CODEL NUNN - MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN NOVEMBER 27

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000801110108-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 108
• Publication Date: November 29, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

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SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN - MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
- YAQUB KHAN NOVEMBER 27
2. SUMMARY: CODEL NUNN MET WITH FOREIGN MINISTER AND
HIS DEPUTIES FOR OVER TWO HOURS NOVEMBER 27. 'IN AN
INITIAL 60 MINUTE TOUR DE FORCE, FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB
KHAN BLENDED PHILOSOPHY, LITERARY ALLUSIONS, AND
HISTORICAL FACT TO EXPLAIN PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTIONS ON
REGIONAL, STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENTS AND THE STATE OF
PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH ITS NEIGHBORS. CITING THE
EVOLUTION AND DISSOLUTION OF STRATEGIC BALANCES AS KEY TO
UNDERSTANDING RECENT HISTORY IN SOUTH/SOUTHWEST ASIA,
YAQUB DISCUSSED THE EFFECTS OF THE SHAH'S COLLAPSE
(LIKE THE DEATH OF A STAR, THE COLLAPSE CAUSED ONE
THOUSAND LINES OF FORCE TO RADIATE OUTWARD); AND SOVIET
EFFORTS TO EXPLOIT THE VACUUM. NOTING THE CONVERGENCE
OF U. S. AND PAKISTANI INTERESTS IN ALMOST EVERY AREA,
YAQUB EXPLAINED THE STRENGTH AND DURABILITY OF PAKISTAN'S
TIES WITH CHINA AND EMPHASIZED THAT A STRONG, SELF-
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CONFIDENT PAKISTAN CAN STAND FIRM FOR SOVIET WITHDRAWAL
FROM AFGHANISTAN; PURSUE ITS PEACE INITIATIVE WITH INDIA;
SEARCH FOR WAYS TO REINTEGRATE IRAN IN THE COMMUNITY OF
NATIONS; BOLSTER STABILITY IN THE PERSIAN GULF; AND
PROMOTE MODERATION IN THE UN, NAM AND OIC.
END SUMMARY.
3. SENATORS NUNN, JOFNSTON, GLENN AND SASSER MET
NOVEMBER 27 WITH FOREIGN MINISTER VAQUB KHAN, FOREIGN
SECRETARY NAIK, ADDITIONAL SECRETARIES SATTAR, SHARYAR
KHAN, KHAISHGI, HYDER AND SHAIKH; DIRECTORS
GENERAL AFRIDI, SADDIQUI, QAZI; AND DIRECTORS KHALID AND
FATMI. AMBASSADOR, POLCOUNSELOR AND SENATE STAFFERS
ALSO ATTENDED ON THE U.S. SIDE.
4. YAQUB CITED U.S. WITHDRAWAL FROM VIETNAM AND U.K.
WITHDRAWAL FROM THE GULF AS TWO EPIC FACTORS THAT SET
IN MOTION THE CHAIN OF EVENTS OF THE MID-19705 AND
EARLY-19805. FOLLOWING THOSE TWO EVENTS, IRAN--WITH
U.S. ENCOURAGEMENT AND ARMS--EMERGED AS A PILLAR OF
REGIONAL STABILITY. THE SOVIETS SAW NO OPPORTUNITIES
TO EXPLOIT INSTABILITY IN THE REGION (EXCEPT BY
SUBVERSION WHICH WAS CONTINUAL); THE SYSTEM AS A WHOLE
WAS IN MAJOR EQUILIBRIUM. AT THE SAME TIME, IN
AFGHANISTAN, UNTIL ZAHIR SHAH FELL, THERE WAS ALSO MINOR
EQUILIBRIUM--THE KING WAS ACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS,
THE PAKISTANIS, THE IRANIANS, AND OTHERS. ONCE THE KING
WAS REPLACED BY DAOUD IN 1973, THE SOVIETS SAW A
TEMPORARY SHIFT IN THE EQUILIBRIUM TOWARDS THEM, AND
PURSUED EFFORTS TO PROTECT THESE GAINS. WHEN THE SHAH OF
IRAN SUBSEQUENTLY TRIED TO .WEAN DAOUD FROM,THE SOVIETS,
THE SOVIET GAIN WAS DIMINISHED AND THEY REACTED, IN THE
END CAUSING DAOUD'S OVERTHROW BY A COMMUNIST REGIME.
