NSSD 4-83: U.S. STRATEGY TOWARDS LIBERIA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000300540002-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 52
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 16, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT
Routing Slip
ACTION I INFO I DATE I INITIAL
SUSPENSE Z 1 June
Do+~!
DCI
DDCI
EXDIR
141 D/Pers.:=-
Please prepare concurrence/comments
for DDCI.'s signature.
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United States Department of State
hington, D.C. 20520
June 16, 1983
Senior Interagency Group No. 36
-
OVP
Mr. Donald
P. Gregg
-
NSC
Mr.
Robert
M. Kimmitt
-
Agriculture
Mr.
4
Raymon
1 Lett
AID
Mr. Gerald
Pagano
-CIA
Commerce -
Mrs.
Helen
Robbins
Defense -
COL
John S
anford
JCS -
LTC
Dennis
Stanley
NSA
OMB -
Mr.
Alton
eel-
Transportation -
Mrs.
Kathe
ine.Anderson
Treasury -
Mr.
David
ickford
USIA -
Ms.
Teresa
Collins
SUBJECT: NSSD 4-83: U.S. Strategy Towards Liberia
Attached for your agency's clearance at the SIG level
are the Interagency Group papers on Liberia, including an
Executive Summary, the IG Study Paper and a draft National
Security Decision Directive (NSDD). The IG paper has been
modified to take into account the results of the May 26
IG meeting and comments received subse ently from various
agencies.
In order to adhere to our NSC deadline we must receive
your clearance by June 22.
0Z
Cha:1e
Executive
1. Executive Summary
2. IG Study Paper
3. Draft National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD)
DECL: OADR
Hill
ecretary
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LPL i
Executive Summary
The purpose of the Interagency Group was to review
our policy toward Liberia in light of developments since
the 1981 SIG and in view of the major political changes
expected over the next two years in connection with the
planned transition to democratically elected government.
There has been considerable progress in accomplishing
our goals in Liberia since 1981, including the mainte-
nance of a pro-American government, a substantially
improved political atmosphere and human rights record,
and the institution of a series of difficult economic
adjustment measures. While these represent important
achievements, a number of significant problems remain
in building political stability and promoting economic
progress.
The United States has substantial interests in
Liberia that it does not enjoy elsewhere in Africa and
which would be difficult and expensive to duplicate
anywhere else on the continent. Through an agreement
with the Government of Liberia, the U.S. has priority
access rights to Roberts International Airport and the
Port of Monrovia, the only such rights we have in west
Africa, although other countries in the region allow
occasional use of their facilities by U.S. military
ships and aircraft. Liberia is the site of three
important U.S. Government installations - a Voice of
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America transmitter, a diplomatic communications facility
and'a Coast Guard OMEGA navigation station. The country
.also hosts the second largest block of private U.S. in-
vestment in black Africa. Equally important is the special
political relationship and the domestic and international
perception of Liberia as a U.S. responsibility in Africa.
These interests will continue to be of considerable
importance to the United States and its objectives in
Africa for at least the rest of the decade. A Liberian
slide into economic or political chaos would not only
provide an opportunity for radical adventurism (Libyan,
Cuban, Soviet) to gain a foothold but would be widely
seen as a U.S. defeat. The most immediate consequence
could be the impact of Liberia's collapse on her neighbors,
especially Guinea and Sierra Leone. (Liberia's use of the
dollar as her currency encourages important cross border
trade, mostly unrecorded, which is becoming increasingly
significant.) Were it perceived that such events occurred
because the U.S. had failed to put forth a serious preventive
effort, U.S. credibility throughout Africa would be severely
damaged.
The political situation in Liberia has improved
markedly since the low point of the 1980 coup. Head of
State Doe has consolidated his power over the ruling
People's Redemption Council (PRC) and purged the govern-
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went of many of its. mare radical and incompetent elements.
The government is strongly pro-west and has pursued.a
foreign pglicy reflective of this. There have been
important improvements in human rights, most notably the
release of all political prisoners and movement to fulfill
a commitment to return to civilian government by 1985.-
Nevertheless, military indiscipline remains a problem and
there are a variety of potential sources of instability.
