CODEL TOWER RECEIVES GLOOMY LEBANON ASSESSMENT LINKED TO WIDER ISRAELI STRATEGY FROM FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030020-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 20
• Publication Date: February 18, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

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PAGE 001
TOR: 18043OZ FEB 84
00 RUEAIIB
ZNY CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
STU1325
00 RUEHC
DE RUEHRH #0897/01 0471006
ZNY CCCCC ZZH
0 160950Z FEE 84
FM USDEL RIYADH
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 8406
INFO RUEHAM/AMEMBASSY AMMAN 1331
RUEHAK/AMEMBASSY ANKARA 0147
RUEHBL,'AMEMBASSY BEIRUT 0221
RUEHEG/AMEMBASSY CAIRO 1444
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS 0864
RUEHJI/AMEMBASSY JIDDA 0834
RUEHLD/AMEMBASSY LONDON 0785
RUFHFR/AMEMBASSY PARIS 0712
RUEHRO/AMEMBASSY ROME 0416
RUEHTV/AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV 1045
RUEHLT/USMISSION USUN NEW YORK 0112
RUEHAD/USINT BAGHDAD 0443
RUEHJM/AMCONSUL JERUSALEM 0815
RUQMDH/AMCONSUL DHAHRAN 7345
BT
RIYADH 00897
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, LE, US, SA, SV, SY
SUBJECT: CODEL TOWER RECEIVES GLOOMY LEBANON ASSESSMENT
LINKED TO WIDER ISRAELI STRATEGY FROM FOREIGN
MINISTER SAUD
1. (C-ENTIRE TEXT).
2. SUMMARY: CONCLUDING AN ARTICULATE ANALYSIS OF THE
LEBANESE SITUATION AND THE PALESTINIANS' PLIGHT, SAUD
AL FAYSAL TOLD SENATOR TOWER AND REPRESENTATIVE MCCAIN
FEBRUARY 15 THAT THE RECENT HISTORY OF REGION IS A
CATALOG OF "MISSED OPPORTUNITIES." HE SAID THAT THE
REDEPLOYMENT OF THE MARINES HAD NOT AFFECTED U.S.
PRESTIGE AND CREDIBILITY IN ARAB EYES; WHETHER THE U.S.
ACHIEVED ITS GOAL OF A SOVEREIGN, INDEPENDENT LEBANON
WOULD. SAUD EMPHASIZED THAT DESPITE SETBACKS THE
KINGDOM WOULD CONTINUE TO WORK TOWARD THAT GOAL, WHICH
IT SHARES WITH THE US. WHILE BLAMING JUMBLATT, HE DID
NOT FULLY ACCEPT THE ARGUMENT THAT THE SYRIANS HAD BEEN
INTRANSIGENT,AND PLACED MUCH OF THE ONUS FOR THE
DETERIORATION ON ISRAEL. SAUD ADVANCED THE ARGUMENT
THAT IN LEBANON AS ON THE WEST BANK ISRAEL HAD IN FACT
REFUSED TO TRADE "TERRITORY FOR PEACE" AND INSTEAD PRACTI
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PRACTICED A POLICY OF SELECTIVE AGGRESSION FOLLOWED BY,
NEGOTIATED WITHDRAWAL. THE SYRIANS FEAR THEY ARE NEXT ON
ISRAEL'S LIST AND THUS SEEK ABROGATION OF THE MAY 17
AGREEMENT. SAUD CHARACTERIZED ARAFAT AS BY FAR THE MOST
POPULAR LEADER AMONG PALESTINIANS AND URGED THAT THE U.S.
MOVE TOWARD HIM SO HE COULD SHOW THAT THE POLITICAL OPTION
COULD PAY OFF. SAUD RECALLED THAT THE ARABS. EVEN SYRIA,
HAD ACCEPTED RESOLUTION 242 AND AT FEZ IMPLICITLY CONCEDED
ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST (IN TANDEM WITH PALESTINIAN
"SELF-DETERMINATION"). ISRAEL HAD IN FACT IF NOT FORM
SPURNED THE "TERRITORY FOR PEACE" PRINCIPLE. SAUD ASKED
U.S. NOT TO ACQUIESCE IN CURRENT ISRAELI STRATEGY, WHICH
ARAB OPINION BELIEVES IT IS DOING. END SUMMARY.
