THE SOVIET UNION IN THE INFORMATION AGE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G00152R000600830007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 65
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 13, 2011
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: March 25, 1987
• Content Type: REPORT

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MAL
ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SUP
Date .
25 March 1987
Ilk (Name. office symbol, room number,
bradongAgency/Post) --
2. DDI Registry
Initials
Date
2. DDI
t\L
s. Executive Registry
s
4. ADCI
5.
_
Action
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For Clearance
Per Cpnversation
As Requested -
For Correction
Prepare Reply
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For Your information
See Me
pomment
Investigate
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REMARKS
SUBJECT: The Soviet Union in the information Age
Attached are:
(1) Revised briefing notes for your use in talking
with Frank Carlucci.
(2) The conference recommendations paper you wished
to give him.
(3) The supporting unclassified conference findings
paper on which the recommendations are based.
(4) The issues paper regarding the content of infor-
mation directed at Soviet audiences.
DO NOT _Ow this -form as a RECORD of approvals.- conclidences, disposals.'
sialikagnarawauge lawA oolaysamh. .
Room No.?Bldg.
5E-46. Has.
Phone No.
51141-102
* GPO : 1980 0 - 311-3.56 (17)
OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by GSA
MAR (41 CFR) 101-11.206
CONE EAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
25 March 1987
The Soviet Union in the Information Age
I. Conference Recommendations for US Policy
Bill Casey held a conference of outside experts to assess the potential
impact of the information age on tne Soviets and to consider how the US
Government could influence Soviet progress in ways that would serve US
interests. Their most important recommendations for US policy are:
The US not provide the Soviets with technology which would
significantly aid their economic development. Such aid would only
delay their realization that their halfhearted reforms will fail and
postpone their trying more fundamental reforms.
The US actively explore avenues to dissuade other countries,
from helping the USSR advance in the information
technologies.
The US support East European civilian applications of information
technologies, possibly creating division within the Pact.
The US step up dissemination into the USSR of information about the
West and encourage pressures for a more politically open and consumer
oriented system.
CONFIDENTIAL
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CONFIDENTIAL
4 March 1987
The USSR Confronts the Information Revolution
Conference Recommendations
Proceedings of a conference held at
Airlie House, Virginia
November 12-13, 1986
riNiurrnrikITT
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Final Draft
25 March 1987
The USSR Confronts the Information Revolution
Conference Findings
Proceedings of a conference
held at Ai rli e House,
Virginia, 12-13 November 1986
Draft--Not yet approved for dissemination
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Table of Contents
Preface
Summary
iv
Introduction ?
1
What is the "Information Revolution"?
2
Technology Ingredients
3
Microelectronics
3
Computers
3
Telecommunications
4
Software
4
Applications
5
Impact
7
How Do the Soviets View the Western Information Revolution?
.10
Concern
11
Admiration and Criticism
13
What Are Goals of the Soviet Information Revolution?
15
Where Are the Soviets Starting From?
23
Technologies
23
Applications 1
26
How Fast Will the Soviets Progress in the Information
Revolution?
29
The Ingredients
30
The Applications
32
What Will Be the Consequences for the Soviets?
35
The Economy and Military
36
The Political System
38
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Preface
On 12-13 November 1986 a conference convened under the
auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence analyzed the
implications of the information revolution for the Soviet
Union. The conference brought together distinguished experts
from the academic, business, and public policy communities:
Ivan Selin (conference chairman) Chairman, American
Management Systems
Norman Augustine
Leo Cherne
Diana Lady Dougan
11
President and Chief
Operations Officer, Martin-
Marietta
Corporation
Vice Chairman, President's
Foreign Intelligence
Advisory Board
Ambassador, Coordinator,
International Communication
and Information Policy
S De artment of State
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Jack F. Matlock, Jr.
Ambassador, Special
Assistant and Senior
Director for European and
Soviet Affairs, National
Security Council
This paper, prepared by staff of the Central Intelligence
Agency, documents the findings of that conference. It represents
only the views of the above participants, except where noted in
the text. It does not necessarily represent the views of the
participants' affiliated organizations, the Central Intelligence
Agency, or any other US Government agency.
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The USSR Confronts the Information Revolution
Summary
Western economic, military, and social development is being
increasingly influenced by the advance and application of
information technologies. Microelectronics, computers,
telecommunications, and software are supporting explosive growth
in the availability of information in all aspects of Western
life. Rapidly expanding applications of information technologies
are supporting fundamental structural change in Western economies
and societies, affecting relationships between individuals,
interest groups, institutions, and countries.
Judging from their writings and statements, Soviet officials
view Western developments with a mixture of concern and
admiration. They recognize the growing contribution of
information technologies to Western industrial and military might
and the difficulty of playing catch-up in such a rapidly
accelerating technology base. They also recognize the potential
for information technologies to undermine state control, both
through greater penetration by Western "propaganda" and through
the growing ability of Soviet citizens to independently obtain,
analyze, and disseminate information. At the same time they
admire Western innovation and dynamism, which they use as a
standard to evaluate (and rebuke) their own government and
industry.
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After a period of drift and lethargy in the 1970s, the
Soviet Union under Gorbachev has embraced information
technologies as critical ingredients in efforts to maintain
Soviet international competitiveness. Soviet officials expect
information technologies to:
o Restructure the economy and support sustained high growth
through the 1990s. They have called for rapid growth in
the production of computers, instrumentation equipment,
robots, and advanced machine tools, and will concentrate
applications on modernizing the industrial base. They
expect substantial productivity dividends.
o Support development of considerably more capable weapon
systems and their manufacture in more efficient
factories. Advances in sensor, signal processing, and
battle management technologies are increasingly
determining weapon effectiveness.
o Contribute to an improvement in the quality of life and
the development of at least elements of a Western
"information culture." The Soviets are initiating a
massive computer literacy program but expect to move very
slowly into the realm of consumer electronics. They
express confidence that they can increase information
technology applications without fostering significant
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social or cultural change, or suffering loss of state
control.
The Soviets have a lot of ground to make up to attain their
goal of equaling Western technical, economic, and military
strength by the year 2000:
o Western experts generally hold that Soviet information
technologies lag those of the West by five years or
more. The Soviets have done better in major hardware
development than in the development of support technology
like computer peripherals and software. In information
technologies they have depended to a particularly great
degree on Western advances.
o The Soviets lag the West to an even greater degree in
applying information technology. They have achieved
considerable success in certain military applications but
have established only islands of automation in industry
and have made inroads into the home only in the form of
state-sanctioned entertainment media.
Conferees believe that the major roadblock to Soviet
progress is the failure to establish an economic system that
effectively rewards development and application of information
technologies. An information revolution cannot be imposed from
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the top. Soviet progress will depend in part on the extent to
which the Soviets create a hospitable environment, which risks at
least some loss of central control. Conferees concluded that--
despite signs of "openness"--the Soviet Union will not move from
a party-dominated command system to a more pluralistic system.
They predicted that:
o The Soviets in 1995 probably will remain five to ten years
behind the West in information technologies, doing
relatively better in areas that lend themselves to a
"national program" approach (for example,
telecommunications) and relatively worse in areas that do
not (for example, software).
The Soviets will preferentially apply information
technologies in the military, government, science,
industry, and, as a means to an end, education.
Applications in economic planning, battle management, and
internal security will suport the maintenance of
centralized control. Industrial applications--mainly
computer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing--
will aim at improved quality and (especially)
efficiency. Entertainment applications will spread, but
personal computers are likely to make few inroads into the
home through at least the early 1990s.
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Conferees judged that even those modest objectives would be
jeopardized if the Soviets chose to substantially reduce their
historically high dependence on Western information technology.
Continuing resort to Western technology might afford some Western
leverage over Soviet development, but, in light of diminishing US
technical advantages, only if Western allies acted in concert.