A number of coup plots have been uncovered, before these
posed any real threat to the government.
The Liberian economy remains fragile and is a major
source of potential political instability. The economy
is suffering from a depression in the world markets for
Liberia's major exports, from a heavy government debt
burden and from poor financial management. Expenditure
control has been a particular problem. On the positive
side, the government enjoys a good record of cooperation
with the IMF and Doe has shown himself willing to take
difficult economic austerity measures, including government
salary cuts, although these have sometimes suffered from
imperfect implementation. In the absence of higher com-
modity prices and a stronger trade balance, Liberia is
likely to become increasingly dependent on U.S. budgetary
support as the availability of IMF resources declines.
Over the longer term, however, prospects for Liberian
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economic recovery may be somewhat brighter, especially
if Liberia succeeds in attracting a new infusion of
foreign investment capital. The country's small popu-
lation, mineral wealth, and commitment to free enter-
prise, together with the tough adjustment measures that
are already being implemented, may put Liberia in a
position to resume economic growth as world recovery
proceeds.
Despite our considerable success in moving the
Liberians forward on both the political and economic
fronts, further progress is needed to prevent instability.
Doe and some of his colleagues on the PRC have matured,
but their capacity for growth is limited and they remain.
capable of taking embarrassing or even dangerous actions
at any time.---Moreover, while they retain substantial
domestic support, this could dissipate quickly if they
reneged on their. commitment to return Liberia to civilian
rule. In view of this, the most favorable course of
political events in Liberia over the next two years from
the U.S. perspective would be a successful transition to
a reasonably democratic, moderate and stable government.
This will stand the best chance of success if the U.S.
can encourge the formation of a broad-based coalition
including civilian and military elements and leaders from
both the indigenous and Americo-Liberian communities.
Public and congressional support for our Liberia policy
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also depend on continued progress in this direction. An
abortion of the process, for whatever reason, would result
in instability, encourage foreign meddling and threaten-the .
substantial U.S. interests in Liberia. Because of the value
of these interests, and in light of our significant ability
to influence events in Liberia, the U.S. should pursue a
comprehensive strategy encompassing the following principal
elements:
-- Use of U.S. influence and resources to support and
guide the Liberian transition to elected government in a
way that will.improve its prospects for success, help main-
tain stability, protect U.S. interests and be publicly and
privately defensible.
-- Provide adequate financial and advisory assistance
for the transitional process.
Prevent meddling by countries hostile to U.S.
interests.
-- Step up contact with the PRC and the Army and under-
take programs to improve discipline and promote their
backing for the political process.
Promote economic stability through improved GOT.
financial management, provision of advisors, coordination
with and encouragement of other donors and development of
a private sector strategy.
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--'Recognize Liberia-as part of the economic sub-unit'
which includes Ivory Coast, Guinea and Sierra Leone and
build upon the growing interdependence of their individual
economics thus providing a broader base for stability.
-- Maintain and expand as appropriate a public infor-
mation campaign to sensitize Congress and the public to
Liberia's importance and our unique special friendship.
-- Continue the priority being given in the budget
process to maintaining economic and security assistance
flows to Liberia at least at current levels in order to
meet our objectives during the transition period and to
help ensure an elected government has adequate resources
to maintain the support of the general populace and-the
military.
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Paper for the-1983 IG/NSDD Review
of U.S. Policies vis-a-vis Liberia
Contents
1. Introduction
II. U.S. Interests in Liberia
III. Review of U.S. Policy Efforts
Since 1981
Page
IV. Liberian Political Setting 9
V. Liberian Economic Setting
VI. Analysis of the Probable Courses
of Events in Liberia
VII. Conclusions
VIII. Policy Recommendations
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I. - Introduction
The purpose of the Interdepartmental Group is to examine
US objectives and interests in Liberia, identify threats to
these interests, and assess the success of US policy since
the SIG decisions of April, 1981. In particular, the-=-,-- -
IG must examine the probable course of internal events
and set out strategies to deal with them, and look into the
question of probable demands on future economic and security
assistance. Other matters to be considered include the question
of US domestic opinion and alternatives to the current approach.
