SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

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• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000600800056-7
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
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• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2008
• Sequence Number: 56
• Publication Date: February 1, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE 98 th CONGRESS, SECOND SESSION
Zonrcziona1 Record
United States
of America
WASHINGTON, WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 1, 1984
Senate
SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF ARMS
CONTROL AGREEMENTS
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr.
TRIBLE). The Senator from Idaho is
recognized.
THE HISTORY OF ARMS CONTROL TREATY
VIOLATIONS
Mr. MCCLURE. Mr. President, arms
control treaty violations are not new.
During the 1930's there was wholesale
violation of existing arms control trea-
ties:
There was violation of the Washing-
ton and London Naval Treaties by
Japan and Italy.
There was German violation of the
Treaty of Versailles.
There was Italian use of chemical
weapons in Ethiopia.
The United States reacted to these
violations the way some would have us
react to the Soviet violations today-
we continued to abide by the Washing-
ton and London Naval Treaties after
the Japanese had publically abrogated
them.
During the 1930's Winston Churchill
publically challenged the British Gov-
ernment to admit that the Germans
were violating existing treaties. It re-
fused to for a long time.
In November 1934 in the House of
Commons, Winston Churchill stated.
and I quote from the words of the
great statesman:
According to the Treaty of Versailles, the
German Government are not allowed to
build any military aircraft or organize any
military air force ... What was meant for a
safeguard for the Allies has in fact become
only a cloak or a mask for a potential ag-
gressor. With any other country the facts
about Its air development would have been
stated quite promptly ... In fact, the
League collects these figures... With any
other country this would make no difficulty,
but it is just because Germany is under this
special disability. I understand how it has
arisen. It has not been considered etiquette,
or at any rate the Government has shrunk
hitherto from stating this would make no
difficulty, but it is just because the fact
which they know well-I am sure they know
about German rearmament, and very natu-
rally, because, if the Foreign Secretary had
Said that there was this or that they were
doing contrary to the Treaty, he would im-
mediately have had to make good his state-
ment, or perhaps stand by his statement,
that he was charging a great Power with a
breach of the Treaty, and I can understand
that until certain disclosures which have
been made on the Continent had been
made, it was necessary for the Government
to proceed with great caution in this re-
spect.
But the time has come when what was
meant to be a protection for others must no
longer be a cloak or mask for Germany. The
time has come when the mystery surround-
ing the German rearmament must be
cleared up. We must know where we are.
This House naturally in these matters
leaves the main responsibility to the Execu-
tive, and that is quite right, but at the same
time, it cannot divest Itself of responsibility
for the safety of the country, and it must
satisfy itself that proper measures are being .
taken.
The same type of intelligence collec-
tion problems we now face were cited
as reasons for not taking actions when
violations were discovered. Winston
Churchill ridiculed this:
I do not know how the Admiralty came to
be without information that even battle-
ships, contrary to the Treaty, were being
laid down before the end of 1934. We always
believed before the War that battleships
could never be laid down without our knowl-
edge. The Germans were entitled to build
10,000-ton ships according to the Treaty.
but they, by a concealment which the Admi-
ralty were utterly unable to penetrate, con-
verted these into 26,000 ton ships.
If Sir Winston had lived to read
some of the intelligence reports pro-
duced on the SS-X-25 over the last 10
months he might have smiled.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous con-
sent that a list of Soviet SALT viola-
tions and Soviet violations of other
arms control treaties be printed in the
RECORD. I also ask unanimous consent
that the President's Report to the
Congress on Soviet Non-Compliance
With Arms Control Agreements be
printed in the RECORD. Finally, I ask
unanimous consent that my unclassi-
fied analysis of the recent Soviet accu-
sations of alleged U.S. SALT violations
be printed in the RECORD.
There being no objection, the mate-
rial was ordered to be printed in the
RECORD, as follows:
SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF 1979 SALT II TREATY
1. SS-18 rapid'reload and refire capability.
2. Covert deployment of 100 to 200 SS-16
mobile ICBMs at Plesetsk test range.
3. AS-3 Kangaroo long range Air-to-Sur-
face Missile on 100 TU-95 Bear bombers.
4. Deployment of long range ASMs on
Backfire bombers.
5. Production of 32 to 36 Backfire bombers
per year.
6. Arctic deployment of Backfire bombers.
7. Almost total encryption (95 to 100%) of
telemetry:
ICBM: SS-18 Mod X, PL-4 (SS-X-24), PL-
5 (SS-X-25).
SLCM: SS-NX-19.
SLBM: SS-NX-20.
IRBM/ICBM: SS-20.
8. Two new type ICBMs in development
testing SS-X-24, SS-X-25.
9. Increased and large scale strategic cam-
ouflage, concealment, and deception. -
10. Testing of a new heavy SLBM-SS-NX-
23.
11. Soviet admission of exceeding 820 and
1200 MIRV missile launcher ceilings, and
1320 MIRV/ALCM ceilings, counting those
launchers and bombers under construction.
12. Soviet failure to reduce strategic nucle-
ar delivery vehicles to 2400 and to 2250 ceil-
ings.
SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE 1972 SALT I
ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE (ABM) TREATY
1. Soviet SAM testing in ABM mode-
SAM-5, SAM-10, SAM-12.
2. Deployment of 6 ABM Battle-Manage-
ment radars in interior of the U.S.S.R. not
facing outward-Abalakovo.
3. ABM camouflage and concealment.
4. Falsification of ABM deactivation.
5. Creation of new ABM test range with-
out prior notification.
6. Development of a rapidly deployable,
mobile ABM system.
7. Testing of a rapid refire ABM capabili-
ty.
8. Deployment of a nationwide ABM de-
fense, using 6 ABM Battle-Management
radars, SAMs 5, 10. 12, and mobile ABM-3.
9. Deployment of more than 100 ABM
launchers around Moscow.
SOVIET VIOLATIONS AND CIRCUMVENTIONS OF
THE 1972 SALT I INTERIM AoRzsssmi ON
OFFENSIVE NUCLEAR WEAPONS
1. Deployment of the heavy 88-19 ICBM
as the replacement for the light 83-11
ICBM.
2. Failure to deactivate old ICBMs on
time, and continuous falsification of official
deactivation reports.
3. Bringing back ICBM equipment to de-
activated ICBM complexes.
4. Keeping 18 88-9 ICBMs at an ICBM
test range illegally operational.
5. Soviet deployment of "IIIX" silos with
a configuration too similar to a missile
launch silo.
6. Increased use of deliberate camouflage,
concealment and deception:
Encryption of missile telemetry.
Camouflage of ICBM testing, production,
and deployment.
Concealment of SLBM submarine con-
struction, berthing, dummy submarines, and
construction of berthing tunnels.
7. Constructing over 68 strategic subma-
rines, when only 62 were allowed.
8. Violation of Brezhnev's pledge not to
build mobile ICBMs.
9. Deploying 88-11 ICBMs at SS-4
Medium Range Ballistic Missile (MRBM)
sites for covert soft launch.
10. Keeping about 1,300 to several thou-
sand old ICBMs stockpiled for both covert
soft launch and rapid reload of silos for
refire.
SOVIET VIOLATIONS or THE 1962 KENNEDY-
KHRUSHCHEV CUBA AGREEMENT
1. Soviet offensive capabilities deployed to
Cuba:
Combat Brigade.
Golf and Echo Class nuclear missile-
equipped submarines.
Cienfuegos strategic submarine base with
nuclear warhead storage facility.
Nuclear delivery-capable aircraft: MIG
23/27, Floggers Bear TU-95 D, F. with oper-
able bombbays.
Military communications center.
2. Use of Cuba as a revolutionary base to
export subversion and aggression.
Training terrorist and revolutionary
forces.
Equipment supply to revolutionary forces.
DOI 4th largest intelligence service in
world.
3. Probably biological and Chemical War-
fare facility.
SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE 1974 THRESHOLD
NUCLEAR WEAPONS TEST BAN TREATY (TTBT)
Over 15 Soviet underground nuclear weap-
ons tests with.estimated yield over the 150
kiloton threshold limit. Some of these tests
were at over 300 kilotons, and we have 95%
confidence that they were violations. Over
50 Soviet treaty violations since 1917,
mostly of non-aggression pacts, according to
1962 Defense Department book entitled,
"Soviet Treaty Violations," an official U.S.
Government source.
SOVIET VIOLATIONS OF THE 1925 CHEMICAL
WARFARE PROTOCOL: SOUTHEAST ASIA,
SOUTHWEST ASIA
Soviet violations of the 1972 Biological
Warfare Convention: Southeast Asia,
Southwest Asia, Sverdlovsk 1979 explosion,
8 facilities expanded, Cuba BW/CW facility,
International terrorists with BW/CW capa-
bilities.
Over 30 unambiguous Soviet ventings of
nuclear debris outside the borders of the
USSR, in violation of the 1963 Limited Test
Ban Treaty.
