LEV NAVROZOV ON MORE CIA INTELLIGENCE FAILURES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000100110006-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 14, 2010
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: October 10, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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!'i1 e
October 10, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
prehensive Test Ban Treaty with the Soviet
Union: and that the President immediately
undertake a program that would replace the
Jobs that are lost from the nuclear weapons
industry as a consequence of a test ban
policy. This body also calls upon our mem-
bers of congress to support legislation that
would enact a moratorium on nuclear test-
ing, to be continued as long as the Soviets
do not test. Copies of this resolution shall
be forwarded to the President of the United
States and to the Senators and Representa-
tives from our congressional delegation.
REAUTHORIZE MARINE FISHERY
PROGRAMS ADMINISTERED BY
THE NATIONAL OCEANIC AND
ATMOSPHERIC ADMINISTRA-
TION
? Mr. GORTON. Mr. President, I
strongly support the committee
amendment to S. 991, which, among
other things reauthorizes important
marine fishery programs administered
by the National Oceanic and Atmos-
pheric Administration [NOAAI. The
amendment includes three separate
bills of which I was an original cospon-
sor-S. 991, which passed the Senate
as a general fishery authorization bill
last year; S. 2583, to provide for an
Under Secretary of Commerce for
Oceans and Atmosphere, an Assistant
Secretary for Oceans and Atmosphere
and a Chief Scientist position at
NOAA; and S. 958, reauthorization of
the Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management Act [MFCMAI.
The committee bill is divided into
four titles: Title I includes amend-
ments to the Magnuson Fishery Con-
servation Act CMFCMAI. Title II sets
up a new seafood promotion program
that is intended to increase domestic
and foreign trade of fishery and sea-
food products. Title III revises the
Commercial Fisheries Research and
Development Act. Title IV contains
miscellaneous provisions such as the
establishment of a Chief Scientist pos-
tion at NOAA.
I would like to focus on two aspects
of S. 991. First, I am pleased that we
were able to work out amendments to
the Magnuson Act. The changes to the
act strengthen its management and
enforcement provisions of the act. The
MFCMA is the single most important
law pertaining to the management of
the fisheries resources located within
our 200-mile fishery conservation
zone. This law would be reauthorized
through fiscal year 1989.
Second, the bill provides waivers
from restrictions on vessel documenta-
tion for two vessels located in the Pa-
cific Northwest-the Kodiak Queen
and the Northtoind. The Kodiak
Queen is a vessel that was built in
California in 1941 for the Department
of the Navy. It was placed under Libe-
rian registry in 1962 when it was pur-
chased by foreign interests. In 196?,
the vessel was acquired by a company
in Alaska, and placed under U.S. flag
and registry. The vessel has since re-
mained in the ownership of U.S. citi-
zens. The Kodiak Queen is document-
ed for use in the fisheries. It has been
engaged in the crab fisklery in Kodiak,
AK. Its present owners would like to
expand the use of the vessel in coast-
wise trade for other fishery purposes
such as tendering salmon, herring or
freight.
The Northwind is a motor yacht
built in Wisconsin in 1930. l.n 1938, the
vessel was transferred from United
States to British ownership, to be used
in the service of the British Govern-
ment and Royal Navy. The Northu+ind
is now located in Seattle, WA. The
vessel has undergone substantial ren-
ovation. The present owners wish to
engage in the coastwise trade as a
pleasure charter in and around Puget
Sound.
Mr. President, S. 991 as amended by
the committee amendment is the
result of a lot of hard work. I thank
the chairman as well as the Commerce
Committee staff for their efforts in
getting this bill before the Senate. I
urge my colleagues to adopt this legis-
lation expeditiously.?
A FORCE FOR GOOD
? Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, the
recent death of Rabbi Jacob B. Agus,
scholar, teacher, leader, theologian,
writer and leader in the efforts to
expand the Jewish-Christian dialog, is
a loss not only to Beth El Congrega-
tion and Baltimore, but to all who
have been involved in building bridges
among the various faiths.
During all his extraordinary career,
Rabbi Agus was proud of his role as "a
community pastor, to have helped pre-
serve a Jewish mentality, to have
helped people with some serenity
through these cataclysmic times, to be
an interpreter of Jewish values." This
is, as Rabbi Agus said, "the greatest
challenge one could wish."
Rabbi Agus met that challenge every
day of his life. I ask that an article
from the Baltimore Evening Sun out-
lining some of Rabbi Agus' accom-
plishments be included in the Rscoan.
The article follows:
[From the Baltimore Sun Oct. 7, 19867
A Foaca Fon Gooa
(By Albert E. Denny)
The death of Jacob B. Agus, rabbi emeri-
tus of Beth EI Congregation, removes an in-
tellectual giant from the American rabbin-
ate and represents a stunning loss to Balti-
more's Jewish community.
An internationally recognized scholar,
teacher, philosopher and theologian, Agus'
penetrating Insights into religion and his
enlightened views of contemporary Jewish
life made him a leading force in the Con-
servative movement. He was the author of
nine scholarly books, some of them used as
texts in religious courses on the university
level, and dozens of articles that appeared
in a wide range of Jewish and secular publi-
cations.
He lectured at Johns Hopkins University
and other colleges In the United States and
abroad, and for 12 years was editorial con-
sultant to the Encyclopedia Britannica on
articles of Jewish content. He served as Vis-
iting professor of modem Jewish philoso-
phy at Temple University, Dropsie College,
the Reconstructionist Rabbinical College
and St. Mary's Seminary.
Perhaps the most durable achievement in
the life of Jacob Agus was his long-time, as-
siduous involvement in building bridges of
understanding between the various faiths.
Begtnn[ng in the early 1950s and extending
to his death, the rabbi worked unremit-
tingly at promoting interfaith harmony,
representing Judaism at various ecumenical
conferences in the United States, South
America and England.
He was a member of a trialogue composed
of Jewish, Christian and Muslim leaders
sponsored by the Kennedy Institute on
Ethics at Georgetown University in Wash-
ington. As professor of classical Hebrew
studies at the Ecumenical Institute of The-
ology of St. Mary's Seminary and Universi-
ty, he taught a course entitled "Matthew-
The Jewish Gospel," which analyzed Mat-
thew in the light of Jewish literature that
was contemporary with the Gospels.
"When the Gospels are placed within a
Jewish context and interpreted according-
ly," the rabbi explained, "there will result a
much deeper appreciation on the part of
Jews with Christianity and Christians with
Judaism."
Even this year, despite his failing health.
the 75-year-old rabbi took Sn active role in
discussions of the ninth national workshop
on Christian-Jewish relations held in Balti-
more. The conference presented an award to
him "for his pioneering efforts in Jewish-
Christian dialogue."
Born in Poland on Nov. 8, 1911, the future
rabbi lived for a time in what was then Pal-
estine, and was brought to the United
States in 1927. After his ordination as an
Orthodox rabbi in 1935, he held a pulpit in
Cambridge, Mass., later earned a doctorate
from Harvard in the history and philosophy
of religion and served Orthodox synagogues
in Norfolk and Chicago.
Chafing under the constraints imposed by
the rigid Orthodox beliefs that clashed with
his emerging liberal views, Agus made the
leap to a Conservative pulpit in Dayton,
Ohio in 1942. He was invited to Baltimore in
1950 to take the spiritual reins of the newly
formed Beth El Congregation.
The innovative ideas that he brought to
Baltimore meshed perfectly with the desire
of Beth El's founders to introduce a liberal
brand of Conservatism to the community.
In the ensuing three decades, the congreea-
tlon built its membership to 1,400 families,
and Beth El and its dynamic rabbi were
catapulted to national prominence.
Agus might have achieved greatness as a
full-time university professor, but he never
regretted his decision to enter the rabbin-
ate. He once said, "As a community pastor,
to have helped preserve a Jewish mentality,
to have helped people with some serenity
through these cataclysmic times, to be an
interpreter and pastor of Jewish values-
that is the greatest challenge one could
wish."?