Conferees agreed that the new, more pragmatic Soviet
leadership will be more effective than its predecessors in making
information technology work for productivity growth and military
advancement. At the same time, materially closing the gap with
the rapidly advancing Western target would require substantial
change in the Soviet system to make it more hospitable to
innovation and growth. Conferees judged that such change was
unlikely, even to the degree achieved in the mid-1980s in
China. Thus, they expect steady if unspectacular Soviet
development, with little change in the governing political and
social institutions:
Most doubt that Gorbachev will transform the Soviet Union
into an engine of economic development, achieving his,goal
of 5- percent annual growth in the 1990s. There is at
least as much skepticism that Soviet technology and
products will become competitive with the best Western
alternatives. If they do not, the USSR will continue to
have an export profile like that of a third world country-
-selling mainly raw materials.
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Western programs to develop "smart" conventional weapons,
advanced reconnaissance and battle management systems, and
systems associated with the Strategic Defense Initiative
may place the Soviets at a severe disadvantage if they do
not keep pace with the West.
To make matters worse for the Soviets, information technologies
(like high-density integrated circuits) are difficult to reverse
engineer; thus the traditional Soviet answer to their
shortcomings--a crash program to acquire and copy--is of limited
value.
On the political and social front, many Western analysts
expect that there will be a gradual moderation of party-state
control of information technologies--partly intended, and partly
unintended:
Over the next five years, modest challenges to control
could emerge from direct Western broadcasts, the growing
availability of consumer entertainment media (especially
videocassette recorders), and increasing access to
telecommunications.
-- In the 1990s the Soviet "computer culture" may take hold
in earnest, when millions of Soviets will be computer
literate and domestic production should support widespread
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industrial applications and the beginnings of widespread
private ownership. Security authorities then would
confront greater problems in monitoring telecommunications
use and access to data bases and efficient, high-speed
report production systems. Soviet economic authorities
will see their chronic battle against data falsification
move to the information technology frontier and will be
hard pressed to avoid at least isolated instances of
computer crime and even sabotage.
Conferees nevertheless judged that such potential threats to
state control could be contained, albeit not without forfeiting
some of the potential benefits offered by unfettered information
technologies.
The conferees concluded that by the mid-1990s at the very
latest the shortcomings of the strategy to close the information
technology gap with the West may force the Soviet leadership to
reevaluate its approach. Tension may increase between advocates
of greater economic decentralization and advocates of tight
political control. Although there is room for compromise and
innovative management, conferees concluded that Soviet leaders
will place a premium on maintaining political control, which
raises the prospect of continuing and possibly intensifying
economic and technical shortfalls.
If this happens the United States may confront a Soviet
Union in the 1990s even farther from its goal of achieving
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equality with the most advanced Western countries in terms of
economic and technical development and citizens' welfare. The
Soviet Union may be forced to rely to an even greater degree on
military power to maintain its influence in the world. Conferees
did not address the consequences of dealing with a "sick bear"
but noted that Soviet progress in the "information revolution"
will significantly influence in the severity of the bear's
illness.
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The USSR Confronts the Information Revolution
Introduction
Advances in computing and communications promise to
transform global society in the 21st century. The massive,
sustained increase in the capability to access, process, analyze,
and transmit large amounts of data has emerged as a major force
in technological innovation and a key determinant of national
economic health. Information technologies have remolded existing
industries and created entirely new ones. Cheap yet powerful
computers have dramatically expanded information available to the
ordinary citizen and simultaneously placed his privacy at risk.
Military programs like the Strategic Defense Initiative call for
successful integration of computing and communications activities
of unprecedented scope and complexity.
This paper draws together published research and conference
findings to assess the promise and challenge of information
technologies in the Soviet Union. It begins with a brief
overview of the so-called information revolution in the West and
summarizes Soviet reaction to it. It then analyzes where the
Soviets are today and enumerates their published goals for the
future. Finally, it assesses likely Soviet progress and the
potential consequences of this progress for Soviet economic
development and political control.
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What Is the "Information Revolution"?
Advanced Western countries are experiencing explosive growth
in the amount and availability of information, a phenomenon
supported by rapidly expanding applications of computing and
communications systems. A variety of public, corporate, and
academic institutions have contributed to the rapid.development
of what has been termed the information society. By measures of
product development, cost trends, and applications, the key
attribute of the information industry and broader information
society has been change.1 Moreover, despite occasional fitful
progress, false starts, and dashed expectations, the advance of
the information industry is contributing to fundamental
structural change in Western economies and societies. Such
change is affecting relationships between individuals, interest
groups, institutions, and countries, and threatens to do the same
for the Soviet Union.
Most experts hold that Western progress has depended in
large part on a hospitable economic and social system that
provides both support and incentive. Fierce competition--
domestic and international--drives progress. Effective
government generally has (1) provided "seed" money to support
fledging industries, either through acquisition policies (such as
those for defense) or outright grants; (2) eliminated barriers,
as in the US deregulation of the telecommunications industry; and
(3) stayed out of the way by exercising relatively little control
of information dissemination or social change. Development of
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the technologies, support infrastructure (such as education and
finance), and applications has been generally balanced and
mutually reinforcing. This has supported the very rapid spread
of applications and the development of a nearly universal user
community.2
Technology Ingredients
The information revolution is dependent on a handful of
interrelated technologies:
Microelectronics. Advances in semiconductor manufacturing
have increased exponentially the density and performance of
integrated circuits (ICs)--the basic ingredient of all modern
computer and communications hardware. Some IC prices have
remained stable, but mass production of inexpensive, general
purpose ICs has resulted in the proliferation of
microelectronics-based computing and communications by the
military, industry, and the public. Continuing advances in
manufacturing methods ensure that this trend will continue.
Globally, electronics is reportedly a $300 billion-a-year
business that is expected to triple by the year 2000.3
Computers. Although advances in the power, speed, and
efficiency of large mainframe computers were fairly predictable,
the surge in the use of minicomputers and personal computers
(PCs) was largely unforeseen. In 1985 US business bought 2,000
mainframes for $6.9 billion, while 84,000 minicomputers were sold
3
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for $9.5 billion. Sales of minicomputers are expected to grow at
an annual rate of 8 to 9 percent for the balance of the decade,
while sales of mainframes are projected to grow at 2 percent. PC
sales in 1985 stood at $3 billion worldwide and are expected to
grow 20 percent in 1987.4 A modestly priced PC typically used in
an office today often outperforms the large costly mainframe
computers used as recently as a decade ago.
Telecommunications. The advent of digital transmission and
switching systems has substantially reduced the cost of voice
communications and has permitted new services, such as
teleconferencing and facsimile transmission. Advances have also
supported high-rate data communication services, linking
computers and data bases in commerce, government, and industry.
In 1983, sales of communications equipment--such as
communications satellites, cable television, cellular radios,
video data systems, and local area networks--totaled almost $60
billion worldwide and were expected to climb to $90 billion by
1988. In 1983 one large telecommunications network was linked to
100,000 computer terminals and required 4,000 minicomputers and
300 mainframe computers to operate.5
Software. Perhaps the most rapidly growing and changing
component in the information industry is the software that
generates the myriad instructions that operate, link, and apply
computers and telecommunications hardware. Global sales of
software totaled $26 billion in 1985 and were growing at an
annual rate of more than 17 percent. In the United States alone,
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PC software sales have doubled annually since 1980 and now
account for one-third of total software sales of $18 billion. By
1990, business is projected to spend more on computer software
than on hardware.6
Software increasingly determines the function and
performance of digital systems, enables hardware to be ever more
generally applied, and serves as the nervous system of national
and local telecommunications and information networks.
