CLEARED COPY OF "OVERVIEW OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS"

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• Document Page Count: 64
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 15, 2013
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: March 3, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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.THE FOLLOWING DOCUMENTS.
ARE ATTACHED:
(Please do not remove)
/I A
iP Oda U__ tt
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ROUTING SLIP
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STAT
xecutive Secretary
4 Mar'88
Date
3637 (10-81)
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11 wL/IVVVNIV IIVElall)
-.89-0226X/4
UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
OFFICE OF
THE DIRECTOR
March 3, 1988
Mr. Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary, Department of State
Colonel William M. Matz, Jr.
Executive Secretary, Department of Defense
Mr. William V. Vitale
Executive Secretary, Department of Energy
Mr. Paul Schott Stevens
Executive Secretary, National Security Council
Mr. H. Lawrence Sandall
Executive Secretary, Central Intelligence Agency
RADM Joseph C. Strasser
Executive Assistant to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: Cleared Copy of "Overview of the INF Negotiations"
Attached is the fully cleared Overview of the INF
Negotiations including'final NSC comments and clearance for
your information and--future reference. The Acting Director
will transmit the Overview to Senator Pell and the SFRC, in
response to Senator Pell's January 13 request, by COB March 4,
1988.
William B.. Staples
Executive Secretary
Attachment:
As stated
DECLASSIFY ON: OADR
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UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
FOx YOUR INFORMATION
Informal copies or this document were
provided to Action Officers at the following
agencies:
OSll: Cassidy
DOE: Donnelly
CIA:
EUR:Simpson
PM: Riems
VIA:
S/ART: Riems
STAT
STAT
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OVERVIEW OF THE INFNEGOTIATIONS
An ACDA Staff Paper
March 3, 1987
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Background ~ ,
. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
US Negotiating
Position . . . ' ? . ? . .
Soviet Negotiating Position . . . . . . ' . ' . ' . ? 2
.
Soviet Unilateral Walkout from?Negotiations
Interim Developments ~ 3
. ? ? . . . 5
Steps Toward Resumption of?INF.Negotiations . . . . ? ?
NST Negotiations Resume on March 12, 1985 . . . 6
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
(March 1985 - December 1987)
II. ROUND I (March 12 April 23, United States Position . . . . . 1.. . . . . ? . . 8
Soviet Position . 8
Soviet Moratorium and Missile Reduction Proposals . . . . .
III. ROUND II (May 30 . 9
Y - July 16, 1985). .
US Position 11
Soviet Position ~ 11
Detailing of Soviet Position' on . . . . . 12
Aircraft
IV. ROUND III (September 23 - Nov. Soviet Position 7, 1985)? 13
US Position . .
13
The Soviet Initiatives . . . . . 14
US Initiatives ~ .
. . . . . . . . . . . ? ? . . 16
V. GENEVA SUMMIT (November
19-21, 1985)
VI. ROUND IV (January 16, 1986 - March 4, 1986)
US Position . .
Soviet Position . . . .
? ? ? . .
SProposals ~ . . . 119
Soviet i Assessment . . . . . . . . . . . . ' ' . .
. . . . . . ? ? 20
of Gorbachev Proposal . . 20
0
US Proposals . . . . . . . . . . ? ? ? . .
Summary of Soviet Movement on Major Issues . ? . . ' ' ' ? . 21
VII. ROUND V (May 8, 1986 -
Soviet I June 26, 1986) . ?
nitiatives . . . . ? ? . 23
US Initiatives . 23
. . . . . ' ?
y of Central Issues . .
During the Round . .
VIII. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S JULY 25 LETTER 24
IX. US-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS MEETINGS 25
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CONTENTS
X. ROUND VI (September 18 - November 12, 1986) . . . .
Pre-Re
k
. . . . .
y
javik Developments (Se
t
18
27
p
.
- Oct. 10, 1986) . . . .
US Initiatives
.
27
. .
Soviet Initiatives ~ ~ ~ .
. .
.
27
. .
. . . .
.
Summary of Key Issues
27
. . . . .
. .
.
XI. REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING IN REYKJAVIK (Oct. 11-12, 1986). . .
XII
RO
28
.
UND VI DEVELOPMENTS POST-REYKJAVIK (Oct. 13-Nov. 12, 1986)
US Initiative . . . .
Soviet Initiative . . . . . . .
.
.
29
XIII. INTERIM SESSION: LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETING
S . .
Summary of Basic INF Issues ? ?
.
31
XIV. ROUND VII (January 15 - March 26, 1987). . . .
US Initiatives . .
. . .
32
. . . . . . . . . . .
.
. . .
Soviet Initiative . . . . . . . . 32
Gorbachev's February 28 TASS Stat
. . ' ' ' . . 33
ement
US Draft Treaty of March 4
. . . . . . . . ? . . . 3
1987
4
f
.
US Verification Provisions . . . . . . . . . . 34
XV. SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MEETI
NG IN MOSCOW (April 13-16, 1987)
? .
36
XVI. ROUND VIII (April 23, 1987 - December 6, 1987) . . . . .
. . .
37
Phase One of Round VIII - Implementing Reykjavik Accord
Tabling of Soviet Draft INF Treat
(A
.
3
y
pril 27, 1987) . .
Note on Phasing
.
8
3
Tabling of US Draft Memorandum
of Understanding on Data
Agreement on a US-Soviet INF Joi
t D
. . .
9
31
41
n
raft Text .
. . .
US SRINF Proposal . . . .
. . .
4
. .
'
42
2
Phase Two of Round VIII - Double Global Zero
Glitman-Obukhov/Chervov Conversati
?
43
. ? . . .
ons on DGZ
Gorbachev's Agreement to Double Gl
b
l
. .
43
o
a
Zero. . . . .
US Position on Gorbachev's DGZ St
t
. ?
44
a
ement. . . . . . . .
Double Global Zero Negotiations
. ? ?
44
. . . . . .
US Warheads on West German Pershing IA
45
Missiles
.
XVII
45
. SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MINISTERIAL IN WASHINGTON . . . . .
. .
46
XVIII. SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MINISTERIAL IN MOSCOW . .
XIX. NEGOTIATING ISSUES IN THE LAST STAGE OF NEGOTIATIONS. .
Disposition of Missile Front Sections
.
.
48
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CONTENT
Phasing of Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . 491
R & D Boosters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50,
Missile Conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
SS-20/SS-25 Missile Stage Similarity and Continuous Portal
Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
Final Decisions on On-Site Inspections (OSI) . . . . . . . . 51,
Suspect-Site Inspections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
NTM Enhancement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52,
Elimination Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . . . . 52'
Inspection Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Memorandum of Understanding on Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
Basing Country Agreements and Exchange of Notes . . . . . . . 55
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OVERVIEW OF THE INF NEGOTIATIONS
1. INTRODUCTION
This paper provides a general overview of the negotiations in
the INF Negotiating Group in Geneva since the negotiations resumed
on March 12, 1985.* It also covers INF negotiating developments in
the Ministerial and Summit Meetings since January 1985. As it
concentrates on the main issues, its content is selective rather
than all-inclusive.
An earlier analysis of the 1981-1983 INF negotiations, when the
US INF Delegation was headed by Ambassador Paul Nitze, and which
were broken off unilaterally by the Soviets on November 23, 1983,
is contained in the."SCG Progress Report on INF" released to the
public on December 8, 1983. Here a brief summary of the US and
Soviet negotiating positions at the outset in 1981, and as they
stood at the resumption of negotiations in March 1985, is provided
in the following section on Background.
An unclassified chronology that summarizes major developments
in the negotiations is also available (see attached published
document: 'INF: Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Chronology,'
Issues Brief, US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Washington,
D.C.)
Background
Looking back from the perspective of late 1987 and the
conclusion of the INF Treaty, it is clear that the Soviet Union was
brought around from its initial unrealistic position of seeking to
preserve a longer-range INF (LRINF) missile monopoly to accepting
the US 'zero option" announced by President Reagan in 1981, in
consultation with the Allies and pursuant to the December 1979
'dual track" decision of NATO. Moreover, US persistence and
Alliance solidarity were the main reasons for this success.
*The INF Treaty signed on December 8, 1987 uses the terms
intermediate-range missiles (IRMs) which are capable of ranges
between 1000 and 5500 kilometers, and shorter-range missiles (SRMs)
which are capable of ranges between 500 and 1000 km. The terms IRM
and SRM are generally equivalent to LRINF (longer-range INF) and
SRINF (shorter-range INF), respectively, which is older US
terminology. The more general term INF (intermediate-range nuclear
forces) includes all US and Soviet ground-launched missiles in the
500 to 5500 km. range band.
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The 1979 NATO "dual track' decision was taken in order to
maintain the credibility of NATO's strategy of flexible response in
light of the large and sustained buildup in Soviet LRINF missile
forces. The 1979 NATO Integrated Decision Document called for
modernization of LRINF forces, while pursuing parallel US-Soviet
negotiations to establish US and Soviet equality in LRINF missile
capabilities on a global basis at a lower equal level. NATO agreed
from the outset on the need for global limits, US/Soviet equality,
no "compensation' for third country forces in any INF agreement, no
undermining of NATO's conventional capability, and effective
verification.
The main impetus for the NATO "dual track" decision of 1979
was the Soviet deployment beginning in 1977 of the SS-20 -- a
highly accurate, 5000 kilometer range ballistic missile equipped
with three independently targetable warheads and launched from a
mobile transporter. As of mid-January 1985, the Soviet Union had
deployed at least 396 SS-20 launchers (with missiles capable of
carrying at least 1,188 warheads) at operational bases. Until the
end of 1983, the United States had no comparable systems deployed.
In the context of rough US-Soviet strategic parity, the SS-20
buildup further exacerbated the threat to our European Allies. It
raised concern that the Soviets might come to believe -- however
mistakenly -- that US strategic forces could be "decoupled" from
the defense of Europe. To maintain credible deterrence, the
Alliance moved to redress the INF imbalance through a combination
of modernization and negotiation.
US Negotiating Position
The original US negotiating aims announced by President Reagan
on November 18, 1981, after Allied consultations, drew on the "zero
option," which called for the complete elimination of US and Soviet
LRINF missiles on a global basis, while establishing collateral
constraints on Soviet shorter-range INF (SRINF) missiles.
The US 'zero option' negotiating position on INF was consistent
with the NATO 1979 Decision Guidelines. Those guidelines were:
-- any limitations on US INF missile systems be accompanied by
appropriate limitations on Soviet INF missile systems;
-- any agreed limitations be consistent with the principle of
equality, both in limits and rights;
-- limitations on US and Soviet LRINF missiles should be
negotiated bilaterally in a step-by-step approach;
-- non-US, Allied systems be excluded from the bilateral
negotiation, and the US avoid negotiating Soviet compensation
for such systems;
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the immediate objective of the negotiations be agreed
world-wide (global) reductions and limitations on US and Soviet
LRINF missile systems; and
-- any agreed limitations must be verifiable.
Thereafter, the Reagan Administration INF proposals built on
this NATO foundation but went significantly further, in close
consultation with the Allies, calling for the global elimination of
an entire class of US and Soviet INF systems and the requirement of
effective verification. Further clarifying the criteria for an INF
agreement, the United States together with the Allies ruled out as
unacceptable any outcome on INF that would entail Soviet
exportation of the security threat in Europe to other regions, such
as the Far East, or result in an adverse impact on NATO's
conventional defense and deterrence capability (e.g., aircraft).
In March 1983, the United States, following Allied
consultation, proposed an interim agreement on INF that would
establish equal global limits on US and Soviet warheads on LRINF
missiles on launchers at the lowest mutually acceptable number
above zero. This US proposal was in effect an offer to
substantially reduce the number of warheads on the planned US LRINF
deployments in Europe, provided the Soviet Union reduced the number
of warheads on its LRINF missiles to an equal number on a global
basis. In tabling this proposal, the United States did not advance
a specific warhead level, indicating that it was prepared to
consider any level between zero and 572 acceptable to the Soviet
side. When the Soviet side refused to advance a number, the US
negotiators suggested a series of alternate levels between 50 and
450. However, the Soviet side rejected any US deployments.
In September 1983, President Reagan elaborated on the interim
agreement proposal by offering to address stated Soviet concerns on
aircraft, geography, and the composition of the NATO LRINF missile
force. These proposals, tabled on September 22, were rejected by
the Soviet side.
On November 15, 1983, the United States specifically suggested
an equal global ceiling of 420 LRINF missile warheads, a number
corresponding to the level the Soviet side had suggested for their
SS-20 deployments in the Western USSR. The Soviet side also
rejected this proposal.
Soviet Negotiating Position
The Soviet negotiating position at the INF negotiations evolved
through several variations between 1981 and 1983. However, every
Soviet proposal during that period had as its ultimate objective
the Soviet retention of a substantial SS-20 missile force in
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Europe, but no US LRINF missile deployments for NATO. The initial
Soviet position called for limiting "medium-range' (1000-5500 km)
missiles and aircraft of the Soviet Union and 'NATO' in Europe or
stationed in the waters adjoining it, to combined aggregates on
each side of 300 systems. This proposal would have: precluded US
LRINF missile deployments; included the capability of the
independent British and French nuclear forces in a bilateral
US-USSR agreement; and significantly impaired US conventional
capability in Europe through the virtual elimination of US
dual-capable aircraft in Europe.
The Soviet side subsequently proposed a missile launcher
subceiling tied explicitly to the level of British and French
missiles (162 by Soviet count) and expressed a willingness to treat
warheads as a unit of account in addition to launchers. However,
neither of these proposals changed the unacceptable outcomes of the
basic Soviet proposal.
