CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF COMMITTEE NOVEMBER 27, 1984

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000801110106-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 23, 2010
• Sequence Number: 106
• Publication Date: December 2, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

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OLL/LD
INCOMING
00 RUEAIIB
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
STU9788
00 RUEHC
DE RUEHIL #4199/01 3350607
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
0 300551Z NOV 84
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI IMMEDIATE 1970
RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 2320
INFO RUEHBJ/AMEMBASSY BEIJING 8465
RUFHCM/AMEMBASSY COLOMBO 3587
RUMJDK/AMEMBASSY DHAKA 5260
RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2820
RUMJHT/AMEMBASSY KATHMANDU 3033
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 6548
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 2272
RUFHNA/USMISSION USNATO 0494
RUEHDT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 3314
BT
S E C R E T ISLAMABAD 24199
DEPT PASS ELECTRICALLY TO SECDEF WASHDC, JCS WASHDC,
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI,
USCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, US, OVIP
SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF COMMITTEE NOVEMBER 27, 1984
2. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: CODEL NUNN (COMPOSED OF
SENATORS NUNN, JOHNSTON, GLENN AND SASSER AND STAFFERS
PUNARO, SULLIVAN, JONES AND WEISS) ACCOMPANIED BY
AMBASSADOR HINTON, POLCOUNS WOLF, AND POL/MILOFF
LEMMON, CALLED ON CHAIRMAN JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
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COMMITTEE GEN. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN NOVEMBER 27. FOLLOWING
A BRIEF COURTESY CALL, DIRECTOR GENERAL OF INTER-
SERVICES INTELLIGENCE (ISI) LTG AKHTAR ABDUL REHMAN KHAN
PROVIDED A THREAT BRIEFING WHICH COVERED: (1) SOVIET
STRATEGY TOWARD THE REGION; (2) THE SITUATION IN
AFGHANISTAN; (3) THE INDIAN MILITARY BUILD-UP; (4)
THE SOVIET-INDIAN "INDIRECT OFFENSIVE" AGAINST
PAKISTAN; AND (5) POLICY IMPLICATIONS FOR PAKISTAN.
AN EXTENSIVE QUESTION AND ANSWER PERIOD FOLLOWED THE
ISI BRIEFING. ALSO IN ATTENDANCE ON THE PAKISTAN
SIDE WERE: DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE JOINT STAFF, LTG
SYED RAFAQAT; DIR GEN PLANS, MG NISHAT AHMED; DIR GEN
LOGISTICS, AVM ABDUL MASOOD KHAN; DIR GEN TRAINING,
RADM I.A. SIROHRY AND MFA DIRECTOR FOR THE AMERICAS,
SAEED KHALID.
3. IN BRIEF, AKHTAR SAID PAKISTAN VIEWED THE SOVIET
OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AS A DELIBERATE MILITARY MOVE
AS PART OF ITS GLOBAL EXPANSIONIST POLICY AND HISTORICAL
DRIVE SOUTHWARD TO THE ARABIAN SEA/PERSIAN GULF. WE
WERE, THEREFORE, IN FOR A LONG-TERM POLITICAL AND
MILITARY STRUGGLE IN AFGHANISTAN. AT THE SAME TIME,
THE USSR SOUGHT TO INFLUENCE OVERTLY AND COVERTLY
LEFTIST FORCES IN SOUTH ASIA TO SUPPORT SOVIET
OBJECTIVES. THE SOVIETS ALSO SUPPORTED THE INDIAN
DRIVE FOR REGIONAL PREDOMINANCE AS IT WAS IN THE OVERALL
SOVIET INTEREST TO SUBORDINATE THE OTHER STATES IN THE
REGION TO INDIA. SINCE INDIA WOULD BE INCREASINGLY
DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET UNION FOR SPARE PARTS AND
REPLACEMENTS FOR ITS LARGELY SOVIET-EQUIPPED MILITARY
ESTABLISHMENT, THE GOI WOULD BE FORCED TO DO THE
SOVIET'S BIDDING IN SOUTH ASIA. THIS REQUIRED,
HOWEVER, DENYING PAKISTAN US POLITICAL ECONOMIC AND
MILITARY ASSISTANCE IN ORDER TO REMOVE PAKISTAN AS AN
IMPEDIMENT TO CONSOLIDATION OF SOVIET CONTROL IN
AFGHANISTAN AND INDIAN HEGEMONY IN SOUTH ASIA.
THEREFORE, THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIA WERE COLLUDING
IN A STRATEGY OF MILITARY PRESSURE AND INTERNAL
SUBVERSION AGAINST PAKISTAN, EACH FOR ITS OWN ENDS.
PAKISTAN'S STRATEGY WAS TO DEVELOP A MINIMUM DETERRENCE
CAPABILITY TO DISSUADE ANY POTENTIAL AGGRESSOR AND
A CREDIBLE DEFENSEIVE CAPABILITY TO HOLD OFF AN
ATTACKER UNTIL THE US AND THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
COULD COME TO PAKISTAN'S AID-AND STOP THE FIGHTING.
END INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY.
AKHTAR NOTED THAT THE EVENTS OF 1979 HAD BEEN A
WATERSHED FOR THE GEO-POLITICAL AND GEO-STRATEGIC
ENVIRONMENT OF THE REGION. THE FALL OF THE SHAH OF
IRAN, THE SOVIET INVASION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE
INTRODUCTION OF SOVIET NAVAL FORCES IN THE NORTH
ARABIAN SEA HAD FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR THE
DEPT PASS ELECTRICALLY TO SECDEF WASHDC, JCS WASHDC,
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI,
USCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR. PK, US, OVIP
SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF
SECRET
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FREE WORLD AND EAST-WEST RELATIONS. THE SOVIET MOVE
INTO AFGHANISTAN WAS A SIGNIFICANT FURTHER STEP IN
SOVIET HISTORICAL DESIGNS ON THE REGION TO ESTABLISH
A LAND ROUTE TO THE ARABIAN SEA/PERSIAN GULF AND
OUTFLANK CHINA. THEREFORE, THE SOVIETS FOUND IT
EXPEDIENT TO CULTIVATE INDIA FOR PROMOTION OF
MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL OBJECTIVES.
