ATTACHED ARE THE PAPERS UNDER DISCUSSION BY THE IG FOR NSSD 11-82

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490017-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 28
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 4, 2011
• Sequence Number: 17
• Publication Date: September 17, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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tR-ET-
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
National Intelligence Council
DDI #7522-82
17 September 1982
MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
THROUGH : Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council
FROM : Stanley M. Moskowitz
National Intelligence Officer for USSR-EE
1. Attached are the papers under discussion by the IG for
NSSD 11-82, "Policy Toward the USSR".
2. The Soviet Challenge section was written by SOYA. Part II,
Meeting the Soviet Challenge, by State Department.
3. Interested in your reaction.
Attachment
a/s
Distribution:
1 - DCI
1 - DDCI
1 - Ex. Di r.
1 - E R
1 - C/NIC
1 - VC/NIC
1 - EX/NIC
2 - NIO/USSR
1 - DDI Reg.
NOI-USSR/SMMOSKOWITZ/sbl
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THE SOVIET CHALLENGE
THE DETERMINANTS OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR
The primary determinants of Soviet international behavior are geography, an
imperial tradition and ideology. The first of these is immutable; the second was
inherited by the Soviet leadership in 1917; and the third has served to reinforce
the imperial tradition and preserve some of its chief characteristics--suspicion,
aggressiveness, and xenophobia.
Communist ideology posits an inevitable struggle between capitalism and
socialism and thus views non-socialist states both as potential targets for
revolution and as potential threats. It sees class antagonism as the driving
force behind political and economic change, and the policies of other nations as
shaped by domestic economic and social struggles. This view provides the
intellectual prism through which Soviet leaders perceive the outside world,
reenforces the expansionist tendencies inherited from the Russian tradition, and
assures them that history is on their side.
Most importantly, Communist ideology is the main source of the regime's
legitimacy. It explains why there is only one political party, which controls the
state administration and all spheres of society, why the media are subject to
censorship, and why the party Politburo dominates political life. For a variety
of reasons--including a deeply rooted fear of anarchy and the absence of any
regularized process for transferring power--questions of the regime's legitimacy
continue to be of basic concern to Soviet leaders.
But Soviet authorities also see their own international role in terms of
traditional great power interests. While as Marxists they believe in the ultimate
transformation of the world along socialist lines, their specific policies and
tactics are perforce often disputed by geopolitical considerations and frequently
result in the subordination of the revolutionary dimension of their doctrine to
such traditional calculations.
The insecurity and suspicion engendered by Russian history and Marxist-
Leninist ideology have been tempered somewhat by the USSR's emergence as a
military superpower and the concomitant growth of its political role in world
affairs. Soviet leaders see military power as the essential foundation of an
assertive foreign policy. The pattern of their policies since the mid-1970s
suggests increased confidence in their global power position-expressed in Soviet
parlance as "the changing correlation of forces in favor of Socialism." The
Soviet leadership also sees continuing opportunities to exploit and foster
international tensions and instabilities to their own advantage and the detriment
of the United States. At the same time a new element of insecurity probably has
been added by the growing recognition that serious domestic problems seem to defy
solution.
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SOVIET STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The political system that has evolved out of this historical and ideological
tradition has provided the means for a serious challenge to US interests. Its
leaders have formidable military power and considerable economic might at their
disposal. The highly centralized decisiormaking apparatus also enhances the
Soviet leadership's ability to develop a cohesive foreign and domestic policy and
to move quickly to take advantage of international opportunities. At the same
time such centralization often makes Soviet domestic policy rigid, and ideological
orthodoxy inhibits adaptations to changing internal and international conditions.
These strengths and weaknesses will be particularly in evidence as the Soviet
Union deals with major global challenges and opportunities in the 1980s.
Internal Factors
The Economy.
The USSR has entered a period of slow economic growth that will confront the
leadership with tough policy choices. Shortfalls in industrial production, and
four consecutive harvest failures have reduced the growth in Soviet GNP to less
than 2 percent a year since 1978-its lowest rate since World War II.
This decline indicates that the formula Moscow has used to stimulate growth
over the past 25 years-maximum inputs of labor and investment-no longer works.