LEV NAVROZOV ON MORE CIA
INTELLIGENCE FAILURES
? Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, the CIA
has repeatedly failed to predict accu-
rately the Soviet military threat, or to
understand in any adequate way
Soviet global intentions. It appears
that the CIA has a methodology for
estimating Soviet military expendi-
tures which produces gross underesti-
mates. By the CIA's own evaluation,
its current estimates of Soviet strate-
gic forces 5 years into the future will
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S 15904
CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE October 10, 1986
not come even close to being accurate
5 years hence.
Mr. President, I believe that the
American people are not getting their
money's worth from the CIA. F'or the
many billions of tax dollars spent by
CIA, we seem mostly to be getting
only underestimates of the Soviet mili-
tary threat, bungled covert operations,
bungled defections of Soviets, bungled
counter-intelligence operations against
CIA defecters, and even bungled plan-
ning and programming of technical
collection resources.
Mr. President, Mr. Lev Navrozov,
who emigrated from the Soviet Union
in 1972 at the height of "detente", has
become one of the most articulate and
knowledgeable critics of the CIA. Lev
Navrozov has made a very careful
study of over 77,000 pages of declassi-
fied materials from CIA. He bases his
critiques on these declassified CIA es-
timates as compared to his own pro-
foundly deep knowledge of Russia. I
point out that Candidate Ronald
Reagan in 1978 and 1979 quoted exten-
sively from Lev Navrozov's critiques of
CIA during his campaign, thereby be-
stowing considerable credibility upon
Mr. Navrozov.
Mr. President, I ask that the follow-
ing articles from the Nero York City
Tribune be printed in the RECORD at
the conclusion of my remarks:
First. "Soviet Anti-Missile Defense
Which Was Not", by Lev Navrozov,
January 1, 1986;
Second. "The 'World's Most Impor-
tant Statistic' and the CIA", by Lev
Navrozov, January 22, 1986;
Third. "The Soviets' Greatest Spy-
Western Free Enterprise?" by Lev
Navrozov, January 29, 1986;
Fourth. "1961-The Year of CIA/
MI-8's Bittersweet Triumph", by Lev
Navrozov, February 19, 1986;
Fifth. "On 30th Anniversary of
'Khrushchev's Secret Speech"' by Lev
Navrozov, February 26, 1986;
Sixth. "The .CIA and Soviet Defec-
tion-Redefection Mysteries", by Lev
Navrozov, March 12, 1986;
Seventh. "Arms Agreements? Com-
pliance Unverifiable by CIA", by Lev
Navrozov, March 26, 1986;
Eighth. "Illusions on Which CIA
Was Founded 40 Years Ago", by Lev
Navrozov, April 2, 1986;
Ninth. "How the CIA Bores the US
Congress Stiff", by Lev Navrozov,
April 16, 1986;
Tenth. "Kim Philby: Espionage Ro-
mance and Drab Reality", by Lev Nav-
rozov, April 30, 1986;
Eleventh. "How the CIA Flunked
Abysmally on Chernobyl Affair", by
Lev Navrozov, May 7, 1986;
Twelfth. "What the CIA Reveals
About Itself in Its Pamphlet", by Lev
Navrozov, May 21, 1986;
Thirteenth. "Has US Intelligence
Improved With Casey at Bat?", by Lev
Navrozov, May 28, 1986;
Fourteenth. "What the Ronald
Pelton Spy Case Demonstrates", by
Lev Navrozov, June 4? 1986;
Fifteenth. "How Former CIA Offi-
cial Responded to Past Error", by Lev
Navrozov, July 2, 1986;
Sixteenth. "Ineptness, Not Immoral-
ity, Is Main Flaw of CIA", by Lev Nav-
rozov, July 30, 1988;
Seventeenth. "CIA and the 'Mys-
tery' of Where Does Soviet Steel Go",
by Lev Navrozov, September 3, 1986;
Eighteenth. "Classic Barter, Soviet-
Style: ASpy for a Journalist", by Lev
Navrozov, September 10, 1986;
Nineteenth. "What the KGB's Dani-
loff-Zakharov Move Signifies", by Lev
Navrozov, September 17, 1986;
Twentieth. "UN Is Moscow's Best
Espionage Base Worldwide", by Lev
Navrozov, October 1, 1986;
Twenty-first. "Sen. Helms Ushers In
New Intelligence Era for West", by
Lev Navrozov, October 8, 1986.
The articles follow:
[From the N.Y. City Tribune, January 1,
1986]
SOVIET ANTI-MISSILE DEFENSE WHICH WAS
NOT
(By Lev Navrozov)
Today, I begin my weekly Wednesday
column on intelligence work in the sense of
espionage, not in the sense of Sovietological
meditations about UPI news.
Those who imagine Western intelligence
work since 1917 as a series of Western espio-
nage exploits in the Kremlin and want to
hear of more such will be bitterly disap-
pointed reading my column. Not only are
they unlikely to find any more of such ex-
ploits In my column, but Lhey will see that
most "true spy stories" they know are
myths, spread by Western intelligence agen-
cies about themselves with the help of the
media and hosts of intelligence/espionage
writers who copy their true spy stories from
each other like Victorian authors of "true
ghost stories" copied them under the as-
sumption that the more minute the details
copied, the truer the ghost story was-or at
least seemed.
I proceed from the assumption that the
West needs espionage in totalitarian soci-
eties, not ghost stories-I beg your pardon, I
mean-not spy stories. Hence the West
needs a critical analysis of intelligence/espi-
onage as is.
Mine is based on (1) primary sources, such
as the CIA's testimony before Congress, (2)
common sense, such as the belief that Allen
Dulles could not be on May 21-27, 1956, at
his post of Director of Central Intelligence
In Washington DC, if incontrovertible evi-
dence shows that his corporeal self (and not
just his ghost) was in Canada at the time;
and (3) the existential experiences of those
who spent a lifetime in a totalitarian socie-
ty, such as yours truly.
Between 1965 and 1971, we lived near the
international Vnukovo airport, 16 miles
from Moscow, Russia.
Whenever a taxi cab sped us from Vnu-
kovo to Moscow, a strange spectacle on the
right side of the highway would open to our
view: a futuristic composition out of high-
voltage insulators, transformers and other
such paraphernalia.
"What's that?" I would ask the taxi
driver.
"Anti-missile defense," he would answer
conspiratorially on the understanding that
the information so confidential could only
be shared with especially good customers.
Don't tell me how secretive the Soviet
regime is. And here every foreigner going
from the Vnukovo airport to Moscow could
photograph from his car a Soviet anti-mis-
stle defense site even without telescopic
lenses, for the site began just 10 yards from
the highway.
Work on anti-ballistic missile (ABM) de-
fense system in the United States naturally
began in the early 19(i0s, as soon as inter-
continental missiles had come into their
own. The Soviet military was in despair.
ABM defense required more sophisticated
computers than did missiles, and that was
just the field in which the Soviet war-ori-
ented economy still lagged far behind, too
late had the Soviet planners realized how
Important computers would be for warfare.
The U.S. ABM defense would reverse the
global strategic situation. Without it, Soviet
missiles could destroy the United States.
Even if the United States could retaliate in
kind, the very possibility of mutual destruc-
tion enhanced Soviet strategic prestige.
Thus the possibility of mutual destruction
of a terrorist and his important hostages en-
hances his prestige by equalizing his and
their survival chances. The Soviet rulers
could always say: "If the worst comes to the
worst, remember that we will all blowup."
The U.S. ABM defense would cancel this
mutual destruction possibility and intro-
duce, instead, the development of ABM war-
fare, in which the Soviet armed forces
would be notoriously behind. From the
glory of the world's first Soviet space satel-
lites and intercontinental ballistic missiles
in the late 1950s, the Soviet regime would
go back to the status of a second-rate mili-
tary power in the early SOs.