The terms of reference for the IG are attached at Tab A.
The principal US objectives in Liberia have been to
protect US assets. and access rights in Liberia; to avoid a major
political defeat or embarrassment for the US through Liberia's
political dis integration or the accession of a government
hostile to the United States; to prevent Liberia's alignment
with unfriendly nations such as the Soviet Union, Cuba or
Libya; and to accomplish these goals with the minimum
necessary expenditure, of resources. Another principal objective
is to win a significant foreign policy victory for the Admini-
stration by overseeing the installation of a stable, constitu-
tional, pro-American government in Liberia.
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There are two basic assumptions underlying this paper.
The first is that political stability is important to pro-
tecting US interests in Liberia. The second is that the
United States exercises substantial influence over the Liberian
political, economic, and military systems and can continue to do
so, given a decision to continue committing sufficient energy and
resources.
II. U.S. Interests in Liberia
A. U.S. Government Access Rights and Facilities
The US Government has facilities in Liberia that it
does not enjoy anywhere else in Africa, which would be hard
to duplicate elsewhere in Africa, and for which, we do not
pay the Liberians rent. U.S. military access rights in
Liberia are unmatched in west Africa. In fact, the largest con-
centration of US government assets in Africa are in Liberia.
It is clear that the US will obtain significant and
substantial benefits from these facilities and access rights
for the foreseeable future, certainly for at least a number of
years beyond 1985. Replacement costs for these facilities
currently exceed S100 million, although it is unlikely they
could be replicated in Africa at any cost. A summary follows:
1. Port and Airport Access Rights. Through unpublished
acreements with the Liberians, the US has priority access to
the Port of Monrovia and Roberts Field (Monrovia's airport).
The Liberians have recently approved a US proposal to upqrade
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facilities at Roberts Field, at a cost of about $6 million,
to make the airport.more suitable for US military use, if
required by events in Africa and other parts of the world,
most notably in the Middle East and Southwest Asia. As a
result of these improvements, the value of Roberts Field to
the USG will increase. Nonetheless, while useful, this access
would not assume great importance except under unusual con-
tingencies, since other facilities in the region are normally
available. -
2. Regional Relay Facility. It is'of slowly declin-
ing value, but will be part of the worldwide diplomatic com-
munications system well into the late 1980's. Although the
posts it serves as a primary communications center can also
be serviced by existing complementary satellite systems, the
facility's redundancy and contingency use may well increase
in value, particularly as a result of studies currently under-
way on communications survivability.
3. Voice of America. The VOA transmitters at Monrovia
broadcast to sub-Sahara Africa. Loss of the station would result
in loss of coverage throughout the area. The loss could be
partially compensated by rescheduling transmitters which now
provide high priority broadcasts of languaqes to the USSR, but
the resulting signals in Africa would be weak and ineffective.
When present construction plans are completed (timing uncertain),
VOA will have a capability for serving Africa at a reduced level
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without the Liberian facility. Further ahead are direct
broadcast satellites Which could eliminate the need for
the station, but this probably will not happen until. after
the turn of the century.
4. OMEGA Navigational Station. Loss of this maritime
nevigational station could be accommodated by the redundancy
within the OMEGA system and existing alternate systems.
OMEGA is scheduled to be replaced in 1988 with a worldwide
satellite system called NAVSTAR-GPSO The OMEGA station is,
however, asource of prestige to the Liberian government
which manages it.
B. Private Assets
American private investment in Liberia, estimated at
about.$300 million, represents the second largest US in-
vestment in black Africa after Nigeria. These funds are
concentrated in the rubber and iron ore sectors. US com-
merical banks dominate Liberian banking. The EXIM Bank has
an exposure of $8.3 million in the country. The US dollar
is the Liberian currency. Liberia is also one of the very
few LDCs following an open economic system,. without exchanqe
controls or excessive restrictions on new private investment.
Liberia is among our leading export markets in Sub-Saharan
Africa, and the U.S. market share of 30 percent (1981) is our
largest in the region by far.
