HANDWRITTEN NOTES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R000500570002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 56
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 15, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 30, 1988
• Content Type: MISC

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Off-Site Managers Conference
30 October ? 1 November 1988
SIJNDAY, 30 OCTOBER
1700-1800
COCKTAILS (Cash Bar)
1800-1900
DINNER
1900-1930
WELCOMING REMARKS DCI
1930-2100
IMPLICATIONS FOR CIA
OF CONTINU
NG THIRD WORLD INSTABILITY
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Director Near East and South Asian Analysis
Chief Near East Division
Chief Africa Division
Director of Global Issues
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MONDAY, 31 OCTOBER
0730-0830 BREAKFAST
0900-1100 PRINCIPAL TECHNOLOGY CHALLENGES OF THE 19905 AND IMPLICATIONS FOR
OPERATIONS, COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
- Director of Research & Development
Julian Caballero - Director of Development & Engineering
- Director of Information Resources
- Chief Collection Requirements & Evaluation Staff
1100-1200 FREE TIME
1200-1300 LUNCH
1300-1430 DEVELOPING THE NEXT GENERATION OF AGENCY LEADERS. (What are our
responsibilities as component chiefs? What skills, assignments, and experiences are critical
to success as a senior Agency officer? How can we prepare the appropriate people for
these positions?)
1430-1500 BREAK
Director of Training & Education
Chief East Asia Division
Director of Technical Services
Frank Ruocco - Director National Photographic Interpretation Center
John Ray - Director of Logistics
1500-1630 THREE HIGH PROFILE ISSUES: COUNTERNARCOTICS, COUNTERTERRORISM, AND
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Associate Deputy Director for Counterintelligence
Chief Latin America Division
Chief Counterterrorism Center
1630-1800 FREE TIME
1800-1830 COCKTAILS (Cash Bar)
1830-1930 DINNER
1930-2000 THE COMING TRANSITION AND EMERGING NEAR-TERM REQUIREMENTS.... DDCI
STAT
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Central Intelligence Agency
WashlrgbrUIC20505
1 November 1988
Administrative Officer, DCI
7D 19, Original Headquarters Building
Dear Jim:
Just a note to let you know how much we
all appreciated the enormous effort that went
into the first Off-Site Managers Conference.
You must be justly proud of its success. It
could not have been run more smoothly and
the arrangements, both food and lodging,
which you made pleased everyone.
Many thanks for a great job well done.
Sincerely,
William H. Webster
Director of Central Intelligence
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JUDGE:
PAO 88-0386
14 November 1988
Attached are your remarks at the Off-Site Managers Conference 30 October-
1 November 1988. Your introductory remarks were taped, and we have included
an edited transcript for your review. Your concluding remarks were not taped,
but we have worked from your outline to reconstruct "summary points" of that
presentation.
We believe that both sets of remarks will be helpful to you as you prepare
for press briefings. The "summary points" provide a review of your
accomplishments as Director.
If you would like us to disseminate either set of remarks, we will be glad
to do that. We have received a number of requests for your comments at the
Off-Site.
Attachments:
As Stated
25X1)Cl/PA0/10,1B
X2053
Distribution:
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Bill Baker
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REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
DCI OFF-SITE MANAGERS CONFERENCE
OCTOBER 30, 1988
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Many have asked why we are holding this conference now. The "why now?"
is a function of time. When the Executive Conference met at a retreat earlier
this year, we decided that we should try to expand attendance at the next
off-site to bring in the thinking of -- and communicate some ideas to -- a
broader range of senior management. Bob Gates and I had two back-to-back
trips out of the country that limited how early in the fall
ould
schedule this. Then with the election coming up and all the problems that
experience tells us might occur with transition teams and others involved,
this turned out to be the only weekend for us to hold this conference. For
those of my fellow spooks who wish they were home Halloweening on Monday, I
can only apologize. I'm one who enjoys that holiday, but this was the only
time we could get together.
This conference is intended to be a four-way dialogue: upwards and
downwards and back and forth across the directorates. I came here to share
some thoughts with you, but even more to listen to you. During the past year
and a half I've managed to get around to most of the offices that are repre-
sented here tonight, but there are others I still want to see. Bob has filled
in, visiting other areas when he could, and I hope to hear more and learn a
great deal more about this organization -- mostly about the people in it.
I have been in a number of places and have consistently found people who
are proud of what they're doing and who understand what they're doing. I
still think of the faces of the ,young men and women going through the CT
graduation ceremony; the pride of those in Agency offices such as FBIS,
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SUMMARY POINTS: DCI CLOSING REMARKS AT OFF-SITE CONFERENCE
Introduction
8 I'd like to get your reaction to what we have completed over the past two
days.
? I encourage you to jot down one or two observations about what we have
discussed and pass them to Jim Taylor.
? In short, we have been looking at ways to turn vulnerabilities into
opportunities.
