TALKING POINTS FOR THE DDCI GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE STATUS OF THE ALL-UNION PARTY CONFERENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R002000030031-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 31
• Publication Date: April 29, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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vvasrungion, 41505
(/' '4?-s\
Public Affairs
[phone]
STAT
29 April 1988
Diane:
Here is background information used in
preparing these talking points. Bob might find
it useful after his trip.
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Con tial
TALKING POINTS FOR THE DDCI
GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL SITUATION AND THE STATUS OF
THE ALL-UNION PARTY CONFERENCE
General Secretary Gorbachev appears in a strengthened position within the Soviet
leadership following Pravda's attack on a Sovetskaya Rossiya letter that was harshly
critical of perestroika. "Second Secretary" Yegor Ligachev has lost ground as a result of
the exchange, but he and other more conservative party leaders will pose a formidable
obstacle to party radicals who hope to use the forthcoming All-Union Party Conference to
secure far-reaching political reforms.
I. Gorbachev on the Offensive
The General Secretary is regaining the momentum that he lost last fall in the wake of the
Yel'tsin affair. He owes his turnaround at least in part to an opportunity from an
unexpected quarter" opponents of perestroika.
o Gorbachev began his counteroffensive at the February Central Committee
plenum, where he delivered an assertive defense of his restructuring policies
which had come under increasing attack from Ligachev, KGB Chief Chebrikov
and others over the preceding months.
Leadership disagreements over the pace and scope of reform burst into the open with
Pravda's publication of a sharply-worded editorial attacking a neo-Stalinist critique of
perestroika--ostensibly written by a Leningrad university lectureer named Andreyeva
that appeared in Sovetskaya Rossiya, the Russian Republic's government newspaper in
March.
o Andreyeva's letter appeared on 13 March, the day before Gorbachev and his
close Politburo ally Aleksandr Yakovlev traveled abroad. Its publication was
reportedly approved by Ligachev.
Upon returning to Moscow, Gorbachev and Yakovlev were reportedly furious with the
Sovetskaya Rossiya piece and ordered Pravda's rebuttal.
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The conservatives, and most likely Ligachev. are now on the defensive.
o Gorbachev -- by practically accusing conservatives of forming an opposition
-- has limited Ligachev's room for articulating an effective alternative to
perestroika in its present form
? Pravda's counterattack has laid the groundwork for other, more virulent,
media assaults on Sovetskaya Rossiya. and Soviet newspapers have
published numerous letters voicing support for Pravda. Sovetskaya Rossiya
reprinted the Pravda editorial and aoologized for oublishing Andreyeva's
article
Ligachev's future in the leadership may be in doubt.
Gorbachev received Politburo support at the 30 March
meeting for a, resolution calling for Ligachev's removal.
While Gorbachev has regained momentum ' faces considerable resistance to his
reforms within the party.
o Ligachev probably has a lame 1:!0C C't suoporters in the Central Committee
who feel he is politically more erthodoY -- and therefore less threatening --
than Gorbachev.
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o Some Soviet sources claim that the party is deeply divided over the issue of
political orthodoxy, and Pravda's mail over the press 25X1
dispute is almost evenly split
II. Party Conference Preparations
Gorbachev's renewed offensive comes at a crucial time in the lead up to the All-Union
Party Conference scheduled to begin on 28 June 1988, particularly since the first stage in
the preparations for the conference had shown minimal results.
o The special nationwide regional party plenums held November-January 1987
failed to remove many entrenched and uncooperative leaders and did little to
promote proposals for the radical "democratization" of the party Gorbachev
apparently hopes to achieve at the conference.
In recent weeks there have been signs Gorbachev s drive to restructure the political
system is now gathering momentum. The press has begun to publish reform proposals
which raise the most serious and contentious ideas, particularly:
o electing party leaders by secret ballot with a choice of candidates,
o limiting of terms of office to a maximum of 8-10 years.
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o changing the occupational composition of the Central Committee to reduce
the influence of entrenched party elites and government ministers,
o reducing the size of the party apparatus by eliminating the branch economic
departments,
o forming a national-front-type organization, similar to those found in Eastern
Europe, that would include other political groups besides the communist
party.
The extent of support for such proposals is unclear however. and Gorbachev faces a
significant challenge as he seeks to lay the ground work for radical change at the
conference.
o Conservative leaders are numerous at the regional levels where the delegate
selection process will take place over the next two months.
o The actual powers of the conference remain uncertain, indicating there is
probable high-level disagreement on both the issues at stake and how they
will be resolved.
o Other than Senior Secrtary and Moscow party boss Lev Zaykov and
unexpectedly. Ukrainian party chief Shcherbitskiy. the rest of the leadership
has remained conspicuously quiet on specific party reform ideas
Thus, even if he dominates the rhetorical battle -- where at the moment he has the
upper hand -- Gorbachev faces an uphill struggle as he seeks to extend control over the
party apparatus and thereby solidify political backing for a radical reform agenda.
