ADDITIONAL ITEM FOR LEADERSHIP MEETINGS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90G00152R000400550025-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 16, 2011
• Sequence Number: 25
• Publication Date: September 28, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
FROM:
SUBJECT:
OCA 87-5006
:2 8 SEP 196i
Davil
Dkriadtleeof Congressional Affairs
\,-
Your Breakfast Meeting on 1 October with
Representatives Stokes and Hyde
Your regular monthly meeting with Representatives
Louis Stokes (D., OH) and Henry Hyde (R., IL), the Chairman and
Ranking Minority Member of the House Intelligence Committee
respectively, is scheduled for 1 October at 0800 for breakfast
in the Director's Dining Room. Also attending are Bob Gates
and I and Tom Latimer and Tom Smeeton from the Committee staff.
A summary of the last meeting with Mr. Stokes and Mr. Hyde
is attached at Tab A.
Suggested talking points follow:
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RET
6-8eg-/r
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Distribution:
Orig. - Addressee
1 - DDCI
1 - ExDir
- ER
- Counselor to the DCI
1 - D/OCA
1 - OCA Record
1 - DD/HA/OCA
1 - OCARead
DD/HA/OCA (28 Sep 87)
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SECRET EI
OCA 87-5046
28 September 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director
FROM: David D. Gries -
Director c41,Congressiona1 Affairs
SUBJECT: Your Meeting on 30 September with
Senators Boren and Cohen
Your regular monthly meeting with Senator David Boren
(D., OK) and Senator William Cohen (R., ME), the Chairman and
Vice Chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee respectively,
is scheduled for 30 September at 1630 in 219 Hart Office
Building. Bob Gates and senior Intelligence Committee staff
will also attend.
SECRET
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1 862 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD ?SENATE September 35, 1987
Cleasthat a portion Of the ?gutty
he establiehed as a national
recreation area. and that the lower
portions of the Meadow and the Blue-
stone be designated as the State's first
wild and scenic rivers. This bill will
also allow for much-needed boundary
modifications in the New River Gorge
National River.
Protecting these rivers in their pris-
tine state will give people the opportu-
nity to enjoy their unmatched beauty
for years to come. Federal designation
of these rivers will go a long way
toward luring more tourists to south-
ern West Virginia. Each year, 700,000
tourists visit the New River Gorge Na-
tional River. Being part of the Nation-
al Park System will provide increased
awareness?both nationally and inter-
nationally?to the recreational oppor-
tunities available on these rivers. It
will give West Virginia's wild, wonder-
ful rivers more publicity than we could
ever buy.
The recently funded New River
Parkway, the just-completed West Vir-
ginia Turnpike, and the soon-to-be-
completed Interstate 84 will enable
tourists to visit these areas on modern,
safe. and convenient highways.
Indeed, West Virginia's interstate
system is now among the most elabo-
rate and accessible in the Nation.
The Gauley River National Recrea-
tion Area will cover a 24.5-mile seg-
ment from Summersville W Swiss.
With its boulder-strewn rapids, high
ledges. narrow chutes. and tortuous
channels, this area provides one of the
most spectacular whitewater experi-
ences in the country. In 1986,
whitewater recreation on the Gauley
alone pumped over $16 million into
the local economy.
The Meadow River, from the Route
19 Bridge to its confluence with the
Gauley, is in a wild and primitive con-
dition. For rafting enthusiasts, it's
even more demanding than the
Gauley due to its narrow channel and
steep grade.
One of the most pristine rivers in
the United States is the Bluestone.
Well known for its beauty and mag-
nificent gorge, superb opportunities
exist for fishing. camping, rafting, and
canoeing on the Bluestone.
The Greenbrier River was also stud-
ied under the legislative mandate. The
study, conducted by the Forest Sem -
ice, determined that 133 miles of the
river were eligible for Federal Protec-
tiors Under the provisions of the 1968
Wild and Scenic Rivers Act. 106 miles
were classified ILE scenic and 2'7 miles
were judged to be recreational. Tne
Forest Service recommended that the
river be protected by the State Natu-
ral Stream Preservation Act?not by
the Federal Government through con-
gressional action.
I have received hundreds of letters,
numerous phone cein and have met
with many residents of Pocahontas
and Greenbrier Counties on the pros-
pect of including the Greenbrier in
the system of federally protected
rivers. Swabs people ? theme to be
beard an the proposal. I sponsored
public Meetings in Durbin. Merlinton.
and Lewbburg. What I heard from my
constituents was an overwhelming
desire to protect their river?but not
through designation as a scenic river.
Moreover, any plan that is put forth
to protect the Greenbrier must ad-
dress the issue of flood control. In
1986. the region was devastated by a
flood. Currently. the Corps of Engi-
neers is preparing a feasibility study
-that will suggest various alternatives
" for flood protection. This study will be
ready for release and public discussion
In January 1988.
Based on what I have heard from
my constitutents and the unresolved
flood control issue. I have decided not
to include the Greenbrier River in this
legislation. Since there is an enormous
Interest in protecting the river. I will
offer my assistance in developing a
local plan that will protect the river?
while not precluding effective flood
control.
Mr. President, without a doubt, the
rivers that I have proposed for Federal
designation are worthy of inclusion in
the system of wild and scenic rivers.
Enactment of this legislation will com-
plement the existing New River Gorge
National River and greatly enhance
the economic development of southern
West Virginia through tourism. I urge
my colleagues to pass this legislation
as soon as possible.*
By Mr. COHEN (for himself, Mr.
Bzwrseri, Mr. DeConcini, and
Mr. efeesowssi):
S. 1721. A bill to improve the con-
gressional oversight of certain intelli-
gence activities, and to strengthen the
process by which such activities are
approved within the executive branch,
and for other purposes: to the Select
Committee on Intelligence.
zuresissesser OVIRSIGHT ACT
? Mr. COHEN Mr. President. I am in-
troducing today, along with three
members of the Intelligence Commit-
tee, Senators Bexeseri, DaCoecter and
Mealsowsise a bill entitled the thtelli.
gence Oversight Act of 1987, which is
an effort to strengthen the statutory
framework already existing in this
area and to ensure that Congress will
continue to play an active, effective
role in the oversight of U.S. intelli-
gence activities, including covert ac-
tions.
It. Is important to recognize at the
outset that this bill would place no
new restrictions upon the President,
either in the conduct of intelligence
activities generally or of covett actions
in particular. Rather. it is aimed at
strenthening the congressional over-
sight process, by clarifying the respon?
sibilities and roles of both branches
and removing the other ambiguities
under current law. To be sure, the ef-
fectiveness of any law will ultimately'
depend upon the mutua trust and
good faith of both parties. but it nev-
ertheless behooves ue?in the interests
of 80041 iptivezeineente40 Malta isur
mutual responsibilities under the law
as clear and certain as we can.
As has been reported teethe press in
recent weeks. the President has, in
fact, taken a number of concrete steps
In this direction. These were reported
to the Intelligence Committees last
August. He has told us that there will
not be oral findings in the future, that
such findings will not authorize covert
actions retroactively, and that all
covert programs will be Periodically
subjected to review. These steps are
welcome and commendable. But one is
nevertheless obliged to recognize that
these are policies which do not have
the force of law, which may be subject
to exceptions or waivers approved by
the President in special circurn-
stances?ones that would be highly
classif ed?and which are not binding
upon any future administrations.
The bill I sin introducing today ac-
cepts and builds upon the commit-
ments already made to the Intelli-
gence Committees by the President. It
does not purport to be the final
answer, but it does represent a com-
prehensive attempt to restructure, and
where necessary, improve the current
system of intelligence oversight.
