INTERPRETING MOSCOW'S RECENT MOVES IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R001200100001-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: November 14, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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.THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS
.ARE ATTACHED:
'(Please do not remove
M 1 o d5'~ o
00
SUBJECT:
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14 November 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Bob Blackwell, NIO for the USSR
SUBJECT: I-nterpr-eting-Moscow!-s=Recent-Moves in-Afghanistan
1. This morning_I_convened_a_meeting=of Sov-ietdand=Afghanist=an
s.pec- a3-ist-s=f-rom=tKC-~Nation l=Intelliger ea=Council;=the -Dir-ector_a-te
of nt_ell genre;=an-d the irectorate=of` peraCions-to-d s uss,,:z,
,Moscow-s lrece -t-moves=to-step p=its=f=firepower-i:-n=Afghanistan-,? The
meeting was prompted in part by the memorandum from the NIO for
Warning over the weekend. suggesting that Moscow may be preparing to
reinsert some combat troops into Afghanistan in order to stabilize
the situation. This memo summarizes that discussion.
2. Th -song-made-clear.=tha-t:there=a-r-e--d-i-f-_f=ereneesef~v eW
between=the=off=ice=of=the-N-lD-f-or-Wa=rning; on=the=one=handand.the
rest=of-=CI-A's-exper=t = n=th-e=subject-on=the-e:ther_-.:~, While there are
numerous areas of minor disagreement, the=cr_iti-cal d.ifferenceas,
over whether=r_ecent=events=find-i:catesMoseow--hasmrecons ider-:ed:i is
commitment=to=withdr-aw-all ts roops-on-or-about=lS=Febr-oar-y=ands
issnow=pre.pared_to=stay=well beyond=that-date=i'--necessary-to-
seeure=a--pol ti7 -l-sett lemen =anda-dign f-lad=exit-.-
3. The View of the NIO for Warning. The NIO=for`Warn-ng-believes
there; is a sig ificant-cha-n ee-(at least=30=40%-)=that,_in_li-ght=of-s
the_de.t.erior-ating-situa-Lion:they=new_fa-ee=insAPghanistan,.(-i=n tthe
wake of=the-withdrawal-of=about=hahf=of=Soviet =troops-in=count=ry by
15August-);_Moscota=has-hail-s~~o d=thoughts=about~withdrawingr
,eunconditionally.- I--n, this view:
-- The Soviets will not allow the resistance to force them out
militarily. They will insist that the resistance agree to some
kind of meaningful political dialogue with Moscow designed to
produce a political settlement before they withdraw from
Afghanistan.
-- The shift in Soviet strategy is evident in the decision to
send First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov to Kabul as
ambassador, in the stepped up use of Soviet airpower, in the
introduction of SCUD missiles, and in the increased level of
activity by Soviet ground troops in Afghanistan over the last
month.
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--.Moscow is prepared to keep its forces in the country well
past 15 February and indeed for as long as it takes to establish
the conditions for withdrawal with dignity.
-- The Soviets may be prepared to reinsert up to four
additional-regiments in an effort to slow resistance gains and
convince them that they cannot push the Soviets.out by force of
arms.
-- Moscow appears to believe that these goals are achieveable,
even though Western experts agree that they are not.
4. The Majority View. There-wa-s-essentially-no suppor_t_f_r_om o
panicipants_- in-the-:meeting_for=the view that the soviets-have
reconsid r-ed--th i diec sionto with-draw -and-are-prepared7 -to-st=ick
ktout-until the insurgents=agree-to-talk. The majority view:
-- Agrees that recent Soviet initiatives are designed to.
pressure the resistance into opening a meaningful dialogue on a
successor government in Kabul and allowing the Soviets the
semblance of a dignified exit.
-- Believes the Soviets could reintroduce some troops if
necessary to secure a safe withdrawal.but sees no evidence of plans
for large-scale reinforcements.
-- Sees no sign that the Soviets are prepared to make
completion of withdrawal dependent on a political settlement,
noting that Moscow continues to reassure the domestic audience that
Soviet troops are leaving.
-- Believes that a decision to stay on indefinitely would be
seen in Moscow as.both militarily and politically untenable (but
does not rule out some slight delay beyond 15 February).
5. In the wake of this morning's meeting, all parties better
understand each other's positions and are closely watching the
military and political indicators of Moscow's withdrawal
intentions. We plan to convene an intelligence community meeting
in the next few days to discuss recent Soviet moves in Afghanistan.
I will use that meeting to get a wider range of views on the thesis
that the Soviets may have reconsidered their decision to withdraw
by 15 February. In the meantime, the DDI has ordered up a PDB
article laying out the respective views on this issue.
SECRET
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
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CLASSIFICATION-
-MESSAGE HO.
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Mr . Frank RuocctL _,
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RADM Clarke
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United States fle nrtment of State
Wasbingw, U.C. 20520
April 12, 1900
To:
Hr. Richard Kerr, CIA/DDI
-*G. '.Horton, DIA/VP
-sera. Clark, NSA/DDO
Mr. Frank Ruocco, D/NPIC
Prom: Ion - Richard Clarke
Subject: Working Group on Monitoring a Soviet. Withdrawdl from
-Afghanistan
As the President announced today, Secretary Schultz will
sign the Geneva ..Accords on Afghanistan on April 14. Thr nS
will be a guarantor of. these Accords. The Accords call for a
Soviet troop withdrawal to begin on May 15 and to he completed
within nine months, with 50 percent of the Soviet forces to be
withdrawn within the first three mouths. A small UN monitoring
force will.- be'in- placein-Afghanisten to help monitor this
withdrawal.
The'US will monitor the withdrawal through its own
resources, including National Technical Means and IIUMINT. Both
COMIRF.X.and:the SIGINT Committee have begun work on monitoring
strategies. A recent N10/NESA memo, prepared at nor retluest.,
also addressed the lams..
An the withdrawal proceeds, the IC and the State Department
will be asked to comment on it to the President, the conclresa,
.friendly governments, and publicly. We need a mechanism to
coordinate these activities and form a bridge from the IC to
.the policy-community. I am therefore forming a Working Group
to deal with this subject. This Working Group will Include
representatives from the Intelligence Community and
appropriately cleared policy officers in the State Department.
This-Group will serve several purposes.
It will a visors that"-Views and interpretations of all
intelligence agencies are considered and carefully
analyzed.
--It will therefore allow the Intelligence Community.to
issue .coordinated reports on the withdrawal.
--It will facilitate quick interaction between the
intelligence and policy sides, so that intelligence
agencies are aware of policy needs and policy makers are
quickly informed of relevant intelligence analysis.
