NEW YORK TIMES ARTICLE BY MICHAEL GORDON ON CIA - 16 JULY 1986

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: July 16, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070009-3
25X1
25X1
25X1
2'
25X1
25X1
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070009-3
'Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070009-3
A 1
THE NEW YORK TIMES, WEDNESDAY, JULY 16, 19a6
CIA., Evaluating Soviet Threat,
Often Is Not So Grim as Pentagon
By MICHAEL R. GORDON
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, July 15 ? When
Representative John Edward Porter
was contesting the Pentagon's case for
developing new chemical weapons last
year, he adopted an unusual tactic;
He turned to the Central Intelligence
Agency.
Mr. Porter, an Illinois Republican,
arranged a closed briefing for the
House Appropriations Committee at
which the C.I.A. delivered an evalua-
tion- of the ,Soyiet phemical warfare
threat The 'analysis was less ominous
P 441. o e .entagon, as the Army
?clitef of Staff;_Gen. John A. Wickham
fias ?acknowledged in Congres-
sional testimony. The C.I.A. view, Gen-
eral. Wickham said, is that "there is
less:intention to use chemical weapons
anci:$: therefore,. probably less of a
threat.'!: ,-
4ndependent lAola continues
The C.LA. still views Soviet military
capabilities as a threat. But on a num-
ber a major issue.% the Cj.A. has pre-
sented ,..less grin picture of Soviet
'military programs than thet.offered
the. Pentagon twig Casp**44.,Nei4-
berger and by othej. senior AdniiNstra-
tion officials. '.', '; ?
To many -Adrainistration:: o
and members Of Congress, ? this sug-
gests that the agency, under William J.
Casey, has generally maintained its
tradition of independence and objec-
tivity on Soviet military issues even as
the Reagan Administration has taken
policy in a more conservative direc-
tion.
This independence, they say, stems
in part from the fact that the C.I.A. pro-
vides intelligence to a variety of Gov-
ernment agencies and increasingly to
Congress and thus is less vulnerable to
bureaucratic pressures than it would
be if it reported to only one agency.
The C.I.A. analyses also...suggest to
some members of CongresssOksome
AdministrOon off icials.bavFexagger-
ated Siiviet military capabilities in or-
der to win support or the Pentagon's
spending requests. ?
"I think that the C.I.A. has probably
driven Secretary Weinberger and some
in the Department of Defense up the
wall by reporting accurately on Soviet
threats and not just saying what every-
body wants for a budget hearing," said
Senator Patrick J. Leahy, the Vermont
Democrat who is vice chairman of the
Senate Intelligence Committee.
..:. Pentagon officials say, however, that
military intelligence officials generally
err on the side of caution in projecting
Soviet capabilities so that the Amer-
ican military will not be caught short in
a conflict.
4:The C.I.A. has challenged a number
of important Pentagon assertions and
has issued findings that undermine ar-
guments made by White House and
other Administration officials:
? (lit has disputed Pentagon assertions
that the Soviet SS-19 missile has the ac-
curacy to be an effective first-strike
weapon.
flIt has concluded that the United
States previously exaggerated the
yield of the Soviet underground tests of
nuclear weapons and has adopted a
new method for estimating the tests'
explosive power, which haethe effect
of lowering United States estimates.
This has raised questions about White
House allegations that the Soviet Union
has violated the 1974 Threshold ?Test
? Ban Treaty, ' ?
gIt has provided a more cautious
reading thamthat of some Administra-
? tion officials of the pace of Soviet re-
search on antimissile systems. 'It has
also raised questions about the mili-
tary usefulness of a new Soviet radar
facilty that is under construction in
central Siberia, which the Administra-
tion has repeatedly suggested may be
part of e future Soviet antimissile net-
glt has contradicted some Adminis-
tration statements that the Soviet
Union could not signifm.ntly expand its
forces if the limits in he second strate-
gic arms treaty are dropped.
? gIt has disputed Pentagon estimates
of Soviet military spending and has
concluded that Soviet spending on new
weapons has been flat for years.
The agency's assessments on these
and other issues have clearly become a
source of consternation for hard-line
conservatives on Capitol Hill.
