NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER HEARINGS BEFORE THE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE OF THE UNITED STATES SENATE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 243
• Document Creation Date: January 4, 2017
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 1, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
TRA SMITTAL SLIP
DATE
TO: O/I>Dc,//,
ROOM O.
7,h O
BUILDI
REMARKS:
tej
FROM: cM S,SS
ROOM NO.
!f`D S
FORM NO. REPLACES FORM 36-8
1 FEB 56 241 WHICH MAY BE USED.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
HEARINGS
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDREDTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8; THURSDAY, APRIL 9; THURSDAY, APRIL 30; AND
FRIDAY, MAY 1, 1987
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
75-691 WASHINGTON : 1987
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, Congressional Sales Office
U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, DC 20402
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
[Established by S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., 2d Sees.]
DAVID L. BOREN, Oklahoma, Chairman
WILLIAM S. COHEN, Maine, Vice Chairman
LLOYD BENTSEN, Texas WILLIAM V. ROTH, Ja., Delaware
SAM NUNN, Georgia ORRIN HATCH, Utah
ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina FRANK MURKOWSKI, Alaska
BILL BRADLEY, New Jersey ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania
ALAN CRANSTON, California CHIC HECHT, Nevada
DENNIS DaCONCINI, Arizona JOHN WARNER, Virginia
HOWARD M. METZENBAUM, Ohio
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Ex Officio
ROBERT DOLE, Kansas, Ex Officio
SvEN E. Houses, Staff Director and General Counsel
JAMES H. Dvas'raA, Minority Staff Director
KATHLEEN P. McGHxz, Chief Clerk
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
CONTENTS
Hearings held in Washington, DC: Page
April 8, 1987 .............................................................................................................. 1
April 9, 1987 .............................................................................................................. 133
April 30, 1987 ............................................................................................................ 163
May 1, 1987 ................................................................................................................ 223
Statement of.
Boren, Hon. David L., a U.S. Senator from the State of Oklahoma and
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ......................... 1
Bond, Hon. Christopher S., a U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri......... 56
Cohen, Hon. William S., a U.S. Senator from the State of Maine and Vice
Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ......................... 46
Cranston, Hon. Alan, a U.S. Senator from the State of California ................ 94
Danforth, Hon. John C., a U.S. Senator from the State of Missouri .............. 55
DeConcini, Hon. Dennis, a U.S. Senator from the State of Arizona .............. 47
Hatch, Hon. Orrin, a U.S. Senator from the State of Utah ............................. 49
Hecht, Hon. Chic, a U.S. Senator from the State of Nevada ........................... 55
Hollings, Hon. Ernest F., a U.S. Senator from the State of South Carolina 72
Metzenbaum, Hon. Howard M., a U.S. Senator from the State of Ohio ....... 108
Moynihan, Hon. Daniel P., a U.S. Senator from the State of New York...... 51
Murkowski, Hon. Frank, a U.S. Senator from the State of Alaska ............... 49
Roth, Hon. William V., Jr., a U.S. Senator from the State of Delaware....... 48
Specter, Hon. Arlen, a U.S. Senator from the State of Pennsylvania ........... 50
Warner, Hon. John, a U.S. Senator from the State of Virginia ..................... 50
Webster, Hon. William H., nominee for Director of Central Intelligence .... 58
Supplemental materials, letters, etc.:
Boren, Hon. David L., Chairman of the Select Committee on Intelligence
and Hon. William S. Cohen, Vice Chairman of the Select Committee on
Intelligence, letter to Judge William Webster, April 1, 1987 ...................... 3
Detroit Free Press, newspaper articles concerning FBI inquiries of city
court judges ........................................................................................................... 186
Edwards, Hon. Don, a U.S. Congressman from the State of California,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights, a letter to
Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence on
March 30, 1987 with enclosures ......................................................................... 16
Financial Disclosure Report ................................................................................... 28
Herst, Esther, Legislative Advisor, National Committee Against Repres-
sive Legislation ..................................................................................................... 23
Las Vegas Sun, newspaper articles concerning nomination of William
Webster ................................................................................................................... 89
Meese, Attorney General, excerpts from testimony on December 17, 1986.. 41
Memorandum explaining processing of Teletype dated July 18, 1985........... 179
Moynihan, Hon. Daniel P., a letter to Chairman David L. Boren, April 8,
1987 ......................................................................................................................... 52
Procedures Governing Reporting to the Senate Select Committee on Intel-
ligence on Covert with Addendum .................................................................... 52
Questionnaire Supplement ..................................................................................... 3
Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential Nominees ................................ 7
Ratner, Margaret, Education Director, Center for Constitutional Rights, a
letter to John Elliff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
April 1, 1987 .......................................................................................................... 20
Struve, Guy Miller, Associate Counsel, letter to Sven Holmes, Staff Direc-
tor, Select Committee on Intelligence, March 25, 1987 ................................. 45
Schroeder, Hon. Pat, a U.S. Congresswoman from the State of Colorado, a
letter to William Webster, March 13, 1987 ..................................................... 18
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Supplemental materials, letters, etc.-Continued
Webster, Hon. William H., Director FBI:
A letter to Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence, in response to letter with Questionnaire Supplement,
April 6, 1987 ...................................................................................................
A letter to Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence with enclosure, April 13, 1987 ..............................................
A letter to Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence with enclosures, April 17, 1987 ............................................
A letter to Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence with enclosure, April 22, 1987 ..............................................
A letter to Hon. David L. Boren, Chairman, Select Committee on
Intelligence with enclosure, May 6, 1987 .................................................
Remarks before the Association of Former Intelligence Officers, De-
cember 8, 1986 ...............................................................................................
Speech before the National Security Agency, October 27, 1986 ..............
Zogby, Dr. James Jr., Executive Director, Arab American Institute .............
Appendix ............................................................................................................................
Page
4
163
166
173
184
225
230
26
237
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER TO BE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
WEDNESDAY, APRIL 8, 1987
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13 o'clock
a.m., in room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. David
Boren (chairman of the committee), presiding.
Present: Senators Boren, Nunn, Hollings, Bradley, Cranston,
DeConcini, Metzenbaum, Cohen, Roth, Hatch, Murkowski, Specter,
Hecht, and Warner.
Staff present: Sven E. Holmes, Staff Director and General Coun-
sel; James Dykstra, Minority Staff Director; and Kathleen McGhee,
Chief Clerk.
STATEMENT OF HON. DAVID L. BOREN, A U.S. SENATOR FROM
THE STATE OF OKLAHOMA AND CHAIRMAN OF THE SENATE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Chairman BOREN. The committee will come to order.
We are here today to consider the nomination of William H.
Webster to be the Director of Central Intelligence. This hearing
itself is a unique occasion. I know of no other Nation where the
selection of the top intelligence official would receive so much scru-
tiny. This process reflects our determination that while a democra-
cy must legitimately protect the secrecy of some information and
operations, the intelligence gathering process must still be ulti-
mately accountable to the people through their elected representa-
tives.
Through this confirmation process, our responsibility as the
members of the Select Committee is to determine whether this
nominee is qualified to serve as the Director of Central Intelli-
gence. Accordingly, it is our responsibility to undertake a careful,
thorough and fair examination of the background of this nominee.
We do this in troubled times, in the midst of the present investiga-
tion by 2 special congressional committees and by an independent
counsel of a covert action program involving allegations of illegal
or improper activities by high government officials, including the
CIA.
This committee and the Senate have a duty to the American
people to ensure that the new Director of Central Intelligence will
conduct a program of effective intelligence gathering within the
framework of our laws and our democratic institutions. It is imper-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
ative that the Director of Central Intelligence be a person of excep-
tional ability and integrity, capable of exercising the independence
necessary to protect against any possible misuse of the Agency and
its resources.
Judge Webster, I welcome you and feel certain that you recog-
nize the magnitude of the new challenge that you have accepted. I
would add to that challenge by asking that in responding to our
questions today, you keep in mind the pressing need for this
Nation to bring order to the disarray in our foreign policy, and the
need for all of us to go forward together in a bipartisan way to con-
structively address the urgent and important problems which we
face.
As DCI, you would have 3 roles to perform: senior intelligence
advisor to the President of the United States; coordinator of the
entire intelligence community; and Director of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. I am sure that part of your deliberation concerning
your decision to accept this nomination centered upon the tremen-
dous burdens that you know from your experience in counterintel-
ligence, rests on the shoulders of the Director of Central Intelli-
gence.
You have served as the Chairman of the Interagency Group on
Counterintelligence, a committee of the National Security Council.
The first National Counterintelligence Strategy was developed
under your leadership, improving the coordination between the
FBI, the CIA, and other related agencies.
If confirmed as DCI, you will chair the Senior Interagency Group
on Intelligence of the National Security Council, which greatly in-
creases your responsibilities to further develop the overall National
Intelligence Strategy. We must continue to concentrate on long-
term strategic planning to meet the ever expanding need for timely
and accurate information.
The competing demands upon the budget and the limited re-
sources we have available make this job even more difficult. Great
advances have been made in our intelligence capabilities, but we
must continue to invest in this most important endeavor.
Our entire intelligence effort depends upon dedicated and profes-
sional career personnel, and this requires concentrated attention to
improve career incentives and training in order to recruit the best
possible available talent, and also to retain present valued employ-
ees. And this committee has again and again put emphasis on the
personnel system and the need to continue to upgrade it and im-
prove it.
There appears to be some progress in the ongoing arms control
talks between the United States and the Soviet Union. That makes
it imperative for us to analyze the present methods of verification
and to correct any shortcomings in order to guarantee our national
security. And if you are confirmed to this post as Director of Cen-
tral Intelligence, of course those of us who serve on this committee
jointly have a heavy responsibility in the area of assuring the abili-
ty to verify any arms control agreement.
This committee is interested in your activities with respect to the
Iran-Contra matter, and we appreciate your responding to some
written questions that the Vice Chairman and I sent to you to sup-
plement the standard committee questionnaire for nominees. We
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
have also received letters regarding your nomination from Repre-
sentative Don Edwards, Chairman of the House Judiciary Subcom-
mittee that oversees the FBI, and from Representative Pat Schroe-
der. Both are concerned about recent allegations of improper FBI
activity. In addition, we have received statements from the Center
for Constitutional Rights, the National Committee Against Repres-
sive Legislation, and from the Arab American Institute. Without
objection, these statements and letters will be placed in the record
at this point.
[The documents referred to follow:]
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC, April 1, 1987.
Judge WILLIAM WEBSTER,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
J. Edgar Hoover Building, Washington, DC.
DEAR JUDGE WEBSTER: The Senate Select Committee on Intelligence has an impor-
tant responsibility to consider your nomination as Director of Central Intelligence
in a comprehensive manner. As you know, we are especially interested in any role
you may have had in matters that are currently under investigation by two special
Congressional committees and an independent counsel.
In the course of preparation for the hearing on your nomination, the Committee
has received information that you were advised as early as July, 1986, of the exist-
ence of the operation to transfer arms to Iran pursuant to a Presidential Finding. A
complete record of your knowledge and involvement would greatly assist the Com-
mittee's consideration of your nomination.
Therefore, we are submitting herewith a supplement to the questionnaire that is
normally completed by nominees considered by this Committee. These additional
questions are intended to provide a comprehensive record with respect to topics of
special concern that are presented by these unique circumstances. We request that
your sworn responses to these supplemental questions be provided to the Committee
as soon as possible in order that they may be available prior to the date of your
confirmation hearing. Of course, if portions of the responses are classified, such re-
sponses should be submitted separately.
Thank you for your cooperation.
Sincerely,
DAVID L. BOREN,
Chairman.
WILLIAM S. COHEN,
Vice Chairman.
QUESTIONNAIRE SUPPLEMENT
1. On what date did you first learn information, either directly or indirectly, from
sources other than public media, regarding the sale of arms to Iran. Describe that
information, and what actions you took, directed or advised upon learning such in-
formation?
2. Since the date set forth in your response to question number 1 above, through
November 26, 1986, state what information that you have subsequently learned,
either directly or indirectly, from sources other than public media, regarding the
sale of arms to Iran. State when you learned such information, describe such infor-
mation and describe what actions you took, directed or advised upon learning such
information.
3. On what date did you first learn information, either directly or indirectly, from
sources other than public media, regarding activities by U.S. officials that had the
purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized assistance to the Nicaraguan
resistance during the period that such assistance was prohibited by law. Describe
that information, and what actions you took, directed, or advised upon learning
such information?
4. After the date set forth in your response to question number 3 above, through
November 26, 1986, state what information you learned, either directly or indirect-
ly, from sources other than public media, regarding activities by U.S. officials that
had the purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized assistance to the Nica-
raguan resistance during the period that such assistance was prohibited by law. De-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
scribe that information, state when you learned such information and describe what
actions you took, directed or advised upon learning such information. Please include
in your response any information known to you with respect to activities involving
Southern Air Transport.
5. Describe any information that you received or conversations that you had on or
before November 26, 1986, regarding any inquiry by or on behalf of the Attorney
General concerning U.S. arms transfers to Iran, the possible diversion of proceeds
from such transfers to the Nicaraguan resistance and any activities by U.S. officials
that had the purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized assistance to the
Nicaraguan resistance during the period that such assistance was prohibited by law.
State when and how you learned such information, or describe any such conversa-
tions and state what actions, if any, you took, directed or advised upon learning
such information or upon having such conversations? As part of your response,
please state whether or not you advised the Attorney General as to whether such
inquiry should be treated as a criminal investigation.
6. Describe any information presently known to you, either directly or indirectly,
concerning any intelligence activities that you have reason to believe may be unlaw-
ful or contrary to Executive Order, which have not been reported to the Intelligence
Oversight Board, or any activities by U.S. intelligence officials, including, without
limitation, FBI, CIA, and NSC personnel, which may involve violation of any federal
criminal law which have not been reported to the Attorney General.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Washington DC, April 6, 1987.
Hon. DAVID L. BOREN,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: This is in response to the letter from yourself and Vice
Chairman William S. Cohen to me dated April 1, 1987, which enclosed a "Question-
naire Supplement."
I have enclosed an unclassified response which addresses the six additional ques-
tions posed.
Sincerely,
Enclosure.
The following information is supplied in response to United States Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence Supplemental Questionnaire provided by letter to me
dated April 1, 1987 signed by David L. Boren, Chairman, and William S. Cohen,
Vice Chairman.
Question 1. On what date did you first learn information, either directly or indi-
rectly, from sources other than public media, regarding the sale of arms to Iran.
Describe that information, and what actions you took, directed or advised upon
learning such information?
Answer. On or around August 5, 1986, following a briefing by the Criminal Inves-
tigative Division, Executive Assistant Director Oliver B. Revell asked to speak pri-
vately with me. Mr. Revell is my representative on the Operations Sub-Group
(OSG), Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) of the National Security Council
(NSC). Mr. Revell advised that he had learned at a regular meeting of the OSG of
an on-going strategic initiative authorized by the President toward an element of
the Iranian Government.
Lt. Colonel Oliver North, the NSC Coordinator for the TIWG, had advised the
OSG members of the President's concern with the strategic importance of Iran and
the need for the United States to have an ability to deal with a post-Khomeini
regime. Lt. Colonel North had advised that the President had authorized a covert
initiative to make contact with an element of the Iranian Government. North had
further advised that in order to show the good faith of the American Emissaries and
their backing by the President, the President authorized a shipment of a small
number of anti-tank missiles and other spare parts. As part of this initiative, the
Iranian group had agreed to use their influence to obtain the release of American
hostages held by radical Shia elements in Lebanon.
Mr. Revell also advised me that Lt. Colonel North had stated that the Attorney
General had reviewed and approved the Presidential fording and that the initiative
had been reviewed by the NSC members. Thus, I became aware that the initiative
was on-going, but I did not know when it had originated. Because the initiative as
described to me represented an apparent departure from the public position of the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
United States with respect to international terrorism, and in order to confirm that
such actions were supported by a Presidential finding, I concluded that I should dis-
cuss this with the Attorney General. I do not recall the exact date that I was able to
discuss this with him personally, but it was shortly following receipt of the informa-
tion from Mr. Revell, possibly the same day. I do recall that following a meeting in
the Attorney General's dining room, I asked to speak to him for a few moments in
his adjacent office. I told him that I had become aware through the OSG meetings
that there was an Iranian initiative involving the shipment of arms and had been
informed that it was supported by a Presidential finding which he had reviewed. I
told him my purpose of inquiring was to be sure of his awareness and approval of
the actions taken. The Attorney General advised me that he was indeed aware of
the initiative and that he had reviewed a finding although it may have been a draft
finding.
Mr. Revell had told me that the FBI had not been asked to take any action to
support the initiative and since the Attorney General had confirmed his awareness
and approval of the initiative, there were no further actions indicated. I informed
Mr. Revell of my conversation with the Attorney General. To my knowledge this
information was not disseminated to any other officials in the FBI, until after the
President's televised speech on November 13, 1986.
Since the 1979 abdication of the Shah of Iran and the establishment of the Islamic
Republic of Iran, the FBI has received and investigated several allegations of arms
trafficking to Iran. In addition, some U.S. Customs investigations have also come to
FBI attention and other FBI investigations were ultimately referred to U.S. Cus-
toms. To my knowledge none of the above investigations surfaced allegations or in-
formation involving U.S. Government sanctioned arms shipments to Iran.
Question 2. Since the date set forth in your response to question number 1 above,
through November 26, 1986, state what information that you have subsequently
learned, either directly or indirectly, from sources other than public media, regard-
ing the sale of arms to Iran. State when you learned such information, describe such
information and describe what actions you took, directed or advised upon learning
such information.
Answer. On September 18, 1986, I submitted a request to the Attorney General
for authorization to provide assistance within the United States to another U.S.
agency concerning efforts to obtain the release of American hostages held in Leba-
non. There was no indication in the information provided to the FBI concerning this
request that any sale of arms to Iran was involved.
On October 14, 1986, following my return to FBI Headquarters after several days
absence from the city, I was informed by Executive Assistant Director Revell that
he had received a telephone call on October 8, 1986, from Lt. Colonel North while
Mr. Revell was attending a convention of the International Association of Chiefs of
Police in Nashville, Tennessee. According to Mr. Revell, North had advised him that
a civilian C-123 aircraft, allegedly of American registry, had crashed in Nicaragua.
North stated that he had learned earlier that day that FBI Agents were reported to
have visited the offices of the Southern Air Transport Company in Miami, Florida,
in connection with the crash. North was concerned that FBI Agents conducting the
investigation might inadvertently discover that Southern Air Transport Company
was involved in the situation concerning the hostages previously disclosed by North
to Revell. Colonel North wanted to emphasize to Revell and to me that the negotia-
tion process was at a very critical stage and that any inadvertent disclosure could
have serious adverse results. I took no personal action with respect to this informa-
tion. Executive Assistant Director Revell had already contacted the Miami Field
Office to ascertain the nature of the FBI inquiry and to obtain a teletype report.
After conferring with Floyd Clarke, Assistant Director, Criminal Investigative Di-
vision, on October 30, 1986, I honored a request by the Attorney General to suspend
for ten days any nonurgent work on a separate preliminary inquiry into a possible
Neutrality Act violation involving Southern Air Transport, due to pending sensitive
hostage negotiations. Authority to resume the inquiry was subsequently obtained
November 20, 1986.
On October 31, 1986, I was informed by Mr. Revell that hostage negotiations were
expected to result in the release of hostages in the near future and that an FBI hos-
tage debriefing team was being placed on immediate standby for deployment if hos-
tages were released. This information required no action on my part.
On or about November 11, 1986, newspaper articles began to appear revealing the
Iranian arms sales. This was followed by a series of statements by various public
officials including a televised report by the President. I received no additional fac-
tural information about the arms sales by U.S. officials or U.S. agencies to Iran
until after the press conference by the President and the Attorney General on Tues-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
day, November 25, 1986, which publicly disclosed that funds from the arms sales
may have been diverted to the Nicaraguan Contra organization.
Following the press conference, I met with the Attorney General, and the details
of this meeting on November 25 are discussed in my response to question number 3.
Question y. On what date did you first learn information, either directly or indi-
rectly, from sources other than public media, regarding activities by U.S. officials
that had the purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized assistance to the
Nicaraguan resistance during the period that such assistance was prohibited by law.
Describe that information, and what actions you took, directed, or advised upon
learning such information?
Answer. Since the fall of the Somoza regime, the FBI has conducted a number of
investigations in which allegations were made of illegal aid to the Contras-but
none to my knowledge involved U.S. officials providing illegal or unauthorized as-
sistance . The first knowledge I had of any possible activity by U.S. officials provid-
ing illegal or unauthorized assistance came to me during the press conference of the
President and the Attorney General on November 25, 1986, and at the meeting in
the Attorney General's office immediately following. The Attorney General had re-
ported that a document had been located in Lt. Colonel Oliver North's records indi-
cating a proposal to divert Iranian arms funds to the Contras. He advised that Colo-
nel North and Admiral Poindexter had been interviewed over the weekend along
with other members of the National Security Council and the National Security
Council staff. At the meeting, the Attorney General advised that he had given the
Criminal Division of the Department of Justice the responsibility for ascertaining
what laws if any may have been violated. He advised me that as soon as that infor-
mation was complete he would determine whether to authorize a criminal investiga-
tion by the FBI. There was a discussion of how best to preserve the records, and the
Attorney General stated that the Department would undertake to advise the appro-
priate offices to preserve and to protect their records.
I returned to my office and met with Executive Assistant Director Revell and As-
sistant Director (Criminal Division) Floyd I. Clarke. I reviewed the discussion with
them, advised them that I anticipated authority to open the investigation shortly
and asked them to prepare to move promptly when so authorized. On Wednesday
morning, November 26, 1986, I received a telephone call from the Attorney General
authorizing the FBI to commence its investigation. I immediately communicated
this information to Assistant Director Floyd Clarke and the investigation began. Mr.
Clarke met later in the day with the Department of Justice officials. The FBI there-
after continued its investigation unabaited by the announcement of the appoint-
ment of an Independent Counsel. Following this assumption of responsibilities, a
team of Special Agents was detailed to assist the Independent Counsel.
Question 4. After the date set forth in your response to question number 3 above,
through November 26, 1986, state what information you learned, either directly or
indirectly, from sources other than public media, regarding activities by U.S. offi-
cials that had the purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized assistance to
the Nicaraguan resistance during the period that such assistance was prohibited by
law. Describe that information, state when you learned such information and de-
scribe what actions you took, directed or advised upon learning such information.
Please include in your response any information known to you with respect to ac-
tivities involving Southern Air Transport.
Answer. This question is answered by my response to # 2 and # 3.
Question 5. Describe any information that you received or conversations that you
had on or before November 26, 1986, regarding any inquiry by or on behalf of the
Attorney General concerning U.S. Arms transfers to Iran, the possible diversion of
proceeds from such transfers to the Nicaraguan resistance and any activities by
U.S. officials that had the purpose or effect of providing illegal or unauthorized as-
sistance to the Nicaraguan resistance during the period that such assistance was
prohibited by law. State when and how you learned such information, or describe
any such conversations and state what actions, if any, you took, directed or advised
upon learning such information or upon havin? such conversations? As part of your
response, please state whether or n of you advised the Attorney as to whether such
inquiry should be treated as a criminal investigation.
Answer. This question is answered in question number 3. I did not specifically
advise the Attorney General whether the inquiry he had been asked to undertake
by the President should be treated as a criminal in tion. On November 21,
1986, when the Attorney General informed me of this p uctive inquiry, I knew of
no facts suggesting criminal activity, and he stated that he knew of none either. My
offer of assistance at that time was more in terms of providing manpower and sup-
port for his inquiry.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Question 6. Describe any information presently known to you, either directly or
indirectly, concerning any intelligence activities that you have reason to believe
may be unlawful or contrary to Executive Order, which have not been reported to
the Intelligence Oversight Board, or any activities by U.S. intelligence officials, in-
cluding, without limitation, FBI, CIA, and NSC personnel, which may involve viola-
tion of any federal criminal law which have not been reported to the Attorney Gen-
eral.
Answer. None. No such information is known.
I, William H. Webster, do swear that the answers I have provided to this question-
naire are, to the best of my knowledge, accurate and complete.
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER.
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE, U.S. SENATE
QUESTIONNAIRE FOR COMPLETION BY PRESIDENTIAL NOMINEES
Part A-Biographical information
1. Name: William Hedgcock Webster.
2. Date and place of birth: March 6, 1924, St. Louis, Missouri.
3. Marital status: Widower.
4. Spouse's name: Drusilla.
5. Spouse's maiden name if applicable: Lane.
6. Names and ages of children: Drusilla Webster Busch, 33; William H. Webster,
Jr., 31; Katherine Webster Roessle, 26.
7. Education since high school:
Amherst College, 1941-43; 1946-47, A.B., 5/47.
Williams College, 1943, V-12 U.S.N.R.
Columbia University, 3/44-6/44, Midshipmen's School.
Washington University Law School, 1947-49, J.D., 5/49.
8. Employment record (list all positions held since college, including military serv-
ice. Indicate name of employer, position title or description, location, and dates of
employment):
U.S. Navy, Lt. Junior Grade, Pacific, 7/43-10/48.
McDonald & Wright, Part-time during law school, St. Louis, MO, 1949.
Cobbs, Armstrong, Teasdale & Roos, Associate, St. Louis, MO, 1949-50.
U.S. Navy, Lt. Senior Grade, Far East, 1950-52.
Armstrong, Teasdale Kramer & Vaughan, Partner, St. Louis, MO, 1952-60; 1961-
70.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. Attorney, St. Louis, MO, 1960-61.
Judiciary, U.S. District Judge, St. Louis, MO, 1971-73.
Judiciary, U.S. Circuit Judge, Eighth Circuit, 1973-78.
U.S. Dept. of Justice, FBI Director, Washington, DC, 1978-Present.
9. Government experience (indicate experience in or association with Federal,
State or local governments, including advisory, consultative, honorary or other part-
time service or position. Do not repeat information already provided in answer to
question 8):
Member, Missouri Board of Law Examiners-appointed by Supreme Court of Mis-
souri, Jefferson City, MO (part-time), 1964-1969.
Chairman, St. Louis County Decent Literature Commission, appointed by St.
Louis County Supervisors & confirmed by County Council under Decent Literature
Code (part-time) 1963-1969.
St. Louis County Public Defender Advisory Board. Member designated by Metro-
politan Bar Association (part-time), 1962-1970.
Member of Ad Hoc Committee on Habeas Corpus, Washington, DC, 1975-1978.
Member, Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, Washing-
ton, DC, 1971-1978. (Chairman 1977-789).
10. Honors and awards (provide information on scholarships, fellowships. honor-
ary degrees, military decoration, civilian service citations, or any other special rec-
ognition for outstanding performance or achievement):
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Honorary degrees:
Amherst College, Amherst, MA.
DePauw University, Greencastle, IN.
William Woods College, Fulton, MO.
Drury College, Springfield, MO.
Washington University, St. Louis, MO.
Columbia College, Columbia, MO.
University of Dayton School of Law, Dayton, OH.
University of Notre Dame, South Bend, IN.
Centre College, Danville, KY.
Dickinson School of Law, Carlisle, PA.
University of Miami, Coral Gables, FL.
DePaul University, Chicago, IL.
The American University, Washington, DC.
John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York City.
Awards and other citations:
Man of the Year, 1980 by the St. Louis Globe-Democrat.
William Greenleaf Elliott Award from Washington University, 1981.
Riot Relief Fund Award, New York City, 1981.
Fordham Law School Louis Stein Award, 10/82.
International Platform Association Theodore Roosevelt Award for excellence in
public service, 8/83.
American University William Moss Award, 1/83.
Jefferson Award for the Greatest Public Service by an Elected or Appointed Offi-
cial, 6/84.
Freedoms Foundation, Valley Forge, PA, National Service Medal, 5/85.
Patrick V. Murphy Award from Police Foundation, for distinguished service in
law enforcement, 5/85.
Father of the Year for Public Service, by the National Father's Day Committee,
5/86.
Thomas Jefferson Award in Law from the University of Virginia, 1986.
11. Organizational affiliations (list memberships in and offices held within the last
ten years in any professional, civic, fraternal, business, scholarly, cultural, charita-
ble or other similar organizations):
Academy of Missouri Squires, Jefferson City, MO, Nonprofit, 1982-present,
Member.
Alfalfa Club, Washington, DC, Nonprofit, 1/79-present, President, 1/83-1/84
Alibi Club, Washington, DC, Nonprofit, 1982-present, Member.
American Bar Association, Chicago, IL, Law, 1953-present, Member.
American Bar Assoc., Corporation Section, Chicago, IL, Law, 1968-present, Chair-
man, 1977-78.
American Law Institute, Philadelphia, PA, Law Ed., 1978-present, Council
Member.
American University, Washington, DC, University, 1982-present, National Adviso-
ry Bd.
American Bar Foundation Fellow, Chicago, IL, Law, 1968-present, Life Member.
Amherst Alumni Assn., Amherst, MA, College, 1947-present, President, St. Louis,
1966-68, VP 1969-70.
Arlington, "Y", Arlington, VA, Athletic, 1978-present, Member.
Delta Sigma RHO, Amherst, MA, Forensic Fraternityy, 1947-present, Member.
District of Columbia Bar, Washington, DC, Law, 1/81-present, Member.
Federal Bar Assn., Washington, DC Law, 1960-, Member.
International Tennis, Tennis Foundation & Hall of Fame, Inc., Newport, RI, Non-
profit, 1980 present, Member, Bd. of Directors Advisory Comm.
International Assn. Chiefs of Police, Gaithersburg, MD, Law Enforcement 1978-
present, Member.
Institute of Judicial Administration, New York, NY, Law, 1985-present, President.
Jefferson National Expansion Memorial Assn., St. Louis, MO, Nonprofit, 1960's-
present, Trustee.
Metropolitan St. Louis Bar Association, St. Louis, MO, Law, 1949-present,
Member.
Missouri Bar Integrated, Jefferson City, MO, Law, 1949-present, Member.
National Academy of Public Administration, Washington, DC, Nonprofit, 1981-
present, Member.
Order of the COIF, Wash. U. Law School, St. Louis, MO, Nat. Law 1949-present,
Member.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Noonday Club, St. Louis, MO, Nonprofit, 1950's-present, Non-resident.
PSI Upsilon, Amherst, MA, Fraternity, 1945-present, Member.
PHI Delta PHI, St. Louis, MO, Law Fraternity, Member.
Rotary Club, St. Louis, MO, Nonprofit, 1971-present, Member & Hon. Member.
St. Albans Tennis Club, Washington, DC, Athletic, 1978-present, Member.
St. Louis Country Club, St. Louis, MO, Nonprofit, 1967 to present, Non-resident
Member.
University of Chicago Law School, Chicago, IL, University, 11/81-9/84, Board of
Visitors.
University of Colorado School of Law, Boulder, CO, University, 1983-present,
Board of Visitors.
Washington University, St. Louis, MO, University, 1974-present, Trustee.
Washington University, Alumni Federation, St. Louis, MO, University, 1949-
present, Past President.
Washington University Law Alumni, St. Louis, MO, Universtiy, 1949-present,
President, 1962-63.