Development of software for artificial intelligence will strongly
influence progress in meeting major US information-processing
challenges--such as SDI battle management and the fifth-
generation computer.7
Applications
Intensifying global technological and economic competition
makes the effective exploitation of these information
technologies a key factor in military and economic survival.
Most modern weapon, command and control, and logistic systems,
for example, depend on these technologies.
Information technologies already pervade Western science,
industry, and society, aiding analysis and decisionmaking,
managing industrial operations, and providing convenience and
entertainment for the consumer. Scientists use large, high-
performance mainframe computers to access and analyze enormous
streams of data, while engineers routinely use minicomputers to
grapple with more modest problems and employ PC networks to share
information. Desktop terminals and PCs provide executives and
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white-collar workers in government and industry with a rapidly
growing capability to access and analyze statistical, financial,
and operational data. Advanced telecommunications links within
and between organizations support high-speed information networks
used to access or share information, thereby enhancing a
company's productivity and competitive position.8
In industry, information technologies have moved onto the
plant floor. In the United States, purchases of factory
automation systems doubled between 1980 and 1985--to $18.1
billion--and are expected to double again by 1990.9
Minicomputers and microcomputers routinely control manufacturing
processes, machine tools, and robots. Flexible manufacturing
systems link machine tools and programmable robots under the
supervision of a computer to further automate manufacturing
processes. Local area networks integrate production scheduling,
procurement, and material handling. Computer-aided design
terminals with complex and often specialized software packages
create in hours designs that would require months to complete
manually. Many larger manufacturers are developing computer-
integrated manufacturing approaches that will eventually
integrate many of these functions into a fully automated
factory.10
Information technologies have rapidly expanded the variety
and quality of services available to private citizens. "Smart"
appliances, pocket calculators, automatic teller machines, and
laser scans at stores and supermarkets save time. Cable
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television and videocassettes provide high-quality entertainment
and in some areas even make it possible to shop in the home. PCs
_
and telephone modems that can be linked to remote data bases or
to local and national networks enable professionals to work at
home, help students with their homework, allow hobbyists to
readily share information, and host video games. The application
of information technologies in medicine has created more precise,
nonintrusive diagnostic tools to monitor individual health,
linked service paramedics to diagnostic equipment at hospitals,
and allowed for the implantation of pacemakers with built-in
microchips. Fire and police departments increasingly control
their vehicles with the aid of computer networks, and local
governments use office automation to speed customer services.
Impact
The impact of advancing information technologies on US
economic productivity, growth, and international competitiveness
is debatable. Some analysts argue that productivity for white-
collar workers--three-fourths of the US labor force--is no
greater than it was in the 1960s. They hypothesize that managers
and workers either have not yet learned how to use computers
properly (if at all), or that the burden of meeting more
intrusive government demands for tax, fiscal, and labor relations
reporting has overwhelmed productivity gains. Other assessments
point to the advantages major airlines and financial services
firms have gained over domestic and foreign competitors by
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raising productivity through office automation. There is a
consensus that the introduction of information_technologies has
streamlined US manufacturing operations, renewin rowth even in
mature industries like those for automobiles and aircraft.
Nevertheless, manufacturing productivity gains in Japan--
even in critical elements of the electronics industry--have
outstripped growth in the United States, inducing fears that
America is losing the high-tech race.11 For example, in the
early 1970s US firms totally dominated the market for integrated
circuits. Today, these firms account for 39 percent of the value
of sales by non-Communist countries while Japan accounts for 42
percent and its share is increasing rapidly. The high cost of
developing new technologies has forced many US companies out of
the market, whereas Japanese companies generally have ready
access to substantial financial resources.
Information technologies are increasingly important in
weapons development and production. Superiority in "smart"
munitions, avionics, missile guidance, fire control, and
surveillance and command and control systems--rooted in advances
in microelectronics, microcomputers, and software--is widely
viewed as America's primary military advantage. Information
technologies offer tremendous improvements in locating and
hitting targets and are consuming ever-increasing portions of
development costs. Computers and software accounted for less
than 2 percent of development costs for the F-4 Phantom, the
mainstay of the US fighter inventory during the 1960s and early
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1970s. The corresponding percentage for the F-15 was over 26
percent, and that for the F-18 was greater than 40 percent. In
1985 the Department of Defense spent $194 million for the very-
high-speed integrated circuit (VHSIC) project, with the goal of
achieving a hundredfold increase in the density and performance
of silicon-based ICs by 1990. The Pentagon reportedly has plans
to use the first generation of VHSIC chips in 37 major weapon
systems by 1992. Military software demands will also be fueled
by the 250,000 computers estimated to be in military operation by
1990.12
Computer and communications security is a vital concern
throughout government, business, and industry, given the danger
of espionage and sabotage. A recent survey of more than 17,000
computers used in the Department of Defense concluded that one-
half required better access control. Disaffected engineers or
programers could insert a few lines of code among the millions of
lines of operating code a large computer may use and severely
disrupt the machine functions. Hackers--often teenagers--share
information on techniques for illegally accessing computers on
some of the roughly 1,000 computer bulletin boards operated in
this country. The question of how to proceed against hackers has
raised unprecedented issues in jurisprudence.
The information revolution is also placing, at least
potentially, the privacy of the individual at risk. Some
estimate that the individual is referenced on average in roughly
40 local and federal government agency files and in about the
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same number of private-sector files. The Internal Revenue
Service is obligated to pass its records to 38 _different
government offices. A 1984 Gallup poll revealed that two-thirds
of the US population believed that they had lost or are likely to
lose some privacy. A 1983 Harris poll revealed that 86 percent
of the citizenry felt it was possible for the government to use
available information to persecute its "enemies."13
Although there appears to be general agreement that the
information revolution is likely to bring about sizable changes
in the world's economies, the questions of how much, how soon,
and in what di rection are hotly debated. Some analysts make the
point that it is difficult to forecast the effects of these new
technologies because their application will be heavily determined
by economic, political, and demographic conditions. In any
event, the importance of product "intellectual content" is likely
to increase the dominance of the services sector in national
economi es. Dislocations of workers in aging smokestack
industries, the semiskilled, and--increasingly--white collar
workers may be a substantial force as well.
How Do the Soviets View the Western Information Revolution?
The Soviets closely follow developments in Western
information technologies and applications. As in many other
aspects of the East-West competition, two themes frequently arise
in their statements and writings: concern over the potential
10
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threat and a carefully crafted balance of admiration and
criticism as they move to emulate Western progress. Although
different factions in the Soviet establishment may place varying
emphasis on each theme, nearly all spokesmen toe the official
line: Western development must and can be matched, borrowing
positive aspects and sidestepping the negatives. Soviet
officials, however, are at odds over where applications will
provide the greatest benefit.
Concern
Soviet leaders--especially Gorbachev--have acknowledged the
danger of lagging the West in the development and application of
information technologies. They have criticized the lethargy of
the 1970s, implying that the Brezhnev leadership failed to act on
the promise of information technologies and to appreciate the
pace and consequences of Western advances. They have
specifically criticized overreliance on copying Western
advances. Officials have noted the difficulty of reverse
engineering, as well as the accelerating Western progress in many
of the key technologies. They express concern over the prospect
of a permanent and possibly increasing lag.
The economic consequences are frequently highlighted.
Soviet leaders and officials talk about achieving international
competitiveness in manufacturing, both in the high-technology
products themselves and in the many product groups--like vehicles
and machine tools--where applications of information technologies
11
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greatly affect cost and quality. Other officials--frequently
scientists--talk about the importance of maintaining prestige as
a first-rate technical power.
More broadly, Soviet officials cite the contribution of
information technologies to productivity growth and economic
development in all advanced industrial countries. Noting that
productivity increases must fuel virtually all Soviet growth for
the remainder of the century, they have argued that the mastering
of information technologies is essential in their efforts to
match Western industrial might, international influence, and
consumption levels. They believe economic competition between
the two systems is more noticeably moving into the scientific and
technical sphere and will be decided precisely in that sphere.
