STATE DEPARTMENT REPORT ON APPLYING THE PRINCIPLES OF EQUIVALENCE AND RECIPROCITY TO THE SOVIET AND SOVIET BLOC REPRESENTATION IN THE U.S.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000200330014-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 62
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: February 17, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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United States Department of State
lishirigton, D.C. 20520
February 17, 1984
SE rm
CIA
DIA
DOD - Col
John Stanford -------
8405034
NSA
FBI - Mr.
Edward O'Malley -----
8405036
NSC - Mr.
Robert Kimmitt ------
8405037
SUBJECT: State Department Report on Applying the Principles of
Equivalence and Reciprocity to the Soviet and Soviet
Bloc Representation in the U.S.
The State Authorization Bill Conference Committee requested
that the Department of State submit by March 15, 1984 a report on
the above subject to the Committee on Foreign Relations and Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and the Committee on
Foreign Affairs and Permanent Select Committee on intelligence of
the House of Representatives. The Conference Committee specified
that the report should be classified, and should evaluate the
advantages and disadvantages of actions that practically can be
taken to implement the principles of reciprocity and equivalence
and to reduce the harm to the national security caused by the
presence in the U.S. of Soviet and Soviet Bloc intelligence
personnel acting as official representatives of their countries.
The State Department was also asked to include the views of
relevant departments and agencies.
In response to this request, the State Department has prepared
the attached draft report and solicits your views.- The draft has
attempted to include the views of the various departments and
agencies as expressed in previous reports and assessments on the
issues. We would appreciate having written comments/clearance by
COB Monday, February 27. Addressees are requested to forward
their written comments to Raymond F. Smith or James F. Schumaker,
Office of Soviet Union Affairs, Department of State', room 4219.
If time considerations dictate, comments may also be phoned in
(green phone no. 5292/black phone no. 632-1712).
b1 Charles Hill
Executive Secretary
Draft Report
-'S'E-
DECL: OADR
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ENSURING RECIPROCITY AND EQUIVALENCE IN THE FUNCTIONING AND
OPERATIONS OF OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF SOVIET AND SOVIET BLOC
COUNTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES AND OFFICIAL REPRESENTATIVES OF THE
UNITED STATES IN SOVIET AND SOVIET BLOC COUNTRIES*
I. Summary and Conclusions
The purpose of this report is to analyze the functioning and
operations of official representatives of Soviet and Soviet Bloc
countries in the United'States, and official representatives of
the United States in Soviet and Soviet Bloc countries with regard
to their numbers, status, privileges and immunities, travel,
accomodations and facilities. The report also reviews possible
legal and administrative measures that might be taken to implement
the principles of reciprocity and equivalence** and to reduce the
harm to national security caused by the presence in the United
States of Soviet and Soviet Bloc intelligence personnel acting as
official representatives of their countries; while taking fully
irfto account the foreign policy and national security interests
which bear on this subject.
In terms of total numbers, Soviet and Soviet Bloc countries
enjoy a substantial numerical advantage in official
representatives by virtue of the fact that there are large-Soviet
and Soviet Bloc contingents at the United Nations in'New York for
which the United States has nothing comparable -in Soviet and
Soviet Bloc countries.. When considering Embassy and Consular
personnel alone, however, rough equivalence exists. The Soviet
and Soviet Bloc countries have 561 accredited diplomats and staff
in this country (320 Soviet and 241 Soviet Bloc), while we have
537 diplomats and staff in Soviet and Soviet Bloc countries (202
in the Soviet Union and 335 distributed among the Bloc countries).
*The term "Soviet Bloc" is defined for the purposes of this report
as all non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Members (NSWP) and Cuba.
Periodically, the term "Eastern Europe" will also be used. For the
purposes of this paper, the term will be defined narrowly as the
NSWP, i.e. Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany (GDR), Hungary,
Poland-and Romania.
**for the purposes of this report, the term "equivalence" will be
defined as equality of numbers, and "reciprocity" will be defined
as-equality of treatment.
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DECL: OADR
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At the United Nations, the Soviet and Soviet Bloc countries
have 463 representatives permanently stationed at their Missions
to the-UN (285 Soviet and 178 Soviet Bloc) and 311 international
civil servants working at the UN Secretariat (277 Soviet, 34
Bloc). The United States has over 2,500 persons accredited to or
working for the United Nations in New York (110 at our Mission to
the UN).
The privileges and immunities possessed by each side are
reciprocal.
Likewise, there is a rough reciprocity in travel and
accommodations opportunities. Certain restrictions placed by the
Soviet Union on our personnel are very difficult to duplicate in
an open society. However, the combined efforts of the Office of
Soviet Union Affairs and the Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) of
the Department of State, in coordination with the appropriate U.S.
Government agencies, have succeeded in establishing-a measure of
reciprocity in the field of travel and accommodations
opportunities. As OFM expands its operations, this task should
become somewhat easier.
In the area of facilities, the picture is very complicated.
In many cases, ownership of property by the United States
Government is not allowed by Soviet and Soviet Bloc countries.
This problem is especially apparent with regard to the Soviet
Union. Because of this and similar situations we face in other
areas of the world, OFM has set as one of its first tasks the
assertion of U.S. Government control over diplomatic property
acquisition, rental, and alteration. In addition, all Soviet and
Soviet Bloc property matters are reviewed by the interagency
community to ensure that national security interests are fully
protected.
During the past ten years, the Soviet and Soviet Bloc official
presence worldwide has increased by 50%, to approximately 40,000
diplomats, trade, cultural and news representatives (CIA estimate,
includes dependents). The increasing number of Soviet, East
European and Cuban official representatives has resulted in an
increased security threat to our country, and to our friends and
allies, as is witnessed by the increasing rate of expulsions of
Soviet and Soviet Bloc officials for espionage (Table III-1). In.
the United States, there are an average of 4,200 Soviet and Soviet
Bloc officials and dependents on permanent assignment (2,600 0
Soviets, 1,600 Bloc). Over the past decade, the number of known
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and suspected Soviet and Soviet Bloc. intelligence officers
operating in this country has increased by about 50% (see Table
III-2).
A number of legal and administrative actions have been
considered at various times by the Administration either to
counter the hostile intelligence threat or to establish conditions"
of equivalence and reciprocity. Some of these have been
implemented (see Part IV). A number of other measures have been
deferred because the costs in terms of U.S. overseas operations
and foreign policy would be greater than the counterintelligence
gains. Nine of the most important of these deferred measures are
discussed in Part V. In addition, three measures are discussed
which we believe merit expeditious consideration. These are
proposals to expand the operations of the Office of Foreign
Missions, to increase counterintelligence staffing and funding for
the FBI, and to increase funding for technical countermeasures.