3. FOREIGN MINISTER SAUD RECEIVED SENATOR TOWER,
CONGRESSMAN MCCAIN, COMMITTEE STAFFERS MCGOVERN AND LOCHE
AND THE CHARGE FOR AN HOUR IN HIS RIYADH OFFICE ON
FEBRUARY 15. IN RESPONSE TO THEIR QUESTIONS, HE PROVIDED
THEM A THOUGHTFUL, HIGHLY ARTICULATE, AND UNEMOTIONAL
ANALYSIS OF SAUDI POLICY TOWARD LEBANON AND THE PALESTINI
QUESTION, EMPHASIZING AT SEVERAL POINTS THAT THE KINGDOM,
AS A FRIEND OF THE U.S., SHARED ITS OBJECTIVES IN LEBANON
AS THE ORIGINATOR OF THE FEZ PRINCIPLES,SAUDI ARABIA WAS
NOT FAR FROM THE U.S. IN ITS APPROACH TO THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT, SAID SAUD.(FURTHER DIALOGUE SHOWED THAT EVEN
WERE THE PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION QUESTION TO BE
RESOLVED. SYRIAN OBSTINACY MIGHT BLOCK ARAB CONSENSUS.)
THE CONVERSATION BEGAN WITH AN EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ON
TURKEY, WHICH THE CODEL HAD JUST VISITED.(SAUDI ARABIA
EXPECTS TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT EVREN NEXT WEEK.) THE
MINISTER AND THE SENATOR AGREED THAT PRESIDENT EVREN'S
ACCOMPLISHMENTS HAD BEEN IMPRESSIVE; SAUD EXPRESSED THE
HOPE THAT TURKEY, ABLY LED BY EVREN AND THE NEW PRIME
MINISTER AND STABLE AGAIN, COULD REVIVE ITS OLD AND VERY
USEFUL LINKS WITH THE EAST AND THE WEST AND ALSO WITH
THE ARAB STATES. INCLUDING THOSE OF NORTH AFRICA.
4. ASKED FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF LEBANESE EVENTS AND
PROSPECTS, SAUD TURNED IN A GLOOMY ANALYSIS. HOPES OF
A RESOLUTION BECOME DIMMER ALL THE TIME; EACH CHANCE FOR
A BREAKTHROUGH IS FOLLOWED BY DETERIORATION. PRESIDENT
GEMAYEL'S REFORM PROPOSALS COME PERHAPS TOO LATE. SAUD
RECALLED THAT THE U.S. AND SAUDI ARABIA HAD WORKED HARD
FOR A POLITICAL SOLUTION WHICH WOULD BUTTRESS THE
LEGITIMACY OF THE GOL. A CONSENSUS HAD EMERGED AT GENEVA.
HAD GEMAYEL BUILT ON THAT, A PROCESS TO STRENGTHEN
LEBANESE SOLIDARITY WOULD HAVE BEEN PUT IN MOTION. THIS
FAILED TO OCCUR FOR TWO REASONS: NO WAY AROUND THE MAY
17 AGREEMENT COULD BE FOUND BY THE GOL AND THE USG;
GEMAYEL HAD ATTEMPTED TO ASSERT HIS GOVERNMENT'S AUTHORITY
OVER GREATER BEIRUT BY MILITARY MEANS, WHICH HAD ALIENATE
THE SHIA AND DRUZE FROM THE GOL.
5. SAUD CONCEDED THAT JUMBLATT HAD PLAYED A ROLE IN THE
FAILURE TO MAINTAIN THE CONSENSUS, BUT ARGUED THAT HAD
GEMAYEL GONE TO WASHINGTON AFTER GENEVA WITH THE PACKAGE
OF REFORM PROPOSALS HE HAS NOW ANNOUNCED HE WOULD HAVE
GATHERED AROUND HIM A PREPONDERANT PROPORTION OF LEBANESE
OPINION. INSTEAD, TIME WAS LOST, THE OPPOSITION GAINED
STRENGTH. THE GOL LOST CREDIBILITY--EVEN WITH CHRISTIANS,
SAID SAUD, CITING DANY CHAMOUN'S CRITICISM OF GEMAYEL.
