SOVIET OPTIONS FOR WITHDRAWL OF FORCES FROM AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100007-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 24
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 29, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington. D. C.20505
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 February 1988
Soviet Options for Withdrawal of Forces from Afghanistan
This memorandum explores the mechanics of a Soviet
withdrawal from Atghani stan. It assumes the existence of a
political settlement stipulating the removal of all Soviet forces
over a period of 10 months. It does not assume any specific
terms for frontloading, regional ceasefires, or accepted
composition of the Afghan government, but considers these as
issues that will affect Moscow's choice of the form of
withdrawal .
There are two general frameworks for the departure of Soviet
troops. In the first, the Soviets could remove their forces
regionally, reserving those units securing Kabul and the road to
Termez for the last phase. In the second, they could opt to
retain their military presence countrywide by thinning various
types of units. There are advantages and risks in each
scenario. Soviet forces would be least vulnerable during a
regional or geographic withdrawal, for example, but this pattern
would be difficult to reverse and could significantly undercut
any image of continuing regime authority. Withdrawal by thinning
units, on the other hand, would preserve the option of reneging
and maintain the fiction of Kabul's influence, but could place
weakened Soviet units at considerable risk depending on the rate
of retrenchment. As a result, we think that this option is the
least likely of the two.
This memorandum was prepared in the Office of Soviet Analysis.
by with a contribution from of the National
Photographic Interpretation Center. This paper was prepared in
response to a request from the Deputy Director for Intelligence.
Comments and queries are welcome and should be directed to the
Chief, Theater Forces Division,
SOV M-88-20012cx
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It is possible that Moscow will develop some variation of one
framework or a combination of the two, particularly if the Soviets
wish to retain the option of reevaluating security along the
withdrawal routes and the staying power of the Kabul regime at
various stages of the withdrawal process. The Soviets could begin
by eliminating their least critical personnel before moving into the
first phases of a regional withdrawal, and then pause to take stock
before completely clearing entire regions. Moreover, every phase of
a regional withdrawal would probably begin by thinning support or
non-combat units within the region before withdrawing essential
combat units.
Some issues--such as the role of Soviet military advisors,
the abiity of the USSR to absorb returning troop contingents, and
the role of air assets in Afghanistan and the USSR--cut across
any framework for withdrawal. They may dictate variations within
either scenario and affect the speed with which the withdrawal
process can be accomplished. The Soviets demonstrated during the
invasion that they can move a large number of troops in a matter
of months, but these issues represent the type of complications
that would affect a withdrawal.
There are a number of military indicators that may precede
the removal of the bulk of Soviet forces, but these may not
necessarily provide insight to a Soviet policy decision to begin
a withdrawal. Some, such as redistribution of MAG personnel,
could be ambiguous initially. Other, less ambiguous, activity
need not begin until after an agreement is in place.
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Soviet Options for Withdrawal of Forces from Afghanistan
Soviet Capability to Move Forces--The Invasion Scenario
We estimate that the Soviets introduced about 40,000 troops
into Afghanistan between 23 and 31 December 1979. About 25,000 of
these troops belonged to ground force units that had been training
and mobilizing in the USSR for some time.
Although the Soviets have demonstrated that they could move
about one half of the troops now in Afghanistan in two to three
months, withdrawal would not simply reverse the invasion. Some
circumstances that influenced the timing of the invasion have
changed:
Because withdrawal would lack the urgency of invasion,
Moscow might be more conservative in its commitment of
resources.
A primary military concern during the invasion was
potential resistance from the Afghan Army. During
withdrawal, the Soviets would expect to have to secure
their routes against an experienced guerrilla force, and
possibly against some Afghan regime troops.