How could they make the United States
stop further development of its ABM de-
fense system?
I doubt that any Western-born expert on
the Soviet Union inside or outside the West-
ern intelligence communities had ever
heard, until a few years ago, about the Main
Directorate of Strategic Camouflage, which
had been founded in the Soviet General
Staff in 1964 under the leadership of the
then General and later Marshal Nikolai
Ogarkov (The same person who coped easily
with a battery of Western journalists at a
news conference after the Soviets shot down
a South Korean airliner with 269 people
aboard in 1983).
It is known or understood even less that
the Directorate's aim is not only to conceal
real Soviet weapons systems, but also to
create dummy weapon systems to mislead
the Western intelligence communities.
The shrewd Ogarkov's solution was
simple:
Let us create our dummy ABM defense for
the benefit of the CIA. The all-seeing CIA
will detect and report it to the U.S. govern-
ment, Congress and hence Lhe public. The
Americans will think that we are even
ahead of them in ABM defense. So they will
conclude that the best solution is to sign
with us an ABM treaty, to halt all further
development of ABM defense in both coun-
tries, that is, in the United States.
First there began to appear in Soviet open
military publications, which many Western
experts in and out of the Western intelli-
gence communities love to study, frequent
references to Soviet achievements in anti-
missile defense.
Shown on the Red Square parade in 1964
was a missile codenamed "Galosh" by
NATO because it w'as always inside a ribbed
container. It was decided that Galosh was
an anti-missile missile, though as of today,
no-one in the West has ever seen It without
its galosh-like container and cannot vouch
that it is not just a length of pipe.
I have the impression that Ogarkov put
those galoshes on those lengths of pipe to
make them easily identifiable on space pho-
tographs. In sunny weather, the ribs, each
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October 10, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
of which is at least a foot long, by my meas-
urements, cast sharp clearcut shadows on
the sunny part of a galosh and stood out,
brightly illuminated by the sun, on its
shady side. The CIA immediately identified
64 Galoshes around Moscow, four sites of 16
Galoshes each.
In Soviet documentaries, a Soviet missile
shot down another, except that the narrator
did not explain that this was no feat if both
Soviet missiles were launched by ordered
trajectories to hit each other.
Ogarkov's finishing master stroke, howev-
P.i, w'aS the building of dummy ABM bases,
like the one near Vnukovo airport, so that
they could be observed by foreigners in the
Soviet Union.
The CIA could not miss the Vnukovo base.
Going from the airport to the U.S. Embassy
in Moscow were those of its staffers who
were on the CIA's or the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency's payrolls. What an opportu-
nity for honest-to-goodness espionage Ogar-
kov had offered them!
The Soviet-American ABM treaty was
signed in 1972 and thus the development of
ABM defenses in the United States was
halted for 13 years, up to 1983, when that
wicked President Reagan revived it in his
Strategic Defense Initiative, to the disgust
of the Concerned Scientists and the Soviet
Politburo.
Naturally, the Soviet military based those
13 years to advance Soviet ABM defense as
much as possible.
Today, the Main Directorate of Strategic
Camouflage seems to be pondering a new
tack: to rig up and show dummy missiles
that allegedly will reduce U.S. anti-missile
defenses to a "pile of junk." At least, the
first "Sov[et military papers," explaining
just that, already have appeared, and one of
them has been reported in The New York
Times in dead earnest.
THE "WORLD S MOST IMPORTANT STATISTIC"
AND THE CIA
(By Leo Naurozov)
A couple of years ago The Washington
Post spoke of the "world's most important
statistic." What is it?
According to Lhe Post, it is the percentage
of military output !n the Soviet Gross Na-
tional Product. That is to say, ?'What por-
tion of Russia's goods and services is intend-
ed for military purposes?"
For the United States, the answer would
be simple. You'd buy the latest World Alma-
nac or some other such book for five bucks,
look up the defense budget estimate for,
say, 1983-$245 billion-and come up with
7%.
For Russia you buy an official statistical
book for 3 rubles and learn that 12.8 billion
rubles was spent on defense in 1965, for ex-
ample.
Yes, but what rubles? The rulers of Russia
set all the prices, and those for military
goods and services are unknown. Therefore,
the rubles with which the Soviet Ministry
of Defense procures guns may have little to
do with the rubles with which a Soviet in-
habitant buys butter.
It is equally futile to convert these rubles
into dollars according to the official ex-
change rate, as is usually done by the West-
ern media.
Let us try, therefore, to gleam from indi-
rect clues some notion of the proportion of
Soviet goods and services Intended for mili-
tary purposes in the last quarter of a centu-
ry.
In his tapes Nikita Khrushchev recalls:
"[The Soviet physicist Peter Kapitza] invit-
ed me to his laboratory." The purpose was,
of course, Lo persuade Khrushchev to allo-
cate money for Kapitza's research project.
The Encyclopaedia Britannica gives Ka-
pitza an impressive four-paragraph entry: in
1929, at the age of 35, while living in Brit-
ain, he was "elected to the Royal Society [of
London], the first foreigner in 200 years to
become a member."
Khrushchev says on tape: "We didn't give
him the money at that time either..."
But why? Khrushchev had made inquiries
about the subject of Kapitza's research, and
was told that it was not very military. Khru-
shchev reminisces on tape:
In a while Kaptiza requested me to receive
him again. And I did. Then I asked him
bluntly: "Why don't you, Comrade Kapitza,
take up a defense subject?"
So, Khrushchev, that founding father of
dtitente, could not bear to see even one out-
standing scientist without demanding that
he take up a military line of research rather
than the line the great scientist was inclined
to pursue.
In the post-Khrushchev era, at a closed
lecture to editors in Leningrad in 1965, Abel
Aganbegyan, a member of the Soviet Acade-
my of Sciences and director of the Novosi-
birsk Institute of Economic and Industrial
Organization, said:
"Of approximately 100 million people in
the U.S.S.R. who work, about 30-40 million
are employed in the defense industry."
High-level economist though he was,
Aganbegyan had no access to the Soviet
secret statistics on those "employed in the
defense industry." His figure was only an
educated guess according to the data at his
disposal.
But the West has not known any more re-
liable figure than his guess of 20 years ago.
How did it reach the West? Someone who
was present at Aganbegyan's closed lecture
managed to record it and gave the text to a
samizdat (underground) typewritten maga-
zine. After it had ceased publication, several
back issues reached the West, and Aganbe-
gyan's guess became known here.
What about those who are not "employed
in the defense industry?" This is not secret
sometimes. In 1983, in an edition of 50,000
copies, the Soviet publishing house "Music"
pI?inted a book for kindergartens entitled In
the Army We Will Serve: Songs, Plays and
Poems for Children of Junior Age (from
three to six) With Piano (Accordion) Ac-
companiment.
Listen:
"We don't yet go to school/
But like soldiers on we march!
Chorus: In the army we will serve... .
An officer I want to be/To rush ahead in all
attacks!
Chorus: In Lhe army we will serve...."
How do you like this little cute poem for
tots:
The sun trumpets its golden horn,
"Glory to the hero-warrior!"
The enemy !s routed, smashed and de-
stroyed,
"Glory to the hero-warrior!"
The plays for tots are a subject apart.
They reduce to drumming, marching, drum-
ming again and are actually a sort of drill
exercises to instill military subordination
and leadership from infancy. The goal of
the whole project 1s to make a tot enjoy the
prospect of being a cog in the global war-
machine.
Yet all such writers, composers, teachers,
educators, editors, book designers, printers,
pianists or accordion players are not "em-
ployed in the defense industry." Nor is their
activity secret-possibly because children of
three are not thought to be sufficiently re-
sponsible to sign "obligation of non-divul-
gence of closed data"
But obviously, all the adults involved itI
this "aesthetic education of junior-age chil-
S 15905
dren" are also engaged in the maximization
of the country's global power.