SAUD FEARED THAT THE CONSENSUS BEHIND THE GOL WHICH THE
USG AND THE SAG HAD LABORED TO SUSTAIN PERHAPS COULD NOT
BE REVIVED. PRESIDENT GEMAYEL MUST TACKLE THE TWO BIG
PROBLEMS: THE MAY 17 PACT AND POLITICAL REFORMS.
6. ASKED BY REPRESENTATIVE MCCAIN WHETHER THE MARINE
REDEPLOYMENT HAD BEEN A SLOW TO U.S. INFLUENCE IN THE
REGION, SAUD REPLIED THAT THEIR REMAINING IN BEIRUT AND
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WITHDRAWING BOTH PRESENTED DRAWBACKS: HAD THEY STAYED,
THEY WOULD HAVE BECOME MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN INTERNAL
CONFLICTS:WERE THE U.S. TO BE PERCEIVED AS "CUTTING AND
RUNNING", THAT WOULD ALSO HAVE HAD A NEGATIVE EFFECT.
SAUD STATED THAT THE MARINE PRESENCE SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED
IN ISOLATION. IF IT IS LINKED TO A PLAN FOR PEACE IN
LEBANON, THE MARINES WOULD BE WELCOME (AS THEY WERE
INITIALLY EVEN AMONG THE DRUZE AND SHIA, SAUD NOTED).
IF THERE IS NO MOVEMENT TOWARD A POLITICAL SOLUTION, THEY
BECOME PART OF THE PROBLEM. SAUD EMPHASIZED THAT THE
EVENTUAL FATE OF LEBANON AND THE GOALS THE U.S. (AND
SAUDI ARABIA) SEEK TO ACHIEVE THERE WILL AFFECT U.S.
PRESTIGE IN THE REGION MORE THAN THE PRESENCE OR ABSENCE
OF THE MARINES. THE CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. WILL BE
INFLUENCED MORE BY ITS EFFORTS TO HELP LEBANON REGAIN ITS
INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY, TO WHICH END THE MARINE
AND OTHER MNF PRESENCE WAS ESSENTIALLY A MEANS.
7. SAUD RETRACED HIS VERSION OF THE HISTORY OF THE
MARINE PRESENCE. THEY HAD LANDED FIRST TO PROTECT THE
PALESTINIANS AFTER THE PLO FIGHTERS' WITHDRAWAL AS
AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD PLEDGED; AFTER SABRA AND SHATILA,
THEY RETURNED TO PROTECT THE REMAINING PALESTINIAN
CIVILIANS. THEN THEIR ROLE EXPANDED AS THEY PROTECTED
THEMSELVES; NO ONE OBJECTED. BUT THE SIZE OF THE DETACH-
MENT DID NOT EXPAND; THEY WERE "GIVEN MORE THAN THEY COUL
CHEW" AND PLACED IN AN UNTENABLE POSITION--THEY WERE TOO
FEW TO ACHIEVE ANY MILITARY OBJECTIVE BUT ENOUGH TO RISK
INVOLVEMENT IN LEBANESE QUARRELS. IT WOULD BE "TRAGIC"
FOR THE MARINES TO BECOME INVOLVED IN LEBANON'S INTER-
NECINE CONFLICTS. IN SUM, SAUD ASSERTED, THE PRESTIGE
AND CREDIBILITY OF THE U.S. IN THE ARAB WORLD WILL DEPEND
ON WHETHER THE U.S. SUCCEEDS IN MODERATING ISRAELI
POLICIES IN LEBANON AND ON THE WEST BANK, WHERE THE GOI
SHOULD BE INDUCED BY THE U.S. TO MAKE PEACE ON THE BASIS
OF UNSC RESOLUTION 242 AND THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. THESE
ARE THE YARDSTICKS BY WHICH ARABS WILL MEASURE THE U.S.--
THE MARINES'PRESENCE OR ABSENCE WOULD NOT BE A PRIMARY
FACTOR FOR THE ARABS.
8. SENATOR TOWER ASKED SAUD'S REACTION WERE THE U.S. TO
PERSUADE ISRAEL TO SUSPEND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MAY 17
PACT AS PART OF A PACKAGE DEAL. SAUD RESPONDED THAT THE
AGREEMENT IS SUSPENDED NOW BECAUSE OF ITS LINKAGE TO
SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL AND THE SYRIAN REFUSAL TO PULL BACK.
