LETTER TO MARY EVELYN DEAN FROM JULIE CHITWOOD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 92
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 14, 2012
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: November 11, 1988
• Content Type: LETTER

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14 :
CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
1 n "
THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
ARE ATTACHED:
(Please do not remove)
3~ 9>7A P7
1 o DTr? I
Pro o [",-
fA0 0.3/19 Ty
-c> gK
3 X
wow
SUBJECT:AFFAiRS CooNC1L
W A S I# I'J G TO /, A, C.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14 :
CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
STAT
Thank You Letter from the World Affairs Council of WDC
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
EXTENSION NO.
ER 88-4233X/1
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
DATE
17 November 1988
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
CT-
STAT
-7 rfr4'
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
3000
1 ''I?
to t Lf 1 f -e. elf!
6e``
DCI
EXEC
REG
FORM USE-IIEVIOUS A U.S. Government MntIne Orfleea 19S5-49MS34,49156
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
1800 M Street, N.W. ? 3rd Floor ? Washington, D.C. 20036 ? 1202) 293--1051
November 11, 1988
STAT
STAT
Public Affairs
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
On behalf of the members of the World Affairs Council of
Washington, D.C., I would like to thank you for your many
hours of assistance on our behalf in arranging for Judge
Webster's address to the Council on October 25.
I am so pleased that you were able to attend and witness
what a successful event it was. His appearance attracted
the largest audience by far that we have had for a single
speaker, and we have not had that wide an interest on the
part of the major networks since Secretary of State Muskie
gave his farewell address in 1981.
Thank you for keeping us informed during the many months
that we waited to have an opening on his calendar and for
all the details that you covered in assuring that the
event went smoothly. It was a pleasure to work with you,
and of course, we would be delighted to have such an
opportunity at any time in the future.
Sincerely yours,
J(ylie Chitwood
Executive Director
AFFILIATED WITH THE FOREIGN POI ICY ASSOC IATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010.1, L
DDS&T
Compt
D/OCA
ACTION
DATE
X lw/ pgr
Secretary
1 Nov '88
Dar.
9L77 lloarl
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
ER 88-4233X.
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
1800 M Street, N.W. ? 3rd Floor ? Washington, D.C. 20036 ? [phone]
November 11, 1988
The Honorable William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Judge Webster:
I would like to express our sincere appreciation to you
for your appearance on October 25 before the members of
The World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. It was an
honor to host your address, and our members were delighted
to have the opportunity to hear your views and your
responses to their questions.
Your appearance attracted the largest audience we have had
in 1988, and we received many favorable comments from our
members about your presentation. I hope you found the
evening as successful as we did.
Enclosed is a photograph to commemorate the occasion, and
we hope that you will consider our platform one that
remains open to you.
It was a personal pleasure to meet with you, and I wish
you much success in your responsibilities.
Sincerely yours,
Philip A. Odeen
Chairman
AFFILIATED WITH THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION P :~ (~ 19
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 I i
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14
: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
F 11 f i (ii-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14
CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
T
STA
STAT
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (OVK?MaQ
Transcript of Your Remarks at the World Affairs Council
of Washington, D.C. on October 25
FROM:
off" A"
NO.
PAO 88-0379
William M. Baker
Director, Public airs
27676
o*n
4 November 1988
TO: (Olllar dssiEnotioe, room rumba, and
iMh
b
)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number sock cemmem to show from whom
u
q
INIITIALS
to whom. Dra+ o lino across column oMr sock eomasnt.)
iiEt~nrEO
roiiwniloeo
1.
ER
0 7 NO
1988
2.
DCI
~~
~
W
Ape
~
?
'
. a.
PAO
is
6.
7.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
DCI
14.
EXEC
REG
DCI
1 S.
EC
MRM610
* U.a. somese ?t MMM OMIM: s
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14 :
CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14 :
CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
 Den 00-A170
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
4 November 1988
JUDGE:
I have attached a copy of the final transcript of your remarks
at the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. on October 25.
Unfortunately, you saw an earlier draft of this transcript before it
was ready for review. I understand that the draft was delivered to
you rather than to my office at Headquarters, which had need of a
'first cut" transcript to respond to the press. The final
transcript, intended as the record copy, incorporates the changes
that you made to the proposed remarks.
STAT
Bill Baker
Attachment:
As stated
STATPAO/WMB/y: emb
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
STAT 1 - DDCI
1-ER
STAT 1 -
1-D
1 - PAO Registry
1 - PAO Ames
1 - CoC (Subject
1 -
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, U.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCTOBER 25, 1988
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
Intelligence collection may be in the eye of the beholder. About two
months ago then KGB Director Chebrikov made one of his rare, perhaps even one
of his first, appearances to talk about intelligence. And he quoted a speech
that I made last year -- or at least a press interview, I think with
The Los Angeles Times -- in which I was asked whether, following the problem
with our Moscow Embassy, it was still possible to collect inside the Soviet
Union. And I had said yes, that we were indeed able to recruit assets who
would supply needed intelligence for that purpose. And then Chebrikov said
that nothing could be plainer -- this makes the point for why the Soviet Union
should spend more money on counterintelligence. I suppose you've heard us
make the same argument in this country. A few days ago, the chief of the KGB
in Leningrad made a similar statement.
It brings to mind one of the stories collected for the President as part
of his perestroika collection. This story was about Gorbachev's desire to
find out how his program of perestroika was working in the outer areas.
Gorbachev sent a representative out into the Ukraine to visit some of the
smaller villages. The representative went to the mayor of one of the villages
and, after talking to the mayor for a moment, he said, "Do you have any
television sets in this village?" The mayor looked at him and said, "Of
course we have television sets. In fact, there may be two television sets in
many of these huts." The representative said, "That is very interesting.
What about refrigerators?" And the mayor said, "Of course. We all have
refrigerators." The representative looked the mayor in the eye and said, "Do
you know who I am?" And the mayor said, "Of course I do. Who else but a CIA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
agent would come into a village with no electricity and ask questions like
that?"
Well, Carlucci, Crowe, Shultz and others are going around having
bilaterals, but I have to tell you we have no planned bilaterals with the KGB.
It is the fall of 1988. We edge toward the end of the year and the end
of the decade. I have been asked rather frequently in recent months to
reflect on what the most important intelligence issues of the 1990s will be.
The question reminds me of an observation once made by a nuclear physicist who
said, "Prediction is very difficult, especially about the future." With that
cautionary note in mind, I will make a few predictions about some of the key
issues that now confront the Intelligence Community -- issues that we expect
to be with us well into the next decade.
My good friend, General Vernon Walters, who was Deputy Director of
Central Intelligence and is now our Ambassador to the United Nations,
describes a view held by many in this country about intelligence.
"Americans," he said, "have always had an ambivalent attitude toward
intelligence. When they feel threatened, they want a lot of it, and when they
don't, they tend to regard the whole thing as somewhat immoral."
With so much going on around the world that affects our national
security, I think the American people today want a lot of intelligence. And a
whole range of issues are commanding the Intelligence Community's attention --
international terrorism and drug trafficking, the proliferation of advanced
weapons, the transfer of strategic technology to the Soviet Bloc -- to name
just a few intelligence issues that are global in nature.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
Our interests around the world as a free superpower require our awareness
of happenings, plans, capabilities, and intentions in many regions of the
world where insurgencies, war, and political change are going on -- such as in
the many different countries in Latin American and in Africa, the problems in
the Middle East, the struggle in Cambodia, to name just a few.
This evening, I want to concentrate on three geographical areas that
are -- and will continue to be -- of great interest to U.S. policymakers and,
thus, to the Intelligence Community. These areas are the Soviet Union, South
Asia, and the Persian Gulf.
The nations of these three areas have many common borders. Their
interests are, necessarily, interrelated. Yet it is really a region without
boundaries, for the force of developments there is felt far beyond Moscow, or
Islamabad, or Tehran. Gorbachev's plans for reform, the withdrawal of Soviet
troops from Afghanistan, and the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq conflict -- one
of the bloodiest wars of our time and one that breached the international
restraint against the use of chemical weapons -- have an impact far beyond the
immediate region. All these events have major implications not only for
regional peace and stability, but for the interests of the United States and
the West and, indeed, for the entire world.
The Soviet Union will remain the primary focus of our intelligence
collection and analysis in the 1990s. Its military capability, its efforts to
increase global influence, and its aggressive intelligence activities continue
to pose security challenges to United States interests.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
Gorbachev's efforts to reform his country have not fundamentally altered
these truths and, in fact, make the Soviet Union of even greater concern to
U.S. intelligence.
Like many of you, I have been fascinated by what is occurring in the
Soviet Union. Gorbachev has stirred.up the stew -- bringing new life and
dynamism to Soviet politics and pushing a series of reforms that none of us
could have foreseen even five years ago.
The forces of democracy are making some political and economic inroads.
Although the USSR certainly is not headed toward democracy as we know it,
today's Soviet leaders appear to understand that their system is faltering
largely because it has not given the people enough breathing room -- room to
innovate, room to inquire, room to unlock creativity.
Change is occurring in the area of foreign policy as well. For example,
the Soviets are leaving Afghanistan and they are eliminating a whole class of
nuclear weapons under the INF treaty -- a process that includes unprecedented
on-site inspections of Soviet military facilities.
The dramatic nature of these policy changes clearly has provoked
controversy within the Soviet Union. A major power struggle is under way
between reformers, who believe radical changes are necessary to make the
Communist system work, and conservatives, who fear such changes could
destabilize the very system they are trying to save. The outcome of this
struggle will affect how far and how fast reform progresses, the extent to
which central authority is relaxed, the general welfare of the individual, and
how competitive the Soviet system will be over the next few decades.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
Just a few weeks ago, Gorbachev successfully challenged a number of
individuals in the Soviet hierarchy -- undertaking the most sweeping overhaul
of the top party leadership since Khrushchev ousted his chief opponents in
1957. The changes made should allow Gorbachev to push his policy agenda at
home and abroad with renewed momentum.
Yet this is only one victory in a very long-term undertaking to reform
the Soviet system. The process will be long and drawn out at best, requiring
Gorbachev to overcome enormous political, economic, and cultural obstacles.
There are strong reasons to question whether a system designed to
centralize authority, maximize government control over its people, and
concentrate resources on building up the nation's military strength can become
more decentralized and democratic in its decisionmaking and more solicitous of
its people. The nationalist unrest in the Baltic states, Armenia, and other
regions of the USSR will further test the Soviet system's ability to make
reforms work.
But if the last three years have taught us anything at all, it is that
Gorbachev is a a highly skilled politician, and we cannot rule out the
possibility that he can, ultimately, pull off a "revolution from above" that
actually increases authority below.
The Soviet reform effort presents the U.S. Intelligence Community with
some very formidable challenges. We must pay closer attention than ever to
the political struggles and issues being raised as Gorbachev continues to
challenge the established interests of individuals and institutions.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14 : CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
We must also help the policymaker sort out how reform will affect Soviet
military and economic capabilities and -- perhaps even more difficult -- how
it may change Moscow's foreign policy.
In the Intelligence Community, we must manage the information explosion
that glasnost has produced which, though welcome, challenges us to sort out
what is important and what is not, what is real versus what Moscow wants us to
hear.
We must support U.S.-Soviet arms control talks. As these negotiations
progress, the Intelligence Community will be increasingly asked to assess
Soviet motivations and monitor Soviet compliance with the provisions of
agreements. And the amount of support required is tremendous. The INF treaty
has required the United States to conduct inspections at 117 Soviet facilities.
Monitoring the START treaty, which is now being negotiated in Geneva, could
involve as many as 2,500 weapons locations spread throughout the Soviet Union.
Yet whatever arms control agreements the United States makes with the
Soviet Union, our relationship is likely to remain adversarial. Policymakers
will depend on the Intelligence Community to make quick and accurate
assessments -- and even to anticipate Gorbachev's sometimes unorthodox and
unexpected initiatives, such as the proposal that he made recently to give up
Cam Ranh Bay if we would give up the Philippines, or to withdraw troops from
Hungary if we would give up our fighters based in Italy.
Moving south, intelligence about South Asia will continue to be important
to policymakers for a number of reasons, not the least of which is Soviet
influence in the region. Gorbachev's decision to withdraw Soviet troops from
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
Afghanistan demonstrates his desire to cut Soviet losses in order to pursue
other objectives. But despite the Soviet troop withdrawal, Afghanistan is
going to remain a key foreign policy concern in Moscow. Because of the
Soviets' continued interest and its strategic location, Afghanistan will
remain an important concern in Washington as well.
I recall a meeting with President Zia this time last year. He went to
his library shelf and pulled off a book showing a map of the region over which
he had put a red celluloid overlay to illustrate Soviet influence in
Afghanistan and show the strategic wedge that further occupation of that
territory represented not only to Iran, but to Pakistan and nations further
south.
We expect the Soviets to abide by their commitment to withdraw the rest
of their troops from Afghanistan by February 15th of next year. That has not
changed, despite the Soviets' pause in their withdrawal. At the same time,
Moscow will try to retain its influence with Kabul through both economic and
political means. The appointment of a new Soviet ambassador to Afghanistan
just a few weeks ago indicates that Afghanistan remains a priority concern in
Moscow.