Appended to the bill is a lengthy sec-
tion-by-section analysis which sets
forth its purposes in great detail. I
wish only to highlight several of them
here.
First, the bill would place all of the
laws bearing upon intelligence over-
sight in one place in the United States
Code, and would restructure those
laws in a logical, coherent fashion. Ac-
cordingly, the Hughes-Ryan Amend-
ment, which was an amendment to the
Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, would
be moved to that portion of the intelli-
gence oversight statute which deals
with limitations on the funding of in-
telligence activities. Moreover, the lim-
itation set forth in Hughes-Ryan
would be expanded to cover agencies
of the executive branch other than
CIA which may be used to carry out
covert actions. This has been the
policy within the executive branch for
several years, although Hughes-Ryan
Itself only applies to CIA.
Second. the bill would eliminate
much of the ambiguity under current
law by specifying those congressional
oversight requirements which pertain
to intelligence activities and those
which pertain to covert actions?
termed in the bill "special activities."
Under current las , these requirements
are, unclean
Third. the bifl would. for the first
time. provide explicit statutory au-
thority for the President to authorize
covert actions. or "special activities'
in support of U.S. foreign policy objec-
tives, provided they are authorized in
accordance with the requirements set
forth in the bill. As 1 mentioned at the
outset, these requirements do not
entail new restrictions on covert ac-
tions, but are designed to improve the
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Sepreisbeili,W ' ? CCRIGSULSSIONAL StilCORD SENATE
Ability of the inideissindi Voauckfttess
to carry out their nverdight of this
vital wen
Recent experience has demonstrated
that the current system has numerous
flaws. This bill addresses them. It pro-
vides for written authorisation of
covert actions and prohibits retroac-
tive authorisations. It requires the
congressional oversight committees to
be advised of all findings within 46
hours of their being signed, but per-
mits such notice to be limited to the
leadership of both Houses and the
chairmen and vice-chairmen of the In-
telligence Committees where the Presi-
dent deems such limited notice essen-
tial to protect vital US. interests. It
provides that the Intelligence Commit-
tees be made aware of precisely who
within Government and outside Gov-
ernment will be used to carry out
covert actions. and it puts to rest the
notion that the President may author-
ize. under the rubric of covert actions,
activities which would violate the stat-
utes of the United States.
I hope this bill will receive serious
consideration, both by my colleagues
in the Senate and on the Intelligence
Committee and by those outside Con-
gress with an interest in this subject.
It represents a balanced, comprehen-
sive approach to congressional over-
sight of intelligence activities, which,
to my mind, would constitute a decid-
ed improvement over the current
system.
In addition to the bill and a section-
by-section analysis. I am submitting
the letter the President sent to the In-
telligence Committee which I referred
to earlier, and I ask unanimous con-
sent that this material be printed in
the RECORD.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
Rscoen. as follows7
S. 1721
Be it enacted by the Senate and NOU-Sf Of
Representatives of the United States of
AmerleCt in Congrres: assembled_ That this
Act may be cited as the "Intelligence Over-
sight Act of 19E7."
Skdriow I. Section 662 of the Foreign As-
sistance Act. of 1962 (22 D.E.C. 2422) is
hereby repealed
Sr:. 2. Section 501 of Title V of the No-
tionol Sec .urity Act of 1947 (be U.S.C. 413) is
amended by striking the language contained
therein. and substituting the following DEM
-SEC_ sai GENERAL PROVISIONS.
(F. Tile President shall ensure that the
Se ler: Committer. on Intelligence of the
Sens)(- and trit Permanent Select Commit-
tee of the House of Representatives (hereir-
after in tho title referred to as the "intelll?
genre corronittees-i are Sep: fully and cur-
rently informed of the intelligence activities
0;. the Iln;lee States as required by this
Laic. butin activities shall ordinarily be cos,-
Ousted pursuant to constiltations between
tn( Presidero, or his representatives and
the Intelligence committees. prior to the th,.
mernentstion of sue:. activities. altnougn
nothing contained herein shall construec
as re?rsn the approva: of the intelligence
committees as a conditson precedent to the
initiation of such activities
-4b) The lisimilisat shall mime dist stain-
less! intalligsnee activity at significant in-
tellimate tsibire le reported to the intent-
once OOMMittella. so well as any corrective
action that has been Winn m? Is plumed in
sonnectioe with such illegal activity or in-
telligence failure.
(c) The President and the intelligence
committees shall each establish such proce-
dures as may be necessary to carry out the
provisions of this title.
(di The House of Representatives and the
Senate. in consultation with the Director of
Central Intelligence. shall each establish, by
rule or resolution of such House. procedures
to protect from unauthorized disclosure all
classified information and all information
relating to intelligence sources and methods
furnished to the intelligence committees or
to Members of Congress under this section.
In accordance with such procedures. each of
the intelligence committees shall promptly'
call to the attention of its respective Rouse,
or to any appropriate committee or commit-
tees of its respective HOUSE% an matter re-
lating to intelligence activities requiring the
attention of such House or such committee
or committees.
(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed
as authority to withhold Information from
the intelligence committees on the grounds
that providing the information to the intel-
ligence committees would constitute the un-
authorized disclosure of classified informa-
tion or information relating to Intelligence-
sources and methods.
) As used in this section. the term "intel-
ligence activities" includes, but is not limit-
ed to, -special activities,' as defined in sub-
section 903(e), below.
SEC 141. IMPORTING PerELLIGV4CE ACTIVMEe
(MIER THAN SPECIAL ACrflaTIFS.
The Director of Central Intelligence and
the heads of all departments, agencies, and
other entities of the United States Govern-
ment involved in intelligence activities shall
keep the intelligence committees fully and
currently informed of all Intelligence activi-
ties, other than specie/ activities as defined
in subsection 503(e), below. whist) are the
responsibility of, are engaged In by. or are
carried out for or on behalf of. &ay depart
fluent. agency, or entity of the United States
Government, including any significant an-
ticipated intelligence activitr provided that
such obligation shall be carried out with due-
regard for the protection of elk:mined infor-
mation relating to sensitive intelligence-
sources and methods In satisfying this obll.
gation, the Director of Central intelligence
and the heads of all departments ssid agen-
cies and other entities of the Unit ed States
Government in intelligence actir lee shal;
furnish the intelligence committees any in-
formation or materia conc-err.drig iriteli
genet activities other than Epf!C-11-2 activities
which is within their custody or control, and
which is requested by either of the intelli-
gence committees it. order to carry out Its
authorized responsibilities.
SEC sas APPROVING AND !REPORTING SPECIAL At
vtrics
(a) The President may authorize the con-
duct of "special activities.' as defined herein
beloo, by departments. ageric.. or -eileetifes-
of the. United State:, Government when he
determines such activities al-e. necessary to
support tro foreign policy otoectives cf the--
Linnet States and are important to the xis
Lions) security of the- Ur.ited States whist,
determination shall be set forth in a finding
that shaL meet each of the following cond:
Lions.
(I) Each finding shall be in writing unless
irnmediate action by the United Stales is re-
quired and time does no: permit the preps-
ration of s written findlng, in which case r
--
? 12353
written mooed of the Tregidda's hidden
whin be contemponensomip made and dial/
be reduced to a written finding as soos as
possible but in no event more than forty-
eight (411) hours after the decision h made:
(2) A finding may not authorise or Mac-
lion special activities, or any sweet of Such
activities, which have already occurred:
CE Each finding shall specify each and
every department. ageneY. or entity Of the
United States Government authorized to
fund or otherwise participate in any way in
such activities provided that any employes.
contractor, or contract agent of a depart-
ment, agency or entity other than the Cen-
tral intelligence Agency directed to pa.rtice-
Pete In any way- in a special activity shall be
subject either to the policies and regula-
tions of the. Central Intelligence Agency, or
to written policies or regulations adopted by
such department. agency or entity. In con-
sultation' with the Director of Central Intel
licence. to govern such participatior..