.. SECRET
DECL: OADR
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-2-
The Group may also wish to consider procedure-: by wh1th
evidence of 'violations discovered through intelligence
resources can be cleared for disclosure to (IN .incl rMMelqu
government officials as necessary.
I would appreciate it-if you would designate a
representative from your agency to at.ten(i nn 1.iit.iai nnettinq of
this Croup whirls .1 will host at the State Depactmk>iit.; 21 April
at 1430 in the INR Conference Roma. St/TK/C clearaftces should
be passed to INR Security Branch at 647-8501. 'The TNR point of
rontArt is South Asia Division Chief. Jeffrey Lunstead9 rtt
647--8574 (open) and 5411 (secure M.
Drafted: INR/NLASA: JLunstead
4/12/88 x78574
CC: P - Amb. Heiman. Hr. Rose
NEA - DAS Peck, Mr. Platen
10 - Mr. Zirby
NSC - Amb. Oakley
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER
FOR USSR .:
National Intelligence Council
NOTE TO: DCI
DDCI
1
FROM: Bob'~lackwell
Ambassador John Negropone during a con-
at State and NSC.
---a
::::v:
F.
versation with Dave Grj7s. I sent it to
;vr
him on Monday and wil,provide it to others
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A/NIO/USSR
22 February 1988
AFGHANISTAN: IS MOSCOW'S DECISION TO WITHDRAW IRREVERSIBLE?
In short, I believe the Soviet leadership has made a firm decision to
withdraw and they are not going to let the issues that remain to be negotiated
ultimately stand in the way. The sea change in the Soviet position has
already occurred--they have severed withdrawal from any guarantees about the
fate of the Kabul regime. The diplomatic issues that remain, while not
insignificant, are of lesser import by comparison.
GORBACHEV'S OFFER IS SERIOUS. The intelligence community is in agreement
that Gorbachev meant what he said in his 8 February statement. If he can
achieve agreement in Geneva along the lines he set out, or close to them,
Soviet forces will depart. They will probably be out by the end of the year.
Is this decision reversible? State and CIA think not; DIA, on the other
hand, gives this possibility some credence.
--Given the expectations that have already been raised at home and
abroad, the leadership would pay a severe price for reversing course.
--Despite the potential costs (some at home will oppose it and Soviet
clients in the Third World will be troubled), on balance the decision
will be popular at home and abroad.
--We have already begun to see evidence--from domestic media
commentaries explaining the reasons for withdrawal to indications of
preliminary planning for it--to suggest that Gorbachev means business.
--The course of events in Kabul as they depart is not likely to
affect the withdrawal. They may well hope that the regime in Kabul
will survive at least for a decent interval, but I believe they made
the decision to go fully aware that they can't count on it.
--DIA, while concurring in the view that Gorbachev's offer is
serious, warns that the Soviets could find cause (legitimate or
otherwise) along the way to halt withdrawal or even reverse it.
While chaos in the country, or a bloodbath for its former friends,
would clearly test Moscow's resolve, I do not believe the leadership
would be likely to change course. In light of the costs of reversing
course, the only development I can see that could lead Moscow to
reconsider would be an effort by the United States to establish a
significant presence in post-war Afghanistan--an eventuality most
observers seem to agree is very unlikely.
AND THE REMAINING OBSTACLES ARE NEGOTIABLE. While there is general
agreement that Gorbachev is prepared to follow through if he can get the terms
he proposed, there is disagreement among the community's analysts on what
happens if he can't. Some (especially at State) believe that Moscow is
determined to be out by the end of the year and thus that they will do what is
necessary to complete the Geneva accords sooner rather than later--even to the
STAT
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point of caving to Pakistan's'insistence that Track 2 be complete before
signing and to the additional U.S. concerns that Secretary Shultz planned to
raise in Moscow. Other analysts at CIA and DIA believe that Moscow is likely
to stick with its current position for at least a while if necessary, even at
the risk of delaying agreement.
--I don't believe the Soviet leadership has yet faced these
decisions--getting agreement to such concessions will certainly
require Gorbachev to go back to the Politburo. Agreeing to halt
military assistance to the Kabul government at the beginning of the
withdrawal period, for instance, would complicate the effort to
withdraw Soviet troops. At a minimum, Moscow will want to turn over
some material to the Afghans (supplies and ammunition for equipment
they use in common) rather than take it back home.
--Achieving a formal agreement in the proximity talks remains
critical for Moscow. The accords provide the "fig leaf"--an official
end to outside support for the resistance--that Moscow probably needs
to exit Afghanistan without incurring excessive loss of face abroad
and unacceptable recriminations at home.
While I believe Moscow will insist that these concerns be addressed, they will
be willing to look for ways to meet us half-way. I suspect that they are
reasonably confident that Pakistan and the United States are sufficiently
eager to have them out of the country that they will also be prepared to
strike a deal.
BEYOND WITHDRAWAL. While we believe the Soviets will leave, we are less
certain about what will follow. The Soviets will work hard to influence the
development of a new regime and develop a relationship with it that protects
Soviet interests. Despite their weakened position, the situation may give
them some hope the damage can be limited:
--Divisions between Pakistan and the resistance--and frictions within
the resistance--could become more important and limit their ability
to capitalize on the Soviet withdrawal.
--The resistance lacks the strength and organization to move quickly
against Kabul, and the city--the symbol of Afghan government--could
remain in the hands of Moscow's clients for some months after the
Soviets have left, unless factionalism caused the regime to unravel
quickly.
The intelligence community has long assumed that the pro-Soviet regime in
.Kabul could not long survive a Soviet withdrawal. While this judgment
probably remains correct, we do not know enough about how various factions
within the Kabul regime or the resistance will react to confidently predict
what the next government will look like or what opportunities the Soviets and
some of their former clients might have for influencing it. We are now
reviewing our earlier assumptions, taking a closer look at the likely
aftermath of withdrawal, and examining the possible alternative scenarios.
SECRETI 25X1
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DDI- ~~S~~' -~Yu
'2 4 FEB 1988
NOTE TO: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
SUBJECT: Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan
1. You asked for comment on the range of views within the
Agency and the Intelligence Community on the likelihood of Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan. (See excerpt, Attachment A, from
your notes of last week's State lunch.) As memo
(Attachment B) indicates, your description of our Soviet
analysts' views is generally accurate. In short, Moscow appears
intent on withdrawing, but Gorbachev probably has not yet
achieved.a consensus within the Soviet leadership to offer any
more lenient terms for a withdrawal agreement than he already
offered in his statement of 8 February.