Following the Soviet withdrawal, we believe that Afghanistan will be
unstable for a considerable period and have so advised policymakers. The
Soviet-backed regime has minimal control or support outside Kabul, and the
withdrawal will make its position even more precarious. The Afghan resistance
will continue its effort to destroy what is left of the regime. However, the
ruling party's fragmentation may be as large a factor in the regime's collapse
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
as the military initiatives of the resistance. We believe that the military
could probably last for a longer period of time than we have predicted for the
political structure itself.
The post-Soviet period will also find the Afghan rebels fighting among
themselves. That has been historically so. They did it throughout the Soviet
occupation and we expect that it will continue. Given that most ethnic groups
are better armed than ever before and are likely to capture additional weapons
from the disintegrating Afghan army, we could expect to see tribal conflict
continue for some time after the Soviet withdrawal.
The fundamentalist groups of the Afghan resistance will enter the
post-Soviet era well-armed and well-organized. Whatever the composition of a
future government in Afghanistan, Islamic ritual and law will probably play a
larger role in its operations and its policies. But the nature and traditions
of Afghanistan make the imposition of a Khomeini-style fundamentalism unlikely.
I think it's important to say that the United States cannot dictate who
will finally emerge as the leaders in Afghanistan. A strong central
government is unlikely, and residual hostility to the Soviets may eventually
be matched by the return of historical suspicions about the West. Perhaps the
good news about events in Afghanistan is not so much what has been gained, but
what has been averted.
Clearly, the Soviet withdrawal and the struggle for political control are
the primary intelligence issues in Afghanistan for the near term. But efforts
by neighboring countries to exert influence there will also receive our
attention. In the longer term, we will examine the future Afghan government's
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
attempts to rebuild the country and resettle the world's largest refugee
population -- more than five million people.
About three million of those refugees now live in Pakistan, a country
that has fully supported the Afghan resistance. Pakistan has always been of
strategic interest to the United States and to its policymakers, but the death
of President Zia in August has raised new issues.
The response to President Zia's death has been a smooth, constitutional
transition. Ghulam Ishaq Khan, the President of the Senate, has taken over as
Acting President. Under the Constitution, a new president must be elected
within 30 days after Parliamentary elections. President Ishaq has announced
that elections set for November 16th will be held on schedule. A series of
judicial rulings have removed the constraints placed on Pakistan's political
parties in the 1985 elections, and the November elections have become the most
closely contested in Pakistan's history.
I think I should also add that the military has supported this effort to
fill the vacancies through constitutional means. I think there is real
support for this process. Pakistan is plagued by problems of terrorism,
partly as a result of its role in support of the Afghan resistance. But I do
not think, as long as the terrorism is under control, that this will change
the military's willingness to let voters decide the issue.
Because of the close relationship between the United States and Pakistan
and because of Pakistan's strategic importance, the U.S. Intelligence
Community will be following these developments with the keenest interest.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14 : CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
Further south is another region of great strategic interest for the
United States -- the Persian Gulf -- an area where tensions remain high
despite the cease-fire between Iran and Iraq. Not surprisingly, the peace
talks between the two nations have been fitful and difficult. The animosities
built up over eight years of bitter conflict are not easy to dispel.
The Iran-Iraq war cost the two countries more than $350 billion, and even
more in human costs -- more than one million casualties and one and a half
million refugees. This was one of the bloodiest wars of the century, and it
will take many years for the two nations to recover.
The conflict has affected nearly every aspect of economic life in Iran
and Iraq. Both economies have been weakened by the loss of oil revenues and
both have borne the expense of large-scale arms purchases. Both countries
have exhausted their financial reserves and have been compelled to cut
economic development programs.
We believe these costs of the war will deter both sides from resuming an
all-out conflict anytime soon. However, Iran and Iraq continue to distrust
each other, and both will probably maintain their military readiness.
The U.S. Intelligence Community has closely followed the Iran-Iraq
conflict, providing assessments of the intentions and capabilities of both
sides, as well as the implications for the region and the United States. When
the U.S. presence in the Gulf was increased, we began providing daily tactical
intelligence support to naval forces operating with the U.S. Central Command.
Our support included reports on Iranian antiship cruise missile sites, naval
bases, airfields, and coastal defense installations. As a result, U.S. forces
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
have been better able to successfully carry out U.S. foreign policy and
protect our security interests.
The end of the Gulf war has created a whole new set of intelligence
questions which we are now addressing -- questions such as what effect the
cease-fire may have on the Western hostages being held in Lebanon; how the
political struggle in Tehran to succeed Khomeini will be affected; what impact
the cease-fire will have on each country's drive for regional influence; and
the long-term impact of these developments on the cost of oil.
Perhaps the biggest question we are considering is what lessons Iran and
Iraq -- and the rest of the world -- have learned from a war that involved the
first sustained use of chemical weapons since World War I.
After the First World War, the use of chemical weapons was outlawed by
signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol. During World War II -- even during the
most desperate battles -- both sides refrained from using chemical weapons --
weapons that Winston Churchill referred to as "that hellish poison."
The Iran-Iraq war ended that restraint and set a dangerous precedent for
future wars. The Intelligence Community has considerable evidence that Iraq
used chemical weapons against Iran and also against Iraqi Kurds. Iran, too,
has employed chemical weapons against Iraqi troops.
I'm sure you've read many accounts recently about the use of and the
effects of chemical weapons. These weapons are thought to offer a cheap and
readily obtainable means of redressing the military balance against more
powerful foes. Some see them as the poor man's answer to nuclear weapons, and
more than 20 countries may be developing chemical weapons.
11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
Mustard gas, which is a terrible weapon first used in World War I, is one
of the favored chemical agents for several reasons -- its relative ease of
manufacture, its long life in storage and on the battlefield, and its ability
to incapacitate those who are exposed to it.
Some countries are developing nerve agents. These agents, though more
difficult to manufacture, can cause death in minutes by attacking the brain
and nervous system. Other nations may use common industrial chemicals such as
cyanide and phosgene. Cyanide prevents the blood from carrying oxygen, while
phosgene, widely used in making plastics, can destroy the lungs.
Most of these plants look like nothing more than pesticide plants and are
difficult to detect.
The Intelligence Community will continue to monitor the ability of
foreign countries to develop and produce chemical weapons, and their
incentives for using such weapons. And with the increase of ballistic
missiles in the Third World, we must be alert to attempts by Third World
nations to arm these missiles with chemical warheads. Virtually every city in
the Middle East would be subject to such an attack, if these two types of
weapons are combined.
The proliferation of advanced weapons affects the prospects for peace and
stability in regions such as Southeast Asia and the Middle East. For Israel,
the spread of chemical weapons among the Arab states -- principally Iraq,
Libya, and Syria -- could seriously alter the regional balance of power. This
has major implications for peace in the Middle East.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14 : CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
It also appears that the moral barrier to biological warfare has been
lifted. At least 10 countries are working to produce biological weapons, and
this presents us with another intelligence concern.
Intelligence support is also vital to the success of United States
efforts to prevent the use of chemical weapons -- efforts such as restricting
the export of certain key chemicals and of ballistic missile technology. On
the international front, the United States participates in the Geneva
Conference on Disarmament, which is trying to negotiate a chemical weapons
ban. And on September 26th, President Reagan addressed the United Nations
General Assembly. He called on the signers of the 1925 Geneva Protocol and
other concerned nations to convene a conference to consider actions that we
can take together to reverse the serious erosion of this treaty.
Yes, assessing the proliferation of chemical and biological weapons is
one of the most difficult challenges we face in the Intelligence Community --
now and into the next decade. It is also one of our most important tasks, for
these weapons may well represent one of the most serious threats to world
peace in the coming years.
The famed British writer and cynic, Somerset Maugham, once noted, "It is
bad enough to know the past; it would be intolerable to know the future." It
would, of course, be just as intolerable not to be prepared for the future.
The intelligence issues that I have chosen for discussion today -- reform in
the Soviet Union, unrest in Afghanistan, and tensions in the Persian Gulf --
are issues that will be with us into the next decade. Assessing these
questions and their far-reaching effects is the critical task of intelligence.
lZ
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
Our machines, our systems, and our satellites are the wonders of the
age. They help us to do our very difficult work. But intelligence is
preeminently an affair of people. It is the caliber of the men and women of
American intelligence -- their creativity, determination, brilliance, and
courage -- that spells the difference, between success and failure.
And I hope very much that we continue to attract those best suited to
carry out our mission -- people who are risk takers, but not risk seekers.
People who are dedicated and responsive to our law and discipline. People who
understand and play by the rules. People to whom fame and fortune are not a
necessary part of their life, but who can find in this difficult work an
avenue to pursue their highest aspirations for a safer and a better world.
With such people, we can continue to provide the intelligence that
policymakers need in order to make wise decisions in the interests of our
national security. This is what you expect of us, what all Americans expect
of us, and I can assure you we are doing our very best to supply it.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
Attached is a revised draft of your remarks to the World Affairs
Council of Washington, D.C. this evening. We have incorporated your
comments on the interrelated interests of the Soviet Union and the nations
of South Asia and the Persian Gulf, as well as the far-reaching
impact of developments in this broad region. We have also removed the brief
section on counterintelligence.
Attachments:
As stated
Regrade as UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from attachments.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 4
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
a
PROPOSED REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCTOBER 25, 1988
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
IT IS THE FALL OF 1988 -- WE EDGE TOWARD THE END OF THE
YEAR AND THE END OF THE DECADE. I HAVE BEEN ASKED RATHER
FREQUENTLY IN RECENT MONTHS TO REFLECT ON WHAT THE MOST
IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE ISSUES OF THE 1990s WILL BE. THE
QUESTION REMINDS ME OF AN OBSERVATION ONCE MADE BY A NUCLEAR
PHYSICIST: "PREDICTION IS VERY DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE
FUTURE."1 WITH THAT CAUTIONARY NOTE IN MIND, I WILL MAKE A
FEW PREDICTIONS ABOUT SOME OF THE KEY ISSUES THAT NOW CONFRONT
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- ISSUES THAT WE EXPECT TO BE WITH
US WELL INTO THE NEXT DECADE.
MY GOOD FRIEND, GENERAL VERNON WALTERS, FORMER DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND NOW OUR AMBASSADOR TO THE
UNITED NATIONS, DESCRIBES A VIEW HELD BY MANY IN THIS COUNTRY
ABOUT INTELLIGENCE. "AMERICANS." HE SAID, "HAVE ALWAYS HAD AN
AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARD INTELLIGENCE. WHEN THEY FEEL
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
THREATENED. THEY WANT A LOT OF IT, AND WHEN THEY DON'T. THEY
TEND TO REGARD THE WHOLE THING AS SOMEWHAT IMMORAL."
WITH SO MUCH GOING ON AROUND THE WORLD THAT AFFECTS OUR
NATIONAL SECURITY, I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TODAY WANT A.LOT
OF INTELLIGENCE. AND A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES ARE COMMANDING
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ATTENTION -- INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM AND DRUG TRAFFICKING. THE PROLIFERATION OF ADVANCED
WEAPONS, THE TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET
BLOC-- TO NAME JUST A FEW INTELLIGENCE ISSUES THAT ARE GLOBAL
IN NATURE.
THIS EVENING, I WANT TO CONCENTRATE ON THREE GEOGRAPHICAL
AREAS THAT ARE -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE -- OF GREAT INTEREST
TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS AND. THUS, OF GREAT INTEREST TO THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. THESE AREAS ARE THE SOVIET UNION.
SOUTH ASIA, AND THE PERSIAN GULF.
THE NATIONS OF THIS BROAD REGION BORDER EACH OTHER AND
THEIR INTERESTS ARE, NECESSARILY, INTERRELATED. YET IT IS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
REALLY A REGION WITHOUT BOUNDARIES, FOR THE FORCE OF
DEVELOPMENTS THERE IS FELT FAR BEYOND MOSCOW, OR ISLAMABAD, OR
TEHRAN. GORBACHEV'S PLANS FOR REFORM, THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET
TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN, AND THE CEASE-FIRE IN THE IRAN-IRAQ
CONFLICT -- ONE OF THE BLOODIEST WARS OF OUR TIME AND ONE THAT
BREACHED THE INTERNATIONAL RESTRAINT AGAINST THE USE OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- HAVE AN IMPACT FAR BEYOND THE IMMEDIATE
REGION. ALL THESE EVENTS HAVE MAJOR IMPLICATIONS NOT ONLY FOR
REGIONAL PEACE AND STABILITY, BUT FOR THE INTERESTS OF THE
UNITED STATES AND THE WEST AND, INDEED, FOR THE ENTIRE WORLD.
THE SOVIET UNION WILL REMAIN THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF OUR
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS IN THE 1990s. ITS
MILITARY CAPABILITY, ITS EFFORTS TO INCREASE GLOBAL INFLUENCE,
AND ITS AGGRESSIVE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ARE A SERIOUS THREAT
TO U.S. INTERESTS.2
GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS TO REFORM HIS COUNTRY HAVE NOT
FUNDAMENTALLY ALTERED THESE TRUTHS AND, IN FACT, MAKE THE
SOVIET UNION OF EVEN GREATER CONCERN TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE.
3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
THE PRESIDENT TOLD ME AN INTERESTING STORY RECENTLY.