Question 12. Published writings and speeches (list the titles, publishers, and publi-
cation dates of any books, articles, reports or other published materials you have
authored. Also list the titles of any public speeches you have made within the last
10 years for which there is a text or transcript. To the extent possible, please pro-
vide a copy of each such publication, text or transcript:
Answer. Submitted separately. Judicial opinions are found in West's Federal Sup-
plement and West Federal Reporter.
Part B-Qualifications and references
Question 13. Qualifications (describe why you believe you are qualified to serve in
the position for which you have been nominated):
I have completed nine years as Director of the FBI.
In addition to administering an organization similar in many respects to the CIA,
I have served as Chairman of the working Group on Counterintelligence (IG-CI) and
as a member of the Special Interagency Group on Intelligence (SIG-I).
My responsibilities have placed me in contact with most of the operational coun-
terparts of the CIA in the free world.
Question 14. References (provide the names and business addresses and telephone
numbers of five individuals whom you believe are in a position to comment on your
qualifications to serve in the position for which you have been nominated. Include
three individuals who have known you for at least five years):
Answer. Hon. Peter B. Bensinger, Bensinger, DuPont & Assoc., 20 North Wacker
Drive, Chicago, IL, 312-726-8620, 9 years.
Walter M. Clarke, Esq., Armstrong, Teasdale, Kramer, & Vaughan, Suite 1950,
611 Olive Street, St. Louis, MO, 314-621-5070, 60 years.
Hon. Lloyd N. Hand, Verner, Liipfert, Bernard, McPherson & Hand, Suite 1000,
1660 L Street, NW, WDC 202-452-7400, 9 years.
Former Chief Justice Warren Burger, U.S. Supreme Court Bldg., Washington, DC,
202-479-3362, 16 years.
Hon. James W. Symington, O'Connor & Hannan, Suite 800, 1919 Pa. Ave., Wash-
ington, DC, 202-887-1400, 25 years.
Part C-Political and foreign affiliations
Question 15. Political activities (list any memberships or offices held in or finan-
cial contributions or services rendered to, any political party, election committee,
political action committee, or individual candidate during the last ten years):
None.
Question 16. Candidacy for public office (furnish details of any candidacy for elec-
tive public office):
Answer. None.
Question 17. Foreign affiliations (Note: Questions 17 A and B are not limited to
relationships requiring registration under the Foreign Agents Registration Act.
Questions 17 A, B and C do not call for a positive response if the representation or
transaction was authorized by the United States Government in connection with
you or your spouse's employment in Government service.)
(A) Have you or your spouse ever represented in any capacity (e.g., employee, at-
torney, business, or political adviser or consultant), with or without compensation, a
foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please
fully describe such relationship.
Answer. No.
(B) If you or your spouse has ever been formally associated with a law, account-
ing, public relations firm or other service organization, have any of you or your
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
spouse's associates represented, in any capacity, with or without compensation, a
foreign government or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please
fully describe such relationship.
Answer. No.
(C) During the past ten years have you or your spouse received any compensation
from, or been involved in any financial or business transactions with, a foreign gov-
ernment or an entity controlled by a foreign government? If so, please furnish de-
tails.
Answer. No.
(D) Have you or your spouse ever registered under the Foreign Agents Registra-
tion Act? If so, please furnish details.
Answer. No.
Question 18. Describe any lobbying activity during the past ten years, other than
in an official U.S. Government capacity, in which you or your spouse have engaged
for the purpose of directly or indirectly influencing the passage, defeat or modifica-
tion of legislation at the national level of Government, or for the purpose of affect-
ing the administration and execution of national law or public policy.
Answer. None.
Part D-Financial disclosure and conflict of interest
Question 19. Describe any employment, business relationship, financial transac-
tion, investment, association or activity (including, but not limited to, dealings with
the Federal Government on your own behalf or on behalf of a client), which could
create, or appear to create, a conflict of interest in the position to which you have
been nominated.
Answer. None.
Question 20. Do you intend to sever all business connections with your present
employers, firms, business associates and/or partnerships or other organizations in
the event that you are confirmed by the Senate? If not, please explain.
Answer. I intend to retain connections with the charitable, educational and pro-
fessional organizations listed in # 11.
I have no business connections, etc., referred to above.
Question 21. Describe the financial arrangements you have made or plan to make,
if you are confirmed, in connection with severance from your current position.
Please include severance pay, pension rights, stock options, deferred income ar-
rangements, and any and all compensation that will or might be received in the
future as a result of your current business or professional relationships.
Answer. As a Government employee, my government benefits and interests will
not be affected by the new position.
Question 22. Do you have any plans, commitments or agreements to pursue out-
side employment, with or without compensation, during your service with the Gov-
ernment? If so, please furnish details.
Answer. No.
Question 2.. As far as can be foreseen, state your plans after completing Govern-
ment service. Please specifically describe any agreements or understandings, writ-
ten or unwritten, concerning employment after leaving Government service. In par-
ticular, describe any agreements, understandings or options to return to your cur-
rent position.
Answer. As far as can be foreseen, I will most probably return to private law
practice. I have no agreements or understandings, written or unwritten.
Question 24. If you are presently in Government service, during the past five
years of such service, have you received from a person outside of Government an
offer or expression of interest to employ your services after you leave Government
service?
Answer. From time to time law firms and corporations have expressed an interest
in me when I should leave Government service. Some made offers. None were ac-
cepted.
Question 25. Is your spouse employed? If the nature of this employment is related
in any way to the position for which you are seeking confirmation, please indicate
your spouse's emploiyer, the position and the length of time the position has been
held. If your spouses employment is not related to the position to which you have
been nominated, please so state.
Answer. N.A.
Question 26. List below all corporations, partnerships, foundations, trusts, or other
entities toward which you or your spouse have fiduciary obligations or in which you
or your spouse have held directorships or other positions of trust during the past
five years.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Answer. See attached list.
Washington University, Trustee, 1974-present, Self.
Jefferson National Expansion Memorial, Trustee, 1960's-present, Self.
American Bar Foundation, Life fellow, 1968-present, Self.
American Law Institute, Council Member, 1978-present, Self.
Institute of Judicial Administration, President, 1985-present, Self.
Alfalfa Club, Past President, 1/83-1/84, Self.
American University, National Advisory Board, 1982-present, Self.
Big Brothers/Big Sisters of America, Honorary Board Member, 1958-78, Self.
International Tennis Foundation & Hall of Fame, National Board Advisory Com-
mittee, 1978-present, Self.
University of Colorado, Law School Visiting Committee, 1983-present, Self.
Washington Area Tennis Patrons Foundation, Board of Directors, 1981-1984,
Spouse.
Question 27. List all gifts exceeding $500 in value received during the past five
years by you, your spouse, or your dependents. Gifts received from relatives and
gifts given to a spouse or dependent totally independent of their relationship to you
need not be included.
Answer. No, other than as beneficiary of spouse's estate.
Question 28. List all securities, real property, partnership interests, or other in-
vestments or receivables with a current market value (or, if market value is not as-
certainable, estimated current fair value) in excess of $1,000. (Note: the information
provided in response to Schedule A of the disclosure forms of the Office of Govern-
ment Ethics may be incorporated by reference, provided that current valuations are
used.)
Answer. Disclosure form-incorporated by reference.
Question 29. List all loans, mortgages, or other indebtedness (including any contin-
gent liabilities) in excess of $10,000. (Note: The information provided in response to
Schedule D of the disclosure form of the Office of Government Ethics may be incor-
porated by reference, provided that contingent liabilities are also included.)
Answer. None.
Question 30. Are you or your spouse now in default on any loan, debt or other
financial obligation? Have your or your spouse been in default on any loan, debt or
other financial obligation in the past ten years? If the answer to either question is
yes, please provide details.
Answer. No.
Question 31. List sources and amounts of all income received during the last five
years, including all salaries, fees, dividends, interest, gifts, rents, royalties, patents,
honoraria, and other items exceeding $500. (If you prefer to do so, copies of U.S.
income tax returns for these years may be substituted here, but their submission is
not required.)
Salary ......................................................................................... $60,663 $60,993 $69,800 $72,600 $75,100
Fees, royalties ............................................................................ 4,086 7,476 3,742 1,299 ....................
Dividends .................................................................................... 46,177 44,879 45,835 32,916 23,156
Interest ...................................................................................... 33,026 29,794 28,325 29,495 26,301
Gifts .......................................................................................................................................................................................................
Rents:
Farm ................................................................................. (8,610) (1,968) (4,877) (4,838) (4,227)
Other-exceeding $500 .................................................... 7,731 (965) 7,941 2,100 417
(CG) (CG) (CG) (CG) 1,000.(H)
Total ............................................................................. 151,683 143,142 155,643 138,410 125,974
Question 32. If asked, would you provide the committee with copies of your and
your spouse's Federal income tax returns for the past three years?
Answer. Yes.
Question 33. Have your Federal or State tax returns been the subject of any audit,
investigation or inquiry at any time? If so, please provide details, including the
result of any such proceeding.
Answer. No.
Question 34. Attach a schedule itemizing each individual source of income which
exceeds $500. If you are an attorney, accountant, or other professional, also attach a
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
schedule listing all clients and customers whom you billed more than $500 worth of
services during the past five years.
Answer. See Schedule A of Financial Disclosure Form.
Question 35. Do you intend to place your financial holdings and those of your
spouse and dependent members of your immediate household in a blind trust? If
yes, please furnish details.
Answer. My investment holdings other than cash and real property (farm) are
currently in a living trust. I intend to enter into an agreement with corporate trust-
ee to satisfy the purposes of a blind trust except as to shares of Edison Bros. Stores,
Inc., which I do not desire sold without my consent.
Question 36. Explain how you will resolve any actual or potential conflicts of in-
terest that may be indicated by your response to the questions in this part or in
part C (questions 15 thru 35).
Answer. No conflict identified. Should any potential conflict develop, I would
employ recusal and other approaches recommended by CIA counsel.
Part E-Ethical matters
Question 37. Have you ever been disciplined or cited for a breach of ethics for un-
professional conduct by, or been the subject of a complaint to, any court, administra-
tive agency, professional association, disciplinary committee or other professional
group? If so, provide details.
Answer. Not to my knowledge.
Question 38. Have you ever been investigated, held, arrested, or charged by any
Federal, State, or other law enforcement authority for violation of any federal,
State, county, or municipal law, regulation, or ordinance, other than a minor traffic
offense, or named either as a defendant or otherwise in any indictment or informa-
tion relating to such violation? If so provide details.
Answer. No.
Question 39. Have you ever been convicted of or entered a plea of guilty or nolo
contendere to any criminal violation other than a minor traffic offense? If so, pro-
vide details.
Answer. No.
Question 40. Are you presently or have you ever been a party in interest in any
administrative agency proceeding or civil litigation? If so, provide, details.
Answer. The following instances concern those situations where I was a party in
interest in the proceedings mentioned above which were not connected to my duties
as Director of the FBI.
In 1961, I was erroneously named a defendant as an alleged last member of the
board of directors of a corporation whose charter had lapsed. The suit was a collec-
tion matter. I had resigned in 1959, was not representing the company at the time
and plaintiffs attorney promptly dismissed as to me when this was called to his at-
tention.
In 1964 an action was instituted in the United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Missouri, Cause No. 64 C 113(2), by Consumers Financial Corporation
against Walter F. Roos and all the partners in my law firm, Armstrong, Teasdale,
Roos, Kramer and Vaughn. I was named as a party defendant although there was
no allegation I was involved in any of the matters alleged. William Erickson, the
principal of Consumers Financial Corp., was competing with another group led by
Burch Williams for control of Associated Fund, Inc. The law firm held 249 shares f
Associated Fund, and Walter Roos held one qualifying share as a director. The law
firm sold its 249 shares to the Burch Williams group, and William Erickson and
Consumers Financial alleged that the firm breached a contract to sell the shares to
Erickson. Plaintiffs sought specific performance of the contract allegedly breached.
The case was dismissed when the Erickson group offered to buy all the stock of As-
sociated Fund and all the shares were purchased. In addition Erickson's group paid
$250,000 to all the shareholders. Walter Roos and the law firm paid no money.
While a Judge of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Mis-
souri (1971-1973), I was informed I had been named as a co-defendant in a civil
rights complaint filed in the United States District Court by three prisoners against
Judge Wangelin, Marshal Link, Warden Lark and Sheriff Edwards. The complaint
as to me seemed to allege that I was an agent for the black power movement in the
city jail. The prayer for relief asked that I be enjoined from hearing another suit in
which some of the plaintiffs were parties. The allegations against me had no founda-
tion in fact. I was never served and the matter was never pursued against me. I
have been advised that the case was dismissed on April 27, 1973.
I was also named in a mandamus action by a petitioner, following my issuance of
a permanent injunction against him which was affirmed by the Eighth Circuit. 462
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
F.2d 897. The mandamus was dismissed by the Supreme Court. 72-5854, February
20, 1973, 41 U.S.L.W. 3449.
I was named as a defendant in a civil action brought by a prisoner seeking to
enjoin me from sitting as a trial judge in his civil rights case against a Southern
Missouri sheriff. Another District Judge dismissed that case as frivolous. The civil
rights case resulted in a jury verdict for the defendant. My refusal to disqualify
myself was affirmed upon appeal.
In 1977, I was named with other as a co-defendant in a real estate quiet title
action brought to clear title to land once owned by a corporation in which I had an
interest. Since I claimed no interest in this land, and, therefore, was not really a
party in interest, I did not enter an appearance or file a pleading in that case. I was
never aware of the outcome of the suit which, by its very nature, had no effect on
me.
Additionally, during my tenure as Director of the FBI I have been named in nu-
merous lawsuits, both in my official and individual capacities. A description of past
and pending litigation in which I have been named as a defendant, prepared by the
FBI Legal Counsel Division, is attached. I have reviewed this and it is complete and
accurate to the best of my knowledge and recollection.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Washington, DC, March 25, 1987.
Re civil actions in which Federal Bureau of Investigation Director William H. Web-
ster is named as a defendant.
The following information was compiled March 25, 1987, from the records of the
Legal Counsel Division of the Federal Bureau of Investigation in conection with Di-
rector Webster's appointment to the Central Intelligence Agency. This document
provides an explanation of the past and pending civil litigation naming Director
Webster as a defendant.
Because of his position as the head of a large Federal bureau, Director Webster is
often named in civil actions which seek damages or equitable relief. These cases run
the gamut from claims arising from autombile accidents of FBI employees, allega-
tions of violations of constitutional rights arising from FBI investigations to Free-
dom of Information Act cases and cases arising from FBI personnel actions. Over
the Director's nine-year tenure with the FBI, there have been literally hundreds of
such cases filed against him but ultimately dismissed. No case has even resulted in
any finding of personal liability against the Director.
Suits presently pending against the Director are categorized according to whether
the Director is named in his official capacity only (i.e., the Director is named only
because he happens to be the head of the Bureau and no personal wrongdoing by
him is alleged), suits naming him in his individual capacity (the Director is named
and relief is sought from him personally), and suits which name him in both capac-
ities. The numbers of cases pending in each category are:
Official capacity .............................................................................................................. 55
Individual capacity ........................................................................................................ 1
Both capacities ................................................................................................................ 18
Total cases March 25, 1987 ............................................................................... 74
The official capacity cases consist of 29 Freedom of Infromation Act/Privacy Act
cases, 23 tort or other miscellaneous actions, and three Equal Employment Opportu-
nity suits.
Of the remaining pending cases, against the Director personally, only three actu-
ally allege in the body of the compliant that the Director himself committed some
wrong for which the plaintiff should be compensated. These cases are synopsized
below:
1. Ebun Adelona, et al. v. William Webster, et al. (U.S.D.C., S.D.N.Y.) Civil Action
No. 81 CIV 0373
Plaintiffs alleged that FBI searches on April 18-19, 1980, at 92 Morningside
Avenue, New York City, in connection with the attempted apprehension of Joanne
Chesimard, a fugitive wanted for escape after conviction for murder of a New Jersey
state trooper, violated various of the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Although
wrongdoing by the Director was alleged, the complaint is so vague that the nature
of the allegations against Director Webster could not be ascertained. For this reason
the Director was dismissed from the suit on February 10, 1987, but an appeal may
be filed.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
2. Imari Abubak Obadele v. William French Smith, et al. (U.S.D.C., D. D.D.C.)
Civil Action No. 80-1844
Plaintiff alleged that the Director and others conspired to violate constitutional
rights arising from plaintiff's participation in political activities. Director Webster
was dismissed from the suit on June 7, 1984, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his
dismissal on June 11, 1986. The suit is still pending as to other Federal defendants,
but the dismissal is final as to the Director.
3. Edwin Montes v. Edwin Meese, et al. (U.S.D.C., S.D. N.Y.) Civil Action No. 86
CIV 8285
Plaintiff, who alleges that he is a mental patient, alleges that Director Webster
and others have subjected him to illegal electronic surveillance, subjected him to tel-
epathic surveillance of plaintiffs thoughts, raped him, assaulted him by providing
his with adulterated cigarettes, and interfered with his employment by mental te-
lepathy. Plaintiff seeks $50 million in damages plus equitable relief. The suit was
dismissed as frivolous on October 30, 1986, and plaintiff entered notice of appeal on
November 7, 1986. The appeal is pending in the Second Circuit.
JOSEPH R. DAVIS,
Assistant Director-Legal Counsel.
Question .41. Have you been interviewed or asked to supply any information as a
witness or otherwise in connection with any congressional investigation, Federal or
State agency proceeding, grand jury investigation, or criminal or civil litigation in
the past ten years? If so, provide details.
Answer. In the year prior to beginning my 9-year tenure as Director of the FBI,
while a Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, there
was only one instance in which I was subpoenaed to testify in a trial. The trial was
between two oil companies. The circumstances was a motion to disqualify an attor-
ney on grounds of conflict of interest. I was asked to give testimony as to whether
confidential information had been exchanged between attorneys in a prior oil as-
phalt conspiracy case in which I was a lead attorney.
With regard to my providing an affidavit or declaration, being interviewed, and
providing testimony as a witness in a criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, a
definitive answer cannot be provided from a review of FBI records. Becuase of the
manner in which the FBI's criminal, administrative, and legal matter files are in-
dexed and maintained, it is not possible to conduct a search that would definitively
establish that all such instances were identified.
However, based on my recollection and the recollections of the only two individ-
uals who have served as Assistant Directors of the FBI's Legal Counsel Division
during my tenure, the only recalled instances are recounted below.
A. DEPOSITIONS
In the course of my tenure as FBI Director, I have not been deposed in any crimi-
nal, civil, or administrative proceeding.
B. INTERVIEWS
1. EEO Complaint.- In one instance recently I did provide to a Department of
Justice investigator a signed statement which was requested in connection with an
Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaint by an FBI employee. The EEO
matter is currently being investigated by the Department of Justice EEO Office, and
I have been advised it would not be appropriate for me to provide any details of this
pending matter.
2. In the Matter of Special Prosecutor's Investigation of Raymond Donovan.-In
August 13, 1982, I was formally interviewed by Leon Silverman, who had been ap-
pointed as a Special Prosecutor in this matter. The interview concerned information
I provided to President Reagan's transition team about Mr. Donovan's organized
crime connections. In addition to this formal interview, I had numerous conversa-
tions and exchanged written correspondence with Mr. Silverman, as well as congres-
sional committees who were investigating this matter. I never testified before the
grand jury investigating this matter. A copy of a summary of the interview obtained
from the Special Prosecutor's Supplemental Report to the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit is attached. A copy of correspondence to
Special Prosecutor Silverman and to the Congress regarding this matter, which I
signed, is attached.
3. In the Matter of the Independent Counsel's Investigation of the Suspension of
the FBI's Southern Air Transport, Inc. Investigation.- On December 19, 1986, I was
interviewed by Special Agents of the Federal Bureau of Investigation concerning
contact I had on October 30, 1986, with Associate Attorney General Stephen S.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Trott, United States Department of Justice. Mr. Trott had contacted me regarding
the FBI temporarily suspending its investigation of a Neutrality Act case involving
Southern Air Transport, Inc. That investigation and the substance of my interview
are both within the investigative jurisdiction of Independent Counsel Lawrence E.
Walsh. I have beern advised that Independent Counsel Walsh would object to disclo-
sure of the substance of the interview or to disclosure of any written record or tran-
script of the interview.
C. AFFIDAVITS AND TESTIMONY
1. United States v. Richard Miller (U.S.D.C., C.D. California) No. CR 84-972A-
Kn.-In this criminal prosecution of a former Special Agent (SA) of the FBI, I fur-
nished a declaration on October 1, 1985 to clarify an aspect of FBI policy and proce-
dure in foreign counterintelligence investigations. SA Miller's attorneys alleged that
I could provide information concerning the FBI's "double agent" programs and ac-
tivities directed against the Intelligence Service of the Soviet Union. A copy of my
declaration is attached.
2. United States v. Edward Tickel (E.D. Va).-This particular case involved a
criminal prosecution of a former SA of the FBI, Edward Tickel. Mr. Tickel alleged
that he had advised me of two situations where he had installed electronic surveil-
lance equipment in facilities prior to the entry of a Court Order authorizing such
installations. I testified on March 11, 1983, as a rebuttal witness for the Government
and also provided a declaration. Copies of my testimony and my declaration are at-
tached. Mr. Tickel was subsequently convicted and sentenced to prison.
3. Testimony in my Private Capacity.-In 1982, I was subpoenaed as a witness in
an action brought in the United States District Court, Eastern District of Missouri,
Docket Number 81-112 C(C), by a former client, Vaughn Morrill, Jr., against Becton
Dickinson and Company, Rutherford, New Jersey. The purpose of my testimony was
in aid of construction of ambiguous clauses in a contract executed and amended
during the period 1961-1970. A transcript of my testimony is attached.
4. Other Instances.- In addition to the above specifically recalled instances, there
have been a few other instances in which I have filed affidavits in civil actions.
These occasionally arise from situations in which I am named as a defendant in my
personal capacity in a civil action, but where I had absolutely no involvement in the
situation which formed the basis for the suit. In order to support a Motion to Dis-
miss or similar pleading I have on occassion filed affidavit(s) and declarations deny-
ing such personal knowledge or action. I have also filed declarations in support of
Motions to Dismiss based on lack of personal jurisdiction to sue me. I have not, to -
the best of my knowledge or recollection, filed any affadavit in a case relating to
any private matter during my tenure as Director of the FBI.
D. CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY
During my nine-year tenure as Director of the FBI, I have testified before Con-
gressional committees on numerous occasions. This testimony has concerned various
matters, including budget appropriations, oversight, and other matters of Congres-
sional inquiry. All testimony occurred while I was engaged in the normal course of
my duties as Director of the FBI. A copy of all instances when I testified before Con-
gress is attached.
Question 42. Has any business of which you are or were an officer, director or
partner been a party to any administrative agency proceeding or criminal or civil
litigation relevant to the position to which you have been nominated? If so, provide
details. (With respect to a business of which you are or were an officer, you need
only consider proceedings and litigation that occurred while you were an officer of
that business.)
Answer. Not to my knowledge.
Part F-Additional information
Question 43. Describe in your own words the concept of congressional oversight of
U.S. intelligence activities. In particular, characterize what you believe to be the ob-
ligations of the Director of Central Intelligence, the Deputy Director of Central In-
telligence, and the intelligence committees of the Congress respectively in this proc-
ess.
Answer. National security is a shared responsibility. In order for the Congress to
be certain that the intelligence activities being carried out by the Administration
are lawful, proper and consistent with national security needs, each body has consti-
tuted a Select Committee on Intelligence. It is the responsibility of the Director of
Central Intelligence, or in his absence, the Deputy Director, to keep the intelligence
committees informed of important information and activities developed within the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
intelligence community on a timely basis. Because such information must not be
publicly or widely disseminated, the committees act as surrogates for the Congress
and the American people. They react to specific issues, at the same time faithfully
preserving the secrets entrusted to them. The key word in the relationship is
trust-and the DCI plays an important role in developing and preserving this indis-
pensible ingredient between the intelligence community and the intelligence com-
mittees in carrying out their respective responsibilities for the National Security.
Question 44. Define in your own words the duties of the position to which you
have been nominated.
Answer. As the President's primary intelligence advisor, the DCI provides objec-
tive and relevant intelligence to our Government's policy makers. Because this in-
telligence serves as the basis for significant foreign policy and national security de-
cisions, the integrity of the intelligence collection and analysis must be absolute. To
ensure that the President receives the intelligence necessary to carry out policy ob-
jectives, the DCI must encourage the entire intelligence community to exchange all
pertinent information. The DCI must promote a free discussion of ideas and foster
analytical competition within the intelligence community. The DCI must work to
see that the intelligence needs of the respective departments of government are
fully understood and effectively addressed within the community.
The DCI has a special and direct responsibility to the Congress. Each Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence is an overseer of intelligence activities and programs as well
as a partner in ensuring that this intelligence is properly gathered and protected.
The DCI, therefore, must provide the Congress, through these committees, the
timely, accurate and relevant information required to conduct its legislative, and
ovesight duties.
Conducting covert operations is one of the most sensitive responsibilities of the
DCI. The CIA cannot legally undertake covert action without a Presidential finding,
and the American public must have confidence that covert operations will only be
undertaken with the proper authority and after a careful consideration of the risks
and objectives involved. The DCI must be certain the policy makers are presented
with all information necessary for a sound decision. Once the decision is made to
carry out a covert oepration, the DCI has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that
it is effectively managed and aggressively implemented within the limit of the au-
thority granted to CIA.
The intelligence community is a great national resource. Its effectiveness depends
upon the ability of its components to act in concert on issues which transcend indi-
vidual departments of government. In planning, articulating needs, and coordinat-
ing joint efforts, the DCI's leadership role is most significant and national security
of the United States.
Question 45. Please advise the committee of any additional information favorable
or unfavorable, which you feel should be considered in connection with your nomi-
nation.
Answer. None.
I, William H. Webster, do swear that the answers I have provided to this question-
naire are, to the best of my knowledge, accurate and complete.
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER.
March 26, 1987.
My Commission Expires 12/14/88.
U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
Washington, DC, March 30, 1987.
Hon. DAVID L. BOREN,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
U.S. Senate, Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN BOREN: For some time, the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitu-
tional Rights has been concerned about the FBI's investigations of domestic oppo-
nents of Administration policy in Central America. We have questioned FBI Direc-
tor Webster on this issue in open hearings and have had several closed briefings
Some of our concerns focused on an intensive three and a half year investigation byy
the FBI of a group known as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Sal-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
17
vador (CISPES). The investigation was conducted under the Bureau's counterintelli-
gence and international terrorism guidelines.
Recently an individual named Frank Varelli, of Dallas, Texas, has come forward
to say that he was an informant for the FBI inside CISPES from 1981 to 1984. Var-
elli asserts that:
(1) The CISPES investigation was opened without any suspicion of criminal activi-
ty; it was based just on the fact that CISPES was a left-wing group opposing the
Reagan Administration.
(2) FBI agents said they wanted to "break" CISPES. As the investigation pro-
gressed, Varelli was supposed to create confusion and distress within the group, to
"neutralize" it by "destroying its credibility."
(3) FBI agents carried out break-ins against the CISPES office and the apartment
of a CISPES member to obtain documents about the group.
(4) The Bureau sent Varelli to El Salvador to set up a "back channel" information
exchange with the El Salvador National Guard. Varelli provided the Guard with in-
formation on U.S. opponents of aid to El Salvador and the Guard provided the
Bureau with the names of El Salvadorans coming to the U.S. The Bureau also pro-
vided the Guard with the names of El Salvadorans who were deported from the U.S.
back to El Salvador.
(5) At FBI direction, he compiled a Terrorist Photograph Album, containing pic-
tures and descriptions of, among others, Congressmen and Senators.
Since Varelli's allegations raised serious questions about the FBI's counter-terror-
ism investigations, we invited Mr. Varelli to testify before the Subcommittee. He did
so on February 20th. A copy of his sworn testimony is attached, along with an affi-
davit he has filed in federal court in Dallas where he is suing the FBI.
The FBI has admitted publicly that Varelli was an informant. It has also ac-
knowledged that Varelli's handling Agent resigned from the Bureau in 1985. The
Terrorist Photograph Album is an official FBI form.
Director Webster has promised the Subcommittee a full accounting for Mr. Varel-
li's allegations and has stated that an intensive investigation is being conducted by
the Bureau's Office of Professional Responsibility. However, this investigation is not
completed and the Bureau has not responded in detail to the Subcommittee. While
the FBI has denied many of Mr. Varelli's allegations, there has been no formal re-
sponse yet.
I believe that these allegations are pertinent to the confirmation of Judge Web-
ster as Director of Central Intelligence. They raise issues of internal controls and
accountability, and have serious implications for the rights of Americans. I would
urge you, therefore, to explore them at your hearings. I would be happy to share
with you any information in the Subcommittee's possession that might be of use to
you.
With kindest regards.
Sincerely,
Hon. DAVID L. BOREN,
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
Hart Senate Office Building, Washington, DC.
DEAR CHAIRMAN BOREN: The committee has under consideration the nomination
of William H. Webster for Director of the Central Intelligence Agency.
The Department of Justice is currently investigating the activities of a former
FBI informant and several current and former FBI agents.
These individuals were alledgedly involved in a surveillance campaign of groups
and individuals, including members of Congress, critical of administration policies
in Central America. The campaign allegedly included providing the El Salvador Na-
tional Guard with information about the activities and travel of certain U.S. and
Salvadoran citizens and the preparation of an FBI Terrorist Photo Album. Said
album is alleged to be upwards of 700 pages, some of which depict members of the
House and Senate as terrorists.
The extent to which this operation was approved, coordinated, or condoned by top
FBI officials is not known because the investigation is not finished. Certainly if Mr.
DON EDWARDS,
Chairman, Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, April 9 1987.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Webster was even aware of the operation it would raise serious doubts about his
judgment and his suitability to direct the CIA.
I oppose, therefore, Mr. Webster's confirmation until such time as this matter is
resolved.
Please make this letter a part of the hearing record.
Sincerely,
PAT SCHROEDER,
Congresswoman.
CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, DC, March 13, 1987.
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER,
Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. WEBSTER: A copy of the enclosed document, "Terrorist Photograph
Album, FD-432 (Rev. 2-8-83)" was recently brought to my attention by Douglas R.
Larson, the attorney for Frank Varelli.
According to Mr. Larson, blank copies of this document were provided to Mr. Var-
elli by Daniel Flanagan who was, at the time, an FBI Agent in Dallas. I understand
that Mr. Flanagan is no longer with the FBI.
Mr. Larson further advised my office that Agent Flanagan provided Mr. Varelli
with the names of elected officials and clergy and, in the case of the official de-
scribed on the enclosed document, a photograph of said official. Mr. Varelli, using a
variety of John Birch Society and other similar material, then completed the "Ter-
rorist Photograph Album," including the "Narrative of Activities." Said document,
of which I understand there may be upwards of 700 on other individuals, was then
submitted to the FBI.
I understand that Mr. Varelli is currently in litigation with the FBI over, among
other issues, a back pay dispute. Apparently there is a difference of opinion between
Mr. Varelli and the FBI as to whether he was paid a monthly salary or piece rate.
