LETTER FROM GEORGE V. LAUDER TO PROFESSOR THOMAS J. HIRSCHFELD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G00152R000500600008-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 27
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 20, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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OFFICIAL/USE ONLY
DCI/ICS 7006-87
20 May 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: Acting Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH: Director, Public Affairs Office h/
Deputy Director for Intelligence,/
Director, Intelligence Community Sta
Deputy Director for Requirements & Evaluation, ICS
SUBJECT: The Texas Speech, Revisited
1. This memorandum is for your information, unless you desire to issue
guidance.
2. In early March, I gave a speech for you in Austin, Texas. entitled
"Arms Control in U.S. Intelligence" (cony attached).
3. Because of your role in having someone from CIA give this speech, I
thought it would be nice--and graceful--to tell you about this subject.
6. What more may I do for you here?
Attachment: a/s
Speech
OFFICIAL SSE ONLY
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OFFICIAL USE ONLY
SUBJECT: The Texas Speech, Revisited
Distribution: DCI/ICS 7006-87
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As Delivered
Arms Control and US Intelligence: The Estimative Process
An Address at the Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
by
University of Texas at Austin
Central Intelligence Agency
March 3, 1987
As one of the lead-off hitters at this conference, so to
speak, I certainly want to help get it started successfully.
Doing so means that I want to keep your attention, deal with the
subject Acting Director Gates agreed to address, and not preempt
my upcoming colleagues--who no doubt have a lot of their own
stimulating thoughts to give you.
I would like to speak today about our estimates--a basic
feature of the many-faceted, vital role played by US intelligence
in this nation's arms control effort. In doing so, I will lay
out basically what US intelligence does, the context in which we
do it, and--lastly--give you my humble opinion about how well we
do it. All these thoughts ought to be even more useful to you
during the follow-on talks on political, military, and
technological issues.
When we speak of arms control, we include the topics you read
or hear about regularly--such as strategic systems (e.g.,
ICBMs)--as well as less exciting topics--such as the US-USSR
Hotline. And we include all of the nations engaged in arms
control with the US--not just the USSR, although it requires the
majority of our efforts by far.
The most prominent and well-known feature of our role is our
"estimates." I use this word broadly to encompass all of our
products we give to policy officers--from the quite formal
National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) down to the oral, tactical
advice given during the negotiations.
The contents of all these products are equally diverse.
Examples include assessments of: weapons--both characteristics
and deployments, specific negotiating goals and tactics, key
foreign officials, US capabilities to monitor compliance (or
not), secrecy and deception efforts, as well as basic objectives
and strategies.
As context, I think it useful to recall that US intelligence
is a full partner in the various arms control processes that have
been going on in the modern era for more than two decades. Our
partners are policy officers in the Executive Branch and the
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Congress. We participate in a team effort, but ours is also an
independent role. We do intelligence; they do policy. In this
team, we help policy officers figure out what the world is like,
what the US should want, and we help them get it. Our efforts
extend from Washington to whereever the US engages a foreign
government on arms control.
At the same time, however, no one should imagine that this
overall, large effort by US intelligence is a one-agency, or a
one-person, show. All the agencies in US intelligence
participate somehow and each agency has its own internal
arrangements and team of officers. A great deal of the effort
happens in the inter-agency arenas--within US intelligence,
within the Executive Branch, and with the Congress. But some of
our work happens more privately totally within specific
departments. An example is defense, where DIA plays a large
role.
Although the role played by US intelligence varies as the
arms control process moves along, there are some key constants we
seek to ensure. One is professionalism; another is non-
partisanship. Those constants are a central element of the CIA
Credo that Director Casey created, and about which he is so
proud. This Credo fits the other intelligence agencies too. The
Credo notes, and we take pride in the fact that:
"We provide objective and unbiased evaluations and
are always open to new perceptions and ready to
challenge conventional wisdom."
These attributes are absolutely critical if US
intelligence is to be effective in the intense environment
associated with arms control. The stakes--beginning with
the nation's security--are great; the pressures are severe,
as well as subtle.
One of our most important functions, on occasion, is to
tell people things they really don't want to hear--facts and
assessments that may conflict with their policy, program, or
personal agendas. And on occasion we have to shout.
