and accountability
of covert activities. Moreover, specific
improvements in the intelligence oversight
process are essential.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVES
National Security Council directives, such
as the National Security Decision
Directives of the Reagan administration,
should be carefully drafted so that they
do not circumvent the law or the
oversight role of Congress. Unless
classified, they should be published in the
Federal Register, like other executive
orders. The president must be willing to
share such directives with the appropriate
committees of Congress, whether
classified or unclassified.
Covert operations should be limited. By
their very nature and as a matter of
policy covert operations are not
accountable to many in government. They
lack the broad congressional or popular
support necessary for actions necessary
to protect America's vital interests.
Furthermore, even the bureaucracies
required to implement covert plans, such
as those of the Department of Defense or
the Department of State, often will not
immediately lend their essential support.
The inevitable result is that a
dangerously small circle of zealous actors
are tempted by secrecy to unilaterally
commit the nation to perilous actions.
Information classification is a powerful
authority of the president affecting the
entire federal government. The president,
as administrator of the laws and as
Commander in Chief, has broad authority
to issue an executive order on
classification of information. However,
Congress also has a role in this area.
Executive Order. A new executive order,
returning to the 30-year trend towards
openness that was halted by President
Reagan, should be developed in
conjunction with Congress. That executive
order should be formulated in a more
open manner and return to a balanced
policy that includes disclosure of
information as practiced by earlier
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
administrations. Decreasing the amount of
information classified should be pursued
in several ways:
* continued reduction of original
classification authority.
* reduction of derivative class-
ification authority.
? reinstitution of automatic
schedules for information declass-
ification.
? elimination of reclassification
authority.
Several steps should be taken to
produce more open formulation of the
executive order:
? public announcement of plans to
revise security classification rules.
? public circulation of the draft order
for sixty days for public comment
and subsequent consideration of
these comments by the president.
s provide the proposal to Congress
with sufficient time to permit
interested congressional committees
to consider the draft order, hold
hearings, and prepare comments.
? requiring the National Security
Adviser or other officials charged
with policy responsibility for
presidential security classification to
provide written findings detailing
the problems that any proposed
changes in security classification
policies and practice are intended to
solve. They should also provide
written explanations to Congress and
to the public as to the purpose and
scope of such proposed changes. If
the findings or explanations are
classified, then a classified version
should be provided to congressional
committees and an unclassified
version should be made public.
Special Access Programs. Confusion over
the number and use of special access
programs and codes requires internal
clarification and accountability. New
policies must be created to govern these
programs.
Presidential guidelines should be
developed within the executive order on
classification for controlling the creation,
use, and accountability of special access
programs. These should set forth the
purposes of such programs -- from mere
routing of information to protecting
intelligence sources and methods.
Guidelines should limit the authority for
use of special access programs. Agency
heads should not be given the broad
authority for creation and evaluation as
created by the current executive order.
Information Security Oversight Office.
The Information Security Oversight Office
(ISOO) is a joint office of the General
Services Administration (GSA) and the
National Security Council (NSC). It is
responsible for monitoring the
classification of information in the
government and issues an annual report
to the president. The task is an enormous
one because of the millions of classified
documents and thousands of employees
engaged in the process of classification.
ISOO requires a larger staff to
exercise its oversight function. The staff
is currently comprised of no more than
fifteen individuals including the director.
Many of the oversight responsibilities of
the office simply go unfulfilled because of
staff shortages. Individual agencies are
consequently allowed too much evaluation
discretion over their own classification
activity.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
ISOO should maintain an increased
number of field staff and auditors to
examine classification activity in
government facilities outside of
Washington, D.C. ISOO should be granted
greater authority to identify and audit
"special access" programs within the
government. The office should also be
utilized to evaluate specific agencies
responsible for overclassification. In this
sense, the ISOO should not simply be
given a list of narrow, routine oversight
responsibilities but should be authorized
to conduct a variety of discretionary and
evaluative long-term oversight projects.
Lastly, the ISOO annual report, now
directed specifically to the president,
should be formally sent by the ISOO
Director to the Speaker of the House and
the Senate leadership, to be referred to
minority leaders and pertinent oversight
committees.
RESTRICTIONS ON UNCLASSIFIED
INFORMATION
National security controls have been
applied to activity ranging from scientific
conferences to computerized information.
This practice should be the focus of
review to identify the questionable basis
of such action. It is a matter of much
dispute whether the export laws and arms
control regulations were intended to apply
to traditional scientific communication,
and important First Amendment issues are
at stake.
In addition, the government has
extended its control over information that
is neither classified nor necessarily
government property through policies that
restrict access to computerized
information. President Reagan's National
Security Decision Directive 145
encompasses activity in libraries,
universities, and corporations. This
directive should be withdrawn, and to the
extent that legitimate concern exists over
"sensitive, but unclassified information,"
there should be a full-fledged debate in
Congress and with the public over the
subject.
Prepublication review of government
employees violates the First Amendment
by imposing unconstitutional prior
restraints. A thorough review must be
conducted of the current policies and
practices requiring certain government
employees, federal contractors, and
federally funded university researchers to
sign lifetime prepublication review
contracts.
Such policies, to the extent that
they are necessary, must exist only to
serve a narrowly drawn national security
objective. These policies should be
reasonably calculated to ensure that the
experience of government officials and
employees will be available for public
discussion of American policy, that
scientific and technological development
is not hindered, and that First
Amendment principles of free speech and
the right to petition government are not
denied.
The current administration has
effectuated its goals in this area by the
use of Form 4193, National Security
Decision Directive 84, and special agency
contracts. The prepublication review
policies outside of intelligence agencies,
lifetime and otherwise, should be
terminated.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Presidential support for the Freedom of
Information Act is essential and practices
designed to decrease information
disclosure must be rejected. The tone and
practices of the Reagan Administration
must be criticized for keeping more
information from citizens and
undercutting accountability of elected
officials and the bureaucracy.
A special evaluation must be made
of the function and authority of the
Department of Justice regarding the
FOIA. This includes the strong role with
which legislative attacks on the FOIA
have been mounted by the current Office
of Legal Policy (OLP) and the extensive
guidelines which OLP has imposed on all
federal agencies to interpret new OMB
fee guidelines for the use of FOIA. In
particular, these guidelines should be
revoked.
Administration of the FOIA in the
agencies would be improved by increasing
resources for handling FOIA requests. In
addition, the idea for creating a separate
FOIA/Information ombudsman office
should be explored. Lastly, special
attention should be given to the need for
new policies and arrangements for
handling electronic information and
automated records pursuant to the FOIA.
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
OMB's extraordinary power should be
carefully reviewed and aligned with its
actual statutory authority. Action should
be taken to reduce both the power and
personnel of OMB.
Executive orders 12291 and 12498
allow OMB regulatory review over federal
agencies, federal information policy
related to the collection and
dissemination of government information,
and power to determine the fate of
proposed federal studies.
These executive orders have
circumvented statutes designed to allow
citizens to interact with federal agencies
and have allowed the executive branch to
conduct regulatory rule making in secret.
They have supplanted the substantive
knowledge of agencies and affected
communities with executive branch
policies lacking in subject matter
expertise. They have led to excessive
secrecy and abuse of agency authority.
Health risks have been perpetuated, the
work place has become less safe, and
government resources for citizens have
been eliminated. Both executive orders
12291 and 12498 should be repealed.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS
The United States Congress plays a
multifaceted role in maintaining a balance
between legitimate and excessive secrecy.
Congress also preserves the rights of
Americans to have access to government
information and participate in an
informed way in the democratic process.
It does so through its oversight of
federal agencies and their implementation
and enforcement of our nation's laws.
Congress has investigative authority to
explore and uncover corrupt and improper
practices, and legislative power to make
necessary corrections in the law.
Regardless of whether the president
addresses the issues outlined in the
manner described above, Congress must
take the initiative in ensuring such
reforms. Indeed, in the aftermath of the
Tower Commission Report and that of the
House and Senate select committees
investigating the Iran-contra affair,
Congress may well be on its way toward
re-evaluating and modifying existing
procedures and safeguards concerning the
creation, notification, and accountability
of covert intelligence activities.
Congress has responded effectively in
the past, balancing the need to protect
vital secrets with the public's right to be
informed of government activities.
Congress has demonstrated its ability to
create limited statutory restrictions on
information, comparable to those in the
president's order on security classi-
fication, with the Atomic Energy Acts of
1946 and 1954. Moreover, in 1973 the
House Committee on Government
Operations formally recommended the
creation of statutory security
classification policy and procedure.
Congress indicated it was willing to limit
the prepublication review policy of NSDD
84 in 1983. Thus, the capability of
Congress to act in any of these areas
should not be doubted, and there is no
reason to believe that Congress would be
reluctant to address the other remaining
issues including oversight of national
security directives, restrictions on
unclassified information or the
extraordinary power assumed by OMB
over information and regulatory matters.