2. memo reflects the views of Afghanistan-watchers
throughout the DI. There is no significant, disagreement on this
question right now between NESA and SOVA analysts. There is,
however, a spectrum of views within the Community. At one end of
the spectrum, DIA suspects the Soviet decision to withdraw may
yet be reversed. At the other end, State/INR thinks the Soviets
will not be adamant about the terms and might even withdraw in
the absence of an agreement in Geneva.
Deputy Director for Intelligence
Attachments:
A. Excerpt
B.
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There then was a further discussion of Soviet withdrawal
with the State representatives presenting their position of
the likelihood of Soviet withdrawal according to the
timetable. I said that it was my impression that views
within CIA and perhaps within the. Intelligence Community
are split on the timing of Soviet withdrawal. I said that
all had seemed to agree that the Soviets have made the
decision to get out. But, generalizing, whereas our Middle
East analysts tend to believe this would happen sooner
rather than later and perhaps according to the timetable in
negotiations, our Soviet analysts generally tend to believe
that precipitate withdrawal could cause Gorbachev some
fficult political problems at home. Accordingly, while
he is committed to getting out, they believe he is in
greater need of a negotiated settlement that gives a
"decent interval" to the Najibullah government. While the
withdrawal still could take place within the time frame
suggested -- ten months -- it might not start on May 15.
(DDI: Is my generalization broadly correct?)
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23 February 1988
SUBJECT: DDCI's Query on SOVA's View of Soviet Withdrawal From
Afghanistan,.
1. The DDCI's characterization of SOVA's position is.a fair one. We
would just add one point of clarification. SOVA believes that it is not
the timing, but the conditions, of a withdrawal that is the central issue
for Moscow right now. If the Soviets can obtain the conditions laid out
in Gorbachev's 8 February statement during the next Geneva round, we
believe they will indeed begin pulling out on 15 May and complete the
withdrawal according to schedule (ten months or less).
2. The key question is: How firmly will the Kremlin hold to the
conditions? We think rather firm--at least through the next Geneva round.
We believe that Moscow considers the most. important of these conditions to
be US/Pak guarantees of a cutoff of military aid to the mujahideen at the
beginning of a Soviet withdrawal and not making signature of the Geneva
accords contingent upon prior arrangement of a coalition government.
Without the cutoff of aid, the prospects for the Kabul regime surviving
after Soviet troops pull out would be reduced almost to nil, and Moscow
could not claim that it had achieved its professed goal when intervening
in 1979--ending "outside interference." Refusing to negotiate the demise
of the Najibullah regime would give the Soviets the fig leaf of having
done all they could to protect the PDPA regime. They are also likely to
resist US calls for a cutoff of Soviet military aid to Kabul by the time
withdrawal begins for the same reasons, as well as because such a cutoff
would complicate the safe withdrawal of Soviet troops.
3. This is not to say that we believe the Soviet position is set in
concrete. Although Gorbachev, iniour view, will insist at least for the
next month or so on a cutoff of military aid to the rebels, he may give
some at the margins on other issues. He is unlikely to fall off his core
demands completely so soon after publicly staking out his position. And
even if he came to believe it was necessary, he would need time to
convince the rest of the leadership. We think he had to battle hard to
get Politburo agreement to the 8 February terms and would have a difficult
time selling new terms that did little to save Soviet face.
4. Thus, if Moscow cannot obtain most of its 8 February conditions, a
Geneva accord is likely to be delayed. Delayed by how much is difficult
to answer at this point. We believe, however, that the Soviets have set
in motion a process that over time will place them under tremendous
pressure--both international and domestic--to quit Afghanistan whether or
not a Geneva agreement is signed.
SECRET I
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STAT
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ROUTING AND. RECORD SHEET
SUd1EC1 (OOtionot)
DI Reporting on Soviet Withdtawal from Afghanistan
o9~~ ;
12 February 1988
COMMENTS {Numbs each comm.nt to., sh6w frpm whom
to whom. Otgw a lino across. column afto each ItaInT .)
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STAT
STAT
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DI Reporting on Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan
This chronology summarizes the most significant DI
products concerning Soviet plans for withdrawal from
Afghanistan. We sought specifically to determine:
rln v'+v.Ln UV 25X1
-- What has the DI said about Moscow's intentions on
withdrawal from; Afghanistan?
-- How has our analysis changed, if at all?
We reviewed virtually all DI publications on
Afghanistan produced since 1 January 1987. A few
representative "talking points" have also been chosen.
The Judgments
The DI, as early as April, in various publications
concluded that the Soviets had determined that the war was
not winnable in the near-term and were looking for a way
out. Over the past year, several typescripts and articles
looked closely at Moscow's diplomatic maneuvering on
Afghanistan.
In our view, the DI analyses left the clear impression
before 9 February 1988 that the Soviets were not prepared to
abandon the Marxist government in Kabul and withdraw from
Afghanistan. This consistent theme of our analysis was
supported by evidence and flowed naturally from judgments
reached by the different DI components which follow the war.
--The Afghan government could not survive without
the Soviets. Factionalism was the bane of the
government itself and the Afghan Army was, in
general, understrength, poorly led, and ill-
trained. If the Soviets left, the Communists
would be defeated and more than likely a blood
bath would follow.
--The insurgent capabilities were improving. Modern
weapons, particularly Stingers, were helping them to hold
their own against even the Soviets. Because the insurgents
concluded that they were doing well, they were not about to
offer concessions for a negotiated peace. .
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--Even if outside suppliers of the insurgency
stopped providing it with arms in conjunction with
a Soviet withdrawal, the insurgents would still
win since they had stockpiled weapons and could
always take more from the Afghan Army.
--The burden of the war on the Soviets was not
intolerable both in terms of manpower and of
money. And that national pride dictated that the
Soviets could not cut and run.
--Most Soviet efforts at the negotiating table
appeared to be designed to split the opposition or
score international points rather than achieve a
real settlement.