We need very special people to do this hardwork and
cope with the long hours. Thankfully, we have them.
In this situation, I cannot stress too strongly how
important it is that we in US intelligence protect the
secrets we receive. For example, we need access to
policymakers to help them. And when they share their
visions with us--so that we may help them even more--
discretion is a must.'
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Three Phases of Arms Control
For convenience, I have separated the arms control
process into three phases: design, negotiations, and
maintenance. In our support to any one arms control area,
however, these phases overlap a lot--especially when
negotiations are underway for a new accord, much less when a
violation may have occurred with an existing accord. Thus,
juggling all of the arms control topics and work daily is
scintillating business.
The Design Phase:
In what I would call the design phase, that is, when
arms control agreements are being contemplated within an
Administration, policymakers rely almost exclusively on
their intelligence advisors for detailed assessments of
relevant Soviet force structures and for projections of
future forces. The estimates during this phase are
Community reports. Where differences exist between
agencies, these are made fully known to our policy
colleagues; the holders of diverse views have a chance to
present their views and explain what they have done.
This is virtually the last point in the arms control
process where we are mostly in control. We are the holders
of the highly classified data bases, the recipients of the
product from the multiple of sensitive collection assets we
employ, and the ones who can best analyze all the
information available. The experience of twenty or more
years of doing such assessments for the arms control world
has given us, and the policy makers we serve, a certain
confidence in the work we do.
We clearly don't do a perfect job, but we are pretty
good at all this. Are we smug about what we do? We try
never to be! In fact, the world sometimes is different than
we think, it changes whenever it feels like it, it has
little obligation to inform us, and we sometimes make
mistakes. We try to remain open-minded, and stay ready to
assimilate new data from wherever it might come, even if it
disturbs formerly held ideas or conventional wisdom. We are
blessed with humility born of experience from having had to
change data bases every time new information becomes
available.
Of all our estimates, however, I think the one type
which has the most impact over time is the category called
"monitoring." Monitoring involves the collection,
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processing, exploitation, analysis, and reporting of
information on foreign activities relating to arms
control. During this design phase, we tell policymakers how
well--or in some cases, how poorly--we think we can monitor
various proposed limitations. Monitoring is extremely
important because in arms control, as in other national
security areas, trust is meaningful only as far as you can
tell with confidence that your treaty partner is behaving.
Our jobs, of course, would be simpler if all we had to
do was make a judgment that a provision could or could not
be monitored. But our monitoring capabilities are never
zero--just as they are never perfect. We have had a long
history of describing to policymakers how well we can
monitor a provision today, and how well we expect to be able
to monitor that provision years down the road--as we attempt
to factor in how we expect the world to change. For
example, as a result of changes in prospective collection
and analytic capabilities.
Lastly, we describe our ability to monitor a provision
assuming greater Soviet data denial efforts and our ability
to detect any cheating or "sharp practices." In fact, the
Soviets are attempting to deny the US data on Soviet
military capabilities. These efforts extend to forces
covered by arms control, as well as those that are not. In
contrast, the new Soviet policy of openness or "glasnost"
rarely intrudes into such matters.
The monitoring judgments we provide, however, are by no
means the last word in assessing the acceptability of a
particular limitation. From our parochial perspective, it
makes little sense to adopt a negotiating position or settle
on a provision that is very difficult or impossible for US
intelligence to monitor effectively. It is hard to imagine
that anyone would be comfortable with a situation involving
major limitations on nuclear weapons where US intelligence
could not tell whether the US' partner in the deal was
behaving.
Nevertheless, monitoring is only one element of a
verification process that national security decisionmakers
have to feel confident about. Verification is a subjective,
policy process that incorporates several factors other than
our judgments on US monitoring capabilities. These
include:
o An assessment as to whether US national interests,
broadly defined, are served better with an accord,
whether or not totally monitorable, than without it.
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o An assessment as to whether certain types of cheating,
which might plausibly be expected to escape detection,
would be militarily significant .
o The ability and willingness of the US to take
countervailing measures, sometimes described as
safeguards. They can limit damage from foreign
actions that are not in compliance, and have some
potential to deter cheating.
