U.S. POLICY TOWARDS INDIA AND PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R001501920022-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: October 6, 2010
• Sequence Number: 22
• Publication Date: October 11, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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THE WHITE HOUSE
SECRET
October 11, 1984
MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE GEORGE BUSH
The Vice President
THE HONORABLE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
The Secretary of State
THE HONORABLE CASPAR W. WEINBERGER
The Secretary of Defense
THE HONORABLE DAVID A. STOCKMAN
Director of the Office of
Management and Budget
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM CASEY
Director of Central Intelligence
THE HONORABLE M. PETER McPHERSON
Administrator of the Agency for
International Development
Executive Registry
84- 9403
SYSTEM II
90988
SUBJECT: U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan (S)
The President has approved the attached National Security
Decision Directive on U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan.
(S)
Attachment
NSDD-147
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THE WHITE HOUSE
Na-tLona.t Security
Deciz.ion D.inec.t.Lve 147
October 11, 1984
SYSTEM II
90988
U.S. Policy Towards India and Pakistan (S)
Assessment
The Soviet expansionary thrust into Afghanistan and the collapse
of the Shah in Iran have heightened the strategic significance of
the South Asian region for U.S. global interests. Enhanced U.S.
relations with India and Pakistan, coupled with a gradual
Sino-Indian rapprochement, would weaken Soviet influence in the
Subcontinent and undermine Moscow's subjugation of Afghanistan.
Conversely, severe internal instability in Pakistan or India, or
another Indo-Pakistani conflict, would have serious adverse
consequences for Western interests, strengthen Moscow's grip on
Afghanistan, challenge Pakistan's viability, and provide new
opportunities for Soviet expansionism in South and Southwest
Asia. (S)
This Administration has bolstered Pakistan's capability to resist
growing Soviet pressures while supporting Afghan freedom
fighters. Our aid gives Pakistan a sense of security and an
incentive to forego a nuclear weapons program. Stronger
U.S.-Pakistani relations contribute to U.S. objectives in the
Persian Gulf region, where Pakistan maintains close security and
political ties. Problems continue, however, in other areas --
particularly nuclear policy, human rights, and textiles. (S)
We have enjoyed some success in improving relations with India
beginning with the 1981 Cancun Summit. Mrs. Gandhi visited the
U.S. Vice-President Bush and Secretary Shultz visited India.
Bilateral economic, scientific, technological, and cultural links
are slowly expanding, and the groundwork is being laid for
widened technology transfer, including new arms sales. Serious
differences persist regarding U.S. arms sales to-Pakistan,
India's unsafeguarded nuclear program, U.S. policy on Indian
access to Multilateral Development Banks, provisions for transfer
of U.S. technology and textile imports. (S)
Historic Indo-Pakistani animosity and the opportunity it affords
the Soviet Union constitute the main obstacle to our objectives
in South Asia. Pakistan's weapons supply relationship with the
U.S. and its continued nuclear explosives development program are
viewed in New Delhi as threatening to India's vital interests.
Pakistan suspects and fears Indo-Soviet collusion, believing that
New Delhi and Moscow could maneuver in tandem to weaken or even
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destroy Pakistan. Since Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan,
Pakistan and India have sought at various times and with varying
success to construct a normalization dialogue. Indo-Pakistani
relations could dip over the upcoming months as election
campaigns in both countries get underway. Mrs. Gandhi could also
implicate the U.S. in her increasing domestic problems. We
cannot exclude the possibility of an Indian preemptive strike on
Pakistani nuclear facilities which would probably lead to an
all-out Indo-Pak war. (S)
U.S. Objectives
Provide support to Pakistan necessary to maintain active
Pakistani involvement in our Afghan policy and to help
ensure the stability of a key partner in South and Southwest
Asia. (S)
Persuade Pakistan and India to accept non-proliferation
measures. (C)
Encourage Indo-Pakistani normalization. (U)
Weaken Soviet influence in South Asia. (S)
Demonstrate to India that it can and should widen its
strategic options, through improved relations-with the U.S.
and China. (S)
Assist economic development in both India and Pakistan. (U)
U.S. Actions (regional)
Consider a high-level visit to India and Pakistan in 1985.
Arrange continuing cabinet-level meetings and visits as wall
as visits by Congressional and senior U.S. Defense and
Military officials. (C)
Coordinate with the British, Saudis, Chinese and others to
reduce Indo-Pakistani tensions. (C)
Attempt to assure that future U.S.' actions constructively
affect Indo-Pakistan relations. (C)
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.Prepare for SPG approval a more active and far-reaching
public diplomacy strategy for improving foreign and domestic
understanding of and support for U.S. policy in South Asia
and Afghanistan. (C)
Pakistan
Work to discourage Pakistan's movement toward a nuclear
explosives capability and to encourage acceptance of
safeguards. This must be backed with substantial U.S.
security assistance if it is to be meaningful. (S)
Continue our dialogue with Pakistan regarding its military
equipment needs. Initiate bilateral discussions about
ongoing, substantial U.S. economic/security assistance for
beyond FY87. (C)
Prepare a program to drive home to Congress Pakistan's vital
role in our Afghanistan policy. In our consultations with
the Pakistanis, we should discuss more effective ways of
expanding our support to the Afghans, draw international
attention to the Afghan issue, coordinate a public diplomacy
effort in connection with the fifth anniversary of the
Soviet invasion, and work together to ensure appropriate aid
levels for the refugees. (S)
Plan contingency steps to be taken in the event of an Indian
preemptive strike on the Pakistani nuclear facilities or a
general Indo-Pak war. (S)
Continue our dialogue with China based on our common
interest in deterring internal pressures on Pakistan while
simultaneously encouraging normalization in..South Asia, (C)
Take advantage of Mrs. Gandhi's presence in the U.S. for the
inauguration of the Festival of India in June,.1985, to
arrange appropriate high-level meetings in Washington. (C)
In our information programs and high-level meetings, raise
the level of Indian apprehensions about the long-term Soviet
threats to the Subcontinent. (S)
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Seek to conclude at an early date a Memorandum of
Understanding on technology' transfer. To facilitate this
process, an inter-agency policy level negotiations team will
travel to New Delhi in November to discuss the MOU and major
pending export cases. (S)
To reduce India's military supply and economic dependence on
the USSR, examine the potential of a more cooperative
technology transfer and arm sales procedure for India,
consistent with both our regional security interests and the
imperative of protecting against diversion of U.S.
technology. (S)
Utilizing the ACEP under Commerce chairmanship, establish
clear guidelines aimed at facilitating the consideration of
future export license applications for India. In this
connection, deal expeditiously with unresolved munitions
control and Commerce export license applications, which have
been subject to delay. (C)
-- Demonstrate our support for India's economic development by
minimizing further decline in U.S. aid to India. (C)
Encourage the inclusion of non-proliferation in the Indo-Pak
security dialogue. (S)
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