Responding to Crisis Situations
II Although we are not in competition with the media, we need to improve our
reporting on crisis situations.
I We must keep in mind the DCI's obligation to provide timely intelligence
to the President and key policymakers.
O We need to reconcile the plea of DI analysts for information with the DO
concern for protecting sources and methods.
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Responding to Technical Challenges
II Again, we must view challenges as opportunities. In a time of constrained
resources, we must make better use of what we have.
We must formulate a strategic information management plan to guide
our long-term technological growth. Such a plan must be based on
user participation.
Managers must become more computer literate if we are to ensure wise
use of our technical resources.
? We must be aware that, with our greater capacity to collect and process
information comes a greater counterintelligence vulnerability, especially
in the area of computer security.
Leadership Challenges
9 I am interested in promoting growth and encouraging a wide range of
experience for Agency managers.
The reluctance of directorates to "share their stars" hinders this
goal.
The need to provide opportunities for minorities and females to
advance within the Agency is necessarily a part of this goal. We
must make affirmative action a focus of our efforts, moving
immediately when we see someone with the potential for greater
responsibility.
? We need to encourage cross-fertilization through rotational assignments.
For these to be beneficial for the office and the individual, we must put
a premium on fairness and candor.
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O We must provide opportunities and separate tracks for experts and managers
through a variety of mechanisms, including executive fellowships,
rotationals on the IG staff, SIS-grade positions for experts, and
lower-level exchanges.
O We all, as senior managers, have a duty to ensure a smooth transition to
our eventual successors.
High-Priority Intelligence Issues
O Counterterrorism: our effort on this issue is firmly in place.
O Counternarcotics: our effort in this area still needs firm definition. We
provide a wide range of support, and our efforts are not always
coordinated. We must further define how our work in this area relates to
our efforts on terrorism.
O Counterintelligence: we need to consider whether a separate career path is
advisable; we also need to reach a consensus on the appropriate and
effective use of the polygraph in this area.
The Transition to a New Administration
O As the DDCI discussed earlier in our conference, the transition poses
three major tasks for us:
We need to reexamine our methods of disseminating our products,
especially concerning the National Intelligence Daily.
We need to think about how we can improve our relationship with
policymakers.
We need to consider the future of covert action.
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Oversight and Public Scrutiny
O We all must understand our public affairs functions and how such efforts
can promote Agency interests.
We must be known to be accountable -- but only for what we are
responsible for, and this distinction must be made clear to the press
and the public.
The speeches I make are intended to build public confidence in the
CIA. To ensure their accuracy and propriety, they are always
coordinated within the Agency.
John Helgerson has as good an understanding of Congress and the oversight
function as anyone I know. I would like to elaborate on his remarks at
this conference by making the following points:
Although we don't want to diminish our relations with Congress, we do
want to keep our level of support manageable.
We should consider reducing the number of briefings we give on the
Hill.
We must place our emphasis on being right the first time; retractions
are costly and time-consuming.
We need to counter Congress's tendency to micro-manage us, especially
in the area of sources and methods.
We need to stress the positive in our dealings with Congress.
We must learn to live with the leaks from Congressional staffers.
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? All the changes in the USSR and their many policy implications make it
more difficult for us to know exactly what the policymaker needs.
Review of Accomplishments as DCI
O Some may remember the situation two years ago, when we were confronting
the Iran-Contra investigations.
? Two years later, we see few negative articles in the newspapers, and we
are not being challenged as we were.
With your help, I have guided the Agency through the most challenging time
in our history.
O I'd like to be remembered for guiding the Agency through the difficult
Iran-Contra period -- for restoring public confidence and for improving
relations with Congress.
? And I'd like to be remembered for the initiatives I've undertaken during
the past two years.
Ensuring objectivity in the preparation of NIEs and other
intelligence assessments. (We are no longer accused of "cooking the
books.")
Developing guidelines for dealing with Congress.
Strengthening internal review of covert action through the CARG:
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Strengthening the mandate of the Inspector General.
Establishing the Counterintelligence Center and making other efforts
within the Intelligence Community to deal with the hostile
intelligence threat.
Avoiding further executive and legislative constraints on
intelligence, including the proposed 48-hour notification and GAO
audits.
Making intelligence a vital component in NSPG deliberations-on key
foreign policy issues such as the Persian Gulf, Panama, and arms
control.
Strengthening CIA-FBI relations.
Finally, leading this conference of our Agency's senior management as
we discuss the difficult challenges ahead.
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ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: poionti4
, Do We Want Gorbachev to Succeed?
FMDM:
Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
EXTENSION
NO.
NIC #03256-88
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
RECEIVED
FOAV/ARDED
DATE
4 November 1988
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a (in* across column after eacli comment.)
Executive Registr
04 NOV 1988
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The Director of Central Intelligence
washigtmac20505
National Intelligence Council
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM: Fritz W. Ermarth
Chairman, National Intelligence Council
SUBJECT: Do We Want Gorbachev to Succeed?