5. THE SOVIETS CONFRONTED A MILITARY STALEMATE IN
AFGHANISTAN AND, SINCE CHERNENKO REPLACED ANDROPOV,
THERE HAD BEEN A DISCERNIBLE HARDENING OF THE SOVIET
POSITION. ANOTHER SOVIET DIVISION HAD BEEN SENT INTO
AFGHANISTAN IN EARLY 1984 BEFORE THE PANJSHIR VII
OFFENSIVE AND THE SOVIETS HAD BECOME MORE HEAVILY
ENGAGED IN DIRECT COMBAT WITH THE MUJAHIDEEN.
PAKISTAN IS THE MAJOR IMPEDIMENT TO CONSOLIDATION OF
SOVIET CONTROL OVER AFGHANISTAN. THEREFORE, THE USSR
HAD MOVED TO NEUTRALIZE PAKISTAN THROUGH CROSS-BORDER
RAIDS AND INTERNAL SUBVERSION THROUGH COLLABORATION
WITH INDIA IN THE TRAINING OF TERRORISTS.
THE SOVIET ARMY IN AFGHANISTAN TOTALLED ROUGHLY 115,000
MEN ORGANIZED INTO THE EQUIVALENT OF 10 DIVISIONS UNDER
THE 40TH ALL-ARMS ARMY IN KABUL. WHICH WAS UNDER THE
SOVIET ARMY'S SOUTHERN COMMAND HEADQUARTERED AT
TASHKENT. AN INDEPENDENT REGIMENT IN THE WAKHAN
CORRIDOR WAS UNDER THE CENTRAL ASIAN MILITARY DISTRICT.
IN THE COURSE OF THE PAST YEAR, CONSIDERABLE UPGRADING
OF SOVIET ARMS AND EQUIPMENT HAD TAKEN PLACE (E.G.,
?INTRODUCTION OF 152MM SELF-PROPELLED GUNS AND 240MM
MORTARS). FOUR BATTALIONS OF SPECIAL PURPOSE FORCES
(SPETSNAZ), WHICH WERE SPECIALLY TRAINED FOR COMMANDO
AND CROSS-BORDER OPERATIONS, WERE NOW STATIONED AT
BAGRAM, JALOLABAD, GHAZNI AND KANDAHAR. THE SOVIET
AIR FORCE STRENGTH TOTALED 150 COMBAT
AIRCRAFT (INCLUDING 45 MIG-23S, 21 SU-255, 84 SU-17/22S)
260 HELICOPTERS (60 MI-24S, 140 MI-8S, 60 MI-6S), AND
39 SAM BATTERIES. THE AFGHAN AIR FORCE TOTALED 195
AIRCRAFT (50 MIG-21S, 76 MIG-17S, 30 50 17/22S,
24 SU-7S, 15 IL-28S), AND 150 HELICOPTERS (30 MI-24
GUNSHIPS AND 120 MI-8 ARMED TRANSPORTS). THE
COMPOSITION AND LOCATION OF THE SOVIET AIR FORCE AND
ITS AIRFIELDS WAS INDICATIVE OF SOVIET PREPAREDNESS
TO OPERATE BEYOND AFGHANISTAN.
7. THE AFGHAN ARMY CURRENTLY TOTALED 35-40,000 MEN
AND WAS INEFFECTIVE AS A FIGHTING FORCE. IT WAS NO
THREAT AT PRESENT TO PAKISTAN'S NATIONAL SECURITY
AND WOULD REMAIN SO UNLESS/UNTIL THE SOVIET UNION
ESTABLISHED ORDER IN AFGHANISTAN AND SUCCEEDED IN
RE-STRUCTURING THE AFGHAN ARMY ALONG RED ARMY LINES.
SINCE JANUARY 1980, THE AFGHAN ARMY HAD SUFFERED
33,294 DESERTIONS AND 2,431 ARRESTS FOR TOTAL NON-
COMBAT LOSSES OF 35,725. IN ADDITION, 57,727 OFFICERS
AND MEN HAD BEEN KILLED, WOUNDED OR CAPTURED. THE
SOVIETS/DRA HAVE TRIED A VARIETY OF TACTICS SINCE 1980,
RANGING FROM CORPS-SIZED SWEEP OPERATIONS TO COMMANDO
OPERATIONS AND SCORCHED-EARTH TACTICS. ALL HAD FAILED
TO CRUSH THE MUJAHIDEEN AND SOVIET/DRA TROOPS HAD
WITHDRAWN FROM THE COUNTRYSIDE INTO GARRISONS, LEAVING
EIGHTY PERCENT OF THE COUNTRY TO THE RESISTANCE. IN
FEBRUARY 1984, HOWEVER, SOVIET OPERATIONAL STRATEGY
CHANGED FUNDAMENTALLY. SOVIET TROOPS WERE ACTIVELY
INVOLVED IN C6A1' "MORE FREQUENTLY, ?ENCAGING IN
EXTENSIVE SWEEP OPERATIONS Ti i2OUGH THE PANJSHIR
SECRET
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VALLEY AND KUNAR, KANDAHAR, LOWGAR, NINGAHAR AND
DEPT PASS ELECTRICALLY TO SECDEF WASHDC, JCS WASHDC,
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI,
USCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, US, OVIP
SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF
HERAT PROVINCES. HEAVY USE OF AIR POWER, INCLUDING
CARPET BOMBING, WAS A PROMINENT FEATURE OF THESE
OPERATIONS.
