JOHN ELLIFF, SSCI STAFF (HUDDLESTON'S DESIGNEE)

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R000200220005-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: December 21, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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NOTE T0: DDCI
' DDS~T
o John Elliff, SSCI Staff (Huddleston's designee)
sent the attached to me, having been tweaked
by The Washington Post article on the shuttle
1 aunch .
o He called first, saying that "he had been
encouraged by several people" to disagree
with Ben Bradlee's contention that the
article did not harm national security
and, essentially, had been drawn from
already available literature.
o John was not seeking approval of the attached
but implied that he would be interested
in comments.
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STAT
ar es A. Briggs
cc: EX DIR
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D/OLL:CABriggs;jms (21 Dec 84)
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~C~r~eb ,$~a~e~ ,~e~a~e
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
~PVRSUANT TO S. RES. X00, WTM CONORESS~
WASHINGTON, D.C.. 20510
12/20/84
Mr. Briggs:
Attached is the draft I talked to you
about. It's status is Lmcertain,
but one or mere Members may want to
say something like this.
John Elliff~~
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DRAFT 12/20/84
Why is it a serious mistake for the news media to report information
about U.S. technical intelligence capabilities, unless the disclosure has
been properly authorized by the Executive branch or the Congress?
In frost circumstances it is not a crime to publish this information,
and many of us in Congress strongly believe in the importance of the First
Amendment right to report the news without fear of government censorship
or criminal penalties.
The question is one of wise exercise of self-restraint by the news
media. The damage to the public interest from unauthorized disclosures
about technical intelligence capabilities outweighs their value for
debate on national policy issues.
Unquestionably, technical intelligence information is relevant to
public discussion of a broad range of problems, from military spending
and arms control agreements to the nat~e and extent of U.S. knowledge
of events in critical areas of the world. A photograph of a Soviet
missile can document a strategic threat requiring stronger U.S. defenses.
Informed speculation about U.S. intelligence systems can either increase
or diminish the public's sense of confidence in our ability to verify
compliance with arms control agreements.
C+n balance, however, this kind of reporting does more harm than is
generally recognized by the news media. The damage is frequently
indirect and cutrtiulative. Soviet intelligence is not omnipresent or
omniscient, and our adversaries are not as adept as we may think.
News reports on technical intelligence matters do at least three
~~
different kinds of damage. The first is sensitizing. Soviet intelligence
and security agencies produce a steady flow of warnings to their military
and political leaders about U.S. intelligence capabilities. Those
leaders must decide how much to spend on countermeasures that can
frustrate U.S. collection efforts. Western news accounts sensitize
Soviet policymakers to the U.S. intelligence threat and make it easier
for the security bureaucrats to win support for their programs.
In other words, U.S. press attention to technical intelligence
systems is likely to have the practical effect of enhancing Soviet
concealment practices and other countermeasures. This need not happen
because the stories provide new information, but because they reach a
higher-level audience in the real world of the Soviet power structure.
A second type of damage is "confirming." Soviet intelligence may
have recruited an agent with access to some information about a technical
collection system. An American with such access may even sell particular
doctanents to the KGB. By listening to U.S. commtmications and reading
technical journals, the Soviets may deduce even more about our technical
capabilities. In such cases an authoritative news report can provide
crucial confirmation for Soviet estimates. It can focus on and tie
together loose pieces of information the significance of which had not
been recognized.
Intelligence gathering is filled with uncertainties, doubts, and
degrees of probability. The Soviet analyst who tries to make sense of
the data for his superiors carmot be sure his sources are bona fide,
because of the successful use of double agents by the FBI and other U.S.
counterintelligence agencies. Nor can he be confident that his
deductions from comBnmications intercepts or technical literature are
correct. That is where a U.S. news story can make a significant difference.
The "sensitizing" and "confirming" effects of news reports on
technical intelligence systems make information the Soviets already
have far mare useful to them. The likely impact is higher priority
for the development of security, concealment, and even deception
practices geared to the characteristics of U.S. collection programs.
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The third risk is "compromising" U.S. capabilities directly.
In some of the most serious espionage cases over the past twenty years,
it has turned out that the Soviets already knew from press reports
what the espionage agent later gave them illegally. In other circtnn-
stances, we have learned that the Soviets missed things that U.S.
security experts thought they were bound to discover and have concluded
that unauthorized disclosure in the media would have been as damaging
as the gravest act of espionage.
Unlike disclosure of weapons systems, the compromise of technical
intelligence capabilities directly affects the ability of the United
States to cope with world events in times of peace as well as war.
The intelligence they provide to U.S. policymakers is critical to our
capacity to resolve international differences by negotiation and diplomacy
rather than by the use of force. It is absolutely critical to the
ability to verify arms control agreements.
At the same time, technical collection systems are highly
vulnerable to the security countermeasures of our adversaries, and we
must rely on these systems for a large percentage of our information
about closed societies. It is not an exaggeration to say that the
money we spend on technical intelligence for peacetime purposes is
worth ten times the amount for military hardware. The importance of
limiting disclosures about technical intelligence is correspondingly
greater than for weapons that are frequently discussed in public.
These are the reasons why reporting on technical intelligence
systems is contrary to the national interest, unless the disclosure is
properly authorized. Too often the news media forget that the Congress,
through its committees, is informed on a bipartisan basis about the
full details of these intelligence systems. Congress can make an
independent judgnent on the merits of Executive branch secrecy claims,
and each house has procedures for authorizing disclosure over the
President's objections, if necessary.
The weakest link in. the protection of technical intelligence
secrets is neither the news media nor the Congress, but the growuzg
number of Executive branch officials who use selective leaks to promote
their particular interests. The media. should not allow themselves to be
exploited this way. Instead, responsible news organizations ought to
maintain a firm policy against reporting such matters in the national
interest.
Finally, and most is~ortant, the Achninistration should forego
any attempt to use goverr~anental powers to coerce or intimidate those
who report the news. The First Amendment guarantees the right to
report facts and allegations about the gwerntrbent's conduct, except
in the most extreme situations. Even if the courts might permit it,
threatening to investigate journalists or to cotr~el their testimony is
counterproductive because it stiffens the backbone of any good reporter.
-Gaverim~ent_officials-mus.t~,-ins-tead;-make-the-ease-for-secrecy on
the merits by explaining insofar as possible why the public interest is
better served by not reporting certain kinds of information. Ina free
society, persuasion and not compulsion is the role of gOVernment ir:
promoting responsible exercise of freedom of the press.
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