In August 1983, General Secretary Andropov announced Soviet
willingness to "liquidate" missiles in Europe made excess by Soviet
proposals. But, it became clear that only one missile associated
with each excess launcher actually would be liquidated. Hence, the
US rejected this approach. Under the Soviet
would bar the Soviet Union from continued puctpoonl, nothing
stockpiling of new missiles in unlimited numbers for pod
deployment in the European theater. Nor would it prevent entiel
further buildup of SS-20s on launchers outside of Europe where they
could threaten our Asian allies and friends while also remaining
within range of much of NATO.
In an October 1983 interview, General Secretary Andropov
suggested some positive movement on the geographic and aircraft
issues. He also offered Soviet reductions to approximately 140
SS-20 missile launchers with 420 warheads in Europe, but continued
to tie these reductions to limits on new deployments of British and
French independent nuclear forces (currently associated, by Soviet
count, with approximately 420 warheads) in order to preclude any
US LRINF missile deployments.
The Soviet Union originally attempted to
of an LRINF monopoly in all of its proposals justify by e ing thattan
INF 'balance' already existed. To make this point, tut an
NATO aircraft with the SS-20. But this argument nwastuhey eed
ndercuttby
the Soviets continuing SS-20 deployments -- over 100 with 300
warheads were. deployed during the course of the talks.
Increasingly, the Soviets tried to rationalize the unequal outcome
they were seeking by a contrived claim for 'compensation" for
British and French forces, a position consistently rejected by the
United States and its NATO allies.
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Soviet Unilateral Walkout from Negotiations
As the November 1983 date for initial deliveries of US LRINF
missiles to European deployment sites approached, the Soviet Union
campaigned to block the US deployment by seeking to intimidate the
United States and the Allies, and to arouse public opinion against
the deployment, particularly in the host countries, while ignoring
the threat posed by their missiles to the Allies. The Soviet Union
threatened to pull out of the negotiations and to begin a program
of so-called 'countermeasures" to the US INF deployment. On
November 23, 1983, the Soviet delegation unilaterally withdrew from
the INF talks. The United States made it known that it regretted
the Soviet walkout and that it was prepared to resume negotiations
at any time the Soviet side was ready.
Subsequently, the Soviet Union implemented its so-called
'countermeasures", which consisted of:
-- ending the Soviet declared "moratorium' on new SS-20 base
construction in the western USSR;
-- stationing SRINF missile systems (SS-12 SCALEBOARDs) in
Czechoslovakia and East Germany; and
-- patrolling Soviet missile submarines closer to US coasts.
Interim Developments
US and Allied steadfastness and the adherance to the INF
deployment schedule in Europe during the intervening period was
effective in finally bringing the Soviet Union back to the INF
negotiating table. Indications that the Soviet side was ready to
return began surfacing about one year after the walkout, in
November 1984.
US deployments called for by the 1979 NATO dual-track decision
proceeded gradually but steadily from the initial deliveries for
deployment in November 1983. Called for were the deployment of 108
Pershing Its in the FRG and 464 GLCMs in five basing countries by
1988, as indicated in the table below under "planned level'. Also
indicated in the table below, as of December 31, 1984, is the
operational status of US INF missile deployments in Europe. The
table shows a total of 102 US LRINF missiles installed in Europe at
the end of 1984, most of which were in the FRG and UK, and a small
number in Italy. By the end of March 1985 (when INF negotiations
had just resumed in Geneva), the total of operational US LRINF
missiles in Europe had risen somewhat to 118 with additional
missiles operational in the FRG.
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US INF DEPLOYMENTS AND SCHEDULE (Dec. 1984)
Pershing II GLCM
Operational* Planned
Operational* Pl
anned
FRG
54
108
0
96
UK
0
32
160
Italy
0
16
112
Belgium
0
0
48
Netherld
0
0
48
TOTALS
54
108
48
464
*Operational figures are based on deployment schedule as
revised through last quarter of 1984. Planned figures denote
numbers scheduled for full deployment, as planned, for completion
in 1988.
During 1984 and subsequently, British and French nuclear
modernization proceeded as planned under their national authorities.
During the year following its walkout from the INF Talks, the
USSR started more than 10 new SS-20 bases, the largest number of
SS-20 bases begun in any one year since deployment began in 1977.
By early January 1985, the number of SS-20 launchers at operational
bases had risen to at least 396 (with 1,118 warheads), with
additional launchers and missiles that could be made available in a
crisis.
Steps Toward Resumption of INF Negotiations
The United States continued throughout 1984 to explore ways to
stimulate the arms control dialogue and to resume the nuclear arms
control talks. In quickly accepting a June 1984 Soviet proposal
for Vienna negotiations on 'preventing the militarization of outer
space,' the United States informed the USSR that it was prepared to
meet with the USSR to discuss and define mutually acceptable
arrangements under which negotiations on the reduction of strategic
and intermediate-range nuclear weapons could be resumed, as well as
feasible approaches which could lead to verifiable and effective
limitations on ASAT weapons. The Soviets responded negatively,
setting unacceptable preconditions which precluded any talks.
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In his September 1984 address to the United Nations General
Assembly, President Reagan proposed "umbrella talks' to stimulate
discussion on arms control issues. In a subsequent meeting with
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and in correspondence with the new
Soviet General Secretary Chernenko, President Reagan also urged the
Soviet side to resume the arms control dialogue.
As a result of these efforts, the United States and the Soviet
Union agreed on November 22, 1984 to negotiations in order to reach
mutually acceptable agreements on the whole range of nuclear
offensive and defensive systems. During their meeting in Geneva on
January 7-8, 1985, Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Gromyko
agreed that these talks would cover nuclear and space arms. The
negotiations on defense and space, START and INF were to be
conducted in parallel but separately, by a delegation from each
side divided into three groups: one to deal with strategic
offensive arms, one for intermediate-range arms, and one to address
defense and space issues. The talks were aimed at limiting and
reducing nuclear arsenals and strengthening strategic stability.
The sides agreed to begin the negotiations on March 12, 1985 in
Geneva. President Reagan announced that Ambassador Maynard Glitman
would have responsibility for negotiations on INF.
At a meeting with Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko in January
1985 in Geneva, Secretary Shultz stated, with respect to the INF
talks, that: While adhering to the principles previously set forth
on INF, the US was prepared to build upon the flexibility inherent
in the US 1983 proposals and to explore possible new approaches as
well, in pursuit of the lowest possible equal global limits.
Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko repeated familiar elements of
the previous, unacceptable Soviet position, including the Soviet
contention that US LRINF missiles were "strategic" systems and that
the British and French systems must be "taken into account.' He
also called for a halt to US LRINF deployments in exchange for a
cessation of Soviet "countermeasures'. He added that the United
States and Soviet Union would then proceed to "reductions to agreed
levels' on medium-range missiles in Europe. He did not demand
withdrawal of already deployed missiles as a precondition for the
resumption of negotiations.
NST Negotiations Resume on March 12, 1985
The NST negotiations which began on March 12, 1985 in Geneva
were divided into three separate negotiating groups: START;
Defense and Space, and INF. The US INF Delegation was headed by
Ambassador Glitman; and the Soviet INF Delegation by Ambassador
Obukhov. The Special Consultative Group (SCG) in Brussels remained
the primary consultation mechanism between the US and its NATO
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allies on matters related to the INF negotiations. The SCG
continued its intensive and productive consultations throughout the
INF negotiations.
CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY OF THE NEGOTIATIONS
(March 1985 - December 1987)
II. ROUND I (March 12, 1985 - April 23, 1985)
United States Position
At the beginning of the new talks, the United States
underscored the principles and criteria underlying its approach.
The US reaffirmed that the draft treaties of 1982, for the global
elimination of all LRINF missiles, and of 1983, for an interim
agreement based on equal global limits on LRINF missile warheads if
the Soviets were unprepared to accept a zero outcome, were still on
the table. It also again placed before the Soviets the US
September 1983 initiatives which addressed concerns that the Soviet
Union had raised and was based on the following:
First, the United States proposed a new initiative on equal
global limits: If the Soviet Union would agree to reductions
and limits on a global basis, the United States would consider
a commitment not to offset the entire Soviet global missile
deployment through US deployments in Europe. The United States
would retain the right to deploy missiles elsewhere.
-- Second, the United States would be prepared to consider
mutually acceptable ways to address the Soviet desire that an
agreement should limit aircraft as well as missiles.
Third, the United States would address the mix of missiles that
would result from reductions. In the context of reductions to
equal global levels, the United States would be prepared to
apportion the reductions in deployments appropriately between
Pershing II ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise
missiles.
At the resumption of negotiations in March 1985, the US
delegation also underlined the importance in any INF agreement of
collateral constraints on SRINF missile systems, and the
unacceptability of any notion of Soviet compensation for third
country systems. The US position was characterized by a
willingness to take into account specific Soviet concerns.
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Soviet Position
The Soviet Union's criteria and
of INF talks remained basically unchanged from its positionmonion
November 23, 1983, when it unilaterally discontinued the INF
negotiations. The Soviet base position sought an outcome that
would remove the US INF systems from Europe and preclude further
deployments, while preserving a Soviet LRINF monopoly. Moreover,
the Soviet Union regressed somewhat from its earlier position by
.trying to equate the Soviet Union's so-called "countermeasures"
with US LRINF missile deployments, a position firmly rejected by
the United States.
Soviet proposals during this opening round were predictable.
The Soviet side:
-- proposed to remove their so-called countermeasures in
exchange for elimination of Pershing II and GLCM
deployments in Europe. The US firmly rejected this
artificial equation between US LRINF missile deployments
which were designed to counter the SS-20 buildup and
threat to NATO and Soviet forward deployments of SRINF
SS-12s to Eastern Europe;
-- insisted on complete equivalence with UK and French
forces, involving third countries in the negotiations and
leaving the Soviets with a substantial LRINF missile force
and room to grow, while no US missiles could be deployed.
The US continued to reject this demand as well; and
-- proposed to reduce and limit "medium-range" aircraft, even
including US carrier-based aircraft, and to have the level
of US aircraft in Europe dependent on the level of UK and
French aircraft. The Soviets were unwilling or unable to
elaborate on this proposal, which appeared little changed
from the aircraft proposals made by General Secretary
Andropov in October 1983.
Soviet Moratorium and Missile Reduction Proposals.
In addition, the Soviets put forward three moratoria'proposals
in the first round.
In addition to a draft moratorium covering all three NST'
negotiating areas, the Soviets tabled a separate INF bilateral
moratorium proposal. General Secretary Gorbachev also announced a
unilateral Soviet moratorium covering Soviet LRINF missile
deployments in Europe that would continue until November 1985.
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However, the Soviets refused to respond to a number of specific-US
questions on details of these proposals unless the US first agreed
in principle to a moratorium.
-- Soviet Bilateral INF Moratorium Proposal: This proposal, tabled
on April 11, 1985, consisted. essentially of the following
propositions.
--
The
SS-4
halt
USSR would "refrain" from deploying additional SS-20,
and SS-N-5 missiles in or near Europe if the US would
deployments of the Pershing II and GLCM in Europe.
--
Verification would be accomplished by NTM; and
--
The moratorium would remain in force until conclusion of
an INF reductions. agreement.
This proposal was patently unacceptable, since it would have
codified a Soviet advantage in LRINF missile warheads of more than
8 to 1 and would have placed no constraints on SS-20 deployments
outside Europe (e.g., in Soviet Asia).
-- Missile Reduction Proposal:
Under the Soviet missile reductions proposal, immediately after
a moratorium had been established:
-- The US would remove all P-IIs and GLCMs from Europe;
-- The Soviets in turn would reverse their "countermeasures,"
i.e., withdraw all "operational-tactical missiles of
enhanced range" (SS-12 SCALEBOARD SRINF missiles) in the
GDR and Czechoslovakia and withdraw the additional Soviet
submarines patrolling off the US coast since late 1983;
-- The Soviets would begin a gradual reduction of their
SS-20, SS-4, and SS-N-5 missile forces in or near Europe
to a level at which their warheads equalled the number of
missiles in the independent UK and.French nuclear
deterrent forces; and
All "medium-range" missiles to be reduced would be
destroyed.
The Soviet side also proposed, as a preliminary measure,
removal from combat duty of the missiles to be withdrawn,
and concentrating them in specially designated zones.
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The US rejected this proposal too, on the grounds that it
would permit retention of a substantial Soviet force threatening
Europe, while no US LRINF systems would be permitted.
-- Linkage
The Soviet negotiators did not emphasize the linkage issue
(i.e., interrelationship of INF to START or Defense and Space
negotiating fora) during this round. They indicated, in informal
probings, that they would be willing to implement an INF agreement
along the lines of their proposal, without awaiting resolution in
the START or Defense and Space areas, and would be prepared to
implement any mutually acceptable INF agreement.
III. ROUND II (May 30, 1985 - July 16, 1985)
The Soviet position in this round was marked mainly by
polemical, hardened and deliberately dilatory tactics. Toward the
end of the round, the Soviets began to discuss more germane issues,
but without any movement toward agreement. Overall the Soviets
continued to insist on total acceptance of their view. The United
States did not change its position.
US Position
The US continued its effort to engage the Soviets substantively
and constructively on the issues. The US Delegation stressed that
it was prepared to consider any reasonable INF outcome provided the
result was equal US-Soviet warhead limits on a global basis.
However, the Soviet side refused to discuss any alternative other
than zero US LRINF missiles in Europe while insisting that SS-20
warhead levels in Europe should be equal to the combined British
and French warhead levels. US efforts to open a discussion on
SRINF and verification also were rebuffed by the Soviets.
The US side refuted Soviet claims that the US LRINF deployments
upset the "balance" in Europe, in view of the overwhelming Soviet
advantage in LRINF missiles and the numbers of Soviet aircraft
capable of attacking targets on NATO territory. The US side also
pointed out that the Soviets based their balance claims on
arbitrary criteria inconsistently applied, including inflated
figures for the number of bombs ascribed to NATO aircraft and the
incorrect equation of bombs on aircraft with warheads on missiles.