NIC #03256-88
4 November 1988
At the off-site, you asked whether we want Gorbachev to succeed. I
wasn't quite satisfied with my response and the ensuing discussion, so I'd
like to try again in this memo.
I cannot improve on Bob Gates' formulation: If success means a more
effective version of the Soviet system as we know it historically and
currently, the answer is "NO." We would face an intensified security
challenge because of improved Soviet tactics in the international sphere and
a strengthened Soviet economy; while under a" revived system of one-party
rule, the Soviet citizen would enjoy no guaranteed expansion of human and
political rights, whatever the transient pleasures of glasnost.
On the other hand, if success means irreversible trends toward a more
liberal, tolerant, decentralized, and open so g many features of
25X1 Russian-Soviet political culture we discussed -then the answer
is "YES." As Westerners, we are inclined to se ieve that any reform which
makes the USSR more efficient and productive must, per force, make it freer.
The trouble and promise of the Gorbachev reform effort--for us as well
as many Soviets who share our values--is that it harbors both possibilities,
? as well as possibilities for failure that bring out the very worst in the
Russian-Soviet political tradition. Grim possibilities include a
conservative reaction that could, in the extreme, be violent and
repressive. Intelligent Soviets do not rule this out, and neither should
we. Were we observing the lively politics and vibrant cultural life of the
USSR in the 1920s, ?we would have found it hard to imagine a return even to
the relatively mild autocracy of the tsarist era, not to mention the
megadeath brutality of Stalinism.
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The possibilities of failure also include that of violent social
revolution in which the nationalities as well as the haves and have-nots in
the society go after each other. Such upheavals usually destroy first those
fragile few who believe in law, tolerance, and the protection of the
individual from the state. Social revolution seems much more likely to
produce a new brand of autocracy than a more liberal, law-governed state.
Moreover, a replay of the Russian Revolution and Civil War in the nuclear
era could be dangerous.
Our task as intelligence officers is to track as best we can the trends
which are shaping the unfolding possibilities. Many conflicting trends are
at work at the same time. To track them, we must pay more attention to what
leaders and audible spokesmen are saying, but also as best we can to what
largely silent, fearful, and resentful masses of the population are
thinking. This is not easy for the Soviet leadership; it's even harder for
us. But neither the Kremlin nor the CIA can afford to be surprised on this
front.
25X1 A second task--the one I stressed in my remarks is managerially
easier, but politically and intellectually challenging enough: that is, to
keep visible events in the USSR in a historical and cultural perspective for
our customers, to highlight the significance of the new and different while
constantly reminding of the deep cultural obstacles to orderly
liberalization. So far, I think we've fulfilled this second task pretty
well because of the expertise and professionalism of the Soviet-watchers in
our intelligence community. Having somewhat underestimated the pace at
which Gorbachev, for his own power-political reasons, would radicalize the
political agenda is a less grave sin than prematurely assuming that the
reform process is already on the high road to success.
This, then, leaves the policy question of how the United States should
try to influence the form of and prospects for "success" of the Gorbachev
reform era. I'll offer my personal view.
First, our main legitimate preoccupation should be to exploit the
outreach of Soviet policy for our own security interests, remaining wary
that the long-term effects of various deals could run against our interests,
e.g., promoting "denuclearization" of Western Europe. Our biggest problem
will be maintaining the integrity of the structures that keep the peace,
such as NATO, the nuclear deterrent, our worldwide military capability, in
the face of a seductive and soporific Soviet diplomacy. These structures
cannot be rebuilt as fast as Moscow could revert to "old thinking" and
threatening ways.
Second, we have to realize that our ability to influence Soviet internal
evolution is marginal, but not zero. The political, moral, ec6nomic, and
military health of the West is itself a powerful stimulus to liberalizing
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4 .?
reform in the USSR, as it has been for Russia over several centuries. The
Russians envy and fear us, as Kennan once said, for what we are, not for
what we do. But the envy and fear are accompanied by a desire to emulate
which is, on balance, healthy. The West must remain something to be
emulated because it cannot be overcome.
Third, we must emphasize those interactions which promote the
liberalizing of the society, not the strengthening of the Soviet state. For
this reason, our own programs for creating subterranean tunnels to get
Western information and ideas into the USSR are, if anything, more important
in the era of glasnost than ever. They put pressure on the system in the
right direction. They also prepare for the all-too-probable day when the
conservative reaction sets in and our modest programs become, once again,
the main bearers of glasnost in the USSR. Striking the right balance in our
official and overt policies on behalf of freedom in the USSR is not easy.
For example, bargaining with the Soviet government about freer dissemination
of Western publications is a worthy effort, but it risks our admission that
control of the press is a legitimate government function. Or take the
example of the Moscow human rights conference: Some would expect that the
West's acceptance of this idea would spur Moscow to new steps, such as
releasing all political prisoners and formally abolishing politically
repressive laws. But others fear that such a conference would put the stamp
of Western acceptance on a system still far less free than Pinochet's Chile
or Greece under the colonels.