RECOMMENDED CONGRESSIONAL
REFORMS, HEARINGS, AND
INVESTIGATIONS
Congress should consider holding hearings
to examine how its various responsibilities
are affected by current secrecy practices:
first, to examine how its checks and
balances role is affected; second, to
evaluate its oversight of federal agencies;
third, to hold hearings on specific laws,
measures, and federal agencies.
The status of our information access
laws and protections against excessive
government secrecy should be examined,
and particular laws and legislation should
be recognized for their impact. Suggested
topics for investigation, inquiry, and
reform include:
(1)
What is the scope of the president's
"national security" power? What con-
stitutional and statutory authorities
exist, and how may the executive
branch operationally protect national
security interests?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
CONCLUSIONAND RECOMMENDATIONS
(2) Is all executive branch activity
pursued for national security
purposes? This includes not only
evaluation and review of current
congressional requirements for
notification and reporting of activity
but also precise identification by
Congress of the breadth of related
activity.
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVES
Specific reforms should include required
reporting of presidential national security
directives, such as President Reagan's
National Security Decision Directives to
the appropriate oversight committees.
Furthermore, all directives authorized by
the president and his appointees
furthering national policy through
mobilization of resources, funds, and
personnel should be reported to Congress.
Improved management of information
classification can result from
improvements to the oversight office. The
Information Security Oversight Office, a
joint office of GSA and the National
Security Council, is understaffed for the
immense job it must perform. A current
staff of 12-15 is inadequate and explains,
in part, its inability to exercise many of
its useful oversight functions.
Authorization and appropriation
committees of Congress should study and
recommend improvements in this area.
The use of special access programs must
be evaluated by Congress for purposes of
accountability and the prevention of
fraud, waste, and abuse. An evaluation
should include a review of the authority
for creating such programs, as well as
their use, duration, and termination.
Classification of information should be
examined by Congress with a view to
reforms and possible legislation of a
classification program. Management of the
system could still be administered through
the executive branch. While the executive
branch has dominated control of
information through classification,
Congress can responsibly develop
alternative policy.
Overclassification is a direct cause of
decreased flow of information and the
unmanageable information systems in the
federal government and a possible factor
in the growth of espionage cases. These
problems, however, require greater
congressional involvement in the
origination of classification programs.
Congress must scrutinize classified
spending by the executive branch, both in
the "black budget" for defense spending
and for intelligence activity. Legislation
should be developed to improve the
knowledge of Congress and to ensure that
defense projects are necessary, feasible,
well managed and free of waste, fraud,
and abuse.
Congress should hold hearings and
develop legislation to control the use of
prepublication review, nondisclosure
agreements, and polygraph testing of
government employees.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
GOVERNMENT SECRECY: DECISIONS WITHOUT DEMOCRACY
SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL
INFORMATION
The use of laws such as the Export
Administration Act and arms control
regulations to control scientific
information and communication must be
addressed. To the extent that these laws
were never intended to control the
communication of ideas, much less private
ideas or unclassified information,
Congress must establish their proper use
by the executive branch.
Efforts to place restrictions on
citizens and access to unclassified
information should be scrutinized.
Congress should support legislation (H.R.
145) developed in 1987 to improve
computer security in and outside
government.
Particular efforts should be made to
hold hearings and develop legislation, if
necessary, to protect the open
communication of scientific and
technological information.
Congress should amend existing laws
used to exclude foreign visitors from
entering the United States on ideological
grounds, as well as those laws used to
register foreign films and other material
as "political propaganda."
The Freedom of Information Act requires
vigilant protection as the single statutory
right of access to information about the
federal government. Its purpose as a
disclosure law, not an information
withholding instrument, must be ensured
for the future.
Congress should determine the
extent to which its recent action allowing
OMB to create fee schedules and
guidelines are consistent with its
responsibility in this area. Furthermore,
Congress must determine the extent to
which recent Justice Department efforts
to further shape these policies have been
implemented. The Justice Department
lacks authority to create binding policies
in this area.
THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND
BUDGET
Congress should examine the role of the
Office of Management and Budget to
determine the exact scope of its powers
and authority created during the Reagan
administration. These activities must be
made consistent with the statutory autho-
rity of OMB under the Paperwork
Reduction Act and other laws, including
the Administrative Procedures Act.
Congressional authorization and
appropriations for OMB should be used to
restrict OMB to its limited lawful role.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Notes
1. Taking the Stand: The Testimony of Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, (New York: Pocket
Books, 1987), p. 443.
2. Letter to W.T. Barry, 1822.
3. The Atomic Energy Commission (1946); The National Security Council (1947); The
Central Intelligence Agency (1949); The Department of Defense (1949); Executive
Branch Information Classification (1951); The Invention Secrecy Act (1951); The
National Security Agency (1952).
4. The Chronology, (New York: Warner Books, 1987), p.7. See also: Washington Post,
5 May 1983.
5. Clyde R. Mark, "Iran-Contra Affair: A Chronology," Congressional Research
Service, Rept. No. 86-190-F. (Washington, D.C.: Library of Congress, 2 April 1987,
Updated 29 April 1987), p. 5.
"Rebel Fund Diversion Rooted in Early Policy," Washington Post, 1 January 1987,
p. Al, A24.
6. Garry Wills, "Power Unchecked," Washington Post Magazine, 28 June 1987, p. 31.
7. Letter to William Charles Jarvis, 28 September 1820.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
1. National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) under President Reagan; Presidential
Directives (PD) under President Carter; National Security Decision Memorandums
(NSDM) under Presidents Ford and Nixon; National Security Action Memorandums
(NSAM) under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson; and National Security Council
Presidential ("P") and "Mill" Papers under Presidents Truman and Eisenhower.
Source: Judicial, Fiscal, and Social Branch. The National Archives. Washington, D.C.
2. Special Committee on National Emergency and Delegated Emergency Powers,
"National Emergencies and Delegated Emergency Powers," U.S. Senate, 94th
Congress, 2nd Session, S. Rept. No. 94-922, 28 May 1976, p. 16.
3. "State Dept. Acted to Block U.S.-Egypt Attack on Libya," Washington Post, 20
February 1987, p. Al, A27.
4. National Security Decision Directive 159, "Covert Action Policy Approval and
Coordination Procedures," 18 January 1985.
5. Bob Woodward, VEIL: The Secret Wars of the CIA 1981-1987 (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1987), p. 394.
6. Office of Information Policy and Security Review, National Security Council,
Letter from the Director, 26 April 1984.
7. National Security Decision Directive 1, "National Security Council Directives," 25
February 1981, Revised 17 December 1981.
8. National Security Decision Directive 23, "U.S. Civil Defense Policy," 3 February
1982.
National Security Decision Directive 25, "Preparations for the Economic and
NATO Summits June 1982," 12 February 1982.
National Security Decision Directive 60, "Preparations for the 1983 Summit," 9
October 1983.
National Security Decision Directive 145, "National Policy on Telecommunications
and Information Systems Security," 17 September 1984.
National Security Decision Directive 94, "Commercialization of Expendable Launch
Vehicles," 16 May 1983.
National Security Decision Directive 68, Nuclear Materials, 18 November 1982.
(official title not public).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
NOTES : THE PRESIDENT'S "SECRET LAWS" 83
National Security Decision Directive 138, International Terrorism, 1984. (official
title and exact date not public).
9. National Security Decision Directive 84, "Safeguarding National Security
Information," 11 March 1983.
National Security Decision Directive 196, "Counterintelligence/Countermeasure
Implementation Task Force," 1 November 1985.
10. National Security Decision Directive 100, "Enhanced U.S. Military Activity and
Assistance for the Central American Region," 23 July 1983.
11. John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars, (New York: Wm. Morrow & Co., 1987).
12. Ibid., pp. 371, 379.
See above, n. 5, pp. 173, 174, 187.
13. "Rebel Fund Diversion Rooted in Early Policy," Washington Post, 1 January 1987,
p. Al, A24.
14. Executive Order 12333, Sec. 3 (4 December 1981).
The order provides that "no agency except the CIA ... may conduct any special
activity (elsewhere defined to include covert actions overseas) unless the
President determines that another agency is more likely to achieve a particular
objective."
In its final report issued in 1987, the Iran-contra Committee concluded: "There
was no Presidential determination that the NSC staff should conduct the Contra
covert operation, and thus the NSC staff's covert action in support of the
Contras violated the President's executive order." "Report of the Congressional
Committees Investigating the Iran-Contra Affair," H. Rept. No. 100-433 and S.
Rept. 100-216, 100th Congress, 1st Session, November 1987, p. 416.
15. Testimony by John Poindexter, Iran-contra Hearings, Federal News Service
transcript, 20 July 1987, p. 12-1.
16. "Pentagon Fumbled on TOWS for Iran," Washington Post, 1 August 1987, p. All.
17. "Weinberger Highlights a Problem: Did '85 Sales to Iran Break Law?" Washington
Post, I August 1987, p. A10.