Senator Jesse Helms, for example,
sent Mr. Casey a letter last fall that
castigated the agency for "the long-
standing habit of the C.I.A. of under-
estimating Soviet intentions and mili-
tary capabilities." Senator Helms sug-
gested that the C.I.A.'s estimates be re-
vised to present a more threatening
view of Soviet military programs.
It is not possible to assess independ-
ently the validity of some of the C.I.A. 's
findings. But some of the agency's con-
clusions, such as the one on the yield of
Soviet tests, are supported by studies
by experts outside the Government.
C.I.A. Has Some Shelter
From Political Pressures
The C.I.A. is generally regarded as
less subject to institutional pressures
than other Government intelligence
agencies. Unlike the Defense Intelli-
gence Agency, which produces intelli-
gence reports solely for the Pentagon,
the C.I.A. serves a number of Govern-.
ment agencies and, increasingly, Con-
gress.
As a result, officials say the C.I.A.
doet not have to worry that the agency
receiving an intelligence estimate has
a stake in how the estimate comes out.
But the C.I.A. has not been immune
from some political pressures. In the
mid-1970's, some conservatives as-
sailed the agency for understAting the
Soviet threat. A panel of hard-line for-
mer officials and experts, called
"Team B," was established by the
White House to critique the agency's
performance.
After Ronald Reagan was elected
President, conservatives continued
their effort to influence the agency and
make it a special target for "re-educa-
tion," as one conservative put it at the
time.
rI,frin Part - Sanitized Coov Approved for Release 2012/11/07 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070009-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070009-3
'These initial efforts by conservatives
and the appointment of Mr. Casey as
Director of Central Intelligence led to
worries on the part of some members
of Congress, including some members
of the intelligence committees; that the
C.I.A. might alter its analyses to re-
flect the policies of the new Adminis-
tration.
By all accounts, Mr. Casey has held
to his conservative views on matters of
policy. In private White House meet-
ings, he has skied with Defense Secre-
tary Weinberger and other critics of
the second strategic arms treaty in
urging President Reagan to repudiate
the treaty, officials report. And Mr.
Casey has played up the Soviet threat
in his speeches and has sometimes de-
scribed Soviet military programs in
terms that are starker than his agen-
cy's own analyses.
But while Mr. Casey has shown an in--
terest in improving the quality of his
agency's analyses, there is no evidence
that he has sought, for political rea-
sons, to influence the substance of intel-
ligence reports on the Soviet Union or ,
East-West relations.
Officials say he appears to have left I
considerable latitude to his profes-
sional or career deputies, such as Rob-
ert M. Gates, an expert on the Soviet
arms control who was deputy director
of the C.I.A. foc intelligence and who
now is the agency's No. 2 official.
"I am generally satisfied with the
quality of the information we receive,"
said Senator William S. Cohen, Repub-
lican of Maine, a member of the Intelli-
gence Committee and the Armed Serv-
ices Committee. "I do not think that it
is biased or ideologically slanted."
"Whether Casey is delegating au-
thority to Gates or whether Gates is
taking the ball and running with it, the
reports are pretty high grade," said
Mr. Cohen.
"We get good stuff," said Senator
Dave Durenberger, the Minnesota Re-
publican who heads the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee, referring to agency
reports on Soviet military develop-
ments and strategic issues. "I believe
that Bill Casey knew that he had a real
good President but one that was an
..inemerienced international politician.
-
This President is only served by hard:
fact."
Another sign of independence is that
analysts who are ideologically diverse
have been appointed to important posi-
tions under Mr. Casey, said Stephen M.
Meyer, an associate professor of politi-
cal science at the Massachusetts Insti-
tute of Technology who specializes in
Soviet military matters and serves as a
consultant to the agency.
Some experts, such as Mr. Durenber-
ger, drew a distinction between C.I.A.
analyses on Soviet military develop-
ment, which they deem to be objective,
and the agency's reports on Central
America.
"In terms of Central America, We
sometimes get something that looks?
like an analyst's product that really
ain't, like reports that the contras will
?be able to win' under,,certain -circum-
stances,"41 said 'Mr.'- Durenberger.
