CALL ON PRIME MINISTER LEE BY SENATOR GOLDWATER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000700900102-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 102
• Publication Date: January 10, 1986
• Content Type: CABLE

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PP RUEAIIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
STU6274
PP RUEHC
DE RUEHGP #0395/01 0100715
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
P 100654Z JAN 86
FM AMEMBASSY SINGAPORE
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHOC PRIORITY 5628
INFO RUMTBK/AMEMBASSY BANGKOK 0300
RUEHCR/AMEMBASSY BANDAR SERI BEGAWAN 1082
RUEHJA/AMEMBASSY JAKARTA 8852
RUEHKL/AMEMBASSY KUALA LUMPUR 9212
RUEHML/AMEMBASSY MANILA 4974
RUEHIN/AIT TAIPEI
BT
O " ` I D 6 -SINGAPORE 00395
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP (GOLDWATER, BARRY M.); PGOV, RP, TW, MASS
SUBJECT: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER LEE BY SENATOR GOLDWATER
2. SUMMARY. DURING SENATOR GOLDWATER'S CALL ON PRIME
MINISTER LEE KUAN YEW JANUARY 9, THE MAIN TOPICS
DISCUSSED WERE THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES,
PROSPECTS FOR TAIWAN, AND (BRIEFLY) REGIONAL SECURITY
CONSIDERATIONS. LEE CREDITED THE BRITISH POLICY OF
GRADUAL WITHDRAWAL FROM THE REGION AND THE US INTER-
VENTION IN VIETNAM WITH HELPING TO MAKE SINGAPORE'S
SUCCESS POSSIBLE. IN DISCUSSING THE PHILIPPINES, LEE
BLUNTLY CHARACTERIZED MARCOS AS HAVING LOST THE
ABILITY TO SOLVE THE PROBLEMS CONFRONTING THAT COUNTRY,
MANY OF WHICH WERE OF HIS OWN MAKING. HE CITED THE
WRITINGS OF AUSTRALIAN JOURNALIST DENNIS WARNER TO
DEMONSTRATE THE DEGREE TO WHICH THE NEW PEOPLE'S ARMY
(NPA) HAD EXPANDED ITS CONTROL. HE DID NOT CONSIDER
THE PHILIPPINE SITUATION COMPARABLE TO THAT IN IRAN,
SINCE MARCOS RETAINED GREAT POWER BUT WAS NOT USING
IT TO GOOD PURPOSE. SENATOR GOLDWATER NOTED HIS DIS-
SATISFACTION WITH US TREATMENT OF TAIWAN AND SAID HE
INTENDED TO URGE THE PRESIDENT TO SELL MORE MODERN
MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO TAIWAN. LEE FELT THAT WHILE
TAIWAN'S FUTURE WAS NOT ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON FACTORS
UNDER ITS OWN CONTROL, THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO
KEEP THE ECONOMY GOING AND TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE
BETWEEN THE TAIWANESE AND MAINLANDERS. BOTH AGREED
THAT PRESIDENT CHIANG CHING-KUO HAD MOVED EFFECTIVELY
TO INTEGRATE TAIWANESE INTO THE CENTRAL ESTABLISHMENT.
IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR GOLDWATER'S COMMENT ON THE
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STRATEGIC IMPORTANCE OF THE STRAIT OF MALACCA AND
THE INDIAN OCEAN, LEE OBSERVED THAT THE REGION WAS
NOT AS PEACEFUL AS IT SOMETIMES SEEMED TO BE. HE
AGAIN COMPLIMENTED THE BRITISH ON THE INTELLIGENCE
WITH WHICH THEY HAD HANDLED THEIR WITHDRAWAL, SUCH
AS BY LETTING THE US INTO DIEGO GARCIA. LEE EXPRESSED
ADMIRATION FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN BUT SAW TOUGH TIMES
AHEAD. NOTING THAT SINGAPORE'S ECONOMIC SUCCCESS
HAD MADE IT MORE DEPENDENT ON EXTERNAL FACTORS, LEE
FELT THE WORLD NEEDED REGIONAL SERVICE CENTERS LIKE
SINGAPORE. END SUMMARY.