The Soviet contingent offer to freeze the level of their LRINF
missiles in Asia (see below, under Soviet position, Gorbachev's May
29 offer) implicitly constituted Soviet acknowledgement, for the
first time, that their Asian systems were indeed relevant to the
INF negotiations. ,
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Soviet Position
The Soviet negotiating stance hardened during Round Two, based
on the previous Soviet insistence in 1982-83 that there be no US
LRINF missile deployments, but the USSR should be allowed to retain
a large LRINF missile force of its own. The Soviets continued to
insist that the US must withdraw its "illegally' deployed cruise
and Pershing II missiles from Europe and that limits on Soviet
LRINF in any agreement must take British and French nuclear forces
into account. The Soviets reiterated their 'reduction proposal'
but added nothing new to it. The Soviet negotiators:
-- stepped up their attack on third country systems, arguing
that an INF agreement should establish a balance between
the Soviet SS-20 force on one side and the entire UK and
French SLBM and land-based missile nuclear forces on the
other;
attacked the US global approach and asserted that the
Soviet SS-20 force in the Asian portion of the USSR was
intended solely to counter US air and naval forces in the
Pacific and Indian oceans and should be left out of the
negotiations; and
-- charged that US LRINF systems were designed to give the US
a strategic advantage over the Soviet Union and were
"strategic, first strike" systems, illegal and a
circumvention of SALT II.
On May 29, 1985, the new Soviet Secretary General Gorbachev
reaffirmed Andropov's October 26, 1983 offer to halt deployments of
the SS-20 in the Eastern USSR once an INF agreement covering Europe
came into force, provided there were "no significant changes in the
strategic situation" in the Asian region. The Soviet negotiators
claimed that this was a new step on their part and that the other
conditions for such a halt and specific numbers could be made an
integral part of an INF agreement. However, the Soviet side
declined to specify what the numbers would be or how this proposal
would be integrated in a treaty, unless the US expressed interest
in the moratorium proposal. (This Soviet offer, though not a major
movement, amounted to Soviet acknowledgement that their Asian
systems were relevant to the INF negotiations.)
Detailing of Soviet Position on Aircraft
In a plenary statement on July 9, 1985 during Round II, the
Soviet side identified the aircraft to be included in their
proposal to reduce and limit Soviet and NATO 'medium-range'
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aircraft to agreed levels. Backfire, Badger and Blinder aircraft
would be included on the Soviet side, while NATO would include US
FB-111, F-111, F-16, F-4, A-6, A-7, F/A-18, French Mirage IV and UK
Tornado. Under this Soviet proposal, some US dual-capable aircraft
would be permitted to remain in Europe depending on the level
chosen and on the size of the UK and French forces.
This proposal merely reaffirmed the longstanding Soviet
position on aircraft'. The Soviet side continued to : (1) seek
inclusion of unrelated carrier-based US aircraft which had mainly
conventional support missions; (2) include UK and French forces;
and (3) demand Soviet equality with a NATO aircraft aggregate.
The United States held that limits on INF missiles were the
main priority because they represented the main threat. But the
United States was prepared to discuss equal limits on specified
types of US and Soviet land-based aircraft at a level that would
not have an adverse impact on NATO's conventional forces.
IV. ROUND III (September 23, 1985 - November 7, 1985)
Round Three was marked by a number of US and Soviet
initiatives, the most important of which were presented late in the
round. The US presented major new proposals on November 1 and the
round was extended for one week, until November 7, to permit
initial discussion of the US initiatives. In anticipation of the
planned November Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in Geneva, the climate of
the negotiations improved and there were fewer Soviet polemics.
The most important change was the Soviet indication, for the
first time, that it was prepared to accept some limited US LRINF
deployments in Europe, albeit for a brief period, according to
their proposal, before reductions to zero. This helped pave the
way for progress on INF at the Summit.
Soviet Position
During Round III, the Soviets presented essentially four
separate proposals covering INF, all of which are described in
greater detail below. In brief, these were:
-- A proposal to include US LRINF in the Soviet START proposal;
-- A second called for the elimination of US LRINF missiles but
Soviet retention of SS-20's equal to UK and French forces as
part of an overall arms control agreement;
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The third would do the same as the second, but as part of a
separate INF agreement; and
-- The last, presented on October 14, would
GLCMs in Europe for a permit up to 120 US
period
SS-20 number also to the level of
of UK and Frenctie h forces.
While the October 14, 1985 proposal would have allowed some US
LRINF deployments in Europe for a limited time, the Soviets made
clear that their ultimate goal remained unchanged: no US LRINF
missile deployments in Europe, but a Soviet right to retain a
'flexible equivalent" in LR?INF missiles to the combined UK and
French independent nuclear deterrent forces. Although the Soviets
also proposed to freeze their substantial SS-20 force in Asia, they
alone would have been free to determine when and if the 'strategic
situation' in that region warranted an increase in SS-20s. There
was no certainty that any Soviet SS-20s would have been eliminated
under any of the "new" Soviet proposals.
US Position
The US continued to respond to Soviet queries and to probe
parameters of the "new" Soviet proposals. While the Soviet October
14 proposal continued to have major drawbacks, it did contain some
movement toward the US position, which the US delegation sought to
explore. On October 31, 1985, President Reagan announced that the
United States would be tabling a new arms control proposal in
Geneva which would address INF and build on "positive elements" of
the Soviet positions of late September 1985.
The US proposal tabled in Geneva on November 1 contained a
number of new initiatives on INF which are detailed below. In
particular, the US proposals offered a flexible approach toward
establishing equal warhead levels in Europe and in determining the
mix between P-IIs and GLCMs. For the first time, the United States
was prepared to agree to an equal European subceiling in the global
limit, with proportional Soviet reductions in Asia and equal global
missile warhead totals. These proposals had been presented
initially to the Soviets during Secretary Shultz's visit to Moscow
in October 1985 in preparation for the November 20-21, 1985 Summit
meeting in Geneva between President Reagan and Soviet General
Secretary Gorbachev.
The Soviet Initiatives
On September 30, the Soviets
the US position of March 1985. presented a counter proposal to
heit Some further new elements in the
position were enumerated publicly by General Secretary
Gorbachev during his trip to Paris that same week. In addition,
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Soviet negotiators made a further informal proposal on October 14,
parts of which were later incorporated into the official Soviet
position.
-- Soviet Counterproposal of September 30, 1985
The Soviet 'strategic' counterproposal of September 30, 1985
covered a wide range of NST issues. A number of elements had an
indirect bearing on INF. These included:
0 a freeze on existing nuclear weapons with a limit on their
modernization;
0 50% reduction in nuclear delivery vehicles capable of
reaching the territory of the other side;
0 a ban on cruise missiles over the 600 km range;
0 a halt in US and Soviet LRINF deployments followed by the
"deepest possible" reductions; and
0 no deployment of nuclear arms in states where none exist,
and no increases or replacements with new weapons in
states where they are already deployed.
The Soviet delegation later explained, however, that the Soviet
position remained zero US INF systems, with sufficient SS-20's to
balance what the Soviets alleged were 178 UK/French missiles with
530 warheads. Under this proposal, SS-20's in the European USSR
would be reduced from 243 to about 178 missiles with 534 warheads.
With this proposal, the Soviets accepted the principle of some
reductions, but the level was fundamentally conditioned by Soviet
incorporation of the numbers of British and French nuclear weapons.
-- Gorbachev's Paris Proposals
During a visit to Paris in October 1985, General Secretary
Gorbachev said that an INF agreement separate from START and
Defense and Space was possible, and offered separate negotiations
with the British and the French.
British and French nuclear forces couldcbevexcludedpfrom US-Soviet
bilateral INF negotiations. This break with longstanding Soviet
demands had yet to be formalized in Geneva, but it was a portent of
how Soviet policy was evolving.
Gorbachev asserted further that some SS-20's had been removed
from "combat alert status" so as to reduce to the level of 243
launchers in Europe claimed for June 1984, and their facilities
would be dismantled during the next two months. He also claimed
that SS-4's were being phased out.
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Soviet October 10 INF Offer
On October 10, 1985, the Soviets backtracked to their previous
position by again proposing reduction of US LRINF missiles in
Europe to zero, while offering equivalent reductions in SS-20
warheads to match, and vary with, the independent nuclear deterrent
forces of the UK and France. The Soviets also formally indicated
they would eliminate their aging force of SS-4s.
-- Soviet October 14 Informal Variant
On October 14, the Soviets proposed that the US freeze the
level of its LRINF missile deployments as of December 1, 1985. In
return the Soviets would continue their declared moratorium.
Subsequently, over an 18 month period, the US would reduce to a
level of 100-120 GLCMs. The effect of this proposal was to require
that all US P-IIs be eliminated from the outset. The Soviets would
then reduce their warheads on LRINF missiles in Europe to the level
of US GLCM warheads plus UK and French systems.
The Soviets also indicated that they would freeze Soviet LRINF
missiles in Soviet Asia if the US strategic "potential" there
remained unchanged. They made only a glancing reference to
aircraft in a follow-on stage. (Thereafter, aircraft no longer
figured as an element in the Soviet approach to an INF agreement.)
This proposal was an explicit Soviet statement of its
willingness to accept some level of US LRINF missile deployments,
at least for a time, and it appeared to moderate the earlier Soviet
demand that GLCMs be banned. The declared freeze on further SS-20
deployments in Asia, while repeating a long-standing Soviet
position, responded to the Western position that Soviet systems
could not be simply transferred from Europe to threaten US Allies
in Asia. However, the proposal did not provide for US-Soviet
equality, but continued to insist on Soviet compensation for
British and French warheads.
US Initiatives
-- US November 1 Proposals
On November 1, the US in an effort to pave common ground made
new proposals which contained the following key elements on INF:
o The previous US negotiating positions remained on the table.
The US preferred outcome remained a US/Soviet zero/solution,
involving the ultimate total elimination of the entire class of
US and Soviet LRINF missiles.
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As an interim step toward this goal, the US proposed the
following approach:
The US would be prepared to cap its LRINF missile launcher
deployments in Europe at the number deployed on December
31, 1985 (140 P-Ii and GLCM launchers), in return for
Soviet agreement to reduce SS-20 missile launchers within
range of NATO Europe to the same number.
The US would retain freedom to mix the types deployed,
i.e., for the US, both the P-II and GLCM. The mix would
be a subject for discussion but the number of Soviet SS-20
warheads in (or within range of) Europe would be no higher
than 420. The number of US GLCM and P-II warheads would
depend on the launcher mix; a mix could be chosen that
would give the US and USSR an equal number of 420 warheads
in Europe, or in return for fewer deployed P-Iis, the US
would be entitled to as many as 450 warheads in Europe.
In this regard, the US would retain the right to relocate
from Europe US LRINF missiles permitted under the
agreement. The US also would retain the freedom to
convert Pershing II missiles removed from Europe under the
terms of the agreement to Pershing IB SRINF missiles.
Under this approach, the USSR would be required to reduce
the number of SS-20 launchers in the Eastern portion of
the USSR (i.e. outside the range of NATO Europe) in the
same proportion as such launcher reductions within range
of NATO Europe.
The end result would be that both sides would be limited
to an equal global LRINF missile warhead number.
Appropriate constraints also would be applied to US and
Soviet SRINF missiles.
The US was prepared (in case the Soviets raised the issue)
to discuss constraints on comparable LRINF aircraft on
both sides, in the context of an agreement that met US
objectives.
The US also continued to stress the importance of
effective verification as well as Soviet compliance with
existing agreements in regard to reaching an INF and other
future agreements.
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V. Geneva Summit (November 19-21 1985)
The Geneva Summit meeting between President Reagan and Soviet
Secretary General Gorbachev took place between Rounds III and IV.
It covered a wide range of agenda items, including human rights,
regional conflicts, and bilateral matters as well as arms control.
In light of the new proposals tabled by the US and Soviet Union in
Round III of the Geneva negotiations, the concluding Joint
Statement of the Geneva Summit contained a mutual commitment to
early progress in the negotiations, focusing particularly on "the
principle of 50% reductions in the nuclear arms of the US and USSR
appropriately applied." It also called for an "interim accord on
intermediate-range nuclear forces." Finally, the Joint Statement
called for agreed effective measures to verify compliance with
obligations assumed during negotiation of these agreements.
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VI. ROUND IV (January 16, 1986 - March 4, 1986)
The US INF Delegation returned to the Geneva talks in January
prepared to implement the November Summit mandate to press for
early progress in those areas where there was common ground. It
sought to broaden and deepen areas of apparent convergence in Round
III and at the Summit. The round was marked by two major events
which gave the negotiations a new impetus: On January 16 the
Soviet side proposed the elimination of US and Soviet LRINF
missiles in Europe, as part of a plan to eliminate all nuclear
weapons by the year 2000. On February 24, the United States
proposed the phased elimination of all US and Soviet LRINF missiles
by 1989, accompanied by detailed verification provisions.
US Position
The US used the opening weeks of the round to restate its
position, underline areas of convergence and stress the need for
accelerated progress. Throughout the round, the US pressed in vain
for additional details on the Soviet January 16 proposal and
continued probing for Soviet flexibility on two key issues -- SS-20
reductions in Asia, and constraints on SRINF missile systems.
Toward the end of the round, the US put forward a proposal,
detailed below, which took account of our Allies' concerns and
responded to the January 16 Soviet offer.
Soviet Position
The initial Soviet response to the US February 24 proposal was
negative. It characterized the US proposal as a reintroduction of
the "unacceptable" zero option. The Soviets also rejected a US
offer to extend the round for INF, or to reconvene the next round
earlier, to allow more time for discussion and to seek common
ground.. The Soviet Union rejected the US proposals on verification
as "premature'. They also failed to mention on-site inspection,
although Soviet public utterances on this point had been positive.
