CODEL TOWER' S FEBRUARY 17-20 VISIT TO PAKISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030010-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 10
• Publication Date: February 21, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/25: CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030010-9
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TOR: 211403Z FEB 84
00 RUEAIIB
ZNY SSSSS ZOC STATE ZZH
STU0188
00 RUEHC
DE RUEHIL #3536/01 0521117
ZNY SSSSS ZZH
0 2111122 FEB 84
FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2561
INFO RUSBLK/AMEMBASSY KABUL 2371
RUEHMO/AMEMBASSY MOSCOW 1913
RUEHNE/AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI 0072
BT
LAMABAD 03536
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, XD, AF, PK, UR US
2. SUMMARY: DURING FEBRUARY 17-20 VISIT OF
SENATOR TOWER AND CONGRESSMAN JOHN MCCAIN TO PAKISTAN,
PRESIDENT ZIA, FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN AND DEFENSE
MINISTER TALPUR REVIEWED THE POSITIVE STATE OF CURRENT
U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS, EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR
CONGRESSIONAL SUPPORT FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S MILITARY
SALES AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE PACKAGE, AND PROVIDED AN
IN-DEPTH REVIEW OF PAKISTAN'S SECURITY ENVIRONMENT. THE
DISCUSSIONS TOUCHED ON PAKISTAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
FOLLOWING THE SOVIET FAILURE TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT ZIA
PRIVATELY IN MOSCOW. THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE BRIEFING
REVIEWED THE CHALLENGES CREATED BY THE SOVIET OCCUPATION
OF AFGHANISTAN, ITS STRATEGIC OBJECTIVE OF ESTABLISHING
A PERMANENT PRESENCE IN THE REGION, AND INDIA'S
ASPIRATIONS FOR REGIONAL DOMINANCE. NOTWITHSTANDING
INDIA'S WAR RHETORIC, THE GOP REMAINS FULLY COMMITTED TO
CONDUCTING A "PEACE OFFENSIVE" FOR THE NORMALIZATION AND
IMPROVEMENT OF INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS. PRESIDENT ZIA
IS DEEPLY CONCERNED AT THE PROSPECT OF LEBANON'S
DISINTEGRATION AND A SYRIAN-ISRAELI WAR IF A SHORT-TERM
TACTICAL SOLUTION CANNOT BE FOUND. HE IS MOST
PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR AND DISTURBED BY THE
IMPLICATIONS OF AN IRANIAN VICTORY FOR REGIONAL STABILIT
AT THE END OF THE MOD BRIEFING ON PAKISTAN'S SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT, SECRETARY GENERAL RAHIM KHAN AND LT. GEN.
ARIF ASKED SENATOR TOWER'S ASSISTANCE IN OBTAINING
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FAVORABLE NDPC RECONSIDERATION FOR RELEASE OF THE AIM-9L
STINGER POST AND COPPERHEAD. PRESIDENT ZIA AT DINNER
ESSENTIALLY FOLLOWED THE SAME LINE, INCLUDING EXPRESSION
OF INTEREST IN AIM-9L, ETC. END SUMMARY.
3. THE HIGHLIGHTS OF CODEL TOWER'S FEBRUARY 17-20 VISIT
TO PAKISTAN WERE THE MEETINGS WITH PRESIDENT ZIA AND
FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN, AND AN IN-DEPTH SECURITY
BRIEFING CHAIRED BY MOD SECRETARY GENERAL RAHIM KHAN AND
CHIEF OF STAFF LIEUTENANT GENERAL K.M. ARIF. CODEL TOWE
ALSO MET NWFP GOVERNOR FAZLE HAQ IN PESHAWAR AND TRAVELE
TO MICHNI POINT OVERLOOKING THE PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN
BORDER AT TORKHAM. THE PLANNED VISIT TO AN AFGHAN
REFUGEE CAMP HAD TO BE DROPPED AS BAD WEATHER CANCELLED
USE OF A PAF HELICOPTER EXTENDING THE TRAVEL TIME
BETWEEN ISLAMABAD AND THE NWFP.
