YOUR MONTHLY MEETING WITH SENATORS BOREN AND COHEN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G01353R000300320012-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 2, 2013
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 18, 1988
• Content Type: MEMO

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/ I I
18 APR 19
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
The Deputy Director
FROM: John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Your Monthly Meeting with Senators Boren and
Cohen
1. On Tuesday, 19 April, at 1630 you are scheduled to have
your regular monthly meeting with Senators Boren and Cohen.
Sven Holmes and Jim Dykstra will be present.
2. I suggest you may wish to discuss the following
subjects, for which talking points are attached:
-- Senator Kerry's request regarding narcotics.
-- Status of oversight legislation.
-- The statutory IG issue.
-- NIE on Soviet intelligence.
-- SSCI request regarding new collection systems for
START
3. Additional items for which no talking points are
included.
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TOP SECRET
-- You indicated that you wanted to mention to
Senator Boren your concern over the number of--often
repetitive--questions coming to the Agency and the
Intelligence Community from the various Committees of
the House and Senate with which we deal. As a way of
making your point, you may wish to thank Holmes and
Dykstra for their efforts to coordinate and review the
many requests from their staff colleagues and ask that
they not relax their attention to this important
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0CA/Senato ~5 Apr 88)
John L. Helgerson
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OCA 88-1006
31 March 1988
SUBJECT: Conversation with Senate Select Intelligence Committee
(SSCI) Staff Director, Sven Holmes
1. On 29 March 1988 I met with Sven Holmes, Jim Dykstra,
and Jim Currie of the SSCI staff. I passed to them a collection
of materials responding to recent requests from Senators Kerry
and Pell. This request sought CIA materials relating to Noreiga
and drug trafficking, Contras and drug trafficking, and
narcotics and politics in Central America, the Caribbean, and
Cuba.
2. I underscored to the SSCI staffers that the documents
passed did not include material on these subjects already
provided to the Iran-Contra Committee and, similarly, material
we have provided in the past directly to Senator Kerry. It also
does not include material passed on earlier occasions to the
SSCI responding to specific questions regarding these subjects.
3. I noted that this material was, for the most part,
finished intelligence that reflected all significant,
substantive information available to the Agency on the questions
raised by the Senators. I highlighted two papers as being
especially relevant and urged that SSCI staff review them
carefully. One was the DI intelligence assessment on drugs in
Panama ("Panama: Role in the Narcotics Industry" (C/NF)). The
second was a memo from Bob Gates to Mort Abramowitz ("Assessment
of Alleged Connections between Drug Traffickers and Contras")
summarizing all information available to the Agency on the
subject of the Contras and drugs.
4. I noted that the package did not include, and we have
been unable to identify, any significant new body of CIA
information not previously passed to the Congress, such as is
alleged to exist by Senators Kerry and Pell. I noted we did not
plan to proceed further on their request unless we were given
more concrete information about specifically what is wanted.
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SECRET-{
5. I alerted the staffers to two additional problems
regarding these open-ended requests that we regard as fishing
expeditions. The first was the tremendous workload already
carried by our officers who cover events in Panama and
Nicaragua. They cannot reasonably be asked to do a
comprehensive search of all materials in the absence of some
constructive, useful guidelines about what is wanted. Second, I
mentioned that much of the raw material on the subjects
available to the Agency comes from DEA, Defense Attache reports,
State Department and the like. We are not in a position to
provide these reports, except as they are reflected in our
finished intelligence which we have passed to the SSCI.
6. I stated to Sven Holmes that he now has all the material
and information necessary to satisfy any legitimate questions
from Senators Kerry and Pell about what the Agency knew about
these subjects and when it knew it. I urged the SSCI staffers
to make this point to Kerry's and Pell's staff. I authorized
them to make this material available for review in the SSCI
quarters by Senators Kerry and Pell and any properly cleared
staffers from the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC).
7. The SSCI staffers listened carefully to all of the
points mentioned above. Sven Holmes noted that the Kerry and
Pell staffers would not believe that our material "answered the
mail" on this issue. He nevertheless committed the SSCI staff
to review carefully the material we have provided and then
decide how they would respond to their colleagues from SFRC.
8. We at CIA are committed to no further action at this
point, but I have no confidence that the subject will not come
up again fairly soon.
John L. Helgerson
Director of Congressional Affairs
D/OCA/JLH:wcsrl I31 Mar 88)
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INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT LEGISLATION
I am pleased that the Intelligence Oversight Act, as passed by
the Senate, takes into account our concerns regarding the need to
protect sensitive intelligence sources and methods. I know that
you and the Committee staff worked to ensure that this bill would
not inadvertently impede the effective conduct of intelligence
activities.
I also know that you have seen Bob Gates' letter on the
definition of special activities contained in the bill. That
letter reflects our understanding that the definition of special
activities does not change the status quo with respect to when a
Presidential finding is required.