During Round IV, the Soviets explicitly refused to join in
efforts to bridge or narrow differences arguing that only the
Soviet proposal provided a basis for negotiation.
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Soviet Proposals
-- Gorbachev Proposal of January 16, 1986
On January 16, the Soviets tabled in Geneva General Secretary
Gorbachev's January 15 proposal for the complete elimination of
nuclear weapons over a fifteen year period. This proal in
a call for eliminating US and Soviet LRINF missilesoinsEuropeluded
during a first stage of reductions whose implementation would
extend for five to eight years (overlapping with follow-on
negotiations and a second stage of reductions). Such elimination
was made contingent on British and French agreement not to build up
their own independent nuclear deterrent nuclear forces, and on US
agreement not to supply "medium-range" or strategic missiles to
third countries. There would be no reductions in Asian SS-20s
during this first stage.
During the Soviet second stage, that would begin no later than
1990 and whose implementation would last five to seven years, the
US and USSR would implement further measures to eliminate
"medium-range" nuclear arms and freeze their "tactical" nuclear
weapons. (Under the Soviet definition, tactical weapons would
include all nuclear capable systems with a range of 1,000
kilometers or below.) After the 50 percent US and Soviet
'strategic reductions" were completed, all nuclear powers would
eliminate their tactical nuclear weapons.
During the third stage beginning no later than 1995, all
remaining nuclear weapons would be eliminated. The Soviets left
obscure when in the second or third stages the remaining LRINF
missiles, i.e. Soviet SS-20's in Asia, would be eliminated.
Assessment of Gorbachev Proposal
This was the first Soviet proposal that did not
Soviet right to retain a residual SS-20 missile forcerinlEurope as
compensation for British and French forces. However, the Soviets
indicated that the British and French
make national commitments not to build gupetheirtnuclear forces.
Thus, actions by third countries were still a precondition to
conclusion of a bilateral US-Soviet agreement. In addition, the
Soviet precondition that the US not transfer strategic
'medium-range" missiles to its Allies could have impacteddheavily
on US programs of cooperation. Moreover, the Soviet popsal
included neither: (1) provisions for any reductions inrSS-20s in
the Asian region, nor (2) restrictions on SRINF missile systems in
the first stage. On linkage to other negotiating fora, the
relationship between the Soviet January 16 proposal and their
acceptance of a separate INF agreement was initially ambiguous.
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However, the Soviets finally stated formally that the INF element
of their proposal was not contingent on prior resolution of
strategic or defense and space issues.
US Proposals
-- US February 24 Proposal
After thorough USG analysis of the new Soviet proposal,
President Reagan authorized the presentation of a new US proposal.
This two-part proposal, in keeping with the commitment in the
Summit Joint Statement to accelerate progress in the Geneva
negotiations, was composed of a reductions scheme and verification
measures and was tabled in Geneva on February 24 and 27, 1986.
0 Reduction Proposals
To achieve global elimination of US and Soviet LRINF
missiles by the end of 1989, the US proposed a concrete plan for
the timing and phasing of LRINF reductions down to zero, with a
concurrent and proportional Soviet drawdown in Europe and Asia, and
alternative approaches to establishing constraints on SRINF
missiles.
-- By the end of 1987, the US and USSR would limit their
LRINF missile deployments in Europe to 140 launchers each,
with the Soviet Union making concurrent proportional
reductions in Asia. In the context of this first phase,
the warhead levels in Europe would be fixed along the
lines proposed by the United States in its November 1,
1985 proposal.
-- Within the following year, both sides would further reduce
the number of LRINF missile launchers remaining in Europe
and Asia by an additional 50 percent.
-- Finally, both sides would move to the total elimination of
this category of weapons by the end of 1989.
-- Associated with this plan, there would be a parallel
series of global LRINF warhead ceilings under which the US
would retain the right to global equality.
Under this plan, Soviet reductions in both Europe and Asia
would be proportional, although the US indicated a readiness to
consider Soviet counterproposals on phasing of reductions. SRINF
limits could be agreed in one of two ways: either equal US and
Soviet SRINF missile ceilings at the December 31, 1985 Soviet level
(roughly 135), or with a freeze of both side's SRINF missiles at
their January 1, 1982 levels (approximately 120 for the USSR and
108 missiles on launchers for the US). This SRINF limit was to be
fully implemented by the end of 1987.
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o Verification measures
As a key element of its February 24, 1986
underscored to the Soviets the need for a comprehenproal,
sivesINF the US
verification regime, as an integral part of an agreement, and
introduced the following elements of such a comprehensive regime:
-- Provision for the use of, and non-interference with,
national technical means (NTM), as well as the requirement
for broadcast of engineering measurements on missile
flights, a ban on encryption, and a ban on concealment
measures that impede verification;
Specification of areas and facilities where treaty-limited
systems would be located and areas where systems would be
prohibited except during announced transit;
-- Reciprocal exchange of specified data in a Memorandum of
Understanding attached to an INF Treaty;
-- Reciprocal updating of specified numerical and technical
data on limited systems, specified associated facilities
and equipment, and related activities;
-- Specialized cooperative measures and procedures to assure
the dismantlement, destruction or conversion of reduced
systems and facilities; and
-- On-site inspection/monitoring.
Summary of Soviet Movement on Major Issues
When negotiations resumed in March 1985, the sides were no
closer together than they had been when talks broke off in November
1983. However, by the end of Round IV in early March 1986, some
areas of convergence between the US and Soviet negotiating
positions were appearing. Substantial differences remained on all
major issues and a great deal of time and effort would be required
to overcome them. Progress was being made, albeit slowly. The
following brief summary describes some important movement in the
Soviet position:
o US-Soviet Equality: With their January 16, 1986
the Soviets for the first time offered to reduce their LRINFosal,
missiles in Europe to zero, if the US did the same, without
demanding compensation for UK/French forces.
o Third Country Forces: The Soviet willingness to accept for
the first time reductions to zero in US/Soviet LRINF missiles in
Europe without demanding residual Soviet missiles to counterbalance
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British and French forces was a major change in the Soviet position
on third country forces. The Soviets did, however, insist that:
Britain and France would have to pledge not to build up their own
nuclear arms, and the US would have to agree not to supply
strategic or "medium-range" missiles to other countries. These
conditions too were unacceptable to the US and its Allies.
o Aircraft: After mid-1985, there was no further discussion
of INF aircraft as part of an initial agreement. Both sides
focused on missiles as the principal priority.
o Linkage: The Soviet position on linkage remained ambiguous.
In this period, the Soviet side emphasized its willingness to
conclude a separate INF agreement.
o Geographic Limits: Under the new Soviet proposal, Soviet
SS-20's in Asia presumably would be covered (in stage two) when the
US and USSR agreed to implement further measures to eliminate their
"medium-range" nuclear arms.
o SRINF: Under the Soviet comprehensive proposal, SRINF
missiles would be frozen in stage one reductions and then
eliminated in stage two as part of a multilateral commitment of all
nuclear powers to destroy all "tactical" nuclear arms having a
range of up to 1000 kilometers. However, the Soviet side was
unwilling to engage in discussions of specific SRINF limitations
integral to a separate INF agreement.
VII. ROUND V (May 8, 1986 - June 26, 1986)
At the beginning of Round V, Soviet Ambassador Obukhov became
the chief START negotiator and was replaced by a long-term member
of the INF Negotiating Group, Ambassador Lem Masterkov. During
this round, the Soviet side introduced a draft agreement, and used
the round to elaborate on it. However, they avoided serious
substantive discussions of the main issues.
Soviet Initiatives
-- Soviet May 15 Draft INF Agreement
Early in the round, the Soviets tabled a draft INF agreement on
medium-range" missiles which embodied the INF portion of their.
January 16 proposal but contained no new elements. The Soviet
Draft INF Agreement was sketchy at best and did not include many of
the more detailed elements of their 1982 Draft Treaty. They
characterized this May 15 draft as a "framework" for an agreement.
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-- Work Groups Proposal
In order to focus attention on their draft agreement, the
Soviets formally proposed on May 22 establishment of a Joint Draft
Text Working Group to begin work on actual Treaty language, based
on their draft. They indicated that questions concerning the
Soviet proposal would be dealt with in the working group. The US
Delegation noted that it could not accept this proposal unless the
US Draft texts and proposals were given equal status. In
particular, the United States insisted that a parallel working
group should deal with verification issues, concurrently with the
group working on the treaty text. The Soviet side rejected this.
US Initiatives
The US delegation emphasized the need for
negotiations to focus on the major issues dividing tthelsides and
attempted to develop areas of common ground. The Soviets were
unwilling to discuss the US proposals of February 24, 1986
insisting instead on discussing their January 16 proposals.
-- Verification Working Group
On June 5, 1986 the US Delegation proposed the creation of
a verification working. group to work in parallel with the treaty
text working group. The Soviets resisted the establishment of two
groups countering that the Joint Draft Text Working Group could
include a subgroup of experts to address verification issues "if
necessary". The Soviets proposed to address verification
sequentially, i.e., only after the US had agreed to the provisions
relating to reduction and limitation obligations. The Soviets'
resisted efforts to work out terms of reference for dealing with
verification, whatever the forum. The Soviet approach was
unacceptable to the US, which continued to insist that verification
must be an integral part of any agreement.
Summary of Central Issues During the Round
o Geographical Scope: The US continued to emphasize that only
reductions and limitations of SS-20s on a global basis would meet
US and Allied security concerns. The Soviets insisted that an INF
agreement should deal only with Europe. The Soviets restated their
proposal to freeze deployments in Asia after Treaty signature (but
refused to discuss freeze levels) and reintroduced their previous
offer dating from 1982-83 that instead of not deploying SS-20s west
of the Urals (approximately 60? East Longitude) they would not
deploy SS-20s west of 80? East Longitude.
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o LRINF Reductions: The Soviets suggested phased reductions
to zero over three to five years with equal reductions of 50
percent the first year. The phased approach and first year outcome
only superficially resembled the US February 24, 1986 Proposal, and
was unacceptable to the US.
o Third Country Systems: The Soviets stressed their view of
the need to prevent the build-up of British and French systems.
They introduced a draft agreed statement which would require a
joint US-USSR understanding that the conclusion of a bilateral
US-Soviet INF agreement depend on the condition that the UK and
France forego increases of their nuclear forces, and indicated that
an INF Treaty would not be ratified by the USSR without such a
formal UK/France obligation. The Soviets also included in the
draft statement an obligation by the US not to transfer strategic
systems to third countries, complementing their draft agreement's
provision prohibiting transfer of "medium-range' systems. The US
rejected the first point as inconsistent with a bilateral US-Soviet
treaty and the second as conflicting with a firmly established US
policy on programs of cooperation with our Allies. Thus, even
though the Soviets had moved away from openly including British and
French systems in a bilateral treaty, they continued to seek limits
and other constraints on those forces as a precondition for a
US-Soviet treaty.
o SRINF: The Soviets proposed to deal with SRINF missiles
outside an INF agreement, either by working out an accord on
systems below 1000 km immediately upon conclusion of an INF
agreement or by invoking a multilateral forum to work on SRINF
systems. The US rejected this as a regressive step in view of the
previous Soviet 1982 willingness to deal with SRINF simultaneously
with constraints on LRINF systems. The Soviets also reintroduced
their offer to remove SCALEBOARD missiles from the GDR and
Czechoslovakia if 'medium-range' missiles in Europe were eliminated.
o Verification: The Soviets again did not put forward
concrete verification provisions comparable to those tabled by the
US and sought to delay discussions of verification until reductions
provisions had been agreed, despite Soviet public claims of
interest in verification. The United States stressed that
verification measures would have to be worked out concurrently with
substantive provisions to ensure our ability to verify those
provisions. Such verification measures would also have to be an
integral part of the treaty.
VIII. PRESIDENT REAGAN'S JULY 25 LETTER
In his letter of July 25, 1986 to General Secretary Gorbachev,
President Reagan again made clear the US preference for the total
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elimination of US and Soviet LRINF missiles on a world-wide basis.
He proposed, if elimination were not possible, a return to the
November 1985 Summit's focus on an interim agreement that could
allow LRINF reductions to begin as soon as possible. This letter
was followed by a series of high level discussions between the US
Secretary of State and the Soviet Foreign minister on INF and on
other arms control issues in August and September.
IX. US-SOVIET ARMS CONTROL EXPERTS MEETINGS (August 11-12,
1986 and September 5-6, 1986)
Between Rounds V and VI, US and Soviet arms control experts met
on August 11-12 in Moscow and again on September 5-6 in Washington
in support of the Geneva negotiations and to
September 19-20 meeting between Secretary Shultrre groun for the
zpand Soviet Foreign
Minister Shevardnadze. These talks served to narrow US and Soviet
differences on INF issues.
At the Experts Meeting of September 5-6, the Soviets moved away
from their January proposal for the early elimination of US and
Soviet LRINF missiles back in the direction of an interim approach
which would provide for a finite level of US and Soviet systems in
Europe prior to complete elimination. The Soviets red
limiting the total number of warheads on LRINF missilesodeployed in
Europe to 100 on each side, limiting Soviet LRINF deployments in
Asia to an unspecified level and allowing the US to deploy in the
continental US (not including Alaska) a number of LRINF missiles
equal to the number of Soviet warheads on LRINF missiles deployed
in Asia. The Soviets also proposed that the LRINF missile systems
permitted in Europe be limited to GLCMs and SS-20s only. They
refused to agree to reductions on SS-20s in Asia, or to specify
existing levels in Asia, although the Soviets agreed that, in the
context of their proposed European limits, they would "limit" the
number of warheads on their LRINF missiles deployed in Asia.