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II. The Soviet and Soviet Bloc Official Presence in the United
States and the U.S. Official Presence in the Soviet Union and
Soviet Bloc Countries: their Numbers, Status, Privileges and
Immunities, Travel Conditions, Accommodations and Facilities
A. Soviet Union and United States
The number of United States official personnel in the Soviet
Union and Soviet personnel in the United States has remained
relatively constant over the past several years. In 1983, there
were, on the average, approximately 200 American diplomatic,
consular, administrative/technical and service personnel
accredited to the Government of the Soviet Union and working at
our Embassy in Moscow or Consulate General in Leningrad. In
addition, the United States employed an average of 220 Soviet
local and third-country personnel to perform non-sensitive tasks
at our diplomatic and consular installations.
The Soviet Union had, on the average, some 185 diplomatic and
consular personnel and 125 administrative/technical and service
personnel accredited to the United States Government and working
at their Embassy in Washington, D.C. or Consulate General in San
Francisco. The Soviets hire virtually no local American staff
(the number is usually around ten), and depend on their
administrative/technical and service staff of 125 to perform the
functions we normally assign to local and third-country personnel.
At the United Nations, there are normally around 275-300
Soviet diplomats and staff assigned to the three Soviet Missions
to the UN (Soviet, Ukrainian, Belorussian), and an additional 275
who work as international civil servants for the UN Secretariat.
The United States has over 2,500 personnel accredited to or
working for the United Nations in New York.
Beyond the official U.S. and Soviet presence, there are
sizeable press, business and exchange contingents present in each
country. In recent years, the Soviets have had some 35-40
correspondents and 50-100 representatives of Soviet commercial
organizations assigned to the United States, with 2198 exchange
visitors coming to. the United States in 1983 (this latter figure
varies considerably from year to year, depending on the state of
U.S.-Soviet relations).
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U.S. correspondents in the Soviet Union usually number from
30-35, and permanently-based business representatives.around 20.
U.S. correspondents and businessmen are based almost exclusively
in Moscow, although at times there have been personnel in
Leningrad, Kuybyshev, Nakhodka and other cities. Soviet
correspondents and commercial representatives are confined to the
New York, Washington D.C. and San Francisco metropolitan areas,
with the exception of three Belarus tractor mechanics based at the
Belarus plant in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and one Soviet fisheries
representative based in Seattle, Washington at Marine Resources,
inc. No centralized records are kept on the number of U.S.
exchangees going to the Soviet Union each year, but the number is
estimated to be roughly comparable, i.e. around 2000.
Soviet tourist visits to the U.S. are few, numbering 1000-2000
a year. The U.S. tourism industry estimates that private U.S.
visitors to the Soviet Union number considerably more, and are now
at arri annual level of 35,000-45,000, of which approximately 6,000
trips are for business purposes. These tourism figures represent
a decline of about 50% since the mid-1970's.
Tables 11-1, 2 and 3 give more precise figures for the U.S.
and Soviet official presence for the representative period of
February, 1984. Table 11-4 gives estimates for changes in the
Soviet official presence in the United States over the past thirty
years.
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Comparison of U.S. and Soviet Presence
at Diplomatic and Consular Establishments
in Each Country
Soviet Government Officials
and Employees in U.S.
U.S. Government Officials
and Employees in U.S.S.R.
(February, 1984)*
(February, 1984)
Sending State
Diplomats and staff
320
local & third country
7**
220
Working spouses
46
31
TDY'ers
65
103
Totals
438
556
*does not include Soviet personnel at UN (SMUN, UNSEC, UN Tdy'ers)
**There are 1-2 English teachers at the Soviet school, and 3-5
English translators at Soviet Life and other magazines.
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U.S. Government Employees
at our Missions in the USSR
as of February, 1984
Moscow
Soviet &
Third-
Country Construction
U.S AECA CONTRACT PIT* Nationals Personnel TDY'er
Leningrad
4 196 59(FBO) 10-25
24+(Seabees) depending
l0+(Sy) on season
202 27 4 220 93
*Part-Time American Employees
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Soviet Official Presence - February 3, 1984
Accredited
Diplomats and
Employees Working Wives
Embassy
ConGen SF
SMUN
BMUN
UMUN
UNSEC
38th UNGA
Trade Orgs
Press
Orthodox
Total
282
38
254
14
17
277
0
58
41
4
985
44
2
11
0
1
7
0
0
0
0
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Dependents
496
56
421
21
26
368
0
90(est.)
66
4
1548
TDY'ers Total
61 883
4 100
35 721
0 35
0 44
4 656
0 0
0 148(est.)
0 107
0 8
104 2702
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Average Soviet Official Presence ** in the United States
Officials Only officials and their dependents
1984
990
2600
1983
960
2580
1982
980
2580
1980
940
2690
1978
990
2570*
1976
1070
2650
1974
920
2390*
1972
800*
2080*
1970
680*
1770*
1968
600*
1560*
1966
520*
1350*
1964
480*
1250*
1962
380*
990*
1960
300
800
1958
300*
750
1956
260*
680*
1954
180*
450
1952
160*
400
1950
140*
350
According to these figures, the Soviet official presence grew, on
the average, at about six percent a year during the 1950-1984
period.
*Estimate based on extrapolation. In determining the number of
dependents by extrapolation, the number of officials is multiplied
by 1.6 (this is the normal ratio between officials and dependents).
**Offic.ial Soviet presence is defined to include all Soviet
officials of Embassy Washington, D.C., ConGen San Francisco, the
Soviet Missions to the UN, Soviet Secretariat employees, newsmen,
Trade Representatives, and Orthodox Church representatives.
Exchangees, TDY'ers, tourists and recent emigrants are not
counted. Entries are rounded off to the nearest ten.
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2. Privileges and Immunities
The privileges and immunities of Soviet officials in the
United States and American officials in the Soviet Union are
strictly reciprocal with regard to members of diplomatic
missions.. Soviet officials stationed in New York as
representatives to the UN or as UN Secretariat staffers are
accorded the same privileges and immunities which apply to all
other foreign nationals performing similar functions. The most
important point to be made with respect to each of the following
categories. from the point of view of national security and
espionage control is that officials of all the categories, with
the exception of UN Secretariat personnel, enjoy full immunity
from criminal prosecution.
Embassy Diplomatic Staff: The basis for privileges and
immunities of the diplomatic staff of the Soviet and American
Embassies is the 1961 Vienna Convention, 23 U.S.T. 3227,
specifically Articles 29 through 42. In addition, the privileges
and 'immunities of Soviet Embassy personnel are elaborated in
Puplic Law 95-393, 22 U.S.C. ?? 254a-e, dated September 30, 1978
and entitled "An Act to Complement the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations." This act clarifies the application of the
Vienna Convention from the standpoint of U.S. domestic law. Among
other things, PL 95-395 provides that "Any action brought against
an individual who is entitled to immunity .. . shall be dismissed"
upon establishment of that immunity.