3. SENATOR BARRY GOLDWATER, ACCOMPANIED BY LT.
GENERAL (RET) WILLIAM QUINN AND THE AMBASSADOR,
CALLED ON PRIME MINISTER LEE KUAN YEW AT THE ISTANA
JANUARY 9. MISS KANG SIEW KHENG, MFA COUNTRY OFFICER
FOR THE UNITED STATES, SAT IN AS NOTE TAKER ON THE
SINGAPORE SIDE.
4. AFTER NOTING THAT THIS WAS HIS FIRST VISIT TO
SINGAPORE, SENATOR GOLDWATER COMPLIMENTED THE PRIME
MINISTER ON WHAT HE HAD ACCOMPLISHED. THE PRIME
MINISTER REPLIED THAT THIS WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN
POSSIBLE IF OTHER FUNDAMENTAL FORCES HAD NOT BEEN
AT WORK. THESE INCLUDED: (1) THE DELIBERATE
BRITISH POLICY OF GRADUALLY REMOVING ITS FORCES FROM
SINGAPORE, WHICH GAVE THE COUNTRY TIME TO ADJUST;
AND (2) THE US INTERVENTION IN VIETNAM, WITHOUT
WHICH THE REGION4MIGHT HAVE FALLEN.
5. SENATOR GOLDWATER COMMENTED THAT WHILE IT MIGHT
NOT BE POPULAR TO SAY THIS IN SOME QUARTERS, AFTER
TAKING ITS STAND IN VIETNAM, THE UNITED STATES HAD
NOT LET IT BE SUCCESSFUL. PM LEE SAID THAT THERE
COULD BE A BIG DEBATE ON THAT QUESTION. SENATOR
GOLDWATER SAID THAT IN FACT THE DEBATE HAD ALMOST
ENDED. HE FELT STRONGLY THAT THE US CONCEPT OF
CIVILIAN CONTROL OVER THE MILITARY WAS OKAY IN PEACE
TIME, BUT IN WAR THE MAN IN UNIFORM SHOULD BE LEFT
ALONE. PICKING UP ON THIS LAST POINT, PM LEE COM-
MENTED THAT IF MRS. THATCHER HAD INTERFERED WITH HER
ADMIRALS, THE WAR IN THE FALKLANDS MIGHT HAVE BEEN
LOST AND GENERAL GALTIERI MIGHT STILL BE IN CHARGE
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP (GOLDWATER, BARRY M.), PGOV, RP, TW, MASS
SUBJECT: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER LEE BY SENATOR GOLDWATER
6. TURNING TO THE PHILIPPINES, SENATOR GOLDWATER
SAID THAT HE KNEW PRESIDENT MARCOS AND HAD THE FEELING
THAT EVEN IF MARCOS LOST THE ELECTION, HE WOULD STILL
RUN THE COUNTRY. PM LEE SAID THE SITUATION IN THE
PHILIPPINES WAS NASTY AND ALMOST IN A DEADLOCK POSITION.
IN HIS VIEW MARCOS NO LONGER HAD THE POLITICAL STRENGTH
TO COPE WITH THE PROBLEMS IN THE PHILIPPINES, MANY OF
WHICH HE HAD CREATED. NOTING THAT HE HAD BEEN A GOOD
FRIEND OF MARCOS, PM LEE SAID IT WOULD BE FOOLISH TO
BELIEVE THAT HE STILL HAD THE MORAL AUTHORITY REQUIRED
TO CLEAN UP THE MESS. NOR DID HE HAVE THE ENERGY.
IN FACT, THE PM COMMENTED, HE SEEMED EVEN TO LACK THE
ENERGY TO PUT ON A GOOD ELECTORAL ACT.
