IMPLICATIONS OF MOSCOW'S AUGMENTED FIREPOWER IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100004-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: November 1, 1988
• Content Type: REPORT

I RR 416QY RR 25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06
CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100004-8 wmman%
^o"02
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
FOR USSR
National Intelligence Council
NOTE FOR: DCI~1~
~-. DDCI
The attached paper is for your information.
It contains the assessment of analysts from
throughout the CIA (NIOs, SOYA, NESA and the
Task Force) on recent Soviet military activity
in Afghanistan. It judges that the increased
use of air power and the introduction of SCUDs
into Afghanistan are designed to prevent a
debacle in Afghanistan while the Soviets are
withdrawing. The Soviets also hope it will
intimidate Pakistan into a more moderate
position and encourage the resistance to adopt
less aggressive tactics while the Soviets remain
in the country. Agency analysts do not believe
it will change Mujahadeen behavior, but it may
have some effect on Pakistan's thinking. In any
case, we believe the Soviet withdrawal will
continue and probably remain on schedule.
13Z-~ 6~4~
Bob Blackwell
25XJ
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06
: CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90GO1353R001200100004-8 25X1
A/NI0/USSRI STAT
1 November 1988
Implications of Moscow's Augmented Firepower in Afghanistan
The-m_i l:i_tar-y=s=i=tua=ti=onWi n-A ghanistan-has-been-deteriorating-more-qu~ircc1y
tha-n the~SoviTet-s-probablanticipated El he=So_vi=ets=may _y=weL_l_be_1_i_ey__e that
Cun.-es=s=they_7_me -equi,ckly to sto-m t.h.e ti_d.e..t-heir Afg-h-a.n-g-ove-r_nment--coul,d----
Z
u n-r-av-aTl=whire=th-ey=a=r= =sti=l=l=i n the-c uuntry-seri-6usly-comp 1=i-cati-n=g=t-hei r
thdrr-a-wa1_m-i_l7ixt-a-ri-_L-y_a-n-dmemb-a-r_a-s-s-i-n-g-t-hem=pola4t-i-c-al_ly:, While the decision to
withdraw is not in question and even a delay is not thought to be likely, the
employment of the BACKFIRE and SCUDs signals a Soviet willingness to use
whatever airpower it takes to keep the Mujahadeen at bay and to prevent any
debacle during the Soviet withdrawal.
They.may.alao=hope=that:_i tt wi_l l=i-nit.i-m=i-da-te=Fak-i-s-.tan=i:nto_a_more-mode-rte
po-sriai-on_an-d=gi=v-e=s-ome-Muja-ha-deen=ea-emen-ts,a-R ynce--nt-iw-e tomd-e_cr_-ease-thei r
combat-a-ctivit_y_. Toyencourage some political accommodation, the Afghanistan
Prime Minister is likely to launch a new political initiative at the UN to add
some luster to previous "national reconciliation" efforts. While these
political/military tactics may encourage some Pakistani officials to push
harder for a settlement with the Soviets, political initiatives that seek to
preserve a role for the PDPA after the Soviets will be rejected by the
resistance out of hand. Military intimidation, moreover, is not likely to be
effective and may only encourage the Mujahadeen to go after Soviet forces
rather than ease the pressure.
The military situation in Afghanistan has become increasingly weighted
against the Soviets and their Afghan allies since the withdrawal of Soviet
troops began in May. The Mujahadeen have been aggressive throughout the
country and nowhere is this more in evidence than at Qandahar, whose fall has
been depicted as imminent in recent reporting. Even Kabul has fallen under
the effects of increased shelling and increasing isolation.
The commitment of BACKFIREs represents a reintroduction of medium bombers
into Afghanistan. Although not believed to be militarily significant in and
of itself, the BACKFIRE's payload should enhance Soviet capabilities to
inflict punishment on the Mujahadeen and those who support them. Their
deployment is consistent with increased Soviet use of air power to 'take up
the slack' left by withdrawing ground, artillery, and helicopter units.
Although not as effective as these other instruments, air power is now the
only viable and readily available means for hitting the resistance.
The introduction of obsolete SS-1 (SCUD) surface-to-surface, medium-range
missiles, reportedly sighted in Kabul on 1 November, is also militarily
consistent with a Soviet desire to increase available firepower during the
withdrawal. It does not have sufficient accuracy to be used effectively
against important military targets, but could, and probably would, be used as
a terror weapon against population centers in Pakistan in response to rocket
attacks against Kabul. These missiles would almost certainly be under Soviet,
not Afghan control.
c-3ocA-,r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90G01353RO01200100004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90GO1353RO01200100004-8
MILITARY AND POLITICAL OBJECTIVES
The re-commitment of medium bombers as well as other advanced aircraft,
has both political and military implications for Afghanistan and Pakistan.