Over 14 documented cases of Soviet SALT
negotiating deception, 120 cases of forgeries,
active measures, propaganda campaigns.
THE PRESIDENT'S REPORT TO THE CONGRESS
ON SoviET NONCOMPLIANCE WITH ARMS
CONTROL AGREEMENTS
The following is the text of a message to
the Congress transmitting the President's
Report on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms
Control Agreements as required by the FY
1984 Arms Control and Disarmament Act:
To the Congress of the United States:
If the concept of arms control is to have
meaning and credibility as a contribution to
global or regional stability, it is essential
that all parties to agreements comply with
them. Bewaype I seek genuine arms control,
I am eon;Initted to ensuring that existing
agreements are observed. In 1982 increasing
concerns about Soviet noncompliance with
arms control agreements led me to establish
a senior group within the Administration to
examine verification and compliance issues.
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For its part the Congress, in the FY 1984
Arms Control and Disarmament Act, asked
me to report to it on compliance. I am here-
with enclosing a Report to the Congress on
Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control
Agreements.
After a careful review of many months,
and numerous diplomatic exchanges with
the Soviet Union, the Administration has
determined that with regard to seven initial
issues analyzed, violations and probable vio-
lations have occurred with respect to a
number of Soviet legal obligations and polit-
ical commitments in the arms control field.
The United States Government has deter-
mined that the Soviet Union is violating the
Geneva Protocol on Chemical Weapons, the
Biological Weapons Convention, the Helsin-
ki Final Act, and two provisions of SALT II:
telemetry encryption and a rule concerning
ICBM modernization. In addition, we have
determined that the Soviet Union has
almost certainly violated the ABM Treaty,
probably violated the SALT II limit on new
types, probably violated the 85-16 deploy-
ment prohibition of SALT II, and is likely to
have violated the nuclear testing yield limit
of the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
Soviet noncompliance is a serious matter.
It calls into question important security
benefits from arms control, and could create
new security risks. It undermines the confi-
dence essential to an effective arms control
process in the future. It increases doubts
about the reliability of the U.S.S.R. as a ne-
gotiating partner, and thus damages the
chances for establishing a more constructive
U.S.-Soviet relationship.
The United States will continue to press
its compliance concerns with the Soviet
Union through diplomatic channels, and
insist upon explanations, clarifications, and
corrective actions. At the same time, the
United States is continuing to carry out its
own obligations and commitments under rel-
evant agreements. For the future, the
United States is seeking to negotiate new
arms control agreements that reduce the
risk of war, enhance the security of the
United States and its Allies, and contain ef-
fective verification and compliance provi-
sions.
We should recognize, however, that ensur-
ing compliance with arms control agree-
mbnts remains a serious problem. Better
verification and compliance provisions. and
better treaty drafting will help, and we are
working toward this in ongoing negotia-
tions. It is fundamentally important, howev-
er, that the Soviets take a constructive atti-
tude toward compliance.
The Executive and Legislative branches of
our government have long had a shared in-
terest in supporting the arms control proc-
ess.
Finding effective ways to ensure compli-
ance is central to that process. I look for-
ward to continued close cooperation with
the Congress as we seek to move forward in
negotiating genuine and enduring arms con-
trol agreements.
Sincerely,
RONALD REAGAN.
Obligation: In an effort to preclude a ter-
ritorial ABM defense, the Treaty limited
the deployment of ballistic missile early
warning radars, Including large phased-
array radars used for that purpose, to loca-
tions along the national periphery of each
party and required that they be oriented
outward. The Treaty permits deployment
(without regard to location or orientation)
of large phased-array radars for purposes of
tracking objects in outer space or for use as
national technical means of verification of
compliance with arms control agreements.
Issue: The study examined the evidence
on whether the Soviet deployment of a
large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk
in central Siberia is in violation of the legal
obligation to limit the location and orienta-
tion of such radars.
Finding: The new radar under construc-
tion at Krasnoyarsk almost certainly consti-
tutes a violation of legal obligations under
the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 in
that in its associated siting, orientation, and
capability, it is prohibited by this Treaty.
SALT II
Treaty Status: SALT II was signed in June
1979. It has not been ratified. In 1981 the
United States made clear its intention not
to ratify the Treaty. Prior to 1981 both na-
tions were obligated under international law
not to take actions which would "defeat the
object and purpose" of the signed but unra-
tified Treaty; such Soviet actions before
1981 are violations of legal obligations.
Since 1981 the U.S. has observed a political
commitment to refrain from actions that
undercut SALT II as long as the Soviet
Union does likewise. The Soviets have told
us they would abide by these provisions
also. Soviet actions contrary to SALT II
after 1981 are therefore violations of their
political commitment.
Three SALT II concerns are addressed:
encryption, SS-X-25, and SS-18.
4. Encryption-Impeding Verification.
Obligation: The provisions of SALT II ban
deliberate concealment measures that
impede verification by national technical
means. The agreement permits each party
to use various methods of transmitting tele-
metric information during testing, including
encryption, but bans deliberate denial of te-
lemetry, such as through encryption, when-
ever such denial impedes verification.
Issue: The study examined the evidence
whether the Soviets have engaged in en-
cryption of missile test telemetry (radio sig-
nals) so as to impede verification.
Finding: Soviet encryption practices con-
stitute a violation of a legal obligation prior
to 1981 and a violation of their political
commitment subsequent to 1981. The
nature and extent of encryption of teleme-
try on new ballistic missiles is an example of
deliberate impeding of verification of com-
pliance in violation of this Soviet political
commitment.
5. S8-X-2nd New Type, RV Weight to
Throw-weight Ratio, Encryption
Obligation: In an attempt to constrain the
modernization and the proliferation of new,
more capable types of ICBMs, the provi-
sions of SALT II permit each side to "flight
test and deploy" just one new type of
"light" ICBM. A new type is defined as one
that differs from an existing type by more
than 5 percent in length, largest diameter,
launch-weight and throw-weight or differs
in numbers of stages or propellant type. In
addition, it was agreed that no single
reentry vehicle ICBM of an existing type
with a post-boost vehicle would be flight-
tested or deployed whose reentry vehicle
weight is less than 50 percent of the throw-
weight of that ICBM. This latter provision
was intended to prohibit the possibility that
single warhead ICBMs could quickly be con-
verted to MIRVed systems.
Issue: The study examined the evidence:
whether the Soviets have tested a second
new type of ICBM (the SS-S-25) which is
prohibited (the Soviets have declared the
SS-X-24 to be their allowed one new type
ICBM); whether the reentry vehicle (RV)
on that missile, if it is not a new type, is in
compliance with the provision that for ex-
isting types of single RV missiles, the
weight of the RV be equal to at least 50 per-
cent of total throw-weight; and whether en-
cryption of its tests impedes verification.
Finding: While the evidence is somewhat
ambiguous, the SS-X-25 is a probable viola-
tion of the Soviets' political commitment to
observe the SALT II provision limiting each
party to one new type of ICBM. Further-
more, even if we were to accept the Soviet
argument that the SS-X-25 is not a prohib-
ited new type of ICBM. based on the one
test for which data are available, it would be
a violation of their political commitment to
observe the SALT II provision which pro-
hibits (for existing types of single reentry
vehicle ICBMs) the testing of such an ICBM
with a reentry vehicle whose weight is less
than 50 percent of the throw-weight of that
ICBM. Encryption on this missile is illustra-
The Fact Sheet provided to the Congress
with the classified report is quoted below,:
]FACTSHEST .
The President's Report to the Congress on
Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control
Agreements
Commitment to genuine arms control re-
quires that all parties comply with agree-
ments. Over the last several years the
U.S.S.R. has taken a number of actions that
have prompted renewed concern about an
expanding pattern of Soviet violations or
possible violations of arms control agree-
ments. Because of the critical importance of
compliance with arms control agreements,
about one year ago the President estab-
lished gn interagency Arms Control Verifi-
cation Committee, chaired by his Assistant
for National Security Affairs, to address ver-
ification and compliance issues. In addition,
many members of Congress expressed their
serious concerns, and the Congress mandat-
ed in the FY 84 Arms Control and Disarm-
ament Act Authorization that "The Presi-
dent shall prepare and transmit to the Con-
gress a report of the compliance or noncom-
pliance of the Soviet Union with existing
arms control agreements to which the,
Soviet union is a Party."
The President's Report to Congress covers
seven different matters of serious concern
regarding Soviet compliance: chemical, bio-
logical, and toxin weapons, the notification
of military exercises, a large new Soviet
radar being deployed in the Soviet interior;
encryption of data needed to verify arms
control provisions, the testing of a second
new intercontinental ballistic missile
(ICBM), the deployment status of an exist-
ing Soviet Ic,BM, and the yields of under-
ground nuclear tests. Additional issues of
concern are under active study.