THE AFGHAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS HAD AVOIDED PITCHED
BATTLES WITH SOVIET/DRA TROOPS AND USED MODIFIED
HIT-AND-RUN TACTICS TO TIE DOWN THOSE FORCES IN SUCH
AREAS AS THE PANJSHIR WHILE CONTINUING TO HARASS/CUT
PRIMARY ROAD NETWORK AND BESIEGE ISOLATED GARRISONS.
MORE RECENTLY THE MUJAHIDEEN HAD FOCUSED ON URBAN
CENTERS, ATTACKING SOVIET/DRA INSTALLATIONS IN KABUL,
CUTTING ROADS BETWEEN CITIES AND TOWNS AND FORCING
THE SOVIETS/DRA TO DEPEND ON AIR TRANSPORT TO MOVE
AROUND THE COUNTRY. THERE HAD BEEN A SUBSTANTIAL
INCREASE IN SOVIET CASUALTIES OVER THE PAST YEAR,
REACHING A TOTAL AT PRESENT OF 15,042 KILLED/WOUNDED
SINCE JANUARY 1980 AND 63 CAPTURED (OFFICERS 1,622
KILLED/WOUNDED AND 24 CAPTURED; SOLDIERS 13,420
KILLED/WOUNDED AND 39 CAPTURED). SOVIET/DRA EQUIPMENT
LOSSES TOTALED: 385 TANKS, 611 APCS, 3,539 VEHICLES,
640 AIRCRAFT/HELICOPTERS AND 451 HEAVY GUNS/MORTARS.
MUJAHIDEEN CASUALTIES AT MINIMUM WERE 37,284 KILLED/
WOUNDED AND 11,333 CAPTURED FOR TOTAL LOSSES OF
48,617.
THE SOVIETS SHOWED NO INTENTION OF WITHDRAWING AND
WERE WORKING HARD TO ESTABLISH A PERMANENT HOLD OVER
AFGHANISTAN. THEY HAD ADOPTED AN UNCOMPROMISING,
HARD-LINE ATTITUDE, ESPECIALLY SINCE CHERNENKO HAD
COME TO POWER. THEIR STRATEGY WAS TO HOLD THE URBAN
AREAS AND PRINCIPAL COMMUNICATIONS CENTERS, CONDUCT A
RUTHLESS PURGE OF THE COUNTRYSIDE, SOVIETIZE AFGHAN
SOCIETY AND ECONOMY, AND CONDUCT AN "INDIRECT
OFFENSIVE" AGAINST PAKISTAN IN ORDER TO "NEUTRALIZE"
IT AND REMOVE IT AS AN IMPEDIMENT TO CONSOLIDATION OF
SOVIET CONTROL OVER AFGHANISTAN. THE SOVIETS SOUGHT
TO SUBDUE THE MUJAHIDEEN THROUGH A COMBINATION OF
MILITARY FORCE AND SUBVERSION TO BREAK THEIR WILL TO
FIGHT. FINALLY, THEY WOULD CONTINUE TO ENGAGE IN
DIPLOMATIC MANEUVERING TO GET THE DRA ACCEPTED AND
AFGHANISTAN RECOGNIZED AS BEING IN THEIR SPHERE OF
INFLUENCE/SECURITY. TOWARDS THESE ENDS, THE SOVIETS
WERE TRYING: TO CAPTURE THE NEXT GENERATION OF AFGHANS
BY EDUCATING URBAN YOUTH IN THE SOVIET UNION (4,000
BOYS AGES 6-12 WERE SENT TO THE USSR EACH YEAR); TO
SPLINTER TRIBAL/ETHNIC GROUPS IN ORDER TO DISINTEGRATE
TRADITIONAL AFGHAN SOCIET; TO MAKE AFGHANISTAN TOTALLY
DEPENDENT ON THE SOVIET ECONOMY; AND TO WIN THE
AGREEMENT OF OTHER REGIONAL COUNTRIES, ESPECIALLY
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INDIA, TO ACCEPT THE DRA AND CONTINUED SOVIET PRESENCE
IN AFGHANISTAN. IN RETURN FOR INDIAN POLITICAL AND
DIPLOMATIC SUPPORT IN THIS EFFORT, THE SOVIETS WERE
SUPPORTING INDIA'S EXTENSIVE MILITARY BUILDUP.
THE PRC-INDIAN CLASHES IN THE EARLY 1960'S HAD OPENED
THE WAY FOR THE INDO-SOVIET MILITARY RELATIONSHIP TO
FLOURISH. THE 1971 TREATY OF FRIENDSHIP AND
COOPERATION PROVIDED THE FORMAL BASIS FOR THE
RELATIONSHIP. THAT IN TURN LED TO MUTUAL COLLUSION
AGAINST THOSE REGIONAL STATES WHICH STOOD IN THE
DEPT PASS ELECTRICALLY TO SECDEF WASHDC, JCS WASHDC,
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI,
USCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, US, OVIP
SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF
WAY OF EITHER'S AMBITIONS (AFGHANISTAN, PAKISTAN,
BANGLADESH, SRI LANKA). INDIA WANTED REGIONAL
PREDOMINANCE AND THE SOVIETS WERE PREPARED TO SUPPORT
THIS AMBITION FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES. AKHTAR QUOTED
MRS. GANDHI AS HAVING TOLD SOVIET DEFENSE MINISTER
USTINOV DURING HIS MARCH 1984 VISIT TO INDIA THAT THE
US WAS MOVING BACK INTO SOUTH ASIA AND INDIA WAS THE
USSR'S ONLY ALLY IN THE REGION. THE US BUILDUP WAS
DIRECTED AGAINST BOTH THE SOVIET UNION AND INDIA.