Frameworks for Withdrawal
Geographic Withdrawal or Regional Phasing. One o ti on for
withdrawal is to remove Soviet units by region. The
Soviets could, for example, begin by consolidating the units in
southern Afghanistan and moving them to the USSR along the
highway through Herat. This western route might be chosen in
preference to routing through Kabul because the distribution of
Soviet force deployments indicates that the Soviets perceive the
insurgent threat in western Afghanistan to be less than in the
northeast. In addition, the western route is shorter, the
terrain is better, and the logistic burden would be eased. Once
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the forces from southern Afghanistan had departed, the next most
exposed group--units in Ghazni and Gardez--would likely depart
via Kabul. A similar pattern in western Afghanistan would roll
up the Tapa units with those from Shindand and Herat to exit
through Towraghundi. Concurrently, the forces in the extreme
northeast down as far as the Konar and the KGB units along the
northern border would withdraw. By the beginning of the final
stage, the forces remaining to be withdrawn would be those
securing Kabul, Jalalabad, and the route to Termez.
One variation of regional withdrawal might have the more
distant units converge on strongpoints in the east and west,
permitting the Soviets to shuffle units. The airborne battalions
of the independent brigades, for example, might replace existing
units at Kabul or Bagram that would then in turn depart for the
USSR. Similarly, detachments in the Panjsher or Konar could
rejoin their home units in Afghanistan before returning to the
USSR, or their parent units might reabsorb them while sending
other subordinate elements to Termez. Withdrawal by
consolidating units at strongpoints would be complex for the
Soviets to administer and difficult to monitor.
Geographic withdrawal might have several military advantages
for the Soviets:
Because Soviet units would be falling back along
internal and controlled lines of communications and
contributing to the protection of these lines, this
method would probably be the most secure military
option. As units moved north, garrisons now covering
the highway would be absorbed, providing additional
mobile self-defense. Units slated for later departure--
now freed of other offensive responsibilities if
insurgent pressure does not materialize--would be
available for defensive road clearing operations.
- As their forces moved north, the Soviets would be able
to concentrate an expanding amount of combat resources
on a continually diminishing amount of territory.
Depending on the degree of frontloading, Soviet
strongpoints could be reinforced to enhance the security
of units remaining in Afghanistan.
Logistic requirements would decrease as the need to
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support distant garrisons was eliminated. Units
previously assigned to convoy protection would be
available to supplement the security of withdrawing
forces.
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The Soviets might conclude that other advantages would
develop during a geographic withdrawal:
They might assume that in the absence of Soviet forces
as targets, internicine fighting among insurgent groups
jockeying for Position would increase. The Soviets
probably are aware that rivalry among insurgent groups
extends to seizure of one another's supplies,
skirmishes, and assassination. Moscow might judge that
any increase in infighting would undercut the level or
effectiveness of guerrilla attacks on Afghan Army
facilities. Moscow apparently al ready believes that
only a small portion of the insurgents are active
combatants.
Moscow may believe that the return of refugees to areas
evacuated by Soviet forces could al so work to Soviet
advantage by increasing the demands for civilian support
on insurgent organizations, Withdrawing Soviet units
and Afghan garrisons might face less insurgent pressure
f the resistance was occupied with administering,
feeding, and housing a large refugee population.
The disadvantages associated with a geographic withdrawal
would reduce Soviet options and flexibility and make it difficult
to reverse the withdrawal process:
Geographic withdrawal might sharply undercut the ability
of the Kabul regime to maintain order. By closing down
garrisons, the Soviets would abandon large areas of the
country to the resistance. If the Afghan forces
garrisoned in regions cleared early fell rapidly under
insurgents attacks, the Sovi ets would be hard pressed to
preserve an image of orderly departure or of leaving the
regime in power.
Once Soviet forces had departed with their equipment and
support units, normal logistic support to the now-empty
garrisons would end. If the Soviets decided for whatever
reason to return troops to the area, there would be no
security or logistics infrastructure in place to receive
them. Afghan units might be encouraged to take over
garrisons or move into the better equipped Soviet areas of
joint garrisons once Soviet units departed. Soviet aerial
resupply to these units could preserve some logistic
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infrastructure in the short term. Aerial resupply--as the
Soviets recently found in Paktia--is precarious in a
hostile air defense environment, however. Moscow probably
would be unwilling to commit combat resources to protect
aerial resupply of Afghan-occupied garrisons during, or
after, a withdrawal.
In this scenario, insurgent forces could increase pressure
on regime forces and lines of communication in cleared
areas.
- It would be politically difficult to justify returning
Soviet forces to an evacuated region as an internal
redistribution.