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 US shipping under the Liberian flag of convenience (open
registry) is important to-US transportation interests,
allowing major savings in taxes and labor costs. Currently,
378 US-owned ships fly the Liberian flag, accounting for
59% of all foreign-registered US ships. Under Section
902 of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, these ships may be
requisitioned by Presidential declaration of the need "for
the security of the national defense or in times of national
emergency."
C. The "Special Relationship"
Liberia, founded by black Americans, has always had a
close historical relationship and psychological tie to the
United States. Indeed the heritage of the past has been
reinforced over the years by the presence in-Liberia of
US missionaries and Peace Corps volunteers, by the growth
.of commercial and governmental links, by the education of
many Liberians in US institutions, by longstanding military
to military relationships, by continuing ties of.family and
marriage. and by a cultural and social. predisposition to
American standards.'"'' That this relationship extends to
Liberians outside the Americo-Liberian community has been
demonstrated by the new indigenous government's continuation
of-close cooperation with the US and of support for US
initiatives in international fora. While there are critics
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of the US tie, Liberia remains a country where pro-Americanism
remains- the norm. The special relationship has reinforced a
strong international perception that Liberia is "our" respon-
sibility in Africa.. Our allies look to us to take the lead
in Liberia. Serious instability, repression or a leftist
takeover would be a significant embarrassment to the United
States.
III. Review of US Policy Efforts Since 1981
Following the inauguration of President Reagan, an
Interagency Group meeting on Liberia took place.on February 26,
1981. The result was a general consensus that, in an attempt to
control the precarious situation in Liberia, there should be a
significant increase in US commitments to that nation, includ-
ina military and economic funds and advisors. The Senior
Interdepartmental Group meeting on Liberia of one month
later (March 31, 1981) elaborated on that view and agreed
unanimously that:
-- the large concentration of US assets and access
rights in Liberia,. which could not be easily or inexpen-
sively replaced, dictated a strong US interest in preserving
a friendly moderate government in Liberia;
-- Liberia presented a ripe target for Soviet, Libyan and
Cuban meddling because of its current economic difficulties; and
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-- the US should seek to have greater direct influence over
events in Liberia by escalating to a higher level of commitment
and resources.
The March 1981 SIG participants also aqreed that the
US should: (1) seek a commitment to Liberia for economic
and military assistance programs totalling approximately
$80 million annually for the next several years, (2) provide
advisors to assure solid economic decision making and a pos-7
itive impact on assistance plans, and (3) establish linkage
between the provision of this assistance and progress toward
a return to civilian rule, sound economic management and a
continued pro-Western stance.
Our activist efforts since that time to realize the
policy directions laid down in March, 1981 have heavily
involved the US in Liberian political, economic, and
military affairs, both in the day-to-day and longer-term
planning aspects. Such is the state of US involvement
at present. Of the specific actions items agreed to at
the March, 1981 SIG meeting, all have been implemented
except for three. These exceptions are the proposed ten
slot increase of the US Military Mission in Monrovia, the
addition of one officer to Embassy Monrovia's economic
section (although a State officer was added, this was offset
by the withdrawal of the commercial slot), and the hoped-for
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participation by EXIM in the rehabilitation of the Liberian
National Iron Ore Company-(1'1IOC) mine. The Military Mission
increase was precluded by Congressional opposition in 1982
and faces an uncertain future on the Hill again this year.
We are continuing to press for a solution giving us at least a
slight increase. EXIM participation in NIOC is no longer an
issue because of the passage of time, but the augmentation
of the-Embassy's economic section remains a desirable goal.
In terms of political and economic impact, the policies
the US has followed since the March, 1981 SIG have:
-- contributed substantially to averting economic
collapsed
-- provided a modicum of political stability in
Liberia;
-- helped move the Doe regime toward greater observance
of human rights and due process;
-- moved Liberia closer to the planned return of
civilian rule;
-- demonstrated US resolve to rest of Africa.
-- effectively'fthecked Soviet, Cuban, and Libyan
meddling;
-- kept the Doe government on a moderate, pro-US
course both domestically and in the foreign policy area.
These successes have protected US assets and access
rights in Liberia and have allowed the US government to'
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