GORBACHEV SENT A REPRESENTATIVE OUT INTO ONE OF THE UKRAINIAN
STATES TO SEE HOW PERESTROIKA WAS GETTING ALONG. HE WENT TO
ONE OF THE SMALL VILLAGES AND ASKED TO SEE THE MAYOR. AFTER
TALKING TO THE MAYOR FOR A MOMENT, HE SAID. "DO YOU HAVE ANY
TELEVISION SETS IN THIS VILLAGE?" THE MAYOR LOOKED AT HIM AND
SAID, "OF COURSE WE HAVE TELEVISION SETS. IN FACT, THERE MAY
BE TWO TELEVISION SETS IN MANY OF THESE HUTS." THE
REPRESENTATIVE SAID. "THAT IS VERY INTERESTING. WHAT ABOUT
REFRIGERATORS?" AND THE MAYOR SAID, "OF COURSE. WE ALL HAVE
REFRIGERATORS." THE REPRESENTATIVE LOOKED THE MAYOR IN THE EYE
AND SAID, "DO YOU KNOW WHO I AM?" AND THE MAYOR SAID, "OF
COURSE I DO. WHO ELSE BUT A CIA AGENT WOULD COME INTO A
VILLAGE WITH NO ELECTRICITY AND ASK QUESTIONS LIKE THAT?"
LIKE MANY OF YOU, I HAVE BEEN FASCINATED BY WHAT IS
OCCURRING IN THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV HAS STIRRED UP THE
STEW -- BRINGING NEW LIFE AND DYNAMISM TO SOVIET POLITICS AND
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
PUSHING A SERIES OF REFORMS THAT NONE OF US COULD HAVE FORESEEN
FIVE YEARS AGO.
THE FORCES OF DEMOCRACY ARE MAKING SOME POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC INROADS. ALTHOUGH THE USSR CERTAINLY IS NOT HEADED
TOWARD DEMOCRACY AS WE KNOW IT, TODAY'S SOVIET LEADERS APPEAR
TO UNDERSTAND THAT THEIR SYSTEM IS FALTERING LARGELY BECAUSE IT,
HAS NOT GIVEN THE PEOPLE ENOUGH BREATHING ROOM -- ROOM TO
INNOVATE. ROOM TO INQUIRE, ROOM TO INVESTIGATE.
CHANGE IS OCCURRING IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY AS WELL.
THE SOVIETS ARE LEAVING AFGHANISTAN AND ELIMINATING A WHOLE
CLASS OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE INF TREATY -- A PROCESS THAT
INCLUDES UNPRECEDENTED ON-SITE INSPECTIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY
FACILITIES.
THE DRAMATIC NATURE OF THESE POLICY CHANGES CLEARLY HAS
PROVOKED CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. A MAJOR POWER
STRUGGLE IS UNDER WAY BETWEEN REFORMERS, WHO BELIEVE RADICAL
CHANGES ARE NECESSARY TO MAKE THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM WORK, AND
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
CONSERVATIVES. WHO FEAR SUCH CHANGES COULD DESTABILIZE THE VERY
SYSTEM THEY ARE TRYING TO SAVE. THE OUTCOME OF THIS STRUGGLE
WILL AFFECT HOW FAR AND HOW FAST REFORM PROGRESSES, THE EXTENT
TO WHICH,CENTRAL AUTHORITY IS RELAXED, THE GENERAL WELFARE OF
THE INDIVIDUAL, AND HOW COMPETITIVE THE SOVIET SYSTEM WILL BE
OVER THE NEXT FEW DECADES.
JUST ABOUT A MONTH AGO, GORBACHEV SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED A
NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY -- UNDERTAKING
THE MOST SWEEPING OVERHAUL OF THE TOP PARTY LEADERSHIP SINCE
KHRUSHCHEV OUSTED HIS CHIEF OPPONENTS IN 1957.3 THE CHANGES
MADE SHOULD ALLOW GORBACHEV TO PUSH HIS POLICY AGENDA AT HOME
AND ABROAD WITH RENEWED MOMENTUM.4
YET THIS IS ONLY ONE VICTORY IN A VERY LONG WAR TO REFORM
THE SOVIET SYSTEM. THE PROCESS WILL BE LONG AND DRAWN OUT AT
BEST, REQUIRING GORBACHEV TO OVERCOME ENORMOUS POLITICAL,
ECONOMIC, AND CULTURAL OBSTACLES.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
THERE ARE STRONG REASONS TO DOUBT WHETHER A SYSTEM DESIGNED
TO CENTRALIZE AUTHORITY. MAXIMIZE GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER ITS
PEOPLE, AND CONCENTRATE RESOURCES ON BUILDING UP THE NATION'S
MILITARY STRENGTH CAN BECOME MORE DECENTRALIZED AND DEMOCRATIC
IN ITS DECISIONMAKING AND MORE SOLICITOUS OF ITS PEOPLE. THE
NATIONALIST UNREST IN THE BALTIC STATES, ARMENIA, AND OTHER
REGIONS OF THE USSR WILL TEST THE SOVIET SYSTEM'S ABILITY TO
MAKE REFORMS WORK.
BUT IF THE LAST THREE YEARS HAVE TAUGHT US ANYTHING. IT IS
THAT GORBACHEV IS A HIGHLY SKILLED POLITICIAN, AND WE CANNOT
RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT HE CAN, ULTIMATELY, PULL OFF A
"REVOLUTION FROM ABOVE" THAT ACTUALLY INCREASES AUTHORITY BELOW.
THE SOVIET REFORM EFFORT PRESENTS THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY WITH SOME FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES. WE MUST PAY CLOSER
ATTENTION THAN EVER TO THE POLITICAL STRUGGLES AND ISSUES BEING
RAISED AS GORBACHEV CONTINUES TO CHALLENGE THE ESTABLISHED
INTERESTS OF INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
WE MUST ALSO HELP THE POLICYMAKER SORT OUT HOW REFORM WILL
AFFECT SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES AND -- EVEN
MORE DIFFICULT -- HOW IT MAY CHANGE MOSCOW'S FOREIGN POLICY.
WE MUST MANAGE THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION THAT GLASNOST HAS
PRODUCED WHICH, THOUGH WELCOME. CHALLENGES US TO SORT OUT WHAT
IS IMPORTANT AND WHAT IS NOT, WHAT IS REAL VERSUS WHAT MOSCOW
WANTS US TO HEAR.
WE MUST SUPPORT U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS. AS THESE
NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL BE
INCREASINGLY ASKED TO ASSESS SOVIET MOTIVATIONS AND MONITOR
SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS. AND THE
AMOUNT OF SUPPORT REQUIRED IS TREMENDOUS. THE INF TREATY HAS
REQUIRED THE UNITED STATES TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS AT 117 SOVIET
FACILITIES. MONITORING THE START TREATY, WHICH IS NOW BEING
NEGOTIATED IN GENEVA. COULD INVOLVE AS MANY AS 2,500 WEAPONS
LOCATIONS SPREAD THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION.5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
YET WHATEVER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THE UNITED STATES
MAKES WITH THE SOVIET UNION, OUR RELATIONSHIP IS LIKELY TO
REMAIN ADVERSARIAL. POLICYMAKERS WILL DEPEND ON THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TO MAKE QUICK AND ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS
-- AND EVEN TO ANTICIPATE GORBACHEV'S SOMETIMES UNORTHODOX AND
UNEXPECTED INITIATIVES.
INTELLIGENCE ABOUT SOUTH ASIA WILL CONTINUE TO BE IMPORTANT
TO POLICYMAKERS FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH
IS SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. GORBACHEV'S DECISION TO
WITHDRAW SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN DEMONSTRATES HIS DESIRE
TO CUT SOVIET LOSSES IN ORDER TO PURSUE OTHER OBJECTIVES. BUT
DESPITE THE SOVIET TROOP WITHDRAWAL, AFGHANISTAN WILL REMAIN A
KEY FOREIGN POLICY CONCERN IN MOSCOW. BECAUSE OF THE SOVIETS'
CONTINUED INTEREST AND ITS STRATEGIC LOCATION, AFGHANISTAN WILL
REMAIN AN IMPORTANT CONCERN IN WASHINGTON AS WELL.6
WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO
WITHDRAW THE REST OF THEIR TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN BY FEBRUARY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
15TH OF NEXT YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME. MOSCOW WILL TRY TO RETAIN
ITS INFLUENCE WITH KABUL THROUGH BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
MEANS. THE APPOINTMENT OF A NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO
AFGHANISTAN SEVERAL WEEKS AGO INDICATES THAT AFGHANISTAN
REMAINS A PRIORITY CONCERN IN MOSCOW.
FOLLOWING THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL. WE BELIEVE THAT
AFGHANISTAN WILL BE UNSTABLE FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD AND HAVE
SO ADVISED POLICYMAKERS. THE SOVIET-BACKED REGIME HAS MINIMAL
CONTROL OR SUPPORT OUTSIDE KABUL. AND THE WITHDRAWAL WILL MAKE
ITS POSITION EVEN MORE PRECARIOUS. THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WILL
CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO DESTROY WHAT IS LEFT OF THE REGIME.
HOWEVER, THE RULING PARTY'S FRAGMENTATION MAY BE AS LARGE A
FACTOR IN THE REGIME'S COLLAPSE AS THE MILITARY INITIATIVES OF
THE RESISTANCE.
THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD WILL ALSO FIND THE AFGHAN REBELS
FIGHTING AMONG THEMSELVES -- AS THEY DID THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET
OCCUPATION -- FOR POLITICAL POWER IN AFGHANISTAN. GIVEN THAT
10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
MOST ETHNIC GROUPS ARE BETTER ARMED THAN EVER BEFORE AND ARE
LIKELY TO CAPTURE ADDITIONAL WEAPONS FROM THE DISINTEGRATING
AFGHAN ARMY, WE COULD EXPECT TO SEE TRIBAL CONFLICT CONTINUE
FOR SOME TIME AFTER THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.
THE FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WILL
ENTER THE POST-SOVIET ERA WELL-ARMED AND WELL-ORGANIZED.
WHATEVER THE COMPOSITION OF A FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN.
ISLAMIC RITUAL AND LAW WILL PROBABLY PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN ITS
OPERATIONS AND POLICIES. BUT THE NATURE AND TRADITIONS OF
AFGHANISTAN MAKE THE IMPOSITION OF A KHOMEINI-STYLE
FUNDAMENTALISM UNLIKELY.
THE UNITED STATES CANNOT DICTATE WHO WILL FINALLY EMERGE AS
THE LEADERS IN AFGHANISTAN. A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS
UNLIKELY, AND RESIDUAL HOSTILITY TO THE SOVIETS MAY EVENTUALLY
BE MATCHED BY THE RETURN OF HISTORICAL SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE
WEST. PERHAPS THE GOOD NEWS ABOUT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN IS NOT
SO MUCH WHAT HAS BEEN GAINED, BUT WHAT HAS BEEN AVERTED.
11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
CLEARLY, THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
POLITICAL CONTROL ARE THE PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE ISSUES IN
AFGHANISTAN FOR THE NEAR TERM. BUT EFFORTS BY NEIGHBORING
COUNTRIES TO EXERT INFLUENCE IN AFGHANISTAN WILL ALSO RECEIVE
OUR ATTENTION. IN THE LONGER TERM, WE WILL EXAMINE THE FUTURE
AFGHAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTS TO REBUILD THE COUNTRY AND
RESETTLE THE WORLD'S LARGEST REFUGEE POPULATION -- MORE THAN
FIVE MILLION PEOPLE.
ABOUT THREE MILLION OF THOSE REFUGEES NOW LIVE IN PAKISTAN,
A COUNTRY THAT HAS FULLY SUPPORTED THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE.
PAKISTAN HAS ALWAYS BEEN OF STRATEGIC INTEREST TO U.S.
POLICYMAKERS, BUT THE DEATH OF PRESIDENT ZIA IN AUGUST HAS
RAISED NEW ISSUES.?
THE RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT ZIA'S DEATH HAS BEEN A SMOOTH,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION. GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN ((GOO.LOM ISH
OCK CON)), THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE. HAS TAKEN OVER AS
ACTING PRESIDENT. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION, A NEW PRESIDENT MUST
12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
BE ELECTED WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS.
PRESIDENT ISHAQ HAS ANNOUNCED THAT THE ELECTIONS SET FOR
NOVEMBER 16TH WILL BE HELD ON SCHEDULE. A SERIES OF JUDICIAL
RULINGS HAVE REMOVED THE CONSTRAINTS PLACED ON PAKISTAN'S
POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 1985 ELECTIONS, AND THE NOVEMBER
ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE MOST CLOSELY CONTESTED IN PAKISTAN'S
HISTORY.8
BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES
AND PAKISTAN AND BECAUSE OF PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE,
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL BE FOLLOWING THESE
DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE KEENEST INTEREST.
ANOTHER REGION OF GREAT STRATEGIC INTEREST FOR THE UNITED
STATES IS THE PERSIAN GULF -- AN AREA WHERE TENSIONS REMAIN
HIGH DESPITE THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.9 NOT
SURPRISINGLY, THE PEACE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS HAVE BEEN
FITFUL'AND DIFFICULT. THE ANIMOSITIES BUILT UP OVER EIGHT
YEARS OF BITTER CONFLICT ARE NOT EASY TO DISPEL.
13
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR COST THE TWO COUNTRIES MORE THAN 350
BILLION DOLLARS, AND EVEN MORE IN HUMAN COSTS -- MORE THAN ONE
MILLION CASUALTIES AND ONE AND A HALF MILLION REFUGEES. THIS
WAR WAS ONE OF THE BLOODIEST OF THE CENTURY, AND IT WILL TAKE
MANY YEARS FOR THE TWO NATIONS TO RECOVER.