(4) Each finding shall speedy, in accord-
ance with procedures to be established pur
stain: to subsection SOlec,. any third party .
Including any foreign country . which is noi
an element of contractor or contract agent
of. the United States Government, or is no:
otherwise subject to U.S. Government poli-
cies and regulations, who it is contemplated
will be used to fund or otherwise participate
in any way in the special activity concerned.
and
(Si A finding may- not authorise an,
action that would be inconsistent with or
contrary to any- statute 01 UN' United
States.
(b) The President. the Director of Central
Intelligence and the heads of all depart-
ments, agencies, and entities of the United
States Government authorised to fund or
otherwise participate in any way in a special
activity shall keep the intelligence commit-
tees fully and currently informed of all spe-
cial activities which are the responsibility
of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for
or on be half of. any department, agency, or
entity c" She United States Government. In
setisfyie; this obligation, the intelligence
committ sas shall be furnished any informa-
tion or material concerning special activities
which is in the possession custody or con-
trol of any department, agency. or entity of
the United States Government and which IE
requested by either of the InteillgenCE com-
mittees in order to carry out its authorized
responsibilities.
(c) The President shall ensure that any
finding Lased pursuant to subsection esis
above. sezeil be- reported to the intelligence
committes as soon as possible, but in nc
event later than forty-eight 48 hours afte-
it has beer, signed: provided however. the-'.
If true President determines it is essentia. to
access to the finding to meet extrs.o7,
&nary circumstance: affecting vita= inter
ests of the Tinned States. such finding may
be reported to the chairmen and ranking
minority members of the intelligence com-
mittees the Speaker and minority leader el
the of Representatn-es. and the tri
ic,rilv and minority leaders of the Senate
enner dirk, a certified copy of the finding
signed by the President, shall be provided at-
the chiarraan of each intelligence corm,
tee.. Wriere access to a finding is limited to
the Members of Congress identifieo herein
above, a statement of the reasons for lun>.
ing such access shall also be provinee.
ecr The President shall promptly notif:-.
the intelligence committees, or, if applies.-
bit. the Members of Congress specified ir;
suesecuor: (Cl. above. of any signifies:::
change in any previously-approved ape-cit
activity -
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rtrisiire 'that C irtterlitiernot wttrities Sr
Cant:V."60 LE the nation& Interest Curren'
tat Oars net fufl!. address the 4*AlvennE? et
the President.. Nor dors thr existent wisitote
ref irr; the commitment to VC7runalt4,.101.
Wia? 11?. Onneress made be the Preyed:4vas
a rek.ur V the lissom learned from the
lran-Cantra enquires
TIe ser'and ob--v w 14., eimunas,
necessar ambigutiir: Ir. tree las 1...spen.
emx? 4.17#04-? 10E- current statute 11,e mains
od signiiican: areas v-hare Coon-ressunst.:
'men; mrr be &u he-:; riasiwerarrta.:
ley Executive brazier. ?flout% as avel as
pups w the as sr.ere COGRieSE ate re:1 ade-
inutteb saticipate the wet to .10kritor;
artudance. Exampies are the unnertani toran?
LE 01 We requirement to report
timely 1 ashion- the sineace of ME 1=11011
prevision tin wrthet Prestamal Ptocurip.
and the need te, speedy tnow respensible
tor Mattementizig covers actions. Toe Art is
U- elarib the intent of Co.ma, Mtn re-
spect as oversight of IsdtieltefiOr 00.01:106-
SO SS 10 redure the possibilities tor susur-
diem:asne or evastea Porpurposeso! cur
ity. a otsuodttor. a iaoe Set-seer th. ele-
tailt16 .proriaiens spena2
a.re inati-urrients of V [Dreier; policy. And
toe zrquiremsrsis for tuber intelligence ac-
tivities Le.. coliectron. anAysts couruerio-
,Lelasence.: alma are ksia controversial
A tt.,.r.ct objective is to provide statutory
autharit-- for thi Pro lent to empiny spe-
.16C-...-.11.1Ci? ac 111101e0(1012- t ZlS.. loreign
policy O.- -cover. meant Congress has not
gprevioutsi 413,71f ac. except to /he extent
that tte CIA war authorized by the Nato:m-
a: St-rur..ty Acs o.r pe_rionx sJc.r.
otrie.r funat.ansa.c outie r?Slej.E.0
ge?nct afrectini se-.:urit
C.:11171: raw, ttme
? Cur-e-: ls. rereF 'Pres:der
tu? t' SD:7.77,11i falLt reper-1.111..-- tr Conirres:.
of "trite:i_;-enrf. rs.:tr.r.... it !rep:. caut
u.lented
_tor ODLE1'.11.4"
.? 7,:. EL ?
F7'-??
EL'? t,? 7.? Cr,
ictb . cp. E?
int: It. ef
rev'-. ? surr: s.-
Of ^ '7717- ???-??,
a'::! ? err S"!? !?-'1 7777 ' 1_
r -..r. F,
? 6.7 et..'n?i. 0. '
Ter- eve-a.;. 0,77TY.,7? C?` tr
1f7.5.,CKet reern: eyrie nerr- e=ta
a mar- e;ier-,ii.esta-...rvorr t.rarnev.ari.
eve:n.1; ?-? coo-w-rt-.1-.-.- tr.
tro.et:erna.: r. FL' .67 ,0/ is 11(`'
rYs rani et 16011-1e". eon t- tr.: wear tilt
traralries '07 SOUS', 0' (16.7. 11(1V.-P:
er suLt' cor_fila.s snc abuses
? ersonasminy the TM:MU& otrigrattons of
tile Presider, and Cangres- an0
? urinri?essar-- ere nnif
'1T1VR unarrauiridins' or, notn var.
.- ? 111111111a*INSININgginiestinsinits:::.=:.
%--Irtir sea SIR* VW, Mb-
Atonal aoctigrits Act la 1M wale wa'4%
itiheiggaseal ansammaidatimi 4aclamileat
mod Abe -Cr fat asunialat t dad
mace acurisies.
Prosulealind shadier and Prior
Considtaticui
Subsectioc at would planes statutory ob-
ligation tux= the Prca.d.en it maw's. that
Erie Senate Select Commatter
on mIrth-
'vflt'- ant the Mous= PCM111.11e01 Pelee;
Conimitiee on lritelintence ire-tarred to it
the ei:11 or the -,intelltaence commit Wee*"
are
he fully and curratt ty triturated at the
elligenor activitirs of tne United Saito
as required ley Lag hilt_ Curran taw kr
pasek such uties an tee DCI and agency
.beads. bun no; or: .t.ht President himself.
Overall respanqiulitty should be vested Ir.
thi President because of the importance
and sertsittrty of siraret actir!-
ties that nst after: wlta nations'. interests
an' SE!'"ALLI6f. Ue Prendt. mav 03.1?F unlace
irnot-ienge of those aeurittee that tie is lam
suited Lc ensure a imparted to tat ant
store cominitiees The- tormr aria condition.
to'- 'Leeson* ths cenunitiees arta cur-
renzty iniormed- are ihust set font in Sec-
tion:: 502 and Ser. discussed beide.