Finally, the question of economic support. Odom's admonition to applaud
but not finance perestroika is sound to a first approximation. But we need
not be too dogmatic about how this works out in practice. I can imagine
circumstances in which the progress of political and economic reforms has
reached the point where, assuming we ourselves can afford it, we might well
consider programs to help improve the lot of the Soviet consumer. We have
to gauge very carefully the difference between help that spurs reform and
liberalization, on the one hand, and measures that help the regime avoid
reform and preserve resource allocation patterns threatening to us, on the
other. Here again intelligence analysis of Soviet internal, military, and
foreign policy developments will be critical; and our policy problem in
practice is likely to be, not whether we should help Gorbachev, but whether
we should try to stop others from doing so. Over the decades, the USSR has
received a lot of help from the West, as Imperial Russia did before it.
Hoover's famine relief in the 1920s saved many lives and helped to
consolidate Soviet power. Lend-lease helped defeat Hitler and bring Soviet
power to the heart of Europe. Western capital and technology transferred to
the USSR in the 1930s helped to build the Stalinist economic order, and in
the 1950s to restore it after the war. This ambiguous history is something
that we should not-forget.
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0'
To understand and remember the lessons of hi story is, perhaps, ?the
bottom line. Those lessons do not condemn us to a stingy, closed-minded
reaction to Gorbachev. They allow us to respond positively while keeping
our powder dry. Striking this balance will test our intelligence and
maturity as severely and more subtly than all the challenges of the Cold War
so far.
Fri W. Ermarth
4
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SUBJECT: Do We Want Gorbachev to Succeed?
DCl/C/NIC:FWErmarthl
Di stri buti on:
DCI
DDCI
SA/DCI
ER
ExDi r
D/PAO
DDO
DDI
D/SOVA
D/EURA
C/SE/DO
VC/NIC
NIO/USSR
NIO/ECON
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NIC #03256-88
4 November 1988
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0351i1V(V
3 NOV 5998
MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Intelligence
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SUBJECT:
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Director of Global Issues
Instability in Communist Countries
1. At this week's off-site managers conference I mentioned
in my presentation on political instability that most of our
effort to date has focused on the Third World. Given those
caanents I believe it is useful to review the work we do have
under way against the issue of instability in Communist
countries.
2. Our research effort on instability in the coming year
will focus heavily on the Conenunist countries in an effort to
get a handle on the political repercussions of reform. We hope
to develop ways to monitor changes as they occur and get a sense
as to their potential for triggering sudden policy adjustments or
in the extreme, a replacement of a regime or form of government.
3. Our kickoff effort is a two-day conference on
instability in the Soviet Union at Airlie House December 12-13,
planned jointly with SOVA. The session will feature a host of
experts on the Soviet Union and political instability to explore
the potential for a major change in policy, regime, or system.
One day of the conference will be devoted to scenarios of
dramatic change in the USSR and identification of critical
variables we can monitor. We have recently let a small
personal services contract that will swanarize the history of
political unrest in Russia and the Soviet Union. A similar
paper is being prepared on Eastern Europe by an outside expert.
I have attached a copy of the conference agenda for your
information.
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SUBJECT: Instability in Communist Countries
4. In addition to the paper, we plan to organize a series
of country specific seminars on Eastern Europe employing outside
experts to discuss instability prospects and indicators. We
hope to build on our own work and previous work done by EURA to
develop country specific indicators and produce assessments of
instability prospects in selected East European countries.
With the sets of indicators developed from these seminars and
the Soviet Union conference, we hope to produce eventually a
companion publication to the Political Instability Quarterly.
5. Our work on other Communist countries will include
a look at reform in the Asian Communist countries and further
expansion of our earlier work on the consolidation of power
in Marxist-Leninist states. On the latter issue, we will be
sponsoring a conference late this month on lessons learned
from anti-Marxist insurgencies which will include a segment
on government control.
Attachment:
As stated
2
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Prospects for Political Instability in the Soviet Union
Conference at Airlie House 12-13 December 1988
Conference Objectives
This two day conference will bring together some 75 Soviet
specialists, political science experts on comparative politics and
dramatic political change, and analysts from the intelligence community
to discuss the prospects for political instability in the Soviet Union.
Specifically, we are interested in exploring scenarios of mass-based as
well as elite-based opposition to the current leadership and the
potential for a major change in policy, regime, or system. Drawing on a
wide range of expertise, the presentations and discussions should provide
some tentative answers to the following questions.
What insights can we gain from past episodes of political turmoil in
Russian and Soviet history that may help assess current prospects for Mr.
Gorbachev and his program?
What are the lessons learned from East European attempts at reform
and are they applicable to the Soviet Union today?