Additionally, they argued that the SRINF issue could be dealt with
after the LRINF question was settled. The Soviets did not raise
their past demands for limits on British and French systems or on
their modernization.
The US indicated a readiness to accept as an interim agreement
a ceiling of 100 LRINF missile warheads in Europe, provided that
Soviets also agreed to a limit of 100 warheads or less outside of
Europe (a global ceiling of 200 warheads).
the US indicated that it could also accept anoa such an ogfenmegt,
the US to deployment on US territory of a number of awarheadsequal
to the number of Soviet LRINF missile warheads outside of Europe.
The US made clear, however, it would not forego its right to deploy
LRINF systems in Alaska. Moreover, while the US was prepared to
discuss the future mix between P-IIs and GLCMs, P-IIs would have to
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be part of any residual force. The US also expressed preference
for an interim INF agreement which would remain in effect until
superseded by an agreement on further reductions and would not be a
'temporary" measure of short duration as the Soviets proposed.
Thus, although the Soviets seemed to be accepting our basic
structure for an equal global LRINF missile warhead ceiling with
equality in Europe, important disagreements continued to separate
the sides regarding SRINF, reductions of Asian SS-20s, the Pershing
II-GLCM mix, verification, and the duration of an agreement.
X. ROUND VI (September 18, 1986 - November 12, 1986)
On September 18, the opening day of Round VI, the United States
tabled in Geneva a new proposal that incorporated the key elements
of the Moscow and Washington experts meetings the previous summer.
A week later the Soviets tabled proposals reflecting their
suggestions at these experts talks. The positions set forth by
both sides reflected a number of areas of convergence and narrowed
differences.
During the round, President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev held their historic meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland (Oct.
10-12, 1986) while the INF negotiations in Geneva carried on.
Their discussions in Reykjavik lent the negotiations a new
direction and impetus.
Following Reykjavik, the US tabled in Geneva proposals
incorporating the areas of agreement discussed in Reykjavik. The
Soviet negotiators also tabled their view on what was achieved at
Reykjavik. However, the Soviets again linked an INF agreement to
resolution of strategic defense issues.
Pre-Reykjavik Developments (September 18 - October 11, 1986)
-- US Initiatives
At the beginning of the Round the US Delegation made clear that
it could accept an interim agreement providing for 100 LRINF
missile warheads on each side in Europe, if the Soviets agreed
concurrently to reduce to 100 LRINF missile warheads or less in
Asia, with a US right to match these deployments on its territory.
-- Soviet Initiatives
On September 25, the Soviets formally temporary" INF accord. The Soviets acceptedothe ied ni"intr
pleeofm,
equality in US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe and
globally -- a significant step beyond their longstanding position
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-- but were reluctant to accept the concept of global limits. They
abandoned their demands for a freeze on British and French nuclear
forces and for restricting long-standing US-Allied programs of
cooperation in strategic systems, although they continued to seek
to restrict the transfer of "medium-range" systems.
-- Summary of Key Issues
Prior to the Reykjavik meeting between President Reagan and
General Secretary Gorbachev, the Soviet side had taken tentative
but significant steps of convergence toward key elements in the US
position, including movement toward the US-proposed conditions of
an interim INF agreement specifying equal LRINF missile warhead
ceilings on each side in Europe and global LRINF limits. For
example, by the end of Round V in June, the Soviet side: had moved
away from including British and French systems in a bilateral
treaty although it hedged by insisting on third country
preconditions for a treaty; and had proposed a phased reduction of
LRINF missiles in Europe down to 50 per cent at the end of one
year
to zero over three to five years, with some similarity to ther
US February 24 proposal. Early in Round Vi, the Soviet side
formally proposed an "interim, temporary' INF accord with finite
equal limits of 100 US and Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe,
and for the first time accepted the principle of equality in US and
Soviet LRINF missile warheads in Europe and globally.
However, key issues remained unresolved prior to the October
Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik, including: (1) Soviet
refusal to reduce SS-20s in Asia, (2) Soviet unwillingness to deal
concurrently with SRINF missiles, and (3) Soviet insistence on
eliminating all US P-IIs in Europe as part of any interim accord.
The sides also were divided on the issue of duration, with the
Soviets seeking a specified duration while the US argued for an
agreement that would remain in force until superseded by a
subsequent reductions agreement. Moreover, despite a general
Soviet commitment to deal with verification, Soviet negotiator did
little work on this subject.
XI. THE REAGAN-GORBACHEV MEETING IN REYKJAVIK (October 11-12,
1986)
President Reagan agreed to General Secretary Gorbachev's
request for a special meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland on October
11-12 to discuss the entire US-Soviet agenda. During two days of
intense discussions, significant progress was achieved on INF.
This progress helped move the negotiations forward on substantive
issues. However, the Soviets relinked INF with Defense and Space
and made demands of the United States that would cripple SDI. They
thus created an artificial barrier that took some months to clear
away.
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On INF, agreement in principle was reached at Reykjavik to
.allow equal global ceilings of 100 LRINF missile warheads on each
side, none of which could be deployed in Europe. The Soviets thus
agreed to reduce their total SS-20 force to a level of 100 warheads
(i.e., 33 missiles) and to remove all SS-20s from Europe.
The Soviets offered to freeze their SRINF missile systems
pending negotiation of reductions, but conditioned this on
"freezing" US SRINF at their current level of zero.
The Soviets also agreed in principle to some general
verification measures. These included: (1) a comprehensive and
accurate exchange of data, both prior to reductions and thereafter;
(2) on-site observation of elimination down to agreed levels; and
(3) effective monitoring of the remaining INF missile system
inventories and associated facilities, including on-site
inspection.
At Reykjavik, it was also understood that other provisions
would have to be added to form the basis for a complete INF
agreement. Also at Reykjavik the Soviets did not mention the
inclusion of British and French nuclear systems or US aircraft in
Europe in an INF agreement, thus conclusively removing these
nuclear forces from the negotiating table.
In the end, however, the Soviet Union held all progress on INF
hostage to an unjustifiable demand to restrict strategic defense
research to laboratories. This demand had no merit in its own
right and bore no relation to the INF negotiations, as the Soviets
had previously acknowledged. The Soviets almost certainly saw it
as a means of bringing public pressure to bear on the United States.
XII. ROUND VI DEVELOPMENTS POST-REYKJAVIK (October 13 -
November 12, 1986)
-- US Initiative
On October 23, 1986, the US set forth at the negotiating table
in Geneva positions based on our understanding of what had been
achieved in Reykjavik in the INF area and we outlined additional
elements to be included in an interim INF agreement, with zero US
and Soviet LRINF remaining our ultimate objective.
The US Delegation noted the following elements as mutually
agreed at Reykjavik:
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o A LRINF missile ceiling of 100 warheads on each side, with none
in Europe, and 100 warheads on each side outside of Europe,
stationed in Soviet Asia and the United States respectively;
o Equal constraints on US and Soviet SRINF missiles in an INF
agreement and early follow-on negotiations on SRINF; and
o Specific verification measures including comprehensive
exchanges of data before and after an INF agreement, on-site
inspection of reductions to agreed levels, and effective
monitoring of remaining missile systems and associated
facilities, including on-site inspection.
In addition, the US Delegation proposed the following
provisions designed to flesh out an INF agreement:
o Phased reductions to agreed levels to be completed by the end
of 1991;
o With regard to SRINF missile constraints, the US was prepared
to agree to a ceiling on US and Soviet SRINF missile systems of
both sides at the current Soviet level on a global basis. This
constraint, accompanied by appropriate qualitative constraints,
would apply to SRINF missile systems with a range equal to or
greater than the Soviet SS-23 but less than or equal to the
Soviet SS-12 SCALEBOARD, along with a ban on systems with
ranges between that of the SCALEBOARD and the US Pershing II, a
LRINF missile. Negotiations on reductions of SRINF missile
systems were to begin within six months after an initial INF
agreement was reached.
o Any interim INF agreement would have to be of unlimited
duration and remain in effect until replaced by a subsequent
agreement to eliminate LRINF missiles entirely.
-- Soviet Initiative
The Soviet Union tabled a package proposal based on Reykjavik
on November 7 at the Joint NST Plenary Meeting in Geneva. The
"medium-range" INF aspects of this package were tabled in the INF
Negotiating Group on November 12. The Soviet INF proposals were
made up of the following elements:
o 'Medium-range' missiles in Europe would be eliminated within a
period of up to five years under procedures and terms to be
mutually agreed upon.
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o Missiles with a range of less than 1000 kilometers deployed in
Europe would be frozen at the January 1, 1987 level for each
side (leaving the US with zero and the Soviets with
approximately 135, a sizeable force) with further questions to
be resolved in follow-on negotiations.
o The USSR would reduce its remaining LRINF missiles in Soviet
Asia to 100 warheads and would undertake to deploy the
remaining missiles in such a way that they could not hit
targets on US territory, including in Alaska, based on Soviet
range definitions for the SS-20s. The US would have to agree
to deploy its remaining 100 LRINF missile warheads in the US,
but not including Alaska.
o Verification would be carried out in the same way as for
strategic offensive arms, taking into account the specific
characteristics of "medium-range" missiles and the terms for
their elimination or reduction.
XIII. INTERIM SESSION OF INTENSIVE LIMITED COMPOSITION MEETINGS
(December 2-5, 1986)
As agreed before the end of Round VI, US and Soviet NST
Negotiators returned to Geneva December 2-5 for an interim session
of intensive limited-composition meetings. The US objective at
these meetings was to gain a clearer idea of where the US and USSR
agreed and disagreed on key issues in all three negotiating
groups. The December session was attended by the three US
Negotiators (Ambassadors Kampelman, Glitman and Lehman) and by
their Soviet counterparts (Ambassadors Karpov, Masterkov, and
Obukhov) and consisted of an intensive schedule of fourteen
meetings and informal contracts.
Unfortunately, the Soviet purpose at the meetings apparently
was to reinforce a broader Soviet public affairs strategy designed
to blame lack of movement on US "intransigence" on SDI and to
obtain US agreement to negotiate on the basis of the Soviet
November 7 proposals.
On INF the Soviets were not prepared to engage in serious,
substantive discussion. Instead they took a polemical line, which
they repeated publicly, accusing the US of creating new obstacles
in INF inter alia by insisting on the right to build up, rather
than freeze, SRINF missiles and by retaining the right to deploy
LRINF missiles in Alaska from where they could reach Soviet
territory.
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The US Pressed the Soviets at these meetings to separate (or
'de-link") progress on INF from progress in other areas and to
negotiate seriously on a separate INF agreement.
Summary of Basic INF Issues
Despite the slow-down in the December talks, Reykjavik had
moved the sides significantly closer on a number of basic INF
issues by year's end. A brief summary of areas of convergence and
outstanding differences follows:
o LRINF: There was agreement on the limits of 100 LRINF missile
warheads, with zero in Europe and the permitted residuals of 100 on
each side to be confined respectively to Soviet Asia and US
territory. However, the Soviets insisted on prohibiting
deployments in Alaska.
o Phasinn : Agreement existed that the zero in Europe should be
reached within five years, that is, by 1991, although the Soviets
following Reykjavik refused to specify that Asian reductions would
take place in the same time frame and in the same agreement.
o SRINF: Agreement was reached that there would be constraints on
SRINF missiles in an initial INF agreement. However, the Soviets
wanted to freeze US SRINF at zero while the US insisted on the
right to match Soviet levels. The Soviets also refused to clarify
which missiles they would constrain and limited their SRINF offer
to Europe only.
o Verification: The Soviets indicated that they agreed on the
basic principles of verification, but were reluctant to discuss
details, including details of on-site observation of the
elimination of missiles.
o Linkage: Soviet linkage of
solution of problems in START andoDefense nanINF to d.Space,l eoverall
specially
crippling constraints on SDI, remained a major obstacle, despite
some indications that they were prepared to waive linkage.
XIV. ROUND VII (January 15, 1987 to March 6, 1987; Extended to
March 26, 1987)
US Initiatives
To build upon the common ground reached at Reykjavik, President
Reagan instructed the US Delegation to table a Draft INF Treaty
during Round VII. Meanwhile, General Secretary Gorbachev's
February 28, 1987 TASS statement signalled Soviet willingness to
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The round was extended three weeks to March 26 to permit fuller
discussion of the US Draft. During this period the Soviets agreed
to a new working group format, including parallel work on
verification. The Soviets asked extensive
Draft Treaty, but revealed almost nothing abouttthesspecificseofS
their own position and were unprepared to engage in substantive
drafting of an INF Treaty.
US Verification Provisions
After lengthy consultations with the Allies, the United States
tabled specific verification provisions separately on March 12,
1987:
o Identification of areas and facilities where treaty-limited
stemsrcould be located and prohibition against having them
s
elewhe;
o Reciprocal comprehensive exchanges of specified data on
treaty-limited systems, support facilities and equipment;
o Reciprocal updating of this data;
? Specialized
procedures for destruction, dismantlement and
conversion of long-range INF missile systems, including on-site
inspection;
o Short notice on-site inspection and continuous monitoring of
facilities declared to the other side in the data exchanges, as
well as short notice inspections of suspect sites; and
o Provisions for the use of and non-interference with National
Technical Means (NTM), a requirement for broadcast of
engineering measurements on flight tests, a ban on encryption
and a ban on concealment measures that impede monitoring by NTM.
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o Soviet longer-range "operational-tactical missiles" (i.e.
SCALEBOARD) would be withdrawn to the USSR from their forward
deployed location in the GDR and Czechoslovakia once an INF
agreement is reached, and;
o Separate negotiations would be opened "immediately" on other
"operational-tactical" missiles (which were not further
defined) with a view to their reduction and elimination.