PAKISTAN WAS THE PRINCIPAL RECIPIENT OF US MILITARY
AID AND WAS A THREAT TO BOTH. THEREFORE, IT WAS IN
BOTH INDIA'S AND THE USSR'S INTEREST TO NEUTRALIZE
AND DISMEMBER PAKISTAN. BUT THEY MUST MOVE FAST TO
DESTABILIZE PAKISTAN BEFORE THE US MILITARY
ASSISTANCE BECAME EFFECTIVE. (EMBASSY COMMENT - THE
ABOVE IS VERY SENSITIVE AND SHOULD BE
HELD CLOSELY. END COMMENT)
11. AKHTAR DECLINED TO REVEAL HIS SOURCE FOR THIS
INFORMATION BEFORE THE SENATORS' VISIT TO INDIA, BUT
SAID HE WOULD MAKE IT KNOWN AFTERWARDS. HE FURTHER
ARGUED THAT INDIA WANTED TO ESTABLISH A VETO RIGHT
OVER HER NEIGHBORS' RELATIONS WITH ALL OUTSIDE POWERS
AND SOUGHT US ACCEPTANCE OF THIS RIGHT. IN INDIA'S
EYES, IT IS THE US-PAKISTAN-PRC CONNECTION WHICH
THREATENED HER INTERESTS, NOT THE SOVIET PRESENCE
IN AFGHANISTAN.
AKHTAR DESCRIBED THE RECENT INDO-SOVIET ARMS DEAL AS
TOTALLING 5 BILLION RUBLES AT 2 PERCENT INTEREST AT
PRICES 1/3 TO 1/4 THE WESTERN EQUIVALENT RESULTING
IN REAL PURCHASES OF $17 BILLION WORTH OF ADVANCED
ARMS AND EQUIPMENT. THIS INCLUDED FOR THE ARMY SOME
750 T-72 TANKS, 675 BMP-1 INFANTRY COMBAT VEHICLES,
110 BRDM-11 APCS, 18 130MM GUNS, 250 122MM D-130 GUNS,
60 122MM 40 BARRELLED RNDS, 18 SAM 6, 36 SAM 7 AND
24 SAM 8 BATTERIES, 60 ZSU-23-4M AD GUNS, 100 ZSU-23-2
AD 'QUNS, 600 KRAZ-255-B-1 GUN''TOWtNG V!HICL@S. THE
NAVY HAD ACQUIRED 8 SUBMARINES, 5 KASHIN CLASS MISSILE
SECRET
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DESTROYERS, 5 MISSILE BOATS, 4 ASW VESSELS. 5 IL-38
ASW AIRCRAFT, 12 ASW HELICOPTERS AND 6 COASTAL
MINESWEEPERS. THE AIR FORCE RECEIVED 155 MIG-23S,
8 MIG-25S, 95 AN-32S, 130 AS-7 AIR-SURFACE MISSILES,
10 MI-8 HELICOPTERS, 15 P-18/19 RADARS, AND 12
SQUADRONS OF SAM 3S. IN ADDITION, SOVIET ASSISTANCE
WITH DEFENSE PRODUCTION WOULD GIVE INDIA A CAPABILITY
TO BUILD 200 T-72 TANKS/YEAR, 500 BMP-I/II ICVS/YR,
40 MIG-27/YR, 3 MISSILE DESTROYERS/YR. 4 ASW CORVETTES/
YR, AND 15 MISSILE CRAFT/YR. THE GOI HAD EXTENSIVE
DISCUSSIONS WITH USTINOV IN MARCH 1984 ON THE 1985-90
INDIAN DEFENSE PLAN AND HAD ASKED FOR. EVEN LARGER
NUMBERS OF ADVANCED WEAPONRY (SEPTEL).
13. SINCE 1971, INDIAN MILITARY FORCES HAD UNDERGONE
A COMPLETE MODERNIZATION AND SIGNIFICANT EXPANSION.
THE INDIAN ARMY HAD ADDED A NEW COMMAND HEADQUARTERS,
3 CORPS HEADQUARTERS, I ARMORED DIVISION, I MECHANIZED
DIVISION, 5 INFANTRY DIVISIONS, 3 INDEPENDENT ARMORED
BRIGADES, 12 INDEPENDENT INFANTRY BRIGADES, AND 19
BORDER SECURITY FORCE BATTALIONS. THE INDIAN ARMY
NOW TOTALLED 1.1 MILLION MEN ORGANIZED IN 5 COMMAND
HO, 8 CORPS HQ, 2 ARMORED DIV. I MECHANIZED DIV,
21 INFANTRY DIV. 9 MOUNTAIN DIV, 6 INDEPENDENT
ARMORED BDE, 16 INDEPENDENT INFANTRY BDE, 119 BORDER
SECURITY FORCE BATTALIONS. THE AIR FORCE HAD ADDED
SEVEN NEW FIGHTER SQUADRONS AND ESTABLISHED AH
DEPT PASS ELECTRICALLY TO SECDEF WASHDC, JCS WASHDC,
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL. USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI,
USCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, US, OVIP
SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF
AIR COMMAND AT TRIVANDRUM TO COVER THE INDIAN OCEAN.
THERE WERE NOW 44 SQUADRONS (INCLUDING 21 MIG-21,
6 MIG-23, 3 SU-7, 3 JAGUAR, 4 AJEET, 3 HUNTER,
I MIG-25, AND 3 CANBERRA) WITH 32 DEPLOYED UNDER
THE WESTERN AIR COMMAND AND 12 DIVIDED AMONG THE
EASTERN, CENTRAL, NORTHERN AND SOUTHERN COMMANDS.