They also acknowledge the "bandwagon" effect in the West--the
tendency of advances in information technology to rapidly promote
further advance--as a way of highlighting the danger of playing
catch-up.
Military concerns also surface. Generally, Soviet military
and political leaders have acknowledged the role of a strong
economy in supporting military power. More specifically, Soviet
military leaders have cited the contribution of information
technologies to advancing Western weapon capabilities--most
recently in smart conventional weapons and SDI. Western
improvements in command-and-control technologies--never a Soviet
strength--are causing considerable concern. The Soviets note
that progress in information technologies is essential to emulate
and, in many cases, also to counter.14
12
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The Soviets also voice concern over the effects of Western
information technology applications on the Soviet populace.
Western broadcasts convey Western viewpoints and values and,
accordingly, have been jammed for many years. The Soviets
recognize that the advent of direct broadcast satellites will
make Western propaganda more readily available to the Soviet
citizen. Although Soviet officials do not openly admit it, their
efforts to tightly control means of information production and
distribution--like copying machines--indicate fear over the
consequences of Western computer, telecommunications, and video
technologies falling unrestrictedly into the hands of the Soviet
consumer.
Admiration and Criticism
Active Soviet proponents of information technologies and
applications, probably encouraged by Gorbachev's admonition to
confront and acknowledge shortcomings, speak and write favorably
about Western accomplishments. They are impressed by Western
dynamism, particularly in rapid industrial assimilation and mass
production, and admit that they were caught by surprise. The
Soviets cite Western cost advantages--comparing, for example,
Western computers costing in the hundreds of dollars with the
Soviet-designed 8-bit Agat, costing up to 3,000 rubles. They
have praised Western innovators like Stephen Wozniak, the
cofounder of Apple Computers. And some have even acknowledged
that Soviet systems like the Agat are modeled after Western
systems and basically use Western-developed components.
13
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Open criticism seems to come from two quarters. Some
officials with a vested interest criticize aspects of Western
development--like decentralized computing--that are incompatible
with Soviet approaches. Other writers in the popular press
frequently use Western experience with information technologies
to criticize the capitalist system. Information technologies are
variously accused of causing bankruptcy, unemployment,
alienation, and invasion of privacy and of supporting Western
militarism and espionage.15
Soviet officials confidently reassure their people that
socialism can reap the benefits and avoid the pain: "We, of
course, do not have these problems and cannot have them." In a
variation of the same theme, Gorbachev stated that "we can and
must cope with acknowledged problems."
Conferees concluded that the Soviet Union under Gorbachev is
determined to confront and respond to the Western information
revolution. Soviet leaders have accepted that information
technologies can radically alter industrial competitiveness and
the military balance. They particularly fear the West's growing
ability to increase military effectiveness by stressing quality
and management of weapon systems rather than quantity. They seem
ambivalent about a strategy of copying Western advances. They
recognize the advantage of a quick fix to Soviet industrial
productivity and military capability, but many fear that a
follower strategy will relegate the Soviet Union to an economic
backseat and cause its R&D capabilities to atrophy. Yet many
14
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Soviets either do not fully understand or reject implications of
the political root cause of Western success--the interaction
between a private, decentralized, high-reward entrepreneurial
economic system and the development and application of
information technology.
Soviet leaders probably do not believe that adopting Western
information technologies will seriously affect their ability to
control their people. They probably intend to minimize
decentralization of control by forgoing certain applications of
electronic systems, microcomputers, and printers. Many uses in
the West--for example, banking and retailing--have little
relevance in the USSR. The Soviets also probably have faith in
the ability of their oppressive state security and centralized
economic apparatuses to control the more restricted industrial
applications that they intend to pursue. Soviet leaders,
however, clearly fear the spread of Western political and social
views and fear that the "demonstration effect" of Western living
standards may lead Soviet consumers to demand more consumer
amenities.
What Are the Goals of the Soviet Information Revolution?
Gorbachev has embraced the information revolution. He has
called for the "technical restructuring" of the Soviet economy
and singled out information technologies and their supporting
15
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industries for highest priority development in the USSR and
Eastern Europe." Gorbachev expects to recharge the Soviet
economy as information and other advanced technologies reverse
the long-term decline in the growth of Soviet labor productivity
and GNP, a goal made more urgent by the prospect of very little
increase in the Soviet labor force.17 Overall, he wants to
launch the Soviet Union on a new development course and holds out
the hope that it will be in the same league as the United States
and Japan by the year 2000.
Gorbachev's domestic policy initiatives related to these
goals represent moderate--not revolutionary--reform. He is
seeking and getting immediate gains by enlisting greater worker
commitment. He is directing investment toward civilian
engineering R&D and production, sources of much dual-use
technology, in the hope that technology advances will sustain
long-run productivity and quality improvement in all sectors,
including the military.
Gorbachev's goals for information technologies, while
ambitious, reflect these moderate efforts to reform the Soviet
economic system. Information technologies are to help make
centralized planning and control viable, not obsolete. As in the
West, they are to help modernize the Soviet economy and maintain
military power. They are to help remedy perceived low prestige,
enabling the Soviet Union to project a strong, progressive image,
both internally and internationally. The information
technologies are not expected to foster great social and cultural
16
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change, and any impact on the quality of life is to be largely a
controlled byproduct of their general impact on economic
development.
Gorbachev has set ambitious economic targets for the
suppliers of information technologies, and prominent officials
promise substantial gains from information technology
applications:
o Production of computer equipment is slated to grow 18
percent annually through 1990. By that time the Soviets
are to produce 1.1 million personal computers, after
producing virtually none until the mid-1980s.
o Output by the main producer of instrumentation equipment
is to grow by 19 percent per year in the 1986-90 period,
up from 6 percent in the previous five-year period.
o Compared with 1981-85 production, production of robots in
the 1986-90 period is to more than double, NC machine
tools almost double, and machining centers more than
quadruple.
The conference concluded that, unlike the West, where
information technologies have had the greatest effects in
financial sectors, the Soviet Union can obtain the greatest
benefits through industrial applications. The Soviets can use
17
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information technologies to improve industrial planning,
enlisting more low-level participation in the process. Their
priority objectives are to increase R&D productivity and to
drastically modernize their manufacturing infrastructure. They
are counting on flexible manufacturing systems and other
computer-aided machinery to provide the necessary precision to
meet the design requirements of advanced military systems,
including subsystem miniaturization, increased structural
strength, and reduced weight.
In the 1960s the Soviets had hopes of creating industries
totally linked by computer networks. They have begun to back
away from that objective and, for the present, appear content to
create islands of automation within industry. Nevertheless,
installation of computer-assisted design and manufacturing
(CAD/CAM) equipment is increasing dramatically in R&D and
production enterprises. Optimistic Soviet officials have claimed
that CAD systems will shorten product development times by 50 to
80 percent. (Such gains have been realized in US industry.)
Other officials have claimed that automation in engineering
industries will at least double labor productivity and that
automation of continuous processing can free up to one-half of
the laborers.
Specific Soviet military goals are less clear. It is
evident, however, that the Soviets have not become any less
aggressive in meeting the challenge of advancing Western weapons
technology. As weapon costs skyrocket and technology
18
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breakthroughs offer large performance gains, there are
indications that the Soviet military is pressing harder than in
the 1970s for weapons of better quality, even at the cost of
reduced quantities. Continued development of SDI, in particular,
will induce the Soviets to press for the substantial advances in
sensor, signal processing, and battle management technologies
necessary for development of comprehensive countermeasures or a
comparable system. Information technologies are central to
Soviet military strategy, both in the weapons and in the
factory.18
The authorities also promise an improvement in the quality
of life and a smooth transition to the new information society.