18. See above, n.6.
19. Taking the Stand: The Testimony of Lt. Col. Oliver L. North, (New York: Pocket
Books, 1987), p. 527.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
84 NOTES
20. The Intelligence Oversight Act requires that the intelligence committees of
Congress be provided on request "any information or material concerning
intelligence activities" in the possession of the intelligence community.
21. Prepared testimony of Rep. Anthony C. Beilenson, Committee on Government
Operations Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security, 17 March 1987,
p.1.
22. This system began in 1907 and publication has been required since passage of the
Federal Register Act in 1935 [44 U.S.C.1505(a)].
23. Prepared statement of Harold Relyea, Specialist in American National
Government, Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress. Before the
House Committee on Government Operations, 17 March 1987, p. 2.
24. Angus MacKenzie, "Fit To Be Tied," Quill, July/August 1985, p. 13.
26. General Accounting Office, "Information and Personnel Security: Data on
Employees Affected by Federal Security Programs," GAO/NSIAD-86-189FS,
September 1986, p. 3.
27. National Security Council, "National Policy on Protection of Sensitive, but
Unclassified Information in Federal Government Telecommunications and
Automated Information Systems," NTISSP No. 2, 29 October 1986.
28. The Computer Security Act of 1987, H.R. 145. Introduced 6 January 1987. Passed
by the House of Representatives 22 June 1987.
"To provide for a computer standards program within the National Bureau of
Standards, to provide for Government-wide computer security, and to provide for
the training in security matters of persons who are involved in the management,
operation, and use of Federal computer systems, and for other purposes."
"Reagan Rebuffed on Computer Files: House Bill Wrests Control of Access From
the Military," New York limes, 23 June 1987.
29. Ross Gelspan, "Reagan Seeks Controls On Database Access," Boston Globe, 20
April 1987, p. 36-7.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
"NATIONAL SECURITY" : PASSWORD FOR SECRECY 85
NOTES : "NATIONAL SECURITY" : PASSWORD FOR SECRECY
1. From John Shattuck, "National Security a Decade after Watergate," Democracy 3
(Winter 1983): 57.
2. Lou Cannon, "The High Cost of Secrecy," Washington Post, 20 July 1987, p. A2=
3. E. O. 8381, 5 Federal Register. 1145 et seq. (26 March 1940). Authority derived
from 1938 statute concerning the security of armed forces installations and
equipment and "information relative thereto." (52 Stat. 3)(1938). Power of
enforcement was still vested in the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy.
4. E.O. 10104, "Definitions of Vital Military and Naval Installations and Equipment,"
15 Federal Register, 597 et seq. (1 February 1950). Truman added a fourth
designation, "Top Secret," which paralleled American information classification
categories with those used by our allies, principally the British.
5. E.O. 10290, "Prescribing Regulations Establishing Minimum Standards for the
Classification, Transmission, and Handling, by Departments and Agencies of the
Executive Branch of Official Information Which Requires Safeguarding in the
Interests of the Security of the United States." 16 Federal Register, 9795 et seq.
(27 September 1951).
6. President Eisenhower issued E.O. 10501, "Safeguarding Official Information in the
Interests of the Defense of the United States," 18 Federal Register 7049 et seq.
(9 November 1953).
President Kennedy issued E.O. 10964, 27 Federal Register 8532 et seq. (20
September 1961).
President Nixon issued E.O. 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National
Security Information," 37 Federal Register 5200 et seq. (10 March 1972).
President Carter issued E.O. 12065, 43 Federal Register 28949 (2 July 1978).
President Reagan issued E.O. 12356, "National Security Information," 47 Federal
Register 14874 et seq. (2 April 1982).
7. New York Times Company v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 at 729 (1971).
8.
1979
14,850,000
1984
19,607,736
1980
16,058,764
1985
22,322,895
1981
17,374,102
1982
17,504,611
1983
18,005,151
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Figures for 1979-1980: Annual Report to the President 1980-1981, Information
Security Oversight Office, Washington, D.C., p. 10.
Figures for 1980-1982: Annual Report to the President FY 1982, Information
Security Oversight Office, Washington, D.C., p. 8.
Figures for 1981-1985: Annual Report to the President FY 1985, Information
Security Oversight Office, Washington, D.C., p. 13.
For 1986 the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO) reported "statistical
aberrations" in several categories including "Top Secret," derivative, and
combined classification. See: ISOO, Annual Report To The President, FY 1986,
Washington, D.C., pp. 16-19.
9. Glenn English, "Congressional Oversight of Security Classification Policy,"
Government Infonnation Quarterly, No. 2 (1984), p. 166. The author is Chairman
of the Government Operations Subcommittee on Government Information and
Agriculture in the House of Representatives.
10. E.O. 12065 at Sec.1-101, issued by President Carter.
E.O. 11652, 37 Federal Register, 10053 (19 May 1971), issued by President Nixon.
Implementing directive contained policy.
11. E.O. 12356, at Sec. 1.1(c).
12. E.O. 10964, issued by President Kennedy, 27 Federal Register 8532 (20 September
1961).
E.O. 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information,"
Issued by President Nixon, 37 Federal Register 5200 (10 March 1972).
13. "Security Classification Policy and Executive Order 12356," Committee on
Government Operations, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, House Rept. No. 97-731, (12
August 1982), pp. 24-5.
14. E.O. 12356 at Sec. 3-3.
15. E.O. 12356 at Sec. 3.4.
16. E.O. 12065 at Sec. 1-607. Issued by President Carter.
17. E.O. 12356 at Sec. 1.6(b).
18. James Bamford, The Puzzle Palace, (New York: Penguin Books, 1983).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
NOTES : "NATIONAL SECURITY' : PASSWORD FOR SECRECY 87
19. Alan Adler, "Dangerous Information," First Principles, 7 (July 1982), p.3. Center
for National Security Studies, Washington, D.C.
20. "Agency Demands Documents Back," New York Times, 14 March 1982.
See: "Security Classification Policy and Executive Order 12356," Government
Operations Committee, 97th Congress, 2nd Session, House Rept. No. 97-731, (12
August 1982), p. 22-3.
21. "CIA Veteran Decries Effort to 'Reclassify' Material in His Book," Washington
Post, 4 April 1982, p. A12.
22. Letters from The National Archives to Mr. Stephen Green on file in the House
of Representatives, Government Information Subcommittee on Government
Information, Justice, and Agriculture, Washington, D.C.
"Air Force Pulls Back on '53 Secret Papers," Washington Post, 5 April 1982, p. AS.
23. American Library Association v. William Odom, Director, National Security
Agency, U.S. Court of Appeals (D.C. Circuit) No. 86-5337 (8 May 1987), p. 5.
24. E.O. 12356 at Sec. 1.6.(b).
25. See above, n.9, p. 171.
26. E.O. 12356 at Sec.1.6(c).
27. E.O. 12065 at Sec. 3-303.
28. E.O. 12065 at Sec. 3-301.
29. General Accounting Office, "Continuing Problems in DOD's Classification of
National Security Information," 12 (LCD-80-16), (26 October 1979).
31. "How Public Remarks Became Classified Data," Washington Post, 20 February
1987, p. A18.
32. Committee on Government Operations, "Security Classification Policy and
Executive Order 12356," 97th Congress, 2nd Session, House Rept. No. 97-731 (12
August 1982), pp. 27-49.
33. Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, "United States Counterintelligence
and Security Concerns--1986," House of Representatives, 100th Congress, 1st
Session, Rept. No. 100-5, (4 February 1987).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
34. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Congress, "The Gulf of Tonkin, the
1964 Incidents," 90th Congress, 2nd Session, (20 February 1968), pp. 38-9.
David Wise, The Politics of Lying, (New York: Random House, 1973), pp. 58-9.
35. E.O. 11652, "Classification and Declassification of National Security Information
and Material," issued by President Richard Nixon, Section 9, 2 March 1972.
36. E.O. 12356 at Sec. 4.2.
This provision gives authority to agency heads to "create special access programs
to control access, distribution, and protection of particularly sensitive
information classified pursuant to this Order or predecessor orders." It also
grants the Director of Central Intelligence control over all special access
programs related to "intelligence activities, or intelligence sources or methods."
37. Washington Post, 19 July 1987, Classified Ads, Section 905.
38. "Dancing in the Dark," National Journal, 11 April 1987, p. 867.
39. John Loftus, The Belarus Secret, (New York: Knopf, 1982). The Office of Special
Investigations (OSI) of the criminal division of the Department of Justice, also
known as the Nazi war crimes unit, revealed the State Department's
responsibility for assisting Nazi war criminals to enter the United States and
become U.S. citizens. The OSI investigators had to obtain special clearances
"above Top Secret" to finally uncover the truth. Over time records of the State
Department, the FBI, Immigration and Naturalization Service, and others became
available only through special access clearances, even to investigators in
Congress who were told that no such files existed.
40. E.O. 12356. at Sec. 4.2(b).
41. See above, n. 38, p. 867, 870.
42. Lee Feinstein, "Secret Pentagon Budget Is Bulging: 200 Items On Current 'Black'
List," Cleveland Plain Dealer, 20 February 1987.
