AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000400640039-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 7, 2008
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: September 12, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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MEMORANDUM FOR: RECORD Copy ~ ~ / 7/ ~ 3
OLL 84-323I/1
12 Sept 1984
The attached was hand carry by
to Tom Latimer, HPSCI, per request made by
Rep. Hamilton who wish to have a written reply
versus an oral briefing.
(Ref
5075 I0~ USE PREVIOUS
EDITIONS
Date 12 Sept 1984
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2 S.EP 1984 ~~(,c,.
SUBJECT: Afghanistan Situation Report
Military Situation - -
Today, after almost five years of Soviet occupation,
resistance to the Communists continues strong throughout the
country. The weak and divided Babrak regime seems unable to
cope with the insurgency, and it will continue to depend on
Soviet troops to maintain itself in power.
Despite frequent Soviet and Afghan military operations
aimed at suppressing the insu rgency, almost 60 percent of the
population remains in areas outside of government control.
With a weakened, poorly trained and unreliable army, the
Government has come to depend almost entirely on the presence of
Soviet forces. Except in joint operations with the Soviets,
Afghan troops can do little more than hold their own garrisons.
For their part, the Soviets remain frustrated and in a quandary
that they will ever be able to militarily or politically control
Afghanistan. Unless the Soviets increase their troop strength
from the current authorized level of about 107,000 to around
500,000 men, they remain in a basic no-win situation.
The installation of the Chernenko regime witnessed no
significant departures-'from earlier Sovre~t. policies in
Afghanistan. There is evidence that the Soviets now recognize
the conflict will last decades and that there is little hope for
a diplomatic solution on their terms.
According to a recent Agency analysis, the combat
effectiveness of the insurgents is likely to continue to
increase. Qualitative and quantitative improvements in
insurgent forces have resulted in increased Mujaheddin
effectiveness.
The insurgents have learned to use better tactics,
intelligence, and rugged terrain to avoid enemy offensives and
to attack convoys and isolated garrisons. Such improvements
will slowly spread to smaller bands in remote areas, raising the
level and scope of fighting throughout the country. Cooperation
among insurgent groups also has increased markedly over the past
two years, although fighting among groups continues to be a
problem.
The insurgents benefit from the fact that the Soviet forces
in Afghanistan are insufficient to crush the insu rgency, and the
Afghan Army is ineffective. Nevertheless, access to men and
supplies from Pakistan, and possibly Iran, will be critical to
continued insurgent effectiveness. Greater numbers of heavy
WARNING NOTICE
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES
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machineguns, mines, automatic weapons and anti-tank rockets have
enabled the-insurgents to attack-more effectively. Without such
weapons, the extent and tempo of insurgent attacks would decline
significantly.
Fighting in Afghanistan's cities increased substantially in
1983 through mid-1984 and caused growing concern among Soviet
and Afghan officials. Reliable reporting on growing insurgent
capabilities and the difficulties facing the Soviet and Afghan
Government forces leads us to believe that the level of urban
insu rgency will continue to increase at least in the near term.
Since the invasion the Soviets have lost an estimated 330
helicopters and 30 fixed-wing combat aircraft. Between mid-June
and mid-July 1984 the Soviets lost 17 helicopters to insu rgent
gunfire. This is the highest number of confirmed losses in a
one-month period since the invasion. This is a direct result of
effective use of heavy weapons, particularly heavy machineguns.
So far this year, 1984, the Soviets have lost at least 35
aircraft--27 helicopters and 8 fixed-wing combat aircraft. Loss
of these helicopters resulted in heavy casualties for the
Soviets. To date, the Afghan air force has lost approximately
185 aircraft since the invasion.
Through August 1984, Soviet forces in Afghanistan suffered
at least 20,500 killed or wounded since the invasion. In the
first five months of 1984 the Soviets had at least 1,150 combat
casualties--including some 570 killed. More than 900 of the
casualties occurred in April and May due to increased levels of
fighting. Afghan forces have suffered 56,000 casualties since
the start of the war. This includes approximately 17,000 killed
and 39,000 wounded.
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Analysis shows the total dollar cost of Soviet operations
in Afghanistan from the start af- Soviet intervention through
1983 to be approximately $14.3 billion. Of this figure, $1.3
billion in costs represents helicopter losses; $1.5 billion was
spent for construction; $2 billion was for direct military aid
to the DRA; and $9.1 billion rep resents operating costs.
The Afghan Resistance
The major Afghan resistance groups based in Peshawar are
loosely grouped into two alliances, both known as the Islamic
Unity of Afghan Mujahidin. These alliances emerged following
various efforts to promote overall resistance unity during the
period 1980-1983 but have not evolved into the kind of coherent
cooperative associations hoped for by their more optimistic
promoters. One, the so-called fundamentalist alliance of seven
resistance parties, is in a state of disarray, while the other,
labelled the moderate alliance of three parties (for lack of a
better name), remains a loose coalition looking toward former
Afghan King Zahir Shah as a possible figurehead for achieving
greater unity. Efforts to forge greater coordination have
foundered on personal, tribal, and ideological differences among
the key resistance leaders. Fu rthermore, the Peshawar-based
groups represent only one slice of the Afghan resistance
picture. Other important groups are based in Quetta, Iran, and
inside Afghanistan, such as the Hazaras, who find little or no
connection or affinity with the Peshawar organizations. In our
view, these problems will continue to obstruct futu re attempts
to create a unified Afghan resistance. + `~ __
Given the fact that differences rooted deep in Afghan
society and politics--both of the traditional variety as well as
among a newly emerging group of religious/military
leaders--characterize the Afghan resistance movement, we see
little promise that the resistance organizations will coalesce
into a single, unified organization in the foreseeable future.
We may well see shifting alliances as one or another group
determines its best interests (i.e., funds and weapons) are
better served by cooperation with some other group or
individual. This will make it difficult for the Afghans to
present a united front either internationally or to their own
people. However, experience has shown that such differences
among the Peshawar-based Afghan leadership do not rule out
cooperation in the field inside Afghanistan. The development of
alliances and cooperative arrangements among local commanders
inside Afghanistan has significantly strengthened the hand of
the resistance against the Soviets and serves our interest in
maintaining pressure on the ground as part of our effort to
persuade the Soviets to consider a political solution in
Afghanistan. Afghans are united in their desire to see the
Soviets withdraw from Afghanistan, but political unity at this
stage of their struggle may prove to be an illusion despite
their expressed conviction that greater cooperation would be
beneficial to their cause.
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