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MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI
,C-,f o7q/X 79
Per your request for Bob Blackwell's
views on recent Soviet statements regarding
a troop withdrawal from Afghanistan,
attached is a short paper by Bob,
Afghanistan: Light at the End of the Tunnel
You may recall that this paper was included
with your material for the Shultz luncheon
last week.
ebruary 1988
$ 7$ 101 EDITIONS'OUS
Date
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NIO/USSR
10 February 1988
Afghanistan: Light at the End of the Tunnel
1.. The ,SoVibt,Jeadershi1p statement. issued "under.Gorbachev's name puts
the USSR clearly on the road out'of"Afghanistan. By setting a tentative
withdrawal date the Soviets have given the initiative to the US and Pakistan
and made it politically difficult to reverse course. While the approach is
designed to save some face and play on US/Pakistani differences, Gorbachev and
his colleagues almost certainly understand that their clients will have a very
difficult time holding on and that the unprecedented withdrawal will be widely
viewed as a Soviet defeat. Gorbachev probably convinced his colleagues that
over the longer run the pluses would offset this debacle, but it is a risky
course and could come back to haunt him. At the same time the decision
confronts the US and Pakistan with some thorny political problems that could,
if not handled effectively, give Gorbachev a propaganda windfall and make us
appear to be blocking a settlement.
2. The Statement. --Aal---analysts now agree__that__Soviet rhetoric has at
;iast-gone beyond statements of intent and put the. USSR on the road to -leaving
Afghanistan. Formally, withdrawal is now subject only to formal signing of
the Geneva Accords (admittedly this will still be a difficult process). He
has dropped (at least for now) any effort to negotiate a coalition government
which was certain to be a lengthy process.
.-This puts the ball squarely in US/Pakistani court and gives us the
power to call:the.'shots.
--If we sign, Gorbachev could not retreat from his commitment without
sacrificing the foreign policy credibility and image he has worked so
hard to create, taking the pressure off the West to help solve the
problem, and giving us a strong hand from which to up the ante.
--While Gorbachev knows US and Pakistani concerns might prevent
signing, he would not count on such behavior from his foreign
adversaries.
3. Soviet Calculations. The,~Soviet'approach gives Gorbachev a fig leaf
o cover the retreat.
--With -the signing of.the-accords- _"outside interference", the -stated
.-
(but false) reason for the Soviet invasion in the first place,. will
end and, thus, the "need" for Soviet troops disappears.
--The agreement would be signed by the government the Soviets came in
to help; it would be in charge in Kabul during the withdrawal and the
Soviet hand would not be involved directly in negotiating or
orchestrating the demise of a communist government and party.
--Short of staying forever, the Soviets probably believe this
combination (the resistance would be on its own, the Soviets could
supply aid, and the regime might gain greater international support)
would give its clients in Kabul the best possible chance of survival.
4. Even so, there is good-reason to believe that the Soviets know that
such optimistic judgments are problematic at best.
EXEC
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--The anticipated boon to broader Soviet foreign policy objectives in
the Middle East, Europe, China, and the US have made the "bitter
pill" palatable.
--Reporting as well'as private statements to US officials have made
clear their lack of respect for their clients.
--The Soviets know even better than we that the Kabul army is
militarily ineffective without Soviet combat troops, logistical help
and advisors and would surely question its staying power when these
are withdrawn.
--The Intelligence Community to,judge from my.soundin-g and what
.has been written -- believes the puppet'regime's survival-:prospects
Arun between "slim and none". There is even a reasonable prospect
that it will unravel as the Soviets pull back from the provinces,
leaving them to take their clients in Kabul with them on the last
plane out.
5. Gorbachev's Domestic Political Calculus. Given the above,
-Gorbachev's ability to get agreement on this course is impressive. At a
minimum, some..in the leadership must be uncomfortable with it. The military
to judge from what reporting we have will not like it. And among the-public
at large the image of a Soviet defeat will not sit well (although many would
be relieved at not having to send their boys to Afghanistan). Overcoming
these obstacles required great skill and daring and clearly belies the notion
that the resistance he has and will continue to encounter has him on the run.
6. How then did he pull it off? And how much risk is he running? The
short answer is, "we don't know"! More speculatively, however,
--It appears that he did get agreement on finding a way out through
political means last year when Shevardnadze and other Soviet
officials started to push the line that this was the Soviet intention.
--Since then the Soviet debate has centered on how to do this and
still preserve as much Soviet equity (the neutral if not PDPA
dominated regime in Kabul) as possible. The national reconciliation
campaign and offers of positions in a coalition government still
dominated by communists along with a diplomatic offensive to pressure
the West and stepped up Soviet military pressure on the resistance
were designed to "let them get out and keep their clients in.
--Increasingly, however, it was evident in Moscow-and elsewhere that
these tactics were not working and indeed both the military and
political situations in Afghanistan were getting worse.
--Thus, Soviet options narrowed to getting out as best they can
whether or not the client regime survives or remaining committed to a
protracted war that could not be won without a substantial increase
in Soviet military commitment over a long period and would continue
to undermine broader Soviet foreign policy goals.
7. Recently, faced with these unfavorable options, Gorbachev's
associates have agreed to terminate Soviet involvement with minimal face
saving.
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--The Soviets may also believe that over the longer run they will be
able to play in the political and military, struggles that will go on
in the resistance after the Soviets and their clients have left,
allowing them to reestablish some of the influence they had before
the 1978 "revolution" and subsequent Soviet invasion.
--The consensus on this course, however, is probably thin even if
broad and Gorbachev will have to maneuver carefully to keep it
together through the likely diplomatic and military vicissitudes of
getting out.
8. :Gorbachev, thus, will likely hang=tough for
'some"months on'Tsfgning
..,the Geneva Accords and resist-`efforts to be drawn into removing ig leaf
-by :directly pulling the plug on his clients as Pakistan wants or-.agreeing that
the "outside assistance" can continue, as the President and'some in Congres`
"favor.
-=He will not want to ask.the:Politburo to approve more concessions,
although eventually he and they are not likely to let even this
prevent them from cutting the knot and leaving.
9.. Pitfalls for the US. Gorbachev's dramatic move has some dangers for
us and Pakistan.
-Ike and the.Paks are,.not now marching_toYthe same tune on the.i_ssue
of. .getting agreement on a new interim government before signing the
Geneva Accords. Pakistan is afraid that signing with the Present
Kabul regime will strengthen it and make the three million refugees
unwilling to return to Afghanistan. The US, on the other hand, wants
to put Soviet withdrawal to the test as soon as possible and is
concerned that negotiations over a new government would be drawn out
and delay resolution.
--This difference now magnifies the international pressure on
Pakistan and runs the risk of making Pakistan look like the obstacle
to settlement.
--Similarly, the Soviets are likely to play our insistence on
continuing to aid the resistance while the Soviet pull out as
indicating bad faith in the Geneva negotiations, use it to seize the
diplomatic highground, and attempt to undermine international support
for the resistance.