43. General Accounting Office, "Information and Personnel Security: Data on
Employees Affected By Federal Security Programs, GAO/NSIAD-86-189-FS,
(September 1986), p. 11.
44. See above, n. 18.
45. See above, n. 38, p. 867.
46. Ibid., p. 871-2.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
NOTES : "NATIONAL SECURITY" : PASSWORD FOR SECRECY 89
47. See above, n. 42.
48. Senator Paul Simon, "The Pentagon's Black Budget," Congressional Record, 18
March 1987, S3418.
49. See above, n. 38.
50. See above, n. 38, p. 873.
51. Louis Fisher, "Confidential Spending and Governmental Accountability," George
Washington Law Review 47 (January 1979): 347.
52. United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166,179 (1973).
53. Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190,194 (D.C. Circuit, 1977).
54. See above, n. 38 p. 869.
55. See above, n. 38, p. 869.
56. See above, n. 48.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
90 NOTES
NOTES: GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES : SWORN TO SECRECY
1. Department of Justice, "Presidential Directive On Safeguarding National Security
Information," (11 March 1983), Issued by Attorney General William French Smith.
2. Department of Justice, "Interdepartmental Report on Unauthorized Disclosures of
Classified Information," (31 March 1982).
3. Angus Mackenzie, "Fit To Be Tied," Quill, July/August 1982, p.13.
4. "White House Acts To Ease Concerns About Polygraphs," New York Times, 21
December 1985, p. Al.
5. "Secrecy Pledges Challenged Openly," Washington Post, 2 September 1987, p. A21.
6. General Accounting Office, "Polygraph and Prepublication Review Policies of
Federal Agencies," (GAO/NSIAD-84-134), Washington, D.C. (11 June 1984), Report
to Rep. Jack Brooks, Chairman, Government Operations Committee.
See: Mark H. Lynch, "Secrecy Agreements and National Security," Government
Information Quarterly, No.2, (1984), p.139.
7. ISOO, Annual Report to the President, FY 1986. Appendix B-Classified
Information Nondisclosure Agreement FY 1986, p.35.
8. "Air Force Aide Balks at Secrecy Pact," New York limes, 4 July 1987.
9. "Air Force Whistle-Blower Could Lose Clearance," Washington Post, 4 July 1987.
10. General Accounting Office, "Information and Personnel Security: Data on
Employees Affected by Federal Security Programs," (GAO/NSIAD-86-189FS)
Washington, D.C. (September 1986), p. 2.
11. Classified Information Nondisclosure Agreement (SF-189), Includes Sample
Indoctrination Briefing, Legislative and Executive Authorities and Questions/
Answers. Prepared by the Directorate of Security Plans and Programs Office of
the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Department of Defense,
Washington, D.C., (July 1985), p. 31.
12. Sen. Charles Grassley (R-IA); Rep. William Ford (D-MI), Chairman, House Post
Office and Civil Service Committee; Rep. John Dingell (D-MI), Chairman, House
Energy and Commerce Committee; and Rep. Patricia Schroeder (D-CO), Chairman,
House Civil Service Subcommittee.
13. 5 U.S.C. Sec. 2302 (b)(8)(A).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
NOTES : GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: SWORN TO SECRECY 91
14. "Air Force Oversteps Security Policy," Washington Post, 24 August 1987, p. AS.
15. "Taking the Pledge," Washington Post, 28 August 1987, p. A21.
16. See above, n. 5.
17. 50 U.S.C. 403(d)(3).
18. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
19. See: Jonathan C. Medow, "The First Amendment and the Secrecy State: Snepp v.
United States," University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 130 (April 1982): 775-
844.
20. Information Security Oversight Office, "National Security Information: Different
Perspectives," Washington, D.C., (5 December 1984), p. 22.
21. Report of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, "Federal Polygraph
and Anti-Censorship Act of 1984," 98th Congress, 2nd Session, Rept. No. 98-961,
Part I, (1 August 1982), p. 14.
22. Ibid., p. 15.
23. See above, n. 9.
24. See above, n. 9.
25. See above, n. 5.
26. Committee on Government Operations Hearing, "Review of the President's
National Security Decision Directive 84 and the Proposed Department of Defense
Directive on Polygraph Use," 98th Congress, 1st Session. (19 October 1983), pp.
158-9.
27. "Seven Former Defense Chiefs See Peril and Promise for U.S.," New York limes,
27 September 1987, p. A16.
28. J. Anthony Lukas, "Class Reunion," New York limes Magazine, 30 August 1987,
p. 24.
29. Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
30. George Lardner, Jr., "Authors of KAL Article Say Agent Warned of Espionage
Law Violations," Washington Post, 3 February 1984, p. A2.
31. United States v. Morison, 604 F.Supp 655 (D. Md. 1985).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
92
NOTES
32.
18 U.S.C. 793(d).
33.
18 U.S.C. 793(3).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
NOTES: RESTRICTING SCIENTIFICAND ACADEMIC FREEDOM 93
NOTES : RESTRICTING SCIENTIFIC AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM
1. Robert L. Park, "The Silent Soviet Submarines," Newsday, 19 July 1987, p. 3.
2. Atomic Energy Act, 60 Stat. 755 (1946), amended 68 Stat. 919 (1956), current
version, 42 U.S.C. 2011-2296 (1976).
3. "The Progressive Case and the Atomic Energy Act: Waking to the Dangers of
Government Information Controls," George Washington Law Review 42 (January
1980):163.
4. 35 U.S.C. 181-188 (1952).
Committee on Government Operations, "The Government's Classification of
Private Ideas," House Rept. 96-1540, 96th Congress, 2nd Session (1980) p. 125.
5. Edward Teller, "Secrecy in Science," Los Angeles Times Magazine, 5 July 1987, p.
4B.
6. Robert L. Park, "Only An Open Society Can Win the Science Race," Newsday, 3
May, 1987, p. 10.
7. "Superconductivity Conference to Exclude Foreign Officials," Washington Post, 25
July 1987, p. A2.
8. "Commercializing Superconductors," Washington Post, 29 July 1987, p. A3.
9. Ibid., Prepared statement of Robert L. Parks, executive director of the American
Physical Society.
10. See above, n. 1.
11. Steven Solomon, "American Laboratories, Foreign Brains," New York Times,
19 July 1987, p. F8.
See also, Roland W. Schmitt, "Export Controls: Balancing Technological
Innovation and National Security," Issues in Science and Technology, 6 (Fall
1984): 117.
12. National Academy of Sciences, Scientific Communication and National Security,
Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1982.
Also, Balancing the National Interest: U.S. National Security Export Controls and
Global Economic Competition, Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1987.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
94 NOTES
13. National Security Study Directive 14-82, "Scientific Communication and National
Security," 23 December 1982.
The president's review was classified and was conducted without input from
universities or other sources outside the federal government.
14. National Security Decision Directive 189, "National Policy on the Transfer of
Scientific, Technical and Engineering Information," 21 September 1985.
15. Harold Relyea, "Increased National Security Controls on Scientific Communication.
Government Information Quarterly, No. 2 (1984): 177.
16. Robert L. Park, '"The Muzzling of American Science," Academe, (September/
October 1986), pp. 19, 20.
17. Nicholas Wade, "Science Meetings Catch the U.S.-Soviet Chill," Science 207
(March 1980): 1056, 1058.
18. Nicholas Wade, "Government Bars Soviets from AVS and OSA Meetings," Physics
Today 33 (April 1980): 81-3.
19. O.N. Garcia, "From the President: On a Matter of Importance -- Technical
Information Flow," Computer (May 1982): p. 7.
20. Jeffrey Smith, "The Mysterious Chinese Luggage Incident," Science 216 (11 June
1982): 1204-5.
21. Robert L. Park, "Science and Secrecy," Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (March
1985): p. 22.
22. Ibid., p. 23.
23. Ibid., p. 23.
24. Ibid., p. 23.
25. "Universities Feel Effect of Information Restriction," Harvard Alumni Gazette,
June 1987, p. 21.
26. "Brief U.S. Suppression of Proof Stirs Anger," New York limes, 17 February
1987, p. C3.
27. See: Jerry Berman, "National Security vs. Access to Computer Databases: A New
Threat to Freedom of Information," First Principles 12 (June 1987): 1, for the
Center for National Security Studies, Washington, D.C.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
28. Presidential Directive 24 (PD-24), 16 November 1977.
29. National Policy on Protection of Sensitive but Unclassified Information in Federal
Government Telecommunications and Automated Information Systems, NTISSP
No. 2,29 October 1986. Section II, Definitions.
30. Information Industry Association, Potential Government Restrictions on United
States Unclassified Commercial Databases, Washington, D.C., (9 March 1987).
31. "Washington Feeling Insecure About Non-Secret Information," New York limes,
30 August 1987, p. E5.
32. H.R. 145, The Computer Security Act of 1987, introduced by Congressman Jack
Brooks (D-TX) and Congressman Dan Glickman (D-KS), January 6 1987.