EVEN THIS MINOR DISTURBANCE IN THE EQUILIBRIUM MIGHT
HAVE BEEN TOLERABLE HAD NOT, AT THE SAME TIME, THE SHAH
OF IRAN'S REGIME BEGUN TO CRUMBLE--FINALLY TO FALL IN
1979. HIS COLLAPSE PROFOUNDLY ALTERED THE BALANCE OF
FORCES. THE EFFECTS, LIKE THE DEATH OF A STAR, HAVE
YET TO PLAY OUT FULLY.
5. THE SHAH'S DEMISE, BY PLUNGING THE AREA INTO
INSTABILITY, GAVE AN OPENING TO THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN
LED TO THE IRAN-IRAQ CONFLICT, RAISED SPECTORS OF
INSTABILITY THROUGHOUT T.HE PERSIAN GULF, SPLIT THE ARAB
AND ISLAMIC WORLD, AND PROVOKED THE WEAKNESS WHEREBY
ISRAEL COULD ATTACK LEBANON.
6. YAQUB POSITED FOUR EXPLANATIONS, SUPPLYING
AT LEAST PARTIAL EXPLANATIONS:
-- (A) STRATEGIC OPERATIONAL--THE SOVIETS WERE CERTAIN THE
EXDIS
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U.S. WAS PREOCCUPIED AND T00 FAR REMOVED TO REACT; THE
SHAH WAS GONE: AFGHANISTAN SEEMED AN OPPORTUNITY T00 GOOD
TO ALLOW TO ESCAPE. WITH LUCK, THE SOVIETS EXPECTED
THEY COULD SWALLOW AFGHANISTAN AND BE POISED TO TAKE
ADVANTAGE OF MULTIPLE OPPORTUNITIES TO MOVE SOUTHWARD
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WHEN THE OPPORTUNITY AROSE.
-- (B) BORDER/TACTICAL--THE SOVIETS WERE ADVANCING
WORLDWIDE. THEY DERIVED GREAT PROPAGANDA VALUE FROM
TWEAKING AMERICAN WEAKNESSES IN THE EARLY 705, AS WELL
AS ITS HUMILIATION IN IRAN IN THE LATE 19705. IN BOTH
YEMENS, ETHIOPIA, CUBA, ANGOLA AND AFGHANISTAN, MOVEMENT
WAS IN THE SOVIET FAVOR. THEY EXPECTED LITTLE RESISTANCE
FROM PAKISTAN, AND ENVISIONED A SHORT, SHARP ANTI-
GUERILLA EFFORT. THE AFFECT OF PICKING OFF AFGHANISTAN
WOULD BE TO ADD LUSTER TO THE GROWING MYTH OF SOVIET
INVINCIBILITY.
-- (C) THEATER/TACTICAL--THE SOVIETS TOOK PREEMPTIVE
ACTION TO PROP-UP/REESTABLISH A COMMUNIST REGIME AND TO
PRECLUDE A RIGHT WING COUP.
-- (D) IDEOLOGIC--THE SOVIET UNION SOUGHT TO BRACE UP AND
PROTECT ITS SOUTHERN REPUBLICS FROM A TIDE OF ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM.
7. WHATEVER THE CAUSE OF THE SOVIET ACTION, THE EFFECT
HAS BEEN A FUNDAMENTAL SHIFT IN THE EQUILIBRIUM IN THE
SOVIETS' DIRECTION. WHAT HAS STYMIED THE SOVIET EFFORTS
TO WIN IN AFGHANISTAN IS PAKISTAN'S WILLINGNESS AND
ABILITY TO STAND FIRM. LIKE THE KEYSTONE IN AN ARCH,
PAKISTAN IS CAUGHT FACING PRESSURES CONVERGING FROM ALL
SIDES--THOSE FROM THE SOVIETS/AFGHANISTAN, FROM A
SUSPICIOUS AND HOSTILE INDIA, AND FROM IRAN STILL RACKED
BY ITS REVOLUTIONARY TURMOIL.