Withdrawal by Thinning of Units. An alternative to
geographic withdrawal would involve designating specific numbers
of troops or elements of units for removal at agreed intervals.
The Soviets would determine which elements of larger formations
would depart, and in what order, to meet that requirement. They
might begin by removing units--probably in battalion-size--that
are normally used for offensive operations. This would include
the Army-level artilllery, the air assault brigade, the
independent parachute regiment, one of the independent motorized
rifle regiments, the Spetsnaz brigades, the airborne battalions
of the independent motorized rifle brigades, and the more active
regiments of the motorized rifle divisions.
Initially, parent units probably would retain those elements
that currently provide perimeter security for their own or other
Soviet garrisons. For example, although Spetsnaz battalions
would be removed from garrisons along the main highway, route
security would still be necessary--both to protect withdrawing
units and to permit resupply of forces that remained in place.
The security units of the Spetsnaz garrisons could be retained to
perform that role. As a result, several battalions of the 103rd
Guards Airborne Division (GAD) could not leave with the rest of
the division.
In the first phase, the Soviets might choose to augment the
complement available for initial removal by including the KGB
maneuver groups, garrison forces such as those in the Panjsher
and Konar Valleys, the units recently removed from Bamian
Chaghcharan, and some engineer and headquarters elements. The
Soviets probably believe that, if western aid were cut off,
garrison forces along major supply routes would be less
essential. By juggling these units, the Soviets would combine
the early withdrawal of a large number of troops with preserving
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their presence countrywide.
The primary advantage of this framework would be to keep
Sovi et options open:
Withdrawal by selected troops would permit the Sovi ets
to rapidly reinsert forces if they determined after the
first phase that wi thdrawa 1 was not proceeding as
hoped. Airborne forces could be reintroduced most
quickly if the Kabul regime and its armed forces began
to disintegrate. Moreover, if the Soviets ultimately
decided to restore and increase their force levels,
facilities to support and secure them would al ready be
n place. The Sovi ets would maintain control of the
major airfields that could be used initially to expand
logistic support for incoming units.
Although we believe the political cost of reneging on a
withdrawal agreement would be high, the Sovi ets might
still opt for this framework to give themselves the
chance of reassessing the withdrawal process. By not
evacuating whole regions, Moscow would avoid the
appearance of weakening regime authority and would be
better able to portray a rei nvasi on as assistance to the
legitimate government.
From the purely military perspective, this option could have
serious drawbacks that would place remaining Sovi et forces at
considerable risk:
In order to trim units, the Sovi ets would have to cease
offensive actions in areas where Sovi et forces are
thinly spread and probably reduce the number of combat
units on route and garrison security duty. Remaining
Sovi et units would concentrate on route security for
departing troops and protection of facilities. The
Sovi ets al ready have a large portion of their combat
units assigned to security duties. In this scenario,
security responsibilities would not decrease in the
short term, but the resources available would be cut
sharply.
-- A frontloaded withdrawal by thinning units would
increase the risks to remaining forces. Isolated Soviet
forces, such as the independent units in Qandahar or
Fey zabad , would be at greatest peril and most difficult
to supply. These exposed units would be less vulnerable
if the agreed rate of removing Soviet forces was neither
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frontloaded nor constant throughout the withdrawal
period, however. Under such circumstances, the Soviets
could retain a large portion of their forces until the
last stage of withdrawal and be better able to secure
and resupply isolated garrisons.
It would be difficult to maintain unit integrity in this
type of withdrawal. The Soviets traditionally prefer to
move combat forces as administrative units, both for
administrative efficiency and enhanced security.
Likely Pattern of Withdrawal. We believe it likely that the
Soviets will ultimately adopt a withdrawal pattern that combines
some elements of both frameworks. The specifics of that pattern
will depend largely on the terms they negotiate at Geneva. If they
agree to a heavily frontloaded withdrawal, they will probably remove
all of their least essential personnel countrywide--logistic support
units, field hospitals, construction teams--at the same time that
large regions are being cleared. Combining the regional pattern
with thinning of units also would be most likely if the Geneva
Accords include some reliable guarantees of security for the
departing forces. Whatever pattern the Soviets choose initially,
the removal of the final contingent of Soviet forces will entail
departure of service support forces before the last combat units
leave Kabul.