33. Ross Gelspan, "Reagan Seeks Controls On Database Access," Boston Globe, 20
April 1987, p. 36-7.
34. John Shattuck, "Federal Restrictions on the Free Flow of Academic Information
and Ideas," Office of the Vice-President for Government, Community, and Public
Affairs, Harvard University (January 1985): p. 11, attachment B-F. Reprinted in
Committee on the Judiciary, House of Representatives, "1984: Civil Liberties and
the National Security State," 98th Congress, 1st and 2nd Sessions, Serial No. 103,
p. 827.
35. Barbara Crossette, "State Department is Asking Colleges to Curb Research by
Chinese," New York Times, 27 November 1981, pp. Al, AS.
The requested information included "professional trips" taken by students;
"specific experiments" conducted on campus; use of "instruments or specialized
equipment (e.g. laser measuring devises, automatic analytical equipment,
computers, etc.) that may be used during the course of the study program."
36. Gina Bari Kolata, "Attempts to Safeguard Technology Draw Fire," Science 212 (1
May 1981): 523-526.
37. Eliot Marshall, "Medical Data Bank: A Security Risk?" Science 216 (21 May 1982):
831.
39. "Libraries Are Asked By F.B.I. to Report On Foreign Agents," New York Times,
18 September 1987, pp. Al, B4.
40. 8 U.S.C. 1182(a) et seq.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
41. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
42. On August 28, 1986, a Federal judge ordered the deportation of Margaret
Randall, a controversial poet and writer who teaches at the University of New
Mexico, who gave up her U.S. citizenship to become a Mexican national in 1967.
Others subjected to attacks under McCarran-Walter while working at U.S.
universities include: Dennis Brutus, South African poet and writer, teaching at
Northwestern University; Cosmo Pieterse, tenured professor at Ohio State
University; Angel Rama, a Uruguay native and tenured professor at the
University of Maryland.
In addition, another section of McCarran-Walter, grounds of "prejudicial to the
public interest," have been invoked to deny visas to Nobel Laureates Gabriel
Garcia Marquez and Czelaw Milosz; authors Carlos Fuentes, Graham Greene, and
Farley Mowat; playwright Dario Fo; actress Franca Rama; and Hortensia Allende,
widow of slain Chilean President Salvador Allende. Before Pierre Trudeau became
Prime Minister of Canada, he had been excluded after he attended an
international conference on economics held in Moscow.
43. H.R. 1119 was introduced by Rep. Barney Frank (D-MA) on February 18, 1987. S.
28 was introduced by Sen. Daniel P. Moynihan (D-NY) on January 6, 1987.
44. "Court Upholds Curb on Visa Denials," Washington Post, 20 October 1987, p. A9.
The case involved four speakers who were invited to speak in the U.S. but who
were denied visas in late 1983. The four speakers included Nicaraguan Interior
Minister Tomas Borge; former Italian general Nino Pasti, who belongs to a peace
group allegedly affiliated with the Soviet Union; and two Cuban women allegedly
tied to the communist party there.
See: Reagan v. Abourezk, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C. Circuit, 1986).
See: Reagan v. Abourezk, 56 LW 4001 (U.S. Supreme Court, 1987).
45. "Verbatim: Testing Freedom," New York limes, 17 August 1986, sec. 4, p. 4.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
1. Dom Bonafed, "Muzzling the Media," National Journal 18 (12 July 1986), pp. 1716-
1720.
2. "CIA Weighs Action on Washington Post Article," Washington Post, 22 July 1986.
3. Of particular sensitivity was the reported ability of the National Security Agency
to intercept and decode messages of other nations, including allies and neutrals.
As noted in: Samuel G. Freedman, "Newspaper Cites Official Pressure," New York
Times, 18 May 1986, p. All.
4. 604 F.Supp 655, (D. Md. 1985). Espionage law involved is 18. U.S.C. 793 (d)(e).
5. "State Dept. Acted to Block U.S.-Egypt Attack on Libya," Washington Post, 20
February 1987, pp. Al, A27.
6. "The Reagan Administration and the News Media," The Reporters Committee for
Freedom of the Press, March 1987, p.49.
8. "Speakes Defends Administration's Controls Over Public Information," Los Angeles
Times, 27 September 1986.
9. National Security Decision Directive 84, "Safeguarding National Security
Information," 11 March 1983, sec. ld.
10. "U.S. Restricts Reporters In Bid To End News Leaks," Wall Street Journal, 25
October 1983, sec. 2, p. 53.
11. "State Department Bureau Bars Talks With Former Chief," Washington Post, 1
March 1985, p. A6.
12. "F.B.I. Unit Tracing Some Disclosures to Press," New York Times, 2 October
1986, pp. Al, A18.
13. Norman J. Ornstein, "North Errs on Leaks By Congress," New York Times, 17
July 1987.
14. "Executive Branch Leads The Leakers," Washington Post, 28 July 1987, p. A13.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
NOTES : CITIZEN ACCESS : THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT
1. The Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C., Sec. 552.
2. Washington Star, 3 August 1978, p. A10. FOIA requester, Washington Star.
3. Common Cause Magazine, August 1981, pp.16-23. FOIA requester, Common Cause.
4. "Crisis Intervention for Traditionalists?" Washington Post, 24 June 1986, p. A24.
Senator Edward M. Kennedy, "Freedom of Information After Twenty Years,"
Congressional Record, (26 June 1986), S8773-8775.
5. "Documents Show FBI Kept Files on Leading U.S. Writers," Washington Post, 30
September 1987, pp. Al, AT
6. "Carcinogen Found in Many Liquor Products," Washington Post, 31 July 1987. 802
wines and spirits were tested, 95 of which would not meet Canada's import
health standards. FOIA requester, The Center for Science in the Public Interest.
7. Testimony of Dr. Sidney Wolfe, House Subcommittee on Government Information,
Justice, and Agriculture. Hearings on S.744, May-August 1984. FOIA requester,
Public Citizen Health Research Group.
8. FOIA requester, Dr. Nancy Lord, Potomac, Maryland.
9. New York Times, 21 July 1975, p. 31. FOIA requester, The Corporate
Accountability Group.
10. "NASA Wasted Billions, Federal Audits Disclose," New York Times, 23 April 1986,
p. Al.
11. San Francisco Examiner, 14 January 1979, p. 13. FOIA requester, United Press
International.
12. Jack Nelson, "The Information Act Comes Under Siege," Los Angeles Times, 23
March 1986, p. Al.
13. "Administration Calls FOIA 'Overrated,' Seeks Wide-Ranging Restrictions on It,"
Washington Post, 16 October 1981.
14. Harold Relyea, "Increased National Security Controls on Scientific Communication.
Government Information Quarterly, No. 2 (1984), p. 177.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
15. Pub. L. No. 99-570, Sec. 1801-1804, 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-48 (1986). See 5 U.S.C.
552(a)(4)(A)(i), as amended.
16. "Uniform FOIA Fee Schedule and Guidelines," Federal Register 10012 (27 March
1987).
17. "New FOIA Free Waiver Policy Guidance," Department of Justice Memorandum,
issued by Stephen J. Markman, Assistant Attorney General for Legal Policy,
Office of Legal Policy, 2 April 1987.
18. E.O. 12600, "Predisclosure Notification Procedures for Confidential Commercial
Information," issued by President Ronald Reagan, (23 June 1987).
19. See: Section 3201, "Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1987," H.R. 1155,
introduced in the House by Rep. Robert Michel (R-IL), House Minority Leader.
20. See above, n. 14.
21. "Freedom of Information Act Changes," Congressional Record, (15 October 1986),
S16504.
22. Eve Pell, "FOIAbles of the New Drug Law," Nation, 13 December 1986, pp. 666-667.
23. Senator Orrin Hatch, "Freedom of Information Act Changes," Congressional
Record, (15 October 1986), S16505.
24. Congressman Glenn English, "Implementation of the Freedom of Information
Reform Act," Congressional Record, (22 April 1987).
25. Letter from U.S. Air Force Freedom of Information Manager. Identity of
requester withheld for confidentiality,
26. Letter from the Director, Freedom of Information and Security Review, Office of
Assistant Secretary of Defense. Name of requester withheld for confidentiality.
27. See above, n. 24.
28. Ibid.
29. Cover letter from the General Counsel, Executive Office of the President, Office
of Management and Budget, sending proposed executive order, 13 February 1987.
30. 5 U.S.C., Sec. 1(b)(4).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Committee on Governmental Affairs, "Preliminary Catalogue of Office of
Management and Budget Authorities and Directives," Office of Management and
Budget: Evolving Roles and Issues, United States Senate, 99th Congress, 2nd
Session, S. Rept. 99-134, (February 1986), pp. 395, 407.
2. 22 U.S.C. 2576(b).
3. E.O. 12322, 46 Federal Register 46561 (17 September 1981). All reports, plans or
proposals relating to Federal or federally assisted water and related land
resources projects submitted to Congress must be submitted beforehand for
review and advice by OMB and when submitted to the Congress it must contain
the advice received.