4. ISI DEPUTY DIRECTOR NIAZI'S BRIEFING ON PAKISTAN'S
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT EMPHASIZED THE LONG-TERM PROBLEMS
ARISING FROM THE CONTINUING SOVIET OCCUPATION OF
AFGHANISTAN AND INDIA'S DRIVE FOR A DOMINANT POSITION IN
SOUTH ASIA. THE 1979 INVASION WAS A DELIBERATE STRATEGI
MOVE TO ESTABLISH A SOVIET REGIONAL PRESENCE ON A
PERMANENT BASIS. THE GOP VIEWS SOVIET LONG-TERM
STRATEGY TOWARD AFGHANISTAN AS THE WHITTLING DOWN OF THE
AFGHAN RESISTANCE BY FORCE AND SUBVERSION, NEUTRALIZATIO
OF PAKISTAN, GRADUAL INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE OF
AFGHANISTAN AS PART OF THE SOVIET SPHERE OF INFLUENCE,
AND THE SOVIETIZATION OF THAT COUNTRY. THE GOP VIEWS
INDIA AS A WILLING PARTNER IN SOVIET EFFORTS TO WIN THE
SUPPORT OF REGIONAL COUNTRIES FOR THIS LONG-TERM
STRATEGY. PAKISTAN ALSO VIEWS IRAN'S UNCERTAIN FUTURE
AS ANOTHER SOURCE OF REGIONAL INSTABILITY, AND BELIEVES
THAT BOTH INDIA AND THE SOVIET UNION ARE INCREASING THEI
EFFORTS TO GAIN A FOOTHOLD IN IRAN THROUGH OFFERS OF
ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE. PAKISTAN REMAINS COMMITTED TO
RESISTING THESE ACTUAL AND POTENTIAL THREATS TO ITS
SECURITY AND TO DOING ITS SHARE TO PREVENT A DEFINITIVE
SOVIET CONSOLIDATION IN AFGHANISTAN.
5. IN RESPONSE TO SENATOR TOWER'S QUERY ABOUT SOVIET
PROSPECTS, NIAZI INDICATED THAT PAKISTAN VIEWS THE SOVIE
TIME-FRAME FOR DOMINATION OF AFGHANISTAN AS EXTENDING TO
A GENERATION AND A HALF. THEY PROBABLY HAVE WRITTEN
OFF THE OLDER GENERATION AND ARE CONCENTRATING ON
INDOCTRINATION AND EDUCATION OF A NEW GENERATION. THEY
HOPE OVER 20-25 YEARS TO ABSORB AFGHANISTAN AS A SOVIET
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, X0, AF, PK, UR US
SUBJECT: CODEL TOWER'S FEBRUARY 17-20 VISIT TO PAKISTAN
SATELLITE. IN THE SHORT TERM. IN THE GOP VIEW, IT IS
UNLIKELY THAT THE SOVIETS WILL INCREASE THEIR TROOP
PRESENCE AS THIS PROBABLY WOULD LEAD TO STRONG REACTIONS
BY THE U.S. AND CHINA AS WELL AS ADVERSELY AFFECT THE
SOVIET POSTURE IN OTHER THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES. DURING
1983 THE AFGHAN RESISTANCE WAS OPERATIONALLY EFFECTIVE I
BOTH THE NORTH (NEAR THE SOVIET BORDER) AND IN PAKTIA AN
PAKTIKA PROVINCES IN THE SOUTH. AS LT. GEN. FAZLE HAO
PUT IT, IN THE SHORT RUN THE SOVIETS WILL BE ABLE TO
PACIFY AFGHANISTAN ONLY AT A VERY HEAVY COST. AT THE
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SAME TIME, THE SOVIETS RETAIN A HOT-PURSUIT OPTION WHICH
WILL CONTINUE TO FACE PAKISTAN WITH A SERIOUS CHALLENGE
TO DEFEND ITS BORDERS AND NATIONAL INTEGRITY.