What does the comparative work on political instability provide in
the way of theories and/or analytical frameworks that would be helpful in
understanding political change and the potential for instability in the
Soviet Union?
What might the "dynamic" process of regime-threatening political
instability in the Soviet Union look like? What factors would be
important to mobilization of opposition groups? What role might external
players or events play? What are the likely regime responses to either
elite-based or mass-based opposition and are they likely to ameliorate or
to aggravate the situation? What combination of factors or events could
produce heightened nationalities violence (including insurgency or civil
war), widespread collective political opposition to the regime, a
military coup, or a political coup from either conservative or radical
elites?
Can reform proceed relatively smoothly under Gorbachev or his allies?
What factors/conditions would have to apply to this "success" scenario?
What are the implications for the United States of growing political
problems for Gorbachev? How might Soviet foreign policy be affected by
internal political stress?
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Conference on Prospects for Instability in the Soviet Union
12 December
8:30-9:15
9:15-9:30
9:30-10:30
10:30-10:45
10:45-12:15
12-13 December 1988
Airlie House
(Monday)
Arrive, register, check-in.
Welcoming Remarks
Conference Objectives and Scope
Point/Counterpoint: Can Gorbachev Succeed?
2 presentations/1 discussant
1 presenter will take an "optimistic" view about
Gorbachev's chances for success in retaining power and
making some progress on reform. What conditions must obtain
for Gorbachev to succeed?
Duke University
1 presenter will take a more "pessimistic" view about
Gorbachev's ability to retain control over the short to
medium term, the most likely causes leading to his demise,
and his most formidable opponents.
Kennan Institute
Discussant:
Break
MIT
Social/Economic Change and Instability
2 presentations/1 discussant
1 scholar on cross-national patterns of political
instability will outline the major variables and patterns
common to the evolution of regime-threatening instability.
Which of the analytic frameworks or explanatory theories
seem most relevant in assessing the prospects for top-down
reform and political instability in the Soviet Union?
Harvard University
1 scholar on risks of moving from a centralized to a
decentralized economy. Can the Soviet Union revitalize
its economy without major political disruptions?
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
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Brookings: invitation extended)
Discussant:
Boston University
12:15-13:15
Lunch
13:15-15:00
Instability in Communist Countries: The Historical Track
Record
2 presentations/1 discussant
Patterns of Political Crises in Russian and Soviet History.
A Soviet scholar will discuss past episodes and
periods of political turmoil--both successful
and unsuccessful challenges to regime authority--in terms of
factors that were common to these periods of instability and
to the success or failure of antiregime efforts. Are these
conditions or factors operative today?
University of Chicago
Political Turmoil in Eastern Europe. What are the lessons
learned from unrest in Eastern Europe? What were the
major issues, groups, government responses,
and role of external factors/players? How effective were
regime reponses? Are there
similarities/differences to the Soviet Union today?
Union College
Discussant:
15:00-15:15 Break
Air University
15:15-17:00 Erosion of Regime Legitimacy as an Indicator of Instability
1 presenter, 2 discussants.
A Soviet expert will address the basis
for the legitimacy of the CPSU and whether Gorbachev is
threatening these. Can he forge a new social contract and
basis for legitimacy? In whose eyes does he need to remain
"legitimate?" What are the empirical indicators of the
erosion of Gorbachev's or the party's legitimacy?
What are the implications for Soviet foreign policy and
the United States?
, Oberlin College
Discussant:
Discussant:
Memorial University
Brown University
STAT
STAT
STAT
? STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
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Dinner and Keynote Address
Harvard University STAT
13 December (Tuesday)
8:30-8:45 Opening Remarks
8:45-10:15 Assessing the prospects for mass-based or collective
anti-regime action.
2 presenters/2 discussants
Presentation on scenarios of heightened nationalities
violence and anti-regime activity, including insurgency
and secession.
STAT Discussant:
STAT
. Memorial University
independent contractor
Presentation on scenarios of organized political
opposition, including "revolution" from below.
(, Columbia University
Discussant:
10:15-10:30 Break
10:30-12:15 Assessing the prospects for elite-based coups.
2 presenters/2 discussants
Presentation on
conservative or
Discussant:
scenarios of a political coup from
radical elements.
Yale University
MIT
Presentation on scenarios of a military coup
Rand Corporation
Discussant: Brown University
12:15-13:30 Lunch
13:30-15:30 Roundtable on Prospects for Instability in the USSR and
Indicators of "Turning Points"
Selected participants of past two days will be asked for
their assessment of most likely developments, critical
variables that will determine a smooth vs. disruptive
outcome, and indicators of how we can monitor these
variables and distinguish between a "crisis" situation,
a turning point, instability as potential for change
vs. instability as commotion. Implications for the US
and Soviet foreign policy will be summed up.