Examples of safeguards include:
- US Research & Development. Maintainance of
vigorous research, eve opment, and testing
programs for limited activities.
- Intelligence Activity. Implementation of a robust
national foreign intelligence program.
- Annual Compliance Report. Production of an annual
Presidential compliance report to the Congress,
tailored to the agreement.
With respect to our monitoring capabilities, there are
several generic problems that can compound the difficulties
we face. Some of these derive from policy choices, some
from technical developments, and some from policy decisions
by other nations. Examples include:
o A desire to limit more important measures of military
power, such as throw-weight.
o The decrease in the size of key weapons and, to a
degree, the resulting increase in mobility.
o A desire to reduce the numbers of weapons, which will
increase the significance of verification
uncertainties and any cheating.
o .Soviet efforts to increasingly protect information
they consider sensitive.
Verification will not be perfect, there will be risks,
and significant monitoring problems will continue for some
provisions even with improved intelligence capabilities,
better treaty language, or such cooperative measures as on-
site inspections. The problems can run the gamut, from
small to very great, depending on what we are aiming to
constrain. They can never be eliminated entirely. And, of
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course, people will differ on the acceptability of the
risks.
Both prospective intelligence capabilities and policy
objectives are subject to change over time. US monitoring
capabilities can change over time, both positively and
negatively. This is so, in part because they are subject to
technical and resource limitations, especially in the
competition with other priority needs. In addition, because
of Soviet data denial, US intelligence is in a contest as we
seek to deal with these denial tactics and the Soviets
attempt to learn of our efforts and take even more
appropriate countermeasures.
And policy standards and judgments on the importance of
verification (including military significance) can also
change over time. For example, in 1972, issues concerning
biological weapons had less than overpowering urgency. But
today, in the light of Soviet noncompliance activity in this
area, and the advances of technology, these weapons may very
well have taken on a new significance.
During the deliberative processes, when US negotiating
positions still are being formulated, our responsibilities
for monitoring prospective agreements also can impel us into
arguing for positions that--in our view--will serve to make
our monitoring capabilities better than they might be
otherwise. Yet we understand that monitoring considerations
are only part of the verification process--and that
legitimate political realities often play a large role in
the decisions about the profile of US negotiating stances.
The Negotiating Phase:
Once an Administration has decided on its negotiating
position, US intelligence provides support to the several
delegations and support committees that are called upon to
implement the President's program. US intelligence has a
representative on all the various interdepartmental groups
that deliberate policy, and on all the backstopping
committees that create and transmit policy and guidance to
all the overseas delegations.
US intelligence, at this stage, continues to supply
policymakers with a rich menu of current intelligence
reporting--the product of extensive, longer term research
efforts; and community-wide assessments, such as National
Intelligence Estimates. These products are frequently hand
carried by senior intelligence advisors to the key arms
control decisionmakers that they directly support.
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Also, US intelligence must be especially concerned about
the protection of this nation's secret sources and
methods. All too often, there seems to be an expectation
that if we can just share pertinent intelligence data with
members of foreign arms control delegations, they will "see
the light" and be convinced of the wisdom of US positions.
It is part of our job to ensure that classified intelligence
data are not revealed to foreign citizens during
disucssions--and we try.
As these diplomatic activities occur, foreign
governments try to explain themselves. Sometimes these
explanations are done very privately, usually to pass on a
"message" or "signal." Some of these signals are real and
important; others are contrived. For example, at various
junctures of the arms control process, we always see in the
press indications of debates within the Soviet polity, of
divergent views among ostensibly competing bureaucracies--
doves verses hawks, if you will. This is not to suggest
that there are not divisions within the USSR's leadership;
there are, but it is to suggest that the Soviets know
Americans only too well. We love a strange story passed on
in strange ways, and the stranger the better, as long as it
has a positive overall point.
The Maintenance Phase:
US intelligence's responsibilities in this last phase
really begin during the negotiations, as various technical
details are debated and compromises or agreements are
made. As one example, we must develop and maintain an
up-to-date, comprehensive, quantitative baseline of all
Soviet weaponry subject to the limitations and reductions
called for in the accord.