10. None of this, of course, alters the real hand the Soviets now have in
Afghanistan. If the Community is right in its judgment that the Kabul clients
will collapse as the Soviets leave, there is little risk in signing. If the
Soviets subsequently renege, little has really been lost and Soviet
credibility is destroyed. On the other hand, while we will pay some short
:'term price for hanging up an agreement, it is likely in my view that the
Soviets will eventually concede even on our-.new terms -- a cutoff of Soviet
aid to the Kabul regime. A weakening in Gorbachev's political position not to
mention his removal could and in the latter case would alter this prognosis,
but I think this is not likely to be a problem.
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MEMORAN&UM FOR: DCI
Attached are Bob Blackwell's (NIO/USSR)
thoughts on the implications of Gorbachev's
recent troop withdrawal proposal. You may
find some of his ideas useful for discussion
at your luncheon today with Secretary Shultz.
I have highlighted the most salient aspects
of his memo. In general, it agrees with
the analysis provided by the DI analysts
in your briefing book. You should note,
however, that Blackwell emphasizes Gorbachev
has already gone out on a limb with regard
to his proposal and will not want to ask
the Politburo for further concessions.
11 February 1988
FORM USE PREVIOUS
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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington. D.C. 20505
NIC-00239/88
21 January 1988
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director Central Intelligence
Deputy Director Central Intelligence
FROM: Robert Blackwell
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: Some Thoughts on Soviet Intentions in Afghanistan and
US Policy
1. The evidence regarding . Soviet intentions about A# hanistan since the
summit remains ambiguous. Recent ovie words and deeds could repres_ent
either yet another attempt to reduce the international costs of Afghanistan or
a genuine effort to signal their intent to find a way out of Afghanistan even
if it means that their clients leave with them.
2. While logic and some evidence can be presented to support these two
interpretations (a better case can be made that they will stay), we can't say
with confidence which view is correct. Current Soviet activity could lead
them toward either objective and, indeed, probably is intended to do just
that, giving the leadership the flexibility to get the maximum political
leverage. possible from its rather weak cards and putting the onus on Pakistan
and the US for brokering a solution.
3. This strategy has caused some disarray in US policy. The US has sent
mixed signals about its assistance to the resistance and seemingly backed away
from pushing the Soviets on formation of a new government to rule in Kabul.
The Soviets have, moreover, been able to avoid making any unambiguous
commitments to leave--getting mileage out of their stated intentions without
taking any irreversable actions.
4. The policy implications of this for the US seem to be pretty
straightforward. We don't have to do anything until we know for sure.
.5. Soviet Seriousness?
A range of opinions exist within the Intelligence Community on this
issue. State/INR is more inclined to see recent Soviet statements as
indicating that the Soviets have decided to get out even if it means
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sacrificing the Afghan-Communists; the only arguments at State are over
whether they will do so unconditionally or whether they will try to get a deal
that permits the USSR and its clients some role in a post-withdrawal regime.
DIA and CIA/SOVA believe that there has been some movement in the Soviet
position but aren't sure that the Soviets have made an irrevocable decision to
get out. (See Attachment 1 for a brief discussion our most recent Community
meeting on the subject and Attachment 2 for the Warning Report of our 1
December special meeting on Afghanistan.)
6. 1 lean more to the DIA and CIA view. Recent Soviet rhetoric on
withdrawal has been stunning and is hard to dismiss out-of-hand. (See
Attachment 3 for illustrative sample.) Yet, impressive as much of it is,-the
.Soviet position is not logically consistent with my reading of Soviet
interests. Withdrawal has been linked only to halting foreign assistance to
the resistance; the composition of the new Afghanistan government, to judge
from its absence in Soviet statements, is not a precondition for settlement.
In fact, a Soviet Foreign Ministry official told Embassy officers in Moscow
that the PDPA and the-opposition would negotiate establishment of a new
government after the Geneva Accords were signed.
--However benign one's assumptions about Soviet policy and "new
thinking", such a position does not reflect real Soviet interests and
hence is not credible. Moscow cannot be agnostic on or uninterested
in the composition of the Afghan government and its policy
inclinations toward the Soviet Union.
--If the Soviets have really decided to sacrifice the Afghan
Communists, Gorbachev will still want to know who he will be dealing
with and get some commitments from them (and guarantees from Pakistan
and the US) about maintaining friendly (diplomatic and economic)
relations with the USSR.
--Without this, Moscow would run the risk of the "bloodbath" and
"chaos" it says cannot be permitted and more importantly open up
Soviet policy to the vicissitudes of. the unknown--something no Soviet
leader would do! Gorbachev and others can only calculate that the
positives outweigh the negatives if they have a handle on how bad
things could get.
7. Moscow's seeming lack of concern with this possibility -suggests that
the Soviet leadership is assuming that a Communist-dominated coalition
(possibly including a ements of the resistance) will be around or sometime
. Acceptance
yet and that Soviet policy remains in fact more smoke than fire
of such a regime within or outside of Afghanistan is not in the cards.
--It does not accord with political or military realities inside
Afghanistan;
--Such a solution would not produce what Pakistan requires above
all--return home of the some 3 million refugees now living in
Pakistan.
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8. Only-when-it--is evident. the Soviets will accept less than this
outcome will their rhetoric about withdrawal have substance.
--The Pakistanis, in my view, are right in judging that the best test
of Soviet intentions is whether or not Vorontsov travels to Islamabad
to "talk'turkey" about alternative regimes in Kabul. The Soviet
Embassy officer cited above said that this visit would in fact occur.
--If he does not go, or if he does and that is not an important item
on his agenda, we can conclude that the Soviets have not yet made the
hard decisions to get out.
--It will be almost impossible to put together any
resistance-dominated coalition to govern and keep order in Kabul
without Pakistan's assistance.
9. Background on Shifting US Position.
Until the last few months, it had been privately understood by all
parties in the dispute that the US and Pakistan would not sign the Geneva
accords until there was a new resistance-dominated regime in Kabul to rule
during the period of Soviet troop withdrawals. Several months ago, however,
we unilaterally changed our position, delinking Soviet troop withdrawal from
the issue of who is in charge in Kabul.
--The change was motivated in part by a State Department judgment
that Pakistan cannot create an alternative Afghan regime. (This
judgment is arguable; the Pakistanis, who are much closer to the
situation than we are, think they have to.)
--There was also concern that the Soviets would only use negotiations
about an alternative regime to prolong its presence in Afghanistan or
alternatively to try to win in negotiations what it had been unable
to win on the battlefield. (These are, of course, legitimate
concerns, if you assume Moscow is not serious about getting out.)
--The policy rests on an assumption (most in the community would
accept) that the PDPA regime would inevitably unravel as soon as any
serious withdrawals began whatever the formal commitments given about
assistance to the resistance.