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
STAT
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
25X1 FROM
25X1
SUBJECT
: Off-Site Conference
1. Here are my views on the off-site conference, which I did
? not have a chance to set down and get to you before we all left
for Headquarters.
2. Although not initially enthusiastic, I found the
conference very interesting, stimulating and useful. A similar
but shorter conference a:year.after the inauguration of the new
Administration wOuld Offer a. good opportunity for stock-taking and
for reviewing how effectively the Agency is responding to its new
masters. Other than for that exception and for holding one a year
after any new DCI's entry on duty, to increase his understanding
of the organization he heads, I suggest holding them no more often
than once every two years.
3. I found all the presentations stimulating. Perhaps the
least successful was that on Developing the Next Generation of
Agency Leaders, which seemed to focus on rotational tours and the
need for more women and minorities to the virtual exclusion of all
else.
, SECRET
DCXEC1
'
',REG
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MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Director
25X1 FROM:
SUBJECT:
Director of Technical Service
DCI Off Site
1. During his closing remarks, the DCI instructed attendees to submit
two comments to you about anything pertaining to the off site. My two
comments:
(a) This was an extremely valuable exercise. It permitted Agency
managers to share their views on a broad range of subjects affecting the
Agency. I suggest such an off site be a yearly affair.
(b) The DCI's concluding remarks were excellent. I suggest, however,
that some additional guidance, possibly from the Deputy Directors, be
. passed to the s - -on those contentious subjects for which there is
25X1 .no consensus.
25X1
25X1
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2. Thanks for organizing such a memorable off site.
Distribution:
0 - Addressee
1 - ER
1- D/OTS
CONFIDENTIAL
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.31..VINI- I
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JUDGE:
PAO 88-0359
24 October 1988
Re: Your Remarks at the Agency Managers'
Off-Site Conference
STAT
October 30, 1988 7:00 p.m.
This is the final version of a draft you were given on Friday,
21 Ortoher It incorporates the comments of the DDCI and includes
record of the number of facilities you have visited. (the
DDCI's copy of the draft with his suggested changes is attached)
Russ Bruemmer has also reviewed the speech and likes it.
Because there will be about people in the audience, we have provided STAT
you with a full text rather than talking points. The full text is repeated on
the cards.
Attachments:
As stated
25X1DCl/PAOPME
Distribution:
Orig. - DCI
1 - D/PAO
25X1 1 -
1
1
1
1 - ER
1 - PAO Registry
1 - Ames (Hold)
_1
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er
/Bil Bak
g- goo-r P
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25X1
PROPOSED REMARKS
BY
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
AT THE
-AGENCY MANAGERS' OFF-SITE CONFERENCE
OCTOBER 30, 1988
SECRET
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I WANT TO WELCOME YOU TO WHAT IS A "FIRST" FOR THIS AGENCY., WE
HAVE NEVER HAD SO MANY TOP-LEVEL MANAGERS TOGETHER FOR A
CONFERENCE. I HOPE THIS IS THE FIRST OF MANY.
THIS FIRST CONFERENCE IS ESPECIALLY IMPORTANT BECAUSE IT GIVES
ME AN OPPORTUNITY TO TELL YOU WHAT I'VE FOUND IN MY YEAR AND A HALF
HERE, AND TO TELL YOU, AS WELL, WHAT I WOULD LIKE TO SEE HAPPEN WHEN
WE LEAVE THIS CONFERENCE.
I HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO TELL EACH OF YOU INDIVIDUALLY HOW PROUD
*
I AM OF THIS ORGANIZATION AND ITS WORK. I WILL TELL YOU THAT IN MY.
PROFESSIONAL LIFE, I'VE HAD SOME INTERESTING AND CHALLENGING
ASSIGNMENTS. BUT NONE HAVE BEEN MORE DEMANDING OR CHALLENGING THAN
WHAT I'M DOING NOW.
SECRET
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SECRET
AS WE CONSIDER WHAT OUR PART SHOULD BE IN THE NATION'S
COUNTERNARCOTICS EFFORTS, CONSIDER THE EFFECTS OF THE NEW OMNIBUS
DRUG ACT.
AS WE EXAMINE THE EFFECTS OF GORBACHEV'S "NEW THINKING",
CONSIDER THE IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLECTION, FOR ANALYSIS, FOR
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE, AND FOR SUPPORTING THE NEGOTIATION AND
MONITORING OF ARMS AGREEMENTS.