Gorbachev has come down forcefully in support of changing the
information cultures in bureaucracy and society. Perhaps because
of this support, the Soviets are beginning to print more
statistics on sensitive issues, more open and frank evaluations
of the performances of officials in all bureaucracies, and more
open criticisms of bureaucratic and social pathologies such as
withholding information and lying about production fulfillment.
In the near term, the regime will emphasize education and
training; for example, in 1985 a mandatory course on the basic
principles of computers and computer programing was begun for 9th
and 10th graders. The Soviets are planning to supply 500,000
personal computers to the schools by 1990--about 45 percent of
total production--and 5 million by the year 2000. Mass
communication services, as well as home personal computers and
19
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VCRs, are expected to increase and improve. Advocates claim that
citizens' lives will be enriched and creative forces unleashed
_
throughout society. As a leading indicator of Gorbachev's
policy, the national press has shown an increased openness that
contrasts sharply with the continued conservatism of the local
press.
Gorbachev also realizes that he faces opposition from a wide
spectrum of society, including segments of the party and state
bureaucracies at all levels. But, like his conservative
opponents, he has given no indication that he endorses any
fundamental reduction in national party control. Conservative
officials point to the need to mobilize control organs to guard
against "infection" by "bourgeois" ideas but express confidence--
at least in public--that such infection can be contained. An
architect of the computer literacy program has promised that
information technologies "will change our life, making it fuller,
wiser, more sensible and, in the end, happier than now."
The Soviets have several choices for developing information
technologies, all promising progress but none offering much
prospect of catching the West by the end of the century. They
are poorly positioned to tap the domestic sources that fueled
Western development. The Soviets lack a broad commercial base,
having geared their industry to military needs. Western
commercial applications of consumer electronics, for example,
have driven progress and rapid growth of the electronics
industry. In the West, defense applications of ICs account for
20
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only about 7 percent of the value and 3 percent of the physical
volume of IC production. The conferees also concluded that the
Soviets are unlikely to introduce measures that would
substantially improve the effectiveness of their massive R&D base
in serving the needs of producers.
The Soviets probably will continue to rely heavily on
imported technology. They will favor the ,acquisition of
production technology with both military and civilian
applications, including turnkey facilities, and will eschew
reliance on Western countries for continuing supplies of
components. Their efforts will be hindered by hard currency
shortages and by the growing difficulty of reverse engineering
increasingly sophisticated information technologies. Moreover,
the greatest Soviet needs--in microelectronics, systems
engineering, and software--are extremely difficult to satisfy
through imports without active Western participation, something
constrained by export control regulations. Moreover, even a
successful follower strategy probably would condemn the Soviets
to being at least one technological generation behind.
The Soviets will probably focus the application of
information technologies on industry and the military.
Increasing industrial productivity is the most pressing goal.
Military leaders are aware that production technology advances
are necessary for a strong military, and they will push for
modernization of the defense industrial base and a gradually
growing emphasis on quality over quantity in weapon
21
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acquisition. On the social front, the Soviets probably will move
only gradually to increase the supply of consumer electronics
such as VCRs.
22
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Where Are the Soviets Starting From?
Soviet and Western observers generally agree that the USSR
lags Western nations considerably in the development and
application of information technologies. These lags have
persisted--and in some areas lengthened--despite a massive
commitment of resources to information technology R&D dating back
to the 1960s. Today the USSR has the largest R&D establishment
in the world and has achieved impressive success in many areas of
science. While this competence has enabled Moscow to erode
certain Western leads at the laboratory stage, familiar problems
in industrial innovation and application have hindered Soviet
progress. The massive size of the Soviet R&D effort, coupled
with its failure to significantly narrow the technological gap
with the West, suggests an ineffective R&D management strategy, a
diagnosis with which Gorbachev has openly concurred.
Technologies
Western experts generally hold that Soviet microelectronics,
computer, and telecommunications technologies lag those in the
West by five years and, in some cases, by even more, depending on
the specific technology.19 In general, the Soviets probably fare
better in major hardware development than in the development of
support technology such as computer peripherals and software.
Where advance is more amenable to a massive, focused campaign--
23
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such as in certain telecommunications and microcircuit
development programs--the Soviets do relatively better and the
Western lead may shrink; where advance depends more on
coordinated and mutually reinforcing development in a host of
interrelated technologies--such as in computers or computer-aided
manufacturing--the Western lead is more likely to be sustained or
even increase:
o In microelectronics, the Soviets are at least two
generations (approximately five years) behind the United
States and Japan and are following Western approaches. In
part because of their late start, the Soviets have built
their microelectronics industry primarily by copying the
West and using Western equipment.
o Soviet computers are by and large copies of Western
computers and are at least one generation behind.
o The Soviets have an archaic telecommunication system, but
one that is being modernized and made more effective with
heavy investment.
o Software has always posed a major problem for the
Soviets. Their systems software is primarily of Western
origin. Application software is their Achilles heel,
because it is job specific and is difficult to modify for
another area of operation.
24
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Across all information technologies, Soviet advancements have
depended significantly on imported or stolen Western
technology.20
In the last several years, Soviet officials appear to have
become more acutely aware of the need for much improved
coordination of interrelated information technologies. Support
services--software, peripheral equipment, maintenance, and user
training--have repeatedly been singled out as the most serious
problem areas.21 Soviet leaders have responded by creating
organizations to coordinate development and foster compatibility
among the hundreds of independent product lines.22 To date, the
response appears to be largely bureaucratic--new oversight
committees, expanded technical standards, and formal quality
certification.
Moreover, to obtain hardware, software, and other support,
the Soviets are trying to capitalize on the resources of their
Eastern European partners in the Council for Mutual Economic
Assistance (CEMA). This also is not new--computer development
(initially the Ryad Series) was the first major product of CEMA
integration of R&D in the early 1970s. Recently, CEMA announced
the S&T 2000 program, singling out key information technologies
for much expanded cooperative development efforts. Soviet
organizations will manage these development efforts and stand to
gain particularly in areas where East European countries are
technical leaders.23 They will also gain by using Eastern Europe
as a conduit for Western information technology.
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Applications
According to Soviet official data, information technologies
are being applied on an increasing scale throughout the
economy. R&D and industrial customers are receiving preference
in the allocation of computers, for example. Mainframe computers
used for inventory control, payroll, and other management support
functions are fairly common in large plants, while minicomputers
are applied extensively in process control. Soviet and Western
authors, however, claim that Soviet computers are generally used
less intensively than those in Western firms.
Western authors have described the Soviet telephone system
as primitive by Western standards and notorious for poor-quality
transmission and unreliability, even though Soviet
telecommunication has followed US architectural strategy. The
plan for 1985 called for increasing the level of existing network
automation--switching of long-distance calls without the
assistance of an operator--to a mere 55 percent. The Soviets
also have a large but unsophisticated communications satellite
network. They have launched six times as much payload weight as
the US Intelsat system but have less than one-fifth the
communications capacity. Leading-edge technologies such as
optical fibers for data transmission, network control programs,
and digital switching presently appear in Soviet literature as
problems that must be solved before wide-scale use begins. At
the same time, the Soviets make more modest demands on their
telecommunications system than is typical in an advanced Western
country 24
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The development of the computer, microelectronics, and
telecommunications industries allowed the Soviets in the mid-
1970s to begin introducing automated management systems (ASUs) on
the plant, regional, and national levels. They use ASUs for
economic, administrative, inventory, product-planning, and
process control applications. By 1985 the USSR reported it had
installed over 6,800 ASUs. Difficulties in applying large-scale
ASUs apparently have convinced the Soviets to deemphasize
ministerial- and enterprise-level systems in favor of lower level
systems for production control and information processing, as
illustrated in the table below. 25
Numbers of ASUs installed in:
1971-75
1976-80
1981-85
Total
1971-85
technical process control
564
1,306
2,611
4,481
data processing
108
133
259
500
ministry management
168
92
60
320
enterprise management
838
389
296
1,523
Total
1,678
1,920
3,226
6,824
In general, Soviet and Western analysts agree that in range
and intensity of applications the USSR remains well behind the
West. The Soviets have highly automated factories, but many are
islands in a sea of aging industrial plant. Uneven development--
especially in services--has also contributed to a failure to
achieve desired gains in efficiency.26 Even when technology does
27
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not threaten state control, the Soviets have not moved
aggressively to exploit the potential for productivity growth.
