CODEL DECONCINI: MEETING WITH ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030006-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: C
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 30, 2012
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: February 25, 1984
• Content Type: CABLE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030006-4
PAGE 001
TOR: 2502112 FEB 84
RR RUEAiIB
ZN1' CCCCC ZOC STATE ZZH
STU4781
RR RUEHC RUEHLL
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R 2218512 FEB 84
FM AMEMBASSY MANAGUA
TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC 9804
INFO RUEHLL%CONTADORA COLLECTIVE
6T
ANAGUA 0976
EO 12356: DECL OADR
TAGS: PGOV PREL NU L'S
SUBJECT: CODE bECONCINI: MEETING WITH ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER
2. SUMMARY: IN A FRANK MEETING WITH CODEL DECONCINI,
ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER VICTOR TINOCO REVIEWED NICARAGUAN
NEGOTIATING POSITIONS. HE INDICATED THE GRN'S RECOGNITION
OF USG?.ECURITY CONCERNS, STRESSED iT5 WILLINGNESS NOT
TO ACCEPT FOREIGN BASES. ANC CLAIMED THAT THE DEPARTURc
OF SALVADORAN LEADERS WAS A SIGNAL OF THE GRN'S WI_ING-
NESS TO NEGOTIATE SERIOUSLY WITH THE U.S. HE ALSO
DEFENDED THE ELECTORAL PROCESS IN THE FACE OF SENATOR
DECONCINI'S SKEPTICISM ABDUT IT. END SUMMARY.
3. CODEL DECONCINI AND AMBASSADOR CALLED ON ACTING
FOREIGN MINISTER VICTOR TINOCO, FEBRUARY 16. ALSO
PRESENT ON THE NICARAGUAN SIDE WA5 SAUL ARANA, DIRECTOR
FOR NORTH AMERICAN AFFAIRS. TINOCO OPENED THE MEETING
EY COMMENTING THAT COMMI:NICATION AND DIALOGUE WERE THE
BEST WAYS TO PROMOTE MUTUAL UNDERSTANDING. THE SENATOR
AGREED AND SAID THAT THIS DIALOGUE WAS GOING ON IN THE
CONTADORA PROCESS.. HE NOTED U.S. SUPPORT FOR THIS
PROCESS AND ASKED TINOCO FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF ITS PROGRESS.
4. TINOCO SAID THAT BEFDRE ANSWERING DIRECTLY, HE WISHED
TO REVEIW THE HISTORY OF NICARGUA'S POSITION. HE POINTED
TO THE GRN'S FOUR DRAFT TREATIES, WHICH HAD BEEN PRESENTED
TO THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES AND TO THE U.S. ON OCTOBER 15.
HE STRESSED THE DATE, NOTING THAT THESE PROPOSALS WERE
MADE TEN JAYS BEFORE GRENADA. THE USG, HE SAID, SHOULD
NOT CONFUSE CAUSE AND EFFECT. NICARAGUA, IN THESE PROPO-
SALS, HAD TRIED TO ADDRESS U.S. CONCERNS, EVEN THOUGH THE
GRN THOUGyT SOME WERE ONLY PRETEXTS. SPECIFICALLY, NICA-
RAGUA HAD MADE CLEAR IT WOULD NOT BECOME A SOVIET BASE
OR A THREAT TO U.S. STRATEGIC INTERESTS. THE DRAFT EILA-
TERAL TREATY HAD MADE CLEAR NICARAGUA WOULD NOT ALLOW ANY
MILITARY EASE ON ITS TERRITORY, IF THE U.S. SUSPENDED ITS
AGGRESSION AND COVERT ACTION. THE CONTADORA FOUR WOULD
GUARANTEE THIS AGREEMENT AND, AS NECESSARY, CARR1' OUT IN
SITU INSPECTION OF ALLEGED VIOLATIONS.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030006-4
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030006-4
CONFIDENT 1 AL
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5. NICARAGUA, HE WENT ON, ALSO WAS WILLING TO ADDRESS THE
ACCUSATION THAT IT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR WHAT WAS HAPPENING
IN EL SALVADOR. IT WAS PREPARED TO REACH AN AGREEMENT TO
SUSPEND ALL ARMS SHIPMENTS IN ORDER TO CREATE CONDITIONS
FOR A DIALOGUE. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION ABOUT A POSSIBLE CUBAN
ROLE, TINOCO SAID THAT WHILE CUBA HAD NOT BEEN ASKED TO JOIN
IN THIS AGREEMENT, NICARAGUA WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO
ITS DOING S0. AS IN THE FIRST AGREEMENT, THE CONTADORA
COUNTRIES COULD SUPERVISE THE ACCORD AND INVESTIAGE ANY
VILATIONS.