Soviet violations of arms control agree-
ments could create new security risks. Such
violations deprive us of the security benefits
of arms control directly because of the mili-
tary consequences of known violations, and
indirectly by inducing suspicion about the
existence of undetected violations that
might have additional military conse-
quences.
We have discussed with the Soviets all of
the activities cckered in the report, but the
Soviets have not been willing to meet our
basic concerns which we raised in the Stand-
ing Consultative Commission in Geneva and
in several diplomatic demarches. Nor have
they met our requests to cease these activi-
ties. We will continue to pursue these issues.
THE ]FINDINGS
The Report examines the evidence con-
cerning Soviet compliance with: the 1972
Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and
the 1925 Geneva Protocol and customary in-
ternational law, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act,
the 1972 ABM Treaty, the unratified SALT
II Treaty, and the unratified Threshold
Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) signed in 1974.
Preparation of the Report entailed a com-
prehensive review of the legal obligations,
political commitments under existing arms
control agreements, and documented inter-
pretations of specific obligations, analyses
of all the evidence available on applicable
Soviet actions, and a review of the diplomat-
ic exchanges on compliance issues between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union.
The findings for the seven issues covered
in the Report, as reviewed in terms of the
agreements involved, are as follows:
1. Chemical, Biological, and Toxin Weap-
ons.
Treaty Status: The 1972 Biological and
Toxin Weapons Convention (the BWC) and
the 1925 Geneva Protocol are multilateral
treaties to which both the U.S. and U.S.S.R.
are parties. Soviet actions not in accord with
these treaties and customary International
law relating to the 1925 Geneva Protocol
are violations of legal obligations.
Obligations: The BWC bans the develop-
ment, production, stockpiling or possession,
and transfer of: microbial or other biological
agents or toxins except for a small quantity
for prophylactic, protective or other peace-
ful purposes. It also bans weapons, equip-
ment and means of delivery of agents or
toxins. The 1925 Geneva Protocol and relat-
ed rules of customary international law pro-
hibit the first use in war of asphyxiating,
poisonous or other gases and of all analo-
gous liquids, materials or devices; and pro-
hibits use of bacteriological methods of war-
fare.
Issues: The study addressed whether the
Soviets are in violation of provisions that
ban the development, production, transfer,
possession and use of biological and toxin
weapons.
Finding. The Soviets, by maintaining an
offensive biological warfare program and ca-
pabilities and through their involvement in
the production, transfer and use of toxins
and other lethal chemical warfare agents
that have been used in Laos. Kampuchea
and Afghanistan, have repeatedly violated
their legal obligations under the BWC and
customary international law as codified in
the 1925 Geneva Protocol.
2. Helsinki Final Act-Notification of Mili-
tary Exercises.
Legal Status: The Final Act of the Confer-
ence on Security and Cooperation in Europe
was signed in Helsinki in 1975. This docu-
ment represents a political commitment and
was signed by the United States and the
Soviet Union, along with many other states.
Soviet actions not in accord with that docu-
ment are violations of their political com-
mitment.
Obligation: All signatory states of the Hel-
sinki Final Act are committed to give prior
notification of, and other details concern-
ing, major military manuevers, defined as
those involving more than 25,000 ground
troops.
Issues: The study examined whether noti-
fication of the Soviet military exercise
Zapad-81, which occurred on September 4-
12, 1981, was inadequate and therefore a
violation of their political commitment.
Finding: With respect to the Helsinki
Final Act, the U.S.S.R. by its inadequate no-
tification of the Zapad-81 military exercise,
violated its political commitment under this
Act to observe the Confidence-Building
Measure requiring appropriate prior notifi-
cation of certain military exercises.
3. ABM Treaty-Krasnoyarsk Radar.
Treaty Status: The 1972 ABM Treaty and
Its subsequent Protocol ban deployment of
ABM systems except that each party can
deploy one ABM system around the nation-
al capital or at a single ICBM deployment
area. The ABM Treaty is in force and is of
indefinite duration. Soviet actions not in
accord with the ABM Treaty are therefore a
violation of a legal obligation.
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tive of the impeding of verification problem
cited earlier.
&. SS-16 ICBM-Banned Deployment.
Obligation: The Soviet Union agreed In
SALT II not to produce, test or deploy
ICBMs of the' SS-16 type and, in particular,
not to produce the SS-16 third stage, the
reentry vehicle of that missile.
Issue: The study examined the evidence
whether the Soviets have deployed the SS-
16 ICBM in spite of the ban on its deploy-
ment.
Finding: While the evidence Is somewhat
ambiguous and we cannot reach a definitive
conclusion, the available evidence indicates
that the activities at Plesetsk are a probable
violation of their legal obligation not to
defeat the object and purpose of SALT II
prior to 1981 during the period when the
Treaty was pending ratification, and a prob-
able violation of a political commitment
subsequent to 1981.
7. TTBT-150 kt Test Limit
Treaty Status: The Threshold Test Ban
Treaty was signed in 1974. The Treaty has
not been ratified but neither Party has indi-
cated an intention not to ratify. Therefore,
both Parties are subject to the obligation
under international law to refrain from acts
which would "defeat the object and pur-
pose" of the TTBT. Soviet actions that
would defeat the object and purpose of the
TTBT are therefore violations of their obli-
gation. The U.S. is seeking to negotiate im-
proved verification measures for the Treaty.
Both Parties have each separately stated
they would observe the 150 kt threshold of
the TTBT.
Obligation: The Treaty prohibits any un-
derground nuclear weapon test having a
yield exceeding 150 kilotons at any place
under the jurisdiction or control of the Par-
ties, beginning March 31, 1976. In view of
the technical uncertainties associated with
predicting the precise yield of nuclear weap-
ons tests, the sides agreed that one or two
slight unintended breaches per year would
not be considered a violation.
Issue: The study examined whether the
Soviets have conducted nuclear tests in
excess of 150 kilotons.
Finding: While the available evidence is
ambiguous, in view of ambiguities in the
pattern of Soviet testing and in view of ver-
ification uncertainties, and we have been
unable to reach a definitive conclusion, this
evidence indicates that Soviet nuclear test-
ing activities for a number of tests consti-
tute a likely violation of legal obligations
under the TTBT.
CONCLUSIONS
The President has said that the U.S. will
continue to press compliance issues with the
Soviets through confidential diplomatic
channels, and to insist upon explanations,
clarifications, and corrective actions. At the
same time we are continuing to carry out
our obligations and commitments under rel-
evant agreements. We should recognize,
however, that ensuring compliance with
arms control agreements remains a serious
problem. Improved verification and compli-
ance provisions and better treaty drafting
will help, and we are working toward this in
ongoing negotiations. It is fundamentally
important, however, that the Soviets take a
constructive attitude toward compliance.
ANALYSIS OF SOVIET ACCUSATIONS OF U.S.
SALT VIOLATIONS
A. SUMMARY
On January 30, 1984, the Soviet Union
published in Izvestia an Aide Memoire
which two days earlier had been delivered to
the United States State Department. The
Soviet note was entitled: The United States
Is Violating Its International Commitments.
The Soviets charged the U.S. with at least
20 SALT and other arms control treaty vio-
lations. Most of these Soviet accusations
had previously been conclusively disproven
by the U.S. in the Standing Consultative
Commission and in diplomatic channels.
The U.S., in contrast, has formally ac-
cused the Soviets of only seven SALT and
other arms control treaty violations.
But none of the Soviet charges against
the U.S. stand up even upon cursory exami-
nation. Moreover, the U.S. has furnished
the Soviet side, with photographs, classified
data, and extensive explanations of the U.S.
actions, including diminishing and even en-
tirely suspending some of the U.S. actions'
questioned by the Soviets.
The U.S. charges against the Soviets, how-
ever, can be demonstrated with hard and
often conclusive evidence. Soviet explana-
tions have been incomplete, and often gross-
ly misleading. And the Soviets have refused
to stop their most flagrant SALT violations.
The U.S. State Department immediately
responded to the Soviet charges by saying:
"We are disappointed with the initial
Soviet response to expressed U.S. concerns
regarding Soviet arms control noncompli-
ance ? ' ? regrettably [the USSR] has re-
sponded initially not by treating the issue
seriously, but by dusting off a familiar list
of spurious counter-charges. The Soviet
charges of U.S. arms control violations are
baseless."
It should be noted that there are Consti-
tutional checks and balances and separa-
tions of powers which strongly militate
against U.S. arms control treaty violations.
The U.S. Congress, and national and world
public opinion would not tolerate U.&arms
control treaty violations: Congress.would 4n-'
stanttq expose them, and fMnds'for such vio-
la pns plans Would- not be authorised or ap-
propriated. We have examples of how the
-SALT If Treaty has already constrained
U.S. strategic forces in over nine ways, even
though it is an unratified treaty.