The Soviet offer made at Reykjavik to constrain SRINF missiles
at 1987 levels (i.e., a monopoly for the Soviet Union) was not a
part of the new proposal. Thus Gorbachev's February 28 proposal
also represented a step backward from Reykjavik in that it sought
to reverse the US-Soviet Agreement which had existed in the 1981-83
INF negotiations and which, after a year and a half hiatus, had
been reaffirmed at Reykjavik, namely that constraints on
shorter-range missiles must form an integral part of an initial INF
Agreement. Gorbachev's new approach would have opened a path for
the Soviet side to undermine the effectiveness of an INF agreement
by creating the opportunity to increase their SRINF missiles which,
depending on their range and locations, could reach many of the
targets covered by Soviet SS-20s.
US Draft Treaty of March 4, 1987
On March 4, 1987, the US tabled its Draft Interim INF Treaty.
This draft had been presented in outline form to the Allies on
February 6 and reflected the continuing and close US-Allied
consultations on INF. While incorporating the INF agreements
reached at Reykjavik, it also sought to advance the negotiations,
particularly in the area of verification. The Treaty contained
specific obligations with respect to the verification of an
agreement and foreshadowed additional treaty documents: A
Memorandum of Understanding on Data, and Protocols on Inspection
and Elimination of Missile Systems. Its essential provisions were:
o Reduction to 100 LRINF missile warheads globally, with none in
Europe, and the remaining 100 to be deployed in Soviet.Asia and
on US Territory.
o Constraints on SRINF missile systems with a US right to
equality at the present Soviet global level of SRINF missiles,
and
o Specific obligations for a detailed and effective verification
regime.
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sign a separate agreement on INF, which President Reagan
characterized as removing 'a serious obstacle to progress toward
INF.reductions.'
The tabling of the US Draft INF Treaty was a significant.
milestone. It permitted the two sides to get down to the task of
translating the general areas of agreement on INF into the more
precise language of treaty commitments based on a US framework.
Soviet Initiative
The Soviets entered the round in January with an agenda that
reflected a continuing effort to link INF with other issues. They
sought to engage the US in drafting the common text of a framework
INF agreement, which, together with similar documents on START and
Defense and Space issues, was intended to form the overall package
solution sought by the Soviets. During the period before the TASS
statement on February 28, the Soviets resisted answering US
questions about the Soviet position and attempted to defer
discussions of key details until after a framework agreement was
achieved. Nonetheless, persistent US probing resulted in further.
clarification of a number of areas of agreement and disagreement.
Gorbachev's February 28 TASS Statement
In the TASS statement of February 28, 1987, General Secretary
Gorbachev announced willingness to sign a separate agreement to
eliminate Soviet and American Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces in
Europe within five years, thus ending Soviet insistence that these
missiles be considered part of a comprehensive arms control
package.
This was at least the fourth time that the Soviets had "linked"
or "delinked" INF from other issues: In March 1985, the Soviets
created the original linkage which they dropped formally at the
Geneva Summit in November, and then reestablished at Reykjavik. The
Gorbachev statement of February delinked INF for the final time.
After that the Soviets worked toward a separate INF agreement, as
the US had proposed all along.
On the topic of SRINF, Gorbachev also proposed that:
o SRINF should be taken out of the current negotiations, "opening
the way for speedy conclusion of an agreement exclusively on
medium-range missiles" -- a step back from his offer at
Reykjavik;
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XV. SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MEETING IN MOSCOW (April 13-16, 1987)
During a three day meeting between Secretary Shultz and Soviet
Foreign Minister Shevardnadze in Moscow on April 13-16, 1987, the
Soviets elaborated on the SRINF position outline in General
Secretary Gorbachev's Prague Speech and his February 28 statement.
Specifically, on SRINF, the Soviets:
o indicated they would accept a reference to SRINF missiles in an
initial INF Treaty, but said they still wished to deal with
SRINF in a separate negotiation from an initial LRINF agreement;
o stated that they would withdraw and destroy the Soviet SRINF
missile systems stationed in East Germany and Czechoslovakia
after an initial INF agreement was reached and proposed that
SRINF missiles be reduced to zero in Europe within one year;
and
o indicated that their position in separate SRINF negotiations
would be SRINF elimination, at least in Europe, and the goal of
reaching agreement on global equality. The Soviets suggested
these negotiations would include SS-12s (SCALEBOARDs) and
SS-23s, cover the range band between 500 and 1,000 km, and be
on a global basis. However the Soviets did not make clear
whether they were prepared to recognize the right to US
equality during any SRINF negotiations.
An "Expert Group" also met on INF issues during the Moscow
visit. It reviewed the status of verification issues which were
identified as a priority area for the INF negotiations. The US
made clear that resolution of difficult verification issues would
be simplified and facilitated if the Soviets would agree to
eliminate all the remaining capability for 100 LRINF missile
warheads which they insisted on retaining in an initial INF
Agreement. While making clear that it would stand by the Reykjavik
formula, the US again stated in Moscow, as it had all along in
Geneva, that a global zero for LRINF remained its preferred outcome.
The Soviets also repeated an offer made by General Secretary
Gorbachev in Prague to include weapon systems with ranges below 500
kilometers as part of negotiations on conventional forces in
Europe. The United States was skeptical of this proposal because
we have avoided linking nuclear and conventional forces in one
negotiating forum and because the.Soviet proposal could have
generated pressure for a "denuclearized" Europe in which Soviet
conventional forces would have retained their superiority. The two
sides exchanged views on the issue of P-II to P-IB conversion, but
there was no narrowing of differences on this issue.
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After the Moscow Meeting, the United States undertook
consultations with its Allies on options for resolving the SRINF
issue in keeping with NATO's basic approach. These consultations
considered how to implement the principle of US-Soviet equality,
which was the centerpiece of the US position. The main choices
were to move toward NATO deployments of SRINF missile systems, or
to press for their complete elimination. (The possibility of
deferring the SRINF question for subsequent negotiations was not
considered to be in the US or NATO interest.) These consultations
took several months of intense discussions both within the alliance
and within individual countries. The final decision was reached by
the North Atlantic Council (NAC) Ministerial which met at Reykjavik
in June, where NATO proposed the complete elimination of the SRINF
missile systems of the United States and the USSR on a global
basis.
XVI. ROUND VIII (April 23, 1987 - December 7, 1987)
Round VIII was the concluding negotiating session. This round
can be viewed as having two distinct phases. The first phase was
based on the Reykjavik Summit formula of zero LRINF missile systems
in Europe with a residual 100 LRINF warheads on each side, deployed
in Soviet Asia and on US territory respectively. The second phase
came about when the Soviet side accepted the US proposal for zero
US-Soviet LRINF globally and zero US-Soviet SRINF globally -- the
"double global zero' (DGZ) formula. This US proposal followed
intensive consultations with the Allies between April and June and
the NAC Ministerial at Reykjavik on June 12. The Soviets formally
accepted this proposal in Geneva on July 23 -- after Gorbachev's
published interview in an Indonesian newspaper on July 22.
DGZ would require US and Soviet reductions of both LRINF and
SRINF missile systems (i.e., all their ground-launched INF missiles
with a range between 500 and 5500 km) to zero on a global basis.
Hence, the draft treaty/protocol texts prepared before or during
the first phase of Round VIII had to be revised to take DGZ into
account during phase two of Round VIII. Round VIII became
correspondingly intense, punctuated by high-level meetings between
Secretary Shultz and Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, and between
Ambassadors Kampelman and Vorontsov, the heads of their respective
NST delegations.
Phase One of Round VIII -- Implementing Reykjavik Accord
The Round began in Geneva on April 23. President Reagan called
on the Soviets to speed progress in the INF negotiation by
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responding to the US verification proposals. He reiterated that a
zero LRINF outcome remained the preferred solution for the US and
its allies, and that Soviet agreement to such an outcome would
facilitate verification of the treaty provisions. The principal US
objective at the start of this round was to obtain Soviet agreement
to begin substantive joint drafting of an INF treaty incorporating
what had been agreed at Reykjavik and in Round VII.
At the outset of the round, both delegations agreed to leave
the closing date of the round open since there were many issues and
details to work out. General V.I. Medvedev, a long-time member of
the Soviet INF Delegation, replaced Ambassador Lem Masterkov as
chief Soviet INF negotiator. On April 27, shortly after the round
began, the Soviets tabled their Draft INF Treaty, which was
presented in two parts -- a basic treaty with a structure similar
to the US March 4 draft, and a lengthy annex with draft agreed
statements and common understandings.
Tabling of Soviet Draft INF Treaty (April 27, 1987)
The Soviet Draft'Treaty which was tabled April 27 included many
of the points in the US Draft. The principal provisions of the
Soviet Draft were:
o LRINF: the Soviet Draft reflected the Reykjavik formula, but
retained a 100 warhead ceiling without providing for follow-on
LRINF negotiations. It prohibited stationing residual INF
missiles within range of the other's territory, i.e.,
precluding the US from deploying its LRINF in Alaska. It
banned new types of LRINF missiles, included reductions and
limitations on non-deployed missiles and launchers, and
reinstated the offer that Soviet residual warheads in Asia
would not be deployed closer to Europe than 80 degrees East
longitude.
o Phasing: The Soviet Draft Treaty proposed reductions in two
phases, with 50 percent reductions in a first three-year phase,
and reduction of the remainder (to zero LRINF missiles in
Europe and 100 residual LRINF warheads outside Europe), in the
second, two-year phase. The Soviet position called for US
reductions to occur concurrently in the first stage. (See
note, infra.)
o Elimination: the Soviet draft accepted dismantlement and
destruction, but not conversion, as methods of elimination.
The US approach at this stage of the negotiations (i.e., before
the Soviets had agreed to global zero LRINF or to inclusion of
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global zero SRINF in the initial INF agreement) would have
permitted conversion within certain limits as a method of
elimination. It would have allowed the sides to convert
missile components for LRINF systems for use in non-LRINF
systems or in non-INF systems of shorter range (i.e.,
non-strategic systems), subject to agreed verification
procedures.
o SRINF: SRINF was mentioned only in a separate prepared
statement, not in the Treaty text itself. In a change from the
Gorbachev proposal in Moscow, the Soviet SRINF
for equal global limits, with zero in Europe forrbopos called
othasides.
The SS-12 SCALEBOARD and SS-23 were both included, with the
range floor set at 500 kilometers and reductions to be achieved
within one year. The Soviet SRINF proposal did not exclude
third country systems explicitly.
o FRG Pershing IA's: In a major shift, the Soviet draft Treaty
proposed p for the first time including US-owned warheads for the
West German P-IAs in an INF agreement, a position which had not
been raised in the Moscow Ministerial and which was immediately
rejected by the United States as inappropriate for inclusion in
a bilateral US-Soviet Treaty and incompatible with existing
US-Allied programs of cooperation.
o Definitions: the Soviet draft definition of INF missiles to be
limited omitted any distinction between nuclear and
conventional, and thus applied to all ground-launched missiles
having a range between 500 and 5500 km.
o Verification: The Soviet draft verification regime generally
followed the structure of the US proposal. For example, it
included in some form most of the measures proposed by the
United States except on-site inspection (OSI) at suspect sites
or of baseline data. The Soviet verification approach was less
specific than the US proposal in some areas, and in a few
places appeared more intrusive (e.g., the Soviet proposal
included mandatory OSI of training sites and test ranges, OSI
of US military bases in third countries, and inspection of
private as well as manufacturing plants owned or under contract
to the government). At this stage, the Soviets left many
details for an Inspection Protocol, which they did not provide.
Note on Phasing:
Given the Soviet LRINF missile
and globally, the US basin Preponderance LRINF in Europe
P g proposal called for early Soviet
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reductions down to the US level in order to achieve US-Soviet
equality as soon as possible. In view of the assumption that under
an INF agreement 100 LRINF warheads would be permitted both
parties, the US also wished to preserve the right to withdraw LRINF
missiles from Europe to US territory, rather than destroy those
systems, so that global equality could be reached during the
reduction process. This meant the first US systems withdrawn would
not necessarily be destroyed, though they no longer would be in
Europe.
The Soviets sought U$ agreement to a percentage reductions
process, and to begin US reductions in the first phase of the
reductions period -- concurrently with Soviet reductions., Thus,
equal levels would only .be achieved at the end of the reductions
period, a situation that would have maintained the global disparity
during the reductions process. The Soviets also sought destruction
of US systems withdrawn from Europe, arguing that the US otherwise
would be engaged in a buildup of LRINF on its territory.
In addition, differences existed on the duration and number of
phases, and the overall duration of reductions. The US preferred
three.years for the overall duration, reductions in two or three
phases, and achievement of US-Soviet equality at the end of the
first phase. The Soviet position called for a five
with 50 per cent reductions by both year period
phase and reductions to zero in Europe rinea two-yearesecond phase,
and the requirement that the US eliminate (destroy) at least some
missiles from the very beginning of the reductions process.
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Tabling of US Draft Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data (Ma
7, 1987)
On May 7, the United States tabled a draft MOU on Data, noting
that it was agreed at Reykjavik to include this document as an
integral part of the treaty, and that subsequent US-Soviet
agreement called for a comprehensive and accurate exchange of data
both prior to reductions and thereafter. This MOU provided for an
extensive exchange on quantitative and qualitative information
about the missile systems subject to the Treaty. It was
unprecedented in scope and detail in nuclear arms treaties.
Agreement on a US-Soviet Joint INF Draft Text (June 1, 1987)
On June 1, the US and Soviet delegations agreed on an initial,
heavily bracketed Joint Draft Text (JDT) of the treaty articles.