6. FINALLY, NICARAGUA WAS WILLING TO ADDRESS THE ALLEGA-
TIONS THAT IT WAS TRYING TO EXPORT ITS REVOLUTION AND WAS
THREATENING ITS NEIGHBORS. NICARAGUA WAS TIRED OF DENYING
THESE CHARGES, SO IT HAD PUT FORWARD A REGIONAL ACCORD
UNDER WHICH ALL CENTRAL AMERICAN COUNTRIES WOULD UNDERTAKE
NOT TO TRY TO OVERTHROW THE GOVERNMENTS OF ITS NEIGHBORS
OR USE FORCE AGAINST THEM, OR ENGAGE IN ANY TRAFFICKING
IN ARMS. ONCE AGAIN, CONTADORA COULD BE THE GUARANTOR.
7.UNFORTUNATELY, TINOCO ASSERTED, THE ONLY USG RESPONSE
HAD BEEN TO SAY THAT THE PROPOSALS WERE NOT CREDIBLE AND
WERE INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE THEY DIO NOT ADDRESS THE ARMS
BUILD-UP. SO NICARAGUAN HAD MADE NEW PROPOSALS ON DECEM-
BER 1. IT HAD SUGGESTED A FREEZE ON THE IMPORTATION OF
ARMAMENTS INTO THE REGION AND A RECIPROCAL WITHDRAWAL OF
ALL MILITARY ADVISORS. IN RESPONSE, THE U.S. HAD RAISED
INTERANL ISSUES. NICARAGUA HAD NO PROBLEM IF THE COUNTRIES
OF THE REGION WISHED TO REITERATE THEIR COMMITMENT TO
ELECTIONS, BUT NICARAGUA WAS NOT WILLING TO SIGN A TREATY
REQUIRING ELECTIONS. WITH RESPECT TO THE IDEA OF AN ARMS
FREEZE, BOTH HONDURAS AND GUATEMALA HAO REJECTED THE IDEA.
EL SALVADOR AND HONDURAS DID NOT WANT AN EARLY DEPARTURE
OF ADVISORS. HOWEVER, FROM THE GRN'S POINT OF VIEW, THE
U.S. WAS THE CRITICAL DIMENSION. THE CONTADORA COUNTRIES
COULD NOT GET THE U.S. ADVISORS OUT OF THE REGION WITHOUT U.S.
AGREEMENT. THE SAME WAS TRUE ABOUT LIMITING THE ARMS
BUILD-UP, SINCE NEITHER HONDURAS NOR EL SALVADOR HAD THE
POLITICAL INDEPENDENCE TO TAKE THESE DICSIIONS.
8. SENATOR DECONCINI EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THIS
DETAILED EXPALNATION. NICARAGUA'S SUBSTANTIVE PROPOSALS
SHOULD 8E DISCUSSED 'dITHIN THE CONTADORA GROUP WITHOUT THE
U.S. TRYING TO IMPOSE ITS WILL. TINOCO AGREED, BUT SAID
THE U.S. WOULD HAVE TO BE WILLING TO ACCEPT SOLUTIONS
PROPOSED BY CONTADORA. AT THE MOMENT, IT WAS WORKING
AGAINST CONTADORA BY ESTABLISHING A BASE IN HONDURAS.
UNFORTUNATELY, CONTADORA WAS ALSO MOVING VERY SLOWLY,
WHILE PREPARATIONS FOR WAR ACCELERATED. THERE WAS A LACK
OF CONFIDENCE AND A FEAR OF THE GAME THE OTHER SIDE WAS
PLAYING. DECONCINI URGED TINOCO TO PUT PARANOIA ASIDE
AND PUT FORWARD CONSTRUCTIVE PROPOSALS. TINOCO AGREED,
BUT SAID THAT THE CRITICAL STEP SHOULD BE FOR THE U.S.
TO END ITS COVERT PROGRAM AND FOR HONDURAS NOT TO ALLOW
ITS TERRITORY TO BE USED FOR THESE PURPOSES BY THE U.S.