Embassy Administrative/Technical and Service Staff: Article
37 of the Vienna Convention limits the immunities of members of
the administrative/technical and service staff. However, the
United States and the Soviet Union agreed in 1967 to extend full
privileges and immunities to all members of the sending state's
administrative/technical and service staff. This agreement was
later confirmed in an exchange of diplomatic notes which took
effect the day that PL 95-395 came into effect. This agreement
provides valuable protection to both sides and, particularly in
the U.S. case, allows for easier recruitment of candidates to fill
administrative/technical and service staff positions.
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Consulate General Staff: A Consular Convention and Protocol,
19 U.S.T. 5018, negotiated by the United States and Soviet Union
was signed in Moscow on June 1, 1964. The privileges and
immunities enjoyed by Consular personnel are somewhat less than
those possessed by Embassy Diplomatic staff. One distinction is
that "Consular officers [and employees] shall not be subject to
the jurisdiction of the receiving state in matters relating to
their official activity." Consular officers and employees "enjoy
immunity from the criminal jurisdiction of the receiving state."
Dependents of officers and employees do not have even this
"immunity. In practice, and in order to avoid a cycle of
retaliation, both sides have treated sending state Consular
personnel and dependents as if they enjoyed full privileges and
immunities.
Soviet UN Secretariat Personnel: UNSEC members are granted
those immunities and privileges listed in Article V of the
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. 21
U.S.T. ? 18(a) limits the immunity of UN officials to that "in
respect of words spoken or written and all acts performed by them
in their official capacity." The International Organizations
Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. ? 288d(b), likewise provides Secretariat
personnel immunity only for "suit and legal process relating to
acts performed by them in their official capacity and falling
within their functions as representatives."
Soviet Representatives to the United Nations: Personnel of
the three Soviet Missions to the UN (Soviet, Ukrainian,
Belorussian) enjoy the privileges enumerated in Article IV of the
Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations,
section 11(a) of which provides for "immunity from personal arrest
or detention," but does not mention immunity from legal process.
Furthermore, Article V, section 25 of the UN Headquarters
Agreement, 61 Stat. 341b, states that persons designated to the
United Nations by members as resident representatives, as well as
members of their staffs approved by the U.S. Government, shall be
recognized by the United States as entitled to the same privileges
and immunities as the United States accords to the diplomatic
envoys accredited to it. This means that most of the personnel at
the Soviet UN missions enjoy full immunity from criminal
prosecution. That immunity could, however, be limited in the case
of certain staff members, whose privileges and immunities are
conditioned on United States approval. In general, however,
because-of existing agreements concerning the UN, the United
States'has substantially less discretion to control the privileges
and immunities of UN personnel and members of UN missions than it
does in the bilateral context.
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3. Travel Conditions and Accommodations
In 1941 the Soviet Government instituted strict controls on
the travel of all foreigners resident in the U.S.S.R., including
American diplomats in Moscow. The US attempted over the next ten
years to convince the Soviets that it was not in the interest of
either side to maintain these controls. When these attempts
proved. futile, the US reluctantly and on a reciprocal basis
imposed its own travel controls on Soviet diplomats in 1951. In
1955 the system was refined by "closing" a number of areas in the
United States to match areas the Soviets had closed to travel by
foreigners.
Over the years, the Soviet authorities have decreased the area
officially closed to Americans, probably in response to our
reciprocal actions. However, they have also refined their
procedures for obstructing travel to nominally open areas. One
means of obstruction is through the control of the transportation
and accommodations reservations process via the Administration for
Services to the Diplomatic Corps (UpDK). Because of this, the
Office of Foreign Missions (OFM) has levied a requirement on
Soviet Embassy, Consulate General and UN Mission officials that
they make all domestic travel and accommodations reservations
through the OFM Service Bureau.
All travel by Soviet diplomats, journalists and resident
businessmen outside a free-movement zone (usually 25 miles from
the center of the city in which they reside) must be registered in
advance. This policy is in accordance with the express desire of
Congress that "it shall be the general policy of the United States
to impose restrictions on travel within the United States by
citizens of another country only when the government of that
country imposes restrictions on travel by the United States
citizens within that country." By law the Secretary of State
shall "seek the elimination, on a mutual and reciprocal basis, of
travel restrictions imposed by [a foreign] government and by the
Government of the United States on each other's citizens."
(Section 126 of Public Law 95-426, 92 Stat. 972.)
Soviet UN Secretariat personnel are exempt from travel controls,
since they are considered under international law to be
international civil servants representing the UN, not the Soviet
Union. In addition, Soviet tourists are not subject to this
travel control system, although the visa issuance process does
allow the United States to have notification and, if necessary,
full control of their itinerary.
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Since, according to Soviet law, foreign governments are not
normally permitted to own property in the Soviet Union, there has
always been a notable discrepancy between the types of facilities
available to the Soviets in the U.S. and those we can obtain in
the Soviet Union. Of late, steps have been taken by the Office of
Foreign Missions and the newly-created State Department Reciprocal
Action Committee to remedy this imbalanced situation.
Currently the Soviet Government owns 15 properties-in the
U.S., which include 8 buildings in the Washington area, 2 in San
Francisco, and 5 in New York (two of these are estates on Long
Island). In terms of function, 8 primarily serve as office
buildings (including the Embassy Chancery and the San Francisco
Consulate General, which contain some apartments), 4 are
residential properties, and 3 are used as recreational
facilities. The Soviets also have a long-term lease on the
so-called Mt. Alto complex, site of their future Chancery and
residential complex.
During the 1960's and the early 1970's the U.S. and Soviet
Governments negotiated a series of reciprocal, bilateral
agreements in order to build new Embassy complexes in our
respective capitals. The Mt. Alto site was made available to the
Soviet Embassy in Washington in return for an area of land in
Moscow where we are now constructing a new'Embassy complex.
According to the exchange of sites agreements of 1969 and 1972,
both countries agreed to lease their respective plots rent free
for 85 years. All appropriate U.S. Government agencies were
consulted before a decision to offer the Mt. Alto property was
made.
In addition to our new Embassy complex in Moscow, the U.S.G.
has two types of property arrangements in the Soviet Union. The
first consists of numerous short-term leases on blocks of
apartments, as well as office and warehouse space. Secondly, we
have long-term (25 year, renewable) leases on 7 pieces of
property, which include the current Chancery and the Consulate
General building, 2 residences (Spaso House in Moscow and the
Consul General's residence-in Leningrad), 2 recreational
facilities known as "dachas", and a 10 1/2 acre plot for another
dacha.