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7. PM LEE SAID THAT MANY OF THE PROBLEMS NOW CON-
FRONTING THE PHILIPPINES SHOULD NOT HAVE ARISEN.
THE PHILIPPINES WAS NOT A POOR, IMPOVERISHED COUNTRY.
THERE WAS A GREAT DEAL OF TALENT THERE. IN THE FIRST
FW YEARS AFTER DECLARING MARTIAL LAW, MARCOS HAD
DONE A GOOD JOB IN CLEANING UP THE PLACE, BUT AFTER
THAT HE HAD ALLOWED HIS FRIENDS TO LOOT THE COUNTRY.
HIS WAY OF GOVERNING NOW REQUIRED A FLOW OF FUNDS
OUTSIDE OF OFFICIAL REVENUES.
8. SENATOR GOLDWATER ASKED THE PM FOR HIS VIEWS ON
WHO MIGHT SUCCEED MARCOS. LEE SAID PERHAPS MRS.
MARCOS AND GENERAL VER, BUT THEY WOULD NOT BE ABLE
TO HOLD THE COUNTRY TOGETHER. WHILE THERE WAS NO
VICE PRESIDENT AT THE MOMENT, MARCOS WOULD HAVE
TOLENTINO IN THAT POSITION IF HE WON THE ELECTION,
WHICH WOULD BE AN IMPROVEMENT.
9. SENATOR GOLDWATER OBSERVED THAT ONE OF THE
PROBLEMS IN THE PHILIPPINES WAS THE LARGE NUMBER OF
ISLANDS MAKING UP THE COUNTRY. PM LEE AGREED BUT
NOTED THAT INDONESIA HAD EVEN MORE ISLANDS. SUCH
FACTORS WERE JUST USED AS EXCUSES. THE MAJOR FLAW
WAS THE LEGACY OF SPANISH CULTURE. THERE WAS NO
SENSE OF TRUSTEESHIP ON THE PART OF THE PEOPLE AT
THE TOP, NO SENSE THAT THEY WERE MANAGING THE ASSETS
OF THE COUNTRY IN THE INTEREST OF THOSE IN THEIR
CHARGE.
10. SENATOR GOLDWATER SAID THE UNITED STATES WAS
PLEASED THAT BOTH SIDES IN THE PHILIPPINE ELECTIONS
HAD NOW SAID THAT THE US COULD RETAIN ITS BASES.
HE WONDERED IF THE OPPOSITION MEANT WHAT THEY SAID.
THE PM SAID THAT AS BEST HE COULD MAKE OUT THE
POSITION OF MRS. AQUINO, THE OPPOSITION WOULD HAVE
PREFERRED NOT TO HAVE SAID ANYTHING ON THE BASES BUT
JUST TO HAVE CARRIED ON.
11. THE PM NOTED THAT THE LEFT IN THE PHILIPPINES
HAD EMERGED WITHIN THE LAST TEN YEARS, WITH THE
SITUATION BECOMING MORE AGGRAVATED IN THE LAST TWO
OR THREE YEARS. SENATOR GOLDWATER ASKED WHETHER
THERE HAD BEEN LARGE SCALE COMMUNIST INFILTRATION
INTO THE PHILIPPINES. THE PM SAID THAT HE HAD NO
EVIDENCE OF THIS PERSONALLY. HOWEVER, HE HAD SOME
FRIENDS FROM VIETNAMESE DAYS WHO WERE FOLLOWING THE
SITUATION MORE CLOSELY. ONE OF THESE WAS DENNIS
WARNER, THE AUSTRALIAN JOURNALIST, WHO WAS NOT AN
ALARMIST BY NATURE OR INCLINATION. WARNER NOW WROTE
FOR THE PACIFIC DEFENCE REVIEW IN AUSTRALIA. WARNER
PORTRAYED THE SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES AS VERY
BAD, WITH THE NPA NOW IN THE POSITION TO LEVY TAXES IN
AREAS UNDER ITS CONTROL. IN SOME OF THE OUTER ISLANDS
IT WAS IMPOSSIBLE TO DO BUSINESS WITHOUT PAYING
TRIBUTE TO THE NPA. ALTHOUGH WARNER HAD NOT VISITED
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP (GOLDWATER, BARRY M.), PGOV, RP, TW, MASS
SUBJECT: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER LEE BY SENATOR GOLDWATER
ALL OF THE PROVINCES IN THE PHILIPPINES, HE ESTIMATED
THAT THIS WAS THE SITUATION IN MOST OF THEM.