The Soviets said In their Aide Memoire:
"As to. attempts of the American side to
cast aspersions on the USSR's honest and
responsible approach to the fulfillment of
its commitments, they are untenable and
can be qualified as being openly directed at
worsening Soviet-American relations."
The Soviets added that:
"We are speaking about very important
things and first of all about trust."
The question of "trust" in U.S.-Soviet
arms control negotiations has a long and
very controversial history. The Soviets have
had the gall to claim frequently that the
U.S. should "trust" the Soviets to comply
with SALT agreements, and in the several
cases, to even wrongly accuse the U.S. of a
SALT violation.
Both the SALT I ABM Treaty and the
SALT I Interim Agreement on Strategic Of-
fensive Arms explicitly stated in their pre-
ambles that their purpose included the
"strengthening of 'trust' between states."
Dr. Kissinger also emphasized several times
in May and June of 1972 that SALT I was
supposed to strengthen U.S.-Soviet "trust."
The Soviets themselves have also stated
that trust was important in SALT:
"The SALT II agreement presupposes
mutual trust and the creation of an atmos-
phere of good will which would promote the
improvement of relations between the
USSR and the United States." (emphasis
added)
"Trust" was therefore an important con-
cept in SALT. However, published analyses
of. Soviet negotiating deception at the
Moscow Summit in May 1972, together with
the massive Soviet camouflage and conceal-
ment effort since 1972, and the Soviet
record of non-compliance with important
provisions of SALT I and SALT II,' cast cer-
tain doubt on the Soviet concept of "trust"
and "good faith" in the SALT negotiations.
In fact, the Carter Administration was
ambivalent about trust in SALT. In the
State Department SALT Compliance White
Paper released in 1978, the Carter Adminis-
tration contradicted itself on the issue of
"trust." On page 8 the document stated:
"0 ? ' confidence and trust 0 ' ? are im-
portant to mutual efforts to establish and
maintain strategic arms limitations."
Five pages later the same, document
stated:
I'* $ 0 The United States does not rely on
trust, on Soviet intentions ? 0 ' in assessing
whether verification of SALT agreement is
adequate."
Probably because the Carter Administra-
tion did not want to admit the fact that
there was substantial evidence of Soviet de-
ception and bad faith in SALT negotiating
and compliance, the preamble to the SALT
II Treaty contained absolutely no reference
at all to "trust." This omission is remark-
able, and should raise important questions
about whether "trust" is possible in arms
control.
It should be noted that the USSR has
definitely accused the U.S. of deliberate
concealment which interferes with Soviet
National Technical Means of SALT verifica-
tion. This is tantamount to a Soviet charge
of U.S. SALT violation. In contrast, the So-
viets have engaged in a constantly expand-
ing pattern of camouflage, concealment and
deception (CCD) since SALT I was signed in
1972. The Soviet concealment prograRn is
huge find deliberately impedes U.S. verifica-
tion. Thus.it.is a fact that the Soviets have
accused the U.S. of a camouflage and con-
cealment violation, when the U.S. has de-
murred from similarly accusing the Soviets.
Nevertheless, it is the Soviets which have a
continuously expanding and large-scale pat-
tern of CCD.
In fact, there are over 40 Soviet SALT and
other arms control treaty violations, com-
pared to only 20 alledged U.S. violations, as
claimed by the Soviets. But the Soviets have
also violated virtually every treaty they
have signed since 1917, over 50, according to
official U.S. government sources.
H. THE SOVIET CHARGES AND U.S. RESPONSES
1. Soviet charge: The U.S. is aiming at
"achieving military superiority" In violation
of the 1972 Agreement on the Basic Princi-
ples of U.S. Soviet Relations. which calls for
"equality, equal security, and no unilateral
'advantages." This Agreement is mentioned
in the Preamble to the SALT II Treaty.
U.S. response: State Department reply:
"The U.S. does not seek military superiority
over the . USSR." The U.S. seeks "equal
levels of forces on both sides." consistent
with the Jackson amendment to SALT I.
2. Soviet charge: "U.S. has disorganized
the process of limiting armaments." by fail-
ing to continue negotiations on a Compre-
hensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, an Indian
Ocean Demilitarization Treaty, and an Anti-
satellite weapons treaty.
U.S. response: The U.S. has suspended ne-
gotiations on a Comprehensive Nuclear
Weapons Test Ban Treaty pending Soviet
agreement to effective verification proce-
dures on the unratified Thresh-hold Test
Ban Treaty in effect on both sides. The
U.S.-Soviet negotiations on armaments in
the Indian Ocean were not resumed by the
U.S. because the Iranian Hostage Crisis
demonstrated the U.S. need to deploy forces
in the Indian Ocean. The U.S. did not
-resume Anti-Satellite weapons Treaty nego-
tiations because the U.S. is still trying to
devise a proposal that would be effectively
verifiable.
3. Soviet charge: "The U.S. did not fulfill
the (SALT III provision concerning the
working out of mutually acceptable solu-
tions in respect of a certain category of stra-
tegic arms, ? ' ? long-range sea- and land-
based cruise missiles."
U.S. response: "The only provision of
SALT II which would have applied to
LRINF systems was contained in its Proto-
col. This limited deployment until Decem-
ber 31, 1981, of cruise missiles capable of a
range in excess of 600 kilometers on sea-
based or on land-based launchers. That pro-
vision would have expired in 1981, however,
even it SALT II had been ratified. More-
over, "In signing SALT II. the U.S. stated
explicitly that any future limitations on
U.S. systems principally designed for the-
atre missions would have to be accompanied
by appropriate limits on Soviet theater sys-
tems like the 88-20."
4. Soviet charge: "The American side vio-
lated the provisions of the SALT II treaty
prohibiting circumvention of the Treaty
through any other state or states."
U.S. response: "The U.S. made clear to the
Soviets during the SALT II negotiations,
and subsequently stated publicly following
signature of the Treaty, that the SALT II
noncircumvention provision would not alter
existing patterns of cooperation with our
allies or preclude transfer of systems and
weapons technology." Thus the U.S. explic-
itly preserved the right to legally deploy
Euromissiles in NATO upon NATO request.
5. Soviet charge: The U.S. has introduced
the.praotice of using shelters over ICBM
launchers ' ' ' for a long time, the Ameri-
can side refrained from stopping the use of
shelters. As It transpired later, this was
done to conceal work to refit these launch-
ers. Since the thus refitted launchers of the
'Minuteman II' missiles do not differ in
practical terms from the launchers of the
'Minuteman III' missiles, it can be conjec-
tured that it is MIRVed 'Minuteman III'
missiles that are really deployed in those
silos. If that is so, the outright and arrogant
failure of the U.S. to observe the provisions
of the interim agreement on verification
means at the same time also failure to
honor one of the main commitments under
the SALT II Treaty on limiting the number
of intercontinental ballistic missiles armed
with multiple independently targeted re-
entry vehicles."
U.S. Response: "During initial Minuteman
-construction, as well as the Minuteman silo
upgrade program during the mid-70's envi-
ronmental shelters were employed to pro-
tect construction at the launchers from the
weather. The facts concerning the activities
being carried out at the launchers were pro-
vided and explained in full detail to the So-
viets, and were also available in the public
domain. In response to Soviet expressions of
concern, the shelters were modified, and
their use was discontinued after the comple-
tion of the Minuteman silo upgrade pro-
gram in early 1979.
In the case of the Titan II silo, a cover
was used to protect it from the weather
during repair work on damage due to an ac-
cident. It was specifically designed to avoid
any impediment to NTM, and was removed
promptly after the need for it ended. The
Soviets have been fully aware of these facts
for several years.
The Minuteman II silos were not convert-
ed to Minuteman III launchers. The Soviets
have been informed that any launchers of
Minuteman II ICBMs converted to launch-
ers of Minuteman III ICBMs would be made
distinguishable on the basis of externally
observable design features, as required by
the SALT II Treaty. In the course of the
SALT II negotiations the U.S. had 550 Min-
uteman III ICBMs, as is well known."
In fact, the only U.S. missile which would
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fit into the Minuteman II silo is the Minute-
man III. The U.S. Titan II would clearly not
fit. The Soviets know this. They also know
that the U.S. had no new missile under
flight-testing in the 1970's which could fit
into Minuteman silos. The Soviets also
know that there were only about 100 Min-
uteman III MIRVED ICBMs which could
have been retrofitted into Minuteman II'
silos. While the Soviets also know that the
U.S. Congress authorized the deployment of
50 to 100 Minuteman III ICBMs Into Min-
uteman II silos in FY 1981 and FY 1982,
such deployment did not occur, because
funds were not appropriated or repro-
gramed.
6. Soviet charge: The U.S. intends "to
create two types of intercontinental ballistic
missiles-the MX and the 'Midgetman'."
This "does not accord with the tasks of
limiting strategic arms that have found re-
flection in attained agreements."