INDIA:
8. YAQUB REITERATED PAST STATEMENTS THAT PAKISTAN WILL
CONTINUE TO PURSUE PEACE AND NOT BE DEFLECTED. HE NOTED
THAT THE GANDHI ASSASSINATION HAD SET IN MOTION FORCES
THAT COULD LEAD TO THE DISSOLUTION OF INDIA. HE STRESSED,
HOWEVER, THAT INDIAN INSTABILITY INEVITABLY WOULD
AGGRAVATE PAKISTAN'S OWN CENTRIFUGAL TENDENCIES. HE
HIGHLIGHTED THE CONTRADICTION IN INDIAN EXPRESSIONS OF
CONCERN ABOUT THE U.S. ARMS SUPPLY TO PAKISTAN--"SINCE
1981, ARE WE MORE WAR LIKE, MORE BELLICOSE, PANICKED OR
HYSTERICAL?" HIS ANSWER WAS N0. PAKISTAN IS ABLE TO
PRESS FORWARD WITH ITS PEACE INITIATIVE, EVEN IN THE
FACE OF PRESSURE FROM THE SOVIETS IN AFGHANISTAN AND
FROM REVOLUTION IN IRAN. PAKISTAN WANTS GOOD RELATIONS
WITH INDIA, BUT IT WILL NOT ACCEPT INDIAN DOMINATION.
9. U.S. MORAL SUPPORT HAS MEANT "A HELL OF A LOT"--FAR
MORE THAN MATERIAL SUPPORT. IT HAS ENABLED PAKISTAN TO
STAND UP TO PROVOCATIONS, SUBVERSION, AND SOVIET
DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGNS DESIGNED TO MAKE THE GOVERNMENT
LOOK IMPOTENT. CONFIDENCE DERIVED FROM ITS RELATIONSHIP
WITH THE U.S. HAS ENABLED PAKISTAN TO ACT WITH MATURITY
VIS-A-VIS THE SOVIETS, IRAN, AND THE PERSIAN GULF. IN
A SLAP AT POLITICIANS AND FORMER MFA "LUMINARIES" (READ
AGA SHAHI) WHO CALLED FOR DIRECT TALKS WITH THE DRA AND
AN ACCOMMODATION WITH THE SOVIETS, YAQUB SAID THE SOVIETS
ASSUME THESE PUBLIC FIGURES REPRESENT THE GENERAL PUBLIC
ATTITUDES, THEY DO NOT?
10. NUMEROUS BENEFITS DERIVE FROM PAKISTAN'S WILLINGNESS
AND ABILITY TO WITHSTAND THE CONVERGING PRESSURES. AMONG
tHESE ARf : .... ..~.. .. .?. .
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-- A STRONG PAKISTAN DETERMINATION TO THWART SOVIET
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SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN - MEETING WITH FOREIGN MINISTER
OBJECTIVES IN THE REGION.
-- A PAKISTAN ABLE TO BUTTRESS SECURITY IN THE GULF AREA.
YAQUB ALLUDED TO MILITARY COOPERATION AND PROGRESS, BUT
AVOIDED DETAILS.
-- AN ABILITY TO BRING IRAN OUT OF ITS ISOLATION.
DESPITE IRANIAN SUSPICIONS, FRIENDSHIP IS BEING
REESTABLISHED. BY ASSURING IRAN DOES NOT FEEL HEMMED IN,
THE POSSIBILITY IS REDUCED THAT IT WILL STRIKE OUT IN
DESPERATION. HOPEFULLY, ALSO, IT WILL HELP TO MODERATE
SOME OF THE IRANIAN POLICIES THAT PAKISTAN T00 OPPOSES.