Once an arms control agreement is signed, our
responsibilities include critical support to the Congress
during the ratification process. In 1979, for example, the
signing of the SALT II Treaty was contemporaneous with the
issuance by US Intelligence of an interagency study of US
capabilities to monitor the provisions of SALT II. The
conclusions of this study were briefed to the Senate Select
Committee and served as an input to that committee's report
to the Senate during the ratification hearings.
And once an arms control accord goes into effect, US
intelligence is charged with monitoring a vast number of
activities that collectively make up the web of limitations
contained in the deal.
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The fact is that once an agreement is reached, we in US
intelligence bear sole responsibility in the US Government
for monitoring compliance-related activities associated with
the accord. Even so, we get lots of free help from our
policy colleagues. And we participate deeply in the process
of deciding whether violations have occurred. This overall
responsibility is not a light or trivial one and we take it
extraordinarily seriously.
This monitoring process continues into the indefinite
future and produces a flow of treaty-related intelligence
data into the policy community. This is aimed at providing
the very best data for the matrix in which foreign
compliance, or noncompliance, can be judged fully and
wisely.
In a very real way, our monitoring work in similar to
the classic function of Indications and Warning. Violations
of arms control accords clearly are not armed conflict, but
they are a very big deal--especially in the political
arena. When we became aware of the Krasnoyarsk radar, for
example, senior people knew in minutes.
The weight of all these responsibilities causes us to be
vitally interested in the totality of the arms control
process and stimulates us to protect vigorously US
intelligence interests and equities.
An Assessment:
With all of this in mind, it is fair to ask: how are we
doing? I propose you judge for yourself at the end of the
day.
Although I clearly have an interest in our report card,
I happen to believe several basic points about the record of
US intelligence over the years in the arms control arena.
One is that our collective report card--i.e., of
objectivity, accuracy, and foresight--is as good as any of
our policy colleagues; and generally, but not always,
better. A second point is that US intelligence is a lot
better at this work today than 10, 15, or 20 years ago.
Among the many obvious possible reasons for this, I think
the key one is that we have better, more experienced people
doing the work and a lot more of them. A third point is
that the largest relative improvements have occurred in the
political, rather than in the technical, areas. And a
fourth point is that US intelligence understands the fact
that data denial, and deception, are real activities--
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undertaken by real governments--which we have to help US
policy officers try to cope with and overcome.
Beyond these general thoughts, citing specific cases
does not seem wise or useful. Every candidate example will
start an old fight anew. And senior intelligence officers
really ought not be blabbing about successes--or failures--
in public. Service in intelligence ought to mean silence
for the most part.
In closing, if I do nothing else for you, I hope you
carry away from this exchange the most fundamental idea of
all: US intelligence is doing its best to help the
Executive Branch and Congress deal with arms control, in a
non-partisan and professional manner. It's a daunting
challenge unlike any other I have ever heard about, as well
as a splendid opportunity--even when it is painful
personally or professionally.
Thank you for this chance to speak to you; I would be
happy to answer any questions you may have.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
PUBLIC AFFAIRS
Phone: [phone]
17 February 1987
Professor Thomas J. Hirschfeld
Lyndon B. Johnson School of Public Affairs
The University of Texas at Austin
Drawer Y, University Station
Austin, Texas 78713-7450
Dear Professor Hirschfeld:
As we have discussed on the phone, the Acting Director of Central
Intelligence Robert M. Gates is unable to make a firm commitment to speak
at the conference on Intelligence and Arms Control on 3 March until he is
confirmed by the Senate. However, we are making arrangements for a
backup to be available in the instance that the confirmation does not
come through in time. Either Chief of the Strategic
Policy Division, the Office of Soviet Analysis, or Chief of
the US-Soviet Affairs Branch/Policy Analysis Division of the Office of
Soviet Analysis, will be available.
Enclosed as requested is a photograph and biography of Mr. Gates. We
thank you for your patience in this matter.
Sincerely,
George V. Lauder
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Director, Public Affairs
DCI/PAO~
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17 FEB 871 I STAT
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Draurr Y ? University Station ? Austin. Texas 78713-7450 ? (512) 471-496?