For example, they could supply their engineers with substantial
numbers of domestically manufactured hand-held calculators, but
they choose to produce only small numbers of elementary models.
The Soviet system itself weakens a manager's interest in
understanding--much less embracing--the information age, whether
he provides or uses information services. There is a huge
disincentive to apply automation in the management structure of
the Soviet economy, and until there is a change in the incentive
system, few substantive changes can be expected. Soviet authors
acknowledge that these shortcomings significantly reduce the
economic benefits obtained from automated management systems.27
Moreover, they recognize that the Soviets do not require state-
of-the-art technology to realize substantial gains.
Conferees concluded that the Soviets have been effective in
using dated technology to create competitive weapon systems but
will move to use considerably more advanced technologies in
future generations of weapons. More extensive military
applications of information technologies--especially in command
and control--may require changes in military doctrine and tactics
as the Soviets move away from relying on overwhelming numbers of
men and weapons. This could cause political and social problems,
and these would be intensified if greater reliance on information
technologies drove up military expenditures. The Soviets
probably have little choice but to move in this direction.
28
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Information technology promises such huge increases in military
capability that they would be increasingly hard pressed to
compensate with numbers.
Information technologies have had varying impact in the home
and have made limited inroads into the schools. The USSR has
significantly upgraded and expanded its television and radio
broadcasting capabilities.28 Soviet surveys reveal that most
citizens obtain an increasing share of their information from
broadcast media at the expense of print media and lectures.
Videocassette recorders are in great demand; an estimated 300,000
are already in homes." Personal computers appear to have made
the least impact, because of shortages of equipment, maintenance,
and training.30
Information technologies also have the potential to be used
by organs of political and social control. Western analysts have
assumed that the privileged position of the KGB, police, and
Communist Party apparatus would assure them ready access to the
best available technology for communications intercept and
surveillance.
How Fast Will the Soviets Progress in the Information Revolution?
Judgments about the pace of Soviet progress depend on
assumptions about how Moscow will choose between partially
incompatible goals. Most authors agree that the centralized,
socialist Soviet system creates an inhospitable environment for
29
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maximizing advance in information technologies and their
applications. Thus, as one author (Rex Malik)_puts it, the Soviets
face an "agonizing dilemma"--balancing the gains of development with
the risks of losing political and social control.
Experts differ, of course, over where the Soviets will end up
along this continuum and what the consequences will be for their
position in the world. We summarize below the key elements of a
consensus that seems to emerge in the literature--the Soviets will
"muddle through" but will not reach the levels of leading Western
nations by the year 2000.31
The Ingredients
Even before Gorbachev, most Western experts believed that
Soviet information technologies would continue to advance at a
healthy rate, benefiting from the traditional impetus of massive
resource commitments, exploitation of Western developments, and
leadership attention. Gorbachev has given a strong boost to the
program, especially in terms of resources. Even so, few observers
expect the Soviets to narrow the gap significantly, except possibly
in some specialty military applications. Most believe the USSR will
remain five to ten years behind in most technologies--that is, in
1995 they will have about the same array of technologies available
that the United States has today. Moreover, most expect Soviet
progress to be faster in information technologies that lend
themselves to a "national program" approach (for example,
telecommunications) than in those that do not (for example,
30
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software).32
These judgments are predicated on the widely held belief
that Gorbachev is trying to modernize the Soviet system but will
not fundamentally change it by moving from a party-dominated
command system to a more pluralistic, decentralized system. He
is moving aggressively on weak links--orienting science to the
needs of production; stressing services, maintenance, and
computer literacy; and generally trying to create an environment
that encourages individual initiative and creativity. These
measures, together with efforts to alter the information cultures
of the bureaucracies and society, are moderately reformist.
Although many Soviet officials support Gorbachev's moderate
policy reforms, most Westerners believe the Soviet governing
apparatus and society will resist or delay advances in
information technology.33
The conference endorsed these views and concluded that
prospective Western advances in information technologies will
make it hard for the Soviets to remain only one or two
generations behind. Conferees felt that the Soviets could
leapfrog a generation in certain information technologies, like
microelectronics, but only if they can obtain major help from
other countries, like Japan. The telecommunication system shows
the greatest chances for substantial improvement, mainly through
the heavy investment in foreign technology. Software, especially
for applications, is likely to continue to be a major
shortcoming. The microelectronics and computer industries are
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unlikely to obtain sufficient resources to close the gap with the
West.
The Applications
Western and Soviet experts seem to agree that information
technologies will be applied preferentially in the military,
government, science, industry, and, as a means to an end, in
education. Conservative Soviet authorities write of the need for
"unified state control" of information technologies, and even the
most vocal believers in these technologies generally write about
the provision of centralized services.
In the government, police, and military establishments,
information technologies are likely to be applied extensively to
support the maintenance of central control. For economic
management, computers have been described as the "last great hope
of central planning." Although early dreams of "computerizing"
the entire economy have been scaled back considerably, computers
are likely to find increasingly widespread use at all levels in
planning production and supply. The conferees judged that the
Soviets are capable of doing most of what they wish to do with
their existing telecommunication system, and that programed
improvements for automated data links will increase Moscow's
ability to collect information and convey instructions. In the
military, information technologies will continue to be
incorporated in weapon systems, but the real frontier is command
and control. Soviet military literature extolls such computer
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applications, and most experts believe that information
technologies will be more extensively applied in combat modeling,
?
operational planning (including reconnaissance and fire support),
and strategic battle management. Conferees presume that the KGB
and militia will be quick to pioneer surveillance and record-
keeping applications, but doubt that the technologies will
support truly all-encompassing measures of control--at least by
the year 2000.
In the economy, most experts expect that the Soviets will
apply information technologies extensively in information
dissemination, product design, and manufacturing process
control. They have long invested large sums in acquiring and
disseminating technical information, and they are moving to
automate this process more extensively. Access to Western data
bases will be aggressively pursued. Soviets acknowledge--and
Western experts agree--that computer-aided design will be a high
priority as the Soviets move into components and systems that are
either impossible or prohibitively expensive to develop by other
means (for example, very highly integrated circuits and high-
performance aircraft). Computer-aided manufacturing probably
will be pursued the most vigorously, because it is so important
for reaching Gorbachev's productivity and growth goals. Many
Western experts believe the Soviets will succeed in producing
large numbers of robots, automated machine tools, materials
handling equipment, and control computers, but will not develop
an effective integrated systems approach. Islands of automation
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will spread, but continuing deficiencies in software,
maintenance, technical standards, and incentives will impair
comprehensive advance and efficient use.
In the home, Western experts expect substantial progress in
entertainment applications but see little prospect of a "computer
culture" comparable to that in the West. Mass communication
services already permeate Soviet society. Given the receptivity
of Soviet citizens to radio and (especially) TV, Soviet officials
probably will try to improve the quality, timeliness, and variety
of offerings, if only to compete with Western alternatives. At
the same time, information technologies are likely to be used in
jamming or otherwise interfering with these Western
alternatives. Ownership of videocassette recorders and possibly
video cameras will become more widespread as Western systems and
Soviet products become increasingly available. The apparent
Soviet concern over the impact of these systems makes it
difficult to forecast how rapidly this process will unfold.