THE CONFLICT HAS AFFECTED NEARLY EVERY ASPECT OF ECONOMIC
LIFE IN IRAN AND IRAQ. BOTH ECONOMIES HAVE BEEN WEAKENED BY
THE LOSS OF OIL REVENUES AND BOTH HAVE BORNE THE EXPENSE OF
LARGE-SCALE ARMS PURCHASES. THE COSTS OF RECONSTRUCTION WILL
BE A FURTHER DRAIN. BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE EXHAUSTED THEIR
FINANCIAL RESERVES AND HAVE BEEN COMPELLED TO CUT ECONOMIC
DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.
WE BELIEVE THESE COSTS OF THE WAR WILL DETER BOTH SIDES
FROM RESUMING AN ALL-OUT CONFLICT ANYTIME SOON. HOWEVER, IRAN
AND IRAQ CONTINUE TO DISTRUST EACH OTHER, AND BOTH WILL
PROBABLY MAINTAIN THEIR MILITARY READINESS.
14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE
IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT, PROVIDING ASSESSMENTS OF THE INTENTIONS AND
CAPABILITIES OF BOTH SIDES, AS WELL AS THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
REGION AND THE UNITED STATES. WHEN THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE
GULF WAS INCREASED, WE BEGAN PROVIDING DAILY TACTICAL
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO NAVAL FORCES OPERATING WITH THE U.S.
CENTRAL COMMAND. OUR SUPPORT INCLUDED REPORTS ON IRANIAN
ANTISHIP CRUISE MISSILE SITES. NAVAL BASES. AIRFIELDS, AND
COASTAL DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS. AS A_RESULT. U.S. FORCES HAVE
BEEN ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY CARRY OUT U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND
PROTECT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS.
THE END OF THE GULF WAR HAS CREATED A WHOLE NEW SET OF
INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS WHICH WE ARE NOW ADDRESSING -- QUESTIONS
SUCH AS WHAT EFFECT THE CEASE-FIRE MAY HAVE ON THE WESTERN
HOSTAGES BEING HELD IN LEBANON; HOW THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN
TEHRAN TO SUCCEED KHOMEINI WILL BE AFFECTED; WHAT IMPACT THE
CEASE-FIRE WILL HAVE ON EACH COUNTRY'S DRIVE FOR REGIONAL
15
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
INFLUENCE: AND THE LONG-TERM IMPACT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS ON
THE COST OF OIL.
PERHAPS THE BIGGEST QUESTION WE ARE CONSIDERING IS WHAT
LESSONS IRAN AND IRAQ -- AND THE REST OF THE WORLD -- HAVE
LEARNED FROM A WAR THAT INVOLVED THE FIRST SUSTAINED USE OF
CHEMICAL WEAPONS SINCE WORLD WAR I.10
AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR, THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS
OUTLAWED BY SIGNERS OF THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL. DURING WORLD
WAR II -- EVEN DURING THE MOST DESPERATE BATTLES -- BOTH SIDES
REFRAINED FROM USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- WEAPONS THAT WINSTON
CHURCHILL REFERRED TO AS "THAT HELLISH POISON."
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ENDED THAT RESTRAINT AND SET A DANGEROUS
PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE WARS. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS
CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST
IRAN AND ALSO AGAINST IRAQI KURDS. IRAN, TOO, HAS EMPLOYED
CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQI TROOPS.11
16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
I'M SURE YOU'VE READ MANY ACCOUNTS RECENTLY ABOUT THE USE
OF AND THE EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE WEAPONS ARE
THOUGHT TO OFFER A CHEAP AND READILY OBTAINABLE MEANS OF
REDRESSING THE MILITARY BALANCE AGAINST MORE POWERFUL FOES.
SOME SEE THEM AS THE POOR MAN'S ANSWER TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND
MORE THAN 20 COUNTRIES MAY BE DEVELOPING CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
MUSTARD GAS. A TERRIBLE WEAPON FIRST USED IN WORLD WAR I.
IS ONE OF THE FAVORED CHEMICAL AGENTS FOR SEVERAL REASONS --
ITS RELATIVE EASE OF MANUFACTURE, ITS LONG LIFE IN STORAGE AND
ON THE BATTLEFIELD. AND ITS ABILITY TO INCAPACITATE THOSE
EXPOSED TO IT.
SOME COUNTRIES ARE DEVELOPING NERVE AGENTS. THESE AGENTS,
THOUGH MORE DIFFICULT TO MANUFACTURE, CAN CAUSE DEATH IN
MINUTES BY ATTACKING THE BRAIN AND NERVOUS SYSTEM. OTHER
NATIONS MAY USE COMMON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS SUCH AS CYANIDE AND
PHOSGENE. CYANIDE PREVENTS THE BLOOD FROM CARRYING OXYGEN,
WHILE PHOSGENE, WIDELY USED IN MAKING PLASTICS. CAN DESTROY THE
LUNGS.
17
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE
ABILITY OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE CHEMICAL
WEAPONS, AND THEIR INCENTIVES FOR USING SUCH WEAPONS. AND WITH
THE INCREASE OF BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD WORLD, WE MUST
BE ALERT TO ATTEMPTS BY THIRD WORLD NATIONS TO ARM THESE
MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS.
THE PROLIFERATION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS AFFECTS THE PROSPECTS
FOR PEACE AND STABILITY IN REGIONS SUCH AS SOUTHEAST ASIA AND
THE MIDDLE EAST. FOR ISRAEL, THE SPREAD OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS
AMONG THE ARAB STATES -- PRINCIPALLY IRAQ, LIBYA. AND SYRIA --
COULD SERIOUSLY ALTER THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER. THIS HAS'
MAJOR IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
IT ALSO APPEARS THAT THE MORAL BARRIER TO BIOLOGICAL
WARFARE HAS BEEN LIFTED. AT LEAST 10 COUNTRIES ARE WORKING TO
PRODUCE BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND THIS PRESENTS US WITH ANOTHER
INTELLIGENCE CONCERN.
18
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IS ALSO VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF UNITED
STATES EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS --
EFFORTS SUCH AS RESTRICTING THE EXPORT OF CERTAIN KEY CHEMICALS
AND OF BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. ON THE INTERNATIONAL
FRONT. THE UNITED STATES PARTICIPATES IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE
ON DISARMAMENT, WHICH IS TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A CHEMICAL WEAPONS
BAN. AND ON SEPTEMBER 26TH, PRESIDENT REAGAN ADDRESSED THE
UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE CALLED ON THE SIGNERS OF
THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL AND OTHER CONCERNED NATIONS TO CONVENE
A CONFERENCE TO CONSIDER ACTIONS WE CAN TAKE TOGETHER TO
REVERSE THE SERIOUS EROSION OF THIS TREATY.12
ASSESSING THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL
WEAPONS IS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGES WE FACE IN THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- NOW AND INTO THE NEXT DECADE. IT IS
ALSO ONE OF OUR MOST IMPORTANT TASKS, FOR THESE WEAPONS MAY
WELL REPRESENT ONE OF THE MOST SERIOUS THREATS TO WORLD PEACE
IN THE COMING YEARS.
19
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
THE GREAT BRITISH WRITER AND CYNIC, SOMERSET MAUGHAM, ONCE
NOTED, "IT IS BAD ENOUGH TO KNOW THE PAST; IT WOULD BE
INTOLERABLE TO KNOW THE FUTURE." IT WOULD, OF COURSE, BE JUST
AS INTOLERABLE NOT TO BE PREPARED FOR THE FUTURE. REFORM IN
THE SOVIET UNION, UNREST IN AFGHANISTAN, AND TENSIONS IN THE
PERSIAN GULF ARE ISSUES THAT WILL BE WITH US INTO THE NEXT
DECADE. ASSESSING THESE QUESTIONS AND THEIR FAR-REACHING
EFFECTS IS THE CRITICAL TASK OF INTELLIGENCE.
OUR MACHINES, OUR SYSTEMS, AND OUR SATELLITES ARE THE
WONDERS OF THE AGE. THEY HELP US TO DO OUR VERY DIFFICULT
WORK. BUT INTELLIGENCE IS PREEMINENTLY AN AFFAIR OF PEOPLE.
IT IS THE CALIBER OF THE MEN AND WOMEN OF AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE -- THEIR CREATIVITY, DETERMINATION, BRILLIANCE,
AND COURAGE -- THAT SPELLS THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUCCESS AND
FAILURE.
I HOPE THAT WE CONTINUE TO ATTRACT THOSE BEST SUITED TO
CARRY OUT OUR MISSION -- PEOPLE WHO ARE RISK TAKERS, BUT NOT
20
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
RISK SEEKERS. PEOPLE WHO ARE DEDICATED AND RESPONSIVE TO OUR
LAW AND DISCIPLINE. PEOPLE WHO UNDERSTAND AND PLAY BY THE
RULES. PEOPLE TO WHOM FAME AND FORTUNE ARE NOT A NECESSARY
PART OF THEIR LIFE, BUT WHO CAN FIND IN THIS DIFFICULT WORK AN
AVENUE TO PURSUE THEIR HIGHEST ASPIRATIONS FOR A SAFER AND
BETTER WORLD.
WITH SUCH PEOPLE. WE CAN CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE
INTELLIGENCE THAT POLICYMAKERS NEED IN ORDER TO MAKE WISE
DECISIONS IN THE INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS IS
WHAT YOU EXPECT OF US, WHAT ALL AMERICANS EXPECT OF US, AND I
CAN ASSURE YOU WE ARE DOING OUR VERY BEST TO SUPPLY IT.
21
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
Next 1 Page(s) In Document Denied
Iq
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 STATn .Ju
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
STAT- _ DDC
1-
STATI
STAT1 - D/PAO 1
- PAO Regi
1 - PAO Ames
1 - ct) Z4 October 1988
1-
1 Security
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: William M. Baker
Director, Public Affairs Office
SUBJECT: Arrangements for Address of the World Affairs Council
of Washington, D.C.
1. This is background information for your address of the World Affairs
Council of Washington, D.C. on Tuesday, 25 October. The meeting will be held
at the Capital Hilton on 16th and K Streets, N.W., Washington, D.C. Phone:
393-1000. Bill Devine will accompany you and remain throughout the program.
2. Arrangements: You are requested to be at the Presidential Ballroom at
approximately p.m. where you will be met by Chairman of the World Affairs
Council Philip Odeen. (See tab opposite for a biography.) A short reception
precedes the program. At approximately 5:55 p.m. you will be escorted by
Mr. Odeen to the platform. Your remarks on "Intelligence: Key Issues for the
1990's" are scheduled to begin at 6:00 p.m. and Mr. Odeen will introduce you
and remain on stage throughout the program. The suggested format is
20 - 30 minutes of remarks followed by 30 minutes of questions and answers
which will be moderated by Mr. Odeen. Questions will be submitted in written
form. Adjournment is at 7:00 p.m. A podium and microphone will be
available. DCI Security will tape your remarks for the Agency's historical
files. A still photographer from the World Affairs Council will take
photographs of you and Mr. Odeen on the dais.
3. Audience: You can expect an audience of approximately
600 - 70 pDssional men and women, representatives from international trade
firms, retired CIA and Foreign Service officers, Treasury and Commerce
officials, and members of the financial community. Since representatives from
the embassies in the Washington area are members of the Council, you can
expect foreign nationals to be in the audience. (See list opposite of
diplomats who have registered.)
4. Media: Although the Council will not have a complete list of the
media who T1 be present until immediately prior to program time, the Council
believes that C-Span, AP, and VOICE OF AMERICA will tape your address. The
press usually does not participate in the question and answer period.
STAT
- .
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
I VI\ V, , av a,.a. vv.. v.....
5. Background: The World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C. founded in
1980 is T non-partisan, non-profit, public service organization. All World
Affairs Council groups located in cities throughout the country are
independent of each other in terms of membership and their programs. The
World Affairs Council is dedicated to fostering greater interest in
international issues by offering a public platform to foreign and US leaders
and policy experts. (See tab opposite for background material.) As FBI
Director, you addressed World Affairs Councils of California and Pittsburgh
and in September you spoke to the Council in San Francisco.
Previous speakers have been Admiral Stansfield Turner and William Colby.
The latter spoke on "The Role of CIA in Foreign Policy." This fall the
Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans and the South Korean Foreign Affairs
Minister Choi Kwang Soo spoke to the council. President of Slovenia,
Yugoslavia, Janez Stanovnik will speak to the group in November. (See tab
opposite for program calendar.)
S/~S
William M. Baker
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 25X1" `' A. ""' SECRET
25, Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
1
Origy - DCI
1 - D/PAO
25X1
1 -
1 -
1 -
1 - PAO Registry
1 - PAO Ame 19 October 1988
s
25X1 1 - (Chrono)
JUDGE:
You are scheduled to address the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.
on 25 October. We anticipate an audience of about 600 area leaders, and your
remarks will be followed by a question-and-answer period.
We have based this speech on the one you delivered to the World Affairs
Council of Northern California in September. The intelligence issues you
discussed then -- the Soviet Union, Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, chemical
weapons, and counterintelligence -- are still very much in the news, and they
illustrate the breadth and complexity of our work.