January 28, 1987
Mr. Robert M. Gates
DDCI
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, D.C. 20505
Dear Mr. Gates:
87-0491 X
As concerns the March 3rd Tom Slick Conference here, the tentative
schedule I sent you last time now looks firm (see updated copy). Also
enclosed is an outline for a first chapter which might help as you think
about your own presentation, in the sense that it tries to pull together
most of the obvious intelligence/arms control connections in an orderly
way. There are, of course, other and different ways of slicing the
subject. Nevertheless, it is my hope that this schema will provide the
framework, and that the other presentations will somehow fit.
I would appreciate advance copies of anything that you put to paper
as far as possible before the third of March, if that can be done, and I
look forward to seeing you.
Very truly yours,
-Thomas .Hirschfeld
ILLEGIB
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Remarks To 17 & 18: Please see "lead off"
recommendation in Para #1.
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/ xecutive Secretar
29 Jan 8~1
3637 ?o-e?
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THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Exec,tive Registry
LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS 87-0369
Drauier Y - University Station - Austin, Texas 78713-7450 - [phone]
January 20, 1987
Mr. Robert M. Gates
DDCI
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Further to my letter of November 18 concerning the March 3, 1987,
conference here on Intelligence and Arms Control, the schedule and
participation now seems firm. As regards the schedule (see attachment),
I thought it would be useful for you to lead off with your description of
the estimative process, as it relates to the formulation of U.S. arms
control negotiations, and the post-hoc maintenance of arms control
agreements. After you speak, the moderator will seek discussion at the
table, followed by questions from the floor. There will be a reception,
hosted by Hans Mark, the Chancellor of The University of Texas System,
which the governor, key legislators, and Lady Bird Johnson normally
attend, on the evening of the 2nd at 7:00 p.m. I hope you can make this
event. The conference itself begins at 9:00 a.m. on the 3rd, preceded by
a continental breakfast at 8:00 in the Dean's Conference Room of the LBJ
School.
The University has booked you into the Marriott at the Capitol,
located at 701 East 11th Street. Transportation between the hotel and
the airport and conference sites will be provided by The University. The
University will, of course, reimburse you for travel and other conference
expenses. We will send you a final schedule, a full program, and other
information in the next few weeks. In the meantime, I would appreciate
a short bio statement and a photograph for public use, as well as the
form of words you would like to appear on the program below your name,
describing past and/or current functions. We look forward to seeing you.
Please call [phone] or write, if you have any questions.
Sincerely,
Thomas. Hirschfeld
TJH/sr
enclosure
Tom Stick Professor ofd World Peace
P.S. A copy of your text before the conference would be much
appreciated, if that is possible.
STAT
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9:00-9:15
9:15-9:25
9:25-9:40
9:40-9:50
9:50-10:00
10:00-10:30
10:30-10:50
10:50-11:00
11:00-11:30
11:30-11:50
11:50-12:20
12:20-12:40
12:40-2:15
2:15-2:45
2:45-3:05
3:05-3:35
3:35-3:55
3:55-4:15
March 3
TENTATIVE SCHEDULE OUTLINE
Welcome - President William Cunningham
LBJ School - Dean Max Sherman
Introduction - Senator John Tower
The Framework - Thomas Hirschfeld
Groundrules and Introduction of Speaker - Moderator
(Sidney Weintraub)
The Estimative Process - Robert Gates
Q&A Gates - Panel/audience
Coffee Break
The Political Dimension - William Colby
Q&A Colby - Panel/audience
The Military Perspective (Tentative) - Bobby Inman
Q&A Inman - Panel/audience
Lunch
The Technological Dimension - Hans Mark
Q&A Mark - Panel/audience
The Perspective of the Intelligence User - Paul Warnke
Q&A Warnke - Panel/audience
Summary - Thomas Hirschfeld
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
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Remarks To 16 & 17: Pls get together and
have a draft ready for DDCI review by 13
Feb.