Ownership of personal telephones will increase, but most experts
believe that even by the mid-1990s it will not reach levels
prevalent in the West in the mid-1980s. Finally, most Western
experts seem to believe that personal computers will reach Soviet
citizens in relatively small numbers. The priority of
applications in the computer literacy program and in industry,
along with restrictions on imports, makes it unlikely that large
numbers will be available to the Soviet consumer before the early
1990s. Deficiencies in or unavailability of peripheral
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equipment--such as printers or modems--will further restrict
personal applications.
The conferees concluded that the Soviets would fall far
short of meeting information technology targets if they chose to
rely on indigenous resources. Thus, the West may have some
leverage over Soviet advance, primarily through the denial of
technology for dual-use applications. US leverage is eroding,
however, as the Soviets become increasingly able to obtain state-
of-the-art information technologies from other Western and
especially Japanese sources.
What Will Be the Consequences for the Soviets?
All conference participants agreed that the new, more
pragmatic Soviet leadership will be more effective than its
predecessors in making information technology work for
productivity growth and military advancement. At the same time,
developments in the West--at least in terms of quality and
effectiveness--are moving forward rapidly and in some areas are
probably accelerating. Conferees judged that materially closing
the gap with the Western moving target would require substantial
change in the Soviet system to make it more hospitable to
innovation and growth. They judged that such change was
unlikely, even to the degree experienced in the mid-1980s in
China. Thus, the conferees expect steady if unspectacular Soviet
development, with little change in the governing political and
social institutions.
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If the Soviets do indeed "muddle through," the Soviet Union
of the 1990s will not be much different than it is today--a
repressive society still trying to catch up to the West, but
still dangerous militarily. Progress and change will be
constrained by a Soviet system that resembles the current
model. Of course, the scenario assumes that the West will
continue to hold the Soviet Union at arm's length in its quest
for high technology and influence the evolution of Soviet
political and social systems mainly by the provision of
I nformation.
The Economy and the Military
Conferees agreed that improved worker effort, massive
infusions of R&D and investment resources, and selected
technology transfers would raise industrial productivity, but
probably not enough to meet Soviet goals. This, in turn, makes
it unlikely that the Soviets will reach Western levels of per
capita production and quality of life by the year 2000. Although
no one is willing to hazard a precise forecast, most doubt that
Gorbachev will transform the Soviet Union into an engine of
economic development, achieving his goal of 5-percent annual
growth in the 1990s. There is at least as much skepticism that
Soviet technology and products will become competitive with the
best Western alternatives. The Soviets probably will continue to
have an export profile like that of a third world country--
selling mainly raw materials. A continuation or worsening of the
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USSR's position in those markets would impair its ability to rely
on the West.
Soviet priorities and the organization of the Soviet system
are likely to ensure that the most rapid progress in information
technologies will be in the military. Arms control agreements or
Gorbachev's civilian modernization programs could lead to
diversion of some military-industrial resources, but there is no
sign of any fundamental shift in priorities, and the military
evidently recognizes that they stand to benefit from advances in
industrial information technologies like factory automation.
Soviet weapon program management techniques serve to concentrate
high-quality resources, including imported or stolen Western
technology, on weapon programs. The Soviets have generally been
successful at deploying improved weapons on schedule, thereby
cutting selectively into Western military technology leads in
fielded military systems.
At the same time, the Soviets also will be aiming at a
moving target in the military arena. Western programs to develop
smart conventional weapons, advanced reconnaissance and battle
management systems, and systems associated with the Strategic
Defense Initiative suggest that an acceleration--if not an
explosion--in information technologies will be driving much of
the Western advance. Conferees judged that the Soviets would do
well to keep pace with the West over the next decade.
These pessimistic conclusions are based on the fact that
progress in the information industries--of all technology areas--
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is particularly incompatible with key features of the Soviet-
style socialist, command economic system. Development of
information industries requires a coordinated advance across a
broad front of interdependent technologies and the provision of
supply, support, and financial services. Spontaneity, "bottom-
up" creativity, powerful incentives, and technical support
provide the impetus for change, and flexible management, well-
developed horizontal communications, and material support
accommodate change. The Soviet system, even moderately reformed,
furnishes virtually the antithesis of this environment. It is
ponderous, cumbersome, vertically oriented, and penalizes
innovation. To make matters worse, information technologies like
high-density integrated circuits are difficult to reverse
engineer; thus, the Soviets' traditional answer to their
shortcomings--a crash program to acquire and copy--is of limited
value.
The Political System
On the political and social front, many Western analysts
expect that there will be a gradual moderation of party-state
control of information technologies--partly intended, and partly
unintended. Gorbachev's "openness" campaign sets the stage for
greater individual access to information systems. His industrial
automation drive and his efforts to encourage individual and
local administrative initiative require some moderation,
certainly more delegating of responsibility for decisions of
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t.
secondary importance, and possibly more sharing of authority with
regional and local officials. Moreover, Soviet officials have
acknowledged that the increasingly sophisticated and demanding
Soviet citizen must be catered to, and indeed one Western author
(Wilson Dizard) argues that the Soviet "yuppie"--and not the
dissident--will be the driving force behind any loosening of
control. Finally, the technologies themselves can work both
ways; some at least potentially support increased state
surveillance, but many (especially in the factory) are compatible
with more decentralized decisionmaking.
At the same time, the Soviet leadership has reason to worry
that an increasingly computer-literate citizenry may develop the
ability to obtain, manipulate, and transmit unauthorized
information, whether at home or on the job. Even within the
bounds of the official system, information technologies can be a
double-edged sword--Moscow can use them to centralize and
penetrate, but local authorities can use them to deceive.
Moreover, according to Yevgeniy Velikhov, Soviet social
scientists are also looking into possible consequences of the
information revolution that have been discussed in the West--
worker alienation and reduced peer contacts. There are also
hints of concern over worker "dislocation," if not unemployment.
Challenges to control are likely to arise. Several areas
offer threats and opportunities over the next five years:
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o
o Direct Western broadcasts, likely to become increasingly
accessible to ordinary citizens--although increased
jamming or Soviet cable TV could check this trend.34
Foreign radio broadcasts like Radio Liberty and Radio Free
Europe have forced the Soviet leadership to be more
forthright with their populace over such issues as the
KAL-007 incident and the Chernobyl' disaster. In the
early 1990s direct-broadcast satellites for television
could carry Western programs and advertisements,
illustrating what is available to the Western consumer.
Paradoxically, to the reported consternation of party
officials, even Soviet television may have a moderating
influence. Television, a major entertainment medium, is
undermining the effectiveness of political lectures and
other, more traditional means of conveying propaganda.
The conference concluded that jamming of foreign
radiobroadcasts, especially Western broadcasts, can be
expected to continue.
o The growing availability of consumer entertainment media,
especially videocassettes, both Western-origin and blank
tapes.35 The Soviets fear propagation of "antisocial"
values and behavior--crime and moral degeneration. They
also fear that such access may foster growing consumerism,
undermining efforts to promote continuing sacrifice to
shore up Gorbachev's growth strategy.
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o Telecommunications. Increasing access to telephones (and
possibly modems), plus improvement in the national
systems, increases control and surveillance problems for
the KGB. Conversely, installation of a system similar to
the US "911" telephone system, an idea that came from a
Soviet patent, could be used by the KGB to monitor
personal communications and facilitate tracking. The
Soviets' 1982 cutoff of international direct dialing
illustrates their willingness to take drastic measures.
In any event, the state's burden will be eased by the fact
that Soviet information networks are and will continue to
be considerably narrower and more focused than Western
networks.
