LETTER TO ROBERT M. EMMERICHS FROM (SANITIZED)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000300410027-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2011
• Sequence Number: 27
• Publication Date: March 6, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP90BO139OR000300410027-3
OCA, FILE C
RECPT # Record
\ cF
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Legislative Liaison
Washington, D.C. 20505
'
Telephone
TO:
Mr. Robert M. Ehr erichs
Carmittee on Armed Services
House of Representatives
W gtu, D_ 20515
The enclosed unclassified package (three
copies) is for Congressmen Norman Sisisky
(D.,VA), Herbert H. Bateman (R.,VA), and
Duncan Hunter (R.,CA) who expressed an
interest in this subject during the 5 March
HASC briefings.
I would appreciate your assistance in
getting the document to the Members. Thanks.
Chief, House Branch
Office of congressional Affairs
'3OR"' 1533 OBSOLETE
3-79 EDITIONS.
Distribution:
Originals Addressee (w/encs)
HA/OCC
OCA Record (w/o encs)
- RR Chrono (w/1 set of encs)
dpt (6 Mar 86)
STAT
i
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP90BO139OR000300410027-3
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP90B01390R000300410027-3
'.J'JCLASS I F I ED
Export of the Revolution
The Intelligence Corn unity believes--based on extensive all-
source reporting--that a key facet of Sandinista foreign policy
has been the continuing export of revolution to other Latin
American countries. Nicaraguan activities include the provision
of weapons, supplies, military and political training, funds,
communications support, and satehaven. The Salvadoran rebels
have been the principal beneficiaries, but available evidence
shows that materiel and political support also has been extended
to other Central and South American radicals.
-- The FSLN committed itself to the eventual spread of
revolution throughout Latin America at a secret meeting
of party cadres in September 1979.
-- A detector reports that the policy of providing support
to leftist revolutionaries was set at the highest
levels and involves all military, intelligence, and
police organizations, including the Defense and
Interior Ministries--headed by key Sandinista leaders
Humberto Ortega and Tomas Borge.
-- Workshops reportedly were set up in Managua as early as
1979 tor constructing vehicle concealment compartments
tor the transfer of materiel to Salvadoran insurgents
and that guerrilla training sites were established. In
1981, Honduran authorities seized a large truck-trailer
loaded with weaponry from US stocks in Vietnam. The
truck was enroute from Nicaragua to El Salvador.
Although the volume of Managua's material assistance to the
Salvadoran guerrillas has decreased from the high levels
delivered in late 1980, 1981, and early 1982, when the insurgents
were preparing large-scale offensives, compelling evidence has
persuaded the Intelligence Community that Nicaraguan assistance
is continuing:
-- A late-model car that crashed in Honduras in Decem'--)er
had five concealment compartments containing 6,700
rounds of ammunition, 86 electric blasting caps, 21
grenades, 12 tactical and command radios, and 39
communications enciphering pads, along with a mar,ites:
listing the call signs of insurgent command posts in
Nicaragua and El Salvador.
-- The driver, who admitted he traveled over the- same
route from Costa Rica through Nicaragua and Honduras to
El Salvador once before, said he had turned the vehicle
1
UNCLASSIFIED
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/01/10: CIA-RDP90B01390R000300410027-3