Executive Secretary
Dote
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8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
X
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
15
VC/NIC
16
17
N10 /SP
X
18
Staff
X
20
21
22
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STAT
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THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Drauvr Y ? University Station ? Austin, Texas 78713-7450-[phone]
November 18, 1986
Mr. Robert M. Gates
DDCI
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
5 5503X
Thank you again for agreeing to participate in our March 3
colloquium on arms control and intelligence. The list of participants is
still the same; James Schlesinger has still not made clear whether he will
participate. However, Senator Tower has agreed to open the conference.
I hope this conference will help describe the relationship between
intelligence and arms control, that is, some sense of the major cross-
connections. Thus it should not be confined to the much-discussed
problems of verification and compliance, although, of course, these are a
necessary and prominent feature. I am therefore requesting participants
to consider the arms control and intelligence relationship in three phases:
the design phase, when an arms control agreement is being contemplated
(when the key issues include the limits of our monitoring capability and
an assessment of the adversary's side of the military balance); the
execution phase (essentially the period of negotiations, as the content of
the initial U.S. proposal gets modified by being rubbed against the
positions of an adversary); and the maintenance phase (when the agreed
obligations that are intended to constrain adversary behavior become the
key issues) and compliance comes to the forefront. Obviously,
intelligence plays a different role in all three phases. One assumes the
estimative process continues throughout.
For your own presentation, I would appreciate a half-hour-long
presentation of whatever you would feel free to say about the nature of
the estimative process for each of the three phases of an arms control
agreement, using, where possible, familiar historical examples of
agreements and particular issues. These could include: in Salt I, whether
the SS-9 was MIRVed; and the significance and nature of the Backfire
Bomber in Salt II; SS-20 range in INF; the speed at which the U.S.S.R.
would MIRY (a SALT I issue); and the issue of telemetry encryption. All
of these have been much discussed in the open literature. Whatever
specifics you can mention on other subjects would be equally welcome.
Your participation will be followed by panel discussions.
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Again, we are grateful that you are willing to come. I'll keep you
informed on other details as conference planning advances. Please call if
you or your staff have any questions.
Sincerely,
Thoma J. Hirschfeld
Tom Slick Professo~ of World Peace
TJH/sr
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
ROUTING SLIP
ACTION
INFO
DATE
INITIAL
1
DCI
2
DDCI
X -3
3
EXDIR
4
D/ICS
5
DDI
X
6
DDA
7
DDO
8
DDS&T
9
Chm/NIC
10
GC
11
IG
12
Compt
13
D/OLL
14
D/PAO
X
15
D/PERS
16
VC/NIC
17
D /Exec St
aff
x
18
X
2
21
22
STAT
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STAT
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LYNDON B. JOHNSON SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS I a? 4745x
THE UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Drawer Y - Univeruty Station ? Austin, Texas 78713-7450-[phone]
October 7, 1986
Mr. Robert T. Gates
DDCI
Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505
Admiral Inman tells me that you have agreed to participate in our
prospective one-day conference on Intelligence and Arms Control on
March 3 of next year. I am grateful that you have agreed to come and
look forward to welcoming you. Others who have agreed to come are
Messrs. Colby, Warnke, and Mark, in addition to Admiral Inman, and
yourself. James Schlesinger is another possibility; so is Senator Tower,
as a keynoter.
Once the funding and participation are firm, I will send you a
tentative schedule, and an annotated outline of what I hope the individual
presentations will contain. The conference is supposed to highlight the
importance of having professional and dispassionate intelligence work
underpin both U.S. negotiating positions and the analysis of compliance
issues. Specific past questions like MIRV deployment, telemetry
encryption, Backfire, and the difficulties inherent in dealing with new
Soviet models (SS-13/25-SS-16/20) could be examined in their historical
context, using publicly available information, to illustrate the nature of
professional disputes (Soviet practice vs. capability assessment) and
essentially political ones, such as Team B.
Because you are a sitting official, I could ask you to describe the
estimative process and speculate what improvements you would like to see
in the future. If you would prefer to deal with some other subject,
please let me know.
Again, many thanks for agreeing to come.
Sincerely,
Thomas ,1. Hirschfeld/
Tom Slick Professor of World Peace
TJH/sr
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