INDIA HAD BUILT 5 NEW AIR BASES ALONG ITS WESTERN
BORDER AND NOW HAD THE INFRASTRUCTURE TO ACCOMMODATE
ALL 44 SQUADRONS IN AN ATTACK AGAINST PAKISTAN. THE
INDIAN NAVY HAD BEEN GREATLY EXPANDED AND WAS NOW
THE MOST POWERFUL IN THE INDIAN OCEAN. IT WAS
COMPOSED OF 72 SHIPS: I AIRCRAFT CARRIER, 8 SUBMARINES,
I CRUISER, 6 MISSILE DESTROYERS/FRIGATES, 19 CON-
VENTIONAL FRIGATES, 3 NANUCHKAS MISSILE CORVETTES,
13 MISSILE BOATS, 6 LANDING SHIP TANKS. 6 NATYAS
MINESWEEPERS, 5 CHARIOTS AND 4 SUAVEY SHIPS. MOST
OF THOSE SHIPS (48) WERE IN THE WESTERN NAVAL COMMAND
AVAILABLE FOR USE AGAINST PAKISTAN. IN ADDITION.
AN ALL-SERVICES RAPID DEPLOYMENT FORCE HAD BEEN
CREATED AND PERIODICALLY EXERCISED IN THE ANDAMAN
AND NICOBAR ISLANDS.
14. MOREOVER, THE HIGH PERCENTAGE OF SOVIET EQUIPMENT
IN THE INDIAN MILITARY INVENTORY (BETWEEN 60 AND 100
PERCENT OF KEY WEAPONS SYSTEMS) MADE INDIA VERY
VULNERABLE TO A POSSIBLE SOVIET CUT-OFF OF SPARE
PARTS AND REPLACEMENTS. THEREFORE, INDIA HAD REFUSED
TO CONDEMN THE SOVIETS OVER AFGHANISTAN AND
KAMPUCHEA AS SHE FELT SHE NEEDED CONTINUED SOVIET
SECRET
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MILITARY AND POLITICAL SUPPORT. NOTWITHSTANDING
US WILLINGNESS TO SELL MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO INDIA
WHICH WAS SUPERIOR TO THE SOVIETS, INDIA WOULD STAY
WITH THE USSR BECAUSE OF A COINCIDENCE OF POLITICAL
OBJECTIVES AND ATTRACTIVE SOVIET TERMS FOR CONTINUED
MILITARY SUPPLIES.
INDIVIDUALLY AND IN CONCERT, THE SOVIET UNION AND
INDIA HAVE TRIED TO NEUTRALIZE PAKISTAN GEO-POLITICALLY
THROUGH SUBVERSION IN ORDER TO CREATE DOMESTIC STRIFE
WHICH COULD LEAD TO MILITARY INTERVENTION BY EITHER.
THEY WERE-COLLUDING WITH DOMESTIC POLITICAL
OPPOSITION, HARBORING AL-ZULFIOAR TERRORISTS IN
KABUL, TRAINING ADDITIONAL TERRORISTS IN TEN
TRAINING CAMPS IN INDIA AND INFILTRATING KHAD/KGB
AGENTS ARMS AND EXPLOSIVES INTO PAKISTAN DISGUISED
AS AFGHAN REFUGEES. IN ADDITION, THE SOVIETS
CONTINUED THEIR CROSS BORDER ATTACKS AND INDIA HAD
INCREASED ITS MILITARY PRESSURE BY OCCUPYING THE
SIACHIN GLACIER AND CREATING INCIDENTS ALONG THE
LINE OF CONTROL. INDIA HAD USED THE SIKH DISTURBANCES
IN THE PUNJAB TO MASSIVELY REINFORCE THE BORDER WITH
PAKISTAN. THE INDIANS HAD UNDERTAKEN A MASSIVE
PROPAGANDA CAMPAIGN AGAINST PAKISTAN AND WAS ENGAGED
IN DISINFORMATION ABOUT PAKISTAN'S ALLEGED ROLE IN
FOMENTING/AIDING THE SIKHS. THEREFORE, PAKISTAN
HAD TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE THREAT ON BOTH ITS
WESTERN AND EASTERN BORDERS COUPLED WITH SUBVERSION
FROM WITHIN AND IT WAS THIS INDO-SOVIET COLLUSION
THAT WAS PAKISTAN'S FOREMOST SECURITY CONCERN.
SENATOR NUNN ASKED ABOUT PAKISTAN'S STRATEGY TO COPE
WITH TWO OVERWHELMING THREATS FROM THE SOVIET UNION
AND INDIA AND WHAT LEVEL OF DETERRENCE PAKISTAN HOPED
DEPT PASS ELECTRICALLY TO SECDEF WASHDC, JCS WASHDC,
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI,
USCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, US, OVIP
SUBJECT: CODEL NUNJ: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF
TO ACHIEVE. GENERAL RAHIM UDDIN KHAN SAID THAT
ZIA HAD UNDERTAKEN A PEACE OFFENSIVE WITH INDIA IN
AN EFFORT TO ACHIEVE PEACE ON ITS EASTERN BORDER.
AT THE SAME TIME, PAKISTAN SOUGHT TO MODERNIZE ITS
MILITARY IN ORDER TO DEAL WITH THE THREAT ON THE
WESTERN BORDER. PAKISTAN'S FRUSTRATION WAS THAT
INDIA WAS NOT LOOKING AT THE LONG-TERM THREAT TO IT
FROM THE SOVIET OCCUPATION OF AFGHANISTAN AND THE
POSSIBLE LOSS OF PAKISTAN AS A BUFFER STATE. THE
NEXT SOVIET MOVE TO THE WARM WATERS OF THE ARABIAN
SEA/PERSIAN GULF WOULD BE EITHER THROUGH IRAN OR
PAKISTAN. GROMYKO HAD TOLD FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB
THAT PAKISTAN WOULD HAVE TO FACE THE CONSEQUENCES OF
ITS SUPPORT FOR THE MUJAHIDEEN AS IT WAS NOW ENGAGED
IN AN 't1 *CLA*O WAR"AUtNS'rZ'T 4 9OVI4?' UNION. T E
DANGER 70 PAKISTAN HAD INCREASED S'! CE CHERNENKO
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REPLACED ANDROPOV AND CROSS-BORDER STRIKES HAD
INCREASED IN NUMBER AND INTENSITY. THIS IN TURN HURT
THE GOP'S CREDIBILITY WITH THE PEOPLE AS IT WAS SEEN AS
UNABLE TO PROTECT THE COUNTRY. THEREFORE. PAKISTAN
NEEDED AIR SURVEILLANCE AND AIR DEFENSE SYSTEMS.