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During the past year the Soviet Government has sought
unsuccessfully to purchase additional property (specifically
apartment units) in the U.S. Since January 1983 foreign missions
wishing to acquire property either by lease or by purchase have
been required to obtain Department of State approval before
proceeding. The Office of Foreign Missions, which has
responsibility for the review of such requests, considers
reciprocity as part of the process. OFM's practice, confirmed by
the Reciprocity Policy Committee, has been to impose parallel
limits on property acquisition by countries which prohibit or
limit acquisition by the U.S. overseas. Thus, recent Soviet
proposals to buy property here have been rejected. (Table 11-5
provides a list of diplomatic properties either under long-term
lease or owned by the Soviets; Table 11-6 provides a list of
diplomatic properties under long-term lease by the United States
in the Soviet Union).
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Soviet Diplomatic Property in the United States*
Washington D.C.
Soviet Chancery (Owned)
1125 16th St., N.W.
Soviet Ambassador's Residence (Owned)
1115 16th St., N.W.
Soviet Apartment Complex
2645 Tunlaw Rd., N.W.
(Mt. Alto Site)
Site of Future Chancery
2650 Wisconsin Avenue, N.W.
(Mt. Alto site)
Soviet apartment building
3875 Tunlaw Road
Soviet Military Attache Office
2552 Belmont Rd.
Soviet Information Office
1706 18th St., N.W.
Soviet Consular Office
1825 Phelps Place, N.W.
Trade Representation of the U.S.S.R.
2001 Connecticut Avenue, N.W.
Soviet "Dacha"
Pioneer Pt.
Centreville, Md.
San Francisco, Ca.
Soviet Consulate General
2790 Green Street
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(Leased)
(Leased')
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
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Soviet Consul General's Residence (owned)
2820 Broadway
New York City
Soviet Mission to the UN '(co-located (owned)
with Ukrainian and Byelorussian Missions)
136 E. 67th Street
Soviet Apartment Complex (owned)
355 West 255th Street
Riverdale, Bronx
Soviet Consulate Buildings (former NYAP) (owned)
9-11 E. 67th Street
Killenworth Estate
Glen Cove
Long Island
(owned)
Miller Estate
Upper Brookville
Long Island
(owned)
*Individual diplomatic residences are not included in this list.
Facilities for Soviet Commercial organizations (Amtorg,'Belarus,
Sovfracht, Intourist), joint ventures (Marine Resources, US-USSR
Trade and Economic Council) and journalists are also not included.
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Properties Under Long-Term Lease Agreements
by the United States in the Soviet Union*
Current Chancery
19, 21, 23 Ulitsa Chaikovskogo
Ambassador's Residence - Spaso House
10 Ulitsa Spasopeskovskaya
Recreational Property - Dacha
(guest house, cabin, caretaker's residence)
Tarasovka
Site of New Embassy Complex
Konyushkovskaya Blvd.
Site of Second Recreational Property - Dacha
Serebryanniy Bor
(terms of agreement being negotiated)
Leningrad
Consulate General Building
15 Petra Lavrova
Residence of the Consul General
4 Grodnensky Pereulok
Recreational Property - Dacha
Zelenogorsk
*Twelve blocs of apartment housing, the U.S. Commercial Office,
the F.B.O. Office, the Embassy Warehouse and other facilities
(including offices of US business firms and journalists) are not
included on this list since they are under short-term leases.
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B. Soviet Bloc Countries and the United States
The seven Soviet Bloc countries currently have 241 accredited
diplomats and staff in this country, while we have 335 American
diplomats and staff in Soviet Bloc countries. At the United
Nations, the Soviet Bloc countries have 178 representatives
permanently stationed at their Missions to the UN and 34
international civil servants working at the UN Secretariat. A
more complete breakdown of the Bloc official presence is available
at Table II-7. Table 11-8 gives a breakdown of the U.S. official
presence in Bloc countries.
Under the terms.of the 1977 agreement to establish interests
sections in the respective capitals, 20 Cubans are permitted to
staffSCUBINT in Washington and 20 Americans may staff USINT in
Havana.
Except for Cuba, there are no formal numerical limitations on
the number of Bloc personnel that can be assigned to official
establishments in the U.S. There is, however, a rough equivalency
of numbers, especially considering that, like the Soviets, the
Soviet Bloc missions use their own nationals for technical,
administrative and service positions, whereas we employ local
employees.(not included in the totals in table 11-8).
The Bloc countries also have 185 persons permanently assigned
to the United States primarily as business representatives of
Eastern European state-owned enterprises or as the staff of
government commercial offices. The largest group comes from
Poland, which has 90 persons permanently assigned to the United
States. Temporary business visitors from Eastern Europe numbered
some 3,800 in FY 1983. The average stay of such business visitors
is less than one month. There are currently 14 Eastern European
correspondents permanently assigned-to the U.S. and the U.N.
There are two Cuban correspondents accredited to the U.N.
The United States also hosts a large number of exchange
visitors from Eastern Europe. In FY 1983 approximately 1650
exchange visitor visas were issued to scientists and scholars to
come to the U.S. from Eastern Europe. The average exchange
visitor remains in the U.S. from 6-12 months. Poland continues to
be the source of the largest number of Eastern European exchange
visitors (863 in FY 1983).
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No figures are available on the number of short-term U.S.
business and scientific visitors to Eastern Europe and Cuba but it
is safe to say that this number is only a small fraction of the
traffic coming to the U.S. There are 14 U.S. correspondents
stationed in Eastern Europe-(all in Warsaw) and 11 U.S.
businessmen. There are no resident U.S. correspondents or
businessmen in' Cuba.
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TABLE 11-8
OFFICIAL U.S. PRESENCE
IN SOVIET-BLOC
Country
Bulgaria
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
East Germany
Hungary
Poland
Romania
January 1984
Number of Americans
56
20
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2. Privileges and Immunities
Privileges and immunities of Soviet Bloc diplomats and
embassy technical/administrative and service staff are defined
by the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations, 23 U.S.T.
3227, and as such are similar to those discussed in section
II.A.2. above. Privileges and immunities of consular staff are
addressed by a series of bilateral agreements with Poland, 24
U.S.T. 1231, Hungary, 24 U.S.T. 1141, the GDR, T.I.A.S. no.
10061, Bulgaria, 26 U.S.T. 687, and Romania, 24 U.S.T. 1317.
Consular relations in the case of Poland, Romania and
Czechoslovakia are also governed-by the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, 21 U.S.T. 77..
The immunity provided by these consular bilateral
agreements with the Eastern European states in general is
dramatically greater than that under the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations or most other consular bilaterals.' This
affords our consular personnel in these states the maximum
level of protection. As a consequence, however, consular
officers and employees (except Polish consular employees) from
the Eastern European states enjoy immunity from criminal
prosecution.'