The U.S. State Department response
stated:
"Under the provisions of the SALT II
Treaty the Parties undertake not to flight-
test or deploy more than one new type
ICBM per side; the Treaty does not prohibit
research and development prior to flight-
testing. The U.S. has declared the MX
Peacekeeper to be its one allowed new type
ICBM. The planned new U.S. small ICBM is
still on the drawing board, thus, it is not
constrained by SALT II provisions since it
will not be ready for flight-testing until
after December 31, 1985, when the SALT II
Treaty would have expired."
In fact, the U.S. "Midgetman" ICBM will
not even be first flight-tested until, at the
earliest, 1989, over four years after the expi-
ration of SALT II. In contrast, the Soviet
SS--X-25, a Midgetman equivalent, began
flight-testing in February, 1983, well before
SALT II expired.
7. Soviet charge: "Clearly in contradiction
with the commitments under the [SALT I
ABM] Treaty, the U.S. have deployed a big
radar station on Shemya Island, the con-
struction of which entailed the utilization of
radar system elements tested for ABM pur-
poses."
U.S. response: "There is no merit whatso-
ever in these charges. Tne Shemya Island
radar in the Aleutians is for national techni-
cal means of verification."
The March 1978 Carter Administration
White Paper stated further: "The U.S. side
discussed this matter with the Soviets and
as a result, we believe, eliminated any con-
cern dbout possible inconsistency with the
provisions of the ABM Treaty."
I. Soviet charge: "Contrary to the ABM
Treaty commitment not to deploy systems
for the antiballistic missile defense of the
territory of the country and not to create a
foundation for such defense, new Pave
Paws' radars ' ' ? can serve as a basis for
providing radar backing for the ABM de-
fense of the territory of the U.S."
U.S. response: "There is no merit whatso-
ever in these charges ' ' ' The Pave Paws
radars are [legal] Ballistic Missile Early
Warning [BMEW] radars [legally] located
on the periphery of national territory and
oriented outward, as specifically permitted
by the [ABM] Treaty."
9. Soviet-charge: "shelters were used over
antimissile launcher silos."
U.S. response: "The U.S. has conducted all
its research activities consistent with the
provisions of the ABM Treaty."
The Soviets may have been referring to
the U.S. dismantling of the second U.S.
ABM complex at the Malmstrom Air Force
Base, under the agreed procedures of 1974.
The March, 1978 Carter Administration
White Paper stated on this subject: "We re-
viewed with the Soviet side the actions
taken by the U.S. to dismantle the Malm-
strom site and also showed them [the Sovi-
ets] some photographs of the before and
after conditions there. The question was ap-
parently resolved on the basis of that dis-
cussion." (Emphasis added.)
The Soviets have reportedly never given
the U.S. photographs of their own ques-
tioned strategic systems.
10. Soviet charge: "Work is being conduct-
ed to create mobile ABM radar systems."
U.S. response: "The U.S. has conducted all
its research activities consistent with the
provisions of the ABM Treaty. No mobile
ABM radars ... are under development."
11. Soviet charge: "Work is being conduct-
ed to create space based ABM sys-
tems."
U.S. response: "The U.S. has conducted all
its research activities consistent with the
provisions of the ABM Treaty ' ' I"
"The ABM Treaty does not prohibit re-
search, and both sides have had research
programs since the signing of the Treaty.
Soviet research and development efforts in
the ABM field have been continuous and
more extensive than our own. Our program
calls only for enhanced research in-, this
area. The President stated in his Maft1i 23,
1983, speech that U.S. activities in this area
would be consistent with U.S. treaty obliga-
tions."
In fact, current U.S. conventional ABM R
da D has been greatly scaled down as a
result of the ABM Treaty, for over 10 years.
Moreover, it has always been designed to
become operational only 10 to 20 years into
the future, in order to comply fully with the
ABM Treaty. Similarly, the U.S. "Star-
Wars" space-based ABM defense concept is
an R & D project possibly resulting in an
operational system more than 20 years into
the future, in full compliance with the ABM
Treaty.
12. Soviet charge: "The Minuteman I
ICBMs are being tested to give such missiles
anti-missile capabilities."
U.S. response: "These tests were part of a
research program conducted in full con-
formity with the ABM Treaty. The tests in-
volved stages of the Minuteman I missile,
but not the whole missile. The Minuteman I
ICBM is no longer deployed by the U.S."
This is confirmed by the U.S. SALT II Data
Exchange Statement as early as 1979.
13. Soviet charge: "Multiple warheads are
being developed for ABM missiles."
U.S. response: "The U.S. has conducted all
its research activities consistent with the
provisions of the ABM Treaty. No ? ? '
MIRVed ABM interceptor missiles are
under development."
. 14. Soviet charge: "It was exactly plans to
create such a large-scale ABM system that
were officially announced by the American
side in March, 1983."
U.S. response: The ABM Treaty does not
prohibit research, and both sides have had
research programs since the signing of the
Treaty. Soviet research and development ef-
forts in the ABM field have been continuous
and more extensive than our own. Our pro-
gram calls only for enhanced research in
this area. The President stated in his March
23, 1983, speech that U.S. activities in this
area would be consistent with U.S. treaty
obligations."
15. Soviet charge: "The American side sys-
tematically violates the agreed upon princi-
ple of observing the confidentiality of the
discussion of questions connected with the
fulfillment of commitments on the limita-
tions of strategic arms."
U.S. response: "The U.S. continues proper-
ly to discharge its obligations and responsi-
bilities under the Regulations of the Stand-
ing Consultative Commission. The U.S. Gov-
ernment is not making public the proceed-
ings of the Commission. The appearance of
stories in the press about the SCC and pos-
sible subjects under discussion there does
not reflect a change in that policy."
The March 1978 Carter Administration
White Paper added further: "We have dis-
cussed with the Soviets the usefulness of
maintaining the privacy of our negotiations
and discussions and limiting speculation in
the public media on SCC proceedings, as
well as the need to keep the public adequate-
ly informed. " (Emphasis added.)
16. Soviet charge: "According to data in
the possession of the Soviet side, there have
been repeated instances of the American
side exceeding the imposed ceiling on the
yield of the tested nuclear devices."
U.S. response: "Since the effective date of
the TTBT and PNET Treaties, the U.S. has
conducted no nuclear tests having yields
which exceeded the 150 kiloton threshold of
these treaties." This is a true statement.
17. Soviet charge: "The Soviet side has ap-
proached the U.S. also about instances of
the ejection of radioactive substances
beyond the national territory of the
U.S. ' ' ?. a violation of the 1963
treaty ' ? 1"
U.S. response: "Both the U.S. and USSR
have encountered some difficulty in totally
containing all their underground nuclear
tests. The U.S., however, has had only a few
problems in the past with the venting of ra-
dioactive debris from underground tests at
the Nevada Test site. As more experience
was gained with the containment of under-
ground tests, venting from U.S. tests became
even more rare. Over the past decade there
has been only one incident of local and
minor venting. The Soviets had not raised
their cgpeerns about U.S. venting with us
since 1976, until the latest reference to it."
18. Soviet charge: "The U.S. is accelerat-
ing.the production of toxic chemical agents
of a new generation (binary ones).-
U.S. response: "The U.S. is committed to
the elimination of all CW and to the conclu-
sion of a complete, effective, and verifiable
global CW ban. This commitment and U.S.
efforts to promote genuine progress toward
as ban in the CD negotiations are widely
recognized and supported by the members
of the CD and the international community.
It is the USSR which must take concrete
steps to convince the world that'it is truly
serious about CW arms control by working
with the U.S. and the CD to develop effec-
tive and mutually acceptable approaches to
banning CW worldwide."
19. Soviet charge: "The U.S. ' ? ? in
recent years ? ? ? carried out a whole
number of actions that brought about a
drastic growth in the military danger in
Europe (which) undermine the process of
strengthening security in Europe, the main-
stays of which were laid by the Helsinki
Final Act."
U.S. response: "The United States is in
compliance with all the undertakings,
human rights as well as security, contained
in the Helsinki Final Act. Our military ac-
tivities are completely in accordance with
the provisions of the Final Act.
We and our allies notify all exercises
which exceed the threshold of 25,000 troops
established by the Final Act, and often
notify smaller-scale military maneuvers, as
a voluntary effort to strengthen mutual
confidence.
We regret that the Soviet Union has not
always reciprocated. Not only have the
Warsaw Pact nations generally declined to
provide voluntary notification of any exer-
cise which did not reach the 25,000 troop
threshold, as the President's report to Con-
gress on compliance indicated, but the
Soviet Union, in a clearcut failure to comply
with the " Final Act, failed adequately to
notify the exercise Zapad 81, which involved
some 100,000 troops.