I would appreciate any light you could shed on the following:
(1) Is this an FBI document?
(2) How many other federal, state, and local officials and members of clergy are
the subject of "Terrorist Photo Album" forms? Please provide me with their names.
(3) What were the periods of Mr. Varelli's employment by the FBI and the total
value of his compensation?
(4) Which FBI official was in charge of the investigation that Mr. Varelli was par-
ticipating in? To whom did that official report to?
(5) Was Mr. Varelli provided with internal FBI memoranda, letters, telexes, etc?
If so, please specify.
(6) I understand that the investigation may have, in early 1983, changed from an
intelligence investigation to a terrorism investigation. Is this correct? If so, who
made that decision and why?
(7) What was the reason for Mr. Flanagan's termination from the FBI?
(8) I understand that Mr. Flanagan may be the subject of a current FBI investiga-
tion. Is that true and could you describe the nature of the investigation?
(9) Did Mr. Flanagan provide Mr. Varelli with the names and/or photographs of
individuals to be the subject of a "Terrorist Photo Album" form?
(10) Once completed by Mr. Varelli, what was the disposition within the FBI of
these "Terrorist Photo Album" forms?
(11) Did Mr. Varelli provide, with or without FBI guidance or knowledge, informa-
tion to El Salvador officials, including National Guard officials, the names of private
citizens, elected officials, clergy, nuns, etc., who would be travelling to El Salvador?
If so, please provide me with the names and dates of such communications.
I would appreciate a timely response to this inquiry.
Sincerely,
PAT SCHROEDER,
Congresswoman.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
1. Ne*
PATRECU S .HROEDER
3. 0.4. 4. P4.ce 04 Us
Ju1'v_i0th
140 P
ortland-
Oregon.
4. OtwW4e
Americ
co
84" a
7. Mly
e. w gie
LO..
Female
dsnW
p""
e. Mr
Brown
tO. Eyw
Rrown
11266:0M T Me sd [1 S.p.W U ovaCW
Denver, Colorado.
Washington, DC.
14. Oce wm'Gnpbw W"Wes raa"mc *W~81
Member of The House of Representatives
16. eiNwy.p r1c,masn
preeorl Na
See d Swro/ No.
? 1e'TrrrM oay~a. RAMTIINTRTA-M rui a*/Twni i g`}, oncW pormn Agent of Influence.
11. Nww~ W oewww
Married to James Schroeder. She has two children. Degree from Harvard.
She is openly working on behalf of the Sandinista Goverment in the US.
through the NNSNP and CISPES. The NNSNP is The National Network in -
Solidarity With the Nicaraguan People. It uses at times the name of
Nicaragua Network. Schroeder is actively raising-money for the Sandi-
nistas. Schroeder is involved in operation HAND (Humanitarian Aid for
Nicaraguan Democracy). She has ties with other pro-Sandinistas member:
of Congress: Tip O'Neill, Christopher Dodd, Michael Barnes, Ed Boland,
Edward Kennedy, Ron Dellume. WARNING. She could be the target of right
wing groups. Strong resentment in right wing circles in the US and El
Salvador against her (Schroeder). Advise if she travels abroad.
SECRET SECRET . SECRET
?
^c' eu1do
No.
E1 Salvadoran Terrorism
EL SALVADOR'S TERRORISM
FBI DALLAS
BY:
OW hoer.
2-2-19f
01
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS,
New York, NY, April 1, 1987.
Re Webster Confirmation Hearings.
JOHN ELLIFF,
U.S. Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence, Washington, DC.
DEAR MR. ELLIFF: Enclosed please find a summary of our testimony before the
House Committee on the Judiciary, Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional
Rights, concerning a suspicious pattern of burglaries and government intelligence
gathering directed at groups and individuals dissenting from administration Central
American policies. Also enclosed is a short piece we did specifically questioning
Webster's role in these activities.
We would very much appreciate your distribution of this material to committee
members and its inclusion in the record of the William Webster confirmation hear-
ings.
MARGARET RATNER,
Education Director.
MICHAEL RATNER,
Legal Director.
CONFIRMING A GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW
The rush to lend bi-partisan support to the nomination of William Webster as the
new head of the CIA must not prevent serious pre-confirmation investigations into
the record of FBI abuses which have occurred during Mr. Webster's tenure, and also
into the relationship between the FBI and the National Security Council during
Oliver North's tenure on the NSC staff.
Only two weeks ago, Congressman Don Edwards' Subcommittee on Civil and Con-
stitutional Rights held hearings on the subject of FBI surveillance of groups opposed
to the administration's Central America policies. The hearings showed that the FBI
is currently engaged in a massive spying operation directed against such groups.
For example, documents received under the Freedom of Information Act indicate
that 24 FBI field offices spent over five years in a deep, intrusive investigation of
the Committee In Solidarity With The People Of El Salvador (CISPES). This investi-
gation was initiated without a scintilla of evidence that CISPES was engaged in any
criminal conduct. Moreover, the six years of spying failed to turn up any criminal
activity. Today, as in the time of Hoover, disagreeing with administration policies
may be sufficient to trigger government surveillance.
FBI files are also maintained on other major groups opposing administration poli-
cies in Central America. Intrusive techniques, discredited in the Nixon years, are
freely employed by FBI agents. Informants are paid to join organizations, and ac-
cording to one ex-FBI employee, warrantless burglaries, entrapment, and efforts to
destroy dissenting groups were not only contemplated, but encouraged.
Moreover, Congressman Edwards suspects that some of the FBI investigations
may have been instigated by North who, as an NSC staff member, was the head of
an inter-agency counter-terrorism group that included representatives from the FBI.
It is more than likely that North directed aspects of FBI intelligence gathering. Ex-
ecutive Order 12333 on foreign intelligence designates the NSC "as the highest Ex-
ecutive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance of, and direction to the con-
duct of national foreign intelligence, counter-intelligence, and special activities, and
attendant policies and programs."
These revelations are unsettling to those who care about protecting dissent in
America. They raise serious questions about FBI activity that must be answered
before Mr. Webster can be confirmed.
In the 60s and 70s there was much talk about ending FBI spying on groups en-
gaged in lawful dissent, and after revelations of the widespread spying against the
anti-war movement, domestic national security investigations were sharply limited.
Today, however, FBI documents show that similar investigation of similar opposi-
tion groups are carried out under a new, and as yet unfettered, denomination
known as "foreign counter-intelligence." This new category of investigation circum-
vents the limitations placed on domestic spying-the targets and the techniques,
however, remain the same.
In addition to investigations of organizations, individuals who travel to Nicaragua,
visit "unfriendly" embassies or even attend anti-contra meetings, receive visits from
the FBI. Travelers, moreover, are often subjected to harassment at Customs by both
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
FBI and Customs officials. Address books and other private material are seized. To
date, the FBI has refused to stop the practice of retaining such materials in its files.
In April 1985, Mr. Webster defended the practice of interviewing travelers, and re-
vealed for the first time that many of the interviews were the result of "specific
taskings" from the National Security Council.
Mr. Webster denies that the FBI has had anything to do with the 58 documented
burglaries directed against groups involved in dissent on Central America which
were also the subject of the House subcommittee hearings. The evidence is substan-
tial, however, that these burglaries are politically motivated and that mailing lists
and private papers were the objects sought. Whether the FBI is involved or not, it
has the legal authority and the obligation to investigate. Mr. Webster has refused to
do so, except in the most cursory fashion.
Spying on groups opposed to the administration's Central America policies is just
one aspect of the FBI's broad intelligence gathering activities. However, these inves-
tigations demonstrate that some hard questions ought to be asked of Mr. Webster.
We ought to fmd out what domestic intelligence "taskings" were carried out by the
FBI under the direction of North, and what broader relationship, if any, the FBI
had to North's lawlessness? Does Webster believe that the Constitution does not
apply to certain types of investigations, or that incantations of the words "terror-
ism' or "foreign intelligence" override treasured rights? According to President
Reagan, Mr. Webster "understands the meaning of the `rule of law,' ' but we don't
know what Mr. Webster's view of the law is. We do know that under Webster, the
FBI operated under an executive order that suspended the warrant requirement for
foreign intelligence investigations. There are many that think that such an execu-
tive order, and activities pursuant to it, run afoul of the Bill of Rights.
SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY OF THE CENTER FOR CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS
Evidence collected by the Center For Constitutional Rights establishes that over
the last six years the FBI has engaged in massive surveillance of organizations and
persons opposed to administration policies in Central America. Files have been
maintained on scores, if not hundreds, of such groups. There are 17 volumes of FBI
files on the Committee In Solidarity with the People of El Salvador (CISPES) alone.
One FBI document in our possession shows that FBI offices in 23 different cities
were conducting surveillance of CISPES. Each of these offices has its own CISPES
files.
Another document shows how the CISPES investigation was used to provide a
window to spy on other groups, such as the Network in Solidarity with the Guate-
malan People (NISGUA), the National Network in Solidarity with the Nicaraguan
People (NNSNP), the Central American Mobilization Coalition (CAMC) (Pittsburgh),
the Thomas Merton Center (Pittsburgh) and the New England Central American
Network (NECAN) (Boston).
All of the extremely intrustive spying techniques-which we thought had been fi-
nally discredited in the wake of the Watergate scandal-continue to be employed
against administration opponents, including the use of informers and infiltrators,
burglaries, interrogations, disruption, wire-tapping, overreaching border searchers
by Customs and the FBI, IRS audits, and mail surveillance.
These techniques are utilized against groups and individuals who are not even
suspected of crimes. In the five-year investigation of CISPES, not a scintilla of evi-
dence was developed to link the organization with criminal activity. CISPES was
simply treated as an "enemy" because of its opposition to U.S. intervention in Cen-
tral America.
We believe that the FBI is functioning as a "thought police." The massive pro-
gram of spying on dissenters, however, comes as no surprise to observers of Presi-
dent Reagan. This administration took office on a platform that promised increased
emphasis on intelligence activities. It should be remebered that one of Reagan's ear-
liest acts upon taking office was to pardon two ex-FBI agents who were convicted of
authorizing illegal burglaries. A Heritage Foundation report, requested by the ad-
ministration, recommended a harder line against domestic opposition groups, and
asserted that the FBI should be permitted to conduct break-ins without warrants. In
1981 President Reagan issued a new executive order governing the intelligence
agencies which authorized surveillance of Americans who are neither suspected of a
crime nor of being foreign agents. The order specifically gives the FBI broad author-
ity to engage in warrantless burglaries against Americans and allows the placement
of undercover agents in domestic groups.
It is against this background that the pattern of break-ins must be evaluated. [See
attached lists.] Our office has documented 58 burglaries directed against individuals
and organizations which oppose administration Central American policies. All in-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
volve a similar modus operandi: nothing of value is taken, although items of value
are readily available; the intruders are familiar with the victims' schedules, and the
locations of offices and files; the files that apparently attract attention contain
membership lists, donor lists, lists of refugees given sanctuary, etc.; and files are ob-
viously rifled and left strewn about. In only one incident was a perpetrator arrested
and convicted.
Frank Varelli, an ex-FBI operative, states that the FBI engaged in burglaries
against Dallas CISPES, giving further confirmation to our view that the govern-
ment may be responsible for some or all of these burglaries. Other factors create a
strong presumption that these burglaries are not carried out by ordinary criminals:
there is no pecuniary motive; they are geographically widespread and follow a defi-
nite pattern; and the targets are a specific category of groups and individuals. More-
over, the FBI claims it has the legal authority to commit burglaries and, coinciden-
tally, it is investigating many of the groups which have been burglarized.
We recommend that the gathering of intelligence about groups and individuals
opposed to adminisrtration Central America policies be stopped: FBI visits should be
authorized only when linked to criminal activities; Customs and the FBI should be
prohibited from using the border search exemption to the Fourth Amendment to
gather intelligence; the IRS and the Postal Service must not be allowed to harass
and gather intelligence about administration "enemies;" infiltration of domestic
groups involved in lawful political activity should not be permitted; unconsented
physical searches must be linked to criminal investigations and should not be per-
mitted without a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate on a finding of probable
cause.
We also recommend congressional investigations and the possible appointment of
a special prosecutor to look into: the infiltration of CISPES; the intelligence activi-
ties being conducted under E.O. 12333, including the possible misused of the coun-
terintelligence classification to avoild legal constraints and congressional oversight;
and the burglaries directed at groups opposed to administration policies.
ORGANIZATIONS BURGLARIZED
Amnesty International .......................................................................... Los Angeles, CA.
Arlington Street Church ........................................................................ Boston, MA.
Casa de la Esperanza .............................................................................. Washington, DC.
Casa del Pueblo ....................................................................................... Washington, DC.
Central American Information Office ................................................. Cambridge, MA.
Central American Solidarity Assoc ..................................................... Cambridge, MA.
Centro Presente ....................................................................................... Cambridge, MA.
Comite de Refugiados Salvadorenos .................................................... Washington, DC.
Comite El Salvador ................................................................................. Washington, DC.
CISPES ...................................................................................................... Dallas, TX.
CISPES ...................................................................................................... Washington, DC.
Educators in Support of ANDES (CAPA) ........................................... Cambridge, MA.
First Congregation Church ................................................................... Cambridge, MA.
Guatemala News and Education Service ........................................... Oakland, CA.
Home for Peace and Justice .................................................................. Saginaw, MI.
International Center for Development Policy ................................... Washington, DC.
New England Central America Network ........................................... Cambridge, MA.
New Institute of Central America ....................................................... Cambridge, MA.
North America Congress on Latin America ...................................... New York, NY.
Old Cambridge Baptist Church ............................................................ Cambridge, MA.
Pico Rivera Methodist Church ............................................................. Pico Rivers, CA.
Reformed Christian Church .................................................................. Washington, DC.
Riverside Church .....................................................................................
Sojourners .................................................................................................
St. Edmunds Episcopal Church ............................................................
St. Stephens Presbyterian Church .......................................................
St. Williams Catholic Church ...............................................................
The Church of the Covenant .................................................................
Trinity Methodist Church .....................................................................
United Church of Santa Fe ...................................................................
United Methodist Church-Calvary .......................................................
University Christian Movement ..........................................................
University Baptist Church ...................................................................
University Lutheran Church ................................................................
Wheadon United Church .......................................................................
Washington, DC.
Pacifica, CA.
Chatsworth, CA.
Louisville, KY.
Boston, MA.
Berkeley, CA.
Santa Fe, NM.
Washington, DC.
Cambridge, MA.
Seattle, WA.
Berkeley, CA.
Evanston, IL.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
AFFILIATIONS OF INDIVIDUALS WHOSE DWELLINGS WERE BURGLARIZED
Bainbridge-Nicaragua Association ....................................................... Kingston, WA.
Casa Nicaraguense .................................................................................. New York, NY.
Central American Refugee Project .................................. .................... Phoenix, AZ.
Central American Solidarity Committee.....-.......... .......................... Lake Orion, MI.
CISPES ...................................................................................................... Washington, DC.
CISPES ...................................................................................................... New York, NY.
Homes for Peace and Justice ................................................................ Saginaw, MI.
New Institute of Central America ....................................................... Dorchester, MA.
Nicaragua Solidarity Network ............................................................. Washington, DC.
Sacred Heart Church ............................................................................. Nogales, TX.
United Methodist Church-U.N. Office ................................................ New York, NY.
Witness for Peace .................................................................................... New York, NY.
STATEMENT OF ESTHER HERST, LEGISLATIVE ADVISOR, NATIONAL COMMITTEE AGAINST
REPRESSIVE LEGISLATION
Thank you for the opportunity to present this statement regarding the nomina-
tion of William Webster to be Director of Central Intelligence. The National Com-
mittee Against Repressive Legislation is a civil liberties organization founded in
1960 as the National Committee to Abolish the House Committee on UnAmerican
Activities. In 1970, recognizing the changing threats to First Amendment rights, we
became the National Committee Against Repressive Legislation. Throughout our
history, we have worked to protect constitutional rights of political association and
expression from legislative or other governmental restrictions.
Through a Freedom of Information Act request filed in 1975, we learned that
NCARL was the subject of a massive FBI "neutralization" campaign launched even
before our official founding and lasting through the 1960s. The full range of "dirty
tricks" were used against us-poison pen letters, break-ins, wiretaps, infiltrators,
and disruption of public meetings. Thanks to the work of the Church Committee, we
know that NCARL was only one of scores of organizations, engaged in absolutely
lawful, constitutionally protected political activities, which were targeted for harass-
ment and destruction by the FBI.
In response to the Church Committee's recommendations, then Attorney General
Edward Levi promulgated guidelines to control the domestic security investigative
activities of the FBI. These guidelines required, for the first time, a clear nexus be-
tween imminent criminal conduct and FBI investigations. Political spying decreased
markedly and the FBI became subject to meaningful executive and legislative over-
sight.
The role of Judge Webster as Director of the FBI was positive. As a man firmly
committed to the rule of law and conscious of the need to rebuild the FBI as an
effective non-political enforcement agency, he played a critical role in halting the
worst examples of the Hoover-era abuses of constitutional rights. In recent years
however, he has been under increased pressure to ease those controls and he has
bowed to those pressures in ways which cause NCARL serious concern.
The most drastic change in policy has been the revision of the Levi guidelines by
Attorney General William French Smith. The Smith guidelines significantly alter
the criminal standard and allow increased use of intrusive surveillance techniques.
The guidelines permit "preliminary inquires" into the activities of individuals or or-
ganizations, including physical surveillance, collection of newspaper clippings and
other publicly available documents, and recruitment and placement of informants
and infiltrators, where there is merly an allegation of possible future criminal activ-
ity. A fuller investigation, including mail openings and phone taps in addition to
undercover operations, may be initiated whenever there is "reasonable indication"
that persons are "engaged in an enterprise for the purpose of furthering political or
social goals wholly or in part" through criminal conduct. As the guidelines them-
s
11 elves concede, this "reasonable indication" standard is substantially lower than
probable cause" to believe a crime is about to be committed, the standard set for
searches and arrests under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. This week
standard is particularly troubling because federal statutes punishing speech such as
the Smith Act, though substantially repudiated by the Supreme Court, have not
been repealed by Congress, and hence serve as a convenient springboard for FBI in-
vestigations.
The guidelines provide that investigations are permissible when an individual has
merely advocated criminal activity.There need not be an imminent likelihood of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
criminal conduct occurring, even though such an immediate danger is necessary
before speech can constitutionally be labeled a crime. Once an organization is under
investigation based on the speech of one of its members, the guidelines allow the
FBI to collect information about all members who participate in its demonstrations,
about the structure of the organization as well as the relationship of the members,
and even about other organizations that cooperate with it. Even after an organiza-
tion has become inactive or no longer presents an "immediate threat of harm," the
FBI may continue surveillance and infiltration.
Separate, secret guidelines set forth standards for FBI foreign counterintelligence
investigations. Such standards have several extraordinary features: the standard for
initiating an investigation is itself classified; warrantless physical searches are per-
mitted; a secret court considers all electronic surveillance requests; special exemp-
tions exist protecting records from disclosure under the FOIA; special access is
available to telephone toll records and financial records. The focus of these investi-
gations is the collection of intelligence and not necessarily the prosecution of
crimes. Yet the definition of foreign intelligence agent is so broad that it can in-
clude peaceful domestic groups.
The practical effect of these new guidelines, including the classified foreign coun-
terintelligence guidelines, has been renewed attacks on political advocacy of contro-
versial positions. FBI agents have interviewed American citizens upon their return
from visits to Nicaragua and El Salvador. Agents have questioned the employers
and landlords of such citizens. The FBI has continued to build files on leading politi-
cal dissenters, such as Milwaukee Auxiliary Bishop Thomas Gumbleton and Seattle
Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen. An FBI agent even questioned an aide to Colora-
do Representative Patricia Schroeder regarding attendees at a church service held
in solidarity with Central American refugees. Most recently, the FBI turned over to
the INS results of an investigation into First Amendment protected activities of Pal-
estinian activists in Los Angeles, leading to attempts to deport those individuals.
Perhaps most ominous is recent testimony before the House Judiciary Subcommit-
tee on Civil and Constitutional Rights which revealed a major FBI "neutralization"
effort against CISPES. Former FBI informant Frank Varelli claimed that he and
other agents infiltrated, burlarized, and tried to influence the activities of Texas-
based organizations working in opposition to U.S. policies in El Salvador. This testi-
mony gives support to the suspicions of many political activists that the rash of over
50 break-ins into organizations involved in Central America solidarity sanctuary
work was mastermind by the FBI.
These actions show an alarming disregard for the constitutional protections of po-
litical association and expression and for the rule of law under which the FBI must
operate in a democratic society. Clearly, Judge Webster must be held accountable
for current abuses of rights by the FBI. It is the responsibility of this Committee to
question him and others in order to ascertain the full truth of FBI excesses. Al-
though the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights is in-
vestigating under its oversight authority, the Senate Select Committee should sup-
plement the House investigation to determine if Judge Webster remains sensitive
enough to constitutional limitations on governmental powers to be entrusted with
the directorship of yet another secret agency.
NCARL is equally concerned that this Committee see these hearings as an oppor-
tunity to bring the CIA under meaningful Congressional controls. Clearly, the CIA
has been operating as a "rogue elephant," to see a characterization common to the
Church Committee era. The Administration has abetted the CIA's tendencies to
work in secret and without lawful authority by seeking ways to circumvent congres-
sional restrictions on military spending and on covert operations. Now is the time
for Congress to halt this trend towards unfettered intelligence agency misdeeds.
Plainly these activities present a serious challenge to American democracy. The
philosophy, tactics, and powers of the intelligence agencies as they operated prior to
1976 and, appare ntly, during the past three or four years point clearly in the direc-
tion of a police state. The curbs on these practices which were put into effect after
the Church Committee and other revelations have not been adequate to control the
agency permanently. The appointment of a new Director or Central Intelligence
offers to Congress a valuable opportunity to reexamine current "controls" and to
add more meaningful restrictions to prevent future abuses.
The most important control would be a statutory definition of the role and pur-
pose of the CIA. Such a "charter" has proven impossible to pass in previous Con-
gresses and NCARL is under no illusions about the potential for approval at this
time. Still, this Committee can begin a charter process incrementally.
1. Prohibit-covert operations.-The proper function of the intelligence agencies is
to collect information, analyze it, and disseminate it to those who need it. When in-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
telligence agencies go beyond this, they are inevitably operating outside the rule of
law. CIA covert operations are designed to harass and destroy, through illegal meth-
ods that do not stop short of violence, individuals, groups, and even governments
perceived as political opponents. The CIA's covert actions have included bribery, ob-
taining publication of false information, training paramilitary groups, attempted as-
sassination, encouraging terrorism, and organizing plots to overthrow governments.
These operations not only violate international law, they have serious domestic con-
sequences including the spreading of false information and the corruption of aca-
demic, religious, and journalistic institutions.
Under no circumstances do these practices have a place in a civilized community.
If allowed to carry on such activities, intelligence agencies become a state within a
state, totally beyond public control. Nothing could be more dangerous for a demo-
cratic society or for the development of international law.
The fact that these activities have continued and have affected domestic political
opinion, despite Congressional bans on specific covert actions and requirements of
"timely" notice to Congressional committees, is an indication that those very
meager limitations are inadequate. Only a clear prohibition on such actions will
root out practices that are so destructive to the democratic process.
2. Collection of foreign intelligence within the US. and with respect to U.S. citi-
zens abroad should be subject to the same safeguards as collection omestic intelli-
gence.-The government has frequently contended that in the area of foreign intelli-
gence the inherent powers of the executive branch are greater, the constitutional
limitations are lesser, and the legislative restrictions required are fewer. This dis-
tinction is unsound and the conclusions drawn from it are dangerous. The position
is based on the assumption that in the area of foreign intelligence the rights of
Americans are less involved than in the area of domestic intelligence. With the ex-
ception of operations conducted abroad not related to American citizens, this as-
sumption is unfounded. The fact that the classified foreign counterintelligence
guidelines have been the basis for ongoing FBI (and perhaps CIA) investigations of
American citizens engaged in lawful political dissent illustrates why it should not be
permissible to make different rules for the conduct of foreign and domestic intelli-
gence. Except for activities in foreign countries which do not affect American citi-
zens, the standards of protection for Americans, not foreigners, should govern.
3. Adequate controls to enforce legislation governing the intelligence agencies re-
quires measures for accountability, internal oversight, and external oversight:-
Ac-countability requires a system of record-keeping and reporting. Significant decisions,
such as the decision to initiate an investigation, should be recorded in writing, with
the facts and reasons given, by the official responsible. Ad-hoc and periodic reports
should be required. The objective is to create a "paper trail" by which individual
responsibility can be assigned and the basis for review made available. Internal
oversight should extend beyond ordinary methods of supervision by superior offi-
cials in the line of authority. The best method of securing an independent check of
performance is probably an inspector- eneral system. In addition, departmental
heads, or similar officials, should exercise oversight through control of the budget
and other devices. Some method of overnight by persons totally outside the agencies
is essential. While legislative committees have not been very effective in the past, it
may be possible to improve their performance. A board of overseers composed of
prominent persons outside the government, if given adequate staff, could perform
an adequate oversight function. The General Accounting Office, which is independ-
ent of the executive branch and possesses a staff trained in investigating the govern-
ment bureaucracy, might be most effective. Any such oversight agency should, of
course, have full access to all agency operations and complete power to investigate
complaints or institute an inquiry on its own.
This machinery for securing compliance with legislative restrictions can operate
successfully only in a context marked by maximum possible openness, including
publication of budgets, protection for "whistleblowers," encouragement of investiga-
tive reporting, an public concern to know what is going on.
In conclusion, we urge this Committee to use these recommendations as the basis
for questions to Judge Webster in order to learn his views of covert operations, the
relationship between foreign counterintelligence and the rights of American citi-
zens, and appropriate mechanisms for effective oversight and accountability. If his
answers do not reflect adequate understanding of the problems and a sensitivity to
the demands for political freedom within our democratic society, we urge the Com-
mittee to disapprove this nomination.
These recommendations should also become the foundation for legislation, drafted
and ultimately enacted through this Committee. History has shown that only when
there is public attention focused on the misdeeds of intelligence agencies is it possi-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
ble to legislate even cautious limitations. In light of the current Iran-Contra affair
and the renewed press, public, and Congressional interest in the workings of the in-
telligence community, now is the-16est possible time to enact positive reforms and
meaningful controls.
NCARL hopes that you will take advantage of the opportunities before you. We
will continue to offer advice and assistance in the passage of legislation to finally
bring the U.S. intelligence community under the rule of law.
STATEMENT OF DR. JAMES J. ZOGBY, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, ARAB AMERICAN INSTITUTE
The nomination of William Webster as Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency is of great concern to Arabs and Arab Americans.
From the earliest period of his tenure as Director of the Federal Bureau of Inves-
tigation, he has shown little regard for Arab American rights or sensitivities.
The ABSCAM affair, for example, was a great insult to Arabs. However, this fact
was lost on Mr. Webster despite our frequent protests and personal meetings with
him. In addition, he remains unapologetic for the FBI's unconscienable use of an
"Arab" to bait politicians into crime.
Mr. Webster has displayed a cavalier attitude to civil rights as evidenced by the
FBI's repeated assaults on the rights of Arab and Arab American political activists
during the past nine years. In 1982 I met with senior officials of the FBI and pre-
sented them with affidavits from 90 Arab and Arab American political activists in
southern California. They complained of FBI harassment, including late night visi-
tations and interrogations as to their political involvement and activities.
At the same time I presented to these officials over 12 complaints from California
Arab Americans of instances of physical violence or threats of violence against
them. Today, eighteen months after the murder of Alex Odeh, southern California
Arab American and political leader, the case remains unsolved. And, while little or
no progress has been made in the Odeh case, we now learn that the FBI has, for the
last year, been conducting an "intensive investigation" into the political activity of
Palestinians in southern California.
The question I asked of Mr. Webster's FBI then, I ask now: why so much empha-
sis on the infringement of the political rights of Arabs and Arab Americans, and so
little emphasis on protecting their rights?
As CIA Director, Mr. Webster will have greater resources, be further removed
from public scrutiny, and oversee a world-wide operation with direct or indirect con-
tact with 21 Arab nations.
Contrary to what President Reagan has asserted in recent press statements, the
United States' standing in the Arab world is at an all time low. Following the sign-
ing of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Accord, intelligence agencies of a number of friendly
Arab governments, decided to limit contact with the U.S. for fear of security
breaches.
U.S. behavior during and after Israel's 1982 invasion and occupation of Lebanon,
coupled with recent revelations of the Pollard spy case and the U.S.-Israel-Iran scan-
dal all have done little to alleviate Arab fears and growing distrust of the ability of
the U.S. to work with them as a trusted friend and ally.
All this should be of great concern to our government since, while we have exten-
sive interests in the Middle East, we are increasingly becoming more isolated in the
region. As both the 1982 Lebanon War and the U.S.-Israel-Iran scandal show, our
penchant for relying on Israeli intelligence and our attachment to Israeli interests
in the Middle Easts are dangerous both to the peace and stability of the region and
to our own national security interests as well.
It is in this context that I feel we should judge the nomination of William Web-
ster. I know from government and leading non-government sources that our friends
in the Arab world have been deeply disturbed by Mr. Webster's behavior in both the
ABSCAM episode and in the instances of harassment of Arab American political ac-
tivists.
In a period when we desperately need to mend our badly damaged image and re-
lations with the Arab states, I am not certain that an uncritical acceptance of Mr.
Webster's nomination is the correct signal we ought to send to our friends in that
region.
Chairman BOREN. Also, I would like to enter at this point into
the record for consideration by the Committee, the background and
financial disclosure statement filed by Judge Webster with the
committee, pursuant to committee rule 5.6. And I would also men-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
27
tion that the committee has taken action to authorize the Chair-
man to release unclassified excerpts of the testimony of Attorney
General Meese before the Select Committee on Intelligence during
the preliminary inquiry into the sale of arms to Iran and possible
diversion of funds to the Nicaraguan resistance. And without objec-
tion, this testimony by Attorney General Meese before the commit-
tee will be entered into the record at this point.
[The document referred to follows:]
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
IN RESPONSE TO QUESTIONS #28 and #34
Financial Disclosure Report
u
A.a,sY Uri Only
OGE Ilra ONy
m
aw of Nppoinwwnt-
are (!/APWieeM.I
r
D
Rporti,p tarot ld,K4 APPropwb Bo+l
, M
. Div.
Yi.l
Ni,rtian ( (Mo., .
Election a om
,
(Moo
a
th
(Ma, aY. Yw1
Termination
New Entrant, Nomino,
F
Announced
incumbent
iin
X m C.rnaal.
Fin, Name and as. Initial
M, -h 1987
Lnt k r.
Reporting Individual's Name
Webster
W 1
TWO of Position
Dteartment w Asomy fit ti)i ble)
Reporting Periods
Position for Which Filing
Director
Central Intelligence Agency
Incumbents: Complete Schedules A. B. C. and Pad I of D. The
P
t
f
AdMeu lNUmbw,:freer, Cirv. Starr and ZIP Coed
T.Iphw Na. D?er?th Art Cool
or
ar
reporting period is the preceding calendar year except
f Schedule D when you must also
n I
P
Location of Present Office
Washington, D.
er FBI Bldg
H
d
. 202-324-3444
a
o
11 of Schedule C and
include any positions held or agreements or arrangements made
.,
oov
gar
J. E
from the beginning of the filing year until the date you file.