While containing the positions of both sides, the structure
essentially paralleled that of the US Draft Treaty tabled on March
4. The common language in portions of this initial JDT provided a
basis for clarifying and helping to resolve the remaining INF
issues. Substantial differences still remained on the following
key points:
OVerification: The Soviets asked questions about the proposed
US approach, including on-site inspection, but provided little
to explain their own approach.
During this period, in addition to the several treaty articles
on verification and the Memorandum of Understanding on Data,
the US tabled a Protocol on Destruction, Dismantlement or
Conversion. By contrast, the Soviets presented only a single
article containing the basic elements of their verification
approach and individual paragraphs setting forth other
provisions. The Soviet language suggested areas of convergence
with the United States, particularly in regard to baseline
inspection and inspection of destruction and dismantlement.
However, the Soviet position was sketchy, and the Soviet side
was unable to explain key elements of its position.
At the same time, the Soviets played a different tune publicly,
and claimed that their verification approach was more demanding
and intrusive than the US approach because it included the
right to inspect any US military base or manufacturing plant
anywhere.
A key difference at this stage was over the US preference for
distinct quotas for different types of inspections. The Soviet
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side proposed a single quota for all inspections at declared
facilities. The US view was that baseline inspection and
inspection of the process of elimination should not be
restricted by quota, whereas the Soviet position on these
issues was undeveloped. In addition, the sides differed
radically on inspections of suspect sites. The United States
called for mandatory inspections (subject to a quota) of all
facilities owned.or operated by the parties on their
territories or that of basing countries where LRINF missiles
might be located. The Soviet Union demanded inspection rights
to US military bases in third countries everywhere (not merely
in the European INF "basing countries') and to any site in
deployment areas in the INF basing countries (whether or not
that site was owned or operated by the United States).
o SRINF: As noted earlier, the United States was carrying out
intensive consultations with its Allies about how to respond to
Soviet SRINF proposals (see section above on Soviet tabling of
draft treaty on April 27). At the drafting level, the Soviet
side did accept the concept of an article on SRINF in the
Treaty. The US continued to make clear to the Soviets that the
belated Soviet effort to include the FRG's Pershing IA SRINF
missile systems was unacceptable. The US categorically
rejected bringing a longstanding program of cooperation into a
bilateral US-Soviet agreement.
o LRINF: The United States continued to stress that Soviet
agreement to eliminate the systems capable of carrying the
final 100 LRINF missile warheads on either side would have a
major positive impact on the INF negotiations by making the
verification requirements simpler, because monitoring INF
activity (or the lack thereof) under a treaty banning LRINF
missiles would be simpler than monitoring under the provisions
of a treaty which allowed each side to retain some missiles.
o Other Issues: Other differences remaining at this stage
included phasing of reductions, conversion as a US method of
elimination, basing of missiles within range of the other's
territory, new types, and non-circumvention.
US SRINF Proposal
The US consultations with allies on SRINF, begun after the
Moscow Ministerial in April, were concluded in June. On June 15,
President Reagan announced that the US would support the
elimination of US and Soviet shorter-range INF (SRINF) missile
systems, provided that elimination was global, bilateral,
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effectively verifiable, an integral part of an INF agreement and
included the Soviet SS-12 SCALEBOARD and SS-23 missile systems. On
June 16, 1987 the US formally made this new proposal at the INF
talks in Geneva.
As noted, prior to tabling its SRINF proposal, the US had
carried out intensive consultation with its allies. The results of
this consultation were reflected in the concluding communique of
the NATO Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Reykjavik, Iceland on June
12, 1987, in which our Allies expressed support for the global and
effectively verifiable elimination of all US and Soviet SRINF
missiles with a range of 500 to 1,000 kilometers as an integral
part of an INF agreement. The communique also called on the Soviet
Union to drop its demand to retain a portion of its SS-20 LRINF
missile capability and reiterated the wish to see all INF missiles
eliminated in accordance with NATO's long-standing objective. The
allies also set certain priorities in other arms control areas,
including the establishment of a 'conventional balance in Europe and
the global elimination of chemical weapons.
Phase Two of Round VIII - Double Global Zero
Glitman-Obukhov/Chervov Conversations on DGZ
Prior to July 22, 1987, there were informal discussions in
Geneva between Ambassador Glitman and Ambassador Obukhov and
subsequently between Ambassador Glitman and General Chervov of the
Soviet Ministry of Defense on the possibility of a 'double global
zero' solution encompassing both LRINF and SRINF missiles.
Following consultations with Washington, Ambassador Glitman queried
Ambassador Obukhov on June 1 about the possibility of reaching a
global zero. Obukhov said he would later so indicate if this
result was possible. While visiting Geneva on June 17, General
Chervov, during a luncheon attended by Obukhov and others, told
Ambassador Glitman that he would be willing, on an informal basis,
to carry back to Moscow a proposal under which the Soviet Union
would accept global zero for both LRINF and SRINF missile systems
if the US side would agree to destroy and not to convert LRINF and
SRINF missiles and launchers.
After consulting with Washington, Ambassador Glitman was
authorized to provide an informal and unofficial. but
response to the Chervov su Positive
informed the Soviet side that sifothe Soviets 20, osedselimination
of all US and Soviet LRINF and SRINF missile systems, the US would
consider destruction or dismantlement of US LRINF and SRINF
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systems, no conversion of missiles or launchers, and no transfer of
any existing US missiles or launchers to any third party. There
would then be no US or Soviet INF missiles in the 500 to 5,500 km.
range. The US viewed a ban on production of such US and Soviet
systems as the next logical step
Gorbachev's Acceptance of Double Global Zero (July 22, 1987)
Negotiations entered a new phase when Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev accepted the goal enunciated by President Reagan in
November 1981 for the elimination of the entire class.of LRINF
missile systems. In a lengthy interview in the Indonesian
newspaper Merdeka carried in TASS, Soviet General Secretary
Gorbachev indicated that the Soviets were willing to agree to a
'double global zero" treaty to eliminate longer-range and
shorter-range INF missiles, in effect accepting the US position to
eliminate US and Soviet LRINF and SRINF missiles globally.
On July 23, Soviet negotiators at the NST negotiation in Geneva
confirmed this position. At the same time, the Soviets made clear
both in Moscow and Geneva that a number of what they termed
'artificial obstacles" to an INF agreement would have to be removed:
systems to be eliminated could not be converted (e.g.,
P-II to P-IB or GLCM to SLCM);
0 warheads would have to be eliminated, including US
warheads for FRG Pershing IAs as well as for Pershing Its
and GLCMs;
o there would be a ban on new types;
o phased reduction procedures would have to reflect. equal
percentages for both sides; and
o verification procedures would have to be modified.
US Position on Gorbachev's Double Global Zero Statement
(July 28, 1
Responding. quickly to the suggestion in Gorbachev's interview,
President Reagan announced on July 27 the tabling in Geneva the
following day of a proposal for implementing the double global zero
outcome. The key elements of the US proposal consisted of:
o global elimination of US and Soviet LRINF missiles;
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global elimination of US and Soviet SRINF missiles;
destruction of missiles and launchers which are subject to
elimination;
o no conversion of INF missiles and launchers to other types
of weapons systems;
o no transfer of existing US and Soviet INF missiles and
launchers to any third party; and
o strict and effective verification provisions.
During discussion of its proposal the US again made clear that,
with respect to the FRG P-IA missile force, the US would not
negotiate about the systems of its allies or bilateral programs of
cooperation and would continue the'established program of
cooperation with the FRG.
Double Global Zero Negotiations:
Soviet acceptance of the double global zero formula on July 22
was a major milestone. Coupled with a ban on production of INF
missiles, it meant that the most important issues left to be
negotiated were: (1) the implementation of the treaty, e.g., the
phasing of reductions; (2) provisions for an effective verification
regime, to aid in ensuring compliance with the terms of a treaty;
(3) the data base; and (4) methods of elimination of LRINF and
SRINF missile systems and their elements. Soviet agreement to the
DGZ formula made it possible for the United States to simplify
verification provisions in the revised draft treaty was tabled on September 14, 1987. Agreement on DGZ alsoofurthert
increased the tempo of negotiations,.which had already accelerated
as the Soviets began to unveil their verification position between
June 16 and July 2. It therefore became
possible
completion of the treaty before the end of 1987. to foresee
US Warheads on West German Pershing IA Missiles
Gorbachev's July 22 announcement accepting DGZ had also
proposed elimination of the West German Pershing IA missile force
and associated US warheads. The United States rejected this
element of the Soviet proposal, making clear that our Allies'
forces are not subject to a bilateral US-Soviet treaty.
Chancellor Kohl announced on August 26 that by decision of the
FRG government, West Germany would forego modernization and
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dismantle its Pershing missile force, provided a US-Soviet INF
agreement based on DGZ was fully implemented.
XVII. SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MINISTERIAL IN WASHINGTON (September
15-17, 1987)
At the conclusion of the Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in
Washington of September 15-17, the United States and USSR announced
agreement in principle to conclude a treaty for the global
elimination of US and Soviet INF missiles. They agreed the treaty
should be ready for signing in the fall, and that the date for a
summit to sign the treaty should be set at the next
Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow, scheduled for October.
Agreement also was reached on procedures for the elimination of
INF missile front sections, specifically, that before US and Soviet
INF missiles are eliminated, nuclear warhead devices and guidance
elements will be removed from the front sections, while the
remainder of the front section structure would then be eliminated
under agreed procedures.
It further was agreed, in view of the FRG decision in August to
eliminate its P-IA missile force, that once the US program of
cooperation with the FRG had ended by decision of the FRG
government the US would remove its reentry vehicles (RVs)
associated with FRG missiles, and these would be eliminated
according to the same procedures as those for eliminating missile
front sections in the treaty. The United States made it clear that
the US-Soviet bilateral agreement concerning the disposition of US
reentry vehicles does not apply to third country forces nor affect
existing US programs of cooperation with allies.
XVIII. SHULTZ-SHEVARDNADZE MINISTERIAL IN MOSCOW (October 22-23,
1987)
The Shultz-Shevardnadze meeting in Moscow on October 22-23 made
progress on a series of detailed issues, many related to the
specific procedures for implementing the agreement. The following
week in Geneva, the Soviets agreed to exchange data under the MOU,
and to eliminate all SS-5s; the US agreed to eliminate its P-IAs
(none of which was currently deployed).
Agreement was reached on the time frame for the elimination of
intermediate-range missiles (IRMs) and their front sections, of
shorter-range missiles (SRMs) and their front sections, and of
reentry vehicles released from programs of cooperation. It was
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agreed that the period of elimination for IRMs and their front
sections would be three years, and that the period of elimination
for SRMs and their front sections will be no longer than 18 months
(and preferably will be 12 months if technically feasible).
N.B.: With respect to the terminology used in the closing
stages of the negotiations, the term IRMs (intermediate-range
missiles) referred to all US and Soviet ground-launched missiles
with capabilities for ranges between 1000 and 5500 kilometers, and
the term SRMs (shorter-range missiles) referred to all US and
Soviet ground-launched missiles with capabilities for ranges
between 500 and 1000 kilometers. The terms IRM and SRM are
generally equivalent to the terms LRINF missile and SRINF missile,
respectively, as used by the US previously in the negotiations.
On procedures for missile elimination, it was also agreed that
"launch-to-destruct" will be permitted for a limited time and for a
limited number of IRMs.
In order'to move toward agreement on inspection procedures, the
US offered to agree that Soviet aircraft will be used in the USSR
and US aircraft in the United States to transport visiting
inspection teams, contingent on Soviet agreement on the other
aspects of the on-site inspection (OSI) procedures in a manner
consistent with US positions.
Consistent with the decision made by the FRG, agreement was
reached on an three-year "overall period of elimination," with all
US and Soviet IRMs and their RVs to be eliminated fifteen days
prior to the end of that period, and for RVs released (by
unilateral action of the FRG government) from existing programs of
cooperation to be eliminated during the last fifteen days of the
three-year period, using agreed procedures.
IX. Negotiating Issues in the Last Stage of Negotiations
Important issues had to be resolved in the last stage of
negotiations. These included:.
-- the disposition of missile front sections and nuclear
warhead devices;.
-- phasing of reductions;
-- R & D boosters and launch provisions;
-- missile conversion;
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missile stage similarity;
continuous portal monitoring; and
final approach to OSI, with implications for:
o suspect-site inspection; and
o NTM enhancement.
These issues and their outcomes are briefly discussed below,
followed by separate treatment of the final negotiating issues
related to the Protocols on Elimination and Inspection and the
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on Data. In addition, the Basing
Country Agreement and Exchange of Notes issues were addressed in
the negotiations in Geneva and were settled in the last stages of
those negotiations
Disposition of Missile Front Sections' and Nuclear Warhead Devices:
The US view of elimination of INF missiles was that, for a
variety of reasons, the focus should be on the destruction of the
missiles and their entire delivery. systems. Our concerns included
the serious verification difficulties associated with the
elimination of nuclear warhead devices.
Following the Washington Ministerial, the Soviet negotiators
again argued that US INF warheads must be destroyed. The purpose
of the Soviet approach was to justify their position regarding the
West German Pershing IA force. The Soviet side declined to resolve
this issue until the issue of phasing of reductions had been fully
settled. It had been previously agreed that the guidance elements
and nuclear warhead devices would be removed from the front
sections before missiles were moved to elimination facilities.
Then the missiles with their remaining front section structures
would be eliminated by agreed procedures (i.e., physically
destroyed).
However, the Soviet side raised the issue yet again in Moscow
at the October 22-23 Ministerial. There the front section issue
was finally resolved on the basis of what had been agreed in
Washington in September.
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Phasing of Reductions
In late summer, the US reshaped its proposal on phasing to
allow for two or three phases within a three year overall
elimination, calling for equal levels at the end of the nupeiod of
lrtimate
pphase (which could be a longer first phase of a two phase period).