The Soviet accusation's lack of substance
is demonstrated by the fact that the Soviet
Union has never formally approached the
U.S. concerning possible U.S. failures to
comply with the security provisions of the
Final Act. Only in response to U.S. concerns
about Soviet compliance with arms control
agreements has the Soviet Union seen fit to
lodge these unsubstantiated charges."
20. Soviet charge: "Neither does the
above-mentioned line tally with the commit-
ments of the U.S. under Article 6 of the Nu-
clear-Nonproliferation Treaty."
U.S. response: "U.S. arms control policy is
fully consistent with the NPT Article VI re-
quirement that parties to the Treaty pursue
negotiations in good faith on effective arms
control measures. U.S. proposals in the
START, INF, and MBFR talks, and in other
fora, embody the U.S. commitment to pur-
suing effective arms control. The Soviets
should ask themselves whether their walk-
out from the INF talks, and their refusal to
set a date for resumption of START talks,
are consistent with the NPT's obligation."
Mr. PELL. Mr. President, in connec-
tion with Soviet violations of arms
control agreements, I submit for the
RECORD a memorandum providing an
analysis of compliance issues.
The memorandum follows:
MEMORANDUM: ANALYSIS OF COMPLIANCE
ISSUES
Charge No. 1. "Repeated Violations" of
the Geneva Protocol of 1925, the 1972 Bio-
logical Weapons Convention, and Related
International Obligations
Issue: The Administration believes that
the Soviets have violated the Geneva Proto-
col, the Biological Weapons Convention,
and related customary international law
through developing and maintaining an of-
fensive biological warfare capability and by
actually using or supplying for use chemical
weapons and biological toxins in Afghani-
stan, Laos and Kampuchea.
Commitment: The Geneva Protocol pro-
hibits "the use in war of asphyxiating, poi-
sonous or other gases and of all analogous
. material", as well as "the use of bacteri-
ological methods of warfare." It seems in-
dubitable that the Soviets or their allies
have used chemical agents in Afghanistan,
Laos and Kampuchea But there is no defi-
nite proof that these agents have included
those outlawed by the Geneva Protocol,
which is understood not to cover riot-con-
trol agents such as tear gas and certain
other agents used against people or the nat-
ural environment, such as herbicides.
While many experts have concluded that
biological toxins and/or other lethal chemi-
cals have probably been used in these areas,
there is significantly disagreement within
the scientific community on this point. A
sizeable body of doubters exist who believe
that Yellow Rain and other phenomena de-
scribed by the Administration's sources can
be explained by natural causes, or at least
that such causality cannot at present be
ruled out. Yet to date the Administration
has not undertaken systematic studies in af-
fected areas to rule out such alternative ex-
planations. Furthermore, the physical evi-
dence that has been collected thus far is
sketchy, Few samples of contaminated sub-
stances have been retrieved from the envi-
ronment, and the characteristics of these
are such as to suggest alternative explana-
tions. Blood and tissue samples have been
obtained, but the nature of the evidence and
the lack 'of satisfactory controls also leave
open the possibility of exposure to toxic
agents from other sources.
The Biological Weapons Convention obli-
gated. parties not to develop, produce, stock-
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pile or acquire biological agents or toxins
"of types and in quantities that have no jus-
tification for prophylactic, protective, and
other peaceful purposes," and to destroy ex-
isting stocks. Aside from the possible use of
biological agents in the manner described,
the Administration has cited little hard evi-
dence concerning the maintenance by the
Soviets of a specifically biological (germ) or
toxin stockpile. Retention of lethal or other
chemical weapons is not outlawed by the
Geneva Protocol as such, unless they are
also used. The U.S. and our NATO allies
maintain such stockpiles, and in fact have
proposed to modernize them.
Aside from certain indications that the
Soviets have continued to develop biological
weapons, including toxins, the primary evi-
dence of such Soviet conduct is the incident
which occurred in Sverdlovsk in 1979. An
epidemic of Anthrax apparently broke out
in that area after an explosion or other inci-
dent in a nearby military facility. Discus-
sions concerning a total ban on the develop-
ment, production, and stockpiling of chemi-
cal agents were broken off in 1980 following
revelation of the Sverdlovsk episode. The
Soviets have continued to maintain that the
events in Sverdlovsk resulted from food con-
tamination by naturally-occurring Anthrax.
Discussion: Although many experts be-
lieve that toxins and/or other lethal chemi-
cals probably were used in Laos and Kampu-
chea, there remains a sizeable body of
doubters, who believe that so called Yellow
Rain could have been a natural phenom-
enon, that there has been insufficient test-
ing of food for toxins, and that physical evi-
dence is not convincing. Even if lethal
toxins and chemicals have been used, evi-
dence of direct Soviet involvement has not
been available. Nonetheless, Soviet interfer-
ence with a United Nations investigation
and general Soviet unwillingness to discuss
the matter have led to conclude that they
must be guilty.
It seems certain that the Soviets have
used non-lethal and/or lethal chemical
agents in Afghanistan, but there is only one
bit of evidence, a contaminated gas mask
bought in Kabul, to point to the use of
toxins.
At present, there is no ban on the develop-
ment, production or stockpiling of chemical
agents. However, the Aministration has in-
dicated that it will table a draft treaty at
the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva.
The Carter Administration had discussed
such a ban, but broke off discussions in 1980
following the 1979 incident at Sverdlovsk,
which apparently led to the death and ill-
ness of hundreds of Soviet citizens because
of plumonary anthrax.
Charge No. 2-"The Soviets have violated
a 1975 political commitment"
Issue: The Administration believes that
the Soviets have "violated" their commit.
ment under the 1975 Helsinki Final Act to
notify participating states of major maneu-
vers involving more than 25,000 troops.
Commitment: Notification is required in
the case of major military maneuvers ex-
ceeding a total of 25,000 troops, independ-
ently or combined with any possible air or
naval components. Notification is called for
when major maneuvers take place on the
territory, in Europe, of a participating state,
as well as, if applicable, in the adjoining sea
area and air space. Notification is expected
21 days in advance or, in the case of a ma-
neuver arranged in a shorter time, at the
earliest possible opportunity. In addition,
states holding major meneuvers are expect-
ed to invite outside observers. These com-
mitments are considered voluntary and not
legally binding.
Discussion: In 1981, the Soviets notified
the parties, 21 days ahead of time, that they
would hold an exercise called ZAPAD-81.
They did not provide required information
on the number of troops, on the maneuver's
designation or on the types of forces en-
gaged. The State Department protested.
There have been several other instances in
which the Administration believes that the
Soviets should have been more open to ob-
servers and should have given better notifi-
cation.
Soviet compliance has improved in 1983.
In Stockholm last week, delegations were
exploring ways to get improved and more
extensive notification.
Charge No. 3-New Radar Under Con-
struction Constitutes ABM Treaty Viola-
tion. Issue: The Soviet Union is building a
large phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk
in central Siberia. Because such radars have
arguably an intrinsic, ABM battle manage-
ment capability, the question arises of
whether the radar itself, regardless of its lo-
cation, is a violation of the ABM treaty.
Futher, even if the Krasnoyarsk radar were
only intended as an early warning radar, its
location and orientation do not appear to be
consistent with the ABM treaty. The ques-
tion is whether its location and orientation
are consistent with the requirements of the
1972 ABM Treaty.
Commitment: Since the radar being built
is of the large phased array type, it is gov-
erned by certain rules set forth in Articles
III, IV, and VI in the ABM Treaty, as well
as Agreed Statement F. These rules prohibit
the deployment of such radars with five ex-
ceptions: radars at specified ABM sites, radars
at ABM test ranges, radars for early warn-
ing purposes only "along the periphery of
its (each nations') national territory and ori-
ented outward." radars to track objects in
outer space, and radars for national techni-
cal means of verification. These rules were
established to preclude development of
either a nationwide ABM defense or a point
defense of area outside the two complexes
allowed by the treaty (subsequently reduced
to one complex in the 1974 protocol).
Discussion: At worst, this radar could pro-
vide the beginning of a system substantially
broadening ABM protection of the, Soviet
Union, if coupled with additional radar and
the necessary mobile ABM missile launcher,
which would be built clandestinely and
placed to protect missiles as nuclear war
loomed. If used as an ABM radar when com-
pleted several years hence, it could conceiv-
ably provide radar coverage for perhaps 120
of the Soviet fleet of 1400 ICBMs.
The Soviets claim publicly that the radar
is for tracking satellites and is. thus permit-
ted.
Many critics are disturbed that the Sovi-
ets never mentioned this project, at appro-
priate times, such as at SCC discussions of
other Soviet LPAR's, much less sought U.S.
approval. They simply waited for this
project to be discovered. It was not likely to
be missed, since it is about the size of the
U.S. Capitol.