We have updated the speech to reflect developments since it was first
delivered on 19 September -- the recent personnel changes in the Soviet Union,
the judicial rulings on the November elections in Pakistan, the fitful
progress of the Iran-Iraq peace talks, further Iraqi use of chemical weapons
against the Kurds, and the President's call for an international conference on
chemical weapons use. We obtained the information to update this speech from
the DI's Arms Control Intelligence Staff, Office of Near Eastern and South
Asian Analysis and Office of Scientific and Weapons Research. This speech has
been coordinated with those offices, with the DI's Office of Soviet Analysis,
and with the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.
Your proposed remarks are attached.
Bill Baker
Attachments:
As Stated
Regrade as UNCLASSIFIED
when separated from attachments.
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
PROPOSED REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
WASHINGTON, D.C.
OCTOBER 25, 1988
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
IT IS THE FALL OF 1988 -- WE EDGE TOWARD THE END OF THE YEAR AND
THE END OF THE DECADE. I HAVE BEEN ASKED RATHER FREQUENTLY IN
RECENT MONTHS TO REFLECT ON WHAT THE MOST IMPORTANT INTELLIGENCE
ISSUES OF THE 1990s WILL BE. THE QUESTION REMINDS ME OF AN
OBSERVATION ONCE MADE BY A NUCLEAR PHYSICIST: "PREDICTION IS VERY
DIFFICULT, ESPECIALLY ABOUT THE FUTURE."1 WITH THAT CAUTIONARY
NOTE IN MIND, I WILL MAKE A FEW PREDICTIONS ABOUT SOME OF THE KEY
ISSUES THAT NOW CONFRONT THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY -- ISSUES THAT
WE EXPECT TO BE WITH US WELL INTO THE NEXT DECADE.
MY GOOD FRIEND, GENERAL VERNON WALTERS, FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR
OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AND NOW OUR AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED
NATIONS, DESCRIBES A VIEW HELD BY MANY IN THIS COUNTRY ABOUT
INTELLIGENCE. "AMERICANS." HE SAID, "HAVE ALWAYS HAD AN AMBIVALENT
ATTITUDE TOWARD INTELLIGENCE. WHEN THEY FEEL THREATENED, THEY WANT
A LOT OF IT, AND WHEN THEY DON'T, THEY TEND TO REGARD THE WHOLE
THING AS SOMEWHAT IMMORAL."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
WITH SO MUCH GOING ON AROUND THE WORLD THAT AFFECTS OUR NATIONAL
SECURITY, I THINK THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TODAY WANT A LOT OF
INTELLIGENCE. AND A WHOLE RANGE OF ISSUES ARE COMMANDING THE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY'S ATTENTION -- INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND
DRUG TRAFFICKING, THE PROLIFERATION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS, THE
TRANSFER OF STRATEGIC TECHNOLOGY TO THE SOVIET BLOC-- TO NAME JUST A
FEW INTELLIGENCE ISSUES THAT ARE GLOBAL IN NATURE.
THIS EVENING, I WANT TO CONCENTRATE ON THREE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS
THAT ARE -- AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE -- OF GREAT INTEREST TO U.S.
POLICYMAKERS AND, THUS, OF GREAT INTEREST TO THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. THESE AREAS ARE THE SOVIET UNION, SOUTH ASIA, AND THE
PERSIAN GULF. AND I WOULD ALSO LIKE TO DISCUSS TWO ISSUES THAT ARE
TIED TO THESE GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS -- THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL
AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS AND OUR CONTINUING NEED FOR EFFECTIVE
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
THE SOVIET UNION WILL REMAIN THE PRIMARY FOCUS OF OUR
INTELLIGENCE COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS IN THE 1990s. ITS MILITARY
CAPABILITY, ITS EFFORTS TO INCREASE GLOBAL INFLUENCE. AND ITS
2
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
AGGRESSIVE INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES ARE A SERIOUS THREAT TO U.S.
INTERESTS.2
GORBACHEV'S EFFORTS TO REFORM HIS COUNTRY HAVE NOT FUNDAMENTALLY
ALTERED THESE TRUTHS AND. IN FACT, MAKE THE SOVIET UNION OF EVEN
GREATER CONCERN TO U.S. INTELLIGENCE.
THE PRESIDENT TOLD ME AN INTERESTING STORY RECENTLY. GORBACHEV
SENT A REPRESENTATIVE OUT INTO ONE OF THE UKRAINIAN STATES TO SEE
HOW PERESTROIKA WAS GETTING ALONG. HE WENT TO ONE OF THE SMALL
VILLAGES AND ASKED TO SEE THE MAYOR. AFTER TALKING TO THE MAYOR FOR
A MOMENT, HE SAID, "DO YOU HAVE ANY TELEVISION SETS IN THIS
VILLAGE?" THE MAYOR LOOKED AT HIM AND SAID. "OF COURSE WE HAVE
TELEVISION SETS. IN FACT, THERE MAY BE TWO TELEVISION SETS IN MANY
OF THESE HUTS." THE REPRESENTATIVE SAID, "THAT IS VERY
INTERESTING. WHAT ABOUT REFRIGERATORS?" AND THE MAYOR SAID, "OF
COURSE. WE ALL HAVE REFRIGERATORS." THE REPRESENTATIVE LOOKED THE
MAYOR IN THE EYE AND SAID, "DO YOU KNOW WHO I AM?" AND THE MAYOR
SAID, "OF COURSE I DO. WHO ELSE BUT A CIA AGENT WOULD COME INTO A
VILLAGE WITH NO ELECTRICITY AND ASK QUESTIONS LIKE THAT?"
3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
LIKE MANY OF YOU, I HAVE BEEN FASCINATED BY WHAT IS OCCURRING IN
THE SOVIET UNION. GORBACHEV HAS STIRRED UP THE STEW -- BRINGING NEW
LIFE AND DYNAMISM TO SOVIET POLITICS AND PUSHING A SERIES OF REFORMS
THAT NONE OF US COULD HAVE FORESEEN FIVE YEARS AGO.
THE FORCES OF DEMOCRACY ARE MAKING SOME POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC
INROADS. ALTHOUGH THE USSR CERTAINLY IS NOT HEADED TOWARD DEMOCRACY
AS WE KNOW IT, TODAY'S SOVIET LEADERS APPEAR TO UNDERSTAND THAT
THEIR SYSTEM IS FALTERING LARGELY BECAUSE IT HAS NOT GIVEN THE
PEOPLE ENOUGH BREATHING ROOM -- ROOM TO INNOVATE, ROOM TO INQUIRE.
ROOM TO INVESTIGATE.
CHANGE IS OCCURRING IN THE AREA OF FOREIGN POLICY AS WELL. THE
SOVIETS ARE LEAVING AFGHANISTAN AND ELIMINATING A WHOLE CLASS OF
NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE INF TREATY -- A PROCESS THAT INCLUDES
UNPRECEDENTED ON-SITE INSPECTIONS OF SOVIET MILITARY FACILITIES.
THE DRAMATIC NATURE OF THESE POLICY CHANGES CLEARLY HAS PROVOKED
CONTROVERSY WITHIN THE SOVIET UNION. A MAJOR POWER STRUGGLE IS
UNDER WAY BETWEEN REFORMERS, WHO BELIEVE RADICAL CHANGES ARE
NECESSARY TO MAKE THE COMMUNIST SYSTEM WORK, AND CONSERVATIVES, WHO
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
FEAR SUCH CHANGES COULD DESTABILIZE THE VERY SYSTEM THEY ARE TRYING
TO SAVE. THE OUTCOME OF THIS STRUGGLE WILL AFFECT HOW FAR AND HOW
FAST REFORM PROGRESSES, THE EXTENT TO WHICH CENTRAL AUTHORITY IS
RELAXED, THE GENERAL WELFARE OF THE INDIVIDUAL, AND HOW COMPETITIVE
THE SOVIET SYSTEM WILL BE OVER THE NEXT FEW DECADES.
JUST ABOUT A MONTH AGO, GORBACHEV SUCCESSFULLY CHALLENGED A
NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS IN THE SOVIET HIERARCHY -- UNDERTAKING THE
MOST SWEEPING OVERHAUL OF THE TOP PARTY LEADERSHIP SINCE KHRUSHCHEV
OUSTED HIS CHIEF OPPONENTS IN 1957.3 THE CHANGES MADE SHOULD
ALLOW GORBACHEV TO PUSH HIS POLICY AGENDA AT HOME AND ABROAD WITH
RENEWED MOMENTUM.4
YET THIS IS ONLY ONE VICTORY IN A VERY LONG WAR TO REFORM THE
SOVIET SYSTEM. THE PROCESS WILL BE LONG AND DRAWN OUT AT BEST,
REQUIRING GORBACHEV TO OVERCOME ENORMOUS POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, AND
CULTURAL OBSTACLES.
THERE ARE STRONG REASONS TO'. DOUBT WHETHER A SYSTEM DESIGNED TO
CENTRALIZE AUTHORITY, MAXIMIZE GOVERNMENT CONTROL OVER ITS PEOPLE,
AND CONCENTRATE RESOURCES ON BUILDING UP THE NATION'S MILITARY
5
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
STRENGTH CAN BECOME MORE DECENTRALIZED AND DEMOCRATIC IN ITS
DECISIONMAKING AND MORE SOLICITOUS OF ITS PEOPLE. THE NATIONALIST
UNREST IN THE BALTIC STATES, ARMENIA, AND OTHER REGIONS OF THE USSR
WILL TEST THE SOVIET SYSTEM'S ABILITY TO MAKE REFORMS WORK.
BUT IF THE LAST THREE YEARS HAVE TAUGHT US ANYTHING, IT IS THAT
GORBACHEV IS A HIGHLY SKILLED POLITICIAN, AND WE CANNOT RULE OUT THE
POSSIBILITY THAT HE CAN, ULTIMATELY, PULL OFF A "REVOLUTION FROM
ABOVE" THAT ACTUALLY INCREASES AUTHORITY BELOW.
THE SOVIET REFORM EFFORT PRESENTS THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY WITH SOME FORMIDABLE CHALLENGES. WE MUST PAY CLOSER
ATTENTION THAN EVER TO THE POLITICAL STRUGGLES AND ISSUES BEING
RAISED AS GORBACHEV CONTINUES TO CHALLENGE THE ESTABLISHED INTERESTS
OF INDIVIDUALS AND INSTITUTIONS.
WE MUST ALSO HELP THE POLICYMAKER SORT OUT HOW REFORM WILL
AFFECT SOVIET MILITARY AND ECONOMIC CAPABILITIES AND -- EVEN MORE
DIFFICULT -- HOW IT MAY CHANGE MOSCOW'S FOREIGN POLICY.
WE MUST MANAGE THE INFORMATION EXPLOSION THAT GLASNOST HAS
PRODUCED WHICH, THOUGH WELCOME, CHALLENGES US TO SORT OUT WHAT IS
6
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
IMPORTANT AND WHAT IS NOT, WHAT IS REAL VERSUS WHAT MOSCOW WANTS US
TO HEAR.
WE MUST SUPPORT U.S.-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL TALKS. AS THESE
NEGOTIATIONS PROGRESS, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL BE
INCREASINGLY ASKED TO ASSESS SOVIET MOTIVATIONS AND MONITOR SOVIET
COMPLIANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF AGREEMENTS. AND THE AMOUNT OF
SUPPORT REQUIRED IS TREMENDOUS. THE INF TREATY HAS REQUIRED THE
UNITED STATES TO CONDUCT INSPECTIONS AT 117 SOVIET FACILITIES.
MONITORING THE START TREATY, WHICH IS NOW BEING NEGOTIATED IN
GENEVA, COULD INVOLVE AS MANY AS 2,500 WEAPONS LOCATIONS SPREAD
THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET UNION.5
YET WHATEVER ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS THE UNITED STATES MAKES
WITH THE SOVIET UNION, OUR RELATIONSHIP IS LIKELY TO REMAIN
ADVERSARIAL. POLICYMAKERS WILL DEPEND ON THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
TO MAKE QUICK AND ACCURATE ASSESSMENTS -- AND EVEN TO ANTICIPATE
GORBACHEV'S SOMETIMES UNORTHODOX AND UNEXPECTED INITIATIVES.
INTELLIGENCE ABOUT SOUTH ASIA WILL CONTINUE TO BE IMPORTANT TO
POLICYMAKERS FOR A NUMBER OF REASONS, NOT THE LEAST OF WHICH IS
7
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
SOVIET INFLUENCE IN THE REGION. GORBACHEV'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW
SOVIET TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN DEMONSTRATES HIS DESIRE TO CUT SOVIET
LOSSES IN ORDER TO PURSUE OTHER OBJECTIVES. BUT DESPITE THE SOVIET
TROOP WITHDRAWAL, AFGHANISTAN WILL REMAIN A KEY FOREIGN POLICY
CONCERN IN MOSCOW. BECAUSE OF THE SOVIETS' CONTINUED INTEREST AND
ITS STRATEGIC LOCATION. AFGHANISTAN WILL REMAIN AN IMPORTANT CONCERN
IN WASHINGTON AS WELL.6
WE EXPECT THE SOVIETS TO ABIDE BY THEIR COMMITMENT TO WITHDRAW
THE REST OF THEIR TROOPS FROM AFGHANISTAN BY FEBRUARY 15TH OF NEXT
YEAR. AT THE SAME TIME, MOSCOW WILL TRY TO RETAIN ITS INFLUENCE
WITH KABUL THROUGH BOTH ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL MEANS. THE
APPOINTMENT OF A NEW SOVIET AMBASSADOR TO AFGHANISTAN SEVERAL WEEKS
AGO INDICATES THAT AFGHANISTAN REMAINS A PRIORITY CONCERN IN MOSCOW.