"Some of that stuff is cooked.!!. ;
But other members of Congress,
such as Mr. Leahy, said that even in
this area, the C.I.A. had been objec-
tive.
Asked about C.I.A4findings on Soviet
military issues, a senior intelligence of-
ficial said the agency had prepared
threatening analyses that have not be-
come publicly known.
"This matter of differences between
policy and intelligence assessments,
including on strategic and arms control
issues, is vastly exaggerated," the sen-
ior official said. "The overwhelming
number of policy decisions are based
on, or consistent with, the intelligence
policy-makers receive."
But some experts say agency offi-
cials do not want their independence to
be highlighted because they fear it will
make them more vulnerable to conser-
vative pressure. "They want to be per-
ceived as being on the right so that they
will be left alone," said Mr. Meyer.
Robert B. Sims, chief Pentagon
spokesman, said, "We know that intel-
ligence analysts do differ and it is
worthwhile to have different analyses,
but on the basic issues, we believe
there is considerable agreement." Mr.
Sims noted, for example, that both the
C.I.A. and the Defense Intelligence
Agency agreed that the Soviet Union
was producing a "staggering" amount
of weapons.
Differing Assessments
About.Soviet Missiles
The C.I.A. has prepared a number of
important assessments in the area of
Soviet strategic forces that run counter
to assertions by the Reagan Adminis-
tration and the White House.
One critical judgment has do with the
SS-19 missile. In the late 1970's, intelli-
gence officials expressed concern that
the accuracy of Soviet missiles, partic-
ularly the SS-18 and the SS-19, was im-
proving more quickly than expected.
This concern had important political
significance and figured in the heated
debate in the late 1970's and in the 1980
Presidential campaign. In that cam-
paign Mr. Reagan said the Carter Ad-
ministration had allowed the opening
of the "window of vulnerability," the
notion that American missiles were
becoming vulnerable to Soviet attack.
But last year, a C.I.A. analysis circu-
lating through the Government said the
the SS-19 missile was less accurate
than previously supposed. Based on the
new estimates, the missile should no
longer be considered an effective first-
strike weapon, according to govern-
ment experts. Senior Pentagon offi-
cials continue to disagree with this
C.I.A. view.
Both the Pentagon and the C.I.A.
agree that the Soviet Union's 308 SS-18
missiles still give the Soviet Union a
substantial capability to attack United
States missile silos.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07:
irf another important development,
the C.I.A. revised its methodology for
estimating the yield of Soviet under-
ground nuclear tests based on seismic
monitoring, an action that has under-
cut the Administration's charge of
Soviet arms control violations.
The old methodology had led the Ad-
ministration to conclude that the Soviet
Union has probably violated the limits
of the unratified threshold test ban
treaty. But questions had been raised
by experts on seismology as to whether
that methodology took sufficient ac-
count of geological differences in the
United States and the Soviet Union.
While panels of nongovernmental ex-
perts commissioned by the Air Force
and the Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency had suggested that
the procedures be changed, Richard N.
Perle, Assistant Defense Secretary, op-
posed the move, arguing that seismic
readings are not a sound basis for
evaluating Soviet testing.
Despite these objections, the C.I.A.
adopted the new procedures in Janu-
ary. This move has the general effect of
lowering Government estimates of the
yield of Soviet underground tests by
about 20 percent.
Under the new estimating proce-
dures, some Soviet tests still appear to
be over the limit, but seismologists
generally believe that the results are
within the realm of uncertainty.
Radar Facility in Siberia
Is Focus of One Debate
C.I.A. analyses have also raised I
questions about Administration asser-
tions on Soviet research and develop-
ment of antimissile technologies.
Administration officials have sug-
gested that a large phased-array radar
that is under construction at Abalakova
in central Siberia may be part of a fu-
ture nationwide missile defense of the
Soviet Union. Indeed, the suggestion
that the Soviet Union may be moving to
deploy It defensive system has become
one of the principal Pentagon argu-
ments in behalf of President Reagan's
Strategic Defense Initiative.
But C.I.A. analysts have provided a
more cautious reading of the purpose
and capabilities of the Abalakova
radar, an interpretation that Mr.