-- PAKISTAN'S ABILITY TO STICK WITH ITS EFFORTS TO
ESTABLISH WITH INDIA NORMAL RELATIONS--ONE OF EQUALITY.
11. IN ANSWER TO QUESTIONS ABOUT AFGHAN NEGOTIATIONS
AND A POSSIBLE FRAMEWORK FOR A SETTLEMENT, YAQUB
REPEATED HIS OFTEN STATED BELIEF THAT THE SOVIETS EVALUATE
ALL SITUATIONS BY MEASURING THE CORRELATION OF FORCES.
THUS PAKISTAN AND THE WORLD MUST KEEP ON A VARIETY OF
PRESSURES--USING A JUDICIOUS BLEND OF DIPLOMATIC SUASION
(MULTI-LATERALLY IN UNGA, OIC, AND VIA BILATERAL. RELATIONS
E.G. BETWEEN THE U.S./SOVIETS AND PRC/SOVIETS). MILITARY
PRESSURE ALSO IS NEEDED--THE FREEDOM fIGHTERS NEED THE
MEANS TO FIGHT ON. THEY CANNOT WIN A MILITARY VICTORY,
BUT THEY CAN GIVE SUBSTANCE TO THE NEGOTIATING TRACK.
HE VOICED SKEPTICISM THAT THERE CAN BE A FAVORABLE
NEGOTIATED OUTCOME, BUT TERMED ANY EFFORTS TO PROLONG THE
FIGHTING (E.G., TO BLEED THE SOVIETS) AS CALLOUS TO THE
AFGHAN PEOPLE.
12. YApUB SAID THE SOVIETS SHOULD WANT A SETTLEMENT, SING
IT WOULD GIVE THEM GREATER FREEDOM OF MANEUVER ON THE
EASTERN FLANK (E.G.WITH CHINA) OR IN THE WEST. THE
SOVIETS WOULD NOT ACCEPT A RIGHTIST GOVERNMENT IN
AFGHANISTAN, SINCE THAT WOULD BE A GAGGER POINTED AT
THEIR HEARTLANDS. THUS, THE PROBLEM IS TO FIND A REGIME
THAT WOULD BE NOT SO ANTI-SOVIET THAT IT WOULD BE
UNACCEPTABLE TO THE SOVIETS, BUT AT THE SAME TIME ONE
THAT THE AFGHANS COULD ACCEPT. FINDING SUCH AN
INDIVIDUAL OR GROUP TO GOVERN WOULD ENABLE THE PREVIOUS
EQUILIBRIUM TO BE RESTORED. FOR PAKISTAN'S PART, ITS
ONLY DESIRE IS A WITHDRAWAL OF SOVIET FORCES.
RELIGION AS A FORCE IN THEISIAMIC WORLD:
----------------------------------------
13. IN ANSWER TO A QUESTION OF WHERE DOES THE CURRENT
FLOW OF RELIGIOUS STRIFE IN THE MIDDLE EAST LEAD, YAQUB
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT THE ISLAMIC TIDE IS RUNNING STRONG.
THIS IS AN APPARENT REACTION TO THE FACT THAT LOCAL
CULTURES WERE FR02EN DURING THE COLONIAL PERIOD. OFTEN,
IN FACT, THE COLONIAL CULTURES WERE THE ANTITHESIS OF
THE LOCAL CULTURES. NOW, AFTER INDEPENDENCE, PEOPLE ARE
SEARCHING AGAIN FOR THEIR IDENTITY. TO FIND
AUTHENTICITY, MANY HAVE TURNED BACK TO RELIGION. HE
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NOTED THAT, IN SUCH SITUATIONS, THE PENDULUM TENDS TO
SWING TO THE EXTREMES, BUT OVER TIME THE EXTREMES
CAN BE MODERATED.