The question is, who is not. After all,
those "employed [n the defense industry" or
even those 3-year-olds who sing about how
"in the army we will serve" have to eat, for
example, and those who work to provide
them with what may be defined as "poor ir-
regular war food rations in peacetime" are
also involved in the same all-out military
effort.
Now, how has the CIA evaluated the mil-
tary share in the Soviet goods and services-
the "world's most important statistic"?
The CIA kept repeating its absurd figure
every year-up to 1975 inclusive.
Before 1976 the CIA's figure was from 6 to
8 percent, roughly the same as for the
United States. But since the total output of
Soviet goods and services was far smaller
than its U.S. counterpart, the Soviet mili-
tary ot.tput must have been far smaller too,
the CIA reasoned.
In 1976 the CIA finally notices that inex-
plicably, Soviet weapons had first overtaken
American weapons and then began to sur-
pass them. Then the CIA declared that it
had been mistaken between 1957 and 1976
and doubled its figure for the proportion of
Soviet military output in the Soviet Gross
National Product, where this figure roughly
stays in 1986. Well, before 1976 the CIA's
"most important statistic" was laughable,
while now it is only SO percent so.
"Can't we make a mistake?" IS the CIA's
plea Yes, but what kind of mistake? To aay,
about a society where even children of three
"march like real soldiers," that it spends
less for military purposes Lhan Lhe United
States does, means just to know nothing
about that society.
THE SOVIETS' GRGTEST SPY-WESTERN FREE
ENTtitPRISR?
(By Lev Naurozov)
We have heard that we live in one of the
open societies, called "the West" for short,
in which Soviet espionage can easily operate
by definition.
This is an understatement. In the West,
information which would be considered top
secret military espionage data in the Soviet
Union is pushed on everyone for free with
aggressive .high-pressure, salesmanship, or
as the expression goes, with the hard sell.
Hereby I announce a contest (no cash
prizes) for the best term for such societ[es.
The hard-sell-of-military-data societies?
MILITARY MARKET
Here in front of me is the Tan. 18 issue of
the British Jane's Defense Weekly which the
mallman has just brought and thus inspired
me to write this column.
Jane's is one of the numberless Western
magazines treating military Research & De-
velopment, the production, of weapons, etc.
as a "military market"-just like any other
market.
Al] this splendid military merchandise
beautifully displayed on the pages of Jane's
has to be sold in a fierce competition, right?
Now, to sell it you must advertise your
product as smartly as possible. The custom-
ers must know that your scientists and engi-
neers have just conceived of a submarine
which will be better than any other subma-
rine on the market. Orders can already be
filed. Negotiations are on. Our customers
are always right, our salesmen are always
bright.
"Yes, sir, only our company in the West
will be able to produce that submarine. The
Soviet military, sir, will perhaps be able to
produce it too-as they have learned about
our concept from Jane's Defense Wetkly, but
you won't buy weapons from the Soviet
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military, will you? Yes, sir, the Soviet mili-
tary will perhaps be able to sink our subma-
rine-since they have learned about our con-
cept. But you are not going to fight them. I
hope not, sir. You intend, I take it, to fight
Tararabumbia or is it South Trali-Vali, sir?
If you place and order ahead of Trali-
Vali ...The right decision, sir. We'll formal-
ize it before lunch, sir. Now I don't envy
Trali-Vali, ha-ha-ha! unless it's Tararabun;-
bia, of course."
MIL BIZ IS LIKE ANY HIZ
My subscription to Jane's seems to have
expired, but I receive it anyway. Of course.
Perhaps I'll place an early order for a dozen
of those new submarines, after all, or at
least will renew my subscription.
Yeah, mil biz is like any biz. From adver-
tisements in Jane's, for example, you can
learn what weapons every Western company
produces, how they look, why they are
better than any other on the market-and
what the company's location and telephone
numbers are. How else? Suppose you want
to place an order for those new submarines.
What company can afford losing potential
customers by withholding its name, address
and phone numbers?
There are grandiose military trade fairs,
and since mil biz must know what to re-
search, develop, produce and sell and the
customers what to order, buy and deploy,
magazines like Jane's give a wealth of back-
ground military information. Supply and
demand. Who researches, develops, pro-
duces, sells, plans, intends, orders, buys and
deploys what in the military field.
Poor KGB and GRU. They feel like the
wives of Soviet Embassy officials at Bloom-
ingdale's. Their eyes run away with them.
What to buy? Which Western weapons to
copy-and improve? What military informa-
tion to use? I can imagine a Soviet subma-
rine builder, rushing to his design office
with a copy of Jane's in his hand: "Broth-
ers! Anew concept in submarines!"
A TORRENT VS. RARE TINY DROPS
If military information from the West
comes to the Soviet military in a torrent,
from the Soviet Union to the Western mili-
tary, it comes in a trickle, nay, rare tiny
drops.
Jane's has a special section called "Soviet
Intelligence." Usually it is a photograph of,
say, a Soviet fighter-bomber in a test flight,
and though the fighter-bomber looks on the
photo more like a blurred mangled frog
than afighter-bomber (it is, obviously, a
blow-up of a satellite photograph) and is a
reprint from Aviation Week and Space
Technology, I imagine the editor rubbing his
hands in glee and composing a text to con-
jecture the performance characteristics as
well as the size and configuration of the
mangled frog-I mean the Soviet fighter-
bornber.
But in the current issue there is an even
greater piece of "Soviet Intelligence:" two
full pages devoted to Vladimir Chernavin,
the new commander-in-chief of the Soviet
Navy.
Well Jane's even carries his photographs,
somewhat blurred, too, but possibly because
the Pravd? photocamera was poor (almost
everything is poor in the Soviet Union
except weapons), not because the picture
had to be taken by the CIA from space.
Strangely enough, while, say, the Soviet
designers of submarines or missiles are total
unknowns (even their names are secret until
they die), the names and faces of Soviet top
military men are at least allowed to be rec-
ognized by the West. But what else?
The first subhead of the Jane's article
about Chernavin is "Patriotic Loyalty."
How did Jane's or the CIA discover that?
From his speeches In the Soviet newspapers.
You see, were not Vladimir a loyal patriot
he would say as much in Pravda. Imagine
a banner headline: "Fleet Admiral Cherna-
vin: Am I a Loyal Patriot? Not By a Long
(Naval) Shot!" But he didn't. So he must be
a loyal patriot.
Similarly, Jane's makes other Soviet intel-
ligence revelations. At the end, the maga-
zine discovers (from an article in Izvestia,
July 27, 1985) that "Chernavin introduced a
new definition" of naval power. It is the
"extent to which a particular state is able to
make the most effective use of the oceans of
the world." Terrific! But I think the "new
definition" could be found in Izvestia 10 or
15 years ago too-or in 16th century British
naval papers.
THE WAY OUT
In short, while the Western military
market or mil biz cascades its splendors on
all and sundry like Bloomingdale's and
Macy's do theirs, the West receives the
blurred photograph of a Soviet admiral and
Soviet newspaper clichQs, referred to as
"Soviet intelligence" revelations.
What's the way-out? To try to eliminate
or reduce free enterprise in the military
field in favor of secretive bureaucracy is
insane.
Free enterprise is creative. It does forge
ahead in many areas ahead of the Soviet
military despite everything. Now, free enter-
prise cannot function without a free open
market and Its free open advertisement and
exchange of information.
Hence Western military information cas-
cades freely and openly on all and sundry,
including the Soviet military, while Soviet
military information is contained inside the
totalitarian reservoir which Western Intelli-
gence/espionage cannot penetrate.
The solution seems to lie in the penetra-
tion of the totalitarian reservoir by Western
intelligence/espionage rather than the at-
tempt to impose secrecy on the Western
free and open military market. But more
about it on future Wednesdays.