In previous years, the Soviet Union has
raised questions about U.S. phased array
radars. In 1975, they questioned whether a
new radar at Shemya Island, Alaska, was
part of an ABM system. The U.S. said it was
for national technical means, space tracking
and early warning. The Soviets were appar-
ently satisfied. In 1978, they first asked
whether the new PAVE PAWS radars in
California and Massachusetts were consist-
ent with the Article VI rules on early warn-
ing radars. The U.S. is now building two new
PAVE PAWS radars in Texas and Georgia,
which are not exclusively oriented outward,
as is required for early warning radars.
It has long been recognized that such
phased array radars are invaluable for
space-tracking and verification work. How-
ever, in my judgment of U.S. government
analysts, this particular radar is not so lo-
cated or oriented that it will be able to make
any meaningful contribution to space track-
ing of either current Soviet space missions
or space missions of other countries.
Technically, if the Soviet Union simply as-
serts that the Krasnoyarsk radar is not a
ballistic missile detection or tracking radar,
the U.S. has little recourse under the ABM
treaty because of a loophole or ambiguity in
the treaty. The ABM treaty contains no
type rules such as those in the SALT II
text. A relevant type rule would assert that
any radar of a type developed or tested in
an ABM or early warning role would be con-
sidered an ABM or early warning radar. Un-
fortunately the ABM treaty has no such
type rules.
Some Administration officials have sug-
gested that, in order to avoid future appre-
hension and concerns about cheating, the
two sides should try to work out a common
agreement in the SCC as to what will and
will not be acceptable in regard to large
phased-array radars.
Charge No. 4-Telemetery Encryption of
Test Data Violates Legal Obligations and
Political Commitments.
Issue: When the United States and the
Soviet Union test missiles, information on
performance is transmitted to ground moni-
toring stations by telemetery. This monitor-
ing allows the side testing to know just what
is happening at each stage in engineering
parameters of the test up to completion or
failure. In order to verify compliance, the
other party tries to monitor the telemetery.
The Soviet Union has over the past
decade encrypted increasingly high levels of
telemetry from tests of strategic weapons
systems covered by SALT II. Current test
programs for the SS-X-24 and 25 ICBM
programs and the SS-X-20.and 23 SLBM
programs contain especially high levels of
telemetery encryption.
The Administration charges that Soviet
encryption before 1981, was a violation of
legal obligation. Activities after 1981, when
Secretary Haig declared SALT II "dead",
are considered violations of political com=
mitments. The Administration objects both
to the nature and extent of encryption on
new missiles.
Commitment: Article XV, Paragraph 3. of
the SALT II Treaty specifies: "Each party
undertakes not to use deliberate conceal-
ment measures which impede verification
by national technical means of compliance
with the provisions of this treaty."
According to the Second Common Under
standing: Each party is free to use various
methods of transmitting telemetric informa-
tion during testing, including its encryption,
except that.'.. neither party shall engage in
deliberate denial of telemetric information,
such as through the use of telemetry en-
cryption, whenever such denial impeded ver-
ification of compliance with the provisions
of the Treaty.
In SALT II, the parties agreed not to
engage in deliberate denial of telemetric in-
formation, including encryption, whenever
such denial would impede verification. This
approach was taken to allow each side to en-
crypt or otherwise deny information not
necessary for verification, but useful in as-
sessing military capabilities of the weapons.
Discussion: There is little doubt among
sepcialists that increasing Soviet encryption
has "impeded" verification. It has contribut-
ed to uncertainties about certain character-
istics of Soviet missiles. However, the
United States has means other than teleme-
try to acquire information on tested mis-
siles. As a result, it is questionable whether
the Soviets will gain some meaningful stra-
tegic edge from encryption.
Nonetheless, encryption is extremely
bothersome. If the matter is unresolved, un-
certainties about compliance could com-
pound. In addition, Soviet success in getting
away with excessive encryption could en-
courage them in other efforts to deny infor-
mation. Verification of American compli-
ance has never been a particular problem
for them, since we are an open society. Be-
cause so much less is freely available from
the Soviet Union, telemetric information
from tests assumes a greater importance.
Thus, even if we were to emulate them
and encrypt at a high level, it would matter
far less to them than to us.
So far, there is no evidence of progress in
resolving this problem, although it has been
discussed in the SCC. A serious weakness to
U.S. complaints about Soviet encryption
practices, of course, is the non-ratification
of SALT II. As a result, the United States is
on shaky ground insisting on full compli-
ance, when neither side has promised to do
more than "not undercut" the treaty.
This problem has particular significance
since some believe that the Soviets may
have based their decision to encrypt heavily
upon a conclusion that the United States
should pay a price for failure to ratify.
Nonetheless, it might be possible to resolve
this matter in the SCC, given a U.S. persis-
tence in explaining, without risking intelli-
gence sources and methods, the telemetry
which it requires and a Soviet interest in
proving its sincerity about arms control.
Charge No. 5-The Soviet SS-X-25 is a
"probable violation" a Soviet political com-
mitment to SALT II.
Issue: In October, 1982, the Soviets began
testing a new, solid-fueled ICBM with multi-
ple warheads, the SS-X-24. Under SALT II,
each side is allowed to have one new
MIRVed ICBM. With no more than 10 war-
heads and a launch-weight and throw-
weight less than that of the largest "light"
ICBM as of SALT II, the Soviet 88-19. The
U.S. MX and Soviet 88-X-24 meet these cri-
teria. Subsequently, the Soviets informed
the U.S. that the SS-X-24 would be their al-
lowed new type.
In February, 1983, they began testing an-
other ICBM with a single warhead, the PL-
5 or SS-X-25. The Administration fears
that the SS-X-25 may be a second new type.
although the evidence is "somewhat am-
biguous." Accordingly, the Administration
believes that the SS-X-25 is a probable vio-
lation of a "political commitment to the
new types limited."
In addition, even if the SS-X-25 is not a
new type, the Administration argues the So-
viets would have violated a political commit-
ment related to the ratio between warhead-
weight and throw-weight of certain missile
systems.
Commitment: Under Article IV, para-
graph 9, of SALT II, "Each party under-
takes not to flight-test or deploy new types
of ICBM's, that is, types of ICBMs not
flight-tested as of May 1. 1979, except that
each party may flight-test and deploy one
new type of light ICBM." In the Third
Agreed Statement under Paragraph 10. Ar-
ticle IV, each Party agreed "not to flight-
test or deploy ICBMs equipped with a single
reentry vehicle and with an appropriate
device for targeting a reentry vehicle, of a
type flight-tested as of May 1, 1979, with a
reentry vehicle the weight of which is less
than fifty percent of the throw-weight of
that ICBM."
Discussion: The Soviets claim that the SS-
X-25 is an allowed modification of the SS-
13. Under SALT II, changes in length, diam-
eter, throw-weight and launch-weight are al-
lowed in existing missile types, so long as
those changes do not exceed five percent. In
effect, the prohibition is more a constraint
on missile designers than it Is a ban on new
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missiles. Thus, even if the S8-X-25 is essen-
tially brand new, it would be an allowed new
type under SALT II, if the stated measures
do not vary by more than five percent.
U.S. persistence in explaining, without
risking intelligence sources and methods,
the telemetry which it requires and a Soviet
interest in proving its sincerity' about arms
control.
Even if the SS-X-25 does not violate the
"new type" rule, the Administration be-
lieves a violation of political commitment
has occurred since the warhead weight was
measured at less than 50 percent of throw-
weight on the one test for which data is
available. The rule on warhead weight is in-
tended to prevent MIRVing of a purported-
ly single-warhead missile.
However, partially because of encryption.
there is some ambiguity about whether the
RV to throw-weight ratio of an operational
SS-X-25 might, in fact, be over 50 percent.
The Issue Is very complex, and analysts
remain uncertain about whether the U.S.
and U.S.S.R. even agree on the definition of
such terms as throw weight and launch
weight.
Because the SALT II protocol has expired,
there is no longer a prohibition on the de-
ployment of mobile missiles. As a single-war-
head missile, the SS-X-25 could be deployed
as a mobile missile and as an addition to
present Soviet forces. This is the first such
weapon that legitimately falls into that cat-
egory (as opposed to the SS-16). Ironically,
it was the Soviets, not the U.S. which
wanted the Protocol extended because of its
controls on cruise missiles. In the end, if the
8S-X-25 becomes a significant Issue, it will
be not only because of possible treaty viola-
tions, but also because Soviets will have out,
paced the U.S. substantially in the deploy-
ment of mobile ICBMs. This situation could
arise because the constraints on the deploy-
ment of mobile ICBMs will have lapsed be-
cause SALT II was first left unratified, then
repudiated by the Administration.
The United States intends to deploy its
own single-warhead missile, but It may be
years behind the Soviets in moving in that
direction. Such actions by both sides would
be more stabilizing if such weapons replace
more threatening weapons as part of a re-
ductions process. The reverse could be true :
if new weapons were simply additions to al-
ready threatening arsenals.