In acidthon. "Jewel:tor. NW would provide
That rz inteLtsenot ii.Oinitier shall mete
nartls be zottehatted pursuant to commute-
NOM between tire President as Alf. snore-
onviatises Ind the inteRipenee tommitter
Prior to the unpiesnentstion SI suet. actw,
nes_ This is cazs:ste-n: with the Intention<
ol the President SE stated in hit letter of
Augusi S. 7887. to The Casirmar. a.nd Vicr
C0117-nrar SI the Senzat Inte-liurence Com-
territes It ayochee to -all U.S. intelligence ar
tivit ineludinr colier11011- aradYlISE,- war-
and sPerin, settvtties
^ Presicienita: reporting tequeetarint-t
for special 11CLJ:liae? air set birth n SecLion
503. &russet: berm. This new general pre,
-vision for .prior consultation with the totelb?
genet cortuntttees would supplement cur-
rent requirements tor Iteeetng the econerdi
tees informed of -sign. tfi_n: anticipated in-
telligence arstraties- The imentiremeni for
prior siersentsuane la a more coiseette re--
Denson of tric ?wt.:: ter e.:.:1-Artise-ieeesiatryf
cooper-altar ir it;, Arrir'_iltc.e_,-- of iritt;i:-
sen-4?. pcilaAa5 Jcr ratesnDie. LrtF?7f.SIOCTil
or his represents..net Dor.
s'.1l1 Ler owe iiWen:::` 007.1E1,;?,..--. or 'n-
oosed Prescient/a: rid: te :het-
stir.roval by 'int
St.--sseztion (a ret.n: cu.i.
feraurrn it cr-reni 0.1f 1.716 113:?*70-11 1107.?
tstr-rd iC. tt. or 007. - L.- 7 1:7- 07 r71C.`
? TC721:.17.77????1.- V- --in -Dr' 6..
t?!. 6".- ?71-- ?
nahr.:zset-z.. z : . rid
tv s, .
07:,1?11.117- 0. er 7.1".7
, I
'Cr-: 'V ? _ ? 1??
i? 7 ? ? 'r'-'7,?-
0,7",,V;1: o S:7711467.. 1E.:it"ri
tc; or.
at at: 0077F,?.-Lit???. 6.71?71: 11,:ii? peer
07 16 tilar.:::-ec tr r.irrietr:Jrir
tsiurE.V.:6077 currer?tat
or.rat-ran!-. Vw au:r c:
tn. DC: ant /W..- 7771
la,: r pis-e
catuter ob.tra:upr. or: tn-
Premier: to ensure reperuni c sur.n mis-
ters tz- tionamir tees Tn. Presider:"
anoint" astanius: procedures tor resiev
aria:: the Etrecutiee brannt or truelove/ire-
actrvrties that may have been Glees: and Jo,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP90G00152R000400550025-9
?iii*L4,1,2a.agsapagataistatAabgaikabrAmombitaa4.-?,42asa4altioassiiiimsww,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP90G00152R000400550025-9
ietyrs
statogibartmagsr .--441111111.011100MINIMINORM =AIM
Wirdatlanl=
hiPoriing
whim a It
ore reascomble arawnils to lmiiseelin
&AM, was a Malthus et Cho Constketiss.
11111111114R or aksootIve man ot the WWI
Stem The Presidia should astabibb
endures ter the reporting of eithities atm,
mined to be identfieent Intelligence Mama
The sorrow provision requires the report-
ing ef an Illegal activitY or ilitnincitnt fail-
ure "la s timely fashion- This language b
deleted because a( Its ambiguity. The intent
b that the committees should be notified
Immediately whenever a determination k
made -under procedures established by the
President in consultation with the intelli-
gence committees-
Another difference from existing law b
MIL the requirement to report illegal activi-
ties or significant failures would not be sub-
ject to the prelunbular clauses in the cur-
rent subsection i01(s) which could be inter-
preted as qualifying the statutory obligation
to inform the intelligence committee-
tel-f.f/ Other General Provisions
Subsections (0 through (e) would retain
provisions of existing las. Subsection (0 Is
identical to the current subsection 501(c)
that authorizes the President and the intel-
ligence committee to establish procedures
to carry out their oversight obligations.
Subsection (d) is the same as the current
subsection feel(di that requires the House
and Senate to establiati procedures to pro-
tect the secrecy of informsUor. furnished
under this title and to ensure that each
House and its appropriate committees are
advised promptly of relevant informatior..
Subsection (e) repeats the current subsec-
tion Witt) which makes clear that infornui-
tion may not be withheld from the intelli-
gence committees under this Act on the
grounds that providing the iriformatior to
the intelligence committees would be unau-
thorised disclosure of classified information
or information relating to Intelligence
sources and methods.
Subsection (f) states that the term -intel-
ligence activities,? as used in this section, in-
cludes, but is not limited to. "special activi-
ties," as defined in subsection 503+ dis-
cussed below.
=MOP 503. RAPORITRG INTILLLIGER
AtiiVLiL5 07RER TRAM SPECIAL ACTIVITIES
The new section 502 is intended to be sub-
stantially the same as the current require-
ments of subsections 502( a x 1> and ( 2 ) inso-
far as they apply to intelligence activities
other thae special activities. This distinc-
tior. be:weer, special activities and other in-
telligence activities is discussed monn fully
war, respect to section 503, below
Fully and Currently/ informed
Section 502 would require the Director of
Centro', Intelligence (DCI and the heads of
all oepartments agencies and other entities
of the United States involvedini intelligence
artivitim keep the intelligence- committees
fuliy and currently' informed of al; Intel',
genet activities other than speciol actimies
as defined in subsection 503,e. terid, are
the responsieilizy of, are engages' Ir. by or
are ca-riec otr, for or on benalf of ar.:\ de-
partment. seem:, or entie.; of the Unitec
States inciudine any sigrultin*, anticipated
tntelligen activity. The special procedure
for prior notiee to eight leader= 1r tilt cur'
rent Clause (E., of paragrann would
deletec since E&? intenciecl tc app to
special activities to be governed by section
503. discussed below.
Sectior 502 Liss would provide that ic.
satis:y-ini the obligation to keep thr corn-
cretteee fully and currently informed. the
DCI and the heads of al, departments anc
agenciel arid other entitim of the Uneed
% ant=
4/s isialloa ANNialit i
mot
aatais iho Mari-
am lairsoleAliolioralliont sod, Abe Oos-
illtailt a mass that ipestests ass
disigyaimralW.
Vat Presidgallof Piadtaps
-Subsection (a) would provide statutory au-
thority for the President to authorise the
conduct of spacial activities by department&
agencies or entities of the United Mates
when he determines such activities are nee-
seser7 to support the foreign policy objec-
tives of the United States and are important
to the national security of the United
States. This determination must be set
forth in a "Finding" that meets certain con-
ditions. The importance of this requirement
is underscored by Section 8 of the bill. dis-
cussed later, which prohibits expenditure of
Inn& for We special activity unless and
until such a presidential Finding has been
Saved
The current Presidential approval provi-
sion in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (22
USC 2422) requires a finding by the Presi-
dent -that each such operation is important
to the national security of the United
States" The proposed new subsection,
8034.) would require the President to make
an additional determination that the activi-
ties "are necessary to support the foreign
policy objectives of the United States.'"This
conforms the statute to the Executive
branch definition of "special activities" in
section 11.4(h) of Executive Order 12333
which refers to "activities conducted in sup-
port of national foreign policy objective
abroad." The President should determine
not only that the operation is important to
national security, but also that it is consist-
ent with and in furtherance of established
U.S. foreign policy objectives.