Leahy said reflected one of the "big-
gest differences" between Pentagon
and I A officials.
While not excluding the possibility
that the radar could be intended as an
element of an antimissile system, the
C.I.A. has raised questions in a care-
fully worded statement about whether
the facility would be effective in that
role. It is the only Government agency
publicly to do so.
The C.I.A. for example, has noted
that the facility would be very vulner-
able to American attack. In written re-
sponse to questions from Senator Wil-
liam Proxmire, Mr. Gates, the agen-
cy's No. 2 official, said, "Because such
radars are fixed and they are key nodes
for an A.B.M. systems's capability,
there will always be an issue of
whether, an A.B.M. system is worth
,having, which depends to a great ex-
tent on a few potentially quite vulner..
CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070009-3
25X1
? Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070009-3
?'This view was in line with a classified
1984 assessment entitled-"Implications
of a New Soviet Phased Array Radar,"
which Administration officials have
said was drafted by? C.I.A. officials
with input from other parts of the intel-
ligence community.
In another case, the C.I.A. has dis-
puted Energy Department assess-
ments about the pace of the Soviet pro-
gram to develop antimissile systems
powered by nuclear explosions.
? Last year Secretary of Energy John
S. Herrington, whose department is
sponsoring American research on nu-
clear antimissile systems, said the
Soviet Union was "substantially
ahead" in this area. Mr. Herrington
said the Soviet Union might be able to
deploy an X-ray laser, which is pow-
ered by a nuclear explosion, "with no
additional testing."
But the C.I.A., in a letter to Repre-
sentative Edward J. Markey, said, IV
"The C.I.A. does not believe that the
Soviet Union can deploy nuclear-driven
directed-energy weapons without con-
ducting additional explosive tests."
The C.I.A. has also generally, said it
will take the Soviet Union loner to de-
velop laser and particle-beam anti-
missile and anti-satellite weaibons than
has been forecast in Soviet Military
Power, an annual publication of the
Pentagon that primarily reflects the
view of the Defense Intelligence Agen-
cy. Recently, however, the publication
has tended to take a more cautious
view that more closely resembles
C.I.A. assessments.
Sometimes, It Is C.I.A.
Painting Grim Picture
Still, it is clear that the C.I.A. doef
not always view Soviet systems asles
threatening than other agencies do.
And officials said there also were cases
in which Pentagon intelligence officials
had lowered their estimates of the
capabilities of Soviet weapons, bring.;
ing them more in line with C.I.A. ar.
sessments. ?
Officials report that Lawrence K.
Gershwin, the national intelligence
officer for strategic programs at the
C.I.A., gives greater credence than do
Defense Intelligence Agency ? officials
to the possibility that Soviet SS-18 Mis-
siles may be deployed with more than
10 warheads. 1
' The C.I.A. view, reflected in the Na-
tional Intelligence Estimate, a high-
level Government intelligence analysis
provided to the President, is that the
missile may have up to 14 warheads,
while the Defense Intelligence Agency
view is that the missile probably has 10
warheads. The missile has never been
tested with more than 10 warheads.
On the second point, the Defense In-
telligence Agency last year lowered its
estimate of the range of the Soviet
Backfire bomber and brought it within
the scope of previous C.I.A. estimates.
In the view of some Administration of-
ficials, the move undercut the Adminis-
tration assertion that the bomber
should be treated as a weapon with in-
gercontinental capability in . Ge4e.ya
:arms,. talks. ,
But while acknowledging ' these
cases, officials also point to arms con-
trol, East-West policy issuee and mili-
tary spending as areas in which the
C.I.A. has departed from some Admin-
istration assertions.
Strategic Arms Treaty
An Object of Contention
C.I.A. analyses, for example, differ
with some of the arguments used by the
Administration to support its decision
to repudiate the second strategic arms
treaty of 1979.
Administration critics of the treaty
have argued that the unratified treaty
had no restraining effect on Soviet mili-
tary programs and that dropping it
would not make much diffeyence.