12. PM LEE SAID THAT MARCOS COULD HAVE LICKED THE
SITUATION, BUT HE HAD NOW FORFEITED HIS RIGHT TO
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FURTHER TRUST. IF HE CONTINUED TO GOVERN, THE
SITUATION WOULD GET WORSE. HE DID NOT KNOW WHETHER
MRS. AQUINO COULD DO BETTER, BUT AT LEAST SHE HAD A
CHANCE. SHE WAS NOT BEHOLDEN TO CORRUPT BARONS OR
GRANDEES IN THE SPANISH STYLE. IF MARCOS CONTINUED
IN POWER IT MEANT A CONTINUATION OF THE LAST TEN
YEARS, OR EVEN WORSE OF THE LAST FIVE YEARS.
13. PM LEE SAID THAT SOME PEOPLE LOOKED AT THE
SITUATION IN THE PHILIPPINES IN TERMS OF WHAT HAD
HAPPENED TO THE SHAH OF IRAN. IN LEE'S VIEW, THE
PHILIPPINE SITUATION WAS NOT COMPARABLE TO THAT IN
IRAN, WHICH HAD BEEN A PRODUCT OF US POLICY AT THE
TIME AND THE SHAH'S ILLNESS. IN THE PHILIPPINES
MARCOS WAS IN CHARGE, BUT HE WAS UNDERMINING HIMSELF.
MARCOS STILL RETAINED GREAT POWER BUT HE WAS USING
IT TO NO PURPOSE. HE WAS NOT MAKING USE OF THE
LIMITED TIME LEFT TO HIM. AT ONE TIME LEE HAD THOUGHT
THAT MARCOS MIGHT STILL HAVE A SPARK OF PATRIOTISM
IN HIM AND MIGHT BE MOTIVATED BY CONCERN OVER THE
LEGACY HE WOULD LEAVE BEHIND HIM. BUT MARCOS,
ALTHOUGH STILL SKILLED TACTICALLY, SEEMED TO LACK
ANY STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE.
14. SENATOR GOLDWATER ASKED WHETHER THE PM HAD HAD
THE OPPORTUNITY TO TALK ABOUT THIS WITH MARCOS.
LEE SAID THE LAST TIME HE HAD SEEN MARCOS WAS
NEARLY TWO YEARS AGO IN BRUNEI, AND THEY HAD ONLY
SKIRTED THE ISSUE AT THE TIME.
