KEY START ISSUES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R000800090001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: February 17, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90G01353R000800090001-8
TO:
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
X
2
DDCI
X
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
91--Chm/NIC
X
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OCA
14
D/PAO
15
D/PERS
16
D/Ex Staff
17
C/ACIS
X
18
D/SOVA/DI
X
19
Nb/USSR
X
20
D/OSWR/DI
X
21
22
SUSPENSE
Dote
Remarks
STAT
txecutive Jecretary
19 Feb '88
Dote
3637 (10-81)
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release
2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90G01353R000800090001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90G01353R000800090001-8
t- United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
e
Exotic, Regist
;88-0666X
S TAT
//'9.---22
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90G01353R000800090001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90G01353R000800090001-8
CRET/SENSITIVE
United States Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520
February 17, 1988
MEMORANDUM
TO: The Secretary
FROM: S/ART - E. RownyCV
SUBJECT: Key START Issues
The President has told us to "go for the gold" and seek a good,
verifiable, START treaty by the Moscow summit, but to walk away from
a bad treaty. Therefore, it is essential that we identify the
critical issues before you begin the ministerial round. In my view,
the following issues are critical to our national security:
START/SDI linkage. We must get from the Soviets an explicit
repudiation of their position that violations of any D&S Agreement
or the ABM Treaty, based on their unilateral interpretation, would
constitute grounds for suspension of START reductions. We cannot
sign a START agreement under ambiguous terms which give standing to
the Soviet claim that they have been granted a right to bail out of
START if we test under the broad interpretation. Failure to close
this issue invites certain Congressional strangling of SDI. A START
agreement at this cost would undermine our national security.
Verification. No one disputes that the START verification
regime must be an order of magnitude more extensive than that for
INF. It is simply inherent in an agreement which reduces 50% as
compared to one which reduces to zero. Specific elements of such a
highly complex regime must be cleared up as a matter of highest
priority. This will be difficult because it cuts both ways. In my
judgment, the minimum essential features are:
- An extensive array of PPM sites, continuously monitoring
ballistic missile production, storage and repair, to include
tagging to reduce uncertainties about non-deployed systems. We
must have more than a token presence.
- A broad right to inspect suspect-sites beyond declared
facilities (only on U.S. & Soviet territory), with a limited
right to protect sensitive installations and programs. Both the
broad and limited rights are politically imperative.
),VegET/SENSITIVE
DECL: OADR
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90G01353R000800090001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90G01353R000800090001-8
SECRET/SENSITIVE
-2-
Mobile ICBMs. The arguments for permitting mobiles in the
interest of stability and for banning them in the interest of
verification are both well-understood and compelling. I and others
have testified that our support for INF depended, in the final
analysis, on adequate verification of mobile systems, which was
clinched by our global zero outcome and by the production/flight
test ban. There appears to be a consensus that our rail-mobiles
should be protected and that we would be willing to give up
road-mobiles if the Soviets did the same. In any case, we are a
long way from an acceptable verification scheme for mobile ICBMs.
Accordingly, I recommend that we hold firm in Moscow to our
position on banning mobiles while we simultaneously: 1) press the
Soviets to tell us how they would verify mobile ICBMs, and 2) work
out our own verification scheme which will meet our security needs
and satisfy the Congress.
ALCM accountability. We must protect our conventional cruise
missile programs as the primary objective. If this is assured, we
can reduce the 1500 km range to 1000 km in exchange for a concession
of equal value. We should stick to the discounting rule for now,
while we consider adopting alternative proposals such as the "as
equipped rule."
SLCM limitations and verification. We cannot accept any
limitations on conventional SLCMs, as the Soviets have recently
proposed. Nor can we tolerate verification measures which would
confirm the presence of nuclear weapons aboard a U.S. submarine or
surface ship. To do so would immediately compromise our
"neither-confirm-nor-deny" policy and wreak havoc with our allies.
We should listen to Soviet explanations of their "concepts".
However, it is evident that the Soviets have no credible
verification scheme.
Non-transfer/circumvention clause. This clause is a Soviet
vehicle for wedge-driving. We cannot accept any restrictions on the
UK Trident program, nor can we bow to any implication that
maintaining our alliances or deterrent fabric would constitute a
violation of a U.S.-Soviet START treaty. The current squabble over
FRG P-1A testing exemplifies the risks of including such a clause.
There is no place in a START treaty for a NT/NC clause.
The following issues, while not critical to our security, would
be extremely valuable in their own right and useful in marketing a
START treaty to conservative elements in Congress:
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90G01353R000800090001-8
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90G01353R000800090001-8
'
SECRET/SENSITIVE
-3-
Heavy ICBM flight-testing and modernization ban. Such a ban is
needed because a 50% reduction in SS-18s still leaves a ratio of 1.5
to 1, possibly greater, against our silos. Kissinger, Nixon, Dole,
and others have drawn attention to this publicly. We can quash
their objections by banning modernization and flight testing. It
prevents Soviet accuracy and throwweight enhancements which could
more than compensate for their loss of SS-18 warheads. It would
also result in a decay of the residual force and would, in time,
reduce their destabilizing first-strike threat.
Throwweight. A cosmetic throwweight limitation will not
suffice. We need a direct, objective,. monitorable limitation to
close off the breakout potential of large Soviet missiles.
ICBM Sublimit. By retaining this barrier, we are better able to
maneuver the Soviets into increasing the proportion of SLBMs and
air-breathers in their force posture. This will benefit stability.
If we don't nail it down, the Soviets will be free to creep back
into an ICBM-dominant structure which. supports the preemptive
strategy they profess to be moving away from.
cc: Ambassador Kampelman
Ambassador Nitze
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/10/10: CIA-RDP90G01353R000800090001-8