But C.I.A. officials have publicly
suggested Otherwise. In 1982 Congres-,
sional testimony, Mr. Gates said the-
strategic arms treaties might have had
a restraining effect on Soviet military.
spending. The "decisions to comply,
with SALT I and the unratified SALT II
treaty also may have slowed the pace.
of procurement in certain areas," he ?
said.
The C.I.A. has also noted that aban-
doning the treaty limits would allow a
further expansion of the Soviet force
with little additional effort by Moscow.
According to the agency analyses,
the Soviet Union could build up its force.
from about 9,000 warheads to about
16,000 if treaty limits are maintained
until the mid-1990's. But if the treaty
limits are abandoned, the Soviet Union
could expand its arsenal of missi10*
warheads to 21,000 by stepping up Its
strategic program, though the C.I.A. '
has said that even this would not in-
volve a "maximum effort."
In another difference, C.I.A. ? ana-
lysts have also questioned in internal
deliberations some of the Administra-
tion's arguments for its proposed ban
on Soviet long-range mobile missiles in
a new arms treaty, officials report.'
The Reagan Administration, in a
policy switch last November, proposed'
a ban on long-range mobile missiles,
where the Soviet have a lead, and justi-
fied the ban on the ground that limits on
mobile missiles cannot be verified.' ?
But one Administration official said,
"the C.I.A. does not want to be associ-
ated with the mobile ban," adding, "it .
does not think that verification prob- ?
lems are all that different" from inter-
mediate-range forces, where the
United States has proposed verification
measures for Soviet mobile missiles.
On general East-West issues, the
C.I.A. prepared analyses early in the-
Reagan Administration that did not
support the Administration's asser-
tions' that Western allies could be in-
duced to support the United States ef-
fort to block construction of a pipeline
to transport Siberian natural gas to
Western Europe and that such an effort
could be successful. The analyses upset
some National Security Council staff
members who wanted to mount an?ef-
forttP block the pipeline.
."
Disagreements Continue
On Soviet Arms Budget
A further area where there has been
open disagreement between the C.I.A.
and the Pentagon is the level of Soviet
military spending.
The C.I.A. says that Soviet spending
from 1974 to 1982 has increased at a
rate of about 2 percent a year, once the
effects of inflation are discounted. The
C.I.A. analyses have also concluded
that Soviet spending on new weapons
has been essentially flat from 1974 to
1982. This represents a change from the
mid-1960's through the early 1970's
when Soviet military spending was
growing at a more rapid rate.
?The Defense Intelligence Ageircrhak
now come around to the C.I.A. view
about past spending trends, but the two
agencies continue to differ over the
current rate of Soviet spending, .with
the Defense Intelligence Agency seeing
a somewhat higher level.
The significance of the C.I.A. assess-
ment is that it indicates that Soviet
military planning operates somewhat
independently of the swings in military
spending in the United States and sug-
gests that the Soviet military industry
suffers from industrial bottlenecks.
This analysis runs counter to initial
Administration assertions that the
Soviet Union is engaged in a continued
escalation of the arms race.
The estimates also "weaken the view
that the Soviet Union is a dual economy
' composed of an inefficient, relatively
backward civilian industry and a mod-
em defense industry," wrote Richard
F. Kaufman, the assistant director of
the Joint Economic Committee, which
holds annual hearings on the issue of
Soviet military spending.
"Casey sometimes shoots from the
hip," Mr. Kaufman said. "But he has
not tried to impose his views on the in-
stitution when it comes to the analyti-
cal side. The analysts on Soviet and
East European developments are ob-
jective. They deserve a lot of credit." ?
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070009-3
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07: CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070009-3
Senator Jesse Helms criti-
cized agency's "underesti-
mating Soviet intentions
and military capabilities."
Associated Press
Senator Patrick .1. Leahy said he
thought the C.I.A. reported accu-
rately on Soviet threat.
1.
The New York Times
"I am generally satisfied
with the quality of infor-
mation," said Senator Wil-
liam S. Cohen of reports.
"We get good
stuff," said Sena-
tor Dave Duren-
berger, Intelli-
gence Committee
chairman, dis-
cussing C.I.A.
analyses.
United Press International
t..
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/11/07 : CIA-RDP90B01390R000100070009-3