15. NOTING THAT HE HAD JUST COME FROM TAIPEI,
SENATOR GOLDWATER SAID HE WAS VERY FOND OF TAIWAN,
WHICH HE HAD VISITED SEVEN TIMES. HE HAD A LONG
ASSOCIATION WITH THE PEOPLE THERE SINCE HE USED TO
FLY FOR GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK. HE WAS NOT
HAPPY WITH US TREATMENT OF TAIWAN. IN HIS VIEW
THE UNITED STATES SHOULD SELL TAIWAN MORE MODERN
MILITARY EQUIPMENT, AND HE INTENDED TO GO BACK AND
URGE THE PRESIDENT TO DO TjiIS, RECALLING THAT PRESI-
DENT REAGAN HAD CAMPAIGNED VIGOROUSLY ON THE TAIWAN
ISSUE IN 1980. HE HAD FOUND THAT PEOPLE IN TAIWAN
WERE GREAT FRIENDS AND ADMIRERS OF LEE. LEE SAID
THAT THE FUTURE IN TAIWAN DEPENDED ON SOME FACTORS
THAT WERE BEYOND THEIR CONTROL AS WELL AS SOME WHICH
THEY COULD CONTROL. THE IMPORTANT THING WAS TO KEEP
THE ECONOMY GOING AND TO MAINTAIN THE BALANCE
BETWEEN THE TAIWANESE AND THE MAINLANDERS. SENATOR
GOLDWATER SAID THAT ASPECT WAS NOT A HAPPY SITUATION,
BUT IT WAS NOT AS DISASTROUS AS IT COULD BE. WITH
EACH ELECTION MORE TAIWANESE WERE ELECTED. LEE SAID
THAT PRESIDENT CHIANG CHING-KUO WAS SENSITIVE TO
THIS PROBLEM. SINCE HIS FATHER HAD DIED, HE HAD
MOVED EXPEDITIOUSLY TO BRING MORE TAIWANESE INTO
POSITIONS OF AUTHORITY. BY BRINGING ENOUGH TAIWANESE
INTO THE CENTRAL ESTABLISHMENT, THERE WAS A CHANCE
THAT A COLLISION OF INTERESTS COULD BE AVOIDED. IF
SOME GROUPS BROKE AWAY AND TRIED TO DECLARE INDE-
PENDENCE THERE COULD BE BIG TROUBLE. SENATOR GOLD-
WATER DID NOT FEEL THIS WAS LIKELY TO HAPPEN SINCE
PRESIDENT CHIANG HAD DONE A GOOD JOB IN THAT AREA.
THE NATIVE TAIWANESE DID NOT SEEM TO FAVOR INDEPENDENCE.
IN THE UNITED STATES THERE WERE SOMETIMES DEMONSTRA-
TIONS SUPPORTING THIS. BUT THEY WERE ALWAYS BUILT UP
OUT OF PROPORTION. LEE SAID THAT PRESIDENT CHIANG
HAD BROUGHT TAIWANESE INTO THE CENTER OF POWER SO
THAT THEY COULD NOT SAY THAT THEIR VIEWS WERE NOT
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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: OREP (GOLDWATER, BARRY M.), PGOV, RP, TW, MASS
SUBJECT: CALL ON PRIME MINISTER LEE BY SENATOR GOLDWATER
TAKEN INTO CONSIDERATION. IN FACT, IF CHIANG DIED
HIS SUCCESSOR WOULD BE A TAIWANESE, A YOUNG AND HEALTHY
MAN IN HIS EARLY 60'S. EVEN IF THIS PERSON WOULD
ONLY BE CHAIRMAN OF A COMMITTEE, HE WOULD STILL BE THE
CHAIRMAN.
16. SENATOR GOLDWATER COMPLIMENTED THE PM ON THE
JOB HE HAD DONE IN DEVELOPING THE ARMED FORCES OF
SINGAPORE. THE PM COMMENTED THAT THIS WAS NOT A
PEACEFUL PART OF THE WORLD EVEN THOUGH IT LOOKED
PEACEFUL AT TIMES. HE FELT THE VIETNAMESE HAD OVER-
REACHED THEMSELVES IN CAMBODIA. SENATOR GOLDWATER
NOTED THAT THE STRAIT OF MALACCA WAS A STRATEGIC
WATERWAY, AND THE INDIAN OCEAN WAS ONE OF THE MOST
IMPORTANT STRATEGIC CENTERS IN THE WORLD TODAY. HE
WAS ON HIS WAY TO DIEGO GARCIA TO LOOK AT THE
SITUATION THERE. ESTABLLSHING A BASE THERE HAD BEEN
AN EXCELLENT MOVE, HELPED BY THE BRITISH. LEE SAID
THAT THE BRITISH HAD HANDLED THEIR WITHDRAWAL FROM
EAST OF SUEZ VERY SKILLFULLY. THEY COULD HAVE JUST
PULLED OUT, BUT THEY HAD GIVEN SINGAPORE TIME TO
BUILD UP ITS OWN FORCES AND TO REACH A LIVE-AND-LET-
LIVE ARRANGEMENT WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. INDONESIA HAD
SIZED UP SINGAPORE AS NO THREAT BUT ALSO AS NO WALK
OVER. MALAYSIA HAD ALSO CONCLUDED THAT THE TWO
COUNTRIES SHOULD LIVE WITH EACH OTHER. BY THE MANNER
IN WHICH THEY HAD LET THE UNITED STATES INTO DIEGO
GARCIA AND HAD DISMANTLED THEIR BASES IN THE SOUTH
ATLANTIC, THE BRITISH HAD SHOWED THAT THEY WERE AN
IMPERIAL SYSTEM WITH INTELLIGENCE. THE BRITISH
MIGHT HAVE LOST THEIR MUSCLE, BUT THEY WERE ABLE TO
THINK.