During the past few years, the USSR has experienced:
a sharp slowdown in oil production growth and a decline in coal
% production;
a major rise in raw material costs;
a fall-off in investment and labor-force growth; and
% a sharp decline in labor productivity growth.
To judge from 11th Five-Year Plan figures, the Soviet leadership,
nevertheless, expects GNP to grow 4 percent per year through the mid-1980s. This
goal, however, in our judgement is based on highly unrealistic assumptions about
labor productivity growth. We estimate that GNP will continue to grow at less
than 2 percent through the mid-1980s.
These economic difficulties have not led the leadership to make fundmental
changes in policy. To maintain the military buildup, it has lowered the rates of
growth for consumption and capital investment. If these priorities continue,
however, the living standard will hold steady and may decline and investment will
be squeezed further. The defense burden, as measured by share of GNP going to
defense spending, might also approach 20 percent by the early 1990s compared to
its current level of 13-14 percent-sharply restricting other claimants and
heightening political tensions over allocation decisions.
Despite these gloomy prospects, the USSR continues to possess great economic
strengths. It has:
a wealth of natural resources, leading the world in the production of
% such key industrial commodities as oil, steel, iron ore, and nickel;
the world's largest military-industrial complex; and
a highly centralized economy that has enabled the leadership to
command resources and set priorities between regions and sectors.
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Moreover, although keenly aware of their difficulties, Soviet leaders apparently
believe that the 1990s will bring some relief from at least two of their major
problems-manpower shortages and energy constraints. They also take comfort in
the gloomy projections of growth for most Western industrial nations and have
expressed doubts both publicly and privately about the United States' ability to
carry out its defense buildup.
Social Issues.
The sources of popular discontent in the Soviet Union--a perceived decline in
the quality of life, continuing restrictions on freedom of expression and belief,
and rising national consciousness among more than 20 major ethnic groups--pose
problems of varying severity for the Soviet leadership. Discontent over the
quality of Soviet life probably represents the most immediate and important
challenge. The Soviet people no longer are confident that their standard of
living will continue to improve. Food shortages have became more apparent and the
availability of some consumer goods has dropped. The sense of rising
expectations, made possible by real consumer advances until the mid-1970s, has
yielded to an apparent growth of dissatisfaction and cynicism. This is
manifesting itself in declining growth in labor productivity-a trend that will
make it more difficult to achieve the rates of economic growth that the leaders
plan. Recent regime actions--such as massive imports of grain and the creation of
special food distribution systems-indicate that they are aware of the problems,
but their policies are as yet inadequate to solve them.
The Soviet leadership thus far has been successful in isolating and
repressing political, religious, and cultural dissent through widespread arrests
and imprisonment of dissident leaders, confinement in psychiatric hospitals, and
exile. In the long term, dissidence could become more widespread--because of
dissatisfaction with living standards, a continuing decline in ideological
commitment, and an apparent resurgence of interest in religious faith--and require
even more leadership attention, but over the next 10 years there is little
prospect that such activity will get out of hand and threaten party rule.
Discontent among the minority nationalities also represents a latent
vulnerability. There is no widespread, disruptive protest now, however, nor does
any appear likely in the near or mid-term. Regime policies-granting linguistic,
territorial, and some cultural autonomy; improving the standard of living; and
expanding the educational base-combined with the use of police power, have been
largely successful thus far. A rising national consciousness among many of these
groups, however, suggests that discontent could become more serious over the next
several decades. It could result in work stoppages, demonstrations and greater
assertiveness by local leaders-particularly in the Baltic States, the Ukraine and
Central Asia--requiring the regime to reassess its basic approach to the
problem.
Political Process and Structure.
The Communist Party's pervasive control gives great power and authority to
its leaders, whose determination to insure the preeminence of the party and
implementation of its decisions is an important underpinning of all national
policy objectives. The successful pursuit of this aim, together with effective
restrictions on public dissent, has given. unity and cohesiveness to both domestic
and foreign policy.