1961-THE YEAR of CIA/MIA-6's
BITTERSWEET TRIUMPH
(By Lev Navrozov)
A quarter of a century ago a Soviet high-
ranking official named Oleg Penkovsky and
a British businessman in Moscow named
Greville Winne walked through Moscow's
whirling snow "on which even the KGB
could not hang a microphone."
The joke is not mine, but Winne's, and
hence in quotes. But whether or not the
KGB can hang microphones on whirling
snow, Penkovsky asked Winne to pass t,o
Britain a package in which he suggested
that he would be an espionage agent for the
British Intelligence Service, MI-6.
And so t;e was, for about half a year, prac-
tically the only espionage agent the West
ever had in post-1917 Russia-that is, in
almost 70 years.
There have been many defectors from
among those Soviet nationals stationed in
the West-but stationed In the West, they
have had no access to centers of strategic in-
formation in Russia.
Penkovsky had that access. The English-
language version of his calling card said:
Deputy Division Chief, Foreign Relations
Department, State Committee for Coordina-
tion of Scientific [read: Military] Research.
IN WEST, MORE MAY HE LESS
The more strategically important the in-
formation a Soviet official handles, the
higher his socio-economic status in the
"Soviet State." The West cannot induce him
to become an espionage agent with only the
prospect of a post and salary in the West.
His relative socio-economic status in the
October 10, 1986
West will always be lower than it was in
Russia-that !s, in the West he will never be
so much more important and wealthy than
the rest of society as he was in Russia.
In his book CIA's Secret Operations,
Harry Rositzke, who worked in the CIA for
25 years and with whom I almost came to
blows on a TV program about intelligence/
espionage, described an alleged successful
inducement in the form of rubles. This is ri-
diculous. Rubles buy little wealth in Russia,
since real wealth is actually distributed ac-
cording to official rank-via "closed stores,"
for example.
Therefore, one of the strong motives for a
Soviet high-ranking official to become an
espionage agent for the West has to be ethi-
cal or spiritual (as it was in the case of Pen-
kovsky), that is, connected with a strong re-
alization that the West is right and the
"Soviet State" is wrong.
But here comes a new difficulty. Those
with strong ethical-spiritual motives of this
kind do not usually join even the Commu-
nist Party, let alone the KGB, just as
decent women do not usually go to work at
a brothel. Hence, those with strong ethical-
spiritual motives have as a rule no access to
strategic data of national importance.
Those like Penkovsky are rare, marginal
or mixed cases.
Let us suppose that a Soviet national who
has access to strategic data and yet is not
devoid of strong ethical-spiritual motives
has realized that the West is right and the
"Soviet State" is wrong.
But it's a long way from having this ethi-
cal-spiritual realization to becoming an in-
telligence agent for the West, something in-
finitely more dangerous in Russia than any
other "crime."
NATHAN HALE NO PARIAH
My apartment house is called "Nathan
Hale Gardens." Some day I will take a poll
to see how many tenants know that Hale
was America's espionage agent.
I wonder, though, if anything in the West
has been named after Oleg Penkovsky. To
the new American culture, grown by univer-
sities in the last 20 years, the military are
the country's pariahs, while espionage
agents are pariahs of pariahs.
Quite a few CIA officials themselves have
been explaining at great length that the
CIA is a kind of university, consisting of
scholars, thinkers, analysts, philosophers-
not some, God forbid, spies-and that the
word "intelligence" and the name "CIA"
mean just information, or analysis of infor-
mation. These CIA authors have been avoid-
ing the very word "espionage" as if it re-
ferred to something shameful, almost inde-
cent and certainly having nothing to do
with the CIA.
If this has been the West's attitude
toward espionage on behalf of the free
world, why should a Soviet official or officer
translate his ethical-spiritual endorsement
of the West into infinitely dangerous espio-
nage on behalf of the free world? To be re-
garded by the West as a pariah of pariahs?
However, a Soviet official who may con-
template conducting intelligence informa-
tion for the West does not live In the West.
He has been living in a Soviet environment
where it was drilled into his mind since in-
fancy that no creature on earth is more hei-
nous than a spy for the West-a loathsome
traitor and an unspeakable scoundrel.
If he is uncovered, his wife, his children
and his friends may think of him in just
such terms, while all Soviet media without a
single dissenting voice will depict on mil-
lions of screens and printed pages how mon-
strous he is.
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Yes, Penkovsky was a miracle. A rare sta-
tistic. Agodsend for the West. Yes, 1961 was
the year of triumph for MI-6 and for the
CIA, which had joined MI-6 on the Pen-
kovsky case. A real espionage agent worked
for the West in Russia.
Those billions of dollars taxpayers had
put into the CIA seemed to be now justified
to some degree. It was now only necessary
to preserve Penkovsky for at least 10 years
and then retrieve him.
All was well for about half a year, as long
as Penkovsky met only Winne (a contact au-
thorized by his Soviet chiefs) and went
abroad (a privilege of the chosen few that
he also enjoyed) to pass on his espionage
data on behalf of the free world.
Now in the fall of 1961, MI-6 and the CIA
decided to use their expertise. In the spirit
of an old sloppy spy thriller, they instructed
Penkovsky to approach the wife of a British
embassy official (she was an MI-6 agent)
seated in a park in Moscow with her chil-
dren and present one child with a box of
candy that actually did not contain candy
(Oh, the diabolical joint cunning of MI-6
and the CIA!) but Penkovsky's espionage
data.
Since all members of the British Embassy
in Moscow and their families have always
been watched all round the clock, Pen-
kovsky was destroyed then and there,
though the KGB did not "nab" him on the
spot. of course, but continued to watch him
for about a year, a standard KGB time for
"investigation."
I always wondered what MI-6 and the CIA
meant to tell the KGB by this grandmoth-
erly spy thriller of theirs-that high-rank-
ing Soviet officials are in the charitable
habit of walking about in Moscow's parks
and giving boxes of candy to the families of
members of the British Embassy?
ON 3OTH ANNIVERSARY OF "KHRUSHCHEV'S
SECRET SPEECH"
(By Lev Navrozov)
Yesterday it was 30 years since the dele-
gates to the 20th Congress of the Soviet
Communist Party listened all night to
Nikita Khrushchev's report, according to
which Josef Stalin was not by far the great-
est man in history, nay, an omniscient, kind
and beloved deity, but as a neighbor of ours
put it, "our Hitler, only worse."
No Western intelligence agency is impu-
dent enough to claim it knew anything
about the report when it was delivered.
Even today, 30 years later, it would have
been known to Western intelligence no
more than is, say, the secret "Letter Con-
cerning L.P. Beria," the chief of Stalin's
secret police, had not Khrushchev decided
to pass copies of his report via Tito to the
West and to Poland, where they became
freely available.
WHAT THE CIA DID NOT KNOW
The CIA did not know that:
Khrushchev's report was motivated by his
struggle for power only: in 1955 he still
meant to succeed Stalin as Stalin's "closest
associate." (Allen Dulles, then CIA director,
thought Khrushchev had to deliver his
report under the pressure of anti-Stalinist
public opinion, led by the intelligentsia!)
Khrushchev managed to deliver the
report only due to a trick of his own, taking
advantage of the fact that the Presidium of
the Central Committee was to be formed
after the Congress, not at the congress.
The delegates listened to the report in a
dead silence. (Dulles thought they argued
with Khrushchev!)
The report was a scholarly bureaucratic
treatise, with long quotations (the CIA won-
dered whether the written text of the
"speech" existed).
The report was printed in a closed edition
of about a half million copies and read to
practically the entire able-bodied adult pop?
ulation of Russia at "closed" (secret) meet-
ings.
NATIONAL CONSPIRACY
This last point is especially staggering.