AND AS WE DEAL WITH THE REALITIES OF OVERSIGHT AND WITH THE
RELATIONSHIP WE HAVE BUILT WITH CONGRESS, CONSIDER WHAT EFFECT THE
NUMEROUS BRIEFINGS AND REPORTS THAT WE PROVIDE CONGRESS HAS HAD ON
OUR RESOURCES. LAST YEAR WE PROVIDED OVER 1,000 BRIEFINGS, AND SENT
UP OVER 5,000 REPORTS. OVER 157 OF MY TIME WAS SPENT DEALING WITH
THE HILL. AND I KNOW SOME OF YOU SPENT AT LEAST 257 OF YOUR TIME
DEALING WITH CONGRESSMEN AND THEIR STAFFS. WE MAY, IN THE FUTURE,
LOOK FOR WAYS TO CUT DOWN THE NUMBER OF BRIEFINGS, OR EVEN THE
NUMBER OF REPORTS WE ARE REQUIRED TO SEND, ESPECIALLY IF IT CUTS
SIGNIFICANTLY INTO OUR RESOURCES.
12
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ALL OF THIS IS PRELUDE, OF COURSE, FOR DEALING WITH THE COMING
TRANSITION. WE ALL RECOGNIZE HOW IMPORTANT IT IS TO PROVIDE
COMPLETE SUPPORT TO THE TRANSITION TEAMS. BUT -- AND I HAVE TAKEN
NO POLLS -- I WOULD BET THAT IF WE WANTED A CONSENSUS ON DESCRIBING
A SINGLE EVENT THAT WOULD OCCUPY THE MOST PEOPLE FOR THE LONGEST
TIME WITH THE LEAST VISIBLE PAYOFF, IT WOULD BE PROVIDING
INFORMATION TO TRANSITION TEAMS.
BUT FOR THE NEXT TWO DAYS, LET US PUT ASIDE THE DEMANDS OF
TRANSITION TEAMS, OF CONGRESSMEN, OF SENIOR POLICYMAKERS, OF FOREIGN
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES, AND CONCENTRATE OUR ENERGIES AND CONSIDERABLE
SKILL ON HOW BEST WE CAN USE OUR RESOURCES TO FULFILL OUR MISSION. ,
YOU ARE THE SENIOR MANAGERS I COUNT ON TO MAKE US INTO A
COHESIVE FORWARD-MOVING ORGANIZATION, AND I AM LOOKING FORWARD TO
HEARING YOUR THOUGHTS BOTH ON THE ISSUES I'VE MENTIONED AND ON SOME
OF THE OTHER ISSUES THAT ARE OF CONCERN TO YOU. I WELCOME OUR TIME
13
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SECRET
DOWN HERE AS AN OPPORTUNITY FOR US TO DEAL WITH THE PROBLEMS OF
LEADING THE AGENCY. I LOOK FORWARD TO A CANDID EXCHANGE AND
WORTHWHILE CONFERENCE.
14
SECRET
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e_ y- - (Pr'
O is--
S TAT
STAT
STAT
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
EWA SUP 1,7" oy
SUBJECT: (Optional)
DA Suggested Topics for the DCI Managers' Offsite
FROM:
EXA/DDA
7D18 Hqs
EXTENSION
NO.
DDA 88-1462
TO: (Officer designation, room number, and
building)
DATE
DATE
13 July 1988
, \
DDARP )
LECH
naivEo
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
FORWARDED
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw a line across column after each comment.)
EA/ExDir
7D55 Hqs
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
12.
URIC: EXA/DDA
13.
14.
15.
Distribution:
Orig - Addressee
I - DDA Subject w/att
1 - DDA Chrono w/o att
1 - EXA/DDA Chrono w/att
CCI
EXEc
REG
?s,
FORM 61 0 us( '1"ms tr U.S. Government PrIntipe Gainer ift1S-4941-834/49156
1-79 EDITIONS o -
tie
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C
,z
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STAT
STAT
DDA 88-1462
13 July 1988
MEMORANDUM FOR: Executive Assistant to the Executive Director
FROM:
Carmen M. Diggs
Executive Assistant to the
Deputy Director for Administration
SUBJECT: DA Suggested Topics for the DCI Managers' Offsite
1. Following are suggested discussion topics for the DCI Managers'
offsite to be held in October:
- Individual privacy vs the Agency's need to know. (Interesting conflicts
between what we should and do know and the individual's desire for
privacy and efforts to withhold information).
- Update on new personnel policies and procedures and the future of Agency
pay and compensation systems, an update on the NAPA study.
- Models and procedures for succession planning in the Agency and
strategies and procedures for Executive Development.
- Space planning, especially in the "backfill" area and the Agency's
master plan for the use of outbuildings in the future.
- Promotion Systems in the Agency (IG view).
- A forward look at Agency programs from the Comptroller's perspective
(resources, cuts, etc.).
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STAT
Technology Resource Issues
- Impact of the increasing Agency dependence on information systems.
- Personal Computers (PC's) are the "New Center of the Universe" for
information systems: organizational implications.
- More investment in automation to meet productivity goals.
- Recapitalization of critical information technology is largely unfunded.
- Enhanced training requirements for a static high technology workforce.
2. I do hope this input will be helpful.
2
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CONFIDENTIAL
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SUBJECT: Managers' Offsite Conference
ORIG:EXDIR:JHTaylor:be
Distribution:
0 - DCI Watts.