4. Ibid., p. XII.
5. OMB had been granted powers of limited information and regulatory review by
the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (44 U.S.C. 3504). The Paperwork Reduction
Act created the OMB Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) for
the purpose of reducing the volume and duplication of government paperwork.
President Reagan broadened OIRA's role primarily by executive orders 12291 and
12498.
For a fuller discussion of the intent and limits of the statutory powers of OIRA,
see: OMB Watch, Washington, D.C., "OMB Control of Government Information,"
Eye On Paperwork, 2, (27 January 1986).
6. Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, "EPA's
Asbestos Regulations -- A Case Study on OMB Interference in Agency
Rulemaking," Committee Print 99-V, 99th Congress, 1st session (October 1985),
P.V.
Congressional concern over OMB was manifested in a number of hearings and
other actions. One such action came in the form of a 1985 amicus curae brief
filed by Members of Congress including the Chairmen of the House Committees
on the Judiciary, Energy and Commerce, Government Operations, Education and
Labor, and Post Office and Civil Service. The brief was filed in support of a
lawsuit challenging OMB's interference with a proposed Occupational Safety and
Health Administration rule regarding exposure to ethylene oxide. The suit was
filed by the Public Citizen Health Research Group.
7. OMB Circular A-130, -titled "Management of Federal Resources", 50 Federal
Register 52730, (24 December 1985).
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
NOTES : THE OFFICE OFMANAGEMENTAND BUDGET 101
8. U.S. Code, Title 44, section 1108, enacted May 11, 1922, section 1.
9. Statement by President Ronald Reagan, Weekly Compilation of Presidential
Documents, April 20, 1981.
10. OMB Bulletin, "Elimination of Wasteful Spending on Government Periodicals,
Pamphlets, and Audiovisual Products," 81-16 (21 April 1981): sec. 5, 7, 8.
11. U.S. Office of Management and Budget, "List of Government Publications
Terminated and Consolidated by Agency," Washington, D.C., (1982).
"Government Restricting the Flow of Information to the Public," New York
Times, 12 November 1982.
12. Judith E. Stokes, "Federal Publications Cutbacks: Implications for Libraries,"
Government Information Quarterly, No. 1 (1984): 49-50.
13. Office of Management and Budget, "Second Annual Report on Eliminations,
Consolidations, and Cost Reductions of Government Publications," (6 January
1984).
14. "OMB Control of Government Publications: Review and Elimination," OMB Watch,
Washington, D.C., (May 1986), p.10.
15. Ibid., p. 11.
"Abridging Government Information: The Reagan Administration's War on Waste,"
Dartmouth College Library Bulletin, (April 1985), p. 58.
16. OMB Circular A-3, "Government Publications," (2 May 1985). Replacing OMB
Circular A-3, "Government Periodicals," (18 May 1972).
17. The new regulations, Federal Acquisition Circular 84-25, amend the Federal
Acquisition Regulation. They appear as a final rule in the Federal Register 52 (20
March 1987):9036.
18. Representative Major R. Owens, "A New Attack On The Right To Know,"
Congressional Record, (8 July 1987), E2772.
19. OMB Watch, Washington, D.C., Monthly Review, 2 (28 February 1987): 5.
20. OMB Watch, Washington, D.C., Monthly Review, 2 (28 February 1987): 10.
21. "OMB Effort to Curb Data Disputed," Washington Post, 15 May 1985.
22. "OMB Reverses Decision To Prohibit Collection Of Data on Race, Gender,"
Washington Post, 26 June 1985.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
23. OMB Watch, Washington, D.C., "OMB Control of Government Information," Eye
On Paperwork, No.1 (27 January 1986): 8.
24. Ibid., p. 9.
25. OMB Watch, Washington, D.C., Monthly Review 7 (30 July 1987): 10.
26. Ibid.
27. See above, n. 18, p. 10.
28. E.O. 12291, 46 Federal Register 13193 (19 February 1981).
E.O. 12498, (4 January 1985). 50 Federal Register 1036, (8 January 1985).
29. See: OMB Watch, Washington, D.C., Through The Corridors Of Power. A Guide to
Federal Rulemaking, (1987).
See: Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, "Oversight of the Office of
Management and Budget Regulatory Review and Planning Process," 99th Congress,
2nd Session, S. Rept. 99-839, (28 January 1986).
See: "Regulatory Policy," The Urban Institute Press, Washington, D.C., The
Reagan Experiment,(1982), pp. 129-153.
30. Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, "Office of Management and
Budget Influence on Agency Regulations," S. Rept. 99-156, 99th Congress, 2nd
Session (May 1986), p. ix.
31. Environmental Defense Fund v. Lee M. Thomas, Administrator, U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency, et al., U.S. District Court for the District of
Columbia, Civil Action No. 85-1747, filed January 23, 1986, p. 9.
See: Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works, "Office of Management
and Budget Influence on Agency Regulations," S. Print 99-156, 99th Congress, 2d
Session (May 1986), p. vii.
32. Tim Miller, "The O.M.B. Writes A Prescription," The Nation, 31 March 1984, p.
383.
33. Richard C. Thompson, "Reye Syndrome Spells Caution to Parents," FDA Consumer,
October 1982, pp. 19-21.
"Ads to Warn of Possible Link Between Aspirin, Reye's Syndrome," Washington
Post, 21 September 1982.
34. See above, n. 27.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
NOTES : THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET 103
35. See above, n. 27.
36. See above, n. 27, p. 384.
37. "Reye's Syndrome Found Widespread," Washington Post, 21 July 1983, p. A17.
38. "Study Reported to Tighten Link Of Aspirin and Reye's Syndrome," New York
limes, 9 January 1985.
39. "Warning to Go on Aspirin Labels," New York limes, 24 January 1985.
40. House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations,
"EPA's Asbestos Regulations -- A Case Study On OMB Interference In
Agency Rulemaking," Committee Print 99-V, 99th Congress, 1st Session (October
1985) p. iv.
41. OMB Watch, Washington, D.C., "OMB Control Of Rulemaking: The End of Public
Access," (1985), pp. 10-11.
42. "OMB Official Said Agency Would Fight an Asbestos Ban," Washington Post, 9
May 1986, p. A2.
43. See above, n. 26, p.21-2.
44. -"The Silent Shift of Power," Newsday, 4 May 1986, p.7.
45. E.O. 12291, 46 Federal Register 13193 (19 February 1981).
46. E.O. 12498, (4 January 1985). 50 Federal Register 1036, (8 January 1985).
47. See above, n. 1, p. XIII.
48. "'Defunding' OMB's Rule Reviewers," Washington Post, 30 July 1986.
"Lawmakers Want To Dethrone Rule Reviewers," Washington Post, 22 May 1986.
49. OMB Watch, Washington, D.C., OMB Watcher, (9 July 1987), p. 10.
50. Review of the administrative procedures for Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, determining the existence of racially discriminatory voting practices.
51. Revisions for the standards for Intermediate Care Facilities for the Mentally
Retarded, 51 Federal Register 7520.
52. Cancer Risk Guidelines, 29 CFR 1990.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
53. "OMB Seeks Restrictions on Agency Studies," Washington Post, 25 April 1985.
54. Committee on Government Operations, "Occupational Health Hazard Surveillance:
72 Years Behind And Counting," 99th Congress, 2nd Session, House Rept. 99-979,
(8 October 1986), p. 27.
55. "OMB Review of CDC Research: Impact of the Paperwork Reduction Act,"
Released by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce.
56. See above, n. 39, p. 10.
57. Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report, 35 (29 August 1986): 538.
58. "Reproductive Health Hazards in the Workplace," U.S. Congress, Office of
Technology Assessment, OTA-BA-266, (December 1985), p. 33.
See above, n. 39, pp. 7-8.
59. See above, n. 39, pp. 10-11.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Appendix A
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
NATIONAL SECUTRTTY DECISION DIRECTIVES
National Security Decision Directives (NSDD) do not appear in published records of the
president or the National Security Council. The following list of NSDDs has been
compiled from those publicly known to exist. Some are now declassified, in partial or
whole form, and are in the National Archives, Washington, D.C., Record Group 273,
Records of the National Security Council.
* Indicates general subject and/or date, but specific title and/or date not public.
NSDD 1 "National Security Council Directives," February 25, 1981. Revised,
December 17, 1981.
NSDD 2 "National Security Council Structure," January 12, 1982.
NSDD 3 "Crisis Management -- Special Situation Group," 1981.
NSDD 5 "Conventional Arms Transfer Policy," July 8, 1981.
NSDD 6 "United States Non-Proliferation and Peaceful Nuclear Cooperation
Policy," July 16, 1981.
NSDD 8 Space Transportation System Policy, 1981.
NSDD 12 "Strategic Forces Modernization Program," October 1, 1981.