IF IT CANNOT BE IMPLEMENTED, WHY INSIST ON KEEPING IT
SINCE IT HAS BECOME A BURDEN TO GOL EFFORTS TO ACHIEVE
RECONCILIATION?
9. RESPONDING TO FURTHER QUERIES, SAUD SAID SYRIA
REFUSED AND THE ARAB WORLD DISAPPROVED OF THE MAY 17
AGREEMENT BECAUSE THE ARABS--EVEN SYRIA--HAD ACCEPTED
THE IDEA OF PEACE WITH ISRAEL ON THE BASIS OF UNSC
RESOLUTION 242 AND ITS "TERRITORY FOR PEACE" PRINCIPLE.
THE REAGAN INITIATIVE IS A REFORMULATION OF 242.
ISRAEL IN FACT AVOIDS NEGOTIATING A GENERAL RESOLUTION
OF THE CONFLICT BECAUSE IT REFUSES TO DEAL WITH PALESTIN-
IANS. WITH THE POSSIBILITY OF A PALESTINIAN STATE.
INSTEAD, ISRAEL TAKES MILITARY ACTION AGAINST AN ARAB
STATE, THEN NEGOTIATES ITS WITHDRAWAL AND PEACF WITH
THAT STATE. EGYPT WAS FIRST, THEN LEBANON; SYRIA KNOWS
IT IS NEXT ON THE LIST AFTER LEBANON IS NEUTRALIZED.
THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT IN SAUD'S ANALYSIS DIMINISHES
LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY IN THE SOUTH AND IN FACT GRANTS
ISRAEL MILITARY HEGEMONY OVER ALL COUNTRIES ON ITS
BORDERS. THUS THE SYRIANS REFUSE TO WITHDRAW NOT OUT
OF OBSTINACY, NOR BECAUSE THEY ARE PRO-SOVIET, BUT OUT
OF FEAR THAT ONCE THEY DO AND THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT IS
IS IMPLEMENTED ISRAEL WILL TURN ON SYRIA.
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10. SLOWLY, SAID SAUD, ARAB OPINION IS COMING TO BELIEVE
THAT IN PRACTICAL TERMS THE U.S. AGREES WITH THIS ISRAELI
STRATEGY. ITS AID TO ISRAEL AND ITS ACCEPTANCE OF ISRAEL
ACTIONS WHICH RUN COUNTER TO U.S. INTERESTS (SUCH AS THE
GOI SETTLEMENT POLICY) NOURISH THE BELIEF THAT THE U.S.
IS IN FACT HELPING ISRAEL ACHIEVE A SERIES OF SEPARATE
PEACE TREATIES WHICH IN FACT REINFORCE ITS HEGEMONY--
DESPITE USG REFERENCE TO 242. AS A FRIEND OF THE U.S.,
SAUD UNDERSCORED, SAUDI ARABIA WANTS THE U.S. TO ACHIEVE
A COMPREHENSIVE PEACE IN THE REGION.
11. SENATOR TOWER NOTED THAT DISUNITY IN THE ARAB WORLD
COULD LEAD TO REJECTION BY AT LEAST SOME STATES OF ANY
EVENTUAL SETTLEMENT. SAUD DEMURRED. ONLY LIBYA STANDS
OUTSIDE THE ARAB CONSENSUS EMBODIED IN THE FEZ PRINCIPLES
SYRIA NOT ONLY ACCEPTED AT FEZ WHAT SAUD CALLED "THE ARAB
FORMULATION OF 242" BUT ALSO FOREIGN MINISTER KHADDAM
HAD GONE TO THE U.S. WITH THE POST-FEZ ARAB DELEGATION
TO SEE ABOUT BUILDING LINKS BETWEEN THE FEZ PRINCIPLES,
242, AND THE REAGAN INITIATIVE. THE SAUDIS HAVE NO
DOUBTS ABOUT THE SYRIAN COMMITMENT TO THE FEZ PRINCIPLES.