9. THE SENATOR THEN TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO ELECTIONS.
RECOGNIZING THE SENSITIVITY OF THE ISSUE,HE ASKED WHAT
ASSURANCES THERE WOULD BE THAT ELECTIONS WOULD BE FREE.
TINOCO SAID HE HAD NO DOUBT THEY W'OULO BE FREE.DIFFERENT
PARTIES WITH DIFFERENT IDEOLOGIES WOULD COMPETE. THE STATE
OF EMERGENCY, WITH A FEW SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS, WOULD BE
LIFTED. PARTIES. AS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, 'dOULD HAVE ENOUGH
TIME TO COMPETE. EVEN IF THE U.S. THOUGHT NICARAGUA WAS
TOTALITARIAN, THE FACTS SHOWED OTHERWISE. THERE WERE OPPO-
SITION PARTIES. THE REVOLUTON HAD NOT CHANGED, HE
WOULD NOT SAY IT HAD BECOME MORE RADICAL, ALTHOUGH IT
HAD 6EEN AFFECTED BY WAR.
CONFIDENTIAL
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10. REVERTING TO SECURITY ISSUES, THE SENATOR EXPRESSED
CONCERN ABOUT NICARAGUA'S ACQUISITION OF HEAVY ARMAMENTS
SUCH AS TANKS AND APCS FROM CUBA AND THE USSR AND ITS
EXPANSION OF AIRFIELDS. HE SAID THAT TO HIM AND TO MANY
AMERICANS, THESE SEEMED TO EXCEED NATIONAL DEFENSE NEEDS.
TINOCO RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS A SUBJECTIVE PROBLEM,
SINCE EACH COUNTRY HAD ITS OWN VIEW OF WHAT IT NEEDED
FOR DEFENSE. ONE COULD CALL NICARAGUA PARANOIC, BUT HE
DID NOT THINK THAT WOULD BE FAIR. THE U.S. WAS TRYING
TO DESTROY AND DESTABILIZE THE REVOLUTION. NICARAGUA
WAS NOT THINKING OF CONFRONTING THE U.S., BUT HAC TO
DEVELOP A POPULAR ARMY TO DEFEND AGAINST THE U.S. NICA-
RAGUA'S REGULAR ARMY WAS THE SAME SIZE AS THAT OF EL
SALVADOR. NICARAGUAN MILITARY DOCTRINE WAS FUNDAMENTALLY
DEFENSIVE. IT HAD THE WEAKEST AIR FORCE IN CENTRAL
AMERICA. IT HAD NO COMBAT AIRCRAFT AND THE AIR FORCE HAD
EMPHASIZED DEFENSIVE ASPECTS. DECONCINI SAID THE U.S. HAD WATCHED
CUBA'S MILITARY BUILD-UP WITH GREAT CONCERN. ANOTHER
BUILD-UP OF THAT TYPE WOULD BE MOST THREATENING TO U.S.
INTERESTS. TINOCO SAID NICARAGUA UNDERSTOOD U.S. SECURITI'
CONCERNS AND HAD NO INTENTION OF ALLOWING ANY FOREIGN
MILITARY BASE IN NICARAGUA.
11. MR. FREEDMAN TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO THE SUBJECT
OF EL SALVADOR AND ASKED IF THERE WERE NOT SOME GESTURE
NICARAGUA COULD MAKE TO CONVINCE THE U.S. TINOCO SAID
THE GRN HAD BEEN TRYING TO GIVE SIGNALS. LEADERS OF THE
FMLN HAD LEFT LAST YEAR. THIS WAS A SIGN THAT NICARAGUA
WAS READY TO TALK. THE USG ASSUMED THAT THESE SIGNALS
WERE THE RESULT OF PRESSURE; PERHAPS THEY WERE. HOWEVER,
12. COMMENT: TINOCO REITERATED STANDARD GRN POSITIONS
ON NEGOTIATIONS, ALTHOUGH IT WAS INTERESTING TO NOTE
THAT HE ACKNOWLEDGED THE POSSIBILITY THAT USG PRESSURE
HAD HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH THE CHANGE IN NICARAGUA'S
NEGOTIATING STANCE OVER THE LAST SIX MONTHS.
OUAINTON
C~NF f DENT t /~L
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/07/30: CIA-RDP90B01370R000801030006-4