FOLLOWING THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL, WE BELIEVE THAT AFGHANISTAN
WILL BE UNSTABLE FOR A CONSIDERABLE PERIOD AND HAVE SO ADVISED
POLICYMAKERS. THE SOVIET-BACKED"REGIME HAS MINIMAL CONTROL OR
SUPPORT OUTSIDE KABUL, AND THE WITHDRAWAL WILL MAKE ITS POSITION
EVEN MORE PRECARIOUS. THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WILL CONTINUE ITS
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
EFFORTS TO DESTROY WHAT IS LEFT OF THE REGIME. HOWEVER. THE RULING
PARTY'S FRAGMENTATION MAY BE AS LARGE A FACTOR IN THE REGIME'S
COLLAPSE AS THE MILITARY INITIATIVES OF THE RESISTANCE.
THE POST-SOVIET PERIOD WILL ALSO FIND THE AFGHAN REBELS FIGHTING
AMONG THEMSELVES -- AS THEY DID THROUGHOUT THE SOVIET
OCCUPATION -- FOR POLITICAL POWER IN AFGHANISTAN. GIVEN THAT MOST
ETHNIC GROUPS ARE BETTER ARMED THAN EVER BEFORE AND ARE LIKELY TO
CAPTURE ADDITIONAL WEAPONS FROM THE DISINTEGRATING AFGHAN ARMY, WE
COULD EXPECT TO SEE TRIBAL CONFLICT CONTINUE FOR SOME TIME AFTER THE
SOVIET WITHDRAWAL.
THE FUNDAMENTALIST GROUPS OF THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WILL ENTER
THE POST-SOVIET ERA WELL-ARMED AND WELL-ORGANIZED. WHATEVER THE
COMPOSITION OF A FUTURE GOVERNMENT IN AFGHANISTAN. ISLAMIC RITUAL
AND LAW WILL PROBABLY PLAY A LARGER ROLE IN ITS OPERATIONS AND
POLICIES. BUT THE NATURE AND TRADITIONS OF AFGHANISTAN MAKE THE
IMPOSITION OF A KHOMEINI-STYLE FUNDAMENTALISM UNLIKELY.
THE UNITED STATES CANNOT DICTATE WHO WILL FINALLY EMERGE AS THE
LEADERS IN AFGHANISTAN. A STRONG CENTRAL GOVERNMENT IS UNLIKELY.
9
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
AND RESIDUAL HOSTILITY TO THE SOVIETS MAY EVENTUALLY BE MATCHED BY
THE RETURN OF HISTORICAL SUSPICIONS ABOUT THE WEST. PERHAPS THE
GOOD NEWS ABOUT EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN IS NOT SO MUCH WHAT HAS BEEN
GAINED, BUT WHAT HAS BEEN AVERTED.
CLEARLY, THE SOVIET WITHDRAWAL AND THE STRUGGLE FOR POLITICAL
CONTROL ARE THE PRIMARY INTELLIGENCE ISSUES IN AFGHANISTAN FOR THE
NEAR TERM. BUT EFFORTS BY NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES TO EXERT INFLUENCE
IN AFGHANISTAN WILL ALSO RECEIVE OUR ATTENTION. IN THE LONGER TERM,
WE WILL EXAMINE THE FUTURE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT'S ATTEMPTS TO REBUILD
THE COUNTRY AND RESETTLE THE WORLD'S LARGEST REFUGEE
POPULATION -- MORE THAN FIVE MILLION PEOPLE.
ABOUT THREE MILLION OF THOSE REFUGEES NOW LIVE IN PAKISTAN, A
COUNTRY THAT HAS FULLY SUPPORTED THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. PAKISTAN
HAS ALWAYS BEEN OF STRATEGIC INTEREST TO U.S. POLICYMAKERS, BUT THE
DEATH OF PRESIDENT ZIA IN AUGUST HAS RAISED NEW ISSUES .7
THE RESPONSE TO PRESIDENT ZIA'S DEATH HAS BEEN A SMOOTH,
CONSTITUTIONAL TRANSITION. GHULAM ISHAQ KHAN ((GOO LOM ISH OCK
CON)), THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE, HAS TAKEN OVER AS ACTING
10
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
PRESIDENT. UNDER THE CONSTITUTION. A NEW PRESIDENT MUST BE ELECTED
WITHIN 30 DAYS AFTER PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS. PRESIDENT ISHAQ HAS
ANNOUNCED THAT THE ELECTIONS SET FOR NOVEMBER 16TH WILL BE HELD ON
SCHEDULE. A SERIES OF JUDICIAL RULINGS HAVE REMOVED THE CONSTRAINTS
PLACED ON PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE 1985 ELECTIONS, AND
THE NOVEMBER ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE MOST CLOSELY CONTESTED IN
PAKISTAN'S HISTORY.8
BECAUSE OF THE CLOSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND
PAKISTAN AND BECAUSE OF PAKISTAN'S STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE, THE U.S.
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL BE FOLLOWING THESE DEVELOPMENTS WITH THE
KEENEST INTEREST.
ANOTHER REGION OF GREAT STRATEGIC INTEREST FOR THE UNITED STATES
IS THE PERSIAN GULF -- AN AREA WHERE TENSIONS REMAIN HIGH DESPITE
THE CEASE-FIRE BETWEEN IRAN AND IRAQ.9 NOT SURPRISINGLY, THE
PEACE TALKS BETWEEN THE TWO NATIONS HAVE BEEN FITFUL AND DIFFICULT.
THE ANIMOSITIES BUILT UP OVER EIGHT YEARS OF BITTER CONFLICT ARE NOT
EASY TO DISPEL.
11
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR COST THE TWO COUNTRIES MORE THAN 350 BILLION
DOLLARS, AND EVEN MORE IN HUMAN COSTS -- MORE THAN ONE MILLION
CASUALTIES AND ONE AND A HALF MILLION REFUGEES. THIS WAR WAS ONE OF
THE BLOODIEST OF THE CENTURY, AND IT WILL TAKE MANY YEARS FOR THE
TWO NATIONS TO RECOVER.
THE CONFLICT HAS AFFECTED NEARLY EVERY ASPECT OF ECONOMIC LIFE
IN IRAN'AND IRAQ. BOTH ECONOMIES HAVE BEEN WEAKENED BY THE LOSS OF
OIL REVENUES AND BOTH HAVE BORNE THE EXPENSE OF LARGE-SCALE ARMS
PURCHASES. THE COSTS OF RECONSTRUCTION WILL BE A FURTHER DRAIN.
BOTH COUNTRIES HAVE EXHAUSTED THEIR FINANCIAL RESERVES AND HAVE BEEN
COMPELLED TO CUT ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMS.
WE BELIEVE THESE COSTS OF THE WAR WILL DETER BOTH SIDES FROM
RESUMING AN ALL-OUT CONFLICT ANYTIME SOON. HOWEVER, IRAN AND IRAQ
CONTINUE TO DISTRUST EACH OTHER, AND BOTH WILL PROBABLY MAINTAIN
THEIR MILITARY READINESS.
THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS CLOSELY FOLLOWED THE
IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT, PROVIDING ASSESSMENTS OF THE INTENTIONS AND
CAPABILITIES OF BOTH SIDES, AS WELL AS THE IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
12
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
REGION AND THE UNITED STATES. WHEN THE U.S. PRESENCE IN THE GULF
WAS INCREASED, WE BEGAN PROVIDING DAILY TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE
SUPPORT TO NAVAL FORCES OPERATING WITH THE U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND.
OUR SUPPORT INCLUDED REPORTS ON IRANIAN ANTISHIP CRUISE MISSILE
SITES, NAVAL BASES, AIRFIELDS, AND COASTAL DEFENSE INSTALLATIONS.
AS A RESULT. U.S. FORCES HAVE BEEN ABLE TO SUCCESSFULLY CARRY OUT
U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND PROTECT OUR SECURITY INTERESTS.
THE END OF THE GULF WAR HAS CREATED A WHOLE NEW SET OF
INTELLIGENCE QUESTIONS WHICH WE ARE NOW ADDRESSING -- QUESTIONS SUCH
AS WHAT EFFECT THE CEASE-FIRE MAY HAVE ON THE WESTERN HOSTAGES BEING
HELD IN LEBANON; HOW THE POLITICAL STRUGGLE IN TEHRAN TO SUCCEED
KHOMEINI WILL BE AFFECTED; WHAT IMPACT THE CEASE-FIRE WILL HAVE ON
EACH COUNTRY'S DRIVE FOR REGIONAL INFLUENCE: AND THE LONG-TERM
IMPACT OF THESE DEVELOPMENTS ON THE COST OF OIL.
PERHAPS THE BIGGEST QUESTION WE ARE CONSIDERING IS WHAT LESSONS
IRAN AND IRAQ -- AND THE REST OF THE WORLD -- HAVE LEARNED FROM A
WAR THAT INVOLVED'THE FIRST SUSTAINED USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS SINCE
WORLD WAR I.10
13
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
AFTER THE FIRST WORLD WAR. THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS WAS
OUTLAWED BY SIGNERS OF THE 1925 GENEVA PROTOCOL. DURING WORLD
WAR II -- EVEN DURING THE MOST DESPERATE BATTLES -- BOTH SIDES
REFRAINED FROM USING CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- WEAPONS THAT WINSTON
CHURCHILL REFERRED TO AS "THAT HELLISH POISON."
THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR ENDED THAT RESTRAINT AND SET A DANGEROUS
PRECEDENT FOR FUTURE WARS. THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY HAS
CONSIDERABLE EVIDENCE THAT IRAQ USED CHEMICAL WEAPONS AGAINST IRAN
AND ALSO AGAINST IRAQI KURDS. IRAN, TOO. HAS EMPLOYED CHEMICAL
WEAPONS AGAINST IRAQI TROOPS.11
I'M SURE YOU'VE READ MANY ACCOUNTS RECENTLY ABOUT THE USE OF AND
THE EFFECTS OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS. THESE WEAPONS ARE THOUGHT TO OFFER
A CHEAP AND READILY OBTAINABLE MEANS OF REDRESSING THE MILITARY
BALANCE AGAINST MORE POWERFUL FOES. SOME SEE THEM AS THE POOR MAN'S
ANSWER TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS, AND MORE THAN 20 COUNTRIES MAY BE
DEVELOPING CHEMICAL WEAPONS.
MUSTARD GAS, A TERRIBLE WEAPON FIRST USED IN WORLD WAR I. IS ONE
OF THE FAVORED CHEMICAL AGENTS FOR SEVERAL REASONS -- ITS RELATIVE
14
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
EASE OF MANUFACTURE, ITS LONG LIFE IN STORAGE AND ON THE
BATTLEFIELD, AND ITS ABILITY TO INCAPACITATE THOSE EXPOSED TO IT.
SOME COUNTRIES ARE DEVELOPING NERVE AGENTS. THESE AGENTS,
THOUGH MORE DIFFICULT TO MANUFACTURE, CAN CAUSE DEATH IN MINUTES BY
ATTACKING THE BRAIN AND NERVOUS SYSTEM. OTHER NATIONS MAY USE
COMMON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS SUCH AS CYANIDE AND PHOSGENE. CYANIDE
PREVENTS THE BLOOD FROM CARRYING OXYGEN, WHILE PHOSGENE, WIDELY USED
IN MAKING PLASTICS, CAN DESTROY THE LUNGS.
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY WILL CONTINUE TO MONITOR THE ABILITY
OF FOREIGN COUNTRIES TO DEVELOP AND PRODUCE CHEMICAL WEAPONS, AND
THEIR INCENTIVES FOR USING SUCH WEAPONS. AND WITH THE INCREASE OF
BALLISTIC MISSILES IN THE THIRD WORLD, WE MUST BE ALERT TO ATTEMPTS
BY THIRD WORLD NATIONS TO ARM THESE MISSILES WITH CHEMICAL WARHEADS.
THE PROLIFERATION OF ADVANCED WEAPONS AFFECTS THE PROSPECTS FOR
PEACE AND STABILITY IN REGIONS SUCH AS SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE MIDDLE
EAST. FOR ISRAEL, THE SPREAD OP"CHEMICAL WEAPONS AMONG THE ARAB
STATES -- PRINCIPALLY IRAQ, LIBYA, AND SYRIA -- COULD SERIOUSLY
15
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
ALTER THE REGIONAL BALANCE OF POWER. THIS HAS MAJOR IMPLICATIONS
FOR PEACE IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
IT ALSO APPEARS THAT THE MORAL BARRIER TO BIOLOGICAL WARFARE HAS
BEEN LIFTED. AT LEAST 10 COUNTRIES ARE WORKING TO PRODUCE
BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS, AND THIS PRESENTS US WITH ANOTHER INTELLIGENCE
CONCERN.
INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT IS ALSO VITAL TO THE SUCCESS OF UNITED
STATES EFFORTS TO PREVENT THE USE OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS -- EFFORTS
SUCH AS RESTRICTING THE EXPORT OF CERTAIN KEY CHEMICALS AND OF
BALLISTIC MISSILE TECHNOLOGY. ON THE INTERNATIONAL FRONT, THE
UNITED STATES PARTICIPATES IN THE GENEVA CONFERENCE ON DISARMAMENT,
WHICH IS TRYING TO NEGOTIATE A CHEMICAL WEAPONS BAN. AND ON
SEPTEMBER 26TH, PRESIDENT REAGAN ADDRESSED THE UNITED NATIONS
GENERAL ASSEMBLY. HE CALLED ON THE SIGNERS OF THE 1925 GENEVA
PROTOCOL AND OTHER CONCERNED NATIONS TO CONVENE A CONFERENCE TO
CONSIDER ACTIONS WE CAN TAKE TOGETHER TO REVERSE THE SERIOUS EROSION
OF THIS TREATY.12
16
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
ASSESSING THE PROLIFERATION OF CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL WEAPONS
IS ONE OF THE MOST DIFFICULT CHALLENGES WE FACE IN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY -- NOW AND INTO THE NEXT DECADE. IT IS ALSO ONE OF OUR
MOST IMPORTANT TASKS, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO PROVIDE U.S.
POLICYMAKERS WITH ACCURATE AND TIMELY INFORMATION ON THIS ISSUE.
ANOTHER MATTER OF CONCERN TO THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IS THE
THREAT POSED BY HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE SERVICES. I WANT TO BRIEFLY
MENTION THIS TODAY, IN LIGHT OF THE AUGUST ARREST IN WEST GERMANY OF
FORMER ARMY SERGEANT CLYDE LEE CONRAD, WHO WAS CHARGED WITH PASSING
CLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS TO THE SOVIET BLOC.13
THIS CASE REINFORCES THE FACT THAT AN EFFECTIVE
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM REQUIRES VIGILANCE ON BOTH THE DEFENSIVE
AND THE OFFENSIVE FRONTS. FIRST, WE MUST PROTECT SENSITIVE
INFORMATION, TECHNOLOGY, EQUIPMENT, AND PERSONNEL. SECOND, WE MUST
DETECT, MONITOR, AND COUNTER THE ACTIONS OF HOSTILE INTELLIGENCE
SERVICES. AS THE SOVIET BLOC INTELLIGENCE SERVICES BECOME MORE
SOPHISTICATED, OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE MEASURES MUST GROW
CORRESPONDINGLY STRONGER.
17
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
THE CONRAD CASE ALSO POINTS TO THE IMPORTANCE OF TENACITY AND OF
CLOSE COOPERATION AMONG THE VARIOUS AGENCIES WITHIN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY. THE FBI, THE CIA, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE. AND ARMY
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WORKED TOGETHER FOR OVER FIVE YEARS IN THE
INVESTIGATION THAT RESULTED IN CONRAD'S ARREST. IN FACT, MOST
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CASES, INCLUDING THOSE THAT THE PUBLIC HEARS
ABOUT, ARE THE RESULT OF YEARS OF CAREFUL WORK.
THE RANGE OF ISSUES CONFRONTING THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY IN A
WORLD OF RAPID CHANGE IS IMPRESSIVE. THE GREAT BRITISH WRITER AND
CYNIC, SOMERSET MAUGHAM, ONCE NOTED, "IT IS BAD ENOUGH TO KNOW THE
PAST; IT WOULD BE INTOLERABLE TO KNOW THE FUTURE." HE MAY BE
RIGHT. BUT THE BUSINESS OF INTELLIGENCE REQUIRES US BOTH TO ASSESS
CURRENT WORLD DEVELOPMENTS AND TO MAKE PREDICTIONS ABOUT FUTURE
EVENTS THAT COULD AFFECT U.S. INTERESTS.
OUR MACHINES, OUR SYSTEMS, AND OUR SATELLITES ARE THE WONDERS OF
THE AGE. THEY HELP US TO DO OUR VERY DIFFICULT WORK. BUT
INTELLIGENCE IS PREEMINENTLY AN AFFAIR OF PEOPLE. IT IS THE CALIBER
OF THE MEN AND WOMEN OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE -- THEIR CREATIVITY,
18
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
DETERMINATION, BRILLIANCE. AND COURAGE -- THAT SPELLS THE DIFFERENCE
BETWEEN SUCCESS AND FAILURE.
I HOPE THAT WE CONTINUE TO ATTRACT THOSE BEST SUITED TO CARRY
OUT OUR MISSION -- PEOPLE WHO ARE RISK TAKERS, BUT NOT RISK
SEEKERS. PEOPLE WHO ARE DEDICATED AND RESPONSIVE TO OUR LAW AND
DISCIPLINE. PEOPLE WHO UNDERSTAND AND PLAY BY THE RULES. PEOPLE TO
WHOM FAME AND FORTUNE ARE NOT A NECESSARY PART OF THEIR LIFE, BUT
WHO CAN FIND IN THIS DIFFICULT WORK AN AVENUE TO PURSUE THEIR
HIGHEST ASPIRATIONS FOR A SAFER AND BETTER WORLD.
WITH SUCH PEOPLE, WE CAN CONTINUE TO PROVIDE THE INTELLIGENCE
THAT POLICYMAKERS NEED IN ORDER TO MAKE WISE DECISIONS IN THE
INTERESTS OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. THIS IS WHAT YOU EXPECT OF US,
WHAT ALL AMERICANS EXPECT OF US, AND I CAN ASSURE YOU WE ARE DOING
OUR VERY BEST TO SUPPLY IT.
19
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
William H. Webster, San Francisco September 1988, Questions & Answers
FBI related (CISPES, Counterintelligence, etc.)
While you were FBI Chief, the Bureau investigated a number of groups
opposed to the Reagan administration, including a Massachusetts based
political group known as "Jobs With Peace". Both Gov. Dukakis and Jesse
Jackson on the advisory board of the group. Do the American people have
anything to fear about their continuing involvement with the Peace
organization; with Gov. Dukakis' involvement?
I'm just not familiar with that exact investigation at all.
The Center for Constitutional Rights is suing the FBI for violating
civil liberties during an investigation. You were head of the FBI when the
investigation started in 1981, were you connected with it and if so in what
way?
I accept responsibility for anything that occured during that
investigation, but I had no personal knowledge of it. The reason is that the
investigation used such low-level investigative techniques and such a little
amount of manpower. It used about 5 man years per year for 2 years, 10 man
years in total compared with dozens and dozens of man years against
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
right-wing terrorist organizations and other investigations that were going
on during the terrorism program. It used no electronic surveillance, no
undercover agents, and no court authorized searches that I'm aware of. In
consequence, any of those things which would have required my approval didn't
come to my attention. If you ask me about CISPES, what I think is important
about the results of that investigation inspection report is that it proved
that it was not the kind of investigation that many Americans feared it might
be. It had no White House connections at all and was not politically
motivated. It began because information from FBI sources--besides the source
who turned out to be very sour--suggested a possible connection between
CISPES and the FMLN--a violant, virulent terrorist organization in Central
America. It was a legitimate investigation at the time when terrorism
problems were a major concern to the United States and it involved minimum
investigative techniques, minimum time, and no none was hurt that I am aware
of. There were mistakes made in handling the investigation and they been
identified and adjustments have been made at the Bureau to keep those sorts
of things from happening again. There was also some ambiguity in the
Attorney General's guidelines and the current FBI Director has asked that the
Department of Justice give additional advice on those areas. The conclusions
that was reached in that investigation was that no laws were violated and
there no misuse of the information, it was not used to discredit anyone. I
think that as I look back on my nine years at the Bureau not a single
successful claim of a violation of a constitutional right was made and I am
very proud of that and very confident that will be sustained in any lawsuit
questioning violation of constitutional rights.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
Would you say there were managerial flaws in the FBI under your
direction, as Mr. Sessions testified?
There's never been an investigation of any kind that I 'have been
familiar with where you couldn't do it better the next time. The important
thing is whether the rules were respected, whether the laws were observed,
and whether you could identify the mistakes after it was over and make sure
that they weren't repeated. There was some looseness in the follow-up by the
supervisory people at Hqs on the instructions that they had given to the
field. They gave the right instructions; they gave instructions that were
consistent with my policy. When they received the inquiries from a few field
offices, New Orleans was one of them, which suggested that the people in the
field were beginning to get interested in the policital views of those
associated with CISPES, Hqs. should have told them immediately that that was
wrong. Instead, they sent out again routine guidance to the field. Director
Sessions has taken corrective action and he has also taken administrative
action and I suppose if I had been there I would have taken similar
administrative action if it were warranted. It is very difficult when you're
running 170 to 200,000 investigations concurrently for them to be followed at
the top as closely as we all like and it's very difficult to run that many
and not have some administration mistakes and I don't want to minimize them,
but I want to stress that the important thing is the FBI respects the law and
there is not one shred of evidence on this investigation, the investigation
of an investigation, that the laws were not respected.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
Did you discuss with Oliver Buck Revell either the investigation into
terrorists from El Salvador and the CISPES investigation? Were you aware of
the CISPES investigation at the time it was ongoing?
Once the problems of CISPES came to light in the early months of 1987,
I did alot of discussing with a lot of people. I do not think that Mr. Revell
or myself were informed about CISPES. That's one of the problems that
Director Sessions is taking steps to correct. I've found only one document
that even mentioned the name CISPES during that whole time coming to me. I
explained earlier it was such a low-level investigation that the mechanisms
we had in place - with 170,000 investigations ongoing - were simply not
triggered. There were no wire taps and no undercover operations. The Dept.
of Justice was periodically reviewing it, but it was kept at a very low level.
The Center for Constitutional Rights says that there are over 1300
pages of documents that they have obtained from the Freedom of Information
Act that showed that the FBI conducted what they refer to as illegal
surveillance on over 150 groups in the U.S. that simply opposed
administration policy in Central America, separate from CISPES. Do you have
any knowledge of those investigations?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
I did not and I think that misdescribes what happened. Those were
spinoff investigations of the CISPES as we looked for leadership involvement
with the FMLN, but the numbers are misstated. I think the final figures that
were given to the Congressional hearing yesterday was there was some 9
organizations - maybe 150 individuals - but only 9 organizations. I don't
know the reasons why they were investigated, I haven't seen the file, but I
come back to what I mentioned earlier. When you have five man-years a year
for two years, that's like five people working full-time for one year one a
case; you can't be that pervasive with a major activity.
Under the Reagan administration the DCI and I think National Security
Advisor have the power to task the FBI to undertake certain jobs. Could you
tell us how many times that happened during your tenure as FBI Chief and did
you ever have any problems with anything you were ever asked to do?
I can't give you a number and I can't recall any time when I had a
problem. Usually the requests originated with one of the agencies in the
Community that the DCI headed. The National Security Agency might request
that a certain action be taken to collect a certain kind of information and
it went through the DCI and then would come to the FBI to make the
installation. The FBI was governed in every respect on electronic
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
surveillance by court orders and not by the DCI, so the probable cause had to
be taken to a federal judge and approved by the Attorney General. We all
looked at these things closely. I can remember one or two positive
collection efforts - counterintelligence - that I asked many questions about,
sat down with my general counsel and assured myself that it was entirely
proper.
Can you give a ballpark figures for how many warrantless searches were
done while you were FBI Director?
I don't belive there were more than a dozen and probably less than
that. As you know that is covered under the President's inherent power. We
tried under then Attorney General Sivelletti to see if the Foreign
Intelligence Surveillance Act Court would issue search warrants and they said
they were not authorized. So it was back to the original authority of the
President and again the Attorney General signed off on it and all the
principal players had to view it and I had to sign it.
Why was the Decision for Social Responsibility investigated- it was a
62 categorization, administrative matter.
I can't tell you. I haven't seen the file.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
Management at CIA
What distinguishes the Agency under your direction compared with that
of the Casey years?
I'm trying to build on much of the progress that has been made. As a
result of the Iran-Contra events certain needs were identified that I'm
trying to put in place. One of those is to improve the confidence of the
public and our oversight authorities in the Congress and the policy makers in
the Executive Branch of the integrity and objectivity of the intelligence
product, that is that we do not cook the books. There's a little difference
in style. I thought that was so important that I asked the President to
allow me to step back from a Cabinet position so that I would not be
identified with the political policy-making process. I've done some other
things in relation to testifying to Congress. We appear about a thousand
times a year before the Congress and I'm very careful now to be sure that on
those sensitive areas where we're talking about a classified matter, that if
the briefers are not sure about what they can say that they simply say they
are not authorized to answer the question. The matter will then be worked
out between the Congress and me, and on occasion I will take the heat with
the Congress for not wanting to answer questions.
Under your leadership, what is CIA policy on using journalists as
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
My understanding is that we do not recruit journalists as cover, but
if journalists want to supply us information out of the sense of obligation
as citizens of this country we'll take it but we will not make assets or
informants out of journalists.
Counterintelligence
Are all the spy scandals ranging from Edward Lee Howard to the Walker
family the result of lax security on the part of the United States
Government? Who should take the blame for all those scandals?
It is important for us to do a better job in what we call
countermeasures as well as counterintelligence. There has been some
sloppiness in our attitude of protecting our nation's secrets. The
clandestine intelligence efforts directed against the United States,
particulary by the Soviets and the Soviet Bloc countries has never been
higher and I've totally reorganized the counterintelligence efforts of the
CIA to do a better job. Those who have embassy responsibilities are also
going to have to do a much better job of protecting our security because we
are dealing with a different kind of world than at the end of World War II
when those who betrayed this country were doing so for ideological reasons-
they believed in communism and what it offered the world. We deal now with
spies who sell out for money, or revenge.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
On the note of loose security, since American diplomats were onboard
the plane with President Zia of Pakistan, should the American embassy in
Pakistan have provided additional security along with Pakistani security?