Soviet Bloc staff members of the -UN Secretariat and members
of Soviet Bloc missions at the UN are covered by the provisions
of the Convention on Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations cited in section II.A.2. as applying to Soviet personnel
Eastern Europeans assigned to the U.S. offices of
state-owned enterprises do not enjoy any privileges and
immunities. They are subject to the civil and criminal
jurisdiction of the United States. The United States has trade
agreements with Hungary (Agreement on Trade Relations Between
the United States of America and the Hungarian People's
Republic, 29 U.S.T. 2711, signed March 17, 1978 and entered
into force July 7, 1978) and with Romania (Agreement on Trade
Relations Between the United States of America and the
Socialist Republic of Romania, 26 U.S.T. 2305, signed April 24,
1975 and entered into force August 3, 1975). Both agreements
oblige the signatories to receive and facilitate the activities
of business representatives of the other side.
The United States has informed Bloc countries that staff
members of commercial offices, although'classified as foreign
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government officials, do not have diplomatic status. However,
the U.S. has accorded diplomatic status to the head of each
office. In most cases-these individuals are employees of the
sending state's Foreign Trade Ministry. The United States does
not have an identical category of-persons assigned to any of
the Soviet Bloc countries. There is no Cuban government trade
office in the U.S.
3. Travel Conditions and Accommodations
Eastern European officials, including those accredited
to.
the U.N., are not restricted with regard to their
travel
in
the
U.S. They do not need to notify the Department of
State
of
their travel plans, nor is their access to various
parts
of
the
country restricted. This lack of restrictions on
travel
is
based on reciprocity. Our officials are accorded
similar
.treatment in all the Eastern European countries.
With respect to Cuba, no geographic travel restrictions
have been imposed by either government, with the exception that
Cuban officials at the U.N. are required to provide advance
notification for any travel more than 25 miles from New York
City. Our officials in Cuba must make all hotel reservations
through a central official travel agency and all public
transportation arrangements must be made through offices of the
Cuban Government. On the basis of reciprocity, we require that
CUBINT personnel make reservations and obtain tickets through
the Department's Office of Foreign Missions.
Of the Soviet Bloc missions in the U.S., only the Cuban
Interests Section is required to obtain housing through the
Office of Foreign Missions (OFM). This requirement is to
reciprocate for a similar arrangement in Cuba where a central
government agency dispenses all housing to foreign diplomats,
including USINT personnel. The Department of State enforces.
reciprocity when foreign governments seek to acquire property
in the United States. There are ongoing negotiations with the
GDR, Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria regarding property
acquisitions in the U.S. in return for reciprocal acquisitions
by our missions in those countries. Leasing of housing for our
embassy personnel in Eastern Europe is easiest in Poland and
Hungary, where, in many cases, it is possible to make private
arrangements which are then certified by the host governments.
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In the GDR, Romania and Bulgaria, all embassy housing must be
obtained through government diplomatic service agencies. The
Czech government has, on occasion, permitted our embassy to
make private arrangements for housing. All Eastern European
missions must obtain OFM approval before signing leases or
settlement agreements on property.
The following listing of Soviet Bloc owned and leased
property in the United States (Table 11-9) and U.S.-owned and
leased property in the Soviet Bloc countries (Table II-10) is
not exhaustive, particularly for U.S.-owned and leased property
in Eastern Europe. The U.S. owns or has long-term leases on
many additional properties (primarily residential) in Poland
and Hungary. This listing does show the major properties,
however, and the Foreign Buildings Office (FBO) of the
Department of State maintains a complete listing of all
U.S.-owned and leased property in these countries.
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TABLE II-9
Soviet Bloc Owned and Leased Property in the United States
Washington, D.C. Area
Bulgarian Embassy Chancery
1621 22nd Street, N.W.
Bulgarian Ambassador's Residence
3516 Rittenhouse Street, N.W.
Cuban Interests Section (Chancery)
'2630 - 16th Street, N.W.
Cuban Chancery Annex
2639 - 16th Street, N.W.
Czechoslovak Embassy Chancery
3900 Linnean Avenue, N.W.
Czechoslovak Chancery Annex
4828 Linnean Avenue, N.W.
Czechoslovak Ambassador's Residence
2612 Tilden Street, N.W.
German Democratic Republic Chancery
1717 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
GDR Chief of Mission's Residence
7608 Rossdhu Court
Chevy Chase, Maryland 20015
GDR Embassy Apartment
1515 Ridge Road
Arlington, Virginia 22202
Hungarian Embassy Chancery
3910 Shoemaker Street, N.W.
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)?
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)'
(leased)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
Hungarian Chief of Mission's Residence (owned)
2950 Linnean Avenue, N.W.
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Polish Embassy Chancery (owned)
2640 16th Street, N.W.
Polish Embassy Chancery Annex (owned)
2224 Wyoming Avenue, N.W.
Polish Embassy Chief of Mission's Residence (owned)
3101 Albemarle Street, N.W.
Polish Embassy Apartments (owned)
2900 Tilden Street, N.W. (4 apartments)
Romanian Embassy Chancery (owned)
1607 23rd Street, N.W.
Romanian Embassy Chancery Annex (owned)
1601 23rd Street, N.W.
Romanian Chief of Mission's Residence (owned)
2236 Massachusetts Avenue, N.W.
New York City
Bulgarian Commercial Office
121 East 62nd Street
(owned)
Bulgarian U.N. Mission (owned)
Bulgarian Tourist Office (leased)
161 E. 86th Street, 2nd Floor
Cuban U.N. Mission (owned)
315 Lexington Avenue
Czechoslovak Commercial office (leased)
292 Madison Avenue, 18th Floor
Czechoslovak U.N. Mission (owned)
1109-1111 Madison Avenue
German Democratic Republic U.N. Mission (owned)
58 Park' Avenue
Hungarian Consulate General (leased)
8 East 75th Street
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Hungarian Commercial office
150 E. 58th Street, 33rd Floor
Hungarian U.N. Mission
10 E. 75th. Street
Polish Government
233 Madison Avenue (3 apartments)
Polish Consulate General
233 Madison Avenue
Polish Commercial Office
47th & 2nd Avenue, 17th Floor
Polish U.N. Mission
9 East 66th Street
Romanian Commercial office
200 East 38th Street
Romanian U.N. Mission
573-577 Third Avenue
(leased)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(leased)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
Chicago
Polish Consulate General (owned)
Polish Government Apartments
1525 Astor Street (4 apartments)
Polish Commercial Office
333 E. Ontario St., 39th floor
Hungarian Commercial Office
130 E. Randolph St.
SECRET
(owned)
(leased)
(leased)
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TABLE II-10
Embassy Chancery
Trziste 15
Prague
Ambassador's Residence
Wintrova 3
Prague
Deputy Chief of Mission's Residence
Majakowskeho 13
Prague
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U.S. Government Owned and Leased Property in the Soviet-Bloc*
Bulgaria
Ambassador's Residence
Georgi G. Dezh, No. 18
Sofia
Embassy Chancery
1 Al Stamboliyski Blvd.
Sofia
Interests Section Bldg.,
Calle Calzada Y M. Vedado
Havana
Embassy Residence
Calle 150 No. 2115
Country Club P.