6. AT THE MOD BRIEFING, SENATOR TOWER WAS TOLD THAT
PAKISTAN VIEWS INDIA'S CONNECTION WITH THE USSR AS ITS
"PRINCIPAL WORRY". THE USSR AND INDIA HAVE COMMON
INTERESTS IN TRYING TO SUBDUE AND WEAKEN PAKISTAN, AND
TO ALTER THE REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT TO PAKISTAN'S
DISADVANTAGE. INDIA'S CLOSE ECONOMIC AND MILITARY
CONNECTIONS WITH THE USSR PRECLUDE IT FROM SIGNIFICANTLY
CHANGING ITS PRESENT POLICIES. GENERAL ARIF SAID THAT
MRS. GANDHI DELIBERATELY PLAYS EAST AGAINST WEST IN ORDE
TO EXTRACT MAXIMUM ADVANTAGE FOR INDIA. FOR EXAMPLE,
SHE USES LIMITED ARMS PURCHASES FROM THE WEST TO GET MOR
FROM THE SOVIETS WHILE CONVERSELY CITING THE SOVIET
PRESENCE IN AFGHANISTAN TO EXTRACT MORE CONCESSIONS FROM
THE WEST. SIMILARLY, INDIA DOES NOT WANT TO FINALLY
RESOLVE ITS BORDER PROBLEMS WITH CHINA AS THIS ALSO WOUL
DIMINISH ITS LEVERAGE WITH BOTH THE USSR AND THE WEST.
7. NOTWITHSTANDING THESE DEVELOPMENTS AND RHETORIC FROM
INDIA ABOUT THE THREAT OF WAR, FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB
KHAN STRESSED PAKISTAN'S COMMITMENT TO WAGING "A PEACE
OFFENSIVE" TOWARD INDIA. HE AND FOREIGN SECRETARY
NAIK REITERATED PAKISTAN'S DESIRE TO HAVE POSITIVE
RELATIONS WITH INDIA AND THEIR HOPE THAT THE PRESENT
DOWNTURN IN RELATIONS WILL ONLY BE TEMPORARY. IN
PRIVATE MEETING WITH SENATOR TOWER, CONGRESSMAN MCCAIN,
AND AMBASSADOR, FOREIGN MINISTER YAQUB KHAN TALKED OF
INDIA AND AFGHANISTAN. HE LAMENTED INDIAN ACTIONS AND
TALK OF WAR, BUT SAID PAKISTAN WOULD PERSEVERE WITH ITS
POLICY OF NOT ALLOWING ITSELF TO BE PROVOKED AND OF
WAGING A PEACE OFFENSIVE. ON AFGHANISTAN, HE SEEMED A
BIT MORE PESSIMISTIC IN HIS ASSESSMENT THAN SOMETIMES.
HOWEVER, HE CONCLUDED THAT FACED WITH CONTINUING WAR
AND SOVIET THREATS, PAKISTAN'S POLICY COULD BE SUMMED UP
AS "DEFIANCE, COURAGE, AND FORTITUDE."
8. FOREIGN SECRETARY NIAZ NIAK, IN DOWNPLAYING SOVIET
FAILURE TO RECEIVE PRESIDENT ZIA PRIVATELY, EXPLAINED
THAT THIS REFLECTS CURRENT SOVIET FOCUS ON THE WEST AND
DISARMAMENT WHEREAS AT THE BREZHNEV FUNERAL THE SOVIETS
CONCENTRATED ON SOUTH ASIAN PROBLEMS. COMMENT: THE
PAKISTANIS WERE DISAPPOINTED THAT PRESIDENT ZIA WAS NOT
RECEIVED AND THIS'IS A FACE SAVING EXPLANATION. YAQUB'S
LINE (HARDER THAN HIS PRE-FUNERAL TONE) "IN FACE OF
THREATS, DEFIANCE" SUGGESTS THE SOVIETS DID NOT SCORE BY
SPURNING PRESIDENT ZIA.
9. AT PRESIDENT ZIA'S DINNER FOR CODEL TOWER, THE
PRESIDENT SAID RELATIONS WERE EXCELLENT. HE HAD NO
PROBLEMS WITH U.S. OTHER THAN DELAYS, MENTIONED ALMOST
AS AN AFTERTHOUGHT BUT MENTIONED DELIBERATELY, IN
PROCUREMENT OF THE THREE ITEMS HE UNDERSTOOD HAD BEEN
DISCUSSED WITH MINISTRY OF DEFENSE OFFICIALS (AIM 9L,
STINGER POST AND COPPERHEAD). AT SENATOR TOWER'S REQUES
HE DISCUSSED AT GREAT LENGTH THE MIDDLE EAST OUTLOOK (SE
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PARAS 11-12 BELOW). AS PRESIDENT ZIA WAS PAINTING THE
SITUATION IN BLEAK TERMS, SENATOR TOWER INQUIRED NOT SO
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, XD, AF, PK, UR US
SUBJECT: CODEL TOWER'S FEBRUARY 17-20 VISIT TO PAKISTAN
INNOCENTLY IF IT WOULD NOT BE A GOOD IDEA FOR DEFENSE
OFFICIALS OF BOTH SIDES TO MEET TOGETHER FROM TIME TO
TIME TO TRADE IDEAS. ZIA AGREED AND SAID HE HAD TOLD
SECRETARY WEINBERGER THIS COULD BE DONE. HE LOOKED UP
WITH A MORE OR LESS PUZZLED AIR AS IF TO ASK WHAT GOES.