Withdrawal Frameworks and the Geneva Accords
A geographic withdrawal would be more easily monitored than
the withdrawal of selected troops. The capability of national
technical means to observe and record the movement of whole units
is better than our ability to determine, from any sources,
changes in the disposition of personnel. By selecting this
option, the Soviets would be best able to demonstrate their good
faith or compliance and be least able to cheat on either the
timing or force levels specified in an agreement.
The removal of troops and small elements of Soviet forces
would be difficult to verify. The most accurate monitoring would
require impartial observers at virtually all Soviet garrisons, as
well as at border crossing points. The Soviets could well refuse
such close observation rather than permit outsiders into their
facilities. If, however, Moscow believed that an observation
force would take some responsibility for the security of Afghan
and Soviet garrisons, they might acquiesce.
There would be little flexibility in the degree of
frontloading that Moscow could produce in a geographic withdrawal
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beginning in the south. To cut its combat forces in half in the
first three months, for example, would require clearing all
Soviet forces except those in Kabul and northern Afghanistan.
This form of withdrawal would put the Kabul regime to the test
more qui ckly than a scenario that retained a large Soviet troop
contingent until the last stages of withdrawal.
Considerations Affecting Moscow's Choices
Several issues cut across any withdrawal framework and may
dictate the framework the Soviets select, variations within each
scenario, and the timing of withdrawal phases. These issues al so
highlight the kinds of military indicators we should see prior to
the actual withdrawal.
Pe reparati ons in the USSR. The ground force units now
stationed in Afghani stan--wi th the exception of some of the Special
Purpose Forces and a regiment of the 5th Guards Motorized Rifle
Division (GMRD)--are those that originally entered the country in
1979-80. They were drawn primarily from the military districts in
central Asia. During the past eight years, the personnel rotated
into these units have come from other military districts as well.
At the same time, most of the home garrisons of the invasion force
have been occupied by new units. As a result, the Soviets will have
to prepare reception centers for returning personnel and space to
house the returning units.
We have some precedent for the speed with which this process
can be accomplished:
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If the Soviets agree to move all their troops initially to
the Turkestan Military Di strict ( TKMD ) in order to enhance
verification, their processing centers would probably be similar
to those used during mobilization, including prepositioni ny of
stocks, administrative areas for onward processing or
demobilization, and preparations for vehicle maintenance. Such
centers could be col ocated with existing units in Central Asia to
speed the process, but several weeks would be required to get
equipment and staff in place. Several more weeks would probably
be allotted for post-transit activities before units relocated
inside the USSR and personnel were either demobilized or
reassigned.
The absence of facilities will not prevent the Soviets from
removing units in toto through a geographic withdrawal. Large
temporary or semi-permanent barracks and parking areas could be
created near existing installations. Moreover, many Soviet
divisions are normally broken down among a number of
installations in close proximity. The Soviets could most easily
accomodate or disperse returning forces if they were withdrawn in
relatively moderate increments.
Methods of Transport. The Soviets are likely to move their
troops by a combination of air and road transport. Airborne, air
assault, and Spetsnaz units, which account for about 16,500
troops, could be moved by air. Other ground forces, whose
equipment is not air-transportable, likely would road march to
the border. Because there is no rail transport available,
wheeled vehicles would probably be driven, while tracked vehicles
and towed equipment would be moved on truck trailers. The lift
capability required for the ground forces units during the
invasion--less than one half the current troop strenath in
Afghanistan--was roughly 8000 metric tons.
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We estimate that it would take
about 15 days to move an airborne division using Afghan
airfields. Since the Soviets are unlikely to view withdrawal
from Afghanistan as an emergency situation warranting significant
air mobilization, we doubt that the bulk of Soviet troops would
be withdrawn by air. Moreover, much of the equipment of ground
force divisions is not transportable by air.
