SOVIET INTENTIONS IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100003-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: November 4, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90G01353RO01200100003-9
1
ROUTING AND -RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
FROM:
Special Warning Topic
Charles E. Alle~A
NI0 for Warning
78 42 HQS
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
7.
VC/NIC
C/NIC
DI Registry
ER
NIO for Warning
7B 42 HQS
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
low
NIC '03262-88
DATE
4 November 1988
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
P ~ &-a4 >L 15 6 C !
/ A/la GVa.,
)RM 61 O USE invious
19 EDITIONS
- 3c,4 _r
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90G01353RO01200100003-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90G01353RO01200100003-9
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
cial Warning Topic
F Allen EXTENSION NO.
les E.
NIC 03262-88
r
for Warning
NIO
7 HQS ATE
4 No vember 1988
TO: on, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
1.
DDCI
2.
e C/ (Co 70
~rM
.
3.
ZG/
wa..o(.a(
/
4.
(,~J V
-71
5.
/ ""'" !l1^ 7~~4~
6.
y1b
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
?,
DC1
EXEC
15.
FORM 610 us E PREVIOUS
I-79 EDITIONS Al 1 /.40
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90G01353RO01200100003-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90GO1353RO01200100003-9
25X1
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505
National Intelligence Council
NIC 03262-88
4 November 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Charles E. Allen
National Intelligence Officer for Warning
SUBJECT: Soviet Intentions in Afghanistan
1. The attached Warning Memorandum spells out in greater detail the
judgments contained in the Special Warning Brief that I sent to you on
30 October and responds to your request that I look further at the recent
Soviet initiatives in Afghanistan. In my view, the Soviets' recent strident
threats and military moves in Afghanistan indicate that Moscow made a major
decision in mid-September to initiate new political and military actions in
Afghanistan to halt the rapid deterioration of the Kabul regime's position--at
least until the Soviets can withdraw without total humiliation--a decision not
necessarily predicated on the 15 February 1989 withdrawal deadline.
2. The National Intelligence Officers for the Soviet Union and Near East/
South Asia judge that the odds are very much against a reversal of the Soviet
withdrawal decision and believe that the Soviets remain committed to
completing the Soviet troop withdrawal on or about the 15 February deadline.
3. The National Intelligence Officer for Warning and his staff prepared
this Warning Memorandum and are entirely responsible for its contents.
1~
/11 12,2~~Z
Attachment:
As stated
CL BY Signer
DECL OADR
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06 : CIA-RDP9OGO1353ROO1200100003-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90GO1353RO01200100003-9
SPECIAL WARNING MEMORANDUM
Background:
The Soviet leaders apparently decided in mid-September that major new
political and military actions were essential to halt the rapid deterioration
of the Kabul regime's position and prospects. This decision was signaled by
an upsurge at the time in Soviet public and private charges that Pakistan and
the United States were violating the Geneva Agreements. In addition, Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze in late September called attention to the pause in
Soviet troop withdrawals since mid-August and implied they would not be
resumed until the issue of compliance had been resolved. Shevardnadze also
made an oblique reference to impending new military measures. Moscow's new,
high-powered ambassador in Kabul, Vorontsov, stated privately on 24 October
that there would be no further withdrawals unless there is a ceasefire in
Afghanistan.
These statements set the stage for the announcement on 4 November that
Soviet troop withdrawals are being suspended "for the time being," and would
be resumed only when the military situation is "normalized" and Pakistan and
the United States comply with Geneva Accords obligations. Vorontsov's remark
that "the Soviet Union is a great power and it will not be humiliated by the
mujahidin and Pakistanis" highlights Moscow's judgment that strong measures
must be applied to avert a ruinous crisis for the Kabul regime and army,
protect the Soviet Union's international standing and credibility, and
reinforce the leadership's political authority at home and in Eastern Europe.