Suppose the entire able-bodied adult popu-
lation of Russia is gathered for secret meet-
ings to listen to a decision to the effect that
a suprise nuclear-missile attack will be
launched on the retaliatory potential of the
West.
Comrades, we are telling you this so that
you could be prepared for nuclear defense
since the enemy may try some counter-
measures in case his retaliatory potential
has not been completely destroyed. But the
enemy should not know this."
If Western intelligence agencies don't
have a single agent even among the ordi-
nary population, as it had none in 1956, the
West would not know the content of such a
decision, known to the entire able-bodied
population of Russia. Therefore, Western
intelligence wouldn't know even the fact
that such secret meetings took place all over
the country, as it didn't know in 1956.
A countrywide conspiracy against the
West is possible, to which practically all the
adult population of Russia would be privy,
while Western intelligence agencies would
read Pr?vd? with an air of great importance
and brag that "space satellites can see even
a hare scampering in a field" (which, inci-
dentally, is not true either).
But what about more narrow higher-level
Soviet conspiracies to which only privileged
strata of the Soviet population are privy? If
the CIA knows nothing even at the Soviet
grass-roots level, how can it presume to
know anything at the highest level which is
infinitely more secret, hidden within thou-
sands of walls, screens and barriers of all
kinds and accessible only to the most privi-
leged few?
NO ANSWER FROM CIA
In my last column (Feb. 5, 1986) I wrote
about my Appeal to the CIA's Information
Review Committee to give the CIA a fair
chance to dissociate itself, on the occasion
of the 30th anniversary of "Khrushchev's
Secret Speech," from the inane canard that
the CIA had allegedly almost purloined the
text of the speech right after the 20th Con-
gress if not at the 20th Congress or before
it.
True, the head of German intelligence,
Reinhard Gehlen, also bragged that his
agency and no other secured the complete
text of the "speech," and certainly had done
so before the CIA or anyone else secured
any text at all.
Similarly, it has been claimed that the Is-
raeli intelligence agency Mossad, and no
other, secured the "speech."
The canard that a Western intelligence
agency purloined Khrushchev's "Secret
Speech" took wind in 1962 with the help of
Dulles himself and has been flying about
since then frantically in all directions.
To begin with, members of each of the
three agencies-the CIA, Reinhard Gehlen's
"ORG" of West Germany and the Mossad
of Israel-have been claiming that their
agency, and no other, acquired the report.
The absurd impression they have been cre-
ating is that Khrushchev's report existed in
one copy, and the only problem is to decide
which intelligence purloined that unique
copy and thus immortalized itself.
It is forgotten that the Soviet bloc coun-
tries have even "closed" newspapers for
their ruling elites, not to mention texts like
Khrushchev's report.
Current and former members of each
agency "leaked" to their favorite journalists
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imaginary colorful details about how their
agency accomplished that "espionage coup
of the century."
Intelligence/espionage authors and who-
ever is not too lazy to write on this subject
have been copying these imaginary details
from each other, embellishing them, adding
what their own imagination suggests and
passing off the resulting concoctions as the
latest inside info, straight from top secret
sources.
Nothing is missing in these yarns: the
CIA's spies in the Kremlin and millions of
dollars in Swiss banks, Gehlen's writing of
Stalin's would-be assassin, Dostoyevskian
love-hate friendship between the head of
the CIA's counterintelligence, James Angle-
ton, and the head of the Italian Communist
Party, Palmiro Togliatti, and whatever a
spythriller author can imagine given unlim-
ited leisure.
Those who have been spinning these
yarns have never noticed that their yarn
not only contradicts all the other yarns, but
is also self-contradictory as such unless it is
all absurd. Reputable book publishers and
publications like the New York Times have
been publishing these yarns as serious
scholarly studies, often complete with
source notes.
Since I am an American citizen, I thought
it behooved me to request the CIA to disso-
ciate itself from these inane boasts on the
occasion of the 30th anniversary of Khru-
shchev's nocturnal delivery of his report.
Let other Western agencies make fools of
themselves by bragging of their imaginary
feat.
Alas, the CIA's Information Review Com-
mittee has answered that it wouldn't be able
to consider my appeal in such a short time.
The fact that the CIA was unable to ac-
quire Khrushchev's report until and unless
Khrushchev sent copies to the West via Tito
and to Poland does not discredit the CIA-
such an operation exceeds by many orders
of magnitude the ability of Western intelli-
gence agencies as they are today.
Something else is deplorable: the event de-
mosntrated that Western intelligence knew
nothing about what was going on in Russia
behind the exterior visible t0 tourists or de-
picted in the Soviet "open" media, that is,
the media available to all, in contrast to the
Soviet multitiered "closed press" available
to Soviet officials according to their rank.
THE CIA AND SOVIET DEFECTION-
REDEFECTION MYSTERIES
(By Lev Navrozov)
When Oleg Penkovsky proposed in 1960 to
become a Western intelligence agent with-
out any renumeration, but just out of sym-
pathy for the West, the CIA rejected him as
an obvious Soviet plant-he was "too good
to be true," in the CIA's opinion.
If British MI-8 had shared this bias-and
fortunately, it did not-the West would
have lost practically the only intelligence
agent it ever had inside the strategic centers
of Russia.
This shows that the bias of viewing any
present or former inhabitant of Russia will-
ing to help the West as "too good to be
true" may lead to disastrous losses of vital
information.
On the other hand, here was Oleg Tu-
manov, adefector working for Radio Liber-
ty for about 20 years. Recently he disap-
peared-presumably redefected. Was he, the
man in charge of broadcasting for Russia, a
Soviet agent all along?
And what was Vitals Yurchenko, who
went back to Russia last November? A KGB
agent who tricked the CIA all along for
some obscured reason? Or a naive minor
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KGB office who first defected, then
changed his mind, and redefected to be shot
as a traitor?
To the CIA and the media he was a riddle
wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma, to
repeat once again a phrase from Churchill's
broadcast on Oct. 1. 1939.
Still earlier another Oleg, Oleg Bitov, a
jounalist and a brother of Andrei Bitov-a
gifted "semidissident" writer whom I knew,
respected and translated into English-de-
fected, and then redefected so strangely
that he was said to have been kidnapped by
the KGB.
How to distinguish between an authentic
defector and a KGB phony?
In Stalin's era, as I recall it, the failure to
spot in one's circle of friends a secret police
informer almost inevitably led to being de-
nounced by him and perishing in Stalin's
camps. Yet my friends and I survived. I had
my trusted friends. They are all alive and
well. None of them turned out to be a secret
police informer. We were able to spot secret
police phonys and avoid them-
How did we do lt?
In a circle of intimate friends-devoted to
things intellectual or spiritual, for exam-
ple-there is always some "key" as in music.
Whatever is off key is out of tune, and
hence a false note.
An intruder trying to be "in" imitates
their "music." but he immediately alerts
them as soon as he opens his mouth, for his
very first "note" is false, and what follows is
cacophonic to the intimate circle's ear. They
freeze and wait for him to slink away.
Now let us assume that I was to determine
in Russia whether a certain American was
an authentic communist sympathizer or a
CIA agent pretending to be such.
I would not have been able to determine
that for two reasons. First since I have
never been a communist, it would have been
difficult for me to sense what was authentic.
Everything ?'communist" would have
seemed to me phony.
Second, though my knowledge of English
was admittedly second to none among the
Russian-born, all Americans seemed to me
more alike than they really were and the
English they spoke seemed to me more uni-
form than it really was.
All that I could tell about an American
correspondent I knew was that he was arI
American and spoke that kind of English
which they speak in the United States.
Recently, 14 years after my sojourn in the
United States, he called me. I neasiy faint-
ed. He sounded so entirely different. Now I
heard not just impersonal "American Eng-
lish," but the language of a particular indi-
vidusl, shaped by his birthplace, childhood,
family life, career, psyche, larynx, mouth
and vocabulary.