Tine of Pmitionlsl a,d Daalsl lire
0 ld Nrd with tna F. .i
Po
a
Termination Fliers: Complete Schedules A. B. C. and Pan I
o
.
Gownn nant 0.6,,,, the Pfwedins 1 ]
Montn, (if Not Soro w Abore)
Director, FBI, 2/23/78 to date
of D. The reporting period begins at the and Of the Period cov-
and ends at the date of termination.
fili
i
ng
ous
ered by your prev
Nam. of conwen,onr Commoir Cohrdanns Nomination
Do Yw IntNtd to create a arihw Diw,rfid Tura
Nominees, New Entrants and Candidates for President and
Presidendrl 11tess
Vke president: Complete Schedules A, C. and D. (Candidates
fwbjeet to Senate Select Committee on
No Under considers
Y
ioeb not file Pan 11 of Schedule D.)
Senau Confuwatian
es
Schedule A-The reporting Period for Incase (BLOCK C) and
C.r iftearlen
si.nuu,. of Reoonirw i? dlvidur
ate !Month, ow. Yw/
Transactions Test (BLOCK D) is the preceding calendar year
Value
f tilin
t
h
d
I CERTIFY f the Oil li I have
this,
I I
3 -1 C ~-'
g.
e o
e
a
and the current calendar year to t
BLOCK B as of any date you choose that is within
i
t
nhedwn:re i-. cmwiert a,,!
mr?t to th. an of n y knowledge
l~+
n
asse
s
31 days of the date of filing.
S,,--, of one, Rewewn
Data !Month, Dar, vwl
. Schedule C, Pan 1 (Liabilities)-The reporting period is the
h
R
preceding calendar year and the current calendar year up to
enew
..
Of
any date you choose that is within 31 days of the date of filing.
(If desired by asenon)
Schedule C, Part 11 (Agreements and Arrangements)-Show
?
Aaenay Ethic ONidel's ()pinion
Signalu,e of Design.,.! Agra. Ethics Official/Reviewing Official
D! Month, ay, Ywl
any agreements or arrangements as of the date of filing.
Th. information conuin.d in Init
. Schedule D-The reporting period is the preceding two
on o,t dltclwo no rennin of interns
unae, ppm". law and r.p,l,uont.
calendar years and the current calendar year up to the date
Of filing
sign?mre
au !Hoorn, ar, vwl
.
Office of
Government Ethics
Use Only
Comm.nu of Reviewing Oliinirt Of adr'honr pace a rap,irM, uo the more. rde of obit snot)
)
!Check boo P curnmenn are canWa d on rat recent side
ran rstoi
other
y
(
pp
$
yy
Amount
0
Dau
vc
IMa
It
acts eva
1 ?
NONE
go
$$
gas
d
?
-
u
g
TYwl
-
'
gg
w
?a
:
ga
$S
T
.1'.'
"
"
spasisi.e
o.f
Non?.I,
S
E,yn. xy ZCdIYllort
x
x
VES
N-0 -
p'?? doe.loltaa a Sm111E Ilonlaxxan
USA
,
tnrurn Inco+m
e_o,oOO
U.S. West,Inc.
X
X
X
X
X
X
Metropolitan Fed. S&L
X
X
X
o
-
X
Boatmen's National Ban
(3)
X
X
X
X
a
265 Acre farm-Williams]
ur
M
-
X
Farmin
g
$12,300
X
American Security Bank
X
X
X
x
Calloway Bank
X
X
X
X
ASB Money Market Fund
X
X
X
X
Proctor 6 Gamble
X
X
X
X
American smuts
X
x
j
-
X
H
X
1-
Xerox
11-1-11---,
X
I
X
X
I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Page
Number
Schedule
A
All Filers: In BLOCK A report lal the
identity of each met hold fx the Praduc
f tM re
ortin
l
All Filers: In BLOCK B report
AB Filers: In BLOCK C report the type and amount of income exceeding $100 or more Incumbents and Termination
p
g
ose o
on of income at the c
t
d a fair market helve
i
hi
h h
d
the value of each asset listed in
received from the assets and other sources of income listed in BLOCK A. You must re-
Films only: In BLOCK P. for
se
per
c
a
o
w
any other met
ceedmg $1000 and Ibl
BLOCK A which had a fair mac-
port the actual amount 01 any income not of a type specifically noted below. You need any real property, stacks, bonds.
,
me svfutlt generated over
source of iM
ken value exceeding $1000 at the
not report the actual amount of your spouse's earned income. only the source in BLOCK commodities futures and other
100 in rrg IM report rag period.
i
d
r
close of the reporting period.
A. You ma not check " ualified trust" unless have a blind trust which has been
Y 9 you txuritix listed in BLOCK A.
to am-
te
his indudac lien is om lim
plovers stocks bonds, tax dWters, bank
specifically approved by the Office ofGovernment Ethics. if you, your spouse or depen- did you
accounts, real property, mutual funds,
dent child are the beneficiary of a trust which no one of you created and has no krlord? purchase, all, or exchange the
pensions, IBA asseu, assets of certain
edge of the assets, refer to the instructions to see it it qualifies as an "excepted trust." item during the reporting period
n y.perso
trusts, ierenc fin lip in
ltM u
and a partner
and
If "none. (or less than $101) is checked under Category of Amount of Income, no other for it value that exceeds $1000?
your
you rent
unless ess
out. personal uctions t it
out. See nstructions to rules on bank
entries need be made in BLOCK C for that item.
ac :ounu and txsmpbx holdings.
BLOCK D
BLOCK A
BLOCK B
BLOCK C Transactions
Auets & Income Sources
Valuation of Assets
Incense Test
-
-
or v,
W.Ix
I
tune
of lor
an (
x)
Ceteoo
ry of
Anvou
nt of I
ncome
IX)
Acted
tr r?. cernnee
Identify each mat and income source
of ours, your spouse(Sl and our
y
y
t c
near
I
r
$S
A'nW^t
onI f
vi
fee" Day, Y0
od
i
pass
mou.s?ts`o`
1
dependentt childtDCl.
_
2
t
wl
8
S
g+
"Otni
e
NONE^
1
-
.
?
c
:
?
sPrafree
vile
no
s
_
__
_x
-_--
x
_
___-
x
-
__
neloen, USA
ytnMO n,ca,e
merican Home Products
X
X
X
issouri Lincoln
X
X
X
X
a
olgate Palmolive
X
X
X
X
?
elta Air Lines
X
X
X
t
X
imeS Mirror
X
X
X
Digital Equip. Corp.
X
I
I
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
4
X
-
BNB
nstitutional Liquid As
et
X
X
X
X
e
ercantile Bancorp. Inc.
X
X
X
X
a
l C
X
X
X
X
orp.
Continenta
X
X
'enerdl Nutut:,
X
i
X
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
neppriing ind,x,doal's Name
William H. Webster
Pape
Number
All File,,: In BLOCK A report la) the
identity of each asset held for the produc
ton o/ i orne at the close of the reporting
All File,,: In BLOCK B report
All Filers: In BLOCK C re n the type and amount of income exceedi $100 or more
W n9
i
ad
f
ke
in
c
the value of each asset listed in
received from the assets and other
sources income listed
BLOCK A. You must
on
Incumbents and Tmminar
nd
ib) any
d
g $1
000
other asset
BLOCK A which had a fair mar
fl
ed
port the actual amount of any income not of f a type specifically noted below.
income
You need
Fgen only: In BLOCK D. for
or source of income which generated over
$100 in income during the reporting perio
d
ket value exceeding $1000 at the
not r n the actual amount of your spouse's earned income,
, only the Source
inBLOCK
real property, stocks, bonds,
m
This includes but is not limited to e
close of the reporting period,
You
A. You may not check "qualified trust" unless you have a blind trust which has been
orne
ilis futures and other
plovers, stocks, bonds, tax shelters, bank
specifically approved by the Office of Government Ethics. It you
your spouse or depart.
s
securities listed in BLOCK A.
accounts, real property, mutual funds,
pensions, IrRA assets, assets of certain
,
dent child are the beneficiary of a trust which no one of you created and has no knowl-
ry y
did you
purchase, sell, or exchange the
trusts, commodities futures, personal bus?
edge of the assets, refer to the instructions [case if it qualifies as an "excepted trust."
item during the reporting period
nesses and px
ip interests. Exclude
If "none" (or less than $101) is checked under Category of Amount of Income, no other
fora value that exceeds $1000?
esiden
your S~ee~insltruct ons ebrnlrulei u rent it
on bank
entries need be made in BLOCK C for that item.
accounts and complex holdings.
BLOCK A
BLOCK B
BLOCK C
BLOCK D
Assets & Income Sources
Valuation of Assets
Income
Transactions
Test
Id
tif
h
d i
c?
i'go,r
of v
ei..e 1x
1
Type
of in
tone
1X)
categ
ory of
Amou
nt of
Incom
e Ixl
U
en
y eac
asset an
ncome source
of yours, your spouse(S) and your
dependent child IDCI.
= e
c g
_
?o
3 -
Y _
omen
Ispeciiv
0
g
g
g g
o
?
o
Ac A-ual nual
or. d
Door Yr.1
IM
yes, compia,e
s'=?$`m .3~~~i+sBe~.aa oS. o?'~`a ~.c?_
p12 a O Gr a9 N n y 2 ai O
O ??. FE? g A ~~,'
n ,3 ds
oy
!2 b
^+
a 9 doekESg
Fw K-
~1O
:Ad
~~d y ~ .o~? ~ag~~8
Pit
?.rmcvF CCpFSHj pro E
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
District judge alleges
entrapment by FBI
Detroit 36th District Judge Leon
Jenkins, saying he "wouldn't be
surprised" to be Indicted as the
result of a federal Investigation of
alleged court corruption, contend-
ed Monday that FBI agents or infor-
mants tried 11 times "to entrap me
Into some type of wrongdoing."
Jenkins also said at a morning
news conference that he was
pushed to the brink of nervous
breakdown by federal harassment,
intimidation and threats. He said
that tie was forced off the road by
two men he believes to be FBI
agents, and that they fled when he
drew a gun on them.
Jenkins said FBI agents "act
worse than hoodlums on the street
.. (and like) communist hoodlums
with government badges."
Although U.S Attorney Roy
Hayes declined to comment, Jen-
kins' allegations were disputed by
Kenneth Walton, special agent in
charge of the Michigan FBI office.
"Judge Leon Jenkins' allega-
tions are untrue. Beyond that, we
have no further comment," he said.
Jenkins, 33, who has been on the
bench four years, has been named
frequently by court personnel and
attorneys as one of the judges be-
lieved to be a target of a three-year
federal InVelttg non into anesa-
tions of corruption, ticket-fixing
and payoffs in 38th District and
Detroit Recorder's courts.
Ju~C-e alleges FBI entrapment effort
JENKINS, from Papa 3A
Attorneys famWar with the case
have said the probe focuses on other
judges, court em
ployea, police 0111.
Ctrs, an assistant
Wayne County
prosecutor, de-
tense lawyers and
others.
FBI agents
swept through
MatdisOniaCenter
and Recorder's
Court's Frank
Murphy Hall of justice two weeks ago,
interviewing court personnel; examin-
ing records and serving subpoenas.
Jenkins was on vacation at the time.
He said he will be available if agents
want to Interview him.
Denying any criminal or improper
g i tivities, Jenkins said he believed he
as targeted "because of my involve-
dlent -i4- the Buddy Battle cane.. , . I
i good by Elm as testily member aod)t of
as a Judge."
Jenkins said he looked upon Battle,
a UAW official acquitted of embezzle-
ment charges last year in federal court,
as a father figure and a man who
befriended him as a poor child.
Saying "no, no, absolutely not,"
when discussing whether he had ever
taken improper payments, Jenkins
Joked that he has trouble spending his
$81,000 annual salary.
HE SAID attempts at entrapment
ucaan In July w t?e 7
and that he rejected each attempt to
have him improperly intervene in traf-
fic tickets and other cases, or, on two
occasions, to accept bribes. The last
approach was three weeks ago, he said.
"At what point - after entrapment
has failed the first, second or third time
- does it stop?" he asked.
The alleged approaches cited by
Jenkins Included:
? An offer of money a downtown
marketowner-w Jenkins said was
an FBI informant - to have him fix
tickets, Intervene or dismiss caaas.
He said he met the market owner
through a former Detroit Judge at
private pov: ,^-'tes. Jenkins said he
was an infrequent player and lost
about $300 over the co"se of a year.
Jenkins sold no .. ' the market
owner over lunch last month in a effort
to wring information from him.
? An effort by a man Jenkins believes
was posing as a marine Corps recruiter
to fix tickets so young Detrolters
WOUIC not oe KICKea 041 vt oaot toms.
? Attempts to fix tickets by It former
judge, a police officer and a court
employe. He said the Court employe
was fired as a result of the alleged
bribery attempt,
He said he reported the attempts to
court officials and to the Michigan
Attorney General's office.
Jenkins displayed what he said
were documents and letters that would
support his allegations.
or read the material,
let reporters copy copy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Chairman BOREN. Senator Specter?
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Webster, in
the letter from Mr. Revell to this committee dated April 17, 1987,
Oliver B. Revell, Executive Assistant Director of Investigations of
the FBI, he says on page 3, quote, "If any action had been taken
based upon my contact with the U.S.A. (United States Attorney's
Office), notification by me to Director Webster and the Department
of Justice would have been in order", close quote.
Do you agree with that?
Judge WEBSTER. I agree with it but I believe that no action
should have been taken without discussing it with me.
Senator SPECTER. Do you think that he should not have contacted
the United States Attorney's Office at all without contacting you?
Judge WEBSTER. If we can bifurcate the steps one step further, I
have no quarrel with the highest ranking officials under me, if
they have a legitimate purpose, to talking to the United States At-
torney, there's certainly no bar on that.
But if his purpose was to request a postponement, he should
have consulted me first.
If his purpose was to get information about the involvement of
Mr. Miller, who incidentally was not a subject of that investigation
but only a witness, then that's a different order of judgment.
Senator SPECTER. Well Judge Webster, I've asked you a very fun-
damental question about the notice to you because what you have
here are 2 documents submitted to this committee. One dated April
13, 1987, one dated 4 days later April 17, 1987.
And the critical difference between these 2 documents submitted
by the FBI just 4 days apart is that there is a change in the repre-
sentation of the underlying facts as to whether Revell asked the
Assistant U.S. Attorney for a postponenement or not.
Now, one key factor arising from that issue of fact is the obliga-
tion to notify you as Director of the FBI. In Revell's letter of April
17, 1987, he says you would have had to been notified had he made
the request for a postponement. But he says since he didn't make
the request for a postponement, he didn't feel it necessary to have
notified you.
Do you agree with his statement that if he had asked for a post-
ponement he should have notified you?
Judge WEBSTER. Absolutely.
Senator SPECTER. The memorandum of April 13, 1987, which you
submitted to this committee functions exclusively on the basis that
a request had been made for a continuance. But in the final part of
the summary statement, the generalization is made that it was just
a routine fraud investigation and no issue is suggested in the memo
of April 13th that you should have been notified.
As I read through this with some care, it seems to me that on
the basis of the facts set forth in the April 13th memo, that a con-
clusion followed that there should have been notification to you.
At page 3 of this document, this statement is made. North re-
quested that Miller's appearance be postponed. Again, at page 3.
Revell recalls contacting an Assistant United States Attorney in
Philadelphia on the secure telephone line and requesting the post-
ponement of Miller's appearance based on NSC's request.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
And at page 4 it says, the AUSA, the Assistant United States At-
torney in Philadelphia, recalls receiving the request for the post-
ponement of Miller's appearance.
At the bottom, in the conclusion of this report, it says the Direc-
tor of the FBI was not made aware of this investigation until April
13, 1987. This was a routine fraud investigation presenting no prob-
lems or issues requiring authorization or notification above Section
Chief White Collar Crimes Section.
Now my question is on the facts as you understood them when
you sent this matter to the committee on April 13, 1987, why
wasn't there the--
One minute? I believe I started at 4:20.
Chairman BOREN. Is it 10 minutes? Five minutes. I'm sorry, but
we'll come back to you with another round if you have additional
questions.
Senator SPECTER. The question is how could you characterize this
as a routine fraud matter in the context of what you knew at this
time that Revell had made the request for a postponement based
upon North's contact?
Judge WEBSTER. I can understand your question, Senator. What
was intended to be conveyed there and if it was not, I certainly ap-
preciate the opportunity to correct the record, is how that investi-
gation was seen.
It was a fraud investigation in Philadelphia involving a bank
which had a bad check among many bad checks to investigate and
that was the criminal aspect of that investigation.
That is what the Prince was convicted of doing.
Senator SPECTER. Isn't it-you've already said it's highly unusual
for a ranking FBI official to contact an Assistant United States At-
torney and ask for a postponement based upon a contact by some
third party.
Judge WEBSTER. I think, although I didn't actually propose that
language--
Senator SPECTER. That's the reason I question how you could
characterize this matter as routine.
When you come back to the committee 4 days later, the excuse is
tendered that there was no need to tell the Director because no re-
quest had been made for a postponement. But on the facts as you
represented them 4 days earlier, there had been a request for a
postponement.
So on those facts, they should have talked to you and that's why
I find it hard to understand how you could represent it as being
routine.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, that memorandum was prepared for my
use and as I listen to you, and I don't have it exactly in front of
me, it said with the exception of his phone call which was not rou-
tine and which was the subject of my discussion with Mr. Revell
about the inappropriateness of my not having been informed.
Senator SPECTER. Judge Webster, that's my precise point. The
whole fact of the matter is about the phone call for the continu-
ance. It hardly has anything to say with the exception of the out-
side contact to Revell. That's the whole point of the matter.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Judge WEBSTER. I don't want to appear to be unresponsive and
I'm trying to understand because I don't know that we're in any
disagreement.
Senator SPECTER. How did it happen that in the intervening
period of only four days it was ascertained that the basic fact was
incorrect that Revell had not asked the Assistant U.S. Attorney?
You submitted to this committee a report on April 13th saying
that Revell asked the Assistant U.S. Attorney for a postponement.
You state, secondly, that the Assistant U.S. Attorney remembered
being asked for a postponement. And then 4 days later, the critical
fact is reversed.
Judge WEBSTER. I believe I previously responded that the file
memorandum of the Assistant United States Attorney was located
in which no request for a postponement was made.
Senator SPECTER. Have you read that memo, Judge Webster?
Judge WEBSTER. Yes I have.
Senator SPECTER. Well, the memo does not say that a request was
not made. The memo was simply silent on it.
Judge WEBSTER. But the Assistant United States Attorney has
since stated that he did not request.
Senator SPECTER. But wasn't the Assistant U.S. Attorney ques-
tioned before you submitted your memo of April 13th?
Judge WEBSTER. There was a phone call. This is the problem with
a rush job of interviewing. Mr. Jamar talked to him. This is Mr.
Jamar's recollection. But the Assistant United States Attorney has
since, upon reading his own memorandum, stated that no request
for a continuance was made.
I can onl report to you what was reported to us.
Senator SPECTER. Well, do you know what it was in his memoran-
dum that led him to change his mind? I have read the memo and
there is nothing in here that says no request was made.
The memo is simply silent on the point.
I find it hard to say that by reference to this memorandum, the
Assistant U.S. Attorney would change his position.
Judge WEBSTER. The Assistant United States Attorney says he
did not tell Mr. Jamar that he had asked for a postponement, that
Mr. Revell had asked for a postponement.
Senator SPECTER. That Mr. Jamar was wrong when he put that
in the report?
Judge WEBSTER. That's Mr. Jamar's recollection and the Assist-
ant United States Attorney says he did not say that.
Senator SPECTER. Was Mr. Jamar wrong when he reported in
writing that Revell had said that he asked the Assistant U.S. At-
torney for a postponement?
You have two things. You have Jamar writing that Revell asked
for the postponement, and you have Jamar writing that the Assist-
ant U.S. Attorney said that he was asked for it.
Then you have Jamar wrong about the Assistant U.S. Attorney's
version. Was he wrong also about Revell's statement?
Judge WEBSTER. I can't say that. Mr. Jamar's job was to write
down what the two individuals told him. And this is his account of
what they wrote down.
Then the memorandum surfaced. The questions were revived.
Mr. Revell's recollection was refreshed. And the Assistant United
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
States Attorney, according to the information supplied to me, said
that he had never said that there had been a request.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Specter, I'll give you another opportu-
nity with another round of questions. Other members have come in
and have been waiting their turn and then we will come back
around to additional questions if you have additional questions.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Hecht?
Senator HECHT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Webster, I have reviewed your written responses to some
of my questions I asked during the earlier hearings on your confir-
mation. Those responses will become a part of the record and made
available to those who are troubled by the performance of the
FBI's Field Office in Las Vegas regarding the Claiborne matter. I
want to thank you for your response.
I would like to, once again, point out that many of the questions
regarding Judge Claiborne and FBI Las Vegas Chief Joe Yablonski
were raised during the impeachment proceedings last year. The
Senate felt the conduct of the government's own investigation war-
ranted further inquiry.
Since that Senate Judiciary Committee investigation has not yet
taken place, I'm pleased to have had this opportunity to review
your responses.
While I don't necessarily agree with what might be your assess-
ment of the special temptations of the good life in Nevada, I sense
your concern about strength of character in FBI personnel working
there. However, there remain some troubling questions about the
propriety of federal investigators exhibiting at least the appearance
of conflict of interest, and engaging in political activity.
I recognize that there is much less probability of this happening
in the CIA, but in reality it could happen. But I think you should
agree that such activity would be highly inappropriate.
I also want to point out during my questions to you when I asked
you a question that your response was very positive; you personally
placed Joe Yablonski in Las Vegas and you took full responsibility
for his actions. I want to compliment you. That's very refreshing in
Washington when people do not shirk their responsibility.
Judge Webster, again, I thank you for your response, and for put-
ting the FBI on record regarding some of the questions raised by
the Claiborne impeachment.
Thank you very much.
Judge WEBSTER. Thank you, Senator.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Hollings has indicated that he does
not have additional questions.
Senator DeConcini?
Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman, thank you. Let me indicate
my thanks to Senator Hollings.
I have to return to the Appropriations Committee to offer an
amendment.
Mr. Webster, I have a few questions I'd like to pursue if you can
recall the Tumcon tapes, T-U-M-C-O-N, which we discussed the
last time as they relate to the Donovan investigation-and confir-
mation proceedings of the Labor and Human Resources Committee.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
The question I asked you then was did you know the contents of
those tapes? And as I recall your answer was that the full tapes
were not actually transcribed until the Independent Counsel was
appointed. However, according to the Bronx Assistant District At-
torney, those tapes were recorded in 1979 and transcribed as quick-
ly as possible in order to conform to the law's requirement that
those people discussed or recorded be informed.
Have you had an opportunity to determine whether or not those
tapes were transcribed and in the FBI office even though they
weren't brought to your attention?
Judge WEBSTER. Senator DeConcini, I have no new information
on that at all. There was some indexing of those tapes as they were
taken and those who were listening to portions of the testimony
made index notes as they went along. Very incomplete.
You may recall that I testified in the past that I was informed at
the time of Secretary Donovan's consideration for nomination that
there had been a couple of entries recorded or noted in connection
with the name of his company which had appeared on the tapes
but not in a criminal context. That's the way it was given to me.
So far as I know, there was no complete transcription of those
tapes until the Independent Counsel was appointed and had about
eight employees working for a number of weeks to transcribe them.
Senator DECONCINI. And so you're saying that as far as you
know, they were not transcribed and the Assistant District Attor-
ney is incorrect that they were transcribed shortly thereafter?
Judge WEBSTER. No, there was some transcripts, some portions of
them based on the notes. But there was no complete transcription.
Senator DECONCINI. Judge Webster, in response to my question
whether or not White House Counsel, Mr. Fielding, had asked that
these allegations tying Donovan to organized crime not be trans-
mitted to the Labor Committee, your response was that I cannot
recall such a request by the White House.
Is that correct?
Judge WEBSTER. That's correct.
Senator DECONCINI. Now, on June 9, 1982, in a press conference,
you stated, "My understanding is that they, the transition team,
were not interested in pursuing that particular matter." That par-
ticular matter being the organized crime allegations about Ray
Donovan.
You said that the FBI expressly asked Mr. Fielding, "Do you
want us to do anything more?" And according to your statement,
you said that Mr. Fielding said nothing was necessary. So you did
discuss it with him but he told you that nothing more was neces-
sary.
Judge WEBSTER. I did not have those discussions. The discussions
were coming from the agent responsible for the SPIN investiga-
tions. And they were having a number of oral conversations at that
time. When the summaries were gone over, there was a suggestion
from the field that Secretary Donovan be interviewed or reinter-
viewed.
And the agent in charge of the SPIN inquired of Mr. Fielding
whether he would like to or thought it necessary to reinterview
Secretary Donovan. And Mr. Fielding said that he did not.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
I later questioned the agent to determine whether he felt that
Mr. Fielding had prevented him from conducting an interview. He
assured me that he was in agreement with Mr. Fielding at that
time that no interview was necessary.
Senator DECONCINI. Judge Webster, do you recall whether or not
you briefed Ed Meese, who at the time who was in the White
House, on the existence of Donovan ties to organized crime?
Judge WEBSTER. The only information that I passed to Mr. Meese
first through the personnel officer and then confirmation to Mr.
Meese was the matter I just referred to. That there were these two
references to his, Mr. Donovan's, company on some tapes in an or-
ganized crime investigation. But that I had been told that there
were no criminal implications. They were not about criminal mat-
ters.
Senator DECONCINI. You were told that?
Judge WEBSTER. I was told that.
Senator DECONCINI. And at that time, you had no information
yourself, heresay or otherwise, about Mr. Donovan?
Judge WEBSTER. That's correct.
Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Webster-Mr. Chairman, I have a lot of
other questions and my time is up.
I also, Mr. Chairman, am very concerned that we're going to vote
today. I don't want this to be interpreted as that I am not going to
vote for Judge Webster's confirmation.
But, for this Senator, it would be far more satisfactory if I had a
chance to read the balance of the testimony and review some of the
questions, particularly those of Senator Specter. In questioning the
nominee, I also have a number of questions, so I ask the Chairman
that we not vote on this today. I'm not asking for a long period of
time, but long enough to read the record and satisfy myself.
While I realize we have a lot of work to do, I'm concerned about
the speed in which this committee operates. But I found myself
very inadequately prepared yesterday to vote on a report, not
having a chance to read it. And I certainly hope that because this
appointment is so important that I hope we could be granted at
least twenty-four hours or through the weekend to review the
record on this nominee.
Chairman BOREN. Well, the Chair certainly will bear in mind
your request and your feeling as I will all the members of the com-
mittee.
The Chair is simply trying to proceed in a manner that the ma-
jority of the committee wished to proceed. And, as you know, the
Chair requested additional public hearings so that we could have
an airing of all these matters. As I have indicated, we have a very
strong desire to be thorough in what we do.
Senator DECONCINI. Mr. Chairman. If the Chairman would yield,
I make no criticism of the Chairman or the conduct of the commit-
tee. It just seems to me after we proceed to another day of hear-
ings, that it would be very wise to have time to review the tran-
script and the information obtained at this hearing before we vote
the nominee out. At least that's the way we operate in other com-
mittees. We should not vote on the same day that we have the
hearing. That's the only question I would like to raise.
Senator HATCH. Mr. Chairman?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Chairman BOREN. Senator Hatch.
Senator HATCH. Mr. Chairman. Look, I understand my dear
friend's concerns. But we're going to have time to review the
record between today and when we vote Judge Webster out, which
I hope is the case.
Senator METZENBAUM. I can't hear you, Senator.
Senator HATCH. I say, we'll have time to look at the record if we
voter Judge Webster out today-between then and the time his
nomination comes up on the Floor.
Now I would suggest this. We can all come up with cases that we
wish we had more knowledge of. You and I have at least ten-fif-
teen that we could ask a lot of questions of the FBI Director, but
basically we've got to get about getting a Director out there at CIA.
I don't think anybody doubts the integrity of this man. And I
think we ought to move expeditiously on this because this has been
dragged out, it seems to me, longer than it needs to be.
Senator DECONCINI. Will my friend from Utah yield?
Senator HATCH. Sure.
Senator DECoNCINI. I just want to say that I'm in no disagree-
ment as to the integrity of this individual.
Senator HATCH. No, I know you are not.
Senator DECoNciNI. And I have every reason to believe right
now that I'm going to vote for him as I have in the past.
But I think the process is important here. Yes, we have taken a
long time and rightfully so and the Chairman has conducted it in a
most professional manner but to have another days hearing today,
and then want to vote it out right at the end of the hearing before
you have a chance to see. I haven't been here all day to listen to
the questions because I'm in Appropriations Committee. I suggest
that's true of other committee members.
I value the judgment of the member's questions here, and I
should like to have that available. That's just one Senator speak-
ing. If I'm overruled, fine. I'll have to vote against the nominee
which I don't want to do because I'm not prepared to satisfy my
obligation to vote this nominee out.
Senator HATCH. May I just make one or two more comments?
Senator DeConcini and I have worked together for many years
now in FBI matters, as Judiciary Committee members and now on
Intelligence matters.
But in all honesty, we're not dealing with a normal situation.
We're dealing with a major agency that is rudderless. It needs to
have a head. Nobody doubts the integrity of Judge Webster even
though we might have questions about a number of FBI cases.
Mr. Chairman, I don't have any problem with bringing Judge
Webster back in the secure room or anywhere else and asking him
questions about some of the things that happened down at the FBI.
But we ought to move ahead because our national security inter-
ests demand it.
And I would like to vote.
Chairman BOREN. Let me ask if there are other members of the
committee, we are allowing a round of questions to all members of
the committee and then I'll be happy to reopen this subject, but I
would at least like to allow completion of the questioning.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Senator Bentsen, do you have questions you'd like to ask at this
time?
Senator BENTSEN. No, Mr. Chairman, but at some point I want to
comment on the points that have just been raised as to the continu-
ance of these hearings. Whenever that's relevant, I would like to
make some comments concerning that. I think, Mr. Chairman, that
you have been exceedingly diligent in holding this hearings and
pursuing any questions that might have arisen. But we have to un-
derstand here that we are not dealing with an utter stranger. This
is man who have been in public service here in Washington for
some time now. He has fulfilled his role, I think, in a most respon-
sible way. You have the situation where I think they made a wise
choice in nominating this man to head the CIA, which is a terribly
responsible position. I'm under the impression that Mr. Webster
was ready to hang up his hat and do something else. I think we are
lucky to have a man of that caliber and that integrity, as I perceive
it, willing to serve in that position. And I hope that we can get on
with voting on his confirmation. I for one am looking at questions
and answers he has given and have been satisfied. I would like to
bring this to a culmination.
Chairman BOREN. Are there any other comments on this matter?
Senator Metzenbaum.