Havana
Building Site
Calle Calzada Y M. Vedado
Havana
Czechoslovakia
(owned)
(leased)+
(owned)
(owned)
(leased)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
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Staff Apartment Building
Majakowskeho 11
Prague
Consulate Office Building
Hviezdoslavovo Namesti 9
Bratislava
German Democratic Republic
Building Site
Brandenburger Tor
East Berlin
Embassy Chancery
4-5 Neustaedtischekirchstrasse
East Berlin
Ambassador's Residence
14-17 Nordenstrasse
East Berlin
(owned)
(owned)
'(owned)
(short-term lease)
(short-tern lease)
Deputy Chief of Mission's Residence (short-term lease)
93 Platanenstrasse
East Berlin
Hungary
Embassy Chancery
Szabadsag Ter 12
Budapest
Embassy Office Building
Vigyszo F U 3
Budapest
Embassy Office Building
Vigyszo F U 5
Budapest
Embassy Office Building
Zrinyi U 4
Budapest
Public Affairs Officer's Residence
Zugligeti UT 91
Budapest
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(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
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Ambassador's Residence
Zugligeti UT 93
Budapest
Staff Apartments
Nepstadion UT 105
Budapest
Staff Apartments
Szechenyi Rakpart 12-B
Budapest
Warehouse
Tancsics Mihaly U 9
Budapest
Deputy Chief of Mission's Residence
Bimbo UT 151-153
Budapest
Poland
Embassy Chancery
Ujazdowskie, 31
Warsaw
Ambassador's Residence
6 Zawrat Warsaw Idzikowskiego.
Warsaw
Staff Apartments
Piekna 14A-B
Warsaw
Apartment'Building
Mianowskiego 8
Warsaw
Apartment Building
Mianowskiego 16
Warsaw
Apartment Building
Mochnackiego 11
Warsaw
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)
(owned)'
(leased)
(leased)
(leased)
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Deputy Chief of Mission's Residence
Dabrowskiego 48
Warsaw
Army Attache's Residence
Niepodleglosci 106
Warsaw
Air Force Attache's Residence
Olimpijska 39
Warsaw
Agricultural Attache's Residence
Pytlasinskiego 13
Warsaw
Public Affairs Officer's Residence
Dabrowskiego 65
Warsaw
Cultural Affairs Officer's Residence
Rozana 43
Warsaw
Consulate Office Building
Stolarska 9
Krakow
Consul's Residence
Cisowa 5
Krakow
Consulate Office Building
Chopina 4
Poznan
Consul's Residence
Chopina 1
Poznan
Consulate Staff Apartment
31-33 Grodziska
Poznan
Embassy Chancery
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(short-term lease)
(short-ter-4n lease)
(owned)
(owned)
(leased)
(leased)
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9 Str Tudor Archezi
Bucharest
Embassy Office Building
7 Str Tudor Arghezi
Bucharest
Ambassador's Residence
21 Sos Kiseleff
Bucharest
(leased)
(leased)
* Short-term leased property is not included, except as noted.
+ The lease expired on September 30, 1983 and we are currently
discussing with the Government of Bulgaria arrangements for the
construction of new embassy chanceries in each others' capitals.
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C, SECRET
III. The Hostile Intelligence Threat
A. The Soviet and Soviet Bloc Intelligence Threat
During the past ten years, the Soviet and Soviet Bloc official
presence worldwide has increased by 50%, to approximately 40,000
diplomats, trade, cultural and news representatives (CIA estimate,
includes dependents). The increasing number of Soviet, East
European and Cuban official representatives has resulted in an
increased security threat to our country, and to our friends and
allies, as is witnessed by the increasing rate of expulsions of
Soviet and Soviet Bloc officials for espionage (Table III-1). .In
the United States, there are an average of 4,200 Soviet and Soviet
Bloc officials and dependents on permanent assignment (2,600
Soviets, 1,600 Bloc). Over the past decade, the number of known
and suspected Soviet and Soviet Bloc intelligence officers
operating in this country has increased by about 50% (see Table
111-2). From the counterintelligence agencies' perspective,
increased -resources alone, which are recognized as finite, cannot
fully enable them to counter the threat. At the same time, a
substantial increase in such resources would contribute to the
overall effort, particularly since foreign policy considerations
require a balanced approach to the overall problem.
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-34-
Table III-1
EXPULSIONS OF SOVIET OFFICIALS 1981-83
Region
1981
1982
1983
Africa
2
*
1
Asia/Pacific
6
7
41
Europe
*
23
82
Middle East
9
*
*
Western
Hemisphere
10
19
11
Total
27
49
135
*No expulsions publicly announced
Note: Because many governments prefer not to publicize such
expulsion actions, the total number of expellees is higher than
the public record would indicate.
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SOVIET, WARSAW PACT AND CUBAN
KNOWN OR SUSPECTED INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS
IN THE UNITED STATES
Country
1982
1978
1974
Bulgaria
24
14
8
43
36
Hungary
26
28
18
Poland
61
72
44
Romania
34
34
20
GDR
49
14
0
'total Eur 244
Cuba 26
USSR 361
total SovBloc 631
205 126
38 13
289 284
532 42
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B. Present FBI Measures to Counter the Hostile Intelligence Threat
Given the limited resources on hand, the FBI has concentrated
on known or suspected intelligence agents whose activities,
principally in the technology transfer field have damaged and will
continue to prove damaging to our interests. In addition, the FBI
and the other agencies in the Intelligence Community have embarked
on an ambitious program to coordinate their data and information
on this hostile intelligence threat. Human and technical
analytical resources are being increased and the bureaucratic
organizational framework streamlined to handle the problem.
C. U.S. Experience with Expulsions of Soviet Officials
Over the past three decades, most-U.S. PNG actions have been
based on evidence of espionage -- in contrast to Soviet PNG
actions against our diplomatic personnel, which have often been
retaliatory in nature. The Soviets have proven less likely to
retaliate when the U.S. PNG action has been based on hard
evidence, and when the case is not publicized. In response to an
intelligence.-related expulsion, the Soviets sometimes PNG
non-intelligence U.S.-personnel whom they dislike for other
reasons. The Soviets also retaliate when we expel someone from
their UN missions, though we contend there should be no linkage
between our missions in the USSR and the Soviet UN missions in New
York. Our general practice in such cases has been to
counterretaliate by expelling someone from the Soviet Embassy in
Washington.