In addition to reflecting these presidential
determinations, Findings must meet five
conditions. First, paragraph 503( a X 1) would
require that each Finding be in writing.
unless immediate action is required of the
United States and time does not permit the
preparation of a written Finding, in which
Special activities (or covert actions) raise case a written record of the President's deci-
fundamentally different policy issues from sion would have to be contemporaneously'
Intelligence other U.S. activities because made and reduced to a written Finding SE
they are an instrument of foreign policy. soon as possible but in no event more than
Indeed, constitutional authorities draw a 48 hours after the decision IS made. This re-
distinction between Congressional power to quirement should prevent a President's sub-
restrict the gathering of information which ordinate from tater claiming to have re-
may impair the President's ability to use ceived oral authorization without further
diplomatic. military. and intelugence organi- substantiation than the subordinate's un
nations as his "eyes and ears.' and Congres- documented assertion_ It is also consistent
Lions) power to regulate covert action that with the President's current policy of re-
goes beyond information gathering. There is tanning written Findings
little support for the view that such special Second. paragraph 503!aX2i would restate
activities are an exclusive Presidential func- emphatically the current lega; ban on retr.
n. o-
tio Congress has the constitutional power active Findinge. It would provide that a
to refuse to appropriate funds to carry out Finding may not authorize or sanction spe-
specia activities and may impost conditions cial activities. Of any aspects of such active.
or the use of any funds appropriated for ties which have ab-eady occurred. This is
such purposes. alsc consistent with the President curt-en;
Under current law, however. the Co:47m- policy'.
sionaf mandate is ambiguous confusing and Third. paragraph 503,,s, Cl; would require
incomplete There is no express statutory true eaeh Finding spectfy eacr, and ever:.
authorma Lion for specie: activities: the re- department, agence or entity of the United
quirement for Presidential approva. of spf-- States Government authorizec to fund or
cis) activities applies only to the Ci-e-. and otnerwise participate in any way in the sot-
Presidential approval procedures are not cis.: activities authorized in the Finding:.
specified. There le a question whetner Con- True requirement is consistent with section
griess has intended that the Presider:: have 1.8,e' of Executive Order 12133 which states
authority to conduct special activities which that no agency except the CIA in peacetim,
are inconsistent with or contrary' to other may conduct any Special activit3 -unless thc
statutes Tne statutory reeueeemente for in. President determines that anotner ageric
forming the intelligence committees of see- more likely to achieve' a particular On.iet ?
ma) activities are subject Le- misinterprets. Live. '
tiori. and the scope of activities covered t* Fourth. paragrapn 50:ea e- 4' would requite
the law is undefined. This lair, seeht te that each Finding specify in 1'mm-dune.:
remedy these deficiencies so that covert as proceduresto be established. any thiii.
IMO is igthis disk agate* sr
lielstabl. sae aSkill la resesoted fir Aber of
aatollioune esumaktems la ardor to
411Stri out -as authorised gesponidallities.
This requirement Is subject to the providoe
ior protection of seneltive iotellisenee
SWUM and methods. discussed below.
Protection or Sensitive Sources sad Methods
-The obligation to keep the Intelligence
committees fully and currently informed
under this section is to be carried out with
due regard for the protection of classified
-information relating to sensitive intelligence
.
sources and methods. This provision is Kind-
hi to the second preambular clause in the
current subsection 501(a) which Imposes
duties -to the extent consistent with due
regard for the protection from unauthorized
disclosure of classified Information e.nd in-
formation relating to intelligence sources
and methods" The proposed new language
more aodurately reflects and Is intended to
have the same meaning as the legislative
history of the similar prearnbuiar clause in
existing law.
The first preambular clause in the current
subsection 501(a) would be deleted. It im-
poses obligations "(tio the extent consistent
with all applicable authorities and duties.
including those conferred upon the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the Govern-
ment." This clause creases unnecessary am-
biguity in the law, because it has been inter-
preted by some as Congressional acknowl-
edgement of an undefined constitutional au-
thority of the Executive branch to disregard
the statutory obligations. Recent experience
Indicates that legislation oualifYing its
terms by reference to the President's consti-
tutional authorities may leave doubt as to
the will of Congress and thus Invite evasion.
Legitimate Executive branch concerns are
adequately met by the provision for due
regard for protection of sensitive intelli-
gence sources and methods, discussed above
SECTION 503. APPROVING AND REPORTING
SPNCIAL ACTIVITIES
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP90G00152R000400550025-9 111.111111111111111M
?iii*L4,1,2a.agsapagataistatAabgaikabrAmombitaa4.-?,42asa4altioassiiiimsww,
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP90G00152R000400550025-9
ietyrs
statogibartmagsr .--441111111.011100MINIMINORM =AIM
Wirdatlanl=
hiPoriing
whim a It
ore reascomble arawnils to lmiiseelin
&AM, was a Malthus et Cho Constketiss.
11111111114R or aksootIve man ot the WWI
Stem The Presidia should astabibb
endures ter the reporting of eithities atm,
mined to be identfieent Intelligence Mama
The sorrow provision requires the report-
ing ef an Illegal activitY or ilitnincitnt fail-
ure "la s timely fashion- This language b
deleted because a( Its ambiguity. The intent
b that the committees should be notified
Immediately whenever a determination k
made -under procedures established by the
President in consultation with the intelli-
gence committees-
Another difference from existing law b
MIL the requirement to report illegal activi-
ties or significant failures would not be sub-
ject to the prelunbular clauses in the cur-
rent subsection i01(s) which could be inter-
preted as qualifying the statutory obligation
to inform the intelligence committee-
tel-f.f/ Other General Provisions
Subsections (0 through (e) would retain
provisions of existing las. Subsection (0 Is
identical to the current subsection 501(c)
that authorizes the President and the intel-
ligence committee to establish procedures
to carry out their oversight obligations.
Subsection (d) is the same as the current
subsection feel(di that requires the House
and Senate to establiati procedures to pro-
tect the secrecy of informsUor. furnished
under this title and to ensure that each
House and its appropriate committees are
advised promptly of relevant informatior..
Subsection (e) repeats the current subsec-
tion Witt) which makes clear that infornui-
tion may not be withheld from the intelli-
gence committees under this Act on the
grounds that providing the iriformatior to
the intelligence committees would be unau-
thorised disclosure of classified information
or information relating to Intelligence
sources and methods.
Subsection (f) states that the term -intel-
ligence activities,? as used in this section, in-
cludes, but is not limited to. "special activi-
ties," as defined in subsection 503+ dis-
cussed below.
=MOP 503. RAPORITRG INTILLLIGER
AtiiVLiL5 07RER TRAM SPECIAL ACTIVITIES
The new section 502 is intended to be sub-
stantially the same as the current require-
ments of subsections 502( a x 1> and ( 2 ) inso-
far as they apply to intelligence activities
other thae special activities. This distinc-
tior. be:weer, special activities and other in-
telligence activities is discussed monn fully
war, respect to section 503, below
Fully and Currently/ informed
Section 502 would require the Director of
Centro', Intelligence (DCI and the heads of
all oepartments agencies and other entities
of the United States involvedini intelligence
artivitim keep the intelligence- committees
fuliy and currently' informed of al; Intel',
genet activities other than speciol actimies
as defined in subsection 503,e. terid, are
the responsieilizy of, are engages' Ir. by or
are ca-riec otr, for or on benalf of ar.:\ de-
partment. seem:, or entie.; of the Unitec
States inciudine any sigrultin*, anticipated
tntelligen activity. The special procedure
for prior notiee to eight leader= 1r tilt cur'
rent Clause (E., of paragrann would
deletec since E&? intenciecl tc app to
special activities to be governed by section
503. discussed below.
Sectior 502 Liss would provide that ic.
satis:y-ini the obligation to keep thr corn-
cretteee fully and currently informed. the
DCI and the heads of al, departments anc
agenciel arid other entitim of the Uneed
% ant=
4/s isialloa ANNialit i
mot
aatais iho Mari-
am lairsoleAliolioralliont sod, Abe Oos-
illtailt a mass that ipestests ass
disigyaimralW.