WHICH FOR EXAMPLE WAS REAFFIRMED IN THE SYRIAN DRAFTS
FOR PRESENTATION TO THE ISLAMIC SUMMIT IN CASABLANCA.
THUS THE PROBLEM IS NOT THE ARAB POSITION BUT THE TRUE
ISRAELI STANCE AS EVIDENT IN THESE ACTIONS: THE SETTLEMEN
PROGRAM IN FACT UNDERCUTS 242, ISRAEL REJECTS THE REAGAN
INITIATIVE, THE ISRAELI INTERPRETATION OF THE CAMP DAVID
PROVISIONS ON AUTONOMY FOR THE PALESTINIANS IS TOTALLY
DIFFERENT FROM THAT OF THE U.S. OR EGYPT. THE NEED IS
NOT TO EVOLVE A MODERATE ARAB POSITION BUT AN ISRAELI
ONE.
12. SENATOR TOWER RECOUNTED THAT EVEN IF WE WERE TO MOVE
ISRAEL, HE HAD BEEN TOLD BY KHADDAM THAT SYRIA IS NOT
INTERESTED IN A SOLUTION IN WHICH KING HUSSEIN WOULD PLAY
A MAJOR ROLE. SAUD, OBSERVING THAT KHADDAM HAD JOINED
THE POST-FEZ DELEGATION LED BY HUSSEIN, SAID KHADDAM
HAD BEEN "BLUSTERING", WHICH HAD TO BE DISTINGUISHED FROM
FACT.
13. COMMENTING ON REMARKS ABOUT ISRAELI POLITICS, SAUD
ASSERTED THAT THE SAUDIS DO NOT DOUBT THAT THERE ARE
ISRAELIS WHO SEE THE INJUSTICE AND THE DANGERS IN THE
ISRAELI POSITION OF SEEKING A HEGEMONIC ARBITER ROLE. IT
IS U.S. AID WHICH MAKES ISRAEL ARROGANT; WITH AN AIR FORC
LARGER THAN BRITAIN'S OR FRANCE'S IT CAN THREATEN ITS
NEIGHBORS. NOTING A POLL SHOWING MOST ISRAELIS FAVOR
CUTTING SETTLEMENT SUBSIDIES, TO WHICH SAUD MILDLY REPLIE
HE WISHED A MAJORITY IN THE U.S. DID TOO, SENATOR TOWER
EMPHASIZED THAT WHILE THE U.S. CONSIDERS ISRAEL A STRATEG
ASSET WE DO NOT ALWAYS AGREE WITH TEL AVIV. SAUD
CAUTIONED THAT ISRAEL'S SUPPORTERS SHOULD EXAMINE ISRAELI
ACTIONS MORE CAREFULLY--IN THE LONG RUN THEY NOT ONLY FAI
TO SERVE U.S. INTERESTS BUT THREATEN TO BRING DOWN ISRAEL
ITSELF, WHERE THE ECONOMIC SITUATION EVEN NOW IS ABNORMAL
14. SOMETHING HAS TO CHANGE, SAID SAUD, AND THE FIRST
THING SHOULD BE ISRAELI POLICIES--WHICH ONLY THE U.S. CAN
ACCOMPLISH. THE THESIS THAT A STRONG AND SECURE ISRAEL
WOULD BE MORE INCLINED TO MAKE CONCESSIONS FOR PEACE HAS
BEEN PROVEN FALSE. THE MORE THE AID, THE GREATER THE
AGGRESSION: THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS (WHICH FREED ISRAEL
TO TURN TOWARD THE EASTERN FRONT) WERE FOLLOWED BY THE
RAID ON THE IRAQI REACTOR, THE INVASION OF LEBANON, AND
NOW DAILY THREATS AGAINST ARAB COUNTRIES INCLUDING SAUDI
ARABIA. SAUD SAID THE ARABS DO NOT ASK THAT THE U.S.
PROVIDE MILITARY ASSISTANCE SO THEY MAY IMPOSE A SETTLE-
MENT ON OR DESTROY ISRAEL; THEY ASK THAT THE ARAB-ISRAELI
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CONFLICT BE SETTLED ON THE BASIS OF RESOLUTION 242 PLUS
THE APPLICATION OF "SELF-DETERMINATION" TO THE
PALESTINIANS, SINCE THEY ARE TREATED ONLY AS REFUGEES
IN THE RESOLUTION. THE U.S. AND THE ARABS AGREE TO A
GREAT EXTENT; ISRAEL DOES NOT, AS IS SHOWN BY ITS FAILURE
TO WITHDRAW, ITS REFUSAL TO DEAL SERIOUSLY WITH PALESTIN-
IANS, ITS INCORPORATION OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS.