Earlier, the US had called for the Soviet Union to reduce toequal
levels by the end of the first of three phases. At the Moscow
ministerial of October 22-23, the Soviet Union, which until then
had called fora five-year-overall period of elimination, agreed to
three years, but continued to call for reductions by both sides to
begin from the time of the treaty entry into force (EIF). The
final agreement on phasing of LRINF elimination called for a 29
month first (penultimate) phase, at the end of which US and Soviet
equality must be achieved. The US agreed to participate in the
process of reductions from the beginning during the first phase.
The United States had consistently preserved its right to
control the INF force mix between the two US types of LRINF missile
systems, Pershing and GLCM, while the Soviet Union sought to gain
US agreement to an outcome featuring emphasis on reductions in
Pershings. The final agreement, corresponding with US plans for
phasing of reductions established in consultation with basing
country Allies, was that the US would carry out the reductions in a
manner that ensured we would continue to have Pershing systems
until the end of the elimination period.
With respect to phasing of SRINF missile reductions, the US
opening position was that elimination should be completed within
one year. The Soviet position called for elimination over three
years. During the negotiations, the Soviets contended that a one
year SRINF elimination period would impose final agreement was to complete SRINF eliminationcwithinbeighteenhe
months, under the following conditions: that all deployed missiles
and all launchers be removed to elimination facilities within three
months, and all remaining non-deployed missiles be removed to such
facilities within twelve months.
The US initially opposed a Soviet proposal for "launch to
destruction" as a method of elimination because flight test data
from such launches could be useful for efforts to maintain the
reliability of a covert capability. The Soviet Union sought the
right to use this method not only for a large part of its LRINF
systems, but also for SRINF missiles. It was eventually agreed
that up to 100 LRINF missiles (IRMs) could be destroyed by launch
within the first six months after the treaty enters into force.
The parties agreed to bar any use of telemetry except for broadcast
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of unencrypted telemetry for range safety. The Soviet Union
finally agreed to our proposal of a three year overall period of
elimination.
The other accepted methods of elimination were detailed by each
missile type and further differentiated by (e.g., stages, fuel, rocket nozzles or motors,tfronttsections,e
canisters, etc.). In general, the other accepted methods of
elimination for solid-fuel missiles, stages, and their other
components included explosive demolition, burning in place (static
firing), and crushing or flattening. The accepted methods of
elimination of cruise missiles included cutting the airframe and
crushing or flattening structures and launch canisters. There is
no limit to how many solid-fuel missile stages a side may burn by
static firing, but it was agreed that instrumentation is not
permitted in using that means of elimination.
R & D Boosters
The US sought a provision in the Treaty that would make clear
that the parties retained their freedom with respect to R & D
Booster systems critical to strategic defensive forces, which might
otherwise be considered to be treaty-limited intermediate-range or
shorter-range systems. At the same time, we sought restrictions on
R & D boosters capable of ranges in the treaty-limited range band
in order to preclude the maintenance of INF operational
capabilities in an R & D guise or at test facilities. It was
agreed that neither side would have more than a total of 35
launchers for such boosters at any one time. The Soviet Union
accepted the principle 'that such R & D boosters and launchers would
be permitted, along with the further stipulation that the launchers
must be limited and the stages must be distinct from those of
existing types of missiles limited by the treaty. The Soviets also
agreed that such boosters be used only for R & D purposes to test
objects other than the booster systems themselves, and agreed to
prior notification procedures for any test-flights of such boosters
with a range capability in the treaty limited band.
Missile Conversion
Earlier in the negotiations, the US had
a means of reducing INF missiles. In the contexts of thev1986?n as
Reykjavik accord, the US wished to preserve the option of
converting LRINF missile stages and components to use in SRINF or
non-INF systems of lesser range. ? Once it became apparent from the
Glitman-Obukhov/Chervov exchange in June 1987 that the USSR might
accept a double global zero solution, this option was
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reconsidered. After the Gorbachev announcement on July 22, 1987
accepting double global zero, the United States decided to forego
conversion of its INF systems. Hence, the basic agreement in the
negotiations was that conversion of INF systems would be
prohibited. The draft treaty thereafter
future production, and for the physical elimination, of all solide
propellant stages of existing INF missiles.
SS-20/SS-25 Missile Sta a Similarity and Continuous Portal
Monitoring
Before the Soviet Union came to accept the double global zero
formula in late July 1987, the assumption that residual INF forces
would exist precluded bans on production and flight-testing. Even
after DGZ, the five year reductions concept -- United States -- would have required maintainingfflight-testy the
programs for operational reliability during the period of
reductions. But with convergence late in the negotiations on the
shorter, three-year overall period of elimination, it became
possible to agree on a total ban on production and flight-testing.
Once there was agreement on double global zero together with a
ban on INF missile system production and missile flight-testin
appeared that the earlier US proposal for g, it
erimetertal
monitoring of production/final assembly faci
litiesrofnINFosystems
was no longer essential. However, the Soviet Union stated in
October, shortly before the Moscow ministerial meeting, that the
SS-20 and SS-25 first stages are 'outwardly similar, though not
interchangeable," and could not be easily distinguished visually by
an inspector.
This posed the problem of how to confirm that SS-25 first
stages were not being used to construct SS-20 missiles. In order
to help verify the ban on production of SS-20 missiles, the Soviets
returned to what was originally a US idea. They proposed that the
US have the right to 'continuous portal monitoring' of the Soviet
SS-25 final assembly facility at Votkinsk, where SS-20 missiles
also previously have been assembled. In turn, the US agreed to
allow the Soviets continuous monitoring of a US missile production
facility, in this case Hercules Plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah where
Pershing II stages had been produced and other missile stages are
now produced.
Final Decisions on On-Site Inspections (OSI)
Suspect-Site Inspections
In the context of an INF agreement that would have permitted
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the US and USSR each to retain missiles and launchers capable of
carrying 100 warheads, the US proposed inspection of any site in
either country where such missiles and launchers could be located
-- suspect sites. After the Soviet Union agreed to the global
double zero proposal, in July 1987, the US reexamined its
for suspect-site inspection. Since any verification proposals
would be reciprocal, the US weighed the provisions
Permitting Soviet access in the US to sensitiveafacilities or
privately owned property against the potential verification
benefits of suspect-site inspection. In that context, the US
determined that on balance, overall US interests were served by
on-site inspections short of "anywhere, anytime" inspections.
NTM Enhancement
In view of the outward similarity between the first stage of
the SS-20 and the SS-25, the US insisted on, and the Soviets agreed
to a cooperative measure to enhance national technical means (NTM)
of verification. The Soviet Union is obliged on a US short-notice
request up to six times a year to open the retractable roofs on the
single-bay garages at SS-25 bases and remove SS-25 missiles on
launchers from them for a specified length of time, so that they
can be monitored by US NTMs to aid in determining whether there are
SS-20s at the SS-25 bases.
Elimination Protocol
The US first tabled a draft of the Elimination Protocol
(initially known as the Destruction, Dismantlement, or Conversion
Protocol) in May 1987. The Soviets responded with their own
version in September. The US achieved its objective of
establishing the specific and detailed procedures for the
elimination of missiles, launchers, support equipment and support
structures.
The Elimination Protocol also embodies agreement on the
disposition of reentry vehicles (RVs) which by unilateral decision
have been released from Programs of Cooperation (i.e. the US-owned
RVs on FRG'P-IAs).
The US and Soviet sides held discussion among technical experts
on methods of destroying solid fuel ballistic missiles and cruise
missiles. They agreed that explosive demolition and burning
(static firing) would be the main methods of eliminating solid fuel
ballistic missiles, and cutting, crushing and flattening the
airframes the main methods of eliminating. cruise missiles.
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The US insisted that destruction procedures should render
treaty-limited items incapable of being restored. The Soviet Union
insisted on strict reciprocity in determining what elements would
be subject to destruction and what could be salvaged. The
elimination procedures meet both these criteria.
Inspection Protocol
The Inspection Protocol sets out the specific procedures for
carrying out on-site and continuous inspections. The US tabled a
draft Inspection Protocol on September 14, 1987. This draft had
been developed in consultation with the basing countries before it
was presented to the Soviets because'Soviet inspectors would be
carrying out inspections on the territories of the basing countries.
The Soviets accepted basic US
diplomatic provisions that: guarantee
privileges and immunities of inspectors; protect the
sovereignty of the basing countries; ensure that inspectors do not
unnecessarily interfere with on-going activities at the inspection
site; protect against the compromise of sensitive information at
the inspection site; prohibit the inspected Party from cancelling
inspections in progress; and permit the inspecting Party to bring
its own equipment to the site. At US insistence, the Inspection
Protocol includes precise details about how inspections will be
conducted, thus minimizing arguments after entry into force about
the rights of the inspecting and inspected parties.
With respect to short-notice inspections, an essential US
objective was to preserve an element of surprise in the conduct of
inspections by minimizing the amount of time between notification
of the site to be inspected and arrival at the site to a matter of
a few hours. At first, the Soviets resisted the basic concept of
short-notice, rejecting arguments that the element of surprise was
essential to verification. They countered that the main
consideration should be to provide adequate time after notification
for transportation, site preparation, etc. However, the US
insisted that the ability to carry out inspections on short notice
was essential to the effectiveness and credibility of the
inspection regime. The Soviets finally accepted the US concept.
The Inspection Protocol specifies procedures that govern the
conduct of inspections at the inspection site. The central
assumption underlying US-proposed procedures was that the
inspectors' objective should be to help verify that there are not
more missiles, missile stages, or launchers at the inspection site
than the number declared by the inspected Party. To assist in
accomplishing this objective, the US proposed that inspectors have
the right to inspect any structure or container at the inspection
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site where a missile, missile stage, or launcher could be hidden.
In contrast, the initial Soviet assumption was that the inspectors'
objective should simply be to count the numbers of missiles and
launchers that the inspected Party shows them. The Soviets
eventually agreed that the sides would have the right to inspect
all structures and objects within the inspection site boundary that
are capable of containing a missile, missile stage or launcher of
the inspected party that is subject to the Treaty.
The Inspection Protocol covers continuous monitoring at missile
final assembly or production facilities (for the US, designated
parts of the Hercules plant No. 1 at Magna, Utah, and for the
Soviets, the SS-20/25 final assembly plant at Votkinsk). The US
objective was to obtain a monitoring system that would help to
ensure that SS-20s could not exit at the monitored installation.
The sides agreed: to station thirty inspectors at each facility; to
permit the application of non-destructive imaging to every missile
canister exiting the facilities; and to permit opening the end of
eight missile canisters which met agreed size limits per year to
measure the stages inside.
Memorandum.of Understanding on Data
At Reykjavik in October 1986, the US and U.S.S.R. agreed in
principle that a comprehensive exchange of data would be a central
and integral element of an INF verification regime. The US
initially tabled a draft format for Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) on Data in May 1987. However, the Soviet Union declined to
begin the necessary work of negotiating the MOU structure and
deferred the formation of a working group for several months.
The Soviets essentially agreed to the basic structure and data
categories of the MOU as proposed by the US. This included: (1)
definitions of MOU terms supplementing those in the Treaty; (2) a
quantitative statement of the overall aggregates of deployed and
non-deployed IRMs and SRMs and their launchers; (3) a disaggregated
list of the specific locations at which deployed and non-deployed
IRMs and SRMs, and their launchers, agreed support structures, and
equipment were to be found (e.g., missile operating bases,
deployment areas and missile support facilities) and the designated
elimination facilities during the three-year reductions period; (4)
technical data on IRMs and SRMs and their launchers; and (5) photos
of items subject to elimination and site diagrams of the locations
subject to inspection.
The Soviets delayed tabling the specific MOU data. Agreement
was reached in October that the was of date for the MOU would be 1
November, 1987. Data was then exchanged in several steps. The
SECRET
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Soviets provided MOU data in four installments on 26 October, 18
and 21 November, and again on 2 December.
The MOU data will be updated by a further exchange of data
after the Treaty enters into force. All of the data will be
subject to verification by each side with the help of baseline
inspections within 90 days after the Treaty enters into force.
Basing Country Agreements and Exchange of Notes
The United States consulted fully and regularly with its Allies
on. all aspects of the INF Treaty. Since we were prepared to agree
to permit Soviet inspections of facilities in the five Allied
basing countries, i.e., Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany,
Italy, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, one important
element of those consultations involved setting the conditions for
such inspections. At the same time, we and the Allies agreed that
we should avoid any direct negotiations between the basing
countries and the USSR on any matters pertaining to a strictly
bilateral US-Soviet agreement. While
principle of the INF Treaty as a solely rbilateral tagreement,1eweal
developed two supporting documents which enabled the US to g
Soviets access to sovereign basing countries and defined theive the
conditions of such access while preserving the sovereignty of the
basing countries concerned.
Parallel with and distinct from the INF Treaty, we negotiated
the Basing Country Agreement between the United States and the
Allied basing countries, enabling the US to guarantee that the
Treaty provisions related to inspections at facilities which are
located in those countries could be carried out under terms
consistent with the Treaty. This agreement was signed by Secretary
of State Shultz and the Foreign Ministers of the basing countries
at Brussels on December il, 1987.
The diplomatic notes exchanged between the Soviet Union and
each basing country express the willingness of each basing country
to permit the Soviet Union to carry out inspections on their
territories, and the commitment of the Soviet Union to behave
during the inspections in a manner consistent with its obligations
under the Treaty regarding the conduct of inspections. The United
States has exchanged identical notes with the those basing
countries in the Warsaw Pact where Soviet systems and facilities
subject to the Treaty are located, namely, East Germany and
Czechoslovakia. The text of the notes is identical in each of
these cases and was worked out in Geneva between the United States
and Soviet delegations working on the INF Treaty itself.
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