FOREIGN SECRETARY NIAZ NAIK SOMEWHAT EMBARRASSED EXPLAIN
THAT THE FOREIGN MINISTRY HAD DRAFTED A REPLY AND IT WAS
BEING CONSIDERED BY THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE, ETC. ZIA
THEN OBSERVED THAT AS A NEW COMER TO THE NON-ALIGNED
MOVEMENT PAKISTAN IS SOMETIMES "MORE CATHOLIC THAN THE
POPE." COMMENT: WHETHER THIS EXCHANGE WILL BREAK THE
LOG JAM ON THE MILITARY PLANNING GROUP REMAINS TO BE
SEEN, BUT THE MESSAGE HAS AGAIN BEEN DELIVERED.
10. DURING THE MOD BRIEFING, SECRETARY GENERAL RAHIM
KHAN AND GENERAL ARIF RENEWED THE GOP REQUESTS FOR NDPC
RECONSIDERATION OF THESE THREE OUTSTANDING MILITARY ITEM
GENERAL ARIF NOTED THAT DURING PRESIDENT ZIA-SECDEF
WEINBERGER'S MEETING IN WASHINGTON IN DECEMBER 1982, PAK
ISTAN HAD REQUESTED FAVORABLE ACTION ON FIVE ITEMS.
TWO OF THESE--THE ALR-69 AND HARPOON MISSILE--HAVE BEEN
SATISFACTORILY RESOLVED. THE OUTSTANDING ITEMS PENDING
NDPC APPROVAL ARE THE AIM-9L MISSILE, STINGER POST AND
COPPERHEAD. IN ASKING SENATOR TOWER TO EXPLORE THE
POSSIBILITIES OF FAVORABLE ACTION, GENERAL ARIF MADE
THREE POINTS: (A) PRESIDENT ZIA TOLD SECRETARY WEINBERG
IN ISLAMABAD IN OCTOBER 1983 THAT HE HAS GIVEN FIRM
INSTRUCTIONS TO THE PAF TO SHOOT DOWN THE NEXT SOVIET
AIRPLANE INVADING PAKISTANI AIRSPACE PROVIDED IT CAN BE
BROUGHT DOWN ON PAKISTANI TERRITORY. PROVISION OF THE
AIM-9L MISSILE WILL HELP TO MAKE THIS POSSIBLE. THE GOP
IS CONCERNED THAT CONTINUED SOVIET AIR VIOLATIONS WITHOUT
AN ADEQUATE PAF RESPONSE WILL REINFORCE PUBLIC CONCERNS
THAT THE BORDER CANNOT BE PROTECTED. THIS IN TURN WILL
AFFECT THE GOVERNMENT'S CREDIBILITY IN ASSURING THE
PUBLIC THAT IT CAN DETER SOVIET AGGRESSION. (B) THE GOP
AS A POOR COUNTRY CAN ONLY INDUCT EQUIPMENT WITH A 20 YEA
TIME FRAME. FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS PRECLUDE PURCHASING
THE STINGER BASIC, ONLY TO REPLACE IT WITH STINGER POST
IN FIVE YEARS. THIS IN GENERAL IS THE REASON WHY
PAKISTAN HAS REQUESTED THE BEST AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGY
FROM THE USG; AND (C) FULFILLMENT OF GOP REQUESTS FOR
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY ITEMS WILL ENABLE PAKISTAN TO ASSURE OTHE
THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES THAT THE U.S. IS READY TO HELP ITS
FRIENDS. INDIRECTLY THIS WILL ASSIST IN BUILDING
CONFIDENCE IN THE U.S. POSITION IN THE THIRD WORLD.
SENATOR TOWER SAID HE UNDERSTOOD PAKISTAN'S REQUIREMENTS
AND WOULD EXPLORE THE STATUS OF THESE OUTSTANDING REQUEST
UPON HIS RETURN TO THE U.S.
