US SENDS NEW ARMS TO REBELS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070039-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: May 7, 1986
• Content Type: LETTER

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U.S. Sends
New Arms
To Rebels
A f ghans, Angolans
Get Stinger Missiles
In Change of Policy
By David B. Ottaway
and Patrick E. Tyler
IllasAmagton Past SW( Writers
The Rea
hesitahn or
bat
adminis
the IL v `37;
in sev r !
be
tinier missiles covcrtiv to lin*
communist rebels in Angola and Af-
ghadistan, informed sources said
yesterday.
The decision, which has been
closely held among the president's
national security affairs advisers
since it was made earlier this
month, marks a major shift in U.S.
policy. Shipments of top-of-the-line
American arms to such insurgents
had been barred in favor of furnish-
ing largely Soviet- and Chinese-
made weapons bought on the inter-
national arms market or from U.S.
allies.
The change in policy is certain to
broaden involvement of the Central
Intelligence Agency in Third World
conflicts and appears likely to es-
calate the fighting in Afghanistan
and Angola, where Soviet helicop-
ter gunships have inflicted heavy
casualties on rebels forces in the
past year.
The shift occurred after activists
in the Pentagon and the CIA,
backed by conservatives in the Sen-
ate and elsewhere, overcame op-
position by officials in the State De-
partment, as well as some in the
CIA. Opponents of the change long
have argued that introduction of
U.S.-made weapons into Third
World conflicts escalates those
struggles into U.S.-Soviet confron-
tations. Those situations pose
touchy problems for neighboring
states attempting to maintain a neu-
tral diplomatic posture while pro-
viding a route for U.S.-backed arms
shipments.
See STINGER, AI6, CAL 1
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved
for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070039-0
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070039-0
A16 SI ?11.11. NI,01.11 3o. I inif,
U.S. Sending
Missiles to
Third World
STINGER, From Al
Introduction of such weapons
also makes it more difficult for the
U.S. government to maintain a pos-
ture of "plausible deniability" of its
involvement in such conflicts.
A White House spokesman said
the administration had no comment
on whether Stinger heat-seeking
antiaircraft missiles have been pro-
vided to rebels in the two countries.
Nor would he comment on reports
that Stingers might also be sent to
the U.S.-backed contras, or coun-
terrevolutionaries, fighting the San-
dinista government in Nicaragua.
The Stinger decisioniolloweclAhe
Feb. 25 rec2mmendation 421 an in-
tervenor committee made up of
sensor representatives tem the
1)eoartment CI Defense
Department ? the National Se-
contr staff\ The commil-
teei , meet&nenodicallr I the
Wute}fousesiva.. room or in
ice orpurwirr...f.
_ ? fog
run 2
ra
er the past year, the inter-
agency review of U.S. covert para-
military operations concluded that
Soviet-backed forces were employ-
ing more lethal weaponry and more
aggressive tactics against muja-
hadeen rebels in Afghanistan and
against the guerrilla army of Jonas
Savimbi in Angola.
One intelligence estimate indi-
cates that roughly one-third of So-
viet special forces units, trained for
counterinsurgency and night com-
bat roles, have been deployed to
Afghanistan where they have in-
flicted heavy casualties.
In Angola, a large column of So-
viet-made tanks and armored ve-
hicles backed by helicopter gun-
ships and MiG21 and MiG23 jet
fighters are poised for an offensive
expected in the next 60 days to rid
he Marxist central government of
Savinibi's 10-year-old insurgency.
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/06 CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070039-0
Rebels in both coolant's lwve
been opposing the increased air
'hreat with Soviet-made, shoulder.
fired SA7 missiles and have com-
plained that their range?less than
two miles?is not sufficient to
thwart "stand-ofr attacks by heavi-
ly armored Soviet gunships. The
rebels also have complained about
the reliability of Soviet SA7s, whose
battery-driven electronics appar-
ently are subject to frequent failure.
The Stinger, a state-of-the-art
antiaircraft missile made by Gen-
eral Dynamics Corp. and supplied to
only a few U.S. allies, is a far more
lethal weapon than the SA7 the
United States has been supplying to
the Afghan rebels. The Stinger has
a range of up to five miles and em-
ploys a supercooled sensor to lock
on to aircraft heat emissions and is
not easily fooled by decoy flares
fired by Soviet helicopters.
In a letter to Reagan last month,
a group of conservative senators
estimated that Stingers could im-
prove the "kill" capabilities of rebel
forces facing Soviet military aircraft
by three to ten times.
The CIA's clandestine service
chief, Clair George, was described
by sources as a strong proponent of
the Stinger decision. George, who
has been credited by CIA Director
William J. Casey with rebuilding the
agency's paramilitary arm, repre-
sented the CIA in the interagency
deliberations. Casey visited Africa
this month to meet with Savimbi
and assure him that "effective" an-
tiaircraft weapons were on the way,
sources said.
The administration has been un-
der pressure for months from con-
servative senators Ind political ac-
tion groups to provide US. weap-
ons to the anticommunist insur-
gents. The CIA and State Depart-
ment have been criticized by these
groups for dragging their feet.
A key event in the Stinger deci-
sion, according to sources, was a
meeting on March 5 between Sec-
retary of State George P. Shultz
and a group of mostly conservative
senators led by Senate Majority
Leader Robert J. Dole (R-Kan.).
During the 70-minute meeting in
Dole's office, Shultz was pressed
Four different times to move quidcly
to provide Stingers to Angolan reb-
el leader Savimbi and to the Afghan
mujahadeen resistance. Each time,
iccording to sources, Shultz asked
the senators: "Are you sure you
want me to go back to Bill Casey
Ind tell him you want Stingersr
All nodded and said, "Yes," the
iources said.
the
week
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ese shipments amvunng t e
?
past week, a source said.
Some conservatives have voiced
private criticism of the Stinger de-
cision, saying that the original pro-
posal to help "freedom fighters"
with American weapons called for
thousands of U.S. antiair and anti-
tank missiles to be provided to
U.S.-backed insurgents in Nicara-
gua and Cambodia as well as Af-
ghanistan and Angola.
An administration official said the
House and Senate intelligence over-
sight committees were notified of
the Stinger decision late last week.
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