Senator METZENBAUM. Well, Mr. Chairman, I actually came here
prepared to vote but then there was placed in front of me a brief-
ing book. It really looks very interesting. It looks like it has a lot of
material in it that I hadn't seen before then I saw also a two page
teletype dated July 18, 1985 but actually dated April 29, 1987 and
frankly I think, I don't know Webster. I've seen him around. I've
talked to him, and I don't have any problem with him. But, but I
also think that there are some questions that we have a right to
inquire into. And I share with this book-what value is this book
to me? I asked my staff when did this book come to me and they
say it was distributed this morning. Well it looks like a lot of items
in here that I would like to look at, that I've never seen before.
And I don't know how I could read it that rapidly and still ask
questions and then the idea well, then we can vote him out or we
can bring him back afterwards or something. Frankly, I don't think
it is good procedure. We are talking about the appointment of a
man to a position that has been a subject of the highest possible
controversy in the past several years. subject
are also talking about a
man who has had a relationship with the Attorney General of the
United States, about whom there are a number of public questions
now and there are some items in this book that talk about that
aspect of the matter as well. I haven't read it. I don't know what it
says. But I believe, Mr. Chairman, that the Senator from Arizona
makes a good point when he says he's not prepared to vote at this
time.
Chairman BOREN. Let the chair say that the information which
was sent to the Chairman on April 13 and April 17 was immediate-
ly shared, distributed to the committee staff. And in fact, during
the past several days, while we are trying to make a decision, I was
canvassing the members to determine if there were additional
questions they wished to be asked based upon this information. The
Chair has been urging members and the staff members including
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
197
the designees to contact all members to see if they had questions
about this matter, and urging everyone to read this material.
The Chair determined that we should have this hearing and
that's the reason we are having it-to allow every single member
an opportunity to ask questions. The Chair felt the desire to ask
some questions and I felt very strongly that certain matters should
be examined and placed in the public record because it was in the
best interest of the committee, the best interest of the nominee and
the best interest of the country to have a full and adequate discus-
sion on these matters. The Chair wil not try to force members of
this committee to rush to judgment on a matter of this importance.
I would urge that the members ask what questions they have to
ask today and at the conclusion of this period, if members want ad-
ditional time to reflect, we have originally planned to schedule a
meeting again in the morning at 11:00 at which time members who
were in and out of this hearing would have time to read the re-
sponses to these questions. These documents that, as I say, have
been in our custody, have been transmitted and available to every-
one. And if that's the desire of the committee at the end of that
time, certainly that was the original intent of the Chairman.
Several members of the committee contacted the Chairman and
suggested that they would prefer to vote at the end of these pro-
ceedings today. The Chair wants to make certain that everyone has
an adequate opportunity to think about this matter and doesn't
plan to try to push the committee faster than it should go. We'll
hold a final decision in abeyance while we complete the rounds of
questions. That would be my plan and if there are more questions
to be asked today, then I would suggest that we come back tomor-
row.
In all fairness, the nominee is here. He has had a conversation
with me that reflects that he fully understands and in spirit fully
understands the responsibility of this committee. He is here to
answer any questions which we have based upon the information
which he has given to us. And I would point out that the informa-
tion he sent on April 13 was not information uncovered by the
committee, it was information volunteered by the Director himself,
who during the recess contacted me, tracked me down, sent it to
this committee and volunteered this information. He has continued
to find every bit of information relating to this subject that he
could. He has been undertaking a search of files of any information
that my be relevant, so I don't want to leave the impression that
he has not been forthcoming in this matter. I think we have given
him the pleasure of joining us again to answer our questions. He's
here waiting to answer them and I think we should proceed ahead
with those questions. It's your turn to ask questions.
Senator METZENBAUM. Mr. Webster, in connection with the Na-
tional Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty, Spitz Channel,
did that subject come to your attention prior to the last few days'
publicity?
Judge WEBSTER. The newspaper publicity? Yes, Senator.
Senator METZENBAUM. No, what I'm really asking you is were
you aware of Mr. Channel's activities, the activities of the National
Endowment for the Preservation of Liberty, the fact that on our
TV sets-it came to my attention because I saw it on the TV last
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
April, a year ago April. Rather it was last April. And I saw where
this was a tax exempt organization engaged in politics. Engaged in
telling people how to vote. Engaged in putting pressure on mem-
bers of the Congress. And then there was available a letter from
their television producer, Mr. Goodman, in which Mr. Goodman
wrote a 4 page letter priding himself and the organization as to the
impact that they had had on the Congressional results of the
Contra votes. I raised that issue with the IRS as to why they con-
tinue to maintain tax exempt status.
But the fact is that you didn't have to be a sleuth to come to the
conclusion that a tax exempt organization was using tax exempt
funds for political purposes which we all know violates the law. My
question is, did the FBI or did you have any involvement at all in
connection with that matter? Was it brought to your attention or
was it self-activated or were you investigating the subject because
it's obvious that Mr. Walsh had enough in a rather short time to go
forward and get a plea of guilty.
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Metzenbaum, the area that you are
talking about is normally within the purview of the Internal Reve-
nue Service with respect to tax exempt funds. We did not have any
references and therefore no investigative interest in Mr. Channel
until the independent counsel was established, rather, even before
that time, until the investigation was authorized by the Attorney
General on November 26. We did develop the information through
our FBI agents before the independent counsel was designated and
following his designation, as assistance to the special counsel,
which has resulted in the report. So, I'm trying to answer your
question, after November 25, we took it on. We had no investiga-
tive interest prior to that time.
Senator METZENBAUM. I have no further questions.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you, Senator Metzenbaum. Some mem-
bers of the committee have indicated to me they wish to come back
in just a moment and they've requested a brief recess, after which
time I will recognize Senator Specter to complete his questioning
and we will just continue rounds of questioning as long as members
have questions.
We will take a brief 10 minute recess. There are some other
votes in other committees going on and members will be returning.
The Chair will then recognize Senator Specter to continue the
questioning.
[A brief recess was taken from 4:56 p.m., to 5:05 p.m.]
Chairman BOREN. At this point, the Chair would say that I want
to give every single member of this committee every opportunity to
ask every question that they want to ask. Out of consideration for
the nominee, I think it only fair that if they have questions, they
appear at this session and ask their questions. We will proceed
along today as long as members have questions that they wish to
ask within the reasonable limits of the fairness to the nominee and
his physical endurance. After all, we are testing his qualifications
to hold office and not engaging in a physical endurance contest.
It has been said, this is a very serious matter. It's a very serious
subject that we're dealing with, a very important post in this gov-
ernment. The Chair wants to make it clear again, the information
with which we are dealing was volunteered to the committee by
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
the nominee and by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The
Chair, upon receipt of that information, has circulated it to the
staff of the committee, the designees of the members of this com-
mittee. It has been available to all members of this committee. This
Senator has spent several hours pouring over these documents.
Other members of the committee have spent hours pouring over
these documents. I have urged members to acquaint themselves
with this information. And the Chair decided that it was appropri-
ate to hold an additional public hearing as an abundance of caution
and thoroughness to make sure that the record was complete and
included all questions that members of this committee wanted to
ask. That's why this hearing is being held. So I have again request-
ed that members of the committee who have questions come to the
hearing room to ask those questions.
In light of the concerns that have been raised by some members
of the committee who want more time to reflect upon the testimo-
ny given today and spend some more time reading through the
briefing and background books that have been prepared by the
staff, it is not my intention to proceed with a vote today. I'll assess
the situation at the conclusion of this hearing. I want members to
have a chance to ask all questions they want to ask. I know that
the nominee wants to make sure they've had that opportunity.
He's here to respond to those questions and we'll proceed with the
rounds of questioning at this time.
I'll recognize Senator Specter at this time.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you Mr. Chairman. Judge Webster, I
had not quite concluded in the first round, the issue on the differ-
ence between the FBI reports of April 13 and 17. As I understand
your testimony, what it boils down to is that Mr. Jamar, who did
the questioning, originally reported that Revell said he asked for a
postponement and the Assistant U.S. Attorney said tht Revell
asked for a postponement and on the April 17 memo-4 days
later-Jamar then reported that the Assistant U.S. Attorney said
that he had not been asked for a postponement, and that Revell
also changed his view and said that he had not asked for a post-
ponement. Is that correct?
Judge WEBSTER. That's correct Senator. In fairness to Mr. Revell,
who had his memory refreshed, I thought it appropriate that he be
given an opportunity to submit that in writing as he did orally to
the members of the staff.
Senator SPECTER. The question was important in Mr. Revell's
mind because as he said in the letter of April 17, that was the de-
termining factor as to whether you should have been notified. In
view of the importance of the issue, do you have any explanation
as to how the facts, or the representations of the facts were altered
in the 4 day period?
Judge WEBSTER. I do not have any other than what I was told.
What Mr. Revell told me was that when he saw the memorandum,
it answered for him the knawing concern that he had not told me
about it as he knew he should have. And that he recalled then that
he had not asked for a continuance because the Assistant United
States Attorney had volunteered that Mr. Miller was not going to
be called at that time.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Senator SPECTER. Judge Webster, essentially we have two issues
on the questioning today. One involves this Philadelphia fraud
matter and what influence North had exerted, and the second in-
volves the question as to whether North received information
about FBI investigations as reported in Newsweek and in the
Philadelphia Inquirer. The central question arises as to how close
North was to the FBI or how close North was to Revell. And exact-
ly what happened. The concern is amplified when you come back to
your memorandum of April 13 where at the bottom of page 2,
North requested the FBI to hold in abeyance the interview of
Zadeh until the week after July 22. So not only is North involved
at a later time to ask for a postponement for Mr. Miller, North is
involved the year before and asks that there be a delay in the ques-
tioning of the Prince. And then, in another FBI cable, North comes
into the picture and claims that Miller had attempted to contact
the Washington field office to arrange for an interview of Zedah.
Then the FBI report says that the information reviewed by the
Bureau here was the first time that there was knowledge of
North's facilitating the channelling of funds to the Nicaraguan
Freedom Fighters. The report goes on to say that this information
was not disseminated further. Why not Judge Webster? Why
wasn't the information disseminated further?
Judge WEBSTER. Are you referring, Senator Specter, to the July
18 memorandum? Is that the one you are talking about?
Senator SPECTER. No. I'm talking now about your transmittal of
April 13, 1987. I am referring to page 3 of the WFO, the Washing-
ton Field Office, teletype dated July 31, 1985, reporting this contact
by North. This is the first time it occurs. Now the importance
comes up-as you and I were just talking informally about it in the
anteroom-if you add this to information which came to you in Oc-
tober of 1986, given North's proclivities, then the picture comes
into focus. And why isn't this information reported?
Judge WEBSTER. This information was reported by the Washing-
ton Field Office to FBI Headquarters by teletype, but as I previous-
ly explained, it was not transcribed and retained at FBI Headquar-
ters and it was not passed up the line. It did go to New York which
was just an information copy. But we did not have it at headquar-
ters because of a teletype failure. Had we had it, I would liked to
have thought that there would have been substantial interest in a
request to defer an interview based upon aid to the Contras.
Senator SPECTER. Well, let's pick up the memorandum of July 18,
1985, Judge Webster. This is the memorandum you have testified
about that never quite got to headquarters. The question arises, on
the face of what is here, why not. Even if it doesn't get to FBI
Headquarters, why isn't there some attention to it? It's addressed
to you, Director of the FBI.
Judge WEBSTER. They are all addressed to me, Senator.
Senator SPECTER. I know they are but they are addressed to you
for a purpose, because you are the Director. And there has to be
some recognition. It's not just happenstance; they are not ad-
dressed to me. They are addressed to the Director of the FBI and as
I was about to say, the attention of SSA George Lane. In addition,
it is marked "priority." And I know that's not your highest proce-
dure either. Priority doesn't necessarily really mean priority. But
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
201
the memorandum contains some very historic facts. "Information
regarding the Prince's expressed interest in donating to the Nicara-
guan Freedom Fighters was discussed by North personally with
President Ronald Reagan and National Security Advisory, Robert
McFarlane." "North specifically requested that attempts by the
FBI to interview the Prince be held in abeyance until after the
week of July 22, 1985 due to the critical timing of the Prince's pos-
sible but remote large donation to the Nicaraguan Freedom Fight-
ers." Now this isn't like Miller. This is not a witness. This is the
prospective defendant. If you delay the questioning of the defend-
ant, it can be very important, as you and I both know on investiga-
tive matters. And it contains the notation that North advised
Kattke that in as much as U.S. public law forbids expenditures of
government funds to aid Nicaraguan insurgents, it was inadvisable
for a member of the NSC, North, to meet with Prince directly. It
shows that North seeks to do indirectly what he cannot do directly.
To a law enforcement officer, you immediately know you can't get
away with that. If it's done by an agent, or indirectly, there's re-
sponsibility which attaches. Why, in the face of a memo about
trying to hold off the interview of the defendant, about the circum-
vention on its face of U.S. public law, and about the attention it
calls, personally, to the President, doesn't that come to the atten-
tion of the Director?
Judge WEBSTER. I have every confidence that it would had come
to my attention had it gotten out of the teletype room. It never left
the teletype room.
Senator SPECTER. Well it got to New York. It got somewhere. It
didn't get to the FBI Headquarters, but it was disseminated. It did
reach some of its destination points. Dit it not?
Judge WEBSTER. Just to New York.
Senator SPECTER. Well, alright. It gets to New York. But it
doesn't get to the Director.
Judge WEBSTER. It did not get to the Director. I should emphasize
that we get about 10,000 pieces of paper a day addressed to the Di-
rector at FBI Headquarters. I wish this had gotten to me. It was
obviously the kind of thing that would have gotten to me had it
gotten even to a supervisors desk
Senator SPECTER. Judge Webster, Mr. Revell in his letter of April
17 characterized his conduct as "entirely appropriate." Do you
agree with that?
Judge WEBSTER. His conduct in making the call?
Senator SPECTER. In making the call.
Judge WESTER. Well, I have to qualify that, because it did not
include a notification to me. In my opinion, I should have been no-
tified in advance of that telephone call and I most certainly should
have been advised following the telephone call.
Senator SPECTER. So with that limitation you would say it wasn't,
at least, entirely appropriate.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I can't automatically say of course, go
ahead and call him and make the request. It's very difficult to
second guess a situation of that kind. But my inclination would
have been to have consulted with the Department of Justice before
any such call were made and perhaps not even to have made it
ourselves. But I can't say that the call was wrong, that it was ille-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
202
gal or that it violated any established rule. I should have been in-
volved in the decision.
Senator SPECTER. Would this have violated any established rules,
if he had asked for the postponement?
Judge WEBSTER. I don't know that I want to concede that point,
because I think a great deal more information would have been
necessary. The Attorney General would have had a call on whether
or not the purpose-are we talking about the 1986 call which had
to deal with delaying the testimony of a witness for one week?
Senator SPECTER. Correct.
Judge WEBSTER. No, I don't know that that would necessarily be
inappropriate. We have to balance investigations all the time. I
think, as you pointed out, had we honored a request to defer the
interview or testimony of a subject of an investigation in order to
support private funding in the Contra effort, that would have been
completely improper. But it did not occur. Nor in fact was there a
delay in the testimony of the witness due to FBI intervention.
Senator SPECTER. It is obviously a lot more questionable to delay
the questioning and interrogation of the defendant as opposed to a
witness. I leave it to you as to what your regulations are. That's
why I started the questioning at the very outset by reading what
Mr. Revell had said. What Mr. Revell said was that if he had made
the request for continuance, or "if any action had been taken based
upon my contact with the U.S. Attorney's office, notification by me
to Director Webster and the Department of Justice would have
been in order." Now I think that means required. It doesn't say re-
quired, it says would have been in order. Was it required or not?
Judge WEBSTER. I don't suppose there is any written rule be-
tween the Executive Assistant Director and the Director as to what
he must be told, but Mr. Revell knows my views on matters of this
kind. Since I have that responsibility I would expect to be notified
and I would have wished to be notified in advance of the call.
Senator SPECTER. I have only one minute left or perhaps even
less than that now, Judge Webster, so let me close with a very
short question. You testified, as I understand it, that this business
involving Mr. Channel was really outside the purview of the FBI. It
would have been IRS. I wonder about that. This charge, as it is re-
ported in this morning's media was conspiracy to defraud the gov-
ernment by soliciting contributions for military aid to Nicaraguan
Contras under the cover of a tax exempt charitable foundation.
Doesn't that state a federal crime?
Judge WEBSTER. Yes, indeed. Well, I don't know for certain. Con-
spiracy is of course a broad charge to cover a lot of offenses. But
normally, the investigative agency in the area of responsibility, for
instance tax matters, are normally processed by the Internal Reve-
nue Service and that is the way in which tax cases normally pro-
ceed. My point was simply that when we got the information which
was not previously available to us by having access to Colonel
North's files, we immediately opened that investigation.
Senator SPECTER. When you noted in this morning's media that
you have Mr. Channel involved with Col. North and Mr. Richard
Miller-the same cast of characters as the Prince case in Philadel-
phia-did it ring a bell that even more so a closer look at that
Philadelphia fraud case should have been called to your attention?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
203
I know this is Monday morning quarterbacking; you have the bene-
fit of the morning paper, but there you have North and Miler in-
vovled as alleged co-conspirators with a man who is entering a
guilty plea and there they were in the Philadelphia story.
Judge WEBSTER. That's right.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Metzenbaum, do you have any addi-
tional questions?
Senator METZENBAUM. Yes I do if you'll just give me a moment.
I'm trying to read, Director Webster, the FBI report in response to
the Newsweek article of April 20, I think it is, which states that
Newsweek has learned that North was sent copies of FBI files
about the Contra network. In effect letting him monitor the inves-
tigation of his own activities and wasn't cut out of this loop until
last October 30. And the story then goes on to talk about a matter
down in Florida where Mr. Leon Counter, the U.S. Attorney, and
Mr. Feldman were involved in an investigation and that there were
and that the Attorney General-well let me first ask you about
that question, I think they are two separate subjects.
Let me ask you, to what extent was North given copies of the
FBI files about the Contra network?
Judge WEBSTER. I don't think I can answer that specifically with
respect to the Contra network because I don't know what that is.
But I can try to answer the question, Senator Metzenbaum, in this
way. Col. North was designated to be the coordinating official for
terrorism matters pursuant to an Executive Order and following
the recommendation of the Vice President's Task Force on Terror-
ism, to be the principal coordinator for all government agencies
dealing with terrorism matters in the National Security Council.
We directed routinely a number of items of information as dissemi-
nation of intelligence information not only to the National Security
Council, but to the Department of State and other Departments
and Agencies that had a legitimate interest. He would have had
access to our routine disseminations. He had no official access to
our files or to individual contacts with individual agents.
As we find out he did of course, make attempts to contact indi-
vidual agents from time to time. Those contacts, as we have found
them, have been reported to this committee. In all cases that I
have found, with the exception of the Revell telephone call, which
Senator Specter has examined me about, any contact outside head-
quarters with an agent was promptly and correctly reported to FBI
Headquarters. And so far as I can determine, no action was ever
taken by an FBI agent in the field under instructions from Lt. Col.
Oliver North on at least two occasions he was interviewed as a
course of our investigative effort, and that information was made
the subject of memoranda. The Adair matter which had to do with
allegations of a conspriacy to conduct a paramilitary raid on Nica-
ragua, was one in which he made contact with an agent in Los An-
geles due to the fact that the agent had contacted, for purposes of
an interview, a film producer on the West Coast who was alleged to
know something about this conspiracy, and who apparently noti-
fied Col. North of our call and Col. North was back in touch with
the agent. The agent promptly reported Col. North's contact with
him to headquarters and sent copies of this report to the Miami
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
204
office. The Miami office in following up its leads was aware of Lt.
Col. North's interest as National Security Officer concerned with
terrorism matters and recommended dissemination of its report to
Lt. Col. North's attention at the National Security Council and it
came back through headquarters, which was exactly the correct
thing to do. The agent who requested to notify Lt. Col. North on
another matter of the conclusion of an investigation, because of the
involvement of the National Security Council requested permission
from Headquarters. Headquarters granted that permission. So far
as I can determine, all of the procedures in place were carried out
scrupulously. The only exception to those procedures was one
which I consider to be inadvertence and that is the matter of Mr.
Revell not reporting his contact with Col. North to me on the
Prince matter.
We have allegations in the newspaper that someone in New
York was funnelling information and we tracked that down to a
particular agent. We have interviewed the agent twice. He has rep-
resented to us that he has had no contact with Lt. Col. North what-
soever. And we are satisifed that he is the agent about whom the
newspaper was reporting.
So that in general I can say to you that we were not funnelling
information to Lt. Col. North. We were disseminating intelligence
information about terrorist activities worldwide to the National Se-
curity Council routinely along with the Department of State and
other interested agencies. Additionally, as the coordinator for the
Operations Support Group, which is a subcommittee of the TWIG
organization, of the National Security Council. From time to time,
Mr. Revell distributed intelligence information to all the members
of the committee, and Col. North would have had access to that as
a member of the committee.
I have reviewed all of those disseminations and can find nothing
improper in them. So, I would be able to conclude from the factual
backdrop that I have just given you that Col. North had no pipe-
line into the FBI and that agents of the FBI were not giving him
information to which he was not entitled.
Senator METZENBAUM. Let me ask you further about the same
Newsweek article which I think is entitled "New Doubts About
Meese and the Contra Inquiry. Did He Choose Not To See The Evi-
dence?" One part of the article talks about early in 1986 a Cuban-
American contra backer Jesus Garcia told the agents a lurid story
of a plot to kill Ambassador Lewis Tims in Costa Rica, blamed Nic-
araguan agents and thus create a pretext for U.S. war in Nicara-
gua. With that, the U.S. Attorney in Miami, Leon Kellender, sent
an assistant Geoffrey Feldman with 2 FBI men to find out what
was going on in Costa Rica. The article goes on to say that they
then investigated it and that while Feldman was in Costa Rica,
skip that point. Meese turned up in Miami to visit 2 wounded FBI
agents and asked Kellender about the investigation. Kellender
denies that he saw this as pressure to ease off and indeed after Kel-
lender and the 2 FBI men returned Kellender initially agreed with
their recommendation to call a grand jury. But after meeting in
Kellender's office with Richard Gregory, Feldman's immediate su-
perior in the criminal section, Kellender reconsidered. Their report
concluded a grand jury would only be a fishing expedition. What
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
205
changed their minds? Another assistant in Kellender's office
quoted him as claiming I'm under a lot of pressure from Washing-
ton. I want this to go very slow. And it goes on further to talk
about such items such as when Meese began his personal invetiga-
tion of the Iran arms deal. Webster offered the FBI services, but
Meese saw no criminal activity and Webster went along. FBI en-
tered the case only later.
The question I have is in the Florida case, I'm sure you are fa-
miliar with it, what was the FBI's position as to whether the
matter should or should not be presented to the Grand Jury and
what do you know if anything about any pressure brought in that
case to keep it from being submitted to the Grand Jury?
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Metzenbaum, I know very little about
that particular case. I had no decisional role in it. Our agents con-
ducted an investigation, completed the investigation. Various pros-
ecutive decisons were ultimately made, and I understand a Grand
Jury has convened and is hearing that case at the present time.
But I cannot supply you any first hand knowledge because no
issues came to my attenton and I can assure you that the FBI gave
no instructions to slow down or delay that investigation. In fact we
completed it, subject to Grand Jury testimony.
Senator METZENBAUM. My time, I'm advised has run out.
Chairman BOREN. Do you have another question? I think Senator
Specter might prefer, if you want to, to have you go ahead and con-
clude and then he could go ahead without interruption.
Senator METZENBAUM. I'm sure you've answered this question
previously, but I don't think I was present when you did. It refers
to the fact when Meese began his personal investigation of the Iran
arms deal, Webster offered the FBI's services, but Meese saw no
criminal activity, and Webster went along. And you entered the
case only later. Why didn't you enter the case at that time? It
seems to me that your responsibility was one which there were
problems, there were legal problems, you belonged in the case and
whether or not the Attorney General thought you should be in, if
you thought you should be in and that there was criminal activity.
Why didn't you get in? And it's a matter of real concern but I
guess it's probably been asked of you earlier.
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Metzenbaum, with all respect, there
really was no criminal cast at that time. We're talking about the
afternoon of Friday, November 21. What we were talking about
were apparent inconsistent statements by government officials
about what had taken place in Iran. I had already earlier in the
year discussed the existence of a Presidential Finding, that the At-
torney General had seen it, had reviewed it, was satisfied that the
Iranian transactions were lawful. And there was no real informa-
tion on that side of the house and none to my knowledge about di-
version of funds to the Contras. We were talking about the fact
that the President had asked Mr. Meese, in view of the inconsistent
statements and inconsistent views of his Cabinet officers, to try to
talk to them and find out what actually happened-to come up
with a consistent story. I only offered any kind of logistical assist-
ance because I thought it was appropriate to make the offer. He
asked me if I saw anything criminal that would warrant the use of
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
206
the FBI and I said no I didn't, based on what I knew at that time.
And that's correct.
It wasn't until he went over there and in the course of questions
and examining of documents for the purposes of getting a consist-
ent statement of what had taken place, that they found one docu-
ment-a document which still has not been characterized in the
legal sense which appeared to be a proposal byCol. North of arms to Iran Admi-
ral Poindexter to use money from the payments the Contras. It was based on that document and the possibility that
there may have been a law violation that the Attorney General
asked his criminal division to consider what laws may have been
violated. And following their consideration on November 25, he au-
thorized the FBI to open an investigation based on those laws. So
that at the time I was asked that question, we were not talking
about criminal investigations but simply his trying to enter into a
fact finding inquiry to tell the President what actually had hap-
pened as distinguished from what various people were saying in in-
consistent ways.
Senator METZENBAUM. I think the nub of the entire issue we
have before us in your confirmation is Director Webster, who it
would appear may have gone along and not raised questions may-
be when they should have been raised. And somewhat part of the
team and it is hard to determine whether you were right or wrong.
The question that I think this committee has to decide, and I think
most of the members have decided, whether or not you will prede-
cessor independence as the CIA Director, that apparently your
cessor didn't have so that we can look to you to run the CIA in a
totally independent manner without anybody being able to call the
shots other than you based upon facts and the information avail-
able to you. I think that's really the question we have to decide.
Judge WEBSTER. I understand that Senator. And you have 9
years of my record to decide whether or not I have ever evaded or
avoided my duty. I can simply tell yout that on that afternoon I
had no information of criminal activity that would have supported
a criminal investigation in my opinion.
Senator METZENBAUM. I'm frank to say to you that at this
moment I'm going to vote for him, I'm almost certain that I am,
but I have just the weeist bit of lingering concern and I think that
based on your 9 years of service I think I have to give you the ben-
efit of the doubt for you. But I think I would be less than candid
with you if I didn't tell you that I think in some of the instances, I
think you might have conducted yourself just a bit differently than
you did. But I suppose it's easier to judge retrospectively than it is
at the time. Thanks for bearing with us.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you, Senator Metzenbaum. Senator
Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Judge Webster,
moving on to the second question now as to disclosures by the FBI
to Colonel North, I refer to a cover letter from you, signed for by
Anthony Daniels, dated April 22, 1987. I turn to page 2 in referring
to the Spivey matter, quote-this is from your report-Spivey com-
mented that he had related much of this information to Oliver
North of the National Security Council. This document is marked
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
207
secret so it's obviously preferable, if not mandatory, to leave out
the substantive materials that are referenced here.
[Pause.]
Senator SPECTER. I'm told it's been declassified.
Chairman BOREN. Senator Specter, which document? I wanted to
follow with you.
Senator SPECTER. I was referencing the cover letter from Judge
Webster, signed for by Anthony Daniels to you, Mr. Chairman,
dated April 22.
Chairman BOREN. April 22?
Senator SPECTER. Yes.
Judge WEBSTER. I have that document before me, Senator Spec-
ter.
Senator SPECTER. Well, this information now is not secret so it
can be disclosed so the public will have a fuller picture of it. The
memorandum specifies that Special Agent Boone transmitted the
teletype to headquarters. Birmingham, Houston, Miami field offices
received a telephone call from Mr. Spivey calling from Florida.
Spivey furnished additional details concerning the proposed action
to Nicaragua. He named the principle planners as Tom Posey, and
a man known only to him as Colonel Flaco. It goes on in some
detail about Posey having met with Adolfo Calero, leader of the
Contra movement. The point I asked you before was, quote, Spivey
commented that it related much of this information to Oliver
North of the National Security Council. Is that appropriate?
Judge WEBSTER. Spivey was not working for us. Spivey was a po-
tential source of information who had originally started this story
running. He had apparently called the Department of State want-
ing to get in on filming this invasion that was being planned, and
we were advised by the Department of State. So, we got in touch
with Spivey. Spivey then told us about hearing about this through
Mr. Adair, who is a writer on the West Coast, and he named one of
the individuals, Tom Posey, and a person known only to him as
Colonel Flaco. Now, he told us that he had--
Senator COHEN. Say that real slow so we don't mispronounce it.
Judge WEBSTER. F-IA-C-O. Flaco. He told us he had already
given this information to Colonel North. And our teletype was
simply reporting the fact that Spivey had said he had called Colo-
nel North with this information.
Senator SPECTER. Continuing on the same page, quote, North re-
quested that no mention be made of Calero in connection with this
matter due to the sensitive nature of his association with the U.S.
Government. Was that request honored?
Judge WEBSTER. I think the answer has to be no because we dis-
seminated this information to the National Security Council as it
was reported by the special agent.
Senator SPECTER. Well, was North requesting that the informa-
tion not be disseminated to his own agency or not to be disseminat-
ed otherwise? The sentence in the report doesn't specify, but I
would think that North would not want to preclude his own
agency. It seems he would be looking not to have it disseminated to
others. But that's my question.
Judge WEBSTER. My recollection-and I can confirm this before
this hearing is over by taking time to look at the documents-my
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
208
recollection is that the informational note which came to me made
no mention of Colonel North, but did reflect that it had been dis-
tributed to the National Security Council and the Department of
State and other agencies. And I can show that to you, but I would
still have to go looking for it.
Senator SPECTER. All right. I would like to see it. Going on, you
pick up with Special Agent Boone saying that he was contacted by
FBI headquarters and requested to recount his discussions with
Oliver North concerning this matter. Boone commented that he re-
gards such contact as highly unusual. And going on, during this re-
contact, North requested an update of the investigation. Was it
given?
Judge WEBSTER. What he did receive-or what the National Se-
curity Council got in connection with this planned revolutionary
activity-or invasion activity-was a report from the Miami office
to FBI headquarters which was routinely disseminated to the Na-
tional Security Council, the Department of State, and others. There
was an indication on the Miami teletype that Lt. Colonel North
wanted to know about it, but it was just routinely disseminated.
Senator SPECTER. The document goes on to say, North wanted to
confirm that the FBI was investigating this matter. Was that con-
firmation given? Are you saying, Judge Webster, that notwith-
standing the telephone calls and that North contacts Boone and
Boone calls him back at the White House, that Boone was suspi-
cious; and yet the calls him back at the White House. Let's say
Special Agent Boone did so and determined that this telephone
number was in fact the White House switchboard. During this re-
contact North requested an update of the investigation. North also
wanted to confirm that the FBI was investigating this matter, em-
phasizing that these reported plans regarding Nicaragua were con-
trary to White House policy. My question to you is, in face of all
that, is nothing given to North? Does it all go through the regular
routine? Through headquarters.