Also, I heard not only the meaning of his
words, but also what was behind or under
them: his hesitations, motives emotions, in-
tentions and limitations. I heard how and
why he chose his words, but them together
and articulated them.
That is the CIA's problem. No matter how
good its American-born experts of Russia
and Russian are, all Russians inevitably
seem to them more alike than they really
are, and their Russian more uniform than it
really is. Neither the CIA nor the media
"understood" Oleg Penkovsky, Oleg Bitov,
Vitaly Yurchenko or Oleg Tumanov: they
perceived them each time just as a "Rus-
sian" speaking "that kind of language which
they speak In Russia."
The difference between a defector, defect-
ing out of sympathy for the West., and a
KGB phony crudely imitating that sympa-
thy, was a nuance for beyond their percep-
tion. They heard an alleged defector's
words, not what was behind or below them.
After it was all over with Penkovsky, the
CIA published The Penkowky Papers, con-
sisting of authentic documents (except one
suspicious photograph) and a fake one pur-
porting to be Penkovsky's notes.
To a native Russian, the phoniness of the
fake Penkovsky notes is comical; to him ev-
erything in the document is plainly ridicu-
lous: it is out of character, out of style, off
key all the time. A native Russian can only
laugh reading the "notes." But to the CIA,
the fake document seemed no doubt very
clever.
The question is: how can the CIA distin-
guish aphony KGB defector from a real
one if the CIA considers a laughable fake so
cleverly made that it needs to publish it?
Naturally, few Western-born experts even
noticed that the "diary" was a fake, and
hardly anyone saw its comical crudeness.
Besides, for many in the CIA and the
media it is as difficult to sense a true defec-
tor's, sympathy for the West "as for Lhe
sated to understand the hungry."
In the West, freedom is as abundantly ob-
tainable as food. That someone somewhere
may lack basic freedom and crave for it is as
irreal in the West as that someone some-
where may lack and crave for the food that
American supermarkets throw out because
it is stale or damaged when shipped.
Therefore, to many in the CIA and media,
a defector's sympathy for the West as such
seems somehow phony: "Why should a pros-
perous, high-status Russian give up every-
thing out of sympathy for some Fourth of
July abstractions that few recall here even
on the Fourth of July?"
When an alleged KGB defector conveys
these abstractions in his own language,
American-borli experts can only grasp the
meaning of his words, but not their infinite
psychological overtones; and if he conveys
them in his rudimentary English, it deper-
sonalizes him completely.
Hence, a true defector becomes indistin-
guishable from a KGB phony, and his be-
havior aconundrum that is useless even to
begin to solve.
[From the New York City Tribune, Mar. 26,
1986]
ARMS AGREEMENTS? COMPLIANCE
I)?NVERI!'IABLE BY CIA
(By Lev Navrozov)
There is anever-answered question that
has been asked at least since 1968 when the
Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT)
went ahead, resulting in the SALT-I agree-
ment in 1972:
"Can the compliance of the closed Soviet
regime with such agreements be verified by
the CIA-led intelligence community?"
The CIA hes been vacillating between its
desire to impress the public with its imagi-
nary ability of verification and its fear of
being found out the hard way (perhaps even
in the extreme form of a surprise Soviet
attack on the strategic retaliatory potential
of the West).
May of those inside and outside the U.S.
government in favor of arms negotiations
and agreements have been saying that, yes,
the CIA has been able to verify SALT I and
SALT II, and only secrecy has been prevent-
ing them or the CIA from ever saying any-
thing on the subject beyond this bold pro-
fession of their faith.
X+Y=?
But does their faith prove anything? In
his memoirs published in 1985, Adm. Stans-
field Turner, director of Central Intelli-
gence from 1977 to 1980-that is, when
SALT II was to be ratified-writes:
"The only means I had for calculating
whether the Soviets could cheat was to
October 10, 1986'
figure out the different ways they might at-
tempt it. I had a team of experts pretend
they were malicious, scheming Soviets and
think up techniques for cheating. One idea
they came up with to hide the construction
of new ICBM silos was to build them inside
large buildings and plan to fire the missiles
through the roofs."
To suppose that a missile like an ICBM
can be hidden inside a large building does
not require "team of experts" pretending
they are "malicious, scheming Soviets"; a
child of six could come up with such an
idea. Turner continues:
"I was prepared to say [to the Congress]
that I had X percent confidence that they
could not secretly build more than 100 mis-
sile silos inside buildings without our detect-
ing what was going on, and that our confi-
dence would be X + Y percent by the time
they got to 200."
So, even in 1985 Turner does not say what
"percent confidence" he had in 1978 or
what it was in 1968, when SALT-I began. In
1985 the public was to believe this was still a
secret that could only be denoted by X and
X+Y.
It is statistically true that anyone who
hides a thing runs a certain risk of that
thing being discovered. That risk for 100
hidden items may be designated by X, and
that for 200 by X + Y. So, put In such neat
symbols of school algebra, Turner's verifica-
tion percentages look impeccable.
But if the Soviet military can hide an
ICBM inside a large building, then, even
though the probability of discovery for 100,
200, 2,000 (and so on) ICBMs does increase
theoretically, neither the CIA nor anyone
else can calculate this X, X + Y, X + Y + Z
(and so on). They can exist only as algebraic
symbols, not as calculated specific figures.
Turner takes advantage of secrecy to conceal
the fact that no one can calculate them.
The U.S. government machinery of strate-
gic arms negotiations and agreements has
been rumbling on in the 1980s on the basis
of nothing except a vague national myth
about the CIA's ability at verification.
which the American media have created for
the CIA.
SALT-II was never ratified, since the CIA
has refused to say unequivocally that yes,
SALT-II is verifiable, but has confined Itself
to safe assurances that the CIA's probabili-
ty of discovery of 1D0 Soviet hidden ICBMs
is X and keeps increasing with the number
of hidden Soviet ICBMs.
MOBILE UNKNOWNS
In 1985 Turner spoke only about station-
ary ICBMs, hidden inside buildings, with an
empty algebraic promise that if very many
ICBMS are hidden in this way, there is an X
chance that the CIA will detect "what was
going on."
But there has been something still worse
in store for the West: mobile missile.
The CIA might have detected this danger
in 1969 if it had listened to ex-Soviet leader
Mikita Khrushchev's tapes, as I did. The
following is Khrushchev on tape:
"I think Stalin was still alive then [that is,
it aas in 1953, take or leave a year or two].
When we had created mobile missile sys-
tems, we discussed this question, and gave
up the building of stationary (missiles] and
went over to mobile ones, which were a
better solution.... They could be dispersed
and it was more difficult for intelligence to
establish where these missiles were."
Do you see the meaning of it all? Some-
where between 1952 and no later than 1964,
when Khrushcehv was thrown out of power,
the Soviet military gave up the building of
stationary missiles and went over to mobile
ones for obvious reasons.
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October 10, 1986 CONGRESSIONAL RECORD -SENATE
But Adm. Turner narrates in 1985 that he
explained to the Congress in 1977 to 1980
how the CIA could detect Soviet stationary
(pre-1964?) missiles with a probability equal
to X, etc. What about mobile missiles? The
CIA didn't know that the Soviet military
had switched to them at least 13, if not 28
years earlier?
On Dec. 31, 1985, SALT-II formally ex-
pired. But the Reagan administration has
declared its intention to abide by it at least
np to the spring of 1988, and it is widely be-
lieved that. secret commitments were made
by President Reagan at the summit late in
1985 to that effect. The liberal media have
been egging on the administration: negoti-
ate. negotiate, negotiate.
But if stationary missiles are unknowns-
they could be hidden in large buildings-
mobile missiles are mobile unknowns, which
the CIA does not even presume to detect
with a probability equal to X.