10. Our "new thinking", however, appears to have created more problems
for us than it solved. Specifically,
--If we get the kind of a settlement we are asking for, the current
Kabul regime would remain in place to preside over at least the
beginning of Soviet troop withdrawals, even if aid cutoff and the
withdrawal commenced at the same time. (We need to be alert to the
possibility that the Soviets may calculate that their clients could
hold their own when Soviet troops withdraw at least for a "decent
interval" if outside aid was, in fact, cut off.)
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--Such an agreement, moreover, could trigger provisions for providing
for a substantial flow of money for development and relief to the
Soviet clients in Kabul by the UN and other relief agencies (this
would be politically impossible to sell in the US) and would not
provide any impetus for the Afghan refugees in Pakistan to go home.
--It has placed us at odds with Pakistan which wants to get whatever
hold it can on a new Afghan government to ensure that its interests
(particularly concerning the refugees) will be protected. Zia told
Armacost bluntly that he is not going to sign the Geneva accords
without an agreement on an alternative regime for Kabul. This
suggests that there isn't going to be any meeting in Geneva in
February or, if there is, it won't be the final meeting.
--The Soviets have taken advantage of the situation to make it appear
that the US rather than the USSR is now the main obstacle to getting
a settlement and ending the war. While this is not a new tactic, it
seems to have more resonance now and, thus, could if not challenged
effectively strain the Western consensus on Afghanistan.
11. Conclusion. Our task should be, to get on the same note and avoid
doing the Soviets' work for them. At present they are still able to "have
their cake and eat it too"--talk withdrawal and keep their clients in charge.
n as the are forced to deal politically itica y with those who have fought them to
a standsti on the battlefield will the contradictions in their policy become
evident and the hard choices (stay and fight for a long time or et out)
unavoidable. If they have to assume the political costs of setting a date and
negotiating over what is to follow the PDPA, they will not have many clients
left to protect and the momentum for withdrawal will be irresistable. If, on
the other hand, the rhetoric is all smoke, the failure to engage their
opponents will be evidence enough, and it won't be hard for us to put the onus
for lack of movement back where it belongs.
Robert Blackwell
Attachments As Stated -
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NIC-00239/88
21 January 1988
SUBJECT: Some Thoughts on Soviet Intentions in Afghanistan and
US Policy
DISTRIBUTION:
orig - DCI
1 - DDCI
i -DOI
1 - AC/NIC
1 - D/SOVA
1 - C/ATF/NE/D0
1 C/SE/DDO
1 - D/NESA
1 - NIO/NESA
1 - NI0/USSR (Chron)
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Attachment 1
Excerpts from NI0/USSR January 1988 Warning Report
Afghanistan: There has been a further evolution in the thinking of at
least some elements of the community since our special warning meeting on this
subject in early December. Then, all agreed that while the Soviet position
appeared to be evolving, we had no unambiguous indications that they had made
the hard decision to settle for less and get out. Now State/INR believes,
primarily as a result of what Foreign Minister Shevardnadze said publicly
during his recent trip to Kabul, that the Soviets have made the decision to
get out. They still disagree among themselves about whether the decision'to
do so is conditional or not: some believe that they will still insist on at
least some role for themselves and their clients in an alternate regime, while
others maintain that they will not. The rest of the community agrees that
there appears to have been a further evolution in Soviet thinking since the
summit, but continues to be skeptical that the Soviets are really intent on
getting out. They read the significance of Shevardnadze's remarks in Kabul
differently than State and cite developments like the Khowst offensive and
Soviet efforts to establish new economic links to Afghanistan's provinces as
evidence that the Soviets are still intent on consolidating Communist rule.
Warning and Collection. All agree that the best indicator of Soviet
'intentions will be whether or not First Deputy Foreign Minister Vorontsov
travels to Islamabad to talk seriously about an alternative regime in
Kabul. Pakistan will almost certainly brief us on the results of any such
trip,
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The Director of Central Untellfigence
*'ashinpon. D.C. ?0505
National Intelligence Council
NIC-04994/87
7 December 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Robert Blackwell
National Intelligence Officer for USSR
SUBJECT: Special Warning and Forecast Report on Afghanistan
1. The Intelligence Community's Sovietologists met on 1 December to
discuss whether recent statements by Soviet officials signify a serious intent
to abandon the Afghanistan Communists and will so signify at the upcoming
summit. The community was virtually unanimous that there will be no major
e r ~ es t
decision to get out some think they never wi . Most ana stems, nonetheless,
are now more inclined tan in the past to conclude that Soviet policy is
evolving and a minorit ro ec that scow will Fv-entually settle for less
than a Communist dominated regime when it leaves. NIO/USSR leans more toward
the latter view and believes there is a fair chance that Gorbachev will
communicate a further evolution in Soviet thinking on Afghanistan during the
visit.
2. BACKGROUND: Recent statements by high-ranking Soviet officials about
Afghanistan--specifically, about Moscow's desire to be out of Afghanistan by
the end of 1988, its alleged interest in an Austrian-type treaty to guarantee
Afghan neutrality, its professed willingness to have former King Zahir Shah
convene a Loya Jirga in order to create and lead an interim coalition
government to rule during a year-long phased withdrawal of Soviet troops--have
already created considerable interest in the policy community about Soviet
intentions. Are the Soviets seriously looking for a way to end their military
involvement, even if it means scaling back Soviet objectives there? And, how
will they play this issue during summit discussions next week? In order to
get some sense of where the intelligence community stands on this issue,
NIO/NESA put the topic on the agenda for his regular November warning meeting
and-I convened a special meeting on 1 December. NIO/NESA will be reporting
separately on the views held by the intelligence community's South Asian
analysts. What follows in this report represents primarily the views of the
intelligence community's Sovietologists.
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3. -The intelligence community has addressed this issue before, when some
senior policymakers concluded not long after the Geneva summit that the USSR
wanted out of Afghanistan. In SNIE 11/37-86, Soviet Tactics on a "Political
Solution" in Afghanistan, published in January, the community judged
unanimously that Soviet moves at that time were not authentic indications of
increased interest in a settlement, but rather part of an effort to divide the
coalition of countries and forces opposing them. While this is still the
prevailing view, the community now seems more uncertain and divided in its
views.