Vat Presidgallof Piadtaps
-Subsection (a) would provide statutory au-
thority for the President to authorise the
conduct of spacial activities by department&
agencies or entities of the United Mates
when he determines such activities are nee-
seser7 to support the foreign policy objec-
tives of the United States and are important
to the national security of the United
States. This determination must be set
forth in a "Finding" that meets certain con-
ditions. The importance of this requirement
is underscored by Section 8 of the bill. dis-
cussed later, which prohibits expenditure of
Inn& for We special activity unless and
until such a presidential Finding has been
Saved
The current Presidential approval provi-
sion in the Hughes-Ryan Amendment (22
USC 2422) requires a finding by the Presi-
dent -that each such operation is important
to the national security of the United
States" The proposed new subsection,
8034.) would require the President to make
an additional determination that the activi-
ties "are necessary to support the foreign
policy objectives of the United States.'"This
conforms the statute to the Executive
branch definition of "special activities" in
section 11.4(h) of Executive Order 12333
which refers to "activities conducted in sup-
port of national foreign policy objective
abroad." The President should determine
not only that the operation is important to
national security, but also that it is consist-
ent with and in furtherance of established
U.S. foreign policy objectives.
In addition to reflecting these presidential
determinations, Findings must meet five
conditions. First, paragraph 503( a X 1) would
require that each Finding be in writing.
unless immediate action is required of the
United States and time does not permit the
preparation of a written Finding, in which
Special activities (or covert actions) raise case a written record of the President's deci-
fundamentally different policy issues from sion would have to be contemporaneously'
Intelligence other U.S. activities because made and reduced to a written Finding SE
they are an instrument of foreign policy. soon as possible but in no event more than
Indeed, constitutional authorities draw a 48 hours after the decision IS made. This re-
distinction between Congressional power to quirement should prevent a President's sub-
restrict the gathering of information which ordinate from tater claiming to have re-
may impair the President's ability to use ceived oral authorization without further
diplomatic. military. and intelugence organi- substantiation than the subordinate's un
nations as his "eyes and ears.' and Congres- documented assertion_ It is also consistent
Lions) power to regulate covert action that with the President's current policy of re-
goes beyond information gathering. There is tanning written Findings
little support for the view that such special Second. paragraph 503!aX2i would restate
activities are an exclusive Presidential func- emphatically the current lega; ban on retr.
n. o-
tio Congress has the constitutional power active Findinge. It would provide that a
to refuse to appropriate funds to carry out Finding may not authorize or sanction spe-
specia activities and may impost conditions cial activities. Of any aspects of such active.
or the use of any funds appropriated for ties which have ab-eady occurred. This is
such purposes. alsc consistent with the President curt-en;
Under current law, however. the Co:47m- policy'.
sionaf mandate is ambiguous confusing and Third. paragraph 503,,s, Cl; would require
incomplete There is no express statutory true eaeh Finding spectfy eacr, and ever:.
authorma Lion for specie: activities: the re- department, agence or entity of the United
quirement for Presidential approva. of spf-- States Government authorizec to fund or
cis) activities applies only to the Ci-e-. and otnerwise participate in any way in the sot-
Presidential approval procedures are not cis.: activities authorized in the Finding:.
specified. There le a question whetner Con- True requirement is consistent with section
griess has intended that the Presider:: have 1.8,e' of Executive Order 12133 which states
authority to conduct special activities which that no agency except the CIA in peacetim,
are inconsistent with or contrary' to other may conduct any Special activit3 -unless thc
statutes Tne statutory reeueeemente for in. President determines that anotner ageric
forming the intelligence committees of see- more likely to achieve' a particular On.iet ?
ma) activities are subject Le- misinterprets. Live. '
tiori. and the scope of activities covered t* Fourth. paragrapn 50:ea e- 4' would requite
the law is undefined. This lair, seeht te that each Finding specify in 1'mm-dune.:
remedy these deficiencies so that covert as proceduresto be established. any thiii.
IMO is igthis disk agate* sr
lielstabl. sae aSkill la resesoted fir Aber of
aatollioune esumaktems la ardor to
411Stri out -as authorised gesponidallities.
This requirement Is subject to the providoe
ior protection of seneltive iotellisenee
SWUM and methods. discussed below.
Protection or Sensitive Sources sad Methods
-The obligation to keep the Intelligence
committees fully and currently informed
under this section is to be carried out with
due regard for the protection of classified
-information relating to sensitive intelligence
.
sources and methods. This provision is Kind-
hi to the second preambular clause in the
current subsection 501(a) which Imposes
duties -to the extent consistent with due
regard for the protection from unauthorized
disclosure of classified Information e.nd in-
formation relating to intelligence sources
and methods" The proposed new language
more aodurately reflects and Is intended to
have the same meaning as the legislative
history of the similar prearnbuiar clause in
existing law.
The first preambular clause in the current
subsection 501(a) would be deleted. It im-
poses obligations "(tio the extent consistent
with all applicable authorities and duties.
including those conferred upon the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the Govern-
ment." This clause creases unnecessary am-
biguity in the law, because it has been inter-
preted by some as Congressional acknowl-
edgement of an undefined constitutional au-
thority of the Executive branch to disregard
the statutory obligations. Recent experience
Indicates that legislation oualifYing its
terms by reference to the President's consti-
tutional authorities may leave doubt as to
the will of Congress and thus Invite evasion.
Legitimate Executive branch concerns are
adequately met by the provision for due
regard for protection of sensitive intelli-
gence sources and methods, discussed above
SECTION 503. APPROVING AND REPORTING
SPNCIAL ACTIVITIES
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The exclusion of VA sattetties to tolled
necessary intelligence Is Intended to cover
all activities of the United States dovern-
sent undertaken for the purpose of obtain-
Irst intelligence necesearr tar the whomf
asourIty of the United Staten While such
activities clearly require oversignt by the
Congress. they are excluded from the defini-
tion of -special 'Latrines-. inasmuch as they
are subject to separate authorisation and
oversight. and often do DM require specific
approval by the President. This exclusion
reiterates the lonnetandmg whey contained
in the Surtun-Ityar. amendment (94 U.S.C.
3422) (1074) and In subsequent lexecuure
*niers,
The exclusion of mile-Ley operatione COO-
darted by the armed fornes of the United
Seater and subject to the War Powers Raw-
)unon (be U.S.C. lie4l-154p .w nes, appear
trig In neither statute or Executive order
heretofore. The purpose of this exclusion is
to clerily a problem of Interpretation
namely. when is a militery operation under-
taken by the United States reportable as a
'special activity- or covert action? The defi-
nition sets forth a clear dividtr.g line: if the
military operateon concerried a carried out
covertly be U.S. military force& and it is not
required to DE reported to the Congress
under the War Pos-en Resolution. thee it Is
? -spec:62 'entity- whit:: Is reportable to
the intellirence committees under this stat-
ute. The exclusion would not apply to
covert sumistance given by the Vallee States
to the military forces, or to support the
operanon.t. of a then parte. either
governmental or to private entities
The third area excluded from the define
tion of special activities is diplomatic activi-
ties carried ou! by the Department of State
or persons otherwier acting pursuant to the
authority of the Pr *lent. The represents
a modification of tl 3 comparable exclusion
In Executive order 1li333. Although most
diplomatic activities ref the United States
are publicly acknowledged. it k recognized
that there are many diplomatic contacte
anti delibemttor.s which are necessarily
genre: The der:re:eon of specie: activitin
eenucies these so tong as the' ert
uncle:taken by the liepartrnent of Si.v.e or
tY persons?either invernmern officien or
pm ere cittzere?wh I are riming pursuant le
thr authority of the eresidene It would not
extiude clution.erec a tteraes irtuct are car
nee ou: by persons a?to are not ernenyeee
of tee Depseemen c S'Atf--eittie!- govern
LDe..nz.h.: pnv--livnIISE authority to car
Del sun arteetin or behelf of the Unite.:
ree. slreatly esuinitshed by taw or
L''-t--t: ye- tearee. neee
foer.r. see fins.. nee: exciunn iron
ten de% eaten of avenues En- 11/1.11i-
11?-` C' tin eireiertrrvt?ZU of A:51'e* or federn
Js. n) enrereeeen: .!"1';:lf.:.7 SDI( 'rD
0'
iteree. geernreerne Tee exteusen isneer
nee referee- ree re- te tav nor EAL,C;1'..11,.