The=mi 1=isnary-objecti ve-i-s-to-reduce Mujah-aden-mi 1=i-fa yr pre-s-s-u-re- on>
Qanda-harms. The-Sov_i-eas=al-sa=hope-for-a-' spi`noff'-effect=wh-ch=w:i 1-L-reduce
Muj-a-ha-deer-m hi_tar_y=a=g=gre=ssi've- es=s=a=r-au d=Kabul=an d=e-1sewhere=i=f=they>are
s u c c e_s_s f u_l t-h e-r e..
Th_e-pol ti-ca-l=obj=e-ct-iw-e-s=are-four=f-o1-d am
-- D_emonsl-ra-te::: -u~pport=far the=PDPA=dur_i=ng=th-e-wa=th=d=rawal
proc-e-s=s. This constitutes strictly a short-term objective,
since Soviet air power will not be able to 'hold' territory
during the withdrawal.nor support the government after the
withdrawal. It is essential, nonetheless, to 'buck up'
PDPA morale and to get them to hold fast. Soviet toughness
also serves to dispell further the notion that they are
abandoning an ally to its fate.
Provi.dea~s-ubtl-e-s howzof=f_or_ce- for t-he-P-a-kistana_s.. The
Soviets hope to:
exert pressure on the Mujahadeen through the Pakistani
.government. In this regard, they may be
over-estimating the amount of influence/control the
Pakistanis (or, for that matter, the Peshewar
leadership) has over the Mujahadeen factions in the
field.
play on the splits in the Pakistani leadership over
whether to seek a deal with the Soviets during the
withdrawal endgame. Some Pakistani leaders (Yaqub
Khan) are arguing strongly for this because they
perceive a potentially serious Soviet threat to the
northwest territories and are more pessimistic about
resistance prospects.
send a strong psychological signal that would lead
other Pakistani leaders to adopt Khan's views more
seriously and possibly to shape or move the upcoming
Pakistani elections in Benazir Bhutto's favor.
Sen-d=a s-i-g:nal=to=t:h=e-Mu-jahadee-n=to=reducemi 1-i=tart'-a-ct v tyz
xi-n=the=c-ou,n-Ltry=u-nt 1 after th_e Sovie_t=Un:i-on=h-a_s=w thd-ra_wn.
By inflicting maximum casualties on Mujahadeen fighting
forces and Afghan civilians they hope to dampen any
Mujahadeen intentions to embarass the Soviets either on the
battlefield or by capturing a major city during the
withdrawal process.
'Gor-bac-hev-al-so-wants-to--pr-ote=et h-i dome-sti c- hank dd-uri ng
t.h_e~wth_d-r_awaa He will actively pursue the withdrawal
process but clearly intends to withdraw gracefully and with
little damage to Soviet prestige as possible.
SECRET
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90GO1353RO01200100004-8
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90GO1353R001200100004-8 25X1
1. The Soviet Union, in committing BACKFIREs, is not trying to reverse
the withdrawal process; in fact, withdrawal preparations are continuing. It
clearly remains committed to the withdrawal of its forces and is attempting to
prevent leaving.under what they have termed, 'embarassing circumstances.' The
fall of Qandahar would clearly constitute such an embarassment.
2. The BACKFIREs demonstrate a Soviet willingness to employ additional
firepower in an effort to maintain the military status-quo in Afghanistan
during the withdrawal. So far, the Soviets have committed fewer medium
bombers against the Mujahadeen at Qandahar than they committed to their
offensive operations in 1984 in the Panjsher valley. The high-altitude
bombing campaign there was regarded a failure and it is unlikely that its use
around Qandahar will have any better results.
3. Commitment of additional air support elements is considered likely if
they are perceived necessary to offset the firepower lost by withdrawing
ground units. Such assets will probably be based inside the Soviet Union to
avoid any conflict with the provisions of the Geneva agreement and to provide
a safe base of operations.
4. Although the Soviets will continue to shift ground forces already
deployed in Afghanistan to meet evolving threats, it is considered highly
unlikely that the Soviets, would re-commit ground forces, unless it was
absolutely necessary to save embattled or beseiged Soviet units.
5. It is unlikely that the Soviets will expand their air operations
against Mujahadeen targets to include Pakistani military targets (there are
none close enough to the border to provide plausible denial). Politically, it
is now probably too late to affect Pakistani decision-making. Militarily,
medium bombers operating against Pakistani air defenses would require air
defense suppression to be effective. The BACKFIRE, particularly, would be a
highly-visable, vulnerable target without considerable air defense suppression
efforts. Moreover, such a move would have little impact on the ground in
Afghanistan and is now probably too late to affect Pakistani decision-making.
Any future attacks on Mujahadeen targets inside Pakistan would probably employ
smaller front-line aircraft already inside Afghanistan.
6. The introduction of SS-1 (SCUD) missiles has substantially more
political than military implications. The deployment of such 'advanced'
weapons is probably intended to bolster failing PDPA morale and to provide
more 'food for thought' for the Pakistani support for the Mujahadeen. Its
timing on the eve of the UN General Assembly Meeting may also be intended to
influence US policy-makers to exert pressure on the Mujahadeen to be less
aggressive until the Soviet withdrawal is complete.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90G01353RO01200100004-8