D. Mass Expulsions of Soviets
The U.S. has never ordered a mass expulsion of Soviets. Since
World War II, the total number of individual expulsions on both
sides has amounted to less than 150 (see tables 111-3,4 and 5).
It is difficult to know what the Soviet reaction would be to a
mass expulsion. The British, Belgians, Canadians and French did
expel Soviets en masse in 1971, 1971, 1978 and 1983,
respectively. When the British expelled 105 Soviets in 1971, five
British diplomats were expelled and thirteen officials,
businessmen and academics were refused permission to return to the
USSR. A "visa war" ensued, and the net result was that the KGB
Residency in the UK. was decimated, while the British Foreign
Office's analogue to the State Department's Office of Intelligence
and Research was banned for several years from serving in the
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USSR. In the Belgian case, 32 Soviets, or one-quarter of the
total Soviet diplomatic presence, were expelled. There was no
retaliation. In the Canadian case, 11 of 64 Soviet diplomats in
Ottawa were expelled. Again, there was no retaliation. Likewise,
when the French expelled 47 Soviet officials on April 5, 1983,
there was no retaliation. In third world countries, such as
Indonesia, there have also been mass expulsions of Soviets. In
most cases, there has been no retaliation, presumably because
Third World missions in Moscow are tiny and counterexpulsions
would eliminate them altogether. Recent'PNG actions by the
British and the United States have met with one-for-one
retaliation.
It would seem that the more important a country is, the larger
its mission in the USSR, and the worse relations are with the
USSR, the greater the tendency is on the part of the Soviets to
retaliate for expulsions of their personnel. In addition, in the
case of the U.S., the Soviet obsession with being considered our
"equal" probably spurs them to greater retaliations.
Historically, the Soviets have expelled two of our personnel
for every three that we have expelled. During the decade of the
1930's, very few Americans were expelled from the Soviet Union as
a proportion of Soviet officials expelled from the U.S. However,
in recent times, the Soviets are retaliating on a virtual
one-for-one basis. We can expect, therefore, that any mass
expulsion of Soviet personnel from the U.S. in this period of
relatively poor relations will be met with a strong reaction from
the Soviets, in contrast to its behavior vis-a-vis .then
countries, and toward us in other times.
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Table 111-4
Soviet Officials PNG'd From The U.S.: 1946-1983*
1983
4
1982
1
1981
2
1980
7
1979
1
1978
4
1977
6
1976
3
1975
3
1974
0
1973
1
1972
3
1971
2
1970
5
1969
4
1968
0
1967
2
1966
2
19.65
2
1964
3
1963
7
1962
3
1961
1
1960
2
1959
3
1958
1
1957
4
1956
8
1955
1
1954
3
1953
1
1952
1
1951
0
1950
1
1949
0
1948
1
1947
0
1946
2
Total
94
*This total includes Soviets who were publicly PNG'd, those who were
quietly asked to leave, and those who were caught "engaging in
activities incompatible with their diplomatic status" but left before
they could be told to leave. It also includes persons who left the
U.S. and were refused reentry for intelligence or retaliatory
reasons. 25 of the PNG cases since 1967, including 6 of the 7 1980
cases, are not yet public knowledge.
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Table III-5
September 12, 1983
June 4, 1983
March 10, 1983
August 24, 1981
January 2, 1978
AMERICANS.PNG'D FROM THE USSR 1976 - 1983
Lon D. Augustenborg
Second Secretary
Leningrad Consulate
Louis C. Thomas
Attache, Adm. Sect.
Moscow Embassy
Richard Osborne
First Secretary
Moscow Embassy
Peter Bogatyr
Third Secretary
Moscow Embassy
Donald Kursch
Third Secretary
Commercial Office
Soviet Reason and Evidence
Allegedly caught in espionage
activity.
Alledgedly caught in espionage
activity.
Allegedly caught in espionage
activity.
Allegedly caught in espionage
activity. .
Allegedly collected political,
economic, and defense
information- and attempted to
instill in Soviet citizens a
spirit of hostility toward
the U.S.S.R. Real Reason:
Retaliation for U.S. PNG of
Avdyunin, Commercial Officer
in Washington.
September 1977
July 1977
Vincent Crockett
(and wife Becky)
Secretary - Archivist
Moscow Embassy
Martha Peterson
Vice Consul
Moscow Embassy
SECRET
Allegedly caught in espionage
activity.
Allegedly caught in espionage'
activity.
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November 18, 1976 Marshall Brement Accused of repeatedly
Political-Counselor attempting to obtain secret
Moscow Embassy political and defense
information from Soviet
citizens. Real Reason:
Retaliation for U.S. PNG of
Stepanov, a counselor in the
Soviet Mission to the U.N.
engaged in intelligence
activity.
June 1976 Edwin Kelly Allegedly caught in-espionage
Vice Consul activity.
Leningrad
SECRET
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EXPULSIONS AND ARRESTS OF SOVIET BLOC OFFICIALS IN THE U.S.
AND EXPULSIONS OF AMERICAN DIPLOMATS FROM SOVIET BLOC
COUNTRIES SINCE 1981
1983 1 Bulgarian Commercial Representative (Penyu Kostadinov)
arrested for espionage.
1983 1 GDR university exchange professor (Alfred Zeher) arrested
for espionage
1982 1 U.S. diplomat withdrawn from Czechoslovakia under pressure
1982 1 Czechoslovak diplomat PNG'd from the U.S. in.retaliation
for above
1982 2 U.S. diplomats PNG'd from Poland
1982 2 Polish diplomats PNG'd from the U.S. in retaliation for
above
1981 1 Polish Businessman (Marian Zacharski) arrested for
espionage, sentenced to life imprisonment.
SECRET
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IV. The.Role of the Department of State in Enforcing Reciprocity
and Responding to the Intelligence Threat
Except for Soviet citizen officers and employees of the United
Nations Secretariat, the United States receives at least some
advance information on the travel of every Soviet citizen in the
United States. In the case of ordinary Soviets who visit
relatives in the U.S., this notification consists of the name.,.
address and telephone number of their U.S. relatives, along with a
request to notify INS if they intend to travel more than 25 miles
from their destination. Although there is no enforcement
provision, this information does provide the FBI with a starting
point for any investigation it may care to institute about the
circumstances of a particular visit.
