BRIEFING FOR OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT (OTA) STAFFERS
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP90B01370R000300390017-9
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
S
Document Page Count:
4
Document Creation Date:
December 21, 2016
Document Release Date:
November 6, 2008
Sequence Number:
17
Case Number:
Publication Date:
September 7, 1984
Content Type:
MEMO
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP90B01370R000300390017-9.pdf | 144.69 KB |
Body:
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OLL 84-296*5
Office of Legislative Liaison
Routing Slip
eetk 7 ~"y
20 Aug 1984
4ame/Date
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fECORU COPY
OLL 84-2965/1
7 September 1984 d T flr
SUBJECT: Briefing for Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)
Staffers
1. On 7 September 1984, Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) staffers Peter Sharman, Tom Karas, and Alan Shaw were
briefed on the topics listed in their letter (attached) of
10 August 1984. CIA briefers were Larry Gershwin, National
7ence Officer/Strategic Programs (NIO/SP); Doug
ANIO/SP; Office of
apons Research; and
of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff.
was conducted at the TS/Codeword level.
The briefing
2. Mr. Gershwin led off the briefing with an overview
of Soviet strategic defense systems. Using vu-graphs, he
discussed the rationale and doctrine underlying Moscow's
strategic defense program, its protection priorities, its
R&D efforts, the Moscow ABM system, and the prospect for ABM
deployment nationwide.
3. This presentation was followed by a briefing on
directed energy by He discussed the relevant
technology in the USSR and the history of its development.
Included in the briefing was discussion of intelligence gaps
and problems in analyzing how far along the Soviets might be
in developing a space-based laser weapon.
4. Due to lack of time, the arms control aspect of
Soviet compliance with existing treaties was not covered.
This may be handled at a later date. The OTA staffers
expressed appreciation for the two-hour briefing given today.
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Liaison Division
Office of Legislative Liaison
Distribution:
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1 - OLL Chrono
OLL/L DA
(1 Nov 84)
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TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT BOARD
MORRIS K. UDALL, ARIZ., CHAIRMAN
TED STEVENS, ALASKA, VICE CHAIRMAN
ORRIN G HATCH, UTAH GEORGE E BROWN. JR.. CALIF
CHARLES MCC MATHIAS, JR., MD JOHN D DINGELL MICH
EDWARD M KENNEDY, MASS LARRY WINN, J.. KANS
LRNEST F HOLLINGS. $,C CLARENCE E MILLER. OHIO
CLAIBORNE PELL AI COOPER EVANS, IOWA
Central Int~eli nce Agency
Office of Legislative Liaison
Room 7B02
Washington, D.C. 20505
Congrtgg of the 1niteb Otattg
OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
JOHN H GIBBONS
DIRECTOR
August 10, 1984
Thank you again for arranging the informative meeting earlier this week on
anti-satellite weapons issues between some of our staff and some of your
analysts. As you know, the ASAT Technical Memorandum we are working on is
part of a larger study of "New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies," a
study requested of OTA by the House Armed Services Committee and the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee.
In carrying out this study, it would be of great help to us to be able to
explore the following points with relevant CIA analytic staff:
1) Description of current Soviet BMD (Ballistic Missile Defense) research,
development and testing.
2) Likely Soviet policies toward BMD and the ABM Treaty in the absence of any
U.S. intitiatives in these areas.
3) Strategic Implications of U.S. SDI development and deployment, including
political and arms control implications -- specifically for ABM treaty.
4) Plausible Soviet countermeasures to SDI deployment including changes in
offensive forces (ballistic missiles, bombers, cruise missiles).
5) Plausible Soviet analogous responses to SDI, such as directed energy
system development, conventional Soviet ABM systems.
6) The Soviet record to date on compliance with the ABM Treaty.
7) U.S. capabilities (current and future) for verifying current and possible
future arms control agreements on ballistic missile defenses (including
national technical means and cooperative arrangements.
I realize that this is a rather full menu of issues, so, if necessary, we are
prepared to make more than one visit to cover it. We would appreciate having
the first meeting as soon as possible after Labor Day, September 3, 1984.
I should add that our ability to keep that appointment is contingent upon
final approval of SCI clearances for two of our staff whose applications are
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still pending. The members of our staff with current SCI clearances who would
probably attend these meetings are as follows:
Dr. Peter Sharfman, Program Manager, International Security and Commerce
Dr. Thomas Karas, Project Director, New Ballistic Missile Defense Technologies
Dr. Robert Rochlin, Senior Analyst (his SCI clearances are through the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency, from which we have him on detail)
In addition, we would hope that by September the following two people would
have received their SCI clearances and would also be able to attend:
Dr. Alan Shaw, Senior Analyst
Dr. Gerald Epstein, Analyst.
Should the new clearances not yet have been granted,, we would hope that
postponement of the meeting to a mutually convenient time could be arranged.
If there are any documents that it would be useful for us to read
beforehand, we would appreciate access to them. (I believe that our security
officer, Tom McGurn, will be contacting you about arranging for CIA approval
of OTA secure storage facilities for non-SCI classified materials.)
Thank you again for your help.
Sincerely,
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