15 April 1988
SOVA/NIG/DPD/LP
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Gorbachev's Economic Program: Problems Emerge
13 April 1988
A paper prepared by the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Defense Intelligence Agency for the Subcommittee on National
Security Economics of the Joint Economic Committee, Congress
of the United States.
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Summary
Gorhachev's ambitious program to create a modern, more dynamic Soviet
economy ran into trouble in 1987. Familiar problems with poor weather and
transportation bottlenecks were compounded by the disruptions caused by the
introduction of economic reforms, with the result that Soviet GNP grew by less
than one percent last year--a rate reminiscent of the late Brezhnev period.
The new quality-control program (gospriyemka) introduced in 1500
industrial enterprises proved to be particularly disruptive, especially early
in the year. The introduction of wage reform, ministerial and enterprise
staff reductions, and, to a lesser extent, new financial reforms, further
complicated the enterprise managers' already difficult and confusing task.
Buffetted by these disruptions, industry grew by only about 1.5 percent, and
the critical civilian machine-building sector did not expand at all. Harsh
weather also hampered agriculture, where output fell 3 percent below the
previous year's record level.
The effects of the sharp slowdown in growth were felt unevenly across the
economy. In line with Gorbachev's emphasis on the modernization program,
investment appears to have been given top priority. Major defense programs
also appear to have continued on track, although Gorbachev demanded that the
armed forces use resources more efficiently and some cost cutting measures
were apparently instituted. The real loser in 1987 appeared to be the
consumer who--now three years into Gorbachev's economic program--has seen
almost no increase in his standard of living.
While slow growth in Soviet GNP--and the attendant problems in resource
allocations--were the most obvious signs of the economy's difficulties, the
real problems for Gorbachev lay elsewhere. The leadership had hoped that a
strong economic performance last year would provide a firm foundation for the
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future development of Gorbachev's economic program, but this did not occur.
Enterprises still appear to be confused by contradictory guidelines for
implementing the self-financing reforms being introduced this year; shortfalls
in 1987 machinery output will limit the pace of modernization; and
transportation bottlenecks persist. In addition, shortages of consumer goods,
reduced job security, and widespread concern over potential increases in
consumer prices are undercutting the prospects for improved worker
productivity.
In light of these problems, the short-term outlook for Gorbachev's
economic program is not good. Although considerable year-to-year fluctuations
are possible due to weather and other external factors, we project average
annual GNP growth of 2 percent or less during the rest of this Five-Year Plan
(1988-90). Under these circumstances, we believe that if, as seems likely,
the leadership continues to pursue its high-investment strategy and provides
some increase in consumer goods to motivate workers, it will have to tap
resources from one or all three of the following areas:
Defense--Defense currently claims 15-17 percent of GNP--including an
especially large share of the output of the critical machine-building
sector and large shares of the highest quality materials--and, thus is a
prime candidate to support Gorbachev's modernization program. The
defense industries are already being drawn into helping the consumer-
oriented industries, and the military is placing increasing emphasis on
more efficient use of resources and on personnel accountability.
Other Sectors--Gorbachev could also try
to other sectors of the economy to find
modernization and the consumer. Energy
half of Soviet investment annually, are
major reductions in these sectors would
a ripple effect across the economy.
to slow the growth of investment
additional resources for
and agriculture, which take about
prime candidates, although any
disrupt output, which could have
Abroad--Continued economic difficulties would make increased imports an
attractive option, especially in selected areas such as energy and
machine tools. Although Gorbachev has repeatedly indicated that the
machinery for modernization must come primarily from domestic production,
the Soviet credit rating in the West remains good and the USSR has
considerable room to expand imports beyond the current levels.
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Prospects for increasing imports from Eastern European allies--which need
machinery for their own domestic modernization programs--are less bright.
While it is still too early to tell how far Gorbachev will go in tapping
each of these sources, we should begin to get some good indications as to the
choices the Soviets are making over the next year. Decisions on economic reform
will probably be made and the fundamental goals of the next fifteen-year plan
(1991-2005) could be unveiled at the All-Union Party Conference in June--the
first such conclave in nearly 50 years. The emphasis placed on traditional
growth targets as opposed to modernization and reform in leadership speeches and
the Soviet press will provide additional insights into the policies Gorbachev
intends to pursue.
Whatever direction Gorbachev follows, we believe that if the economy
continues to perform poorly in the next few years, tension within society and
the leadership will increase. Bureaucrats will become increasingly frustrated
by loss of privileges and status and by demands that they show greater
initiative. Military leaders are likely to become more and more uneasy if
benefits from the industrial modernization fail to materialize. Soviet citizens
will need to see some improvement in living standards if the regime is to
achieve necessary gains in worker productivity and avoid widespread
discontent. Although Gorbachev appears to be working against no set timetable,
failure to head off these tensions would, at a minimum, make it more difficult
to pursue his economic program vigorously and could, ultimately, call into
question his strong political position at home.
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Scope Note
This joint CIA-NA report is the third in a series evaluating the
performance of the Soviet economy under Gorbachev and analyzing trends in
resource allocation. Data on Soviet economic performance in 1987 are
preliminary and, as in past years, will probably be revised slightly as more
complete information on 1987 results becomes available.