17. RESPONDING TO A COMMENT BY SENATOR GOLDWATER
CONCERNING PRESIDENT REAGAN'S FAR-SIGHTED APPROACH
TO WORLD PROBLEMS. LEE SAID THAT HE WAS AN ADMIRER
OF THE PRESENT US ADMINISTRATION, IN PARTICULAR THE
WAY IT HAD RESTORED AMERICAN CONFIDENCE AND SENSE
OF PURPOSE. NEVERTHELESS, IT COULD BE IN FOR A TOUGH
TIME. AS MUCH AS GORBACHEV MIGHT WANT TO CONCENTRATE
ON ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, HE WOULD BE ACTIVE IN OTHER
AREAS AS WELL. SENATOR GOLDWATER FELT THAT US ECONOMIC
PROBLEMS WERE IN RELATIVELY GOOD SHAPE FOR THE NEXT
THREE OR FOUR YEARS, BUT THERE WOULD BE TROUBLE IF THE
US DID NOT ATTACK THE DEFICIT. IF WE COULD SHOW THAT
WE WERE MAKING PROGRESS, WE COULD MOVE VERY RAPIDLY.
WHEN WE WERE STRONG, THIS AFFECTED OTHER PEOPLE TOO.
18. GENERAL QUINN NOTED THAT HE HAD VISITED
SINGAPORE IN 1938. THE CITY HAD LOOKED LIKE A
VILLAGE THEN, WHILE IT NOW LOOKED LIKE MANHATTAN.
LEE SAID THAT THE MORE SINGAPORE PROGRESSED, THE
RISKIER IT GOT. IT WAS BEING DRAWN INTO AN EVEN
TIGHTER NEXUS WITH THE REST OF THE WORLD. IF THE
REST OF THE WORLD DID BADLY, SINGAPORE COULD BE
REALLY HURT SINCE ITS DEPENDENCE ON THE WORLD (I.E. ITS
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FOREIGN TRADE) REPRESENTED 300 PERCENT OF ITS GNP.
SINGAPORE AND THE WORLD NEEDED EACH OTHER. THE
WORLD NEEDED PLACES LIKE SINGAPORE TO PROVIDE BANKING,
INSURANCE, COMMUNICATIONS AND SHIPPING SERVICES.
REGIONAL CENTERS OF THIS SORT WERE DESIRABLE. FOR
EXAMPLE, SHIPS COMING INTO THE STRAITS COULD ALERT
SINGAPORE OF THEIR ARRIVAL SIX HOURS IN ADVANCE AND
OFF-LOAD HUNDREDS OF CONTAINERS IMMEDIATELY UPON
ARRIVAL. THESE CONTAINERS MIGHT THEN ENCOUNTER
LENGTHY DELAYS BEFORE THEY COULD BE SHIPPED TO
VARIOUS RIVER PORTS. IF THE CONTAINERS COULD NOT
BE OFF-LOADED IN THIS FASHION, THE SYSTEM MIGHT
FREEZE UP.
ROY
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