THAT IN TURN LEADS THE INDIANS TO PROTEST THAT
PAKISTAN INTENDS TO ATTACK THEM. PAKISTAN HAD NEITHER
THE CAPABILITY NOR THE INTENTION OF GOING TO WAR WITH
INDIA AS IT WAS TOO LARGE AND PAKISTAN NEEDED A
STABLE INDIA FOR ITS OWN SECURITY. INDIA WAS VERY
VULNERABLE TO COMMUNIST PENETRATION GIVEN THE HINDU
CASTE SYSTEM WHICH MADE THOSE ON THE BOTTOM VULNERABLE
TO ITS RHETORIC. THE INDIAN MILITARY BUILDUP TOOK
PLACE AT THE EXPENSE OF THE PEOPLE'S POVERTY. PAKISTAN,
THEREFORE, WANTED AN IMPROVED DETERRENT CAPABILITY
AS WELL AS A DEFENSE CAPABILITY. IT WANTED ONLY TO
BE LEFT ALONE TO DEAL WITH ITS OWN DEVELOPMENT PROBLEMS.
PAKISTAN WOULD NOT ACCEPT THE POSITION OF A SATELLITE.
INDIA AS THE MORE POWERFUL COUNTRY WOULD HAVE TO
PLAY THE GREATER PART IN IMPROVING RELATIONS ON
THE SUB-CONTINENT. THE GANDHI ASSASSINATION AND THE
RISE OF NEW LEADERSHIP PROVIDED SOME HOPE FOR CHANGE,
BUT GIVEN INDIA'S DEPENDENCE ON THE SOVIET UNION
FOR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THE GOI
WOULD CHANGE ITS POLICIES VERY MUCH. THEREFORE,
PAKISTAN MUST GROW MUCH STRONGER IF REGIONAL
STABILITY IS TO BE ENSURED GIVEN THE SOVIET OCCUPATION
OF AFGHANISTAN. PAKISTAN MUST BE AS STRONG IN SOUTH
ASIA AS ISRAEL IS IN THE MIDDLE EAST. OTHERWISE, IT
WOULD NOT BE ABLE TO PLAY THE ROLE ENVISAGED FOR
IT TO STAND UP TO THE SOVIETS UNTIL HELP ARRIVES FROM
ITS FRIENDS. PAKISTAN HAD NO DESIRE FOR WAR WITH
INDIA AND HOPED THAT IT WOULD FINALLY SEE THAT THE
REAL THREAT TO BOTH COUNTRIES IS AS IT HAS ALWAYS
BEEN -- FROM THE WEST BY THE SOVIETS MOVING THROUGH
AFGHANISTAN INTO PAKISTAN AND THEN INDIA.
17. SENATOR JOHNSTON QUERIED AS TO WHAT WAS INDIA'S
GOAL VIS-A-VIS PAKISTAN. GENERAL RAHIM UDDIN KHAN
REPLIED THAT INDIA WANTED TO PLAY THE ROLE OF
DOMINANT POWER IN THE REGION, "CUT PAKISTAN DOWN TO
SIZE" AS IT HAD DONE IN 1971, AND MAKE IT PLAY A
SATELLITE ROLE. PAKISTAN, HOWEVER, WOULD NEVER
ACCEPT SUCH A ROLE AND SOONER OR LATER INDIA WOULD
HAVE TO ACCEPT THAT FACT. SENATOR JOHNSTON ASKED
WHETHER HE THOUGHT INDIA WAS PREPARING TO ATTACK OR
SIMPLY TO INTIMIDATE PAKISTAN. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN
SAID THE GOP WAS VERY CONCERNED WITH THE MOVE OF
SUBSTANTIAL INDIAN MILITARY FORCE INTO THE PUNJAB TO
HANDLE THE SIKH CRISIS. THIS WAS GREATER THAN WAS
REQUIRED FOR RESTORING ORDER IN THE PUNJAB. SENATOR
JOHNSTON ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE A DIRECT
THREAT TO PAKISTAN AS LONG AS THEY WERE TIED DOWN
DEPT PASS ELECTRICALLY TO SECOEF WASHDC, JCS WASHDC,
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI.
USCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, US, OVIP
SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF
FIGHTING THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN
SAID THE SOVIETS WERE A THREAT NOW BUT THAT HE DID
NOT THINK THAT THEY WOULD START A WAR WITH PAKISTAN
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UNTIL THEY HAD CONSOLIDATED THEIR CONTROL IN AFGHANISTAN
HE NOTED THAT AFGHANISTAN WAS NOT VIET NAM AS THE
SOVIETS COULD APPLY THEIR AIRPOWER WHEREVER AND WHEN-
EVER AGAINST THE MUJAHIDEEN; AND AFGHANISTAN BORDERED
DIRECTLY ON THE SOVIET UNION WHILE THE US HAD BEEN
3,000 MILES AWAY FROM SE ASIA. THE SITUATIONS WERE
GEO-STRATEGICALLY DIFFERENT. THE SOVIETS COULD BOMB
AFGHANISTAN WITH AIRCRAFT BASED IN CENTRAL ASIA AND
HAD 30 DIVISIONS IN PLACE WHICH COULD BE QUICKLY
MOVED INTO AFGHANISTAN. THE QUESTION WAS WHETHER THE
SOVIETS WOULD BE ABLE TO SUSTAIN THEM LOGISTICALLY
AS THEY REQUIRED CONTROL OVER THE COUNTRYSIDE. HOW
THE WORLD HELPED WOULD BE A FACTOR IN HOW LONG THE
MUUAHIDEEN COULD GO ON. THERE HAD BEEN LITTLE PUBLIC
PRESSURE ON THE SOVIETS AS AFGHANISTAN WAS NOT A
WESTERN COUNTRY AND THE EUROPEANS IN PARTICULAR
WANTED TO PRESERVE THEIR RELATIONS WITH MOSCOW --
THE GERMANS FOR EXAMPLE WERE MORE INTERESTED IN THEIR
GAS DEAL WITH THE SOVIETS THAN THE INVASION OF
AFGHANISTAN.