Beyond the next five years the Soviet "computer culture" may
take hold in earnest. By that time, millions of Soviet citizens
should be computer literate. Soviet production of personal
computers and peripheral systems should be adequate to support
widespread industrial applications and at least potentially the
beginnings of widespread private ownership. At that time Soviet
security authorities could confront problems of monitoring
telecommunications use, data base access, and access to
efficient, high-speed report production systems. Soviet economic
authorities will see their chronic battle against data
falsification move to the information technology frontier, and
Soviet experience suggests that they will be hard pressed to
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avoid at least isolated instances of computer crime and even
sabotage.
The conference judged that such potential threats to state
control could be contained, albeit not without forfeiting some of
the potential benefits offered by unfettered information
technologies. Conferees acknowledged, however, that alternative
scenarios offered by Western authors raise the possibility of
more serious conflict or disruption within the Soviet system:
o One scenario holds that Soviet authorities may
underestimate how quickly and seriously spreading
information technologies may challenge state control. As
information technologies expand, a "crossover point" is
reached--possibly suddenly--at which developing
installations and networks overwhelm the ability of
controls.36
o Another scenario raises the possibility of a policy
crisis. Tension may grow between "conservatives" and
"modernizers" as one or both sides become dissatisfied
with trends in Soviet economic progress and political
control. Disagreement could lead to an abrupt change in
policy, with ramifications extending beyond the world of
information technologies. It could prompt a dramatic
liberalization of the Soviet system, or a monumental
internal crackdown and external belligerence. Malik,
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perhaps the most alarmist of the writers on this topic,
concludes that "we are on track for a highly dangerous
situation."
On balance, the conferees expect Gorbachev's policies,
applied to information technologies, to foster some moderation of
political and social control over the next 10 years. Yet the
Soviets probably will not accept a Chinese-style trade-off in
which central control is substantially relaxed to improve the
country's economic position. They also are not likely to resort
to Western techniques--like extensive reliance on market forces--
to create a truly hospitable environment for information
technologies. Moreover, elements of the Soviet leadership will
try to buck any moderation, while the technological innovators
push for more moderation.
The conferees concluded that by the mid-1990s at the very
latest the shortcomings of the strategy to close the information
technology gap with the West may force the Soviet leadership to
reevaluate its approach. The conferees expect growing tension
between advocates of greater economic decentralization and
advocates of tight political control, but do not foresee a crisis
developing. Although there is room for some compromise and for
innovative methods of leadership and management, Soviet leaders
probably will place a premium on maintaining political control.
This raises the prospect of continuing and possibly intensifying
economic and technical shortfalls.
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c,
If this occurs, the Soviet Union in the 1990s may be even
farther from its goal of achieving equality with the most
_
advanced Western countries in terms of economic and technical
development and citizens' welfare. It may be forced to rely to
an even greater degree on military power to maintain influence in
the world arena--becoming, as the Economist put it, an "Upper
Volta with rockets." Conferees did not address the consequences
of dealing with a "sick bear," but noted that Soviet progress in
the "information revolution" will significantly influence the
severity of the bear's illness.
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Notes
2Ibid; Tom Forester, ed., The Information Technology Revolution
(MIT Press, 1985), pp. 45-55; and Harry L. Freeman, "The
Information Revolution: Trade in Services," Vital Speeches of the
Day: (13 May 1986): pp. 572-575.
3Gene Bylinsky, "The High Tech Race: Who's Ahead?" Fortune (13
October 1986): pp. 26-32; and Forester, op. cit., p7-0717-xviii.
4John Browning, "Information Technology," The Economist (12 July
1986): pp. 7-8.
5Forester, op. cit., pp. 116, 122.
6Browning, op. cit.
7Browning, John, op. cit., and Forester, Tom, ed., The
Information Technology Revolution, MIT Press, 1985, pp. 27-44.
8Forester, op. cit., and Stuart Gannes, "The Soviet Lag in High-
Tech Defense," Fortune, (November 25, 1985): pp. 107-120.
9"High Tech to the Rescue," Business Week, (June 16, 1986)
pp. 100-108.
"Ibid; Forester, op. cit., pp. 260-272.
11"A Puzzlingly Poorly Productive America," The Economist, (March
29, 1986): p. 55.
12Gannes, loc. cit.
13David F. Linowes "Privacy Protection in the United States in
1984: Is it Adequate?," Vital Speeches of the Day, (27 November
1987): pp. 168-171.
14See, for example, Gannes loc. cit.
150. Vydrin, "American Capitalism Criticized for Use of
Computers," JPRS-UCC-85-007, (7 October 1985): pp. 1-4 and Steve
White, "USSR: Academic Journal Takes Up Debate Over Computers,"
Foreign Press Note, (12 February 1985).
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"Excerpts from Gorbachev's Speech on Science and Technology,
11 June 1985.
17The Soviet Economy Under a New Leader, DDB-1900-122-86, July
1986, p.2.
19S. E. Goodman and Alan Ross Stapleton, "Microcomputing in the
Soviet Union and Eastern Europe," Abacus, 3, No. 1, (1985): pp.
6-22 and Ivan Selin, "Communications and Computers in the USSR:
Successes and Failures," Signal, (December 1986): p. 8.
20 Soviet Acquisition of Militarily Significant Western
Technology: An Update, September 1985, a White Paper; and Bruce
Parrott, ed., Trade, Technology and Soviet-American Relations,
(Indiana University Press), pp. 117-136.
215ee, for example, Ye Zamura, "Microcomputer Repair Service
Excoriated," JPRS-UCC-85-002, (4 March 1985): pp. 12-14.
22 Computerization Encounters Difficulties," The Current Digest
of the Soviet Press, XXXVIII, No. 28, p. 10.
23"Computer Bang-or Whimper," The Economist, April 20, 1985, pp.
13-15.
24Goodman and Stapleton loc. cit., and Ivan Selin, "Ma Bell's
Spirits Alive and Well in Moscow," The Washington Post, p. Fl.
25Narodnoye khozyaystvo SSR, 1985.
26L. Volchkevich, "Problems of Production Automation," JPRS-UST-
85-003 (28 February 1985): pp. 84-87.
27See, for example, Daniel Seligman, "The Great Soviet Computer
Screw-Up," Fortune, (8 July 1985): pp. 32-36, and V. Piven,
"Problems in Acceptance of Computers Reported," JPRS-UCC-85-007,
(7 October 1985): pp. 5-8.
28"The Rapid Expansion of Soviet Satellite TV Broadcasting,"
United States Information Agency Contract Report #R-6-85,
prepared by George Jacobs and Associates, Inc., (February 1985).
29Victor Yasman, "The Collectivization of Videos," Radio Free
Europe/Liberty RL355/86 (September 22, 1986).
30Victor Yasman, "Home Computers Have Gone On Sale...," Radio
Free Europe/Liberty RL407/85, (6 December 1985).
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31S. E. Goodman, "Advanced Technology: How will the USSR
Adjust?," and Rex Malik, "Communism vs. the Computer: Can the
USSR Survive the Information Age?," Computer, (9 July 1984): pp.
35-48; and Wilson Dizard, "Mikhail Gorbachev's- Computer
Challenge," The Washington Quarterly, (Spring 1986).
32Selin, "Communications and Computers in the USSR: Successes
and Failures."
33L oren Graham, "The Soviet Union is Missing Out on the Computer
Revolution," Washington Post.
34George H. Quester "Transboundary Television," Problems of
Communism, (September-October, 1984): pp. 76-87, and Igor
Reichlin, "Big Brother's Grip Can Fail," Science Digest (January
1984): pp. 14-15.
35Yasman "The Collectivization of Videos"; and Victor Yasman,
"Video in the Soviet Union: Trouble with the Capricious
Stepchild," Radio Free Europe/Liberty RL129/86 (21 March 1986).
36Malik, "Communism vs. the Computer: Can the USSR Survive the
Information Age?," and Dizard, "Mikhail Gorbachev's Computer
Challenge".
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