Judge WEBSTER. That s exactly what I am saying.
Senator SPECTER. The agents don't tell him anything?
Judge WEBSTER. That's exactly what I am saying. He gets it
through the regular dissemination route.
Senator SPECTER. Would the information have been disseminated
to the National Security Council had North not made these calls?
Judge WEBSTER. I think that question was asked of the supervi-
sor and his answer was yes because it involved an invasion of for-
eign policy issue and those normally will go to the National Securi-
ty Council.
Senator SPECTER. What you are saying is that with all of North's
activities such as calling up the agents in the field and giving to
the FBI agents the White House number-that it all amounts to
nought. He doesn't get any extra leverage, doesn't get any extra in-
formation.
Judge WEBSTER. That's what I'm saying in this instance.
Senator SPECTER. Any other instances to the contrary?
Judge WEBSTER. None to my knowledge. No.
Senator SPECTER. And over on page 3, the Miami field office re-
ported the results of its investigation to FBI headquarters via tele-
type on January 8, 1985 with copies to Los Angeles, Birmingham,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
209
Houston, and the New Orleans field office in view of the concern of
Oliver North in this matter, which Miami had discerned from the
January 5, 1985 Los Angeles interview. Miami requested the sub-
stance of their teletype be relayed to Oliver North of the NSC by
FBI headquarters. Was it?
Judge WEBSTER. Yes, it was. But it was disseminated to the Na-
tional Security Council.
Senator SPECTER. Would that have been so disseminated absent
North's request?
Judge WEBSTER. The supervisor advises that would have been his
judgment.
Senator SPECTER. If you regarded that it was unusual that Colo-
nel North has all of these contacts with FBI agents, makes these
requests and has them calling at the White House, it has to have
an impact on a man it would seem to me.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, it may have, and I was very pleased in re-
viewing this because I did not know about these contacts. It pleased
me very much that all the agents consented to stay in channels.
Senator SPECTER. Judge Webster, I think you did know about
them. The bottom of the report says, quote, an informative note
dated January 8, 1985 summarizing the contents of the Miami tele-
type of that same date and enclosing a copy of the communication
was sent to the Director who initialed it to the file.
Judge WEBSTER. That's correct. But the informative note made
no reference to Lt. Colonel North.
Senator SPECTER. Do you have a copy of that handy?
Judge WEBSTER. Yes, I'm sure we do.
Senator SPECTER. May I see it? I've only had an opportunity, as
you can see, to scan these 4 pages briefly, but why was no refer-
ence made to Lt. Colonel North's participation? Wasn't that a
pretty important factor?
Judge WEBSTER. It would have been to me, but I can understand
how those reporting it and summarizing it may not have recog-
nized that Colonel North was not under anybody's suspicion at that
point. You've asked me from time to time to put myself into the
head of other people. I can't do that. It would have been important
to me. I would have wanted to know that.
Senator SPECTER. Well, that's a question we keep coming back to.
We keep coming back to the question about what impact Colonel
North had in the entire process, and you say none. Reports that
you have filed with this committee says none. These reports from
the FBI of 4 pages are fairly lengthy. They contain more material
in sum than your condensation does to this committee, and you
refer to North frequently. Of course, North is the subject of a
matter of our interest, but why not a reference to Colonel North? I
think it's a fair question, Judge Webster, because you're the boss.
Judge WEBSTER. I think it's a fair question, but I have to find out
after the fact that there was no reference to Lt. Colonel North. Lt.
Colonel North, as I have mentioned earlier, was the coordinating
official designated in the National Security Council by Executive
Order to be the coordinator for all terrorism matters. He had a se-
rious responsibility and I can see no reason why the agents would
do more than report it, which they did. That was their responsibil-
ity. The supervisor did not see anything unusual in it sufficient to
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
210
report it to me. In hindsight, naturally I'd like to. I don't know
about all of the world seeing it all, but it would have made me
aware of Lt. Colonel North's contacts with individual agents. That
would have been disturbing to me. But, I was pleased in reviewing
the record to see that the agents handled themselves commendably
and in accordance with our procedures that are put in place to pro-
tect against that sort of thing. From time to time I have made it
clear to my executives that I wanted to be closely informed about
any kind of White House influence, and as recently as September,
1986 before all this broke, I addressed a memorandum to my execu-
tive conference reminding them that I wished to be informed of
any committee meetings at the White House to which they were
invited as my representatives or for any other purpose.
Senator SPECTER. Well, Judge Webster, I think you've put your
finger on the core of the issue when you talk about, your words,
White House influence. Influence is questionable no matter whose
influence it is. You had seen that memorandum of October 30th
prepared by Mary Lawton that we talked about extensively at the
last hearing. It made reference to the fact that North might be the
subject of a special prosecutor's investigation, and therefore that
certain information ought not to go to the NSC. You had initiated
this 30 October memorandum but didn't recollect it. Would it have
had a considerably different impact if you knew that a guy out of
the White House giving the White House number is doing a lot of
talking with a lot of your agents all around the country.
Judge WEBSTER. It certainly would have had more influence. The
Nicaraguan one-the one we ve just been talking about-the Adair
case-was one in which Lt. Colonel North was simply emphasizing
in his role in the National Security Council, his interest in seeing
that this group be vigorously investigated as violative of federal
law and national policy. So I can't see anything suspicious in his
interest. It was simply in the procedures that he followed that I
would have had some concern and quarrel with.
Senator SPECTER. Well, I wouldn't use the word suspicious, but I
would use the word questionable. And the word questionable arises
in my mind because he starts to make contacts with FBI agents.
And this is at a time when he might well be a suspect-a subject of
investigation himself. That's the gravamen of a concern that I
have. But, let me try to wrap this up fairly soon; I do have a
number of other questions-and, turn to a report--
Judge WEBSTER. Back in 1985 I don't think there was anything
that suggested he was a suspect, Senator. But, anyway, I under
stand what you're saying, and I agree with you. I would have liked
to have known that he was doing it, but I'm glad that our proce-
dures protected the process.
Senator SPECTER. Well, you didn't know it in 1985. But, you know
today that it was going on in 1985. It's on the front page of the
Post.
Judge WEBSTER. Absolutely.
Senator SPECTER. Conspiratorial conduct is alleged wherein you
have Channel pleading guilty and North identified as a co-conspira-
tor in the indictment, and also Miller. There's an April, 1985 trans-
action contemporaneously with all of these events.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
211
Judge WEBSTER. 1985. That's true. But, what we know today is
not what we knew in 1985.
Senator SPECTER. Well, that's the question as to what you might
have pieced together if this memo had contained a reference to
Colonel North. But, let me go on if I may. Turning to a report by
the Philadelphia Inquirer dated April 15, 1987, it says this, quote,
FBI spokesman, Ray Mcllhenny, issued a 2 sentence statement
saying that the FBI headquarters in Washington, quote, has dis-
seminated no files regarding Neutrality Act investigations to the
National Security Council and certainly is not aware of such dis-
semination by FBI field offices. That would be totally unauthorized,
the FBI statement said. Is that accurate on the basis of delineating
it only to a Neutrality Act investigation as opposed to these other
matters where the NSC and North has access to FBI reports? Or is
Mcllhenny just wrong?
Judge WEBSTER. I don't know what Mcllhenny was talking about
whether he was talking about the dissemination of investigative
files or the dissemination of intelligence information. We have rou-
tinely supplied intelligence information to the National Security
Council on international terrorist matters.
Senator SPECTER. And that could have involved matters involving
the Neutrality Act?
Judge WEBSTER. It could have. Yes.
Senator SPECTER. This Inquirer article contains this statement-
the document was written by an FBI agent working in Miami ac-
cording to Federal law enforcement sources who spoke on condition
that they not be identified. It allowed North to keep tabs on an in-
vestigation that could have revealed his own possible role in assist-
ance to the contras during the 2 year Congressional ban on U.S.
military aid to the guerrilla force, unquote. Is it possible that the
disclosures that the FBI made to the NSC that got into North's
hands did reveal to him matters which could have revealed his own
possible involvement in a criminal matter?
Judge WEBSTER. I don't think so. We had well over a hundred
Neutrality Act investigations arising out of Nicaraguan activities
and allegations, none of which so far as I know were ever dissemi-
nated to the National Security Council. The National Security
Council got the Adair matter because we're talking about an inva-
sion by U.S. persons of Nicaragua. That's ax} entirely different kind
of problem. I
Senator SPECTER. The Wall Street Journal of April 16, 1987 has a
report which is similar. It says, quote, "Justice Department spokes-
man Patrick Courtney yesterday confirmed that the memo appears
to have been transmitted to Lt. Colonel North, but said it never
went through Justice Department or FBI headquarters in Washing-
ton." And this is the substance of it. Quote, "Law enforcement offi-
cials said that the agent who hasn't been identified wrote a memo
distributed to Colonel North and others in early 1986 about the
status of a politically sensitive criminal investigation of alleged
arms smuggling to Nicaraguan rebels or contras. The investigation
which began in 1985, and still hasn't been completed, could have
exposed efforts by Lt. Colonel North to assist the contras during a
period when Congress banned U.S. military aid to the guerrilla
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
forces." Do you have any knowledge of North having gotten any
such memo?
Judge WEBSTER. I do not, Senator Specter. I directed the Assist-
ant Director in charge of our Inspection Division to try to get to
the bottom of that. The investigation identified the particular
agent who was alleged to have made that dissemination. The agent
has twice been interviewed and has twice denied even knowing
Colonel North. I don't know how you keep on proving negatives,
but I have no such information. I do not believe it to be true.
Senator SPECTER. You have testified that you had made the in-
quiry to the New York based FBI agent. You said you thought you
knew who it was and it turned out to be incorrect.
Judge WEBSTER. That's correct.
Senator SPECTER. Without telling too much, can you state why
you think you had the right guy even if it turned out to be incor-
rect?
[Pause.]
Judge WEBSTER. We had information with respect to a case agent
who was conducting the investigation that fit this picture and we
were able to match that name with information supplied to mem-
bers of this staff-of your staff-the committee staff.
Chairman BOREN. The committee staff did supply this informa-
tion and the agency has made a determination of identity.
Judge WEBSTER. We confirmed the identity that this appears to
be the person the newspaper article was talking about. Whether or
not there is some other person floating around the New York
office-there are a thousand agents up there-I can't say for cer-
tain. But it appears that the source information is attributing it to
this agent. When we are dealing with allegations and unnamed
sources, we can only take it as far as that, and I think we have
done the best we could.
Senator SPECTER. You think you have the right guy in New York,
but you can't be sure.
Judge WEBSTER. Yes, Senator.
Senator SPECTER. The Wall Street Journal article refers to a
second FBI agents in Miami. How about that one?
[Pause.]
Judge WEBSTER. We are not able to match that one up, Senator,
beyond simply the assumption that it is the agent that made the
Miami teletype that said attention of Colonel North or Lieutenant
Colonel North wants to know about this, but sent it to headquar-
ters, not to Lieutenant Colonel North.
Senator SPECTER. Well, I understand, Judge Webster, the impos-
sibility of providing negatives. I know that. But the long and the
short of it is that you really just can't say for sure because you
have so many agents in the field.
Judge WEBSTER. I am very confident from the fact that we have
been able to pick up the information that we volunteered to you
since these hearings started, that our agents, who are very sensi-
tive to outside importuning, were very careful and meticulous in
transmitting this information to headquarters. We have 9,000 spe-
cial agents, 21,000 employees, 300,000 investigations going on at
any given time, but I am so confident of my agents that I would be
willing to stake my reputation on the fact that no such transmittal
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
213
of information was going on to Colonel North other than as I have
described to you at length today.
Senator SPECTER. Well, just to fill out the last question on this
line, Newsweek says the same thing. "Newsweek has learned that
North was sent copies of FBI files about the Contra network, in
effect letting him monitor the investigation of his own activities
and wasn't cut out of the loop until last October 30th," unquote.
Judge WEBSTER. I do not believe that to be true. He received cer-
tain kinds of information relative to terrorism and the hostages
that were given along with other departmental officials at the OSG
meetings, but none of those related to Contra network or other
matters covered by that term.
Senator SPECTER. The question arises because you do have the
calls by Mr. Revell, you do have the contacts with the FBI agents
and you do have a man, Lieutenant Colonel North, who was extra-
ordinary at making a lot of representations and getting a lot of
people to do things that would surprise some sitting in calm settings
like Senate hearing rooms. That is why it comes up.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I certainly appreciate your concern. It is a
concern, his method of doing business, that worried us all, as I
have previously testified. I have tried to hold a tight rope on what
kind of contacts or influences he or anyone else could have on the
White House. The Independent Counsel has conducted a very thor-
ough investigation of all of Colonel North's files. Nothing has come
up to indicate that he has access to that kind of information from
us.
Senator SPECTER. Well, these circumstances have raised the con-
cern that I have had about the investigations. Did the FBI conduct
an investigation following up on the GAO report on humanitarian
aid to the contras?
[Pause.]
Judge WEBSTER. I am told that we did. I don't have the details of
that myself, but I am told that yes, we did.
Senator SPECTER. I don't know quite how to phrase this question.
I can't ask you, was it a thorough investigation. What did you do,
what did you find?. Was it a thorough investigation? That's like
asking if the fish is fresh today.
Judge WEBSTER. It is still pending, Senator Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Still pending. Full scale, tough investigation by
the FBI?
Judge WEBSTER. I would like to think we were giving it our best
shot, and I can assure you that when this session is over, I will
assure myself of that.
Senator SPECTER. Well, the issue, of course, arises as to whether
investigations that are conducted after November 24, 1986, are like
investigations conducted beforehand. You really only qualify for in-
vestigations before November-it is a more important consider-
ation as to what happened before all of this came to light.
The last subject matter on this line involves my concern about
the Hasenfus investigation. Information has been called to my at-
tention which may or may not be correct, but the conclusion is that
there wasn't a whole lot of investigation done, and I would like to
ask you about that. Hasenfus, as I recollect, was shot down on Oc-
tober 5th. There were allegedly initial visits by the FBI to South-
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
ern Air Transport which had done the maintenance work, and the
inquiry was about the ownership. On October 8, Colonel North
called Mr. Revell, asked the Miami special agent in charge as to
what was going on, made some contact there.
On October 9th, Southern Air called the FBI, responded to give
the name of a Mr. Gadd, I am told, and was transferred back to the
special agent in charge of the FBI office who said he didn't need
anything more.
We had the memorandum which you had sent to the file con-
firming holding up on that investigation. We have the later memo-
randum from Mr. Martin, Chief of the Internal Security Division,
to Mr. Weld, the Assistant AG in the Criminal Division, asking if
the FBI can go ahead. Now, there is the representation that the
FBI did very little more on that. One more interview on or about
December 20th. Is that substantially correct?
Judge WEBSTER. I don't know whether I can agree that it was
substantially correct or not because of the kind of slant that seems
to have been placed on it. We moved promptly when the question
arose of whether Mr. Hasenfus was flying in a plane that was asso-
ciated with Southern Air Transport. We ascertained almost imme-
diately that it was not a Southern Air Transport plane, but a flight
that had originated outside the United States in a C-143 airplane
owned by another airline not associated with Southern Air Trans-
port.
We attempted within a short period of time to try to locate the
official of Southern Air Transport, who was not available, for fur-
ther interviews. We were interested in reviewing any records rela-
tive to the maintenance of that airplane, which may have been
maintained at some time by Southern Air Transport. We, through
a sensitive source which I am not privileged to talk about in an
open session, satisfied ourselves that we could obtain all of the
record information that we needed relative to that activity. We did
in fact subsequently obtain all of that record information.
There is no pertinent connection between Southern Air Trans-
port and the activities of Mr. Hasenfus.
Senator SPECTER. Did you ultimately ascertain who the owner of
the plane was?
Judge WEBSTER. I believe that we did. I am not prepared to give
you the name, but we did.
Senator SPECTER. I am not asking you for the name. I am just
asking you if you ascertained who it was.
Judge WEBSTER. Yes.
Senator SPECTER. Do you know whether it is true that the special
agent in charge in Miami responded to a Southern Air employee
that the FBI agent wasn't interested in the identity of the owner of
the plane?
Judge WEBSTER. We have not been able to confirm that.
Senator SPECTER. You have investigated that?
Judge WEBSTER. I can't give you the answer to that question. It is
just another one of those-if we chased down every allegation
about how we answered a question as reported in the newspapers, I
am afraid we would be pretty busy. I don't know whether we
looked into that one or not.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
Normally, when there is an off the wall, obviously improper re-
sponse attributed to the FBI, I direct an investigation if I see it, or
I ask for an explanation of the facts. This one did not really come
to my attention. I am not sure that it came to anybody else's atten-
tion. We do not have an answer for you as to whether or not an
agent said that or did not say that.
Senator SPECTER. Judge Webster--
Judge WEBSTER. But we did conduct the investigation, and after
all, isn't that the important thing,
Senator SPECTER. Well, yes, that is the important thing, but I
asked about that question because I think it is important. It isn't a
regular off-the-wall comment that appears in the newspapers if
there is an allegation that the special agent in charge of the Miami
office responded that he wasn't interested in knowing the owner of
the plane which was maintained by Southern Air Transport I
would think that this is an important question.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, there are many ways that he might have
said it. He might have said it that way. He may already have
known who the owner was and did not choose to give out informa-
tion to the press about what we did or did not know. There are
many, many reasons why a person might respond in that way.
Senator SPECTER. Well, I am not referring to the response to the
press. What I am asking about is did the matter come to your at-
tention that the special agent in charge allegedly turn down infor-
mation on the ownership of the plane?
Judge WEBSTER. No, it did not, other than the newspaper reports.
Senator SPECTER. But it came to you through the newspaper re-
ports?
Judge WEBSTER. Ultimately, yes.
Senator SPECTER. And did you investigate that question?
Judge WEBSTER. I don't think that one. I asked for any informa-
tion about anybody giving information to Colonel North. I don't
know that I asked for that particular information to be run down
or manpower resources be expended on it.
Senator SPECTER. And the Hasenfus investigation is now complet-
ed?
Judge WEBSTER. It is with the Independent Counsel. I am not
prepared to answer that question.
Senator SPECTER. Was it true that after the memorandum of No-
vember 12, 1986, to Weld from Martin, that there was only one ad-
ditional interview completed by the FBI on the Hasenfus matter?
Judge WEBSTER. I really can't answer that question. I don't know
the answer to that question.
Senator SPECTER. Well, Judge Webster, I go into these questions
at some length and there is a lot more that could be said, but I am
going to end these lines of questioning now. And I do so because a
confirmation hearing is an unusual opportunity to combine Con-
gressional oversight with the function of confirmation. And the
impact of Colonel North on our system is being felt in very strong
ways and a lot of different ways. But I think it was important to
spend the past 40 minutes in discussing these matters in terms of
how he circumvented the system and why it raises a question as to
the thoroughness of the FBI in terms of what happened. Perhaps
there are only isolated transactions such as those with Mr. Revell,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
and perhaps they are entirely innocuous. Perhaps, they are entire-
ly appropriate. Others can judge that. My thought is to ask the
questions and put this matter on the record, and a lot of people
will pay attention to the questions and the answers; we'll be more
careful when these matters recur in the future. That is a very im-
portant part of what we are doing here. And that is my purpose in
asking.
And if you add to it the Mary Lawton memorandum of October
30th with your initials on it and what might have been done had
more of these small pieces of the puzzle been in your purview,
there might have been a different outcome to this affair given your
capability and your ability to assimilate and to assess and to put
the pieces together.
The last question I have for you relates to the open question
when you were here before on April 9th. That concerns Mr. Gates.
I had asked you at that time, as it appears at page 31 of the record,
did Deputy Director Gates act properly in having a hand in the
preparation of Director Casey's testimony of November 21, 1986,
which omitted the important reference to diversion of funds to the
Contras, Ghorbanifar's failing the lie detector test, the absence of a
Finding, and the effort, subterfuge, to have a Finding apply retro-
actively.
You said at that time that you would review the record if I in-
sisted and I said I did. My question to you is, are you prepared to
answer that question now`
Judge WEBSTER. Senator Specter, I acceded to your request. I did
read the record of Mr. Gate's testimony and the interrogation of
Mr. Gates. I finished with the same concern that I expressed to you
at that time, that I thought it was a very narrow record on which
to draw interpretations as to correctness of conduct.
I can make some generalizations. I noticed that Mr. Gates in his
testimony, when he found out that Mr. Allen had some concerns,
took them, brought them forward to the Director; that he asked the
General Counsel to conduct a review; that he and Mr. Casey took
their concerns to Admiral Poindexter, who apparently did not give
much of an indication about what he was going to do about it or
shed any further information.
With respect to the preparation of the testimony, it was clear to
me that it was prepared in a maze of confusion. Mr. Casey was out
of the country. Mr. Gates testified that he had some initial cuts at
it but did not participate in the end product. Mr. Casey came back
from his trip abroad. The indications from the record and from, I
must say from what I have been told because I have made some
independent inquiries, that he made many personal changes in
that testimony; that they were ripping up sheets and going back
and forth.
I don't know what Mr. Gates saw at the end. I do know that you
were concerned about omissions-the omission to discuss the prob-
lem of the Finding and the omission to discuss the possibility
raised by Mr. Allen that there may have been some diversion of
funds. The only thing I can say about that, Senator Specter, and I
can't make a judgment-a personal judgment on the record that
you gave me-is that it would depend a lot, were I in that situa-
tion, either in Mr. Casey's role or Mr. Gates' role, whether or not I
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
217
had been convinced by the evidence or the information supplied by
Mr. Allen, that I was convinced that there was a substantial likeli-
hood that there may be truth to this sort of information. If it were
just speculation or just uncorroborated informant information, I
don't know whether I would have insisted or tried to insist on that
type of thing coming before the committee.
Having read his lengthy testimony and having experienced your
own concerns here and having talked at length with the Chairman
and the Vice Chairman about the kinds of things that you want to
know, what I might think now and what I might have thought in
those days might be entirely different.
I know that great masses of uncorroborated information come to
the CIA, because we get a lot of it. The Libyan hit team that we
never bought into in the FBI came out of such information, uncor-
roborated, and just passed along. I wouldn't think that this com-
mittee would want to get that kind of information. The question
that I can't answer from this record is whether or not that type of
information had reached-had gelled sufficiently that you should
have been made aware of it.
The Finding problem was hampered in part by the opinion of the
General Counsel. As I understand it both the previous and the
present General Counsel are of the view that a Finding was not
necessary. I--
Senator SPECTER. Judge Webster, I don't think that is correct.
Judge WEBSTER. Well, I am glad to be corrected on that.
Senator SPECTER. I don't think that is correct, but that is--
Judge WEBSTER. I happen to think a Finding was required. So as
far as the future is concerned, I have no problem with that.
Senator SPECTER. Well, I was reluctant to interrupt you because
it is an important answer, but I don't want to let it pass. Mr. Gates
gave some testimony on that issue, but I do not believe that the
underlying facts are that now Judge Sporkin thought a Finding
was not necessary or that the General Counsel who succeeded him
thought that a Finding was not necessary.
Judge WEBSTER. I see. But you are just giving some vindication to
what I said about the difficulty of trying to come to a logical con-
clusion from such a narrow record that I had.
I can assure you, as I would all members of the committee, that
as information develops from the Select Committee's investigations
the Independent Counsel, I, if confirmed, will have all of these mat-
ters in mind. But in my working with Mr. Gates in preparation for
these hearings and in my past experience with him, I really have a
great deal of confidence, both in his integrity and his willingness to
come forward and tell me, if I am confirmed, of matters that ought
to go into my testimony. And I would be very disappointed if he did
not and I would be very much surprised if, after his experience
before this committee, he failed to do so.
But that is as far as I can honestly go, and I would not ask you
to push me beyond that at this time, in fairness to him and the
inability from such a narrow record to reach any quick shotgun
conclusions about it.
Senator SPECTER. Well, I think that you have answered the ques-
tion. I would not be reluctant to push you, but I don't think that is
warranted or appropriate.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
I would comment really that it is not enough for Mr. Gates to
tell you. Mr. Gates has a duty to tell this committee. He ought to
start off by telling the DCI, and if the DCI doesn't tell the commit-
tee, then he ought to tell the committee. That is a point you made
at the last hearing, of the affirmative obligation of the Deputy. Mr.
Gates did not do that, however. Where you talk about his appropri-
ate conduct in recalling what Mr. Allen said to the Director, after
which he and the Director went to talk to Admiral Poindexter, I
think that was proper, important and good. But it doesn't go far
enough. The critical step is coming to the committee.
Judge WEBSTER. Excuse me, Senator, I don't mean to interrupt
you, but weren't they under a Presidential order not to do that at
that time?
Senator SPECTER. I am not sure. That is one of the tough legal
issues. A case can be made that they were; that the Finding had
included that. But there is also a case to be made as a legal matter,
one lawyer to another, that those Findings have to be reviewed,
and as one lawyer to another, that if the directive is unlawful, it is
no excuse. You can't follow an unlawful directive. And it is a tough
choice for a subordinate to make, but there are cases going back to
the German U-boat cases, the shooting down of the survivors with
the gunmen claiming they are acting under orders, and a lot more
cases of less violence and less firmness than that. So that is seemed
to me at that juncture there was an invalid direction. And there
was a duty on the part of those in authority to come forward and
tell the committee at that point. But I think that really is the
issue.
But I accept the answer which you have given. And the more im-
portant answer may be is its educational process as to what will
happen in the future.
Thank you, very much, Judge Webster; thank you Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you very much, Senator Specter.
Judge Webster, I also want to express my appreciation to you for
the candor with which you have answered questions. Let me say
again, just for the record and not to reopen the debate, because this
is the confirmation hearing of William Webster and not the confir-
mation hearing of Robert Gates, but I would say again, and I have
said this to Senator Specter individually, and it is a subject that I
imagine that we will discuss some more over a period of time, that
my own experience with Mr. Gates during this period of time in
which he has been Acting Director-of course, he did not become
Deputy Director until April of 1986, which was after the issuance
of the Presidential Finding-my own experience with him during
this period of time in which he has been free to operate as the
Acting Director and to impose his own policies has been that no
one could have been more forthcoming than Mr. Gates has to the
Chairman, the Vice Chairman, the members of the committee,
with the kinds of information that he has given this committee. In
fact, I would have to say that during the time that I have been
Chairman, I have not dealt with anyone in government that has
been more open, candid or accountable than he has been.
That is not to say that every action of any public official is
always perfect as we look back in retrospect. We have asked some
very difficult questions today. The members of the committee have
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
219
posed some very difficult questions to you. They have been
straightforward. They have been probing. I think that is healthy.
Because I hope that the confirmation process will not only be one
in which we determine fitness for a position, but it will also be a
process that will sensitize all of us to our responsibilities.
Quite frankly, I think that what we have been through in this
committee and in the Congress over the past several months has
not only caused us to have thoughts about how the Executive
Branch should conduct itself; I think it has caused us to feel our
own sense of responsibility for the oversight process more keenly.
That is the reason, as I said today, that I scheduled this additional
hearing, that every member of this committee, charged with over-
sight responsibility, would have an opportunity to ask every ques-
tion. I think that is exactly the sentiment Senator Specter was ex-
pressing awhile ago. That it is not in hostility that questions are
asked, but it is out of a heavy responsibility that each and every
member of this committee feels to the oversight process with which
we are charged.
This is a unique committee. We sit as 15 members who learn a
lot of information that is not automatically communicated to all of
the rest of the Senate. So in essence, we are called upon to be trust-
ees for the rest of the Senate. I am not asked to exercise just my
own judgment, but I am asked as a trustee to try to understand
how the 85 Senators who are not members of this committee might
feel about a certain course of action if they were privy to the same
information.
I think it has been a healthy process. It sensitizes us to our over-
sight responsibilities. I hope that it has sensitized you even more so
to the responsibilities that you would have as Director of Central
Intelligence, to work the mutual trust with us, to try to make sure
that all of the actions of our government in this area are lawful,
accountable in every way, appropriately to the democratic process.
We have had a great tragedy that has developed in the country
because in this bicentennial year of the Constitution, we are now in
the midst of an investigation about what happens when the regular
Constitutional process is not followed.
We have a way of making law in this country. Congress either
enacts or turns down bills. Presidents either sign or veto proposed
legislation. That is the way we are going to make policy. And obvi-
ously it is a dangerous and slippery slope we start down when
either through private fundraising mechanisms, shadings of the
law as Senator Specter said during his questioning, utilization of
agents to do indirectly what it is illegal to do directly. When we get
into this area of not following the straightforward Constitutional
process, it is fraught with danger for the republic, it is fraught
with danger for the policies that are involved, and dangers for the
individuals that are involved. And so I think we have been through
an important process.
As I have said to you one of the important considerations that
has been in my own mind and I have been very candid, I doubt
that there is a member of this committee that has a doubt about
the personnel integrity of William Webster. I would say to you that
after as many years of public service on the bench and as Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, some of those early years
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
especially in very difficult circumstances, that you took on that re-
sponsibility, that it should be a mark of great pride to you and an
encouraging record for the country that I would make that state-
ment. With the kind of record and the length of public service that
you have behind you, I don't think there is anyone that would
question your personal honesty and integrity. I don't think there is
anyone who would believe that you would initiate yourself any-
thing that would be improper.
There have been some questions raised in terms of concern about
whether you would aggressively hold accountable all of those that
would work with you in any agency of government to the same
standards that you yourself would follow. And whether you would
aggressively pursue any possibility of wrongdoing to learn the
truth about it and to stop any kind of unauthorized behavior or im-
proper behavior.
Now, I have been reassured by the kinds of comments that you
have made today. I have been reassured by the manner in which
you have volunteered to the committee and have obviously made
an intensive effort to try to bring additional information to us. I
appreciate that very much.
I would just like to ask you, and I think it would be important as
a part of the record, as the members reflect on this hearing this
evening and as they come to a final conclusion about your confir-
mation, for your personal feelings or your personal expression,
your personal philosophy about the importance of accountability.
Again, this is not to imply that the people with whom you would be
working at the Central Intelligence Agency are not worthy of trust
and respect. I think unfortunately, as I have said before, it is only
when the agency goes astray, it is only when some failure occurs,
that the agency usually comes into the fore in the media. Day in
and day out there are a multitude of successes. There are an in-
credible number of able, honest people working in that agency. I
don't think the quality of the people in that agency is surpassed by
any other agency of government. I have great respect for the
people that work in that agency. And it is unfortunate, by the
nature of the enterprise, we are not often enough able to hold up
and share with the American people the many successes that go on
there.
But still, as the man in charge, not only accountable to this com-
mittee and accountable to the American people, but in charge of
supervising that Agency-any agency that includes human beings
of any kind is bound to require supervision-I wish you would ex-
press to the committee, for the record, your own philosophy and
your own sense of commitment on that particular subject.
Judge WEBSTER. I have a deep and abiding faith in this country
and in its Constitution and in its laws. I think that no one has the
right to hold public office unless they are committed to the faithful
observance of those laws and who insist upon the faithful observ-
ance of those laws by all who are reporting in to the head of that
agency or department.