I don't think we would find that kind of looseness in security at the
American Embassy. We don't know the real cause of that crash at the present
time. You can always look back and see flaws in security efforts; and I know
that those who were involved in planning that security would feel very badly,
if in fact, it was sabotage and not an accident through maintenance or pilot
error.
Have you made recommendations to Secretary of State Shultz as to
whether the American Embassy in Moscow should be torn down?
Sec. Shultz commissioned an outside study which has completed its
report. Whether we take it to the ground or whether we take it down several
floors and do some slicing and other techniques and try to rebuild it, it's
going to be a major investment for us. But we are learning alot. A good
part of that building has come home for examination and exploitation. The
focus has been on the embarrassment of the embassy in Moscow, but just as
much damage can be done in other embassies in other parts of the world where
the ability to penetrate is easier and where security is more lax. And for
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
that reason we have been working to develop new standards of security. The
Sec. of State and I have some competing interests, but the charge is to make
it secure and I regard that as a heavy responsibility, not only for the
Secretary of State but for the Director of Central Intelligence because we
have substantial equities there as well.
What kinds of things did we learn in taking apart that embassy? Did
we learn anything about their intelligence techniques that we didn't know
before?
Yes, we did. We learned a number of intelligence techniques that I
can't discuss in this kind of a forum, but it puts us in a much better
position to be sure that that sort of thing doesn't happen in the future and
can guard against it in a more general way across the board in our embassies
elsewhere.
Why is the CIA still classifying "Secret" national security
information documents relating to a past surveillance and infiltration
operation?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
I can't answer the question because I'm really not familiar with the
particular investigations you're talking about. I can tell you in general
that classification should be limited to the protection of sources and
methods. If there are sources who are still alive who could be adversely
affected, if there are methods which are still being used in any other part
of the world, there is a tendency on our part to protect it. The Freedom of
Information Act is there, if we are abusing that privilege the Freedom of
Information Act is there to protect our citizens.
That begs the question does the CIA still have operations involving
U.S. based publications, either as intelligence gathering operations inside
radical publications for example or using their offices abroad . . .
No.
Briefing of Vice President
Have you consulted with V.P. Bush on intelligence matters and if the
Vice President wins this election do you expect to remain in your post?
I serve at the pleasure of the President. I've considered myself on
loan to my Government for 18 years and when I'm not needed I'm fully prepared
to reenter private life. As far as advising the Vice President, he can
attend all my meetings and briefings with the President as well as the
National Security Council and he frequently does so. He has access to the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
same briefing materials that are provided to the President each morning and
frequently asks for additional information which is given to him. I have
provided Gov. Dukakis and Sen. Bentsen with an overall assessment of our
national intelligence situation around the world and have left with them an
invitation to provide any additional briefings that they might require.
Foreign Policy
Given that the Government of Nicaragua was elected by the people in
1984 by a rather large majority, don't you think it defeats our purposes in
trying to help democracy grow in foreign countries to support organizations
or groups like the Contras?
The Central Intelligence Agency, under my direction, is not interested
in setting policy, that's not our job. When we assist State Dept. or the
National Security Council, whether by covert action or by intelligence
collection, it is in furtherance of the foreign policy of this country, not
CIA policy. I can give you the reasons why Nicaragua represents a threat to
our national security but I don't want to make an argument for policy.
The Nicaraguan Government depends in large measure for support upon Marxist
countries, Cuba and the Soviets. They have been ruthless in putting down
freedom of expression, closed radio stations, closed newspapers, and have
disregarded the Arias peace commitments and to that extent they represent an
activity that is hostile to the overall foreign policy of this country -
which is to promote democratic institutions everywhere in Central and South
America - our national security is affected.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
?
But don't you think that conditions have dramatically improved since
the Sandinistas have taken power compared with the Samosa years?
Many ruthless things were done under Samosa and the foreign policy
ofthis country was to see him removed. The people of Nicaragua are not
enjoying a better quality of life under the Sandinistas - their inflation is
up in the 1500% area. They should have freedom to determine their own form
of government, but they have denied that expression to the opposition inside
Nicaragua. It was only when the Contras represented a serious military
presence inside Nicaragua, 15,000 strong, that Nicaragua came to the peace
table. Now that the Contras are weaker, the Sandinistas are poised to crush
the remaining resistance and are ignoring their commitments under the Arias
peace plan. I sound like I'm getting dangerously close to making foreign
policy arguments and I don't want to do that. I'm simply saying how I find
Nicaragua today.
Would you like to comment on the current situation in Pakistan with
the November election coming up?
I think the election is going to be a very close one. I think Mrs.
Bhutto has an opportunity to prevail for a lot of reasons having to do with
some dissention inside the government in power. I have no reason to believe
the elections on Nov. 16 will not take place. I can't guarantee whether they
are going to be fair or not. But I believe that as long Bhutto does not
attack the military, it will not interfere with the election and would accept
her if she were elected. If she and her party take on the military, then we
have a different potential for the future.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
What's the American assessment of Gen. Mirza Beg?
I don't think I should be publicly assessing the military or political
leaders of countries with whom we have a warm relationship. He is an
experienced military officer, he was Vice Chief of Staff at the time of the
death of the Chief of Staff, General Akhtar. He is allowing the
parliamentary elections to take place, and the only reservation that I sense
is that it must be orderly.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
PAO 88-0106
22 March 1988
RE: Speaking Invitation
World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.
Capitol Hilton Hotel
Washington, D.C.
Convenient date 1988
You have agreed to address the World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.
at some convenient date. (See memo opposite.) Since your schedule is tight
for the remaining spring months and many people are on vacation in the summer,
I propose you speak to the Council sometime in September or October. If you
agree, I will have a member of my staff schedule a mutually agreeable date.
STAT
Bill Baker
o set a date in September:
set a date in October:
AINISiRA
Disagree:
STAT
`STAT
STAT
M4'4~ +1ew19
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
DCI/WMB/
DistributiAa
dressee
Orig1 - DDC
1 - ER
1-
1 - PAO Registry
1 - D/PAO
l - PAO Ames
l - PAO Chrono
Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
STAT
STAT
SUBJECT= (Optionoq
ROUTING AND RECOR
Speaking Invitation - World Af
William M. Baker
Director, Public Af airs
TO: (Offic,, designation, room number, and
building)
STAT
FORM
1-79
See DCI comment on date.
610'a
2 'D C 1981
27676
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
Mf
SHEET
fairs Council of Washington, D.C.
PAO 87-0164
1 December 1987
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from wh'
to whom. Draw o line across column offer each commer
C/3+nA.~ cL.sn. r~.t. X41. ~w~
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14 : CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
? PAO 87-0164
1 December 1987
RE: Speaking Invitation
World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.
Capitol Hilton Hotel
Washington, D.C.
Convenient Date
Chairman of the World Affairs Council Philip Odeen has invited you to
speak to the Council on some convenient date. You are asked to choose from
two proposed formats. The first is an evening meeting for the general
membership from 5:30 - 7:00 p.m. Beginning with a brief reception, a program
of 20 minutes of remarks on a topic of your choice and 30 minutes of questions
and answers would follow. You could expect an audience of approximately 600
area leaders. C-Span usually covers the event. The other alternative is an
off-the-record luncheon for 40-60 corporate supporters who represent defense
related corporations.
Previous speakers have been Admiral Stansfield Turner and William Colby
who spoke on "The Role of CIA in Foreign Policy" last March. Recently
Alexander Haig and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, Gaston Sigur, spoke to the group. As FBI Director, you have
addressed both the World Affairs Council of California and Pittsburgh.
In your role as Director of Central Intelligence, I believe that the World
Affairs Council is an appropriate group for you to address. In order to reach
the largest audience, I recommend that you choose the evening meeting with an
audience of 600. If you agree, attached is an interim letter of acceptance
for your signature.
STAT
STAT DC I /PAO/WMB
Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ER
1 - D/Ex Staff
SIAI 1
1 -
UIPAO
1 - PAO
1 - PAO Ames
1 - PAO Chrono
1 - MED(Sub.iect)
ADMINISTRATIVE INTERNAL USE ONLY
STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
Central Intelligence Agency _ / R ? f/ /-a /
16 DEC 1987
Mr. Philip A. Odeen
Chairman
World Affairs Council of Washington, D.C.
1800 M Street, N.W. Suite 295
Washington, D.C. 20036
Dear Mr. Odeen:
Thank you for the invitation to speak to the World Affairs Council of
Washington, D.C. at some convenient date. I am pleased to accept the honor
and look forward to meeting with your membership at one of your evening
meetings. A member of my Public Affairs staff will be in touch with you
concerning the arrangements.
Best regards.
Sincerely yours,
/$/ William a Webs>
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 ? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
I trectltr;3 ' .R .";;
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
,.$7-3487X
1800 M Street, N.W. ? Suite 295 ? Washington, D.C. 20036 ? [phone]
October 20, 1987
The Honorable
William G. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Judge Webster:
As chairman of The World Affairs Council of
Washington, D.C., I am writing to extend an invitation
to you to address our membership at a time convenient
to your schedule. We would be honored to host a
program featuring you as Guest Speaker at the earliest
opportunity.
Philip A. Odeen
Chairman
Patrick W. Gross
Vice Chairman
Lois Haase Mares
Secretary
Henry A. Dudley, Jr.
Treasurer
Rosemary N. Niehuss
President
Mahlon Apgar, IV
William B. Bader
Lucius D. Battle
Daniel J. Callahan, III
Charles J. DiBona
Thomas H. Ferguson
Richard L LePere
W. Walker Lewis
Philip Merrill
Jean C. Newsom
James G. Roche
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Mary Ann Stewart
Anthony C. Stout
Robert Taft, Jr.
Walter E. Washington
Wesley S. Williams, Jr.
R. James Woolsey
The World Affairs Council is a non-partisan,
non-position-taking organization, dedicated to
fostering greater interest in international issues
through offering a public platform to foreign and U.S.
leaders and policy experts.
Traditionally our programs for the general membership
are held in the early evening timeframe (5:30-7:00
p.m.) and include a brief reception, formal address,
and question/answer period, with questions submitted
in writing by the audience. A luncheon meeting is
also possible, if that is your preference. Our events
are held in one of the major hotels, with several
hundred members attending.
Alternatively, we also have a Corporate Forum for
executives of companies that support the Council, for
which we schedule off-the-record sessions either as
luncheons or early evening meetings. These smaller,
private sessions involve 40-60 of our business
supporters.
I do hope you might agree to address the Council and I
look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely yours,
Ex Officio
Robert V. Lindsay
Chairman, FPA
Leonard H. Marks
Chairman, Executive Committee
John Kiermaier
President, FPA
Honorary Program Chairmen
Mayor Marion S. Barry, Jr.
Mrs. George P. Shultz
Philip A. Odeen
Chairman
(office: 822-4294)
AFFILIATED WITH THE FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14 :
CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1 GI.Kr.1Hic1H1
KUU i1ING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
x
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
18
19
20
21
22
STAT
ec rve e
26 Oct ' 87
-ry
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14 :
CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90GO1353R002000020010-1
`&-3487X
1800 M Street, N.W. ? Suite 295 ? Washington, D.C. 20036 ? [phone]
WORLD AFFAIRS COUNCIL OF WASHINGTON, D.C.
October 20, 1987
Philip A. Odeen
Chairman
Patrick W. Gross
Vice Chairman
Lois Haase Mares
Secretary
Henry A. Dudley, Jr.
Treasurer
Rosemary N. Niehuss
President
Mahlon Apgar, IV
William B. Bader
Lucius D. Battle
Daniel J. Callahan, III
Charles J. DiBona
Thomas H. Ferguson
Richard L. LePere
W. Walker Lewis
Philip Merrill
Jean C. Newsom
Jaynes G. Roche
Helmut Sonnenfeldt
Mary Ann Stewart
Anthony C. Stout
Robert Taft, Jr.
Walter E. Washington
Wesley S. Williams, Jr.
R. James Woolsey
The Honorable
William G. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Judge Webster:
As chairman of The World Affairs Council of
Washington, D.C., I am writing to extend an invitation
to you to address our membership at a time convenient
to your schedule. We would be honored to host a
program featuring you as Guest Speaker at the earliest
opportunity.
The World Affairs Council is a non-partisan,
non-position-taking organization, dedicated to
fostering greater interest in international issues
through offering a public platform to foreign and U.S.
leaders and policy experts.
Traditionally our programs for the general membership
are held in the early evening timeframe (5:30-7:00
p.m.) and include a brief reception, formal address,
and question/answer period, with questions submitted
in writing by the audience. A luncheon meeting is
also possible, if that is your preference. Our events
are held in one of the major hotels, with several
hundred members attending.
Alternatively, we also have a Corporate Forum for
executives of companies that support the Council, for
which we schedule off-the-record sessions either as
luncheons or early evening meetings. These smaller,
private sessions involve 40-60 of our business
supporters.
I do hope you might agree to address the Council and I
look forward to hearing from you.
Sincerely yours,
Ex Officio
Robert V. Lindsay
Chairman, FPA
Leonard H. Marks
Chairman, Executive Committee
John Kiermaier
President, FPA
Honorary Program Chairmen
Mayor Marion S. Barry, Jr.
Mrs. George P. Shultz
Philip A. Odeen
Chairman
(office: 822-4294)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/14: CIA-RDP90G01353R002000020010-1