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22 April 1988
A/NIO/USSR
THE SOVIET LEADERSHIP SITUATION AND THE REFORM DEBATE:
On 19 April, intelligence community representatives met to discuss the exchange of
polemics between party conservatives (the "Andreyeva letter" in the 13 March Soviet
Russia) and reformers (a full-page Pravda editorial article on 5 April) and the
implications of this confrontation for Gorbachev's reform agenda.
-- There are some important differences within the community over the origins
and implications of this dustup, especially over the extent of Second Secretary
Ligachev's involvement with the Andreyeva letter.
-- But judging from the meeting there is substantial agreement on critical issues:
that the struggle between reformers and conservatives for control of the party is
reaching a decisive stage as the June party conference approaches, that the Pravda
editorial and subsequent developments signify a major victory for Gorbachev and reform
proponents, and that Gorbachev is likely to move in the near term--if indeed he has not
done so already--to effectively neutralize Ligachev's influence.
WHAT'S THE DISPUTE ABOUT? The radicalization of Gorbachev's agenda over the last
two years has produced a fundamental split in the party between reformers (who want a
decisive break with the command economy and rigidly centralized political system Stalin
created) and conservatives (who believe tinkering will suffice and fear that Gorbachev's
reforms are leading the country toward disaster). This split has reached the Politburo,
where Ligachev's go-slow rhetoric has clearly established him as the conservative
alternative to Gorbachev. The blistering Pravda rejoinder to the Andreyeva letter
indicates that the dispute has come to a head as the two sides jockey for position in
anticipation of the party conference.
WHO'S WINNING? Community analysts disagree on the extent of Ligachev's opposition
to Gorbachev and whether he was behind the Soviet Russia attack on reform, as the
Moscow rumor mill suggests. Even those who question Ligachev's association with the
Soviet Russia article, however, agree that it has been used by Gorbachev and his allies
as a pretext to launch a sweeping counterattack on party conservatives and to attempt
to neutralize Ligachev's influence in the leadership. An incipient press campaign in
support of Gorbachev's agenda since 5 April, and spreading rumors of trouble for
Ligachev, suggest Gorbachev has scored a decisive victory.
OUTLOOK FOR THE NEAR TERM A decisive confrontation between conservatives and
reformers in the Central Committee and the Politburo now seems likely in the run-up to
the party conference. While conservatives remain powerful in the party elite?especially
in the regional apparatus that forms the core of the Central Committee--the momentum
now seems to be running in Gorbachev's direction. Some sort of move to neutralize
Ligachev (as well as reshape the Central Committee) seems likely:
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-- Gorbachev could attempt to remove Ligachev from the Politburo altogether at a
plenum preceeding the conference.
-- As a compromise, Ligachev could be kicked upstairs to replace former foriegn
minister Gromyko as President. Such a step, while effectively circumscribing Ligachev's
influence, could be more palatable to party conservatives than an outright removal from
the leadership.
-- Moves to effectively strip Ligachev of his "second secretary" duties--relieving
him of the important cadres and ideology portfolios--could be sufficient to neutralize
his authority and signal the party ranks that those who attempt to undermine
"perestroika" down below will no longer find protection at the top. Gorbachev could
calculate that this solution would achieve his objectives while promoting a healing
process in the party in the months ahead.
If Gorbachev is able to neutralize Ligachev in some manner it could allow him to
dominate proceedings at the party conference and give a powerful boost to the efforts
of reformers to launch a decisive attack on the underpinnings of the Stalinist political
and economic system. Given the magnitude of Ligachev's apparent challenge, if
Gorbachev fails to now clip his wings it will be a significant--perhaps fatal--political
defeat.
THE SUMMIT The Moscow summit will occur in the midst of the most dramatic ferment
in the Soviet leadership in the last 30 years.
NIO/USSR believes Gorbachev has strong incentives to
force the leadership dispute to a conclusion before the visit to
bolster his authority in the negotiations with the President and
to gain control of preparations for the party conference at the end of June. There is
some chance--probably less than one in five-- that Ligachev will beat back this effort,
casting doubt on Gorbachev's ability to press his foreign and domestic agenda. But the
odds are good that he will succeed. Indeed, the summit may help him achieve his
objective by providing an occasion in which the Politburo will want to pull together for a
show of unity.
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STAT
The Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
VVashington. D C. 20505
Maj Gen John E. Morrison, Jr., USAF (Ret.)
Security Affairs Support Association
80 West Street, Suite 110
Annapolis, Maryland 21401
Dear John:
ER 0545/5 88
18 May 1988
Thanks for your note about the SASA Spring Symposium.
Below I list what I described in my talk as the "four
maxims of the 1980s 'intelligence officer." The part about
finding them in John McMahon's desk is fictitious; I was just
pulling John's chain.
1. If you want a friend, buy a dog.
2. There is no job so simple that it cannot be done wrong.
3. A man who can smile when things go wrong has thought of
someone he can blame it on.
4. When the going gets tough, everyone leaves.
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
Robert
M. Gates
g316--/r-
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