In Moscow's view, the most urgent requirement is to reverse the steady
erosion of Kabul's power and stability, thereby refuting presumptions in
Islamabad and Washington that the collapse or defeat of the Kabul regime is
only a matter of time. Only then, according to the Soviet assessment, will
Pakistan, the United States, and Afghan resistance leaders be prepared to
consider a ceasefire and serious negotiations for a political solution that
would preserve a Communist role in a new coalition government.
Military Initiatives
The Soviet air offensive is aimed at inflicting such heavy losses on
resistance forces that mujahidin commanders will be compelled to accept a
ceasefire. Although Vorontsov has warned that the Soviets may reinforce their
combat forces in Afghanistan, they most likely intend to avoid this extreme
option. The Soviet command will,attempt to hold Soviet ground casualties to a
minimum, but it will make selective use of ground force units in high-priority
operations, such as strikes on mujahidin forces threatening Kabul.
The use of advanced aircraft and Scuds is meant to underscore Moscow's
readiness and capacity to strike'targets in Pakistan if Islamabad continues to
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90GO1353RO01200100003-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90G01353RO01200100003-9
S E C R E T
provide military assistance to the Afghan resistance. It is unlikely that the
Soviets will conduct air strikes against Pakistani military or civilian
targets in the first stage of the offensive, but they probably will renew
attacks on resistance camps inside Pakistan. The Soviets may also authorize
intensified Afghan sabotage and terrorist bombings in Pakistani cities.
Political Initiatives
The military stick probably will be accompanied soon by political carrots,
including offers to replace the communist regime with a coalition government
including resistance leaders, military commanders and expatriate politicians
such as former King Zahir. The Soviets' short-term goal will be to split the
Peshawar Resistance Alliance along moderate-fundamentalist lines. Afghan
Government leaders will emphasize their desire for an early ceasefire and for
negotiations with the Resistance.
Vorontsov's agreement to hold secret talks in mid-November with the leader
of the Resistance Alliance appears to be part a Soviet strategy to obtain at
least a "partial ceasefire" by holding out the prospect of a cessation of the
current "offensive" bombing in exchange for Resistance restraint from taking
major cities and from attacking key Soviet facilities and departing Soviet
troops.
The Soviets probably will renew Shevardnadze's September proposals for
meetings of the Geneva signatories or of the permanent members of the UN
Security Council to "discuss the question of compliance with the Geneva
Accords." They will emphasize their desire for a political solution and their
willingness to accept a significant reduction in the communist role and
authority in a new government. Soviet denunciations of violations of the
Geneva Accords will focus primarily on Pakistan, but they will also hold the
US responsible for encouraging Pakistan and failing to honor Washington's
obligations as a guarantor of the agreements.
Soviet leaders are responding to a dangerous situation which they
apparently had not anticipated, at least not so soon. Although heavy air and
artillery strikes will have some effect on the pace of mujahidin military
operations, they will not force major retreats, inflict lasting damage on the
Resistance or coerce commanders into accepting a ceasefire. The Soviets again
seem to have underestimated Resistance resolve.
Harsh military pressures instead may produce effects opposite of those
intended. Heavier Soviet air strikes may make it more difficult to restrain
the mujahidin, some of whom have been biding their time, waiting for the
Soviets to withdraw before launching large-scale attacks. Individual
commanders, as well as the resistance as a whole, could decide to extract
vengeance upon the Soviets wherever they can be located, including Kabul.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90G01353RO01200100003-9
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90G01353RO01200100003-9
Such a decision would further endanger the Western diplomatic community in
Kabul before the Soviets withdraw.
In sum, the Gorbachev leadership has embarked on a high-risk gamble in a
desperate attempt to avert a humiliating defeat. If intensified air strikes
and ground offensives fail to break mujahidin sieges and force a ceasefire,
the Soviets will have enormously compounded their present predicament. Moscow
would then face a stark choice between a major military escalation--including
reintroduction of large numbers of ground troops--and even more ignoble
retreat and withdrawal. Either outcome could have incalculable effects on
Gorbachev's political authority at home and abroad. It would take all his
considerable political skills to forestall irreparable damage to his domestic
reform program and his "new thinking" in foreign policy.
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/06: CIA-RDP90G01353RO01200100003-9