4. DISCUSSION: Most of the community's Sovietologists agreed with
CIA/SOYA's assessment that the Soviets have not yet made the hard decisions
necessary to leave Afghanistan. In the view of the clear majority, the
Soviets are still trying to have their cake and eat it too--i. e., get out,
but in a way that leaves a communist-dominated regime still in power. They
think recent Soviet statements stem mainly from Moscow's desire to minimize
the impact of its latest defeat at the UN and to create a better atmosphere
for the forthcoming summit and subsequent INF ratification process. They do
not anticipate any major surprises at the Soviet-US summit because they think
Moscow will want to see how Afghan President Najib's efforts to forge a
leaner, meaner Peoples Democratic Party (PDPA) fare and await the outcome of
planned US-Soviet and Soviet-Pakistani consultations as well as the
US-Pakistani controversy on the nuclear issue before undertaking any major
policy reassessments. These analysts also stress the political risks at home
for Gorbachev if he really pushes to get out, arguing that for any Soviet
leader, the risks of getting out will never outweigh the costs of staying
until the job is done.
5. At the same time, however, many community analysts believe that
Moscow's position has evolved in the last 12 months and project that it could
change further, to the point where the Soviets might eventually conclude that
a Communist-dominated government is not essential to securing Soviet
interests. In fact, all analysts agree that they will have to sacrifice the
PDPA if they are ever to get any kind of viable political settlement, because
the resistance will not agree to a settlement which gives the Communists any
real power, even in an interim coalition regime. These analysts believe that
the Soviets are not at this point yet, but in their view Soviet assessments of
the problem are becoming more realistic and their pressure on their clients in
Kabul to pursue "national reconciliation" is--whatever the
intention--undermining the PDPA regime.
6. INDICATORS: How will we know? If the Soviets really want out, the
community judges that the Soviets would do more of what they are already
doing, but at a stepped-up pace. They might indicate in a more authoritative
way that they could accept a neutral interim coalition in Afghanistan to rule
during a period of Soviet troop withdrawals and begin negotiations toward that
end. Alternatively, they could engage in open negotiations with the Peshawar
seven, departing from the current practice of occasional secret contacts with
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incivi.duhl party representatives. Or they could announce and implement real,
albeit, small troop withdrawals (as opposed to the sham withdrawal conducted
last year)., Finally, they could raise publicly their interest in an
Austrian-style arrangement that would ensure the neutrality of a post-PDPA
Afghanistan. Such moves would put the Soviets on the road to "going home" and
make a reversal in course much more difficult.
7. OUTLOOK: Whether, in fact, Soviet policy will move in this direction
is unknown to us--and perhaps to them. NIO/USSR believes the Soviets are
working their way through the problem of looking for a way out without knowing
when, if, or how they might actually do it. The costs--political or most
importantly military--are not so great that they have to leave. Their military
position is far from weak, although increased difficulties have been
encountered during the past year. The Soviets are in no danger of being
driven out or under the gun to make a rash or risky political decision to
leave.
8. Odds are the Soviets assess the situation this way as well. But
NIO/USSR however, would not be as categorical as the community view in
judging that the Soviets have not decided to go home and signal this at the
Summit. Their statements (to Ambassador Kampleman last June and Under
ecretar Armacost more recently) and to some extent actions Increasingly have
the smell of putting the Soviets political on the slippery slope of
withdrawal, even if on ni allantended on as a tactical ambit. Continuing
to play around with such gestures could leave the Soviets with no clients to
protect and very little political position to defend. If their real intention
is to stay until their ally can stand on its own feet (however improbable that
might seem to us), it is poor tactics and strategy to be offering up--however
hedged--a 12-month timetable, most of the government ministries, and even more
forthcoming hints that will be hard to take back politically and
propogandistically.
9. Either way, Gorbachev by design or omission will probably use the
summit to signal more clearly Soviet intentions. Even if a decision to get
out and sacrifice the Afghan Communists (heretofore a cardinal Soviet
interest) has been made, Moscow is not going to pull out precipitately,
without some guarantees that its other (and possibly now more important)
fundamental interest--an Afghanistan that cannot be used by the US for actions
inimical to the USSR--will be preserved. The Soviets almost certainly would
want to negotiate this with us directly. They would also want US support for
any effort to negotiate a deal with the Pakistanis and the resistance,
something they will in the end have to do if they want to create a semblance
of order, in Kabul at least, after they leave and allow for some form of state
relations with a post-PDPA regime. If, on the other hand, Soviet statements
continue to be tantalizing but ambiguous, I would agree that the skeptics are
right, and that we are seeing nothing more than a more sophisticated game of
smoke and mirrors.
Robert Blackwell
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (Optional)
Some Thoughts on Soviet Intentions in Afghanistan and US Policy
FROM: EXTENSION NO.
NIC-00239/88
Robert Blackwell
NI0/USSR DATE
21 January 1988
TO: '(Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
RECEIVED
FORWARDED
INITIALS
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
Acting Chairman/NIC
H. F. Hutchinson, Jr.
~t
r
--Copy hand carried
3
Executive Registry
fis
2 2 JA
I 1988
4.
SA/DCI
l
z
6.
7.
2 8 JAN 19$8
DDCI
/
Copy hand carried
B.
a
4 FEB
t9 /
~~[
hand carried
Copy
DCI
10.
11.
NI0/USSR
nhert Blackwell
2.
13.
bcl
14.
15.
FORM
1-79
U EDITIEON
610 EDITIONS
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IMMEDIATE
PAGE 001 NC 7499196
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DC P.UEAIIE
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
TOP1181
00 RUEHC
DE RUEHMO #0843/01 0150813
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 150811Z JAN 88
FM AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2186
INFO RUEHIL/AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD PRIORITY 2527
RUSEKB/AMEMBASSY KABUL PRIORITY 1783
BT
C 0 N F I D E N T I A L MOSCOW 00843
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL US UR AF
SUBJECT: SOVIET EXPERT DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN'S
PAST AND FUTURE .
2. EMBOFF MET JANUARY 13 WITH ORIENTAL INSTITUTE
AFGHANISTAN Ed(P.ERT:YURIY' GANCOVSKIY 'WHO
ARNED 'OFT,HE''DANGERS'OF -LEBANIZATIDN"
OF AFGHANISTAN AND NECESSITY"FOR BOTH-
U. S .- xAND -SOVIET 'UNION TO 'TAKE-STEPS TO
PREVENT -A ABL'OODBATH xAFTER-SOVIET TROOP
WITHDRAWAL,7,7~,rSANKOVSKIY1FNOTED -THAT:.:%z
SOVIET INTERVENTION HAD COME
ABOUT BECAUSE "LEFT EXTREMISTS"
HAD COME TO POWER IN AFGHANISTAN,
BUT NOW THERE WAS A THREAT THAT
"RIGHT EXTREMISTS" LIKE GULBUDDIN
HIKMATYAR MIGHT SEIZE POWER;
THE U.S. HAD BEEN "RIGHT" TO CON-
CENTRATE ATTENTION ON SOVIET
TROOP WITHDRAWAL, BUT THAT "IN
CURRENT CIRCUMSTANCES" URGENT
ATTENTION NEEDED TO BE DEVOTED
TO THE PROBLEM OF REABSORBING
UNPRECEDENTEDNIMBERS OF REFUGEES,
AND4C,-~REATING A'MECHANISMTO "LIMIT"'''
TILING ~OF::SCORES" ;
THE BREAKUP OF AFGHANISTAN INTO
FIEFDOMS WAS A DISTINCT POSSIBILITY,
WHICH WOULD LEAVE THE U.S. AND
SOVIET UNION WITH "TEN PROBLEMS
INSTEAD OF ONE."