Preparations in Afghanistan. Any Soviet units slated to
return to the USSR will require time to consolidate and prepare
for departure. Activities conducted during this period will
include vehicle maintenance, return to garrison of outlying
units, training for the march, and possibly withdrawal
ceremonies. Examples from the invasion, the sham withdrawal, and
normal combat deployments suggest the preparation period could
range from several days to some weeks:
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None of these situations parallels what a total withdrawal
involve. All three precedents illustrate, however, that a
logistically-based withdrawal is not simply a matter of travel
time. Our own military forces al lot several months lead time to
move major units for standard exercises such as the well-
rehearsed Reforger.
Transfers to the Afghan Armed Forces. Leaving behind
equipment tor the Afghan Army and Air Force would simplify Soviet
withdrawal tasks by minimizing route security requirements. A
larger portion of troops could be moved by air if their vehicles
were to remain behind. Moscow has sharply increased its
deliveries to Afghan units in the past year, and the Afghan Army
would be hard-pressed to absorb a significant portion of vehicles
and weapons from the Soviets. We have some evidence that the
Soviets intend to leave materiel for the Afghans and have ordered
inventories of some units to determine what equipment could be
transferred. The Soviets would be unlikely to give the Afghans
advanced systems, such as the new self-propelled artillery that
has been introduced to Soviet forces since 1985. Some equipment
not normally found with specialized units--vehicles with Spetsnaz
forces, for example--could be left behind. To speed their
departure, the Soviets might also abandon the equipment belonging
to elements such as field kitchens, supply depots, bakeries and
the like. Only in an emergency would they discard normal combat
equipment.
Evacuation of Non-Combat Personnel. The Military Advisory
Group (MAG) and pro-Soviet Afghans may be removed with Soviet
combat personnel. They likely would be evacuated by air, but the
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timi n9 of their departure will depend on the terms of the
poli ti cal settlement.
If the settlement does not permit the Soviets to keep
advisors in Afghanistan, the MAG might move at any time
during the withdrawal process. Soviet advisors could be
used to help Afghan units provide security for departing
Soviet forces and to enhance the survivability of Afghan
garrisons once Soviet troops had left. The US kept its
advisors in Vietnam and expanded their presence even as
combat forces were withdrawing. On the other hand, some
Soviet advisors could be at risk from mutinous Afghan
units.
An agreement that results in the degradation of the
Kabul regime' s authority would likely lead to rapid
disintegration of the Afghan Armed Forces. If Moscow
believed that the safety of Soviet advisors could no
longer be guaranteed, the MAG could be removed early and
counted as a small portion of a frontloaded withdrawal.
We estimate that the Soviets might remove as many as
2500 members of the PDPA cadre to prevent their being
killed. Another 15,500--i ncludi ng military officers,
Sarandoi , and Khad personnel --probab ly would al so need
relocation outside Afghanistan. The Soviets might be
willing to accept these individuals and could phase them
out gradual ly- -1 eavi ng the PDPA cadre to the last so
that some vestige of authority remained throughout the
withdrawal period.
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Regional Ceasefires. Ceasefires with local tribes would be
useful whatever withdrawal format the Soviets choose.
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In the absence of
ceasefire arrangements, clearing operations along each segment of
the route would be required during each phase of withdrawal,
slowing or delaying movement and increasing the regui rements for
security units to accompany columns.
The Role of Combat Aircraft. Soviet aircraft based in the
USSR might play a major role in providing tactical air cover for
departing forces and fire support for those that remain until the
later stages of withdrawal. In withdrawal by thinning of units,
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the need for additional air cover would probably be greater than
n a geographic withdrawal to compensate for the absence of other
fire support. In a regional withdrawal, air assets would
probably be held in place until near the end of each withdrawal
phase, but would be unsupportbl e once airfield security units
departed.
Likely Indicators of Withdrawal
Based on the above considerations, there are a number of
indicators that should be evident prior to withdrawal. These--
and other indicators--could begin to appear as early as six
months before any movement of forces takes place. The majority
would take place in the last month or two before departure. Any
single i ndi ctor--such as the consolidation of a single regime nt--
coul d be ambiguous in the absence of othprs
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Several of these indicators might not appear at all. For
example, the Soviets might continue to develop their
infrastructure right up to the end of withdrawal. We also might
mi ss some indicators in Soviet communications, as we did during
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the invasion. The absence of indicators would not be firm
evidence that withdrawal was not about to take place.