I have tried to demonstrate that in my public life. I believe that
as head of any agency, I am responsible for everything that takes
place in that agency. I may not be able to prevent things from hap-
pening that happen though human error or though machine error,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
221
but I can through my own active interest in faithful compliance,
demonstrate and insist upon a quality of performance that will
give the highest level of faithful adherence to our responsibilities.
In the FBI I took that so seriously that for most of the nine years
I have been in office I have operated without a Deputy in order to
be sure that I indeed got most, if not all, of the information which I
should receive in order to take appropriate action and to set appro-
priate policies.
I have had two special assistants, from outside the Bureau, dis-
tinguished young lawyers, whose job, without any line responsibil-
ity, is to roam the Bureau and to ask the hard questions from the
non-institutional point of view about why are we doing it this way.
I have personally, because the law requires me to do so, certified
every Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act application that has
come through the Bureau. And there are several hundred every
year. I have personally, and the law does not require me to do this,
approved every application for a Title III Omnibus Crime Act that
has come through me while I've been in Washington on duty. I've
done that because I thought it would emphasize the responsibility
of faithful adherence to procedures.
I mentioned the September order where I was concerned. We
have followed those things through rigorously. When information
comes to me that I have reason to question, I ask for facts. I bring
people in. I talk not just to the people around me, but to the people
who actually did the work. I personally review the disciplinary ac-
tions that are taken in the FBI and personally approve those of all
the ranks of Assistant Special Agent In Charge or above to be sure
that appropriate action is taking place. The Inspection Division and
the Office of Professional Responsibility report directly to me as
does the Office of Legal Counsel so that I can be sure that nothing
is filtered from me that I need to know about the faithful adher-
ence in terms of conduct.
I think the same principles apply to any agency and especially to
the Central Intelligence Agency and the responsibilities of the Di-
rector of Central Intelligence. I recognize that in many respects,
the agency operates beyond the protection of our Constitution in
other areas of the world. But we do have our laws that apply to us
in the agency. We do have laws that govern what we can do and
what we can t do. We have oversight to which I have given a full
pledge, because I think it is a two way street. kthink that oversight
helps in the faithful performance of our responsibilities. Now, those
are some of the things that I have done to try to insure a high level
of professional standards from our agents in the FBI.
I would not want to complete this kind of a statement, which I
had not anticipated and I will probably think of several things to-
night that I wish I had said in response, without saying that I have
the highest respect for the men and women of the Central Intelli-
gence Agency. They are performing an enormously important serv-
ice for this country and its citizens. They have extraordinary, as
you have pointed out, capability, extraordinary dedication to duty
and they do so without any public praise. I would hope, as a part of
any responsibilities that might come to me if I'm confirmed, to
help the American people understand a little better the enormity
of the work and the high quality of the performance that is going
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
on, without attempting in any way to minimize my responsibilities
to seek out and correct any areas in which conduct does not meet
those high standards.
Mr. Chairman, I think that's about all I have to say.
Chairman BOREN. Well, Judge Webster, I don't think had you an-
ticipated the question that you could have answered it any more
eloquently or any more appropriately and I appreciate what you
have said. I feel assured by the values which you have expressed.
They are values that are reflected by your record of public service.
Again I say that I think that this procedure that we have gone
through has been a positive one. I say to my colleague from Penn-
sylvania that while I may not agree with every sentiment he
always utters, I have great respect for him. I appreciate the fact
that he does his homework, that he comes prepared to ask the
questions that need to be asked as part of an oversight process. I
respect him for that. I appreciate his contribution to this commit-
tee as I do the contribution of other members of this committee. I
think we've all come through this process better able to render the
kind of service and meet the kind of responsibilities we are called
upon to meet. I would just say to you, Judge Webster, that having
looked at the record very carefully, and having spent many hours
and tried to familiarize myself completely with your qualifications
and having listened to the values you've expressed that it's the in-
tention of this Senator, as Chairman of this committee, to vote for
your confirmation and to participate in recommending your confir-
mation to the full Senate. I will of course be casting that vote only
as one Senator. The rest of this committee will make its own collec-
tive judgment and I will survey the members of the committee this
evening to determine a time to be set for the committee to take
action on your confirmation. I want to do that in a way that will be
fair to all the members of the committee. I did send out telephone
calls to all of them this afternoon, including some of those that
were here earlier. I specifically talked to Senator DeConcini. He
said he had satisfied himself in terms of the questions he had
wanted to ask. He did not need to return to ask additional ques-
tions and I have sent notification to others. So I think every
member of the committee has had a thorough opportunity to ask
every question, and I will in fairness to all the members, try to
schedule this vote as soon as possible, because I think it's impera-
tive that we have a Director, a permanent director, in that critical
position as soon as possible. Again, I thank you for your participa-
tion. Senator Specter and my colleagues have been participants in
this process and the hearings will stand in recess. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 6:41 p.m., the Committee was recessed, subject to
the call of the Chair.]
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER TO BE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
FRIDAY, MAY 1, 1987
U.S. SENATE,
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE,
Washington, DC.
The select committee met, pursuant to notice, at 12:30 p.m., in
room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. David Boren
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Present: Senators Boren, Nunn, Hollings, Cranston, DeConcini,
Metzenbaum, Cohen, Hatch, Murkowski, Specter, Hecht and
Warner.
Staff Present: Sven E. Holmes, Staff Director and General Coun-
sel; James H. Dykstra, Minority Staff Director; and Kathleen P.
McGhee, Chief Clerk.
Chairman BOREN. The committee will come to order. This meet-
ing has been called for the purpose of taking a vote on the nomina-
tion of William Webster to be Director of Central Intelligence. The
committee has had a brief meeting this morning with Judge Web-
ster on a classified matter. At the conclusion of that meeting, the
committee also, by unanimous consent, waived the provisions of
Rule 5.5 to allow the committee to proceed to take this vote at this
time.
So, without further ado, the clerk will call the roll on the confir-
mation of William Webster to be Director of Central Intelligence.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Bentsen.
Chairman BOREN. Aye by proxy.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Nunn.
Senator NUNN. Aye.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Hollings.
Senator HOLLINGS. Aye.
Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Bradley.
Chairman BOREN. Aye by proxy.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Cranston.
Senator CRANSTON. Aye.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. DeConcini.
Senator DECONCINI. Aye.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Metzenbaum.
Senator METZENBAUM. Aye.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Roth.
Senator COHEN. Aye by proxy.
Mrs. MCGHEE. Mr. Hatch.
Senator HATCH. Aye.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Murkowski.
Senator MuRxowsxi. Aye.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Specter.
Senator SPECTER. Aye.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Hecht.
Senator HECHT. Aye.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Warner.
Senator WARNER. Aye.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Cohen.
Senator COHEN. Aye.
Mrs. McGHEE. Mr. Boren.
Chairman BOREN. Aye.
Senator SPECTER. Mr. Chairman, I have a statement I would like
to make when the time is appropriate.
Chairman BOREN. The Vote, 15 in favor, none opposed, and the
recommendation of the committee to the Senate will be that Judge
Webster be confirmed as the Director of Central Intelligence.
I appreciate the attendance of my colleagues, and any that would
like to make a statement at this time. Senator Specter is recog-
nized.
Senator SPECTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I have voted for Judge Webster to be Director of the CIA because
I am satisfied that he is qualified for this important position. But
while the evidence does not raise a serious question about his quali-
fications to be CIA Director in the context of his long distinguished
record of public service, his confirmation hearings do suggest that
the FBI and to some extent Judge Webster himself did not respond
to clear warnings to stop Lieutenant Colonel North's improper if
not illegal activities.
These hearings should give guidance for the future. It may be
that Lieutenant Colonel North's key position in the National Secu-
rity Council in conjunction with the President's strong personal
support of the Contras created a climate where the FBI winked at
possible violations of law involving the Contras. Frankly it is hard
to understand why Judge Webster did not act in the face of the
FBI memorandum which he initialed, dated October 30, 1986, that
Lieutenant Colonel North be excluded from confidential informa-
tion because, quote, "North may soon be involved in a criminal
probe concerning U.S. activities in Central America by a Special
Prosecutor,"
The memorandum contains an even more important danger
signal from counsel to the Attorney General for Intelligence Policy
that, quote, "It would not be possible to advise other persons in the
NSC and be assured that technically derived information would not
be made available to Lieutenant Colonel North," unquote.
In the face of widespread media reports that Lieutenant Colonel
North was sent copy of FBI files about the Contra network, in
effect letting him monitor the investigation of his own activities, it
was disquieting for me to learn of North's extensive contacts with
FBI agents, with calls going to North at the White House, and of
his request to Executive Assistant Director Revell to defer the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
225
questioning of a suspect in a fraud case and to postpone the ap-
pearance of a witness before a Federal Grand Jury. Judge Webster
said that Mr. Revell erred in failing to report to Judge Webster Mr.
Revell's contacts with that Assistant U.S. Attorney.
Further serious questions were raised on a July 18, 1985 cable to
FBI headquarters which apparently never arrived. That cable con-
tained the assertion that Lieutenant Colonel North personally dis-
cussed aid to the freedom fighters with President Reagan, that
Lieutenant Colonel North asked the FBI to delay an interview with
the fraud suspect, and that Lieutenant Colonel North was dealing
with alleged Saudi prince through an intermediary because it was
not advisable for North, as a member of the NSC, to deal directly
in light of the legal prohibition against aiding the Nicaraguan in-
surgents.
On the record, as I see it, these key FBI documents cannot be
charged against Judge Webster for purposes of these confirmation
hearings because there is no evidence that he received them.
At a minimum his confirmation shows the need for preventative
measures to stop the kinds of contacts which Lieutenant Colonel
North had with FBI officials and to insist on rigorous investigative
standards by the FBI and other Federal agency to follow the law,
notwithstanding what Judge Webster himself described in hearings
here yesterday as quote, "White House influence," close quote.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman BOREN. Thank you, very much, Senator Specter, and
again I want to express my appreciation to the members of the
Committee, and these confirmation hearings are adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:35 p.m., the hearing was adjourned.]
REMARKS BY WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
BEFORE THE ASSOCIATION OF FORMER INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, FORT MYERS, VA, DE-
CEMBER 8, 1986
Thank you very much, and thank you, Ray. It's a great pleasure for me to be
here, and I particularly enjoyed your introduction since it was called to my atten-
tion that I was described in Parade magazine as the "anonymous Director of the
FBI" on Sunday. That's just all a part of my ability to perform covert operations.
I want to take just a second-I wasn't going to do this-but I'll take just a second
to establish my credentials with you former intelligence agents.
George Washington had a spy by the name of Katie Montgomery who carried
messages in her clothing across the lines in North Carolina. In each succeeding gen-
eration, there has been a Katie in our family, including my great-aunt, my mother,
my daughter, and my granddaughter.
I'm not sure that that establishes me here in this room, but it has worked else-
where.
I would, however, like to mention Malcolm Forbes' gift to me, which he also gave
to Bill Casey, of a letter from George Washington to one of his majors. This letter
described the usages of tradecraft, discussed how to write invisible ink messages,
and indicated that such a Ines .rfe was in the letter and how to find it. It's a very
interesting letter. Malcolm pai115,000 for it ... and I was glad to have a reason-
able facsimile of it at no cost to the Bureau.
The letter does show, I think, that, from time immemorial, intelligence has been
extremely crucial and so regarded by our leaders in the field.
Certainly, as we commemorate Pearl Harbor Day today, we cannot help but think
of the crucial importance of getting intelligence-meaningful intelligence-and
having the ability to understand its meaning and take appropriate action on it.
That's certainly true in the military in time of war; it is equally true in time of
peace.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
I know it is true in our own terrorism program, as we looked back upon what, I
think, in the last eight years has been a proud record of reducing the number of
incidents in this country, as compared with the rising problem of terrorism through-
out the world. When people ask me, "How were you able to do it? To what do you
contribute it?" I give credit to a lot of things. But I say first and foremost: intelli-
gence. You cannot get there before the bomb goes off unless you have the intelli-
gence to know that the bomb may go off; where it may go off; and who will set it off.
The construction of that quality of intelligence, almost from scratch-after the
Church and Pike Committee days, which made that type of intelligence-gathering so
unpopular in law enforcement circles-has made the difference, in my opinion, be-
tween what we face in the United States, and what other countries in the world
have been facing.
And so I, at every opportunity, stress the importance of intelligence. I would em-
phasize, too, that intelligence means something more than just gathering enormous
amounts of data about every aspect of problem areas. It means a focused attention
upon the real problems-the real targets. By pushing our resources in specific
areas-for example, at twenty or so active domestic terrorist organizations-we'll
gain much more than we would by spreading ourselves as an inveterate intelligence-
gatherer of irrelevancy. Unfocused intelligence gathering only complicates the work
of the analysts, consumes our resurces, and undercuts our public support and confi-
dence.
Today, I believe we have the right measure of balance in our focus, at least in
domestic terrorism. But that isn't really what I came to talk to you about. I want to
talk about our role with other intelligence agencies in counterintelligence.
Today, our citizens are thinking very hard about national security. They've seen
Vladimir Izmaylov of the GRU caught picking up classified information at a drop
site, and they've seen him interdicted and expelled. They've seen Gennadiy Zakha-
rov, more recently, arrested and indicted-and they've seen a Soviet reaction to that
indictment that aroused the indignation of the world and terminated in the expul-
sion of 80 Soviets from their diplomatic missions in the United States-80 Soviets
whose business it was to engage in intelligence activity here in the United States.
They've also seen American spies discovered in all our sensitive agencies, as well as
in sensitive industries. In the past three years alone, more defendants have been
charged with espionage than the preceding 18 years.
These troubled 80's have been a time of success and disappointment, a time of re-
examination and refinement, for all the members of the intelligence community. I
think it's pretty clear that each agency must continue to improve its responses to
the national intelligence effort and, just as importantly, must work hard to share
information and coordinate efforts with each other.
As the investigative law enforcement arm of the intelligence community, the FBI
concentrates its efforts on counterespionage. We strive both to reduce our nation's
vulnerability to hostile efforts and to neutralize hostile activity through counteres-
pionage. I'd like to talk to you today about how we're meeting these challenges-
and what further efforts we believe are necessary to protect our national security.
Our counterintelligence efforts work around a very basic problem. There are too
many hostile intelligence officers, too great a hostile presence in this country. We
have to identify that presence today.
From 20,000 students from communist countries who study in our schools;
From 90,000 visitors from communist countries who arrive on our shores each
year;
And from over 4,000 communist diplomatic and commercial officers who are
based in the United States-one-third of whom are believed, reliably, to be
charged with intelligence-gathering activities by their own governments.
Furthermore, we are observing an increased aggressiveness on the part of these
hostile services to collect our scientific and technical, our political, and our military
information. The Soviets, in particular, have closely focused their efforts: they have
specifically targeted our technology that is used for weapons, weapon systems, and
military support equipment. And they have adapted their recruitment techniques to
appeal to the worst in human nature. They call it the "typical American attitude
toward money"-an attitude that says that it's okay to sell anything if the price is
right.
In years past, we have investigated Americans who agreed to spy for reasons of
ideology and personal political conviction. But today, we are confronted with a new
breed-a breed of volunteer spies who are motivated primarily by their own greed.
Their treachery may be colored by job dissatisfaction or by a desire, occasionally, for
excitement or even revenge. But we come across very few instances where money
isn't changing hands.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
227
Just look at the track record for the 1980s. David Barnett, William Holden Bell,
James Durward Harper, Thomas Cavanagh, the Walkers, Jerry Whitworth, Ronald
Pelton, Jonathan Pollard, Bruce Ott-all were looking to make a "fast buck." Only
one aberration: Allen John Davies, who recently tried to pass classified documents
to the Soviets to avenge himself on the Air Force. As the indictment charges, he
was angry about an ongoing dispute over just $1,200. He tried to give away precious
military secrets for reasons of spite. Nevertheless, he certainly wasn't motivated by
ideology or conviction.
The lack of conviction of this new breed makes it more difficult to go to the place
where we are most likely to find those who would betray their country. It makes
them more difficult to identify as we did in years past. It represents a tremendous
challenge for us.
The question then is: how can we reduce or control the numbers of hostile agents
and potential spies in our country? We do not have-nor do I think we ever will
have-enough personnel to keep track of everyone who comes into this country with
intelligence-gathering missions, and we certainly don't have enough personnel or re-
sources to keep track of every citizen. Nor do we want to investigate the activities of
law-abiding citizens without just cause.
In this regard we are different from our competition: we do not subscribe to the
block-control, the block-watch concept. We have to have something more consistent
with our open and democratic society. As our main tactic, therefore, we "spiderweb"
known or suspected intelligence operatives. Spinning our webs with physical and
electronic surveillance-all electronic surveillance being court authorized, by the
way-we weave a barrier between hostile agents and our citizens. We hope that the
barrier itself will frighten off potential traitors. But if contact is made, we want to
be in a position to detect the individual who is thinking about selling secrets to our
adversaries.
To tighten these webs, focusing as we do on the hostile intelligence service rather
than upon our citizens, we've increased the number of our Agents in the field.
We've increased our recruitment-in-place, perhaps the most valuable, most impor-
tant, and most cost effective of our efforts. We're running double agents to step in
wherever possible with undercover operations. And we're implementing dangle op-
erations. The dangle technique is unusually important to us because it serves to
keep our enemies off balance. Because of successful operations like the Dr. Zehe
case and the Izmaylov case, the Soviets are never really sure, these days, when a
volunteer shows up for a real buy, whether they are dealing with a potential traitor
or with someone working for the FBI.
Our number-one resource has always been and, I believe, will always be the
human intelligence-gathering agent. But today, our Agents in the field are now sup-
ported by improved technologies and expanded resources that are clearly making a
difference in our overall counterintelligence program.
We have Special Surveillance Groups that act as the eyes and ears of our Agents.
By conducting physical surveillances and by securing and controlling locations and
individuals in undercover operations, they provide a dimension to investigative op-
erations that cannot be duplicated by other means. Time and time again, these spe-
cialists have shaped an investigator's suspicion into a prosecutor's fact.
We've expanded our corps of language specialists to conduct technical collection.
We have a computerized intelligence information system to help process informa-
tion and to assist in prosecutions.
And we have a corps of intelligence research specialists who analyze the data and
piece the fragments of intelligence into explicable patterns.
I might mention, too, that in our computer efforts we now have a program well on
its way to permitting us to use artificial intelligence to identify and guide our Intel-
ligence Division operatives in taking on the more complicated and ambiguous tasks.
All in all, I believe that we have made impressive strides in our counterintelli-
gence efforts in recent years. And if 1985 was hailed by the press as "The Year of
the Spy," 1986 has certainly turned out to be "The Year of Icing the Spy."
Since the beginning of 1984, 28 people have been arrested for espionage, and 26
convictions have been secured. Allen Davies, of course, awaits trial. Only Richard
Craig Smith, of all of those charged, was acquitted. That's an all-time record since
World War II.
Just since the beginning of 1985, our Government has formally or informally ex-
pelled over 90 hostile intelligence officers, based on information developed by us and
by other agencies in the intelligence community.
I'm particularly satisfied with Zakharov's arrest and expulsion-he was clearly
just beginning to call in his markers so that he could return triumphantly to
Moscow at the end of his tenure, which was not far away.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
228
Eighty of the total number of expulsions, of course, occurred this fall in the wake
of Zakharov's arrest. At long last, with these expulsions, the diplomatic equivalency
terms of the Leahy-Cohen Amendment have been achieved. Even better, the 80
Soviet officers who left were the top intelligence officers known to or indentified by
us. Their departures will make an enormous hole in Soviet intelligence-gathering
activities in New York, in Washington, and in San Francisco.
And what was our punishment in return? The punishment was the withdrawal of
260 spies from our embassy in Moscow-another goal we had set for ourselves that
was accelerated, compliments of Mr. Gorbachev. I know that our officers in Russia
are put to unusual discomfort and stress, but they are bearing up well under it. It
will be a matter of pride for them to have outlived this problem, and we will have
achieved a major effort on both sides of the Atlantic as a result of what has taken
place.
The real proof of our efforts, however, I think is best shown in our actual investi-
gations. And, today, I'd like to highlight briefly our Pelton case, because I think it
demonstrates so many important features of today's counterintelligence efforts.
Ronald Pelton worked for 14 years as a communications specialist in the National
Security Agency. Although he didn't have much education, he was a highly intelli
gent an with a remarkable memory for technical data. Over time, he was given
more and more responsibility at NSA, until, in 1978, he wrote a 60-page report on
what the United States knew about Soviet signals intelligence.
The next year, Pelton's life fell to pieces. He declared bankruptcy, quit the NSA,
and failed at one get-rich-quick scheme after another. Thinking he could recoup his
losses by selling his last marketable product-his memory-he called the Soviets.
One phone call later, on January 15, 1980, Pelton entered the Soviet embassy. When
he left three and a half hours later, he had shaved off his beard, was wearing Soviet
work clothes, and went out with other men in a van close to the exit door.
We saw him go in, saw his back side, and we could not identify his exit. We had
knowledge of these events, but they were odd fragments of information that simply
could not be put together in a larger context. Remember that this was 1980. Impor-
tantly, these facts were retained, and the effort continued.
Then, when Yurchenko defected, we learned that an unnamed NSA employee had
been providing the Soviets with information since 1980.
We quickly formed a joint NSA-FBI task force, and we began pouring over NSA
files, looking for possibles. I believe that there were some five hundred possibles as
we began this effort. Through an interveiw with Yurchenko granted by the CIA, we
almost inadvertently learned that the man we wanted had red hair. When we
pushed Yurchenko to describe the exact shade of brown hair that he had earlier
identified, Yurchenko pointed to a red color. And with this critical piece of informa-
tion, we made the identification-and confirmed it when NSA employees identified
Pelton's voice on calls to the Soviet embassy in 1980.
The rest of the case is history. Pelton was arrested November 25, 1985, and was
convicted on May 6, 1986. We learned from the investigation just how critical inter-
agency cooperation can be. We needed CIA access to Yurchenko. We needed NSA
cooperation as much as it needed ours. And, as a sidelight, we also learned the effec-
tiveness of one of our countermeasure techniques. When the Soviets asked Pelton to
return to NSA as their mole, he said, and I quote: "I can't. I won't pass the poly-
graph." Clearly, polygraphing can act as a great deterrent when used judiciously.
Successful investigations like that of Pelton may demonstrate that coordinating
efforts among members of the intelligence community can make the system work.
But it's legitimate for you to ask, are we winning overall?
Well, on the balance, I think that the FBI is in a better position today than it was
10 years ago-or even 5 years ago. But you know as well as I do that in the counter-
intelligence business no service can be expected to "win" every time. After all, our
adversaries are also using well-trained professional intelligence officers.
I believe, however, that we will continue to make headway, maintaining the
present momentum, and will continue to close the weak links in our national securi-
ty, so long as we continue to identify and address issues that do, in fact, relate to
our national security.
As right now I can think of several national security issues that need to be met:
issues that concern the internal security of sensitive agencies; issues that concern
inter-agency cooperation; and issues that concern public awareness of and support
for intelligence operations-a vital part of getting the resources and the authority
to do what needs to be done.
First, we can and must implement more strenuous security countermeasures. And
I underscore the tremendous work that General Dick Stilwell has done in alerting
our community to the importance of that first critical step.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
229
We must improve screening procedures for employees in senstive areas-not only
when they're hired, but during the course of their employment, and even after they
leave the organization.
Further, we must carefully consider procedures and guidelines for the use of em-
ployee drug testing. The FBI, for example, now routinely tests its incoming
Agents-and it is formulating a policy for random objective testing of its employees.
I cannot emphasize too strongly the security threat posed to us by an employee who
uses drugs. If hostile agents have been quick to seize on Americans' weakness for
financial gain, imagine how quickly they can take advantage of those dependent
upon drugs.
Second, we must all strive for inter-agency cooperation-sharing resources and in-
formation as necessary to protect our national security. The FBI's counterintelli-
gence role, for example, is critical to all intelligence efforts. Collection and analysis
cannot produce reliable results-and covert action cannot be effectively conducted-
unless we know what hostile (and occasionally even friendly) services might do to
turn our intelligence activities to their advantage. There must be no penetration of
our intelligence-gathering apparatus.
Conversely, the FBI depends on the rest of the community for critical leads. We
certainly needed access to the defector Yurchenko to begin our investigation of
Ronald Pelton. I chair an inter-agency committee called the IGCI, the Inter-agency
Working Group on Counterintelligence, a part of the SIGAI, as you know the Spe-
cial Inter-agency Group on Intelligence chaired by Bill Casey. Again and again here,
I have seen us coming together to devise a central strategy to deal with counterin-
telligence problems here and around the world.
Third and last, for today's discussion, we need to reach the public. You know from
your own work with public educational programs that an informed American public
is a public willing to assist intelligence efforts.
Several years ago, for example, a student at Columbia University watched a TV
documentary on the KGB and realized, with horror, that he was quite possibly being
recruited by Penyu Kostadinov, a Bulgarian commercial attache. This student noti-
fied the FBI, and we subsequently arrested Kostadinov for espionage.
I would call for more public programs-and practical ones at that-that will alert
our citizens to the telltale signs of security weaknesses. I'm proud of the work that
Morris Leibman is doing to alert the lawyers across our country of their impor-
tance. They're opinion makers in many ways, and it's important that they support
this effort. Morris is doing a tremendous job on the National Security Committee of
the American Bar Association.
In our own effort, DECA-the FBI's Development of Counterintelligence Aware-
ness Program-we educate defense contractors in standard recruitment techniques.
Fifteen thousand Government contractors have been reached so far. These kinds of
programs will work-and they do work. Jonathan Jay Pollard, the analyst for the
Navy's Anti-Terrorism Alert Center, was caught because fellow employees noticed
and reported that he was requesting documents outside his need-to-know area. This
arrest wasn't the result of our DECA program, but it illustrates what an alert and
informed employee can do to help the effort. It's our job to get the employers to
incorprate programs that will produce that kind of alertness.
There are many ways that I could close this part of the program today. My own
assessment is that we are combining the best of human intelligence-gathering capa-
bilities with modern scientific electronic computer analysis and with other devices,
too sensitive to discuss in detail, to keep track of the hostile intelligence presence in
this country-to recognize it, to "spiderweb" it, to make it virtually impossible for
an American traitor to make contact without our knowing about it.
Again and again, we have seen instances where the Soviets have refused to meet
with people who are trying to meet with them. As you know, in a couple of those
instances in the past two years, we've run undercover operations against those
people, caught them, found out what they had, made the arrests, and made the pros-
ecutions and the convictions. Many of the meetings are taking place in Mexico be-
cause it is now too difficult to meet in the United States. We want to keep it that
way.
We can only keep it that way if we have the balance between our resources and
their resources. I have argued in public tesitmony that, in my opinion, the best way
to approach this balance, wherever possible, is to reduce the Soviet and Soviet bloc
presence in the United States. I always point out that one-third of this presence, at
least in the diplomatic community, represents hostile intelligence operatives. It isn't
any good to give us an additional Agent to take care of one additional spy-and I
don't need to tell this audience why it's no good to do it that way. But when we can
eliminate one Soviet spy, we can concentrate our considerable resources on the
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
230
other problems that remain. I think the Congress and the administration are in con-
cert on this issue, and our "spiderweb" approach to dealing with counterintelligence
will become increasingly effective. These efforts, taken together, are needed to keep
our country strong.
As I listened to what Ray had to say this morning, I thought of the same people
who have given their lives for their country, particularly those at Pearl Harbor.
During the Korean War, I was executive officer of a tanker operating out of Pearl
Harbor to the Far East, and we berthed right across from the Arizona, which at
that time, was its own memorial. It didn't have e a housing much to kit. Being eep our there,
you couldn't help but think of the people who had given m
try the way it is today.
These same thoughts occurred to me last night at the Kennedy Center, when the
program closed with a tribute to Ray Charles by the boys and girls of the Florida
School for the Blind and the Deaf. A hundred children must have been on stage-
some were using sign language, and those who could not see were singing; in their
own ways, all were singing "America, The Beautiful." And I think that s our job-to
keep it that way. Thank you.
SPEECH BY WILLIAM H. WEBSTER, DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
BEFORE THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY, SECURITY WEEK, WASHINGTON, DC, OC-
TOBER 27, 1986
Thank you very much General Odom. Ladies and gentlemen, it's a great privilege
for me to be here. I can't tell you how many times I've sat in this audience and
coveted that Travis Trophy-but I haven't figured out how the FBI can become eli-
gible. We have some international jurisdiction now; perhaps that might give us a
shot at it.
These past few weeks have been momentous ones in the intelligence community,
not the least of which was the recent NSA dedication by the President of the United
States-a first, I understand, in the history of this great agency. And other things
have been going on between us and Moscow which I would like to mention a little
of carrying
bit this morning, things that I think augered very well for us in theirs.
out our mission and that prevented the Soviets from carrying out National security is a serious concern in these "troubled 80s," and terrorism and
espionage are two virulent forces that specifically target our national security.
These two forces are quite different in many ways, and I will discuss them separate-
ly, but they are alike in that both strive to undermine the soundness of our Nation's
health and well being.
Espionage invades the body politic silently like a virus attacking our immune
system, proceeding inconspicuously but with grave effect.
Terrorism, on the other hand, attacks it outright, traumatizing it in unexpected
places and often producing fear far beyond the actual damage done.
As members of our Nation's intelligence community, we are the guardians of this
body politic. You are the eyes and ears of the national effort: In the fields of signal
intelligence and communication, you at NSA are tasked to preserve our Nation's
intelligence and to penetrate that of our enemies. We from the FBI, by contrast, are
the hands and arms of this effort. We are the only law enforcement agency in the
intelligence community, and we are tasked to investigate foreign counterintelligence
and terrorism within-and sometimes outside-the United States.
Together, our organizations have worked well as a team., We are always ready to
support your foreign intelligence collection efforts, and youve provided excellent in-
telligence support for our operations. I think the Pelton case illustrates perfectly
what can happen when we share resources and intelligence.
Today, however, I would like to concentrate on the FBI's special role in counterin-
telligence and counterterrorism efforts. Both, as you know, are FBI responsibilities,
and we have elevated both to national investigative priority programs.
COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
Counterintelligence efforts are complicated by two obvious factors. There are two
many hostile intelligence agents in our country trying to make recruitments. And
there are too many self-selected "volunteer" spies-Americans-who are motivated
by greed, by job dissatisfaction, even by murky ideas of excitement or revenge. It's a
difficult equation, because in combination, the two factors increase many fold the
chances of sensitive intelligence reaching our enemies.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152ROO0801520003-1
231
Just as obviously, then, our overall strategy must be to reduce or control the num-
bers on both sides of the equation. We do not have, however-and I suppose never
will have-enough personnel to keep track of everyone who comes into this country
with intelligence-gathering missions. And we certainly don't have enough people to
keep track of every citizen-nor do we want to investigate the activities of law abid-
ing citizens without just cause. We cannot transform ourselves into the types of
police states that are currently controlled by our enemies abroad.