Charge No. 6-"Probable Violation" of
Ban on SS-16 Missiles
Issue: The Soviets have had a number of
SS-16 mobile missiles at their Plcsetsk test
range since before SALT II was signed. The
Administration reports it cannot reach a
"definitive conclusion" en whether some
SS-16s could be considered deployed. On
the basis of "somewhat ambiguous" evi-
dence, the Administration concludes that
there is a "probable violation" of a legal ob-
ligation before 1981 and of a political com-
mitment after that. The issue is whether a
significant number of SS-16s could be
mated with mobile launchers and other
equipment in a short time be operational
and pose a threat to .he United States at a
time of nuclear crisis. In terms of the SALT
II text, the issue is whether SS-16 related
activities at Plesetak constitute deployment.
Commitment: According to the Common
Understanding under Paragraph 8 of Article
4 of SALT II, the Soviets pledge that they
will not "produce, test, or deploy" SS-16
missiles during the term of the Treaty.
There is no requirement that SS-16s al-
ready produced be dismantled. Moreover,
there is no firm agreement between the
sides on a satisfactory definition of -deploy-
ment", nor agreement in the the U.S. gov-
ernment on when the line from simple pos-
session to deployment is crossed.
Discussion: The Soviets have given no par-
ticular evidence of interest in the SS-16
since 1979, when SALT 11 was signed. The
missile has not been tested since well before
SALT II was signed. However, the Soviets
do still maintain the SS-16s and equipment
that they had before SALT II. Little has ap-
parently changed since then.
If SALT II were in force and the two sides
were cooperating, it might be useful to ask
the Soviets to go beyond their SALT com-
mitment and actually dismantle SS-16s.
Charge No. 7-Soviet Activities Are
"Likely Violation- of Threshold Test Ban
Treaty
Background: In 1974, President Nixion
agreed with the Soviets to limit under-
ground nuclear tests to a level of 150 kilo-
tons in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.
That accord was not sent to the Senate
pending negotiation of a companion treaty
to limit peaceful nuclear explosions.
The companion accord was agreed to by
President Ford In 1976, and the Threshold
Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions
Treaties were sent to the Senate in July,
1976. The SFRC held hearings in 1977, but
did not vote upon the treaties in 1978, when
it became clear that the Carter Administra-
tion attached higher priority to the negotia-
tioa of a Comprehensive Test
After review, the Reagan Administration
decided in 1882 that it wanted expanded
verification provisions in the two treaties
and would not seek Senate consent to ratifi-
cation until the Soviets agreed The Soviets
maintain that the changes of data and
other steps that would occur it the treaties
were ratified would suffice for verification:
purposes and that they will only discuss ver-
ification changes after ratification, Matters
are at standoff.
Concern: While the treaties have Isn-
guished, both aides have conducted vigorous
testing programs ostensibly within the 154
kilotons ceiling which both sides have
pledged to respect. Seismological meas-
urements indicate that a fraction of the
Soviet tests may have had yields above 150
kilotons. However, because of uncertainties
in calculating yields, scientists are sharply
divided over whether the results Indicate
clearly that the Soviets have cheated. Some,
believe that the Soviet testing program is
consistent with a policy of adherence to the
150 kiloton ceiling. Others believe that at
least several tests may have been somewhat
above that level.
Adding to the confusion is continued un-
certainty as to the accuracy of our measure-
ment techniques. In recent years, some
studies have shown a probable over-estima-
tion of Soviet yields, although not enough
to resolve to, everyone's satisfaction ques-
tions about Soviet compliance. Thus, while
charging a "likely violation" of legal obliga-
tions under the TTBT the Administration
admits the evidence is ambiguous.
Commitment: Under the TTBT, the two
sides obligate themselves to a testing ceiling
of 150 kilotons. The two sides agreed that
one or two breaches of that ceiling a year
would not be considered violations. The
PNET contains provisions designed to
ensure that neither side uses so-called
peaceful explosions to get out around the
TTBT ceiling.
Discussion: The TTBT includes a protocol
providing for the exchange of Information
on geographical boundaries and on the geol-
ogy of test areas and the provision of pre-
cise coordinates of tests to help in locating
the shots and assessing yields.
Data is also to be provided on a certain
number of tests for calibration purposes.
The PNET provides for extensive exchanges
of information before and after each explo-
sion. In addition, in instances of multiple
explosions with an aggregate yield above
150 kilotons, there are provisions for on-site
inspection. Some discount the value of ex-
changes of information under the TTBT on
the theory that the Soviets would lie. For
those and others, however, the more de-
tailed and complete Information called for
under the PNET seems to have definite
value, even if the Soviets tried to mislead.
It Is arguable how much, if anything, the
Soviets may have gained from any testing
above the ceiling. Certainly, no breaches are
likely to have been large enough to allow
the Soviets any sort of testing the U.S.
would not be permitted because of adher-
ence to the treaty. The U.S. has tested ade-
quately all of the weapons in its nuclear ar-
senal Senior U.S. military leaders have tes-
tified that there is no reason to resume
high-yield testing.
It is useful to recall that one of the main
reasons for negotiating the 150 kiloton ceil-
ing was to deny the Soviets the opportunity
to exploit their greater ability to conduct
high yield tssts. Because they have remote
test areas, they would be able to test in the
multi-megation range if unconstrained by
the TTBT and PNET, whereas US, tests at
the Nevada Test Site which approached a
megation would pose serious threat of
death, injury and structural damage in Las
Vegas.
The PRESIDING OFFICER (Mrs.
HAWKINs). The majority leader is rec-
ognized.
CLOSED SESSION
Mr. BAKER. Madam President,
under the order previously entered. In
a few moments the Senate will go Into
closed session. It is anticipated that
shortly after we go into closed session
the leadership may ask the Senate to
recess so that the Members may, if
they wish, receive a briefing on S. 407.
I hope that when we return we are
able to get on with the crime package
and particularly the amendment at
I have discussed in a preliminary
way certain arrangements to produce
a vote on 'those amendments shortly
after we return. We do not yet have a
reply from the distinguished minority
leader on his side but I hope we will be
able co make an announcement or a
request in that respect shortly after
we return from the briefing.
I have attempted to ascertain how
long the briefing might take, and it is
difficult to ascertain because we do
not know how many Members are
going to attend or how many questions
they will ask, but just for the sake of
planning, I guess that we may be in
the position to get back to the crime
package around 3 p.m.
PRIVILEGE Or THE FLOOR.
Mr. BAKER- Madam President. I
ask unanimous. consent that during
the closed session of the Senate this
afternoon, the following individuals be
permitted the privilege of the floor.
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
Robert R_ Simmons, staff director.
Gary Schmitt, minority staff direc-
tor.
Mike Mattingly, professional staff
member.
Thomas Blau, professional staff
member.
Thomas Connolly, professional staff
member.
Eugene Iwanciw, professional staff
member.
Ed Levine, professional staff
member.
Joe Mayer, professional staff
member.
Eric Newsom, professional staff
member.
Angelo Codevilla, professional staff
member.
Lot H. Cooke, assistant security di-
rector.
John Elliff, professional staf f
member.
Senator BAxsR, G. C. Montgomery.
Senator BYRD, Dick D'Amato, Mike
Epstein.
Senate Armed Services Committee,
Doug Graham, Arnold Punaro.
Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee, Geryld Christianson, Carl Ford,
Hans Bennendijk, Bob Bell.
Official reporter, Ron Kavulick, C.
J. Reynolds, Fran Garro.
Office of the Secretary, George F.
Murphy, Jr.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, it is so ordered.
Mr. BAKER. Madam President, it is
1 minute until 2, and I wonder if the
Chair would be Inclined the last of
that 1 minute and place the Senate in
closed session.
CLOSED SESSION
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
hour of 2 p.m. having arrived, the
Chair, pursuant to rule XXXV, now
directs the Sergeant-at-Arms to clear
the galleries, close all doors of the
Chamber, and exclude from the
Chamber and the immediate corridors
all employees and officials of the
Senate who under the rule are not eli-
gible to attend the closed session and
who are not sworn to secrecy.
(At 2 p.m. the doors of the Chamber
were closed.)
LEGISLATIVE SESSION
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President. I see no
other Senator seeking recognition in
closed session. I move the Senate now
return to open session.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
out objection, the motion is agreed to.
(Thereupon, at 3:40 p.m., the doors
oP the Senate Chamber were opened.
and the Senate returned to legislative
session.)
Mr. BAKER. Mr. President, I believe
it is necessary to gain a little time for
us to restore the Senate to open condi-
tion. In order to provide for that time.
I suggest the absence of a quorum.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. The
clerk will call the roll.
The legislative clerk proceeded to
call the roll.
Mr. METZENBAUM. Mr. President,
I ask unanimous consent that the
order for the quorum call be rescind-
ed.
The PRESIDING OFFICER. With-
Qut objection, it is so ordered.
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