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
,a/
NI0/USSR,
INCOMING
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TOR: 1508592 JAN 88 MOSCOW 00843
AFGHANISTAN'S PAST: THE LEGACY OF THE "LEFT
- EXTREMISTS."
ESHAWAR. GANKOVSKIY SAID THAT THE "CRAZY
POLICY" OF THAT ERA HAD SOUGHT TO "LIQUIDATE
ILLITERACY BY LIQUIDATING THE ILLITERATES."
IT WAS THIS INCIPIENT GENOCIDAL ^SITUATION~tTHA1 P?-~!
PRECIPITATED SOVIET INTERVENTION.
'ENTERED THE OPPOSITION'AND WERE NOW IN
% OJADEDDI AND.SAYID AHMED GAILANI'S FAMILIES-,HAD?;4v
3. EMBOFF MET JANUARY 13 WITH INSTITUTE OF
ORIENTAL STUDIES, AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN
DEPARTMENT HEAD, YURIY GANKOVSKIY. THE
MEETING WAS PROPITIOUS, GANKOVSKIY SAID,
BECAUSE AN AFGHANISTAN SETTLEMENT SEEMED
INCREASINGLY POSSIBLE. GANKOVSKIY, HOWEVER,
WAS CONCERNED THAT THE TRAGEDY OF AFGHANISTAN'S
PEOPLE WOULD CONTINUE. HE OFFERED SOME
REFLECTIONS ON AFGHANISTAN'S RECENT HISTORY
IN ORDER TO PUT THINGS IN PERSPECTIVE.
AFTER THE APRIL 1978 REVOLUTION "LEFT EX-
EXTREMISTS" HAD SEIZED POER. THESE PEOPLE
--
HAD INTO TRAGEDY. HE
HIMSELF HAD HEARD HAFIZULLAH AMIN PROCLAIM
IN PRIVATE MEETINGS THAT THE AFGHAN PEOPLE
OFFERED POOR HUMAN MATERIAL FOR THE
MODERNIZATION OF THE COUNTRY. THEY WERE
POOR, ILLITERATE, AND BADLY EDUCATED.
AMIN HAD SAID "WE ONLY NEED FOUR MILLION
(OUT OF A POPULATION OF SIXTEEN MILLION)
AFGHANS TO CONSTRUCT SOCIALISM." GANKOVSKIY
NOTED THAT UNDER THE TARAKI-AMIN REGIME
PEOPLE HAD BEEN ARRESTED AND EVEN EXECUTED
FOR REFUSING TO ANSWER QUESTIONS FROM
CENSUS-TAKERS. MEMBERS-OF: SEBGHATULLAH-
4. UNFORTUNATELY, "COMRADE BREZHNEV DID
NOT THINK THROUGH THE FUL_ IMF, PLICATIONS
OF SUVTETZ TERTV E VV NT ION." THE SOVIETS
HAD A SIMPLISTIC NOTION THAT BABRAK KARMAL,
A BETTER EDUCATED AND MORE POLISHED FIGURE
WITH LEGITIMATE POLITICAL CREDENTIALS,
C 0 N F I 0 E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 MOSCOW 00843
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL US UR AF
SUBJECT: SOVIET EXPERT DISCUSSES AFGHANISTAN'S
THE SOVIETS. HAD- SOUGHT TO.LIMIT THE NUMBERSP
OF TROOPS COMMITTED TO AFGHANISTAN AND THLIS`~'-NW
BEENABLE'TO DO LITTLE MORE'-`
THAN HOLDwSOME'-CITIES AND ROADS.?`?WITH THE
WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS THERE WAS A
GREAT DANGER OF A BLOODBATH ANO..THE
'LEBAN.IZATION OF AFGHANISTAN.
COULD BE GIVEN A CHANGE TO SUCCEED. GANKOVSKIY
SAID THAT THE POINT OF HIS REVIEW OF
AFGHAN HISTORY WAS TO NOTE THAT THERE WERE
GREAT DANGERS AHEAD FOR BOTH THE U.S.
AND THE SOVIETS ONCE TROOP WITHDRAWAL BEGAN.
AFGHANISTAN'S FUTURE: THE THREAT OF "RIGHT
- EXTREMISM"
CONFIDENTIAL
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TOR: 150859Z JAN 88 MOSCOW 00843
5. WITH THE WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET TROOPS,
THERE WERE TWO POSSIBLE SCENARIOS. THERE
WAS THE DISTINCT THREAT OF A "RIGHT EXTREMIST
LIKE HIKMATYAR" TAKING POWER. THIS WOULD
UNLEASH A BLOODLETTING ON THE SCALE OF
TARAKI AND AMIN. THERE WAS ALSO THE
POSSIBILITY OF IRANIAN EFFORTS TO "EXPORT"
THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION TO AFGHANISTAN.
(COMMENT: GANKOVSKIY DID NOT DWELL ON THIS
AND SEEMED TO GIVE IT LITTLE CHANCE OF
SUCCEEDING. END COMMENT) ULTIMATELY,
AFGHANISTAN MIGHT BREAK DOWN INTO A SERIES
OF FIEFDOMS. SOME OF THE WARLORDS
WOULD TURN TO THE CHINESE, SOME TO
PAKISTAN, SOME TO THE U.S. AND SOME
TO THE SOVIET UNION. THIS WOULD BE DISASTROUS.
"IN THAT CASE WE WOULD BE FACING TEN PROBLEMS
INSTEAD OF ONE." GANKOVSKIY OBSERVED THAT
BRITISH POLICY IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY,
WHICH HAD'DEFENDED THE NATIONAL INTEGRITY
pF,AFGHANISTAN AS-A BUFFER BETWEEN RUSSIA
ANDrTHE