As our main tactic, therefore, and with your help, we "spiderweb" known or sus-
pected intelligence operatives. Spinning our webs with physical and electronic sur-
veillance-and I might add, always court-authorized electronic surveillance-we
weave a barrier between hostile agents and our citizens. Contact becomes difficult if
not impossible when the spiderweb system is working. We see more and more meet-
ings taking place in Vienna and Mexico, and fewer and fewer meetings taking place
in the United States.
To tighten our webs, we have increased the number of our agents in the field, and
tasked many of them to develop recruitments-in-place, to control double agent oper-
ations, to step in where possible with undercover operations, and to implement our
dangle operations. The dangle technique is especially important, because it serves to
keep our enemies off balance. Because of successful operations like the Dr. Zehe case
and the Izmaylov case, the Soviets are never sure when a volunteer spy shows up
with a "real buy," whether they might not actually be buying a one-way ticket back
to Moscow.
All in all, I believe we have made impressive strides in recent years. And if 1985
was hailed as "the year of the spy," 1986 has certainly turned out to be "the year of
icing the spy."
Since 1984, 27 people have been arrested for espionage, and 26 convictions have
been secured. Only Richard Craig Smith was acquitted. That's an all-time record
since World War II.
Just since the beginning of last year, our government has formally or informally
expelled over 10 Soviet and bloc officers, based on information developed by us, you,
and other agencies in the intelligence community. I note with pleasure Zakharov's
arrest and expulsion-he was clearly just beginning to call in his markers so he
could return to Moscow in triumph.
I'd also like to note that 25 Soviets based in the U.N. mission have been ordered
week- a e-and have good start, I lbelieve,toward achieving the diplomatic for
equivalency terms of
the Leahy-Cohen amendment, which clearly reflects the policy of the current ad-
ministration. And I'd also like to say as a footnote that we in the FBI are enormous-
ly pleased and even excited that, through inadvertence and miscalculation, by fail-
ing to get the first 25 out on time, the Soviets opened themselves up to our selected
reductions in force. The 25 who had to leave and the others who are going, are the
top intelligence officers known or identified to us. Their departures will make an
enormous hole in their intelligence-gathering capacities in New York, Washington,
and in San Francisco.
And I think I have an obligation to recite our most recent bittersweet victories of
catching American spies.
In the private sector, Thomas Cavanagh, an engineer for Northrop Corporation,
showed how effectively our undercover techniques do work. When Cavanagh con-
tacted the Soviets to offer them the priceless Stealth technology, we detected the
contact in our spiderweb. We beat the Soviets to Cavanagh's doorstep, sending Rus-
sian-speaking undercover agents to meet with him. Our agents agreed to his deal
and came away with samples of what Cavanagh could produce-samples that aston-
ished and shocked those at the Pentagon. For $25,000, Cavanagh was willing to give
away one of the great military secrets of this country, which I am told cost over $1
million in research.
But private industry is by no means the only weak link in internal security.
We've certainly learned that sensitive Government services are also vulnerable.
We have been saddened by the treachery of our former agent Richard Miller. You
have been touched by the betrayal of your analyst Ronald Pelton-and I understand
that others later in the week have planned an excellent step-by-step presentation of
the Pelton case for you. The CIA has suffered over Edward Lee Howard and Larry
Wu-Tai Chin. Naval intelligence has contended with the Walker family and Jerry
Whitworth; Army intelligence, with Richard Craig Smith; and the Air Force with
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152ROO0801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
232
Airman First-Class Bruce Ott. Clearly, we must all work together in the area of in-
ternal security to close our weak links.
We can and must implement more strenuous screening procedures for employees
in sensitive areas-not only when they are hired, but during the course of their em-
ployment, and even after they leave the organization.
We must carefully consider procedures and guidelines for the use of employee
drug testing. The FBI, for example, now routinely tests its incoming agents and is
formulating a policy for the random objective testing of its employees. I cannot em-
phasize too strongly the security threat posed to us by an employee who uses drugs.
If hostile agents have been quick to seize on Americans' weakness for financial gain,
imagine how quickly they will take advantage of those dependent upon drugs.
And we must strengthen our training programs to educate the public in standard
recruitment techniques. In DECA-our "Development of Counterintelligence Aware-
ness" program-we have already reached over 15,000 Government contractors. Pro-
grams that alert the public to the tell-tale signs of spies at work can have a direct
payoff, as in the case of Jonathan Jay Pollard, the analyst for the Navy's anti-ter-
rorism alert center, who was caught because fellow employees noticed and reported
that he was requesting documents outside his need-to-know areas.
Countermeasures become a very important part of the whole security area-one I
cannot discuss today, because it's outside the scope of my remarks-but I do want in
a footnote to underscore how important it is for each of our agencies to be sure,
first, that we have taken the necessary steps to protect the security of the secrets
entrusted to our care and, second, that we have followed through with those to
whom that information is disseminated. We must be certain that they too have
taken appropriate steps to protect those secrets.
TERRORISM
Let's turn now to the issue of terrorism. Terrorist investigations begin with the
profile of a terrorist. Motivated by emotional politics and hatred, terrorists take vio-
lent action afainst easy targets primarily to gain media attention for their particu-
lar cause-its theater. Wherever they live, they band together in ideological cells
and are as difficult to penetrate as they are to understand. Consequently, good intel-
ligence is hard to come by, and the intelligence that is developed comes in frag-
ments that don't easily fall into meaningful patterns.
Also, terrorists complicate investigations by their hit-and-run tactics. Committing
-crimes to gain money as well as to make political statements, they move from juris-
diction to jurisdiction-requiring law enforcement agencies to connect with each
other, to share information with each other, and to coordinate investigations. That's
why it's important to have an FBI with national jurisdiction to move quickly across
those boundaries to link in with state and local law -enforcement authorities. This,
in my opinion, has been one of the principal problems in Europe. A Balkanization
process occurs when countries are unable or unwilling to share information or to
follow through on quick arrests and apprehensions because they perceive acts of ter-
rorism as political rather than criminal activities. The result is confusion when
overall efforts are attempted in order to deal with terrorism on the European conti-
nent.
Given these circumstances, the FBI designated terrorism as a top priority pro-
gram in 1982. Our aims were, and they are, to detect and prevent domestic and
international terrorist activity in the United States and to investigate those acts of
terrorism abroad which have-by statute-been made prosecutable in our country.
Why have we been given jurisdiction? I think because our jurisdiction puts consider-
able heat on the other nations with whom we're involved to do something them-
selves. It also reflects our country's determination to deal with terrorists who are
focusing upon United States citizens, institutions, and property. And it means that
we must gather the intelligence and information promptly while it's still alive and
fresh, even though the actual apprehension of the terrorist is off in the vague and
indefinite future. But if someone does show up who is wanted by us and we have the
evidence-as the Italian government said we did not in Achille Lauro-we're in a
better position to enforce our extradition treaties and to call upon Interpol to make
prompt and effective arrests.
In the United States, we are currently investigating 20 different groups. We are
investigating right-wing terrorists like Aryan nations, the Order, the Covenant, the
Sword, and the Arm of the Lord, and Posse Comitatus; we're investigating left-wing
terrorists of the United Freedom Front, Puerto Rican Independence Groups, and the
Prairie Fire Organizing Committee; and we are investigating extremist elements in
the United States among Armenians, Croatians, Sikhs, Jews, and Arabs.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
233
We have developed three primary strategies that enable us to combat terrorism
effectively.
First, I put great effort into developing an extensive intelligence base on terrorist
groups. Only by constantly feeding the small pieces of information that we glean
into a central bank can we hope to put together a larger picture and detect emerg-
ing patterns. And we must do this pursuant to the Attorney General guidelines and
the restrictions of the Privacy Act. Developing the larger picture is now the job of
our Terrorist Research and Analytical Center [TRAC]. TRAC analysts and computer
experts review the information we receive about terrorist activities, then make re-
lated threat assessments. I think this process is probably most responsible for the
success we have had in recent years in preventing terrorist incidents from taking
place. When I first came to the bureau almost eight-and-a-half years ago, it was
almost an assumed fact-certainly by the Congress-that we could not get there
before the bomb went off. Intelligence ... intelligence has made the difference.
Second, we concentrate our most sensitive techniques-undercover agents, inform-
ants, and court-authorized electronic surveilliance-on our targeted terrorist organi-
zations. Our guidelines now permit us to maintain threshold intelligence levels on
all those organizations, just as we have been allowed to do without any question in
the past on organized crime and racketeering groups to gather the same kind of in-
telligence. For years we were frustrated by a concern that we would invade the first
amendment rights of various organizations. I think we dealt with that primarily by
showing the tests, the thresholds, and the standards we use for conduct-not words,
but conduct. Also, we are focusing hard upon, currently, 20 different groups-as dis-
tinguished from several thousand groups that we were investigating in the 1970's.
This focus keeps us from diffusing our resources and allows us to develop an analyt-
ical capability that can get us there first.
Our third and final strategy addresses one of our thorniest problems: how to co-
ordinate effectively the investigations of different law enforcement agencies. I em-
phasize this strategy because of its implications for international efforts against ter-
rorism. When specific and persistent terrorist-related activities flourish in a particu-
lar area, law enforcement agencies should pull together-and they should work to-
gether-in well-coordinated task forces. When Federal, State, and local agencies
pool their resources and personnel, duplication of effort is minimized and-at least
as important-a spirit of cooperation replaces the usual hard edge of competition.
We have seen that in terms of our joint task forces in New York City-exemplified,
of course, in the successful celebration of the 100th Anniversary of the Statue of
Liberty. Thirty thousand boats in the harbor and not a single incident. Two years
before that, the well-planned and well-coordinated task-force effort made a safe and
terrorist-free Olympics in Los Angeles.
The results of our strategies are encouraging. Within our borders we have seen a
heartening decrease in the number of terrorist incidents-in stark contrast to the
rest of the world. From the 112 acts of terrorism recorded in 1977-using the same
criteria-we have, each year, reduced the number: 31 in 1983; 13 in 1984; 7 in 1985;
and only one confirmed this year. There may, however, be three or four others out
in Hayden Lake, where the Aryan nations has operated, that may ultimately be de-
termined to be terrorist inspired. No loss of life there. Still an extraordinarily small
number.
At the same time, we have improved our record of preventing incidents. Last year
we prevented 23 incidents from taking place in this country. Our interventions in
the planned assassinations of Roberto Suazo, President of Honduras, and Indian
Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, I think, demonstrate how well the system can work.
Above all, each day we add to our intelligence database-often with your assist-
ance-continually expanding our knowledge of terrorist groups; continually dimin-
ishing their power to hurt us unexpectedly.
What then, can we do about acts of terrorism that strike outside our borders? Cer-
tainly we have a large stake in this matter since Americans traveling abroad are
targeted by terrorists, as we well know. To date, in fact, over 30 percent of all vic-
tims of terrorism overseas have been Americans.
We have already made some progress in our efforts to investigate those acts of
terrorism abroad which are prosecutable in our country. The Comprehensive Crime
Control Act of 1984 enabled us to investigate the hijacking of TWA flight 847, the
Achille Lauro, and, most recently, Pan Am flight 73. The protection of foreign offi-
cials statute has enabled us to investigate the killing of Marines in El Salvador.
And, as you know, FISA has allowed our approved intercepts to be used as evidence
in court against international terrorists.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
234
But we cannot by ourselves-nor can any individual country-even begin to wage
a successful campaign against terrorism. Only through serious cooperation and con-
certed actions can nations ever hope to rid the world of this terrible scourge.
Today we are seeing many serious and thoughtful efforts to contain terrorism. On
December 9th of last year, the United Nations General Assembly passed, by consen-
sus vote, its first unequivocal resolution condemning terrorism. Eleven days later,
the U.N. Security Council adopted a resolution that condemned all acts of hostage-
taking and urged international cooperation to prevent, prosecute, and punish hos-
tage-taking as an act of international terrorism. These resolutions were a long time
coming-and still don't address practical counterterrorism procedures.
By contrast, Interpol's similar resolutions have produced some practical results.
And I want to say that the American delegations to Interpol over the last four years
have been primarily responsible for these initiatives and these results. By resolving
in 1984 that acts of terrorism should be viewed as crimes-and that's the bottom
line, as crimes and not as politically motivated events-it, in effect, invited its
member nations to use network for cooperative efforts in terrorism. And now it is
hammering out the guidelines to be used for reporting and coordinating terrorism
information. We finally got the message through that when acts of violence are
committed against innocent victims, they are crimes. And because they are crimes,
all of the apparatus for international cooperation among police should be invoked to
deal with them. And that's now what's beginning to happen.
Governments around the world are also recognizing that unilateral reactions to a
terrorist incident are not always effective.
Today, more and more bilateral and-I think, more importantly-multilateral
agreements are being forged among nations.
Joint declarations of unity on the issue of terrorism have been drafted on four
separate occasions by Japan, Italy, West Germany, France, the United Kingdom,
Canada, and the United States.
This year the European, Trevi ministers met at the Hague with Attorney General
Meese and myself to focus on counterterrorist accords.
One of the points I tried to make at the Hague-which came just a week or two
after the American incursion into Libya in retaliation for La Belle Discotehque-
was that the European countries each came up with a different threat assessment
about Libya. And when they put all their assessments together, they realized that
significant things were happening. They saw that Libyan terrorists were no longer
focusing upon Libyan dissidents but were concertedly seeking to achieve high-casu-
alty incidents in various parts of Europe. Having arrived at a consensus, they began
to take more concerted and effective action in reducing their Libyan presence and
in developing other techniques to protect against Libya. That is the product of mul-
tilateral efforts against terrorism.
Also in furtherance of international agreements, in June of this year, I headed
the terrorism subgroup of the joint Italian-American working group in Rome-then
hosted its second meeting just a few weeks-ago in Washington.
Furthermore, aviation and maritime security standards have tightened consider-
ably, thanks to the efforts of the International Civil Aviation Organization and the
International Maritime Organization.
And, finally, extradition loopholes are being closed. Today, for example, we seen
the resolution of an extradition treaty revision between the United Kingdom and
ourselves which now improves our ability to return Irish terrorists for trial in Eng-
land.
These steps are encouraging and show that progress will continue to be made. But
much remains to be done. Certainly in the United Nations we should be able to
craft an official definition of the crime of terrorism that, universally accepted,
would give teeth to today's resolutions condemning it. Many of the United Nation's
resolutions are great in word and spirit, but because they lack definition, they
result in a haranguing confusion when specific efforts are brought to bear.
Certainly we should extend the process of agreements among nations and their
law enforcement agencies to share resources, cooperate, and avoid duplication of
effort.
Certainly we should establish a consolidated intelligence center on international
terrorism, as recommended by the Vice President's Commission on Combatting, Ter-
rorism.
And certainly we should study further the relationship between terrorism and
international law to determine how law can assist, rather than block, efforts to re-
spond to acts of terrorism.
Our successes in foreign counterintelligence and counterterrorism demonstrate, I
believe, that enhanced resources, better coordination, and increased government
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
support most effectively combat the crimes of espionage and terrorism. And to these
I would add two words because they are everything in this area: Better intelligence.
Again and again I find myself repeating the words "cooperation," sharing re-
sources," and "support." We could not do our job without your critical intelligence
support, and for that I thank you. Only organized efforts against organized criminal
enterprises will keep our country safe and free.
Thank you.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90G00152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
APPENDIX
U.S DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION,
Washington, DC, April 29, 1987.
Chairman, Select Committee on Intelligence,
Senate, Washington, DC
DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Enclosed you will find answers to 12 record questions raised
during hearings, on my nomination as Director of Central Intelligence before the
Committee on April 8 and 9, 1987.
Please feel free to contact me or my staff should any further clarification be re-
quired on these answers or any answers which I provided to the Committee during
the hearings.
Sincerely yours,
Enclosure (11).
Question. What is the date of the Beirut bomb' ?
WILLIAM H. WEBSTER,
Director.
Answer. The American Embassy, Beirut, Lebanon, was bombed on April 18, 1983;
on October 23, 1983, the United States Marine Corps Barracks, Beirut, Lebanon, was
bombed and on September 20, 1984, the American Embassy Annex, Beirut, Lebanon,
was bombed.
Question. Did you have in your possession the 1/10/81 teletype from FBI New
York concerning Raymond Donovan when the FBI reports on his background inves-
tigation went to the White House? Was the 1/10/81 teletype in the possession of
FBIHQ (Senator DeConcini stated "I am concerned about this type of information,
maybe it wasn't sent to Headquarters.")
Answer. The New York Division January 10, 1981 teletype, mentioned by Senator
DeConcini, was received at FBI Headquarters after the summarization of the back-
ground investigation of Raymond J. Donovan was disseminated to the White House
(January 5, 1981). Additional disseminations were made on January 7th, 12th, 14th,
16th and 23rd to convey information received at FBI Headquarters after the back-
ground investigation had been completed. Information contained in the January
10th teletype was discussed with the White House by telephone on January 11th
and the established practice at that time of summarizing details and furnishing in a
collective form the substance of allegations that bear on the same or similar issues
was followed regarding the January 12th, and January 23rd documents. Currently,
the FBI provides the White House with a summary memorandum and with the full
text of interviews containing derogatory information to prevent any potential for
summarization shortcomings.
Records indicate that the summaries of January 5th, 7th, 12th, 14th, and 16th
were released without the Director's participation. The dissemination of the Janu-
ary 23rd summary occurred with his authorization. No indication is evident that the
Director saw the January 10th teletype before the Senate confirmation vote of Ray-
mond Donovan (February 2, 1981).
Question. Would you supply a list of the changes made in background investiga-
tions as a result of the lessons learned in the Donovan case?
Answer. The background investigation process is under frequent review to ensure
that these investigations are conducted in a thorough and impartial manner. There
have been many improvements in this process over the past five years, the most
significant of which are:
The units at FBI Headquarters which direct these investigations have been re-
structured to provide an additional level of review and control of the investigations.
An automated case management system has been implemented which substantial-
ly enhances supervision of these cases.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
238
The scope of internal FBI indices checks has been expanded to identify all retriev-
able information regarding a candidate.
Reporting rules have been strengthened to ensure that all information developed
by field offices is available to FBI Headquarters.
The scope of agency checks has been broadened to include any local, state or Fed-
eral entity which might logically possess information regarding a candidate or the
candidate s businesses.
Investigative policies stress the full development of the factual situations which
lead persons interviewed to arrive at their views regarding a candidates suitability.
re-
ports themselves are sent to the White House along with the usual summary of in-
vestigations.
Some of these changes have resulted as part of a FBI-Department of Justice study
of the background process in 1982 and 1983, and other changes resulted from fre-
quent reviews of the program by FBI managers and executives. This evolutionary
process includes input from the agencies served, from the intelligence community as
a whole, and the Congress. For example, the FBI has improved its procedures for
examining the issue of a candidate's financial responsibility as a result of a recent
report and request of the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence.
Question. Would the FBI consult with the Department of Justice (DOJ) in order to
determine whether the provisions of the criminal statutes relating to gross negli-
gence and mishandling of classified information would apply to the security
breaches at the Moscow Embassy?
Answer. Assistant Director James H. Geer of the FBI's Intelligence Division has
held discussions with the appropriate official within the DOJ concerning whether
any acts which occurred in connection with the security breach at the Moscow Em-
bassy would constitute a violation of Federal criminal law within the FBI's jurisdic-
tion. Further, an FBI Agent has been assigned full time to the Naval Investigative
Service (NIS) task force charged with coordinating the investigation surrounding
the events at the Moscow Embassy. One of the tasks of this Agent is to closely scru-
tinize information coming out of the NIS investigation to determine whether addi-
tional violations exist falling within the FBI's jurisdiction.
The specific statute to which Senator Hollings made reference is 18 U.S.C. 793 (f),
which states in part "Whoever, being entrusted with or having lawful possession or
control of ... information, relating to the national defense, (1) through gross negli-
gence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered
to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed ...
Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or
both." Gross negligence, according to the Justice Department official, would require
wanton and reckless disregard for security procedures and practices and neither the
FBI nor the DOJ is in possession of information of this nature.
The President has, of course, appointed two separate groups to review the Moscow
Embassy situation and one of these groups will certainly be examining the manage-
ment and security procedures and practices in the Embassy. Should this review de-
termine information that would appear to fall within the provisions of this statute,
it will be pursued appropriately.
Question. Did the FBI open a bribery investigation on Las Vegas Detective Chuck
Lee, a polygraph operator who had earlier cleared Judge Claiborne of other allega-
tions?
Answer. In September, 1979, the Las Vegas Division of the FBI initiated an inves-
tigation into an allegation that Private Detective Eddie Gene LaRue was engaged in
illegal wiretapping. A search was made of the names and businesses previously in-
dexed in prior FBI investigations and as a result of that search, onepLaRue refer-
ence was located.
It indicated that on May 23, 1978, Daniel Patrick Bohan, Jr., voluntarily appeared
at the Las Vegas FBI Office to furnish information regarding Federal Judgeship
candidate Harry Claiborne. Bohan stated that prior to their marriage, Harry Clai-
borne had made attempts to date his future wife Bonnie Jenson. Bohan claimed
that Claiborne directed the illegal wiretapping of his (Bohan's) residence in July,
1977, which was reported to the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department
(LVMPD). To corroborate Bohan's statements, the FBI contacted the LVMPD. The
LBMPD investigation indicated that, at Claiborne's request, a polygraph examina-
tion was afforded to Claiborne on September 23, 1977. The polygraph showed no
signs of deception in Claiborne's answers to questions of wiretapping Bohan. Their
investigation was stopped by former Sheriff Ralph Lamb. This information was filed
along with the results of the FBI background investigation for Harry Claiborne's
Federal judgeship nomination.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
239
The FBI's LaRue investigation continued and LaRue's AGR Detective Agency em-
ployees stated LaRue had been hired by Claibone to wiretap the Bohan residence.
LVMPD's polygraph examiner, Chuck Lee, was interviewed by the FBI. Lee
stated Claiborne s polygraph examination indicated no deception. A copy of that ex-
amination was obtained and examined by the FBI Headquarters (FBIHQ) Polygraph
Unit. The FBIHQ Polygraph Unit determined that Lee's examination indicated Clai-
borne's deception in responding to questions about the wiretapping. A second poly-
graph examination of Claiborne by Lee appeared to be mechanically manipulated
and was found to be inconclusive by the FBIHQ Polygraph Unit.
The FBI investigation resulted in LaRue being indicted on August 27, 1980, by a
Las Vegas Federal grand jury for a one-count violation of Interception of Oral Com-
munication by Means of an Electronic Device (Title 18, United States Code, Section
2511 (1X13XII), and four counts of violation of Intercepting Wire Communications by
Means of an Electronic Device (Section 2511 (1)(A), supra). Motions and appeals filed
by LaRue's attorneys delayed the start of the trial until February 2, 1982. The delay
resulted in an inability to locate some witnesses and for others to withdraw their
cooperation. LaRue was acquitted on February 10, 1982. This matter was prosecuted
by the Department of Justice, Public Integrity Section (PIS). Claiborne was not pros-
ecuted because PIS opined that the evidentiary case was too weak to go forward. No
opinion was obtained from PIS concerning Lee in this case.
In a separate investigation, the LVMPD advised in November, 1980, that they sus-
pected Chuck Lee to be cooperating with organized crime figures to either cover up
or sabotage certain LVMPD organized crime investigations. The LVMPD provided a
large number of Lee's polygraph examinations. These were reviewed by the FBIHQ
Polygraph Unit, and a significant percentage were found to indicate deception while
Lee had reported no deception.
Lee resigned from LVMPD in January 1983, and accepted a similar position with
the Clark County, Nevada District Attorney's Office.
The results of the FBI investigation into Lee's activities were presented the De-
partment of Justice Organized Crime Strike Force in Las Vegas, in March, 1983, for
a prosecutive opinion. Prosecution was declined based on the opinion that there was
insufficient evidence to support Federal prosecution. The FBI investigation of Lee
was closed.
Question. What was offered to Joseph Conforte by the Government in return for
his cooperation in the Claiborne case?
Answer. Attached is the December 15, 1983 agreement between Joseph Conforte
and the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice.
In addition, we have been advised by the Department of Justice that no Federal
tax break was afforded to Mr. Conforte.
Re Joseph Conforte.
PETER PERRY, Esq.
Reno, NV.
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Washington, D.C., December 15, 1983.
The undersigned parties have engaged in discussions regarding the matters set
forth below. An agreement as outlined herein was reached on December 4, 1983, and
is reduced to writing here for the first time. Other than the use immunity granted
to Mr. Conforte in November 1981, this is the only agreement the Department of
Justice has ever reached with your client.
This letter sets forth the full and complete agreement between Joseph Conforte
and the Department of Justice.
1. Joseph Conforte has, pursuant to the terms of this agreement, returned to the
United States, having resided for several years in a country from which extradition
could not have been obtained in the United States; J cies, providing candid and truthful information, cooperate will testify candidly and enforcement truth-
fully in all court proceedings and before grand and petit juries, on all occasions on
which his cooperation is sought;
3. The Department of Justice will recommend to a United States District Court
Judge that Joseph Conforte be resentenced in the following manner with regard to
the sentence previously imposed in United States v. Joseph Conforte, et al., CR-77-
00024, United States District Court, District of Nevada; CR-83-0316, United States
District Court, District of Columbia;
(a) A five year sentence on each of the four counts of which Mr. Conforte was
convicted should be imposed, to be served concurrently with each other;
(b) All but 15 months of each of the five year sentences should be suspended,
on the condition that Mr. Conforte shall, for the full five year period, cooperate
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
240
fully with all law enforcement agencies, and testify candidly and truthfully in
all court proceedings and before all grand and petit juries on all occasions on
which his cooperation is sought with regard to matters he has previously relat-
ed to the Department of Justice;
(c) Any sentence that may be imposed by the court should be ordered, to the
extend possible, to be served concurrently with any sentence imposed by the
State of Nevada with reference to paragraph no. 5 hereof; and
(d) Any sentence imposed in this matter should, for purposes of computing the
he time served, be deemed to have commenced on December 4, 1983.
4. The Department of Justice will recommend to a United States District Court
Judge that a certain indictment, captioned United States v. Joseph Conforte, CR. No.
R-81-9-ECR, charging Mr. Conforte with having failed to appear for his sentencing
with regard to the employment withholding tax violations outlined in paragraph
No. 3 hereof, be dismissed;
5. The Department of Justice has, and will continue to provide information to
assist the District Attorney for Washoe County, Nevada to reach an appropriate
plea agreement with Mr. Conforte with regard to the disposition of an indictment
pending in Washoe County, Nevada and associated flight changes; and
6. The Department of Justice will not use any statement made by Joseph Conforte
against him in any future criminal prosecution; except that, in the event Mr. Con-
forte is believed to have testified falsely under oath, or to have intentionally made
false statements to law enforcement agencies, those statements can, and will be
used against him in criminal prosecutions for perjury and/or false statements.
Mr. Conforte understands that the recommendations the Department of Justice
agrees to make to the court as outlined in paragraphs 3 and 4 hereof are not bind-
ing upon the court. Whether or not the court chooses to accept the Department's
recommendations, Mr. Conforte's obligations as set forth herein shall remain in full
force and effect.
This agreement does not relate in any way to any civil, administrative, tax or
bankruptcy proceedings to which Mr. Conforte may presently be, or in the future
may become a party.
Mr. Conforte shall not receive financial benefit of any kind because of this agree-
ment. The amount of any tax liability that Mr. Conforte may owe to the U.S. Treas-
ury shall be determined between the Internal Revenue Service and/or the Tax Divi-
sion, U.S. Department of Justice and himself. This agreement shall not favorably
influence the determination of such tax liability. In fact, as Mr. Conforte believes,
his cooperation as set forth herein has and may continue to detrimentally influ-
enced the government's determination of such liability.
The parties understand that the terms of this agreement shall remain in full
force and effect regardless of whether any person isnyonvicted of federal offenses as
a result of Mr. Conforte's cooperation and testimo.cMr. Conforte therefore has no
incentive, financial or otherwise, to testify other than truthfully.
The conditions and location of Mr. Conforte's incarceration shall be determined
exclusively by the United States, which has not made any agreement with respect
to such matters.
No promises have been, or will be made to Mr. Conforte with respect to the terms
and conditions of his release; such matters being within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the U.S. Parole Commission.
This is the entire agreement between the Criminal Division of the Department of
Justice and Joseph Conforte. No other promises, representations or inducements,
written or oral, have been made between the parties.
Sincerely, STEVEN A. SHAW,
Public Integrity Section Criminal Division.
Question. Did the FBI conduct a sting operation against the regional director of
the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) in Las Vagas in relation to the Judge Claiborne
case?
Answer. In February, 1982, the IRS Inspection Division, Las Vegas, Nevada, noti-
fied the FBI in Las Vegas, Nevada, that a complaint had been received alleging that
then IRS District Director Gerald Swanson may be involved in soliciting a bribe
from Joseph Conforte, owner of the Mustang Ranch in Reno, Nevada, who was then
in the midst of criminal tax problems with the IRS.
The IRS received the complaint from Peter Perry, a Reno, Nevada attorney repre-
senting Conforte before the IRS. Perry informed the IRS that Peter Lemberes, a co-
defendant in a state bribery matter at Reno, told him that Alex Lemberes, his
brother, could reduce Joseph Conforte's tax liability from $7 million to $3.5 million
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1
241
in return for ten percent of the reduction or $350,000. Peter Lemberes described
Alex Lemberes as the best friend of IRS District Director Swanson.
Investigation was initiated by the IRS to determine whether Swanson had been
involved in the unauthorized disclosure of IRS information to Alex and/or Peter
Lemberes. The IRS requested FBI assistance with respect to whether Swanson had
been involved in bribe solicitation. By agreement, the FBI's role was limited mainly
to technical and surveillance support.
The investigation did not develop evidence to support involvement by Swanson in
bribe solicitation. Accordingly, the Public Integrity Section, Department of Justice,
declined to consider prosecution of Swanson.
Alex and Peter Lemberes were indicted by the Federal grand jury, Reno, Nevada,
in July, 1982, for their involvement in this matter. Alex Lemberes was charged with
conspiracy and perjury violations; Peter Lemberes was charged with conspiracy, per-
jury, and obstruction of justice violations. In November, 1982, Alex Lemberes plead
guilty to misdemeanor conspiracy. In December, 1982, Peter Lemberes plead guilty
to perjury and obstruction of justice.
Subsequent to the investigation, IRS District Director Gerald Swanson was trans-
ferred by the IRS out-of-state.
During the prosecution of Claiborne and the Senate Impeachment proceedings, de-
fense counsel unsuccessfully alleged that the FBI had focused on Swanson to pres-
sure him into granting tax relief to Joseph Conforte as an incentive for Conforte's
cooperation with the FBI in the Claiborne investigation.
QUESTION FOR JUDGE WEBSTER FROM SENATOR ROTH
1. As you recall, the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations held a hearing
last year on the Justice Department's and the FBI's handling of the Jackie Presser
investigation. We got good cooperation from the Justice Department and the Labor
Department, but we were essentially "stonewalled" by the FBI. We received no
access to FBI witnesses and virtually no access to FBI documents which we request-
ed. I and the other members of the Subcommitte found this very disturbing. Do you
have any explanation and do you plan to respond to Congressional requests for in-
formation from the CIA in the same manner?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/06/06: CIA-RDP90GO0152R000801520003-1