While we are pleased with your intent to maintain the status
quo, we are having discussions with the staff of the
House Intelligence Committee on this issue with the intent of
developing a single definition that would cover all departments or
agencies of the U.S. Government.
I hope that you will keep an open mind toward adopting a single
definition that takes a new and positive approach toward defining
special activities.
I believe this new approach will further clarify what
activities require a Presidential finding. I understand your staff
has a copy of this proposal, and hope they will study it carefully.
(Attached is a copy of the letter from the DDCI to Boren and Cohen
on the definition of special activities.)
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Ccntral Intclligcncc AScncy
UCA Fff SSM
ICA
OCA 88-0747
11 March 1988
The Honorable David L. Boren, Chairman
Select Committee on Intelligence
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510
Dear Mr. Chairman:
We are aware that S. 1721, the Intelligence Oversight Act
of 1988, is scheduled to be considered by the Senate next
week. I am writing to clarify an issue that has arisen with
respect to that legislation.
The issue concerns what types of CIA activities will
require Presidential Findings. It is my understanding that the
definition of "special activities" contained in S. 1721 is
intended to maintain the status quo with respect to when a
Presidential Finding is required. That understanding is
derived from our discussions and from the report accompanying
S. 1721, which states the Committee's intention "to maintain
current law with respect to both CIA and the Executive branch
as a whole, as mutually interpreted and agreed upon by the
Executive branch and the intelligence committees." As you are
aware, we are also working with HPSCI on language for its
version of the oversight bill that may clarify that intent even
further. We hope the result will be a single definition that
would apply to all U.S. Government departments and agencies.
Any definition of "special activities" contained in the
legislation will, of course, be subject to interpretation.
Under existing law, the Hughes-Ryan Amendment, there has been
little disagreement in the majority of circumstances about
those activities for which a Presidential Finding is or is not
required. We expect that to continue if S. 1721 becomes law.
In a few rare circumstances, however, the Agency considers
activities for which that determination is not as clear. We
believe the record will show that the Committee has generally
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been aware of any significant such activities undertaken by the
Agency, even if a Finding was not obtained, as a result of the
Agency's keeping the Committee fully and currently informed of
its intelligence activities. If S. 1721 or similar legislation
becomes law, we intend to continue reporting these activities
as we have in the past.
We do not interpret the intent of the legislation as
changing this approach. If this is not consistent with your
view of the intention of this legislation, Director Webster and
I would appreciate the opportunity to discuss this matter
directly with you and the Vice-Chairman. A similar letter is
being sent to the Vice-Chairman.
obert M./fates
Acting Director of Cen ral Intelligence
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Statutory Inspector General Legislation
I was grateful for the opportunity to appear before the
Committee last March to express my concerns regarding Senator
Specter's bill to establish a statutory Inspector General at CIA.
I now understand that Senator Specter is submitting an amendment
(attached) to this year's Intelligence Authorization bill, that
while affirming the Inspector General as a DCI appointee, would
also establish separate Inspector General reporting requirements to
the Congress.
--I continue to oppose any such separate IG reporting
requirements for the reasons I outlined at the hearing;
namely the Director of Central Intelligence must be the
responsible and accountable official for all matters
related to congressional reporting.
--Imposing an independent and discrete statutory duty on
the Inspector General would derogate from my existing
statutory responsibility to protect intelligence sources
and methods, and will inevitably lead to a perception by
our colleagues and contacts abroad that the DCI cannot
ultimately protect and control sensitive information
entrusted to the CIA.
--Furthermore, I am concerned that attaching the Specter
proposal to the authorization bill may result in the
bill being referred to the Governmental Affairs
Committee, which could well add more stringent
requirements to the IG provisions. Accordingly, I
continue to ask your support in opposing the amended
version of the Specter proposal.
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STATUTORY INSPECTOR GENERAL
Amended Bill
Bill codifies to some degree what is already the practice:
o -- Non-partisan appointment and removal by Director of
Central Intelligence;
o -- Direct reporting to the Director;
o -- Independent initiation and conduct of inspection,
investigations and audits; and
o -- Direct access to all records and to the Director.
Bill adds the following new points:
o -- Sets qualifications for IC based on demonstrated
ability in accounting, financial analysis, law, management
analysis or public administration;
o -- Gives the IG subpoena power;
o -- If the Director prohibits the IC from initiating,
carrying out or completing an audit, inspection or
investigation or from issuing a subpoena, he must notify the
oversight committees within seven days;
o -- If the Director removes the IG from office, he must
immediately notify the oversight committees and explain why;
o -- If the IG and the Director differ with respect to the
IG's duties and powers, the IG must report the matter to the
oversight committees within seven days; and
o - - The IG must prepare semiannual reports summarizing his
office's activities and give them to the Director, who will
then transmit them to the oversight committees.