NSDD 13 "Nuclear Weapons Employment Policy." *
NSDD 17 Deterring Cuban Models / Covert Action in Nicaragua, November 23,
1981. *
NSDD 19 "Protection of Classified National Security Council and Intelligence
Information," January 12, 1982.
NSDD 22 "Designation of Intelligence Officials Authorized to Request FBI
Collection of Foreign Intelligence," January 29, 1982.
NSDD 23 "U.S. Civil Defense Policy," February 3, 1982.
NSDD 25 "Preparations for the Economic and NATO Summits, June 1982," February
12, 1982.
NSDD 26 "U.S. Civil Defense Policy," March 16, 1982.
NSDD 30 Anti-terrorist Policy / State Department, 1982.
NSDD 32 National Strategy, May 1982. *
NSDD 35 MX Basing Mode, May 17, 1982.
NSDD 38 "Staffing At Diplomatic Missions and Their Constituent Posts," June 2,
1982.
NSDD 42 National Space Policy, 1982.
NSDD 47 "Emergency Mobilization Preparedness," July 22, 1982.
NSDD 50 Space International Payloads, August 6, 1982. *
NSDD 60 "Preparations for the 1983 Summit," October 9, 1982.
NSDD 68 Nuclear Materials, November 18,1982. *
NSDD 75 Strategy Regarding Soviet Union/Covert Operation.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
NSDD 77 "Management of Public Diplomacy Relative to National Security," January
14,1983.
NSDD 80 "Shuttle Orbiter Production Capability," February 3, 1983.
NSDD 84 "Safeguarding National Security Information," March 11, 1983.
NSDD 85 "Eliminating the Threat from Ballistic Missiles," March 25, 1983.
NSDD 89 "The Export Administration Act," April 11, 1983.
NSDD 90 "United States Arctic Policy," April 14, 1983.
NSDD 91 ICBM Guidance, April 1983. *
NSDD 93 "Refugee Policy and Processing Refugees from Indochina," May 13, 1983.
NSDD 94 "Commercialization of Expendable Launch Vehicles," May 16, 1983.
NSDD 97 "National Security Telecommunications Policy," August 3, 1983.
NSDD 99 Lebanon. *
NSDD 100 "Enhanced U.S. Military Activity and Assistance for the Central
American Region," July 28, 1983.
NSDD 102 "U.S. Response to Soviet Destruction of KAL Airliner," September 5,
1983.
NSDD 111 Middle East Policy, October 29, 1983. *
NSDD 113 Radio Telephone COMSEC Government Limousines.
NSDD 119 Strategic Defense Initiative, 1984. *
NSDD 124 U.S. Objectives in Central America and Mexico, February 1984.*
NSDD 127 Strategic Policy. *
NSDD 138 International Terrorism, 1984.
NSDD 143 U.S. Third World Hunger Relief: Emergency Assistance," July 9, 1984.
NSDD 144 National Space Strategy, August 15, 1984. *
NSDD 145 "National Policy on Telecommunications and Automated Information
Systems Security," September 17, 1984.
NSDD 156 "U.S. Third World Food Aid: A 'Food For Progress' Program," January 3,
1985.
NSDD 159 "Covert Action Policy Approval and Coordination Procedures,"
January 18, 1985.
NSDD 164 "National Security Launch Strategy," February 25, 1985.
NSDD 166 U.S. Support to Afghan Rebels, April, 1985. *
NSDD 167 "Food For Progress Program Implementation," April 29, 1985.
NSDD 168 "U.S. Policy Towards North Africa," April 30, 1985.
NSDD 172 Strategic Defense Initiative, 1985. *
NSDD 175 "Establishment of a Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management,"
June 17, 1985.
NSDD 178 Strategic Policy.
NSDD 179 "Task Force on Combating Terrorism," July 20, 1985.
NSDD 181 Space Shuttle Pricing Policy, August 1, 1985. *
NSDD 189 "National Policy on the Transfer of Scientific, Technical, and
Engineering Information," September 21, 1985.
NSDD 192 SDI/Narrow Interpretation of ABM Treaty, October 12, 1985.
NSDD 196 "Counterintelligence / Countermeasure Implementation Task Force,"
November 1, 1985.
NSDD 197 "Reporting Hostile Contacts and Security Awareness," November 1, 1985.
NSDD 201 "National Security Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications Funding,"
December 17, 1985.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
NSDD 202 Arms Control. *
NSDD 207 Protection of Spouse of Foreign Heads of State. *
NSDD 219 Blue Ribbon Commission on Defense Management, April 1, 1986.
*
NSDD ? "Narcotics and National Security," April 8, 1986.
NSDD 254 "United States Space Launch Strategy," December 27, 1986.
NSDD 259 "U.S. Civil Defense Policy," February 9, 1987.
NSDD 266 "Implementation of the Recommendations of the President's Special
Review Board," March 31, 1987.
NSDD 276 "National Security Council Interagency Process," June 9, 1987.
NSDD 280 "National Airlift Policy," June 24, 1987.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Appendix B
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Extract From National Security Decision Directive 159
January 18, 1985
COVERT ACTION POLICY APPROVAL
AND COORDINATION PROCEDURES
Approval Procedures for Intelligence
1. Presidential Findings. The President shall approve
all covert action Findings in writing. Under Section 662 of
the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, all covert
actions undertaken by the Central Intelligence Agency must be
authorized by a Presidential Finding that each such operation
is important to US national security. E.O. 12333 and this
Directive establish that covert actions (intelligence "special
activities") undertaken by components other than CIA also
require a Presidential Finding. Each covert action is also
considered a significant anticipated intelligence activity
under Section 501 of time National Security Act and is subject
to certain Congressional reporting procedures. The
Congressional reporting procedures for significant intelligence
activities apply to all agencies of the intelligence community.
Findings shall remain valid until formally cancelled. U~'f
2. In accordance with Executive Order 12333, the Contra.
Intelligence Agency shall conduct covert actions unless the
President specifically designates another agency of the govern-
ment. When the provision of substantial support by one govern-
ment component to another is essential to to conduct of a
covert action, indication of the extent and nature of that
support shall be included as part of the Finding or Memorandar
of Notificaff'on. However, the provision of routine support in
the forts of personnel, funds, equipment, supplies, transporta-
tion, training, logistics, and facilities by Government compo-
nents other than CIA to support a covert action shall not in
itself be considered a 'separate covert action by the supplying'
agency. (V)
L
.,e SS..~~ 14gi
'IS of ^ 12'56
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Appendix C
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION NONDISCLOSURE AGREEMENT
An Agreement Between and the United States
(Name - Printed or Typed)
1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the obligations contained in this Agreement in consideration of my being granted access to classified
information. As used in this Agreement, classified information is information that is either classified or classifiable under the standards of Executive Order
12356, or under any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest of national security. I
understand and accept that by being granted access to classified information, special confidence and trust shall be placed in me by the United States
Government.
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a security indoctrination concerning the nature and protection of classified information, including the pro-
cedures to be followed in ascertaining whether other persons to whom I contemplate disclosing this information have been approved for access to it, and
that I understand these procedures.
3. 1 have been advised and am aware that direct or indirect unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized retention, or negligent handling of classified informa-
tion by me could cause irreparable injury to the United States or could be used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree that I will never divulge
such information unless I have officially verified that the recipient has been properly authorized by the United States Government to receive it or I have
been given prior written notice of authorization from the United States Government Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or Agency) last
granting me a security clearance that such disclosure is permitted. I further understand that I am obligated to comply with laws and regulations that
prohibit the unauthorized disclosure of classified information.
4. I have been advised and am aware that any breach of this Agreement may result in the termination of any security clearances I hold; removal from any
position of special confidence and trust requiring such clearances; and the termination of my employment or other relationships with the Departments or
Agencies that granted my security clearance or clearances. In addition, I have been advised and am aware that any unauthorized disclosure of classified
information by me may constitute a violation or violations of United States criminal laws, including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and
952, Title 18, United States Code, the provisions of Section 783(b), Title 50, United States Code, and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities Protec-
tion Act of 1982. I recognize that nothing in this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory
violation.
5. I hereby assign to the United States Government all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that have resulted, will result or may result from any
disclosure, publication, or revelation not consistent with the terms of this Agreement.
6. 1 understand that the United States Government may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this Agreement including, but not limited to, applica-
tion for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information in breach of this Agreement.
7. 1 understand that all information to which I may obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and will forever remain the property of the United
States Government. I do not now, nor will I ever, possess any right, interest, title, or claim whatsoever to such information. I agree that I shall return all
materials which have, or may have, come into my possession or for which I am responsible because of such access, upon demand by an authorized repre-
sentative of the United States Government or upon the conclusion of my employment or other relationship with the Department or Agency that last
granted me a security clearance. If I do not return such materials upon request, I understand that this may be a violation of Section 793, Title 18, United
States Code, a United States criminal law.
8. Unless and until I am released in writing by an authorized representative of the United States Government, I understand that all conditions and obliga-
tions imposed upon me by this Agreement apply during the time I am granted access to classified information, and at all times thereafter.
9. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If a court should find any provision of this Agreement to be unenforceable, all other provisions of this
Agreement shall remain in full force and effect.
10. I have read this Agreement carefully and my questions, if any, have been answered to my satisfaction. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has
made available to me Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952 of Title 18, United States Code, Section 783(b) of Title 50, United States Code, the Intelli-
gence Identities Protection Act of 1982, and Executive Order 12356, so that I may read them at this time, if I so choose.
SOCIAL SECURITY NO. (See
notice below)
The execution of this Agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who, on behalf of the United States Govern-
ment, agreed to its terms and accepted it as a prior condition of authorizing access to classified information.
NOTICE: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies Inform Individuals, at the time Information Is solicited from them, whether the
disclosure Is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such Information is solicited and what uses will be made of the Information. You are hereby
advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Account Number (SSN) Is Executive Order 9397. Your SSN will be used to Identify you pre-
cisely when it is necessary to 1) certify that you have access to the Information Indicated above or 2) determine that your access to the Information
Indicated has terminated. Although disclosure of your SSN Is not mandatory, your failure to do so may Impede the processing of such certifications or
determinations.
STANDARD FORM 189 (8-83)
Prescribed by GSA/ISOO
e.en 1e1"
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Appendix D
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Nondisclosure Agreement
1. Intending to be legally bound, I hereby accept the
obligations contained in this Agreement in consider-
ation of my being granted access to information
known as Sensitive Compartmented Information
(SCI). I have been advised and am aware that SCI
involves or derives from intelligence sources or meth-
ods and is classified or classifiable under the stand-
ards of Executive Order 12356 or under other Execu-
tive order or statute. I understand and accept that by
being granted access to SCI, special confidence and
trust shall be placed in me by the United States
Government.
2. I hereby acknowledge that I have received a
security indoctrination concerning the nature and
protection of SCI, including the procedures to be
followed in ascertaining whether other persons to
whom I contemplate disclosing this information have
been approved for access to it, and that I understand
these procedures. I understand that I may be required
to sign subsequent agreements as a condition of being
granted access to different categories of SCI. I further
understand that all my obligations under this Agree-
ment continue to exist whether or not I am required to
sign such subsequent agreements.
3. 1 have been advised and am aware that direct or
indirect unauthorized disclosure, unauthorized reten-
tion, or negligent handling of SCI by me could cause
irreparable injury to the United States or could be
used to advantage by a foreign nation. I hereby agree
that I will never divulge such information unless I
have officially verified that the recipient has been
properly authorized by the United States Government
to receive it or I have been given prior written notice
of authorization from the United States Government
Department or Agency (hereinafter Department or
Agency) last granting me either a security clearance
or an SCI access approval that such disclosure is
permitted.
4. I further understand that I am obligated to comply
with laws and regulations that prohibit the unautho-
rized disclosure of classified information. As used in
this Agreement, classified information is information
that is classified under the standards of E.O. 12356,
or under any other Executive order or statute that
prohibits the unauthorized disclosure of information
in the interest of national security.
5. In consideration of being granted access to SCI
and of being assigned or retained in a position of
special confidence and trust requiring access to SCI
and other classified information, I hereby agree to
submit for security review by the Department or
Agency last granting me either a security clearance or
an SCI access approval all materials, including works
of fiction, that I contemplate disclosing to any person
not authorized to have such information, or that I
have prepared for public disclosure, which contain or
purport to contain:
(a) any SCI, any description of activities that
produce or relate to SCI, or any information
derived from SCI;
(b) any classified information from intelligence
reports or estimates; or
(c) any information concerning intelligence activ-
ities, sources or methods.
I understand and agree that my obligation to submit
such information and materials for review applies
during the course of my access to SCI and at all times
thereafter. However, I am not required to submit for
review any such materials that exclusively contain
information lawfully obtained by me at a time when I
have no employment, contract or other relationship
with the United States Government, and which are to
be published at such time.
6. 1 agree to make the submissions described in
paragraph 5 prior to discussing the information or
materials with, or showing them to anyone who is not
authorized to have access to such information. I
further agree that I will not disclose such information
or materials unless I have officially verified that the
recipient has been properly authorized by the United
States Government to receive it or I have been given
written authorization from the Department or Agency
last granting me either a security clearance or an SCI
access approval that such disclosure is permitted.
7. 1 understand that the purpose of the review de-
scribed in paragraph 5 is to give the United States a
reasonable opportunity to determine whether the in-
formation or materials submitted pursuant to para-
graph 5 set forth any SCI or other information that is
subject to classification under E. O. 12356 or under
any other Executive order or statute that prohibits the
unauthorized disclosure of information in the interest
of national security. I further understand that the
Department or Agency to which I have submitted
materials will act upon them coordinating with the
Intelligence Community or other agencies when ap-
propriate, and substantively respond to me within 30
working days from date of receipt.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9 I
8. 1 have been advised and am aware that any breach
of this Agreement may result in the termination of
any security clearances and SCI access approvals that
I may hold; removal from any position of special
confidence and trust requiring such clearances or
access approvals; and the termination of my employ-
ment or other relationships with the Departments or
Agencies that granted my security clearances or SCI
access approvals. In addition, I have been advised and
am aware that any unauthorized disclosure of SCI or
other classified information by me may constitute a
violation or violations of United States criminal laws,
including the provisions of Sections 641, 793, 794,
798, and 952, Title 18, United States Code, the
provisions of Section 783 (b), Title 50, United States
Code and the provisions of the Intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1982. 1 recognize that nothing in
this Agreement constitutes a waiver by the United
States of the right to prosecute me for any statutory
violation.
right, interest, title, or claim whatsoever to such
information. I agree that I shall return all materials
which have or may come into my possession or for
which I am responsible because of such access, upon
demand by an authorized representative of the United
States Government or upon the conclusion of my
employment or other relationship with the Depart-
ment or Agency that last granted me either a security
clearance or an SCI access approval. If I do not return
such materials upon request, I understand that this
may be a violation of Section 793, Title 18, United
States Code, a United States criminal law.
12. Unless and until I am released in writing by an
authorized representative of the United States Gov-
ernment, I understand that all conditions and obliga-
tions imposed upon me by this Agreement apply
during the time I am granted access to SCI and at all
times thereafter.
13. Each provision of this Agreement is severable. If
a court should find any provision of this Agreement to
be unenforceable, all other provisions of this Agree-
ment shall remain in full force and effect.
9. 1 hereby assign to the United States Government
all royalties, remunerations, and emoluments that
have resulted, will result, or may result from any
disclosure, publication, or revelation not consistent
with the terms of this Agreement.
10. 1 understand that the United States Government
may seek any remedy available to it to enforce this
Agreement including, but not limited to, application
for a court order prohibiting disclosure of information
in breach of this Agreement.
11. I understand that all information to which I may
obtain access by signing this Agreement is now and
will forever remain the property of the United States
Government. I do not now, nor will I ever, possess any
14. I have read this Agreement carefully and my
questions, if any, have been answered to my satisfac-
tion. I acknowledge that the briefing officer has made
available to me Sections 641, 793, 794, 798, and 952
of Title 18, United States Code, Section 783 (b) of
Title 50, United States Code, the Intelligence Identi-
ties Protection Act of 1982, and Executive Order
12356 so that I may read them at this time, if I so
choose.
15. 1 make this Agreement without mental reserva-
tion or purpose of evasion.
The execution of this Agreement was witnessed by the undersigned, who, on behalf of the United States Government, agreed to its terms and
accepted it-as a prior condition of authorizing access to Sensitive Compartmented Information.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
Sensitive Compartmented Information
Nondisclosure Agreement
SECURITY BRIEFING
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
SFN
I hereby acknowledge that I was briefed on the following SCI
Special Access Program(s):
I certify that the above SCI access(es) were approved in accordance with relevant SCI procedures and that the briefing
presented by me on the above date was also in accordance therewith.
SECURITY DEBRIEFING
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT
Having been reminded of my continuing obligation to comply with
the terms of this Agreement, I hereby acknowledge that I was
debriefed on the following SCI Special Access Program(s):
Notice: The Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. 552a, requires that federal agencies inform individuals, at the time information is solicited from them,
whether the disclosure is mandatory or voluntary, by what authority such information is solicited, and what uses will be made of the
information. You are hereby advised that authority for soliciting your Social Security Account Number (SSN) is Executive Order 9397.
Your SSN will be used to identify you precisely when it is necessary to I) certify that you have access to the information indicated above, 2)
determine that your access to the information indicated has terminated, or 3) certify that you have witnessed a briefing or debriefing. Al-
though disclosure of your SSN is not mandatory, your failure to do so may impede the processing of such certifications or determinations.
FORM 4193 OBSOLETE PREVIOUS IRphn? Farm. 4066. 3968, 4193. sd 4193b
9-83 EDITIONS which vo obrohno and w$ nor b. aud.3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9
"I know of no safe depository of the
ultimate powers of society, but the
01 1
but to inform their on
eclassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/13: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000030039-9