11. ON LEBANON PRESIDENT ZIA SEEMED TO FAVOR MASSIVE
U.S. INTERVENTION, BUT ALSO RECOGNIZED IT MUCH LESS
LIKELY IN AN ELECTION YEAR. HE FORESEES BREAKUP OF
LEBANON INTO FIVE CANTONS AND THE POSSIBILITY OF ANOTHER
SYRIAN-ISRAELI WAR IF LEBANESE UNITY AND INDEPENDENCE
CANNOT BE MAINTAINED. FOREIGN MINISTERYAQUB KHAN'S
ASSESSMENT STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF FINDING A SHORT
TERM TACTICAL SOLUTION TO PREVENT A FURTHER DETERIORATIO
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THE UNDERLYING STRATEGIC REALITY, HE SAID, IS THAT A
POWER VACUUM LOOMS AHEAD IN LEBANON. SYRIA'S GOAL
APPEARS TO BE THE EXPANSION OF ITS INFLUENCE IN LEBANON
IN COOPERATION WITH THE MILITANT WING OF THE PLO. THIS
WILL PUT PRESSURE ON JORDAN AND THE OTHER ARAB MODERATE
STATES. IF ISRAEL DOES NOT ACCEPT THIS, AS IT PROBABLY
WILL NOT, A CONFLICT BETWEEN SYRIA AND ISRAEL COULD
BECOME "STRATEGICALLY INEVITABLE." THE MODERATES DO NOT
FAVOR SYRIAN EXPANSION BUT THEY ARE INSISTING, AND WILL
CONTINUE TO DO SO, THAT ISRAEL MUST WITHDRAW UNCONDITI
UNCONDITIONALLY FROM LEBANON. THE EGYPTIANS SAY THAT
SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IS AN ARAB PROBLEM WHICH THE ARABS
THEMSELVES MUST RESOLVE. THEY THEREFORE SUPPORT
ABROGATION OF THE ISRAELI-LEBANESE AGREEMENT AS THE FIRS
STEP TO WORKING OUT A NEW MODUS VIVENDI. YAQUB BELIEVES
THAT THE SOVIETS WILL STAY DIPLOMATICALLY ACTIVE BUT WIL
BE RELUCTANT TO BE DRAWN MILITARILY INTO AN ISRAELI-
SYRIAN CONFLICT. THIS IN EFFECT WOULD BE DRAGGING THEM
INTO A GLOBAL CONFLICT AT A TIME AND PLACE NOT OF THEIR
CHOOSING.
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, XD, AF, PK, UR US
SUBJECT: CODEL TOWER'S FEBRUARY 17-20 VISIT TO PAKISTAN
12. ON IRAN-IRAQ WAR PRESIDENT ZIA ELABORATED HIS CONCE
THAT IRAN BECAUSE OF SUPERIOR MANPOWER AND ECONOMIC
STRENGTH WILL EVENTUALLY PREVAIL WITH DIRE CONSEQUENCES
FOR THE SHIA-SUNNI BALANCE OF POWER WITHIN THE ISLAMIC
WORLD. HE FORESEES A DEFEATED IRAQ WITH ITS HEAVILY SHI
POPULATION ALLIED WITH IRAN, SYRIA, AND SHIAS IN LEBANON
EXERTING ENORMOUS AND UNCONSTRUCTIVE PRESSURE ON THE GUL
STATES. PRESIDENT ZIA USED WORDS SUCH AS "TERRIBLE" AND
"MADNESS" TO DESCRIBE THE SITUATION. THE WORST OF IT
FOR HIM SEEMED TO BE THAT IT WAS A SENSELESS WAR DIVIDIN
ISLAM ALONG ARAB AND NON-ARAB LINES. HE THOUGHT THAT TH
BEST THAT COULD BE HOPED FOR NOW WAS A CONTINUING STALE-
MATE. ONLY IF KHOMEINI OR SADDAM HUSSAIN WERE OUT OF TH
PICTURE DID HE THINK A CEASE FIRE COULD BE NEGOTIATED.
13. THIS MESSAGE WAS PREPARED FOLLOWING SENATOR TOWER'S
DEPARTURE AND WAS NOT CLEARED WITH HIM.
14. KABUL MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
HINTON
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