14. RESPONDING TO A STATEMENT THAT THE PRC AND PAKISTAN
ARE STRANGE BEDFELLOWS, YAQUB NOTED THAT IT IS A
RELATIONSHIP THAT HAS ENDURED MANY CHANGES. AS AN
EXPLANATION FOR THE DURABILITY OF THE RELATIONSHIP, HE
HARKENED BACK TO 1967 WHEN, AS CHIEF OF STAFF OF THE
ARMED FORCES, HE WENT TO BEIJING TO SOLICIT CHINESE HELP
IN REARMING A DEFEATED PAKISTANI ARMED FORCES. THE
CHINESE PROVIDED 200 TANKS, AND EQUIPMENT FOR TWO
DIVISIONS, AT ALMOST NO COST. WHEN YAQUB TRIED TO
EXPRESS PAKISTAN'S THANKS TO CHOU EN-LAI, CHOU RESPONDED
THAT NO THANKS WERE DUE, AS PAKISTAN HAD ALREADY DONE
MUCH FOR THE PEOPLES' REPUBLIC OF CHINA. CHOU POINTED
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OUT THAT IN THE 60S, PAKISTAN HAD BEEN CHINA'S ONLY
WINDOW ON THE WORLD. IT BEFRIENDED THE PRC, EVEN WHEN
IT WAS TIED TO THE U.S. VIA SEATO--A TREATY ORGANIZATION
AIMED AT CONTAINING CHINA. PAKISTAN HAD RISKED ITS
RELATIONS WITH THE U.S., AND INVITED SOVIET ANIMOSITY.
IT HAD HELPED BRING CHINA INTO THE MAINSTREAM AND STOOD
BY IT. IT WA$ A RELATIONSHIP OF EQUALS CHOU NOTED, AND
NO DOLLAR VALUE COULD BE ATTACHED TO IT. IN ACCEPTING
THIS,YAQUB SAID POINTEDLY, THEY AGREED NOTHING
UNDERMINES A RELATIONSHIP MORE THAN WHEN THERE IS A
GIVEN AND A TAKER.
15. IN ADDITION TO OTHER POINTS ON IRAN, YAQUB
ASSERTED THAT PAKISTAN IS NOT TRYING TO REPLACE
THE SHAH'S IRAN AS A REGIONAL POWER. HOWEVER, IF
PAKISTAN COULD SURVIVE "IN A SEA OF TROUBLE", IT WOULD
BUTTRESS STABILITY IN THE REGION--AN INDEPENDENT
SOVEREIGN PAKISTAN WOULD STABILIZE THE REGION, AND THIS
IS WHERE PAKISTAN AND U.S. INTERESTS CONVERGE.
16. IN RESPONSE TO 'SENATOR NUNN'S QUESTION AS TO WHETHER
UPCOMING ELECTIONS WOULD CHANGE PAKISTAN'S FOREIGN POLICY,
AND HIS EXPRESSION OF HOPE THAT THE ELECTIONS WOULD OCCUR,
YAQUB STRESSED THAT ELECTIONS WILL OCCUR. HE INDICATED
THAT HE DID NOT SEE ANY FUNDAMENTAL CHANGES IN PAKISTAN'S
FOREIGN POLICY, SINCE THE THRUST OF THE POLICY WAS IN
PAKISTAN'S INTEREST AND HAD BROAD SUPPORT. HE NOTED THAT
IT IS IMPOSSIBLE, EVEN FOR MILITARY REGIMES, TO OUTRUN
PUBLIC OPINION. IN FACT, HE POINTED OUT, MILITARY
GOVERNMENTS NEED TO BE MORE SENSITIVE THAN DEMOCRATIC
GOVERNMENTS SINCE MILITARY GOVERNMENTS HAVE NO LINKS
TO THE PEOPLE.
17. SENATOR NUNN ~'6RESSfD THE IMPORTANCE OF Ci6TTING ON
WITH THE BUSINESS OF SUPPRESSING~NARCOTIC~. HE INDICATED
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THANKS FOR WHAT HAD BEEN DONE AND THANKS FOR THE STRONG
STEPS THAT HE EXPECTED WERE STILL TO BE TAKEN. YAQUB
ACKNOWLEDGED THE SENATOR'S POINT.
18. THIS MESSAGE HAS NOT BEEN CLEARED WITH CODEL
NUNN.
19. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. HINTON
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