oreee bee:enter.. his ineernoratiot. here e
ire-ere:en te- cierey a ercrben. of intereren
Lao:. wnicr. 1w eristet une-r the currere
freineeeere ac ertlw,..e.:To.n: ar
LB-111f:: -.11101`-n.6.1f21 C-01Tr:;:. b: &oven
mee: agencier teresid, tee lee;
snecue aree17.1f,:' Tie- tcrrrwr.
renuenet r the propose,:
exciude essestance provion. co,.ertis,
tr trert countren t, lee. tau erearmmere
inerticen. It WouIC no: exciuor las enforce-
liesterseitir 4011.1110 Void
lor 111.1011itirlbsIMILOVIIIIIMMES
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ACTOWITISS
Seaton 3 of the KO redetignaLes section
11102 of the liatatinal Sematty dot of OWL
which soneenu the funding of intelligsnee
bethities. as section itie of the Act and adds
a new subsection (di which deals with the
Lae of funds for special activities.
This provision is intended to carry tw-
ined and expand the limitation currently
contained In 32 U.S.C. 2422 (the Hughes-
Ryall Amendment), which would be re-
pealed by- Section I of the bill The Hughes-
Ryan amendment restricts the use of funds
alitrPrePrIatece to CIA to may out iliCtions
outside- the?United States "other than the
colleceion of necessary inielhgenoe's. tiniest
and wen/ the President had determined that
such actions were Important to the national
security
Section 504(d would similarly provide
that appropriated funds could not be es?
pended for special activities until the Presi-
dent bad signed, or otherwke approved, a
lending authorising such activities. but It
would expand this limitation to cover the
Jun& appropriated for any department.
agency. or entity of the Government. not
solely MA. It would also corer non-appro-
priated funds which are available to such
elementm from any source. over which the
agency involved exercise: eiontrot These
alight include funds offered or provided by
third mum. funds produced as a result of
Intelligence activities the. proprietaries). or-
funds originally appropriated for an agency
other than the agency who wither to
expend the funds The limitation contained
in section 504'.d) would also apply whether
or not the agency concerned actually came
into pa tori of the fun& at tame. So long
as the agency concerned had the ability to
direct such funds be expended by third par-
ties?governmental or private?tt could not
do so until a presidential ?incline had been
signed. or otherwise approved. in socordance
sem the reouiremente of section
SP.C*.TION 4. ILEDESIGWATION Or i="110) &Oa Cl?
1.TIO1eA1 EXCtili.ITT 41C7 OF 1947
SVC.110!". 4 redenenata secteer SCZ of the
natereea'. et-re:len Act of IP47 as section 50e.
ti ) ciartfc_rn. to. to' changes made by the bil..
Tien or rxr Pens renere Lerrei, or New
GrIDC...12M- TOP COrrET OPELATIONS
Ron. D4rIn L BOR.E...
Chairman Senate- Seim:: Committee on In-
telligence. US, Senate. Washinrtore DC.
cc The lionorab:t Low: Stores arto ter
liononner her27. .3. Rept
DIJJ CliA/R24AN boaxic ln my Idarct 31
lcer messen- U Core:inn. 1 repartee or
those sten- 1 hd taker. and frenenec Ic
neer tr t ree.orr_mencia!ionl c`
try Frescen a Sr.f?cle- Review enerd These-
incluciet 6 comprehensive review of exer:-
tree branch procedures coe....rrang Presenie
use approve ant nettle:anon to Congress in
COVr.:0",-kCIJOL programs?or se-called spent.
lh my meagt. 1 noted that the reforms
and changes I hat made and would roas.e.-
-are evidencls of my determine:eon to return
to pre.per proectures corks:tits:Am.
with the- Congress '
IL the regard, IFrans Cerium. has pre-
sented it- nan the suggestiont developed by
'-nn ? 7:1 a'ne - t
ese eng 1.14-aeler
eiii Innen e
le Teem . ?
agillailliairaillia011414
IIIMegO/117.
'Odd I IltaAve to toot wOb pea
bra of al the two eisenzatttsse to attlam IL We
APO beamed whim we hove Oa egetieramiliein
eionfor in advance about batiortant decision'
attectAng our national see-min.
Stecifically. I want to exPreol lne silent:int
for the following key colaccpte recommend-
ed by the committee:
1. Except hi cam of extreme easement,
all national secw-ity -findings- should be
writing If an oral directive it necessary. a
record should be made eorztensporaneosali
and the lending reduced to writing and
signed by the Preadent as soon as poesibit,
but in no event more than two working days
thereafter. All findings wil: be made avai,
able to members of the Plat-lona: Eiecurit3
Council (N.S.C.1.
2. Plc Plrentle should reteoectirely author
ize or sanction a special activity
1. If the President directs arn areney or
person: outside of the C.I.A or tractittonel
intelligrenm agencies to conduct a speret ac-
tivity, all applicable procedures tor approval
of a fueling and notifinatioe to Congress
Abel] &POLY to sucb agency or pereone
4_ The intelligence committees should be
appropriately informed of participation of
any Government agencies private parties..
or other countries Involved to assist-int with
sPee1831. ThelletretvishUeld be a regular and periodic
review of all ongoing special activities bat
by the intelligence ocannettees arid by th'
le..S.0 The reales should be made to deter-
mine whether each such activity is conteree
int to serve the purpose for which It a-as in-
stituted Findings should terminate or
-sunset- at periodic intervals unless the
President, by appropriate actiore continues
them hi force.
I believe we earmot conduce art effeethee
Pecan= of aPeceal activities without the Oce-
operation and support of Congress. affec-
tive consultation with the intelligence com-
mittees is erisenLial. and I am determined to
ensure t.hat these committees can discharge-
their statutore responsibilities P. this area,
in aE but the mos: exeeritione: eteetlre
stances timely motif:trance. to Congrec-
under Section 501(b) of 1.1-; national Sectie
ty ac-.. of 1P4". as amen nee no! be 0,-
layed beyond two worsen/ wee 0' the- tre
of a specie: activity. VI nee I believe
that the current statutc7-3 frameworl: n-
liCif:glIELL&. nee exettaiVe bro.:. Preentem
neverthelen ere dent-Bee le ensure the:
ter spin: of the la, e fuer urenemented
Accordingly 1 fl6VE EILT-Pelfe in"., staff u,
craft for my SignaL.11TE Cif .:-.1:!VF 1:10C1.1121/e/IL--
to anteeme.r.: aperepnatee tne principle,
set lone ut ehls letter
Whet Let Presiaent mus: renein tar flex.
ben: as Commende: ir C1:!f.f and chief e'-
en:I:AveU exercise treee ceneenreense
neeesene, z: sale-en:en tne men
ent !If cinzere mextreten nonsteneicr, an:
netifieneen is ane an, be the fur pobey
the. Admit-uneaten
Seeceree
Noe fen Reneen
? Mr. BENTSEN Mr. President I air
pleased today to join me colleagues in
introducing the `?lni.eiligence Over
sight Act of 188'7." Tru: iegislation
continue:, the pattern in statutor-:.
strengtnening of the InVIngenee over-
sight process that was established 4(1
tommlommiellalli1111111111111111111111
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years Igo ler Me Walked fleellitlyMi
-of Int fa the ensulng yesei. Chains
bas enacted ether ksklaticii tbis
area. Including most recently-the Por-
elm n InteMgenoe Surrealism* Act of
1978. the Intelligence Oversight Act of
1990, and the intelligence Identities
Protection Act of 1982. Each of these
pieces of legislation responded to a re-
enurement that was ioentified at the
time, ranging from the need to
strengthen our counterintelligence ca-
pabilities in the first instance to a life-
and-death situation where CIA agents'
icientities were being publicly revealed
in tile past. The legislation we are in-
troducing today, too, grows out of our
own recent experience.