- Ea Addt'l Adse Watts.
ER w a.. s
- EXDIR Chrono w/atts.
1 - DCI ADM Watts.
[ CONFIDENTIAL
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ER 2015/1 88
EA/ Executive Director
NOTE FOR: DDA
DDI
DDO
DDS&T
SUBJECT:
20 May 1988
Offsite Conference for
Agency Managers
The DCI has indicated that he would like to
pursue the suggestion raised by Jim in the attached
memorandum.
STAT therefore. as been asked to set
up a managers conference
STAT this October. Would
you please offer suggestions to Jim or to Stan with
respect to the most appropriate speakers and for
other topics that you think would be worth
discussing.
STAT
Thank you.
Attachment
cc: D/OTE
EA/EXDIR
EA/EXDIR
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
DCl/DDCI Executive Staff
NOTE FOR: DCI
.SUBJECT: Paperwork on.Off-Site;.
8 October 1988
The otherday...you asked, whether
or not we had.recei.9ed-anyadvance'
paperwork on the Off7Site,Conference.
My answer was no,, not. to my
knowledge. I spoke:.to,Mr., Taylor and .
.he tells me that he did forward a memo
to Bob last May :proposing this
Off-Site and ,that Bob in turn spoke to
. you. about it at .that time.. Attached.
is a copy. of the memo from the
Executive Director to the DUCT.
.441.'44/444,.
1V-Ritlitair"
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i;z
rid
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STAT
ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET
SUBJECT: (optimal)
Off-site Conference for CIA Managers
FROM:
Executive Director
EXTENSION
NO.
ER 2015 88
Dot
17 May 1988
TO: (Offices designation. room number, and
building)
DATE
OFFICER'S
INITIALS
COMMENTS (Number each comment to show from whom
to whom. Draw ? line ?cross column after each comment.)
ItECEPiED
N3RwARDED
1.
Deputy Director of
y Central Intelligence
-...A5.....
2.
3.
E.)( NI.
4.
5.
6.
.
8.
9.
_
10.
lb
12.
DCI
EXEC
REG
13.
14.
15.
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Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Off-Site Managers Conference
30 October - 1 November 1988
'DEPUTY DIREC I OR
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?
Jope.qa Xmciaa
9WD SOS
BOB Gates
Deputy Director
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DCI Off-Site Managers Conference
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ILLEGIB
STAT
STAT
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Attachment J
Page I
MENUS FOR OCT 30 - NOV 1
SUNDAY OCT 30th
HORS D' OEURVES
Barbequed Shrimp
Vegetable Crudite with Curry Dip
Fresh Fruit and Cheese Tray
DINNER
Assorted Tossed Greens with Herb Vineqarette
Roast Tenderloin of Beef with Bernaise Sauce
Stuffed Baked Potato
Fresh Vegetable Medley
Rolls, Butter
Fresh Fruit Cobbler
Coffee
Wine: Red Liberty School Cabernet
MONDAY OCT 31st
BREAKFAST
To be served Buffet Style at each billeting facility. Will need to be
informed if breakfast will need to be served in Quarters 3.
Scrambled eggs, Bacon, Sausaoe Buffet
Toast, Bagels, Pastries
Cereal, Assorted Milk, Fresh Fruit
Orange Juice, Tomato Juice, Coffee, Hot Tea, Sanka
LUNCH
Minestrone Soup
Chunky Chicken Salad Plate with Fresh Fruit
Croissants/ Butter
Raspberry Sorbet
Coffee, Iced Tea
HORS D' OEURVES
FIRE VENISON
Mushrooms Stuffed with Crabmeat
Fresh Vegetable Crudite with Spinach Dip
Fresh Fruit and Cheese Mirror
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Page 2
MENUS Ebn't pg 2
DINNER
Assorted Tossed Greens with Balsamic Vinegarette
Paupeiette of Flounder with Duxelles of Mushrooms
Saffron Potatoes
Fresh Vegetable Medley
Rolls, Butter
Chocolate pate with Apricot sauce
Coffee
Wine: Chateau St. Michelle Chardonnay
TUESDAY NOV 1
BREAKFAST
Pancakes, Bacon, Sausage Links Buffet
Toast, English Muffins, Pastries
Cereal, Assorted Milk, Fresh Fruit
Orange Juice, Grapefruit Juice, Coffee, Saaka, Hot Tea
LUNCH
Tossed Greens with Dressiags
Cold Cut Buffet with: Tuna Salad, Roast Beef, Slice Ham, Sliced Turkey, Salami
Assorted Cheeses and Breads
Relish Tray and Condiments
Yogurt, Potato Chips, Fresh Fruit, Chocolate Brownies
Coffee, Iced Tea
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15: CIA-RDP90G01353R000500570002-7
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15: CIA-RDP90G01353R000500570002-7
SECRET
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/08/15: CIA-RDP90G01353R000500570002-7