We have al ready seen some of these signs-
The
climate of speculation leading to the March session of the Geneva
peace talks and Gorbachev' s recent announcement may have sparked
contingency planning for withdrawal by prudent military
commanders concerned about having the maximum lead time possible
for an orderly departure. Given that some preparations for
withdrawal might be completed within a matter of months--during
the interim period of sixty days outlined in Gorbachev ' s speech,
for example--it is possible, however, that we would not have
sufficient unambiguous indictors prior to the signing of a
poli tical settlement to make a call.
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Afghanistan
A'
Turkestan
Military District
Ttamt ? urmi
Iran
Ba dghis
North- est
owes..
Nimria
NM, Ism
Oiandahar
; ?
4
Map 2. Garrisons in the USSR that Might Be Involved in Withdrawal
Airfield
Province-level
boundary
Road
maftmmers
This Map is Secret
150 Mites
709669 (A02566. 3 87
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. TOP SECRET 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/03: CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100007-5
Subject: Soviet Options for Withdrawal Of forces from
Afghanistan
External Distribution
White House
Copy 1 The Honorable Donald Gregg
Assistant to the Vice President
for National Security Affairs
Room 298, Old EOB
Copy 2 The Honorable John Negroponte
Deputy Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs
The White House -
Copy 3 Robert B. Oakley
Special Assistant to the President
..for Near East and South Asian Affairs, NSC
Room 438, Old EOB
Copy 4 Dennis Ross
Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs
National Security Council
Room 351, Old EOB
Copy 5 Peter W. Rodman
Special Assistant to the President for
National Security Affairs (Foreign Policy)
Room 372, Old EOB
DoD
Copy 6 - Dr. Darnell Whitt
Intelligence Advisor to the Under Secretary
' of Defense for Policy -
Room 2E812, The Pentagon
Copy 7 Vice Admiral Powell Carter, USN
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Room 2E936
The Pentagon
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/03: CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100007-5
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? TrlD
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/03: CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100007-5
SUBJECT: Soviet Options for Withdrawal of Forces from
Afghanistan
External Distribution
Copy 8 - Rear Admiral William O. Studeman, USN
Director, Naval Intelligence
Room 5C564, The Pentagon
Copy 9 - Dr. Wynfred Joshua
DIO for European and Soviet Political-Military Affairs
Room 2A520, The Pentagon
Copy 10 - Colonel Walter P. Lang
DIO for Middle East and South Asia
Room 2C238, The Pentagon
Copy 11 - Afghan Fusion Cell, US Central Command
MacDill AFB, FL
ATT: Col. Thomas Loken
Department of State
Copy 12 - The Honorable Michael J. Armacost
Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs
Room 7240, Department of State
Copy 13 - Richard H. Solomon
Director, Policy Planning Council
Room 7311, Department of State
Copy 14 - Richard W. Murphy
Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs
Room 6242, Department of State
Copy 15 - Thomas Simons
Deputy Assistant for Secretary of State
European/Canadian Affairs
Room 6219, Department of State
Copy 16 - Edward Djerejian
Senior Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near
Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 6242, Department of State
Copy 17 - Mark R. Parris
Director of Soviet Union Affairs
? European and Canadian Affairs
Room 4217, Department of State
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/03: CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100007-5
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. 4 TrIO 25X1,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/03: CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100007-5
Subject: Soviet Options for Withdrawal of Forces from
Afghanistan
External Distribution
Copy 18 - Ambassador Morton I. Abramowitz
Director of Intelligence and Research
Room 6531, Department of State
Copy 19 - Richard Clark
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Regional Analysis, INR
Srrj 7646W Uepartment of State
Copy 20 - Wayne Limberg
Chief, INR/SEE/FP
Room 4843, Department of State
Copy 21 - Peter Burleigh
Director, Northern Gulf Affairs
Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
Room 5246A, Department of State
Copy
NSA
22 - George S. Harris
Director of Analysis for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs, INR
Room 4634, Department of State
Copy 23 - Lt. Gen. William E. Odom
Director, National Security Agency
T532/CDB, Fort Meade, MD
TOP SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/12/03: CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100007-5
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