Only espionage agents inside the Kremlin
could have yielded such information, but
the CIA has, practically, never had any, and
has been relying on space surveillance in
the hope of photo-graphing Soviet station-
ary missiles hidden behind walls-which has
been futile anyway since at least 1964, when
the Soviet building of mobile missiles began.
[From the New York City Tribune, Apr. 2,
1986]
ILLUSIONS ON WHICH CIA WAS FOUNDED 4O
YEARS Aco
(By Lev Navrozov)
The birth of the CIA 40 years ago was
based on several American illusions.
Since it is no problem to buy any commod-
ity on sale in the United States if you have
enough money, there originated a delusion
that intelligence/espionage will also be
available if Congress pays enough money
for it.
Since American corporations like General
Motors are fairly efficient, there originated
a delusion that a government non-profit bu-
reaucracy will be also fairly efficient if orga-
nized along the lines of General Motors to
produce intelligence/espionage data.
Since many gifted Americans are paid sal-
aries, there originated a delusion that every
American was gifted in intelligence/espio-
nage if he was paid a salary.
Since Soviet spies penetrated during
World War II and thereafter even the U.S.
top secret atomic laboratory, which was
completely isolated in a remote practically
desert area, there originated a delusion that
an American who is paid a salary for intelli-
gence/espionage would similarly be able to
penetrate the innermost recesses of Stalin's
Russia.
FROM OMAHA TO THE KREMLIN
We know how the CIA was born due to
someone who joined it at its birth worked in
it for 25 years, and then wrote memoirs. His
name is Harry Rositzke.
I would read his and other such books as
comical writing except that their meaning is
tragic. Anyway, Rositzke wrote his memoirs
in dead earnest. He takes himself for the
CIA's master spy who has given the taxpay-
ers more than the value of his salary they
paid him for 25 years. So let us begin with
Rositzke himself.
Who the hell would imagine that a Ro-
sitzke, who was born in Brooklyn, studied
German at Harvard and taught English in
Omaha, could penetrate, say, a Soviet mili-
tary laboratory in Kungur?
Did Rositzke know a word of Russian or
any other of the more than 130 languages of
Russia? Or was it assumed that English or
German was spoken in Kungur, and so Ro-
sitzke would speak with the local populace
in his Brooklyn-Omaha English or his Har-
vard German? Was Kungur thought to be
like Brooklyn, Omaha or Harvard?
What does the teaching of English in
Omaha have to do with espionage in
Russia? What did Rositzke know about the
subject? Why on earth was he thought to be
more gifted in the field than in heart sur-
gery, weight lifting or the composition of a
concerto for violin and orchestra?
FUTURE SPIES IN THE KREMLIN
Rositzke did us a great service by listing
also the occupations of those of his new col-
leagues whom he came to know best. These
were:
Two journalists. Excellent! They would
send their messages from a secret laborato-
ry in Kungur as newspaper reports, with by-
line and ail.
A state trooper from the Midwest. Fantas-
tic! He would be a sports coach at a local
school.
Several sons of missionaries. Splendid!
They would convert some atheists at the
Kungur laboratory in the process of espio-
nage.
A lawyer. Magnificent! He would talk in
Kungur. Lawyers know how to do it.
A postal clerk. My God! He could get a job
at the local post office and read all letters.
Several high-school and college teachers
(like Rositzke). They would find no more
difficulty than Rositzke himself in passing
themselves off in Kungur for itinerant
circus acrobats, for example. Surely the nas-
cent CIA could teach them somersaults or
whatever.
True, there was one defect in them all.
None of these future spies in Kungur of the
Kremlin knew a word of any of Russia's 130
languages. Away-out seemed to be for all of
them to pretend that they were deafmutes.
REHASHED WISDOM
Once on his job, Rositzke decided to learn
something about Russia-to train himself
on the job, as they say. How? By reading
Soviet books and magazines.
In 1973, that is, about 25 years later, Ro-
sitzke published a book of his own, entitled
The USSR Today. Needless to say, I've
tracked It down to see what he produced
after 25 years of his salaried sojourn in the
CIA. I hardly need to say that the CIA's es-
pionage did not move an inch during those
25 years. But here was at least Rositzke's
book.
Thousands of Americans write books
about Russia by rehashing other books
about Russia. written by rehashing still
other books about Russia. So after 25 years
of his salaried sojourn in Washington Ro-
sitzke churned out in the same way his book
about Russia: it is thin, and hence subse-
quent experts on Russia will have little to
rehash.
Otherwise here are three of Rositzke's re-
hashed "truths about Russia":
The "average Soviet factory worker is
better off than the 20 million Americans at
the bottom of the income ladder";
"Marxism-Leninism appeals to countless
men"; and
The "Soviet record in public health is out?
standing."
It is not clear why Rositzke should have
struck it out for 25 years in the CIA to pen
this rehash one could learn straight from
any Soviet propaganda pamphlet in English
on sale to Washington for 50 cents a copy.
Had Rositzke seen a single Soviet factory
worker in the flesh in a town like Kungur?
How did Rositzke know that Marxism-Len-
inism appealed even to Brezhnev? What did
Rositzke know about Soviet public health
except what was written about it in Soviet
propaganda?
S 15909
TOP SECRET
But it took Rositzke 25 years In the CIA
to obtain these gems of rehashed wisdom,
while at the birth of the intelligence
agency, Rositzke was yet to begin reading in
absolute top secrecy what-Pravda? No, of
course, not. In those days Pravda was not
published in English. But fortunately, sever-
al Soviet glossy propaganda magazines were.
These Rositzke would read in absolute top
secrecy until he knew Russia enough to pen-
etrate the Kremlin or at least Kungur.
In absolute top secrecy did Rositzke ar-
range for subscriptions to several such peri-
odicals. His job was so secret that even his
wife was not supposed to know that her hus-
band was the Chief of Special Projects Divi-
sion/Soviet, Strategic Services Unit. Indeed.
Harry Rositzke didn't exist any more. He
used cover names from now on, say, Dick
Appel and when Dick Appel was asked
where he worked, he had to say: "At the
State Department" or name some other in-
nocuous place. Of course, the Soviet maga-
zines were to arrive at some innocent Post
Office Box.
Finally, the first of them did, postmarked
Moscow. Inside his absolutely top Secret Di-
vision within an absolutely top secret Unit,
Dick Appel picked up the package from his
in-basket and read the Moscow label on the
brown wrapper.
Harry Rositzke
Chief, Special Projects
Division/Soviet
Strategic Services Unlt
2430 E Street
Washington. DC.
[Fmm the New York City Tribune, Apr. 18,
1988]
HOW THE CIA BORES THE U.$. CONGRESS
.STZF!
(By Lev Navrozov)
The CIA has been testifying before vari-
ous congressional committees, and whatever
sanitized version is released for the press, I
collect it, so that now I have a huge stack of
the CIA's testimonies dating back as early
as 1959.
As a random sample, I pull out from the
stack a typewrittern release for the press:
the CIA's testimony before the Joint Eco-
nomic Committee on Sept. 14, 1983, entitled
USSR: Economic Trends and Policy DeveZ-
opmenG
In the 1980s a member of the U.S. Con-
gress would not mind hearing from the CIA
how the Politburo harnesses all available
economic sources to maximize Its global
might, and when the later will be sufficient
in the Politburo's estimation to put an end
to the United States by striking at Its retali-
atory nuclear missile potential.
But there is something more important
for the CIA to testify about. Hark ye, U.S.
senators and representatives: "Production
[in 1982] of fruits and vegetables reached
record levels .
This is what the CIA learned from Soviet
"open" (that is, freely available) reference
books, Lhoueh as usual the CIA give no
source note. The Congress is to suppose that
the CIA has received this strategic informa-
tion via intelligence/espionage, and so no
sources could be given.
Imagine a dark, rainy .night, when all
KGB counterintelligence agents stay at
home