18. SENATOR NUNN ASKED WHETHER PAKISTAN COULDN'T
DO MORE WITH OTHER ISLAMIC COUNTRIES AND THE NON-
ALIGNED TO INCREASE POLITICAL/DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE
ON MOSCOW. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN SAID PAKISTAN WAS
TRYING TO DO WHAT IT COULD, BUT MANY COUNTRIES DID
NOT WANT TO ANTAGONIZE THE SOVIETS OR SIMPLY WEREN'T
WILLING TO CRITICIZE MOSCOW.
19. SENATOR GLENN ASKED ABOUT GEN. AKHTAR'S SOURCE
FOR HIS RECITATION OF MRS. GANDHI'S CONVERSATION
WITH USTINOV. AKHTAR SAID HE WOULD PROVIDE THE
ANSWER "IN DUE COURSE" FOLLOWING THE CODEL'S VISIT
TO INDIA. SENATOR GLENN QUERIED WHETHER THERE WAS
ANY EVIDENCE THAT THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO GET
CONTROL OF THE MILITARY IN INDIA THE WAY THEY HAD
TRIED IN EGYPT. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN SAID THAT INDIA WAS
A LARGE COUNTRY AND IT WAS HARD TO GET THAT KIND OF
INFLUENCE. INDIA'S VULNERABILITY CAME FROM ITS
DEPENDENCE ON SOVIET MILITARY SUPPLY/SPARE PARTS.
SENATOR GLENN ASKED WHETHER INDIAN POLICY MIGHT
CHANGE UNDER RAJIV GANDHI. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN
RESPONDED THAT INDIAN DEPENDENCE WAS SO DEEP THAT,
EVEN IF RAJIV WANTED TO CHANGE, IT WOULD TAKE MANY
YEARS TO DIVERSIFY INDIA'S SOURCES OF SUPPLY.
THEREFORE, HE WAS LIKELY TO KEEP THE INDO-SOVIET
RELATIONSHIP GOING AS LONG AS POSSIBLE AND REFRAIN
FROM CRITICIZING OR PRESSURING THE SOVIET UNION.
SENATOR GLENN QUERIED AS TO HOW LONG IT HAD TAKEN
FOR THE RUSSIANS/SOVIETS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR CONTROL
OVER CENTRAL ASIA. AKHTAR SAID THE RUSSIANS TOOK MORE
THAN FIFTY YEARS TO CONSOLIDATE THEIR CONTROL AND THE
AMBASSADOR OBSERVED THAT FIGHTING STILL OCCURRED AS
LATE AS THE 1930'S. AKHTAR SAID THE RUSSIANS MOVED
FORWARD WHENEVER POSSIBLE, AND TURNED BACK WHEN
CHALLENGED. PAKISTAN WANTED AMERICAN PROTECTION
FROM THE SOVIETS, THOUGH THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE WOULD
NEVER ACCEPT DOMINATION BY EITHER THE SOVIET UNION OR
INDIA. SENATOR GLENN OBSERVED THAT CENTRAL ASIANS
WERE MUSLIM BY HERITAGE AND WONDERED WHETHER
AFGHANISTAN WAS CAUSING ANY PROBLEMS AND WHETHER THIS
COULD BE EXPLOITED. AKHTAR SAID IT WAS CONCEIVABLE.
BUT THAT MOST OF THE POPULATION KNEW LITTLE OR NOTHING
ABOUT ISLAM. ANY EXPLOITATION WOULD HAVE TO BE THROUGH
THE JOINT EFFORTS OF MANY, NOT JUST PAKISTAN. AKHTAR
QUOTED A SENIOR CHINESE OFFICIAL AS SAYING THAT ONLY
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------------------------------------------------------------------------
DEPT PASS ELECTRICALLY TO SECDEF WASHDC, JCS WASHDC,
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI,
USCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: OECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, US, OVIP
SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF
THE COMBINATION OF FIVE POWERS COULD DEFEAT THE SOVIET
UNION: CHINA, US, JAPAN, WESTERN EUROPE (FRG AND FRANCE)
AND THE THIRD WORLD.
20. SENATOR NUNN NOTED THAT AKHTAR HAD NOT MENTIONED
IRAN AND ASKED WHAT ADVICE HE WOULD GIVE THE US AS TO
WHAT WE SHOULD AND SHOULDN'T DO. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN
ADVISED THAT THE US SHOULD AVOID CONDEMNATION AND
ADOPT A ,POSTURE OF FORGIVING AND FORGETTING. PAKISTAN
WAS PLAYING ITS PART BY NOT LETTING IRAN FEEL TOTALLY
ISOLATED AND OSTRACIZED. SENATOR NUNJ ASKED WHETHER
IRAN SHARED PAKISTAN'S PERCEPTION OF THE THREAT.