Depending on the purpose of their visit, certain aliens from
Soviet and Soviet Bloc countries are designated "SPLEX" or
"BUSVIS." Virtually all Soviet visitors are either diplomatic,
SPJL,EX or BUSVIS except for private citizens visiting relatives.
(In-Eastern Europe, only those visitors who enter the U.S. for
particular scientific or technical purposes are classified as
SPLEX.) Once a Soviet SPLEX or BUSVIS visitor has entered the
U.S., he is expected to adhere to his approved itinerary. Any
deviations must be approved in advance by the.Department of
State. In the case of exchange visitors on long-term stays, all
travel outside the area of residence must be approved by the
Department.
The Department of State pays particular attention to the
travel of resident Soviets (except for UN Secretariat employees,
who are exempt from travel controls). Advance notification of all
travel is required 24 or 48 hours in advance depending on
destination. The Department reserves the right to disapprove any
Soviet travel. This right is exercised, normally in response to
Soviet.denials of analogous American travel in the USSR, but when
necessary for reasons of national security as well. The Office of
Soviet Union Affairs, which carries out this program, stays in
close contact with the FBI and in almost all instances acts
favorably on FBI requests to approve or deny particular travel
requests.
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B. The Office of Foreign Missions (OFM)
The Office of Foreign Missions is the monopoly supplier of
travel services to the Soviet Embassy, the Soviet Consulate
General in San Francisco, and the three Soviet missions to the
United Nations. As such it books and issues tickets for all
commercial transportation taken by their staff members, and books
and processes payments for all commercial accommodations utilized
by staff members. In addition to providing an extremely important
tool in our efforts to enforce'reciprocity and expand travel
opportunities for American diplomats in the USSR, OFM's travel
services provide significant counterintelligence benefits. In
many instances, it provides more advance notice of impending
travel than is obtained from the formal travel notifications. It
gives the FBI advance information on precisely which hotels (or
even rooms) and flights Soviets will be utilizing, enhancing
surveillance opportunities. It provides the military services
with the opportunity to review all Soviet travel and to schedule
sensitive activities accordingly. And through OFM'?s routine
contacts with American hosts, it provides the FBI with quicker,
more accurate and cheaper information on what Soviet travelers may
be up to and who they will be seeing., OFM provides similar
services to the Cubans.
C. Visa Ceilings
The United States has unilaterally imposed on the Soviet Union
a limit of 320 permanently assigned personnel at their diplomatic
and consular establishments in the United States, with a
subceiling of 41 in San Francisco. This ceiling is monitored and
enforced by the State Department and is implemented in such a
fashion as to ensure that there are no more than the authorized
number of staff members in the U.S. at any one time. Visas are
authorized only after openings have been created by the departure
of other staff members, or the Soviets have identified an
individual who will leave shortly after the arrival of the new
person. The Soviets are normally 5-15 persons beneath the ceiling
at any one time since all Soviets are counted as "present" from
the time their visas are authorized until they have permanently
left the U.S. Since the Soviets are reluctant to tell us who is
replacing whom, this ensures gaps rather than overlaps in their
staffing.
The Department keeps a comprehensive list of Soviet officials
present in the-U.S., using visa issuance, Immigration Service
arrival/departure information and official registrations and
deregistrations by Soviet missions with the Department and the
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United-Nations. InFaddition,,..the Department's lists are
periodically compared ;to the FBI lists In order to ensure:the
greater accuracy of;both.: As a:result,`we have a high degreeo
confidence:inour- figures on the Soviet presence.
D. Visa - -Applications '.Control
lc y
All visa applications worldwide Are checked through they, ,
Department of StateVisa Lookout System (AVhOS) . Both the Department andthe FBI can, enter Into this computer-based index~7
the names sof suspected intelligence officers, terrorfsts~or the
ersons'`whose applications x'should` be ` carefully; considered
P s
Washington agenc es tbefore visas;~are issued or denied- ' Since ~_ he 4
FBI willu not,, as ~a smatter iof r policy, : provide ::the ;Department
State with$ lists~,of*own orr~ suspected intelligence officer ~ or z ~.
inclusion in ~AVLOS orsl forj'any other -,purpose, the visa lookout as
of limited .util ty P~ nscreening applications by Soviet orY Sovietxz
Bloc rdiplomats. If a naive , lsh included in AVLOS, a full evfew of ?,
national security;=considerations. is,,made ,.before issuing-visas tox`>
identified or }suspected ;hostile" intelligence officers The 'FBI~ is
ZN-
normally providednw th mat least, a full working' week's? notice-'
before our,Embassy~ or, Consulate issues 4 visas toSoviet,orSoviet
Bloc diplomats. Thus, the FBIhcan conduct its own internalhxchecks
and in appropriate cases 'can request' the ;Department to suspend
issuance of ,the visa. z s '. ~;1 < w { s x , ;~ , t ! - :
In ,the rcase of diplomats and staff members designatedfor
bilateral missions, the.Department of State can decline to; accept
them as diplomatssaccredited to the U.S., and they would`:not'be...
admissible Ain :the `diplomatic '.visa categories (A-1 and A 2)>_. We~do
not, however,=have a blanket policy of refusing admission`inthe
A-l..,and A-2 categories to all hostile intelligence officers. Each.;::
case is examined on?its-,merits,. and denials of visas in the A 1
category are very.rarei n-practice. Visas or accreditation can be
denied in certain circumstances,. however", such as in cases `where
persons have been ,expelled previously from the US or allied st
countries for hostile intelligence
,.. .., c....; "gem i,-..,, ..,' . - .. - - :'.' .. .., ,.._...,. f..9 a
prejudicial to the national security, they will be denied-visas
intelligence services and-that they have engaged, or probably;:
would during their visits in the U.S. engage in activities.
evidence that these officials are affiliated with hostile.'::'
Headquarters Agreement:=:When there is significant incriminating
accordance with our obligations 'under the United Nations'.
missions or with the U.N Secretariat are admitted 'to the',U.SO"'
organization category ,.(G-1.,,.:G-2 :and G-4) for assignments,'to U
Officials coming to ~aheUnited States in the internat1ona
SECRET
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 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/03/04: CIA-RDP90B01370R000200330014-9
SECRET
-48-
1 `to :;the "extent :possible: by.'limiting `their. stays to finite:'
extensions of ;;stay for.SPLEX,
..Soviet:-BU-::SVIS and
(BUSVIS) . on 'short-term trips to the U.S., .'a,'detailed.':advance
ingiryis*whether sensitive technology or `other goodsor,
format on sub`~ect = to 'export licensing ? is involved. If *,.
e-exchange program to be carried out. One of--the mayor points>F~r 1 i~,y4 r_.. tar K u.s k~ f ~~
f.h ~.. t 4:v ft..1_ _ . 1~4 n .,. A.1_