15. SENATOR TOWER ASKED WHETHER SAUD FOUND ENCOURAGEMENT
IN THE ISRAELIS' HAVING PERMITTED WEST BANK MEMBERS OF
PARLIAMENT TO GO TO AMMAN.SAUD REPLIED THAT THE ISRAELIS
HAD HOPED (IN VAIN) TO CREATE PROBLEMS BETWEEN THESE
PALESTINIANS AND HUSSEIN BY OBLIGING THEM TO DECLARE A
PALESTINIAN OR JORDANIAN NATIONALITY; SAUD ADDED THAT
HE WOULD BE ENCOURAGED WERE THE ISRAELIS TO PERMIT
PALESTINIANS TO ATTEND THE NEXT PALESTINIAN NATIONAL
COUNCIL MEETING, WHICH THEY HAVE ALWAYS REFUSED TO DO.
OBSERVING THAT ARAFAT'S STOCK HAD RISEN A BIT IN THE U.S.
AFTER HIS DEFEAT BY SYRIA, SENATOR TOWER ASKED SAUD'S
VIEWS OF ARAFAT'S POSITION. SAUD SAID ARAFAT'S
POPULARITY AMONG PALESTINIANS IN GAZA AND THE WEST BANK
AND EVEN SYRIA REMAINED HIGH: HIS FEW OPPONENTS WERE HELD
IN LOW REGARD. HOWEVER, THIS MIGHT PROVE TEMPORARY: IF
THE STALEMATE REMAINS AND ARAFAT CANNOT SHOW THAT HIS
CONTACTS WITH HUSSEIN AND MUBARAK ARE ACHIEVING RESULTS,
HIS CREDIBILITY AND POPULARITY AMONG PALESTINIANS WILL
DROP AND THEY WILL TURN TO THOSE FAVORING MILITARY AND
TERRORIST ALTERNATIVES. TIMING IS THE KEY: NOW THAT
ARAFAT IS FREE OF SYRIA AND THE USSR, THE U.S. SHOULD
MAKE A BREAKTHROUGH IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE PLO.
16. TURNING TO CONGRESSMAN MCCAIN'S QUESTION BASED ON
AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS OF SYRIAN OBSTINACY, SAUD SAID THAT
HE DOES NOT SEE THE SYRIANS AS OPPOSED TO A SETTLEMENT
IN LEBANON. THE SYRIANS HAD AGREED TO A PHASED,
UNCONDITIONAL WITHDRAWAL ALONG WITH THE ISRAELIS IN A
LETTER FROM ASSAD TO KING FAHD, AS AMBASSADOR HABIB HAD
BEEN TOLD IN JIDDA A YEAR AGO. LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER
WAZZAN HAD TOLD FAHD THAT THE MAY 17 AGREEMENT CONTAINED
SECURITY PROVISIONS TO GO INTO IMMEDIATE EFFECT, WITH
THE "NORMALIZATION" PROVISIONS TO BE DISCUSSED SIX
MONTHS AFTER WITHDRAWAL. ASSAD HAD TOLD FAHD HE ACCEPTED
THIS PROPOSAL PROVIDED SYRIAN AND LEBANESE. AS WELL AS
ISRAELI, SECURITY WAS COVERED. THUS THE RECORD SHOWED
SYRIA HAD NOT BEEN INTRANSIGENT, SAID SAUD.
17. IN CONCLUSION, SAUD TOLD HIS GUESTS THAT THE RECENT
HISTORY OF THE MIDDLE EAST WAS A SERIES OF "LOST
OPPORTUNITIES". HE URGED THAT THE U.S. NOT MISS THOSE
PRESENTED BY THE CURRENT SITUATION, HOWEVER GLOOMY IT
MIGHT SEEM.
18. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. SUDDARTH
END OF MESSAGE CONFIDENTIAL
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