AKHTAR SAID IRAN WAS VERY ISOLATED WITH LITTLE WESTERN
INFLUENCE REMAINING. IT WAS AWARE OF THE SOVIET
THREAT, BUT IT DIDN'T SAY IT LOUDLY BECAUSE OF ITS
ISOLATION FROM THE WEST. IRAN WAS ABSORBED WITH ITS
WAR WITH IRAQ, BUT IT WOULD NEVER ACCEPT SOVIET
DOMINATION. THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR WAS IN NO ONE'S
INTEREST EXCEPT THE SOVIETS WHO HOPED TO PICK UP THE
PIECES.
21. SENATOR JOHNSTON ASKED HOW PAKISTAN ASSESSED THE
IMPACT ON IRAN OF THE US'S RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF
RELATIONS WITH IRAQ. AKHTAR DEFERRED TO AMBASSADOR
HINTON WHO NOTED THAT THE US UNDERSTOOD THE IMPORTANCE
OF IRAN AND WANTED TO RE-ESTABLISH GOOD RELATIONS.
HOWEVER, IRAN WAS STILL RUNNING TERRORIST OPERATIONS
AGAINST THE US AND WE COULD NOT AND WOULD NOT MOVE
TOWARDS THEM AS LONG AS THAT CONTINUED. SENATOR NUNN
UNDERSCORED THAT AS THE AMERICAN PUBLIC BECAME
INCREASINGLY AWARE OF IRANIAN TERRORIST OPERATIONS,
STRONG PUBLIC PRESSURE WOULD BUILD. TO STRIKE AGAINST
IRAN. THIS WAS NOT IN OUR LONG-TERM INTEREST BUT IT
WAS A FACT OF POLITICAL LIFE. HE HOPED THAT
PAKISTAN WOULD PASS THIS ON TO IRAN.
22. SENATOR GLENN RECOUNTED US EFFORTS TO PREVENT
THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO MORE AND MORE
COUNTRIES. WE UNDERSTOOD PAKISTAN'S SITUATION AND
HAVE MONITORED DEVELOPMENTS IN PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR
PROGRAM. HE WANTED TO UNDERSCORE THAT THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE WERE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT NUCLEAR NON-
PROLIFERATION AND THAT THIS WAS ONE ISSUE THAT
COULD UPSET THE WHOLE US-PAKISTAN RELATIONSHIP.
RAHIM UDDIN KHAN STRESSED THAT PAKISTAN DIDN'T DREAM
OF A CONVENTIONAL, MUCH LESS A NUCLEAR WAR. IT HAD
PROPOSED TO INDIA THAT BOTH COUNTRIES OPEN THEIR
NUCLEAR FACILITIES TO INTERNATIONAL INSPECTION.
PAKISTAN'S NUCLEAR PROGRAM WAS VERY MODEST AND THEY
HAD NEITHER THE INTENT, THE DESIRE NOR THE ABILITY
TO PRODUCE NUCLEAR WEAPONS. PAKISTAN WANTED TO AVOID
ANY SITUATION WHERE NUCLEAR WEAPONS COULD BE USED.
BUT IT BADLY NEEDED MORE ENERGY AND OIL WAS TOO
EXPENSIVE. SENATOR GLENN NOTED THAT PAKISTAN HAD
ENGAGED IN SOME ACTIVITY WHICH IN THE PAST HAD
INDICATED A COUNTRY WAS MOVING TOWARDS ACQUIRING
A NUCLEAR WEAPONS CAPABILITY. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN SAID
THAT SENATOR GLENN WOULD BE SEEING PAKISTAN ATOMIC
ENERGY COMMISSION HEAD MUNIR KHAN AND THAT HE WOULD
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BE ABLE TO ADDRESS THIS QUESTION BETTER.
23. SENATOR SASSER NOTED THAT US PRESS REPORTS HAD
ASSERTED THAT PAKISTAN HAD PULLED BACK ITS FORCES
FROM THE AFGHAN BORDER IN ORDER TO AVOID PROVOKING
THE SOVIETS AND ASKED AT WHAT POINT PAKISTAN DREW
THE LINE AT CROSS-BORDER INCURSIONS. GEN RAFAQAT SAID PA
FORCES HAD NOT BEEN MOVED BACK. RAHIM UDDIN KHAN
REITERATED THAT PAKISTAN NEEDED A MODERN, SOPHISTICATED
EARLY WARNING SYSTEM TO DETECT INTRUDERS AND AN AIR
DEPT PASS ELECTRICALLY TO SECDEF WASHDC, JCS WASHDC,
USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL, USCINCPAC HONOLULU HI,
USCINCPACFLT PEARL HARBOR HI AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR
TAGS: PREL, MARR, PK, US, OVIP
SUBJECT: CODEL NUNN: MEETING AT JOINT CHIEFS OF
DEFENSE CAPABILITY TO BRING THEM DOWN. IN THIS
REGARD, PAKISTAN HAD ASKED FOR STINGER POST, AIM9L AND
E2CS. IT HAD ALSO REQUESTED THAT DELIVERIES OF SOME
OTHER WEAPONS SYSTEMS BE SPEEDED UP.
24. SENATOR SASSER ASKED ABOUT THE IMPACT OF THE
SIKH CRISIS ON THE INDIAN ARMY. AKHTAR SAID THE
HANDLING OF THE GOLDEN TEMPLE EPISODE HAD BEEN A
"POLITICAL MESS UP". USING THE ARMY TO ASSAULT THE
GOLDEN TEMPLE HAD SET SIKHS AGAINST NON-SIKHS IN
THE ARMY. COMMAND OF SIKH UNITS HAD BEEN GIVEN TO
HINDUS AND SIKH OFFICERS HAD BEEN REMOVED FROM KEY
POSITIONS. THE SIKHS MAY YET TAKE THE REVENGE PATH
AS THEY HAVE STILL NOT FORGIVEN THE HINDUS FOR THE
ASSAULT ON THE GOLDEN TEMPLE.
25. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
HINTON
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