One of the lessons that we learned
during the investigation of the Iranian
arms sales and diversion of profits to
the Contras is that current oversight
statutes particularly in the area of
coven action reporting are sunply not
specific enough Incieed. it had become
obvious during the preliminary investi-
gation conducted by the Select Com-
mittee on Intelligence late last year
that there were gaps and loopholes in
our oversight laws and that there were
some individuals within the executive
branch who exploited these loopholes
BF a means of avoiding congressional
notification of a coven operation.
To be specific, there is currently a
statutory reouirement that the over-
sight committees of Congress be noti-
fied in advance of covert actions. or
must be notified "in a timely fashion"
after the fact. This loophole of
-timely fashion" was broad enough to
allow the administration not to report
the Iranian arms sales for some 18
months. I doubt they would have re-
ported them even then. except that a
small newspaper in the Middle East
broke the story in November of last
year.
The legislation that we are introduc-
ing today closes that loophole by re-
f:1111'1rP that the President provide
written notificatior, to the Oversight
CorrintIttees of the Congress within for
46 nor- after he has authorized a
covert action If he believes that the
action, is too sensitive to reveal to the
entire memoership of the Intelligence
Committees he would oe autnonzed
to limn notification to the chairmen
anc ranking members of those com-
mittees the majority and 2/11110rM
ieaders of the Senate and the Speaker
arc minority- leader of the House No-
tification. of tnese eight mdividuals
II:it:it: insure that we (ie nol nave an ?
other situation vthere Our coun:rNis
ern Dart: f.?C or. B COU:SF-O actio r..Witn
potential* grave foreign D0i1C.
Ch110:1-c without notifying tne Congress
that such was about to Df done
Unlike present Asa.. which does no:
require Presidential approvit o7
covert activities conciucted by agencies
other than the CIA. tnis legislation
arselir ou: for the firs-. time trial the
Y'resioent mar: personally approve
each covert action o7 -special activ,
ty.' as they are sometimes called. Sc.
VII Ilene
"has
be ed ft. our .
,reguires that a Presidential finding:he
In initial( and that a copy of each
finding must be transmitted to the In-
telligence Committees wiihin 48 hours
after lila signed. Retroactive findings
such as were used in the Iran arms
Wes would be prohibited.
In other sections, this legislation
would spell out for the first time the
statutory power of the President to
authorize covert actions. It also pro-
vides that no finding which authorizes
a covert action can operate contrary to
statute and that no funds can be used
for a covert action unless there is a
finding. Taken together, it seems to
me that these requirements represent
? reasonable approach to the problem
of regaining control over covert ac-
tions. while at the same time not in
any way harming or endangering our
Nation's ability to conduct suck) oper-
ations.
Mr. President, I would like to close
this statement on a more personal
note. I have been a member of the
Select Committee on Intelligence for
almost 7 years now, In tune of service
on the committee 1 am the senior
member on the Democratic side.
During these years it has been my
privilege to have had weekly, arid
sometimes aimost daily, contact with
the men and women of our Nation's
intelligence services. The work that
they do for Our country is absolutely
invaluable, and many of them routine-
ly put their byes on the line with little
or no public recognition.
Indeed, when public recognition does
occur, it can sometimes mean death, as
in the case of William Buckley who
was CIA station chief in Beirut. Buck-
ley was taken hostage. tortured. and
killed because of what he was doing
for his country?our country. There
are similar men and women all over
the world doing their jobs in. silence
and without public praise. In the
lobby of the CIA heaciouarters build-
ing in Langley-, VA. tnere are rows of
gold stars carved into trie wal Each of
those stars represents a CIA empioyee
who was killed serving tur country. Be-
neath the stars is a Cusplay case in
which has beer placed an open book.
There are names in the boor repre-
senting most of the stars on Ulf waL
but there are Plans lines as weL. br
some of these CLA, employees- sttil
cannot be- publicly oentthed even 3,5
years later
Mu. President.. I end with these ser,
laments DeCaUSe I wan'. to mace- it
clear that in sponsoring this legisis-
tion today. I am no, aiming it at toe
men and women of the intelligence
commurat. i am not criticizing trssrc
for the job they ch for us each and
every day No. I arn not introducing
this legislation, as a lara of strengthen-
ing toe oversight process continuing
the part-err of the past 40 years. and
maiting our Nation's partnership be.
tween the legisiative and executive
=Om Ibb Wm a dresser Ube
VIM product/vs one*
...41tr..21131tICOW1013. Kr. 'President.
;assists of 'recent months have high-
lighted She importance of centrelines-
-el oversight if intelligence activities.
The oversight function, performed by
the two Select Intelligence Commit-
tees?one in the House and one Ext the
Senate?is the means by which this de-
mocracy reconciles the people's right
to know with the intelligence agencies
need for secrecy.
Under existing law the intelligence
agencies are obliged to keep the two
communities currently informed of
significant intelligence activities, in-
cluding covert action. However. amoi-
guities inherent in existing statutes
were dramatically highlighted during
the recently concluoed congressional
investigation of the lran-Contra affair.
It is important that these ambiguities
are eliminated so that the ground
rules are clearly uncterstood in both
the Executive and the Congress and
the temptation to look for loopholes is
reduced.
As an outgrowth of painstaking ne-
gotiations on these issues between the
staffs of the Senate Intelligence Corn-.
munity and the National Security
Council, the committee sent a letter
to the President's National SecuritS
Adviser. The legislation closely follows
the provisions contained in that letter.
This bill does not impose new and
more onerous burdens upon the intel-
ligence agencies. Rather, it clarifies
and rationalizes existing last. For ex-
ample, this bill will, for the first time,
explicitly empower the President to
authorize covert actions and establish
a Presidential "finding" as the author-
izing document.
I am pleased to join with my distin-
guished colleague from Maine, the vice
chairman of the Senate Select Com-
mit-tee on Intelligence, in cosponsoring
this legislation.
By Mr. INOLTYE for himself.
. EVANS . Mr. BY-sr Mr.
CRANSTON Mr . SIMPSON . Mr.
DzCoricipri Mr. Dual)! Cat Mr.
DASCIL,E Mr. lit 7}...E OW SE: Mr.
MCCAIN Mr. BIN GAM.AN Mr
BoscErwrrz Mr. Coortrzfts Mr.
CONTRAE Mr. Dolizzycl M.7
GORE. Mr. Gramic Mr. larvis.
MATSUN A GA Mr. Mi-
Rain M.r. RIEGLE Mr. ROCE.E
Mr R 7151CL_N M. SE AJ -
POLL SiLN-r-DEL M. Sim
Mu V IP.Th Mr. BOREN /Mt
Mr. ?
S. 1722. A bill to authorize the estab-
lisrunem of the Nations. 'Museum of
the American Indian lieye Pouncia.
tion within the Smithsonian Institu-
tion. and to establish a memorial to
the American Indians an: for other
purposes lc* unanunou, consent re-
f errec jointly to the Committee or
Rules and Admintscra.00n and the
Select Committee on Inchari Affairs.
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