The amended bill is attached.
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3/18/88
A Bill To establish an Inspector General for the CIA.
The Central Intelligence Agency Act of 1949 is amended by
adding after Sec 16 the following:
of INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY"
"Sec 17. (a) Purpose; Establishment. In order to create an
objective and effective unit, appropriately
accountable to the Congress, to initiate and conduct
independently, inspections, investigations and audits
relating to programs and operations of the Central Intelligence
Agency, there is hereby established in the CIA an office of
Inspector General.
"(b) Appointment and Removal. There shall be at the head
of the office an Inspector General who shall be appointed by
the Director of Central Intelligence. This appointment shall be
made without regard to political affiliation and shall be made
solely on the basis of integrity, the security standards of the
CIA and on prior experience in the field of foreign
intelligence. Such appointment shall also be made on the basis
of demonstrated ability in accounting, financial analysis, law,
management analysis or public administration. The Inspector
General shall report directly to and be under the general
supervision of the Director of Central Intelligence.
"(c) The Director may prohibit the Inspector General from
initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit, inspection or
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investigation, or from issuing any subpoena, concerning only
ongoing operations, and only if he determines that such
prohibition is necessary to protect vital national security
interests of the United States.
"(d) If the Director exercises any power under subsection
(c) of this section, he shall submit an appropriately classified
statement of the reasons for the exercise of the power within
seven (7) days to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
"(e) The Inspector General may be removed from office only
by the Director of Central Intelligence. The Director shall
immediately communicate in writing to the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select
Committee the reasons for any such removal.
"(f) Duties and Powers. (1) It shall be the duty and
responsibility of the Inspector General appointed under this
Act--
"(A) to provide policy direction for and to conduct,
supervise, and coordinate independently, the inspections,
investigations and audits relating to the programs and
operations of the CIA to assure they are conducted efficiently
and in accordance with applicable law and regulations; and
"(B) to keep the Director fully and currently
informed concerning violations of laws
and regulations, fraud and other serious problems, abuses and
deficiencies and to report the progress made in implementing
corrective action.
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"(2) In the event the Inspector General is unable to
resolve any differences with the Director on the execution of
his duties and powers, he shall report such matter to
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence within seven (7)
days.
"(g) The Inspector General shall have the power to issue
subpoenas, as may be necessary, to carry out his work.
In addition, he shall have direct access to all records and
direct and prompt access to the Director when necessary for any
purpose pertaining to the performance of his duties.
"(h) Reports. The Inspector General shall not later than
April 30 and October 30 of each year, prepare a classified
semiannual report summarizing the activities of the Office
during the immediately preceding six-month periods ending
March 31 and September 30. Such reports also should include
information contained in subsection (f)(l)(B).
"(i) Classified semiannual reports of the Inspector
General shall be furnished to the Director not later than
April 30 and October 30 of each year and shall be transmitted
by him to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and to the
House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence Representatives
within 30 days after receipt, together with any comments he
deems appropriate."
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IS April i9Rg
Background
TALKING POINTS FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL iNTELLIGtNC;
FOR USE DURING HIS 19 APRIL MEETING WITH
SSCI CNAIRMEN ?UREN AND COHEN
o The Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Senate Select Ccw+mvIt tee in
Intelligence (SSCI) wrote you on 16 March seeking
"your profes:icnal ,.dvIL.- as to any audltion,tI (apai,illtlr\ y?tI d_~'m
are needed by US intelligence to cope with potential ihreats to oun
security in the 1990s, particularly in the context of a potential
START agreement. "
o Should the subject of the letter arise in Tuesday's meeting with SSCI
leadership, D/ICS suggests a response along the following llne%
Talking Points
o Thank you for seeking our advice on this Important issue.
o In preparing our response, we are addressing ou- needs in a broader
context than the challenges of a START accord, along the 1 iioe% ckrkipleted
last September on strengthening US Intelligence capabilities aq.:in;t the
Soviet military In the 1990
o Intelligence Community members. collectively and separately. have done
considerable work relevant to this Issue since then. We gave been sh,-iinq
this work with all the elements of US iuitrlligence.
o The basis for our .esponse will be the September repo t plus the new w(+-k
that has been done in the meantime.
o Moreover, in our response we are taking into account the impact of the
National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) cuts for FY 19RQ, which will
make it even more datintiny to address future problems.
o Last Friday (15 April) the Intelligence community Staff citiculatrd an
initial draft of our response among Community members.
Tomorrow (20 April), a meeting of senior intelligence officlalc will
be held to address the draft and any major problems.
A complete, coordinated package will be on my desk for signature tiv
Friday--22 April.
o He intend to have the response in your hands before the mark-up begins on
Tuesday morning, 26 April.
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