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This focus on the maintenance of party control,' however, also has introduced
some rigidity and inefficiency that have been harmful to the pursuit of national
goals. This has been especially evident in the economy. Party leaders, despite
their interest in improving the efficiency and technological base of the economy,_
have been reluctant to fully back the kind of decentralization and economic
incentives that would contribute to this end, mainly for fear that this would
dilute their power. They have also been unwilling to codify their powers and
responsibilities within the political system and develop an institutionalized
process for replacing the top leader. As a result, political succession creates
potentially disruptive personal and policy conflict. The lack of any mechanise to
ensure rejuvenation of the administrative elite-while it has produced what are
surely the world's most experienced bureaucrats--also has reduced the flow of
fresh ideas and lessened the regime's ability to respond to new challenges.
Instruments of Policy.
Foreign Policy
To judge from the USSR's sustained heavy investment in military forces and
weapons research and development, the Soviet leaders believe that military power
is their principal instrument of influence and status in international
relations. In strategic nuclear forces, the Soviets probably now credit
themselves with aggregate nuclear capabilities at least equal to those of the
United States and in some respects, such as the ability to threaten US land-based
missile silos, with superiority. The Soviets have also significantly improved
theater nuclear and conventional forces, accentuating regional military
asymmetries opposite China and West Europe.
In the Third World, arms sales, military training and advisors also are
effective instruments of Soviet policy. While such aid does not necessarily
translate directly into political leverage, it usually is the keystone of Soviet
relations with less developed countries and with revolutionary and insurgent
groups. Despite Soviet interest in garnering hard currency from arms sales,
Moscow has been willing, where it. perceives political advantage, to make major
concessions, such as extended repayment periods and payment in soft currency.
This, combined with their apparent responsiveness, allows the Soviets to depict
their actions as manifestations of solidarity with the Third World.
Another trend in Soviet Third World involvement is the continuing use of
proxies and other intermediaries, together with covert Soviet involvement in
supporting insurgent groups and in aiding the military ventures of client or
dependent regimes. For the Soviets, the proxy relationship-one that has proven
most successful in Angola and Ethiopia--minimizes the level of direct Soviet
involvement while achieving Soviet aims and projecting the image of "socialist
solidarity" with the recipient regimes.
Foreign debt obligations and hard currency shortages, however, affect the
overall level of Moscow's commitment to client regimes. The hard currency crunch
has made the Soviets reluctant to provide other clients with economic aid as
extensive as that provided to Cuba or Vietnam. The net result is that Moscow is
more dependent on military aid as an entree of influence in the Third World.
In recent years the Soviets also have strengthened their traditional
diplomatic activities, supplementing them with increased usage of a broad range of
pseudo-official and covert activities that the Soviets themselves refer to as
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"active measures." The increased use of such measures is in part a reflection of
the importance Moscow attributes to the "ideological struggle," which is waged not
only through propaganda, but also with psychological warfare and subversion.
The Soviet Union and International Communism.
The international Communist movement is no longer the unambigious asset to
the USSR that it once was. Threats to Soviet leadership and control of both
ruling and non-ruling parties are growing. The turmoil in Poland and problems in
Romania underscore the failure of the costly policy of buying stability and
loyalty in Eastern Europe through economic subsidies.
The objective possibilities for continuing to pursue this policy, moreover,
are fading quickly due to Soviet economic problems and Western resistance to
deeper economic involvement in Eastern Europe. In the coming decade slow economic
growth in Eastern Europe will threaten regime stability in bloc countries. The
downfall of a corrupt and incompetent party leadership in Poland, precipitated by
the.protests of a popular workers' movement, and the use of the military to fill
the gap, also raise disquieting questions about the legitimacy and effectiveness
of Communist party rule throughout the bloc.
Despite these problems, Moscow's options are limited. An economic bailout
would be too costly. Economic reform and greater Western involvement would
diminish central control and could stimulate pressures for political reform. A
resort to greater repression, on the other hand, would further complicate Moscow's
relations in the West and the Third World.
Beyond Eastern Europe, the most serious challenge to Soviet control and
orthodoxy in the world Communist movement comes from Eurocommunism. The West
European parties are trying to balance their ties to the Soviet Communist Party
with their own national and political interests. They resist Soviet efforts to
subordinate national parties to Soviet control. Criticism of Soviet policies has
now become common and probably will increase if the Soviets exercise greater
repression at home and political and military expansion abroad.
The return of the Chinese Communist Party to active involvement in the
international movement and its opposition to Soviet hegemony also are potentially
severe challenges facing the Soviet leadership. The Chinese are in the process of
forming a tacit alliance with several of the leading West European parties. The
Chinese, in addition, have indicated their intention to compete with the Soviets
for influence with "progressive forces" in the Third World, including such pro-
Soviet radical regimes as Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique.
The Economic Burdens of Enpire.
The Soviets almost certainly believe that their economic support of other
Communist countries and clients brings substantial strategic and political
benefits, but its rising cost and economic stringencies are prompting a tougher
aid posture. Assistance to East European and Third World clients rose
dramatically from $1.7 billion in 1971 to $23 billion in 1980-some 1.5 percent of
GNP. Moscow is prepared to shoulder a large aid burden for its Communist clients;
their economies are generally in trouble, and their stability is important to
Soviet foreign policy objectives. The Soviet leadership, nonetheless, is
attempting to slow the rise in aid costs by cutting subsidized oil deliveries to
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some East European allies, refusing increased deliveries of fuel to Vietnam and
demanding that allies end their trade deficits with the USSR.
Moscow's tight-fisted aid policy toward non-Communist LDCs will almost
certainly continue as well. Moscow's present hard currency problems will make it
even more reluctant to extend substantial hard currency aid to such countries as
Nicaragua, despite repeated requests for it. Several radical clients, such as
Ethiopia and South Yemen, moreover, are increasingly unhappy with their inability
to augment Soviet military support with extensive economic cooperation.
Opportunities and Challenges.
The Soviets are faced with both opportunities and challenges abroad. Their
international strengths derive for the most part from their huge military
investments; their vulnerabilities stem principally from changes in the
international environment that could threaten past gains.
The Soviet Union's growing military power has strengthened its ability to
pursue political goals in Western Europe. By threatening additional nuclear
deployments if NATO's INF decision is implemented, the Soviets are in effect
attempting to force the West Europeans to accept de facto Soviet military
superiority on the continent.
The Soviets also believe Washington's ability to raise the economic and
military costs of the East-West competition is subject to competing US economic
priorities and to reluctance on the part of US allies to follow our lead. The
Soviets think that conflict between Western Europe and the United States over arms
control and East-West economic relations presents opportunities to provoke
divisions within the alliance. In particular, the failure thus far of US efforts
to dissuade its West European allies from participation in the Yamal gas pipeline
project has probably encouraged the Soviets in their assumption that difference in
the Western alliance can be exploited to Soviet advantage. Moscow also remains
hopeful that NATO's fragile consensus in favor of new intermediate-range missile
deployments can be broken, leading to a serious rupture in the alliance.
In the Far East, Moscow's military buildup opposite China remains not only a
lever on the PRC but a potential bargaining chip should Beijing became more
serious in its desire to ameliorate Sino-Soviet tensions. Opportunities in the
Far East are also afforded by the frictions in US-Chinese relations and potential
divergences between the United States and Japan stemming from trade problems,
disagreements over economic sanctions against the USSR, and Japanese reluctance to
accelerate defense spending.
Moscow believes that its military investment also has improved somewhat its
capabilities for projections into more distant regions. Although the Soviets
recognize the limitations of that capability against a major military power, they
hope that their increased capacity will deter US military action against Soviet
proxies or clients and assure the favorable resolution of regional conflicts.
Moscow's increased involvement in the Third World also reflects a belief that the
United States has been constrained from direct military intervention there by the
trauma of Vietnam and the difficulty of reaching a domestic political consensus on
foreign policy in general. Indeed, political and economic instability throughout
the Third World, together with the radicalization of postcolonial elites, have
been viewed by the Soviets as major US and Western vulnerabilities and,
conversely, relatively low-risk opportunities for the Soviet Union to insinuate
itself through offers of military and technical aid.
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In addition to these opportunities, however, Soviet leaders also see new
threats and challenges in the international arena. The deteriorating Soviet US
relationship is a source of concern, potentially eroding Soviet military and
foreign policy gains of the past decade. Planned US strategic and theater
programs also are seen by the Soviets as an attempt to negate the USSR's strategic
advantages and to create a credible "first strike" capability.
In the Far East, the Soviets view China's improved relations with both the
United States and Japan as a serious security problem, raising the possibility
that the USSR might be opposed by all three countries in a conflict in the Far
East. More immediately, the USSR suspects that this trilateral reapprochment
portends active US and Japanese aid in the modernization of Chinese armed
forces. Moscow's territorial disputes with both China and Japan, moreover, are
major obstacles to any dramatic improvement in its relations with either
country.
In the Third World, the Soviets recognize that even where they have
substantial political and military investments their continued influence is not
guaranteed. The defeat of Soviet clients in Lebanon and Soviet inability to
intervene effectively was the most recent demonstration. Similarly, the Soviets
see current US efforts to broker a more comprehensive peace settlement in the
Middle East and to achieve a settlement in Namibia as potentially leading to a
further erosion of Soviet influence in the Third World.
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
Soviet economic and social problems will provide the strongest impetus for
systemic or policy change over the next 10 years. Unless major changes are
forthcoming, economic growth rates will remain at historically low levels, popular
dissatisfaction with a perceived decline in the quality of life will grow, and
resource allocation decisions will become more difficult for the leadership. The
gravity of these problems for the Soviet system, however, remains difficult to
measure, and there are important uncertainties in our judgments about the
possibility that they will cause major system or policy changes. We, thus, will
examine possible major systemic discontinuities that-although much less likely
would have important consequences for US interests.
The Soviet leadership obviously has a more sanguine view of its problems than
we do. While their rhetoric reflects evident concern, there is no sense of mortal
danger to the Soviet state. The gloomier projections of foreign observers, on the
other hand, reflect a perception that Soviet problems are intractibile and less
optimism that the added manpower and energy resources the Soviets are counting on
in the 1990s will reverse adverse economic trends.
Even with the more negative assessment of Soviet economic and social
difficulties, however, we believe that the strengths of the system--its control
mechanisms, its economic power, the patriotism and passivity of its populace--will
allow Soviet leaders to manage whatever internal pressures for systemic change
(changes in basic philosophy or the nature of Communist party rule) are likely to
develop over the next decade. The regime while facing important long-term
vulnerabilities, does not, in our judgement, appear to be in imminent danger.
While this assessment leads us to believe that the prospect for major
systemic change in the next years is relatively low, the likelihood of policy
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shifts is much higher. The immediate post-Brezhnev leadership will almost
certainly make a more vigorous effort in the next 3-5 years to reverse the
economic slowdown, and in the process alter sectoral and regional resource
allocations, administrative structures, prices and incentives, and even tighten
administrative controls. Toward the end of the decade and with the emergence of a
new generation of leaders, more far-reaching solutions to this fundamental problem
could emerge, involving perhaps much greater use of market forces, cuts in the
growth rate for military spending or more repression. At the same time, any group
of leaders almost certainly will continue to rely on military power as a key
instrument of foreign policy and will be sure to maintain its competitive strength
vis-a-vis the United States. They are likely to count on Third World developments
to provide new political and diplomatic opportunities as well.
Changes in the Political System
Despite internal weaknesses, the institutions of political control remain
strong and firmly entrenched in the USSR. Popular discontent--although
threatening to economic goals-does not as yet challenge the party's authority.
Revolutionary collapse or major alterations in the system are highly unlikely in
the next three to five years.
In the longer run, institutional rivalaries will persist, and may increase as
economic growth declines, but the party apparatus will probably remain the
dominant political institution for at least the next decade. here the party's
potential competitors-the military, the KGB, and the government bureauracy-have
political clout that can be especially important during periods of intra-party
strife, none of them is well equipped to supplant the party and none seems
inclined to try in the near term.
A military coup?
There is at most an outside chance of a military takeover within the next 10
years. Although the military has the organizational skills and certainly the
muscle to take charge, it has been indoctrinated from the regime's beginnings to
stand aside from higher politics and historically has rarely been a major
political actor. Moreover, its interests have been well served by the current
party leadership. It has, for example, been given a large role in defining the
security threat and in determining the programs required to deal with it--its two
main political interests. The party, in addition, has developed a wide array of
checks and controls to forestall a military coup. The military probably would
attempt to assume power only in the event of a significant "liberalization" of the
political system that was viewed as undermining social discipline and threatening
the military's priority claim to resources or under conditions of political and
economic chaos similar to that in the Polish crisis.
Return to One-Man Rule.
Within the framework of the existing system of party rule, however, a variety
of changes are possible. During the next decade, for example, a leader who
exercised power far in excess of that wielded by Brezhnev or Khrushchev could
emerge. Such a development (perhaps a 20 percent possibility) could result from
frustration with the lack of clear national direction, a perception that more
discipline is needed in the party and society, and a confluence of serious
domestic and international problems. Although no leader who succeeds Brezhnev
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will initially have such authority, the time required for his consolidation of
power could be far shortened by a shared sense of urgent national tasks. The
emergence of such a leader, less constricted by the need for consensus, would make
major policy shifts and changes much more likely. Domestic policies probably -?
would take an authoritarian turn, but external policies could range from highly
aggressive to pragmatic.
"Liberalization" of the System.
Another possibility would be some liberalizing reform that would allow for
much greater personal freedom and decentralization of political and economic
authority. This seems a less likely prospect (perhaps a 10 percent possibility
over the next decade), considering the absence of effective popular pressure for
such change, the strength of the regime's control mechanises, and the apparent
lack of significant sentiment in that direction within the Soviet establishment.
Given the nature of the great power rivalry, however, a "liberal" Soviet regime
would not necessarily be more accommodating to US interests. Indeed, such a
regime might be more effective at overcoming some of the Soviet Union's systemic
and policy weaknesses, making it an even more formidable adversary.
Changes in Policies through the Mid-1980s
More likely than systemic change are changes in specific policies, some
probably following shortly on Brezhnev's departure. Although our knowledge of
Soviet internal debate is limited, there have been discernible differences among
Politburo members on several key issues. Conflict over these and other issues,
heightened by political jockeying and the complexity of the country's problems,
could lead to major policy shifts in the next three to five years.
Economic Policy-
The most immediate changes are likely in economic policy, where the current
investment strategy has provoked considerable debate. Differences in priorities
already have emerged between the pronouncements of one group (represented by
Kirilenko, Shcherbitskiy, and others) that has advocated the priority development
of heavy industry, and another (represented mainly by Chernenko) that has
emphasized the need to increase the availability of consumer goods. Whatever the
outcome of this debate, a major reallocation of resources almost certainly will be
undertaken in the immediate post-Brezhnev era, with agriculture-in the absence of
its principal patron--becoming a likely target for cuts. Other sectors also will
be affected by the political fortunes of their sponsors, however, making the
eventual economic beneficiaries largely uncertain.
Military Spending.
Concern about the domestic economy also could eventually impel one or another
leader to propose in the mid-1980s some reduction in the rate of growth of
military spending, if not an absolute cut as Khrushchev did in the mid-1950s. A
number of additional factors, however, make even symbolic reductions in the growth
of the defense b-dget unlikely in the near term, including:
the poor state of US-Soviet relations;
the political commitment of most Soviet leaders to a strong defense;
the challenge of planned US defense programs; and
the momentum of weapon development and production programs that are
under way.
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In a succession environment, however, no new leader,`'unless he perceives an
existing consensus, is likely to risk antagonizing the military establishment and
conservative forces in the party by proposing cuts in the growth of defense
spending. Indeed, the military could even cane away from the caning power
struggle with some increase in the rate of growth for a few years.
Over time, as the post-Brezhnev leadership struggles with declining economic
growth, there may be greater pressure to reduce the growth in military spending in
order to free up the labor and capital resources urgently needed in key civilian
sectors. In this connection, the cost-avoidance benefits of arms control
agreements could assume greater importance. Even in the mid-1980s, however,
absolute reductions in the defense effort seem unlikely, barring economic
catastrophe. Moreover, Soviet military investment is now so large that even with
reduced growth-or indeed with no growth at all-military capabilities would
continue to increase well into the 1990s.
Economic Reforms.
In addition to investment disputes, succession politics may bring forth new
proposals to improve the economy's efficiency. Concern over declining growth
apparently has led some leaders to reevaluate economic and administrative reforms
they earlier found unacceptable. Since 1978 several Soviet leaders have publicly
endorsed Hungary's "New Economic Mechanism"-a system based on centrally
formulated plans and economic goals but using some market forces to guide the
economy at the micro-level.
Although there is little prospect that the Soviet Union will adopt changes so
sweeping, some administrative reforms may well be enacted. The multitude of
functionally related and overlapping ministries might be placed under more
centralized management. This could be accompanied by some decentralization of
operational authority-a move that already has been at least started in the
agricultural sector. (It is in this area that the Hungarian model has been most
closely studied and emulated.) Changes that are politically feasible, however,
probably will not significantly improve the economic situation.
Foreign Policy.
The existing consensus on foreign policy is stronger than that on domestic
issues, and major changes are less likely in that area in the next few years.
Some issues, nonetheless, could become a bone of contention in the post-Brezhnev
Politburo. Although these issues will be determined largely by the international
situation at the time, a successor regime will have to deal with both the
challenges and opportunities outlined above.
Rival claimants to leadership in the immediate post-Brezhnev era are likely
to share a commitment to sustain the global dimensions of Soviet policy. This
commitment could be reinforced by a possible tendency on the part of a younger
generation of Soviet leaders to equate the growth of military power with the
growth of global power and influence. Supporting such thinking, moreover, are
factors that go beyond tangible or measurable indexes-ideological conviction, a
sense of insecurity and of hostile encirclement, and a contrasting confidence and
sense of achievement in the USSR's emergence as a global superpower.
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Soviet leaders probably will wish to continue an arms control dialogue with
the United States for at least the next few years, seeking new agreements that
will slow US weapons programs, thereby facilitatiing Soviet planning, reducing
weapons costs, and lessening the possibility of technological surprise. Although
the Politburo as a whole now seems to believe the prospects for improved Soviet-US
relations are dim, in the past some leaders (such as Andropov and Chernenko) have
seemed more enthusiastic about pursuing this goal than others (such as
Kirilenko). The price the Soviet leadership is willing to pay for an arms
limitation agreement, therefore, may depend in part on the outcome of the
succession.
A new Soviet leadership may, in addition, undertake new initiatives designed
to alter the geopolitical environment. They may, for instance, attempt a
breakthrough in relations toward Western Europe or China. Moscow's principal
assets in these instances would be the ability to offer greater intercourse
between East and West Germany and to offer China significant concessions on
contentious military and border issues.
The Soviet Union's other future policy options will depend on events beyond
its control. A collapse of the Saudi monarchy, for example, could usher in an
anti-Western regime, presenting the Soviets with major new possibilities for
expanding its influence in the area. Likewise, the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war
might also create significant opportunities or dangers from Moscow's perspective
that could lead to policy shifts.
Longer-Range Uncertainties.
For the next 3 to 5 years, the Soviet leadership will continue to be
dominated by Brezhnev's current colleagues in the Politburo. Present policy
already reflects their influence, and they may be less willing than their younger
colleagues waiting in the wings to push for major policy or systemic change.
Soviet policies will become less predictable in the late 1980s and early
1990s, however, as the gap between economic performance and leadership
expectations widens, as the basis for optimise about future economic performance
erodes, and as the generational change in the Soviet leadership takes hold. The
policy preferences of this younger generation are largely unknown. Although they
have discretionary authority in implementing the Politburo's domestic policies,
these officials now hold positions--in the Central Committee apparatus, regional
party organizations, and the government bureaucracy-that provide little
involvement in foreign policy.
What little evidence we have of this younger group's views reveals no clearly
dominant orientation and no apparent consensus regarding the direction of future
policies. Their eventual domestic course will probably reflect elements of both
orthodox and reformist views, perhaps undertaking some decentralization of
economic r.anagement, while 'at the same time tightening labor discipline.
Their foreign policy course is even more difficult to predict. Conceivably,
some members of this group might favor a more accommodating foreign policy stance
in order to increase trade with the West and ease domestic economic problems. The
same pressures, however, might lead others to urge the adoption of economic self-
sufficiency (autarky) at home and a more adventurist policy abroad, increasing the
risk of a Soviet-US confrontation.
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IMPLICATIONS FOR US POLICY
Changes in the Soviet system or policies over the next decade probably will have little impact on the basic nature of the Soviet US relationship. Even if the
climate of relations improved somewhat, the antagonistic nature of the interaction
almost certainly will persist because of conflicting views and political goals.
Limited accommodations in the areas of arms control or other bilateral issues may
be possible, but a more encanpassing accord on bilateral relations or geopolitical
behavior is precluded by fundamentally divergent attitudes regarding desirable
political or social change in the international order.
Although the Soviets will not wish a major confrontation. with the United
States, their belief that they now enjoy strategic equality and some advantages
enhances the prospects for a more assertive foreign policy. Soviet leaders
probably also can be expected to seize new opportunities offered by instability in
the Third World to enhance Soviet geopolitical influence and divert US attention
from areas of direct US-Soviet interaction, even in situations where the USSR has
little prospect of making significant gains for itself. If the Soviets are able
to ameliorate some of their current internal and external weaknesses--for example,
by stemming the decline of economic growth-this also would improve their ability
to compete with the United States for global influence.
It is doubtful, however, that Soviet leaders perceive a "window of
opportunity" stemming from an overweening confidence in present Soviet nuclear
forces relative to future prospects. Fran the perspective of the Soviet
leadership, there will remain important deterrents to major military actions that
directly threaten vital US national interests. These include the dangers of a
direct conflict with the United States that could escalate to global proportions,
doubts about the reliability of some of their East European allies, and an
awareness of the greater Western capacity to support an expanded defense effort.
These concerns do not preclude action abroad, but they act as constraints on
military actions in which the risk of a direct US-Soviet confrontation is clear.
US Influence on Soviet Behavior
The future of the Soviet political system and its basic values will be
determined primarily by internal political forces that the United States has
relatively little ability to influence. Specific policies, and Soviet behavior in
the international arena, nonetheless, can be affected by US policies designed to
condition the Soviet perception of the costs and risks involved in continuing the
military buildup and pursuing an expansionist foreign policy.
Impact on the Political System
US and Western influence over the ongoing Soviet political succession process
is highly limited. Even if this were not the case, a contender whose stance
appears more favorable to Western interests today may alter his position when he
becomes party chief. In the initial stages of the Lenin succession, for example,
Stalin appeared to be one of the more moderate Soviet leaders. During the Stalin
succession, Khrushchev at first adopted a hardline internal position and later
shifted to a more moderate course.
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Western ability to influence the nature and evolution of the Soviet system is
similarly limited. Although the United States and its allies can lend support to
dissidents and call attention to Soviet violations of human rights, these actions
in themselves are unlikely to hasten democratization of Soviet society. Despite-
the many weaknesses of the system, the passivity and patriotism of the Soviet
citizenry and leadership sensitivity to any effort to play upon the system's
vulnerabilities severely limit Western ability to effect its transformation.
Leverage over Policy
US policies, however, may be able to exacerbate several continuing weaknesses
in Soviet foreign and domestic policy. Foreign policy actions which the Soviets
perceive as necessary to preserve existing equities--such as repressive measures
in Eastern Europe-tend to isolate them in the world and complicate achievement of
other goals. Moreover, the attraction some Western values hold for the Soviet
people will cause the regime to expend considerable effort to protect then from
foreign contagion and to prevent the development of a stronger dissident
movement. The Soviet economy also will be hard pressed to keep pace with rising
consumer expectations, probably resulting in more leadership attention to work
stoppages, strikes, and other manifestations of social unrest.
Past US efforts to use trade leverage to influence specific Soviet policies,
however, have had only limited success. Moscow has circumvented most economic
restrictions and refused to modify its policies substantially in return for
increased trade. During the past two decades the Soviets have:
thwarted the 1962 US--West German embargo on oil pipe by increasing their
own pipe production and obtaining pipe from Britain, Sweden, and Japan;
rejected the mid-1970s offer of lower tariffs and expanded trade credits
when the Jackson-Vanik Amendment tied it to freer emigration for Soviet
Jews; and
successfully exploited Western differences over sanctions related to the
Afghanistan invasion and-thus far--Polish martial law.
Western goods and technology are becoming more important to the USSR's
strained economy; the volume of imports tripled in the 1970s and imports have been
crucial to completion of several major production projects and to overcaming
production shortfalls. But Moscow almost certainly will remain resistant to
attempts at trade leverage. Unilateral US trade restrictions could create short
run difficulties for the Soviets in some sectors-such as the oil and gas and
chemical industries--but would probably not persuade Moscow to alter major
domestic or foreign policies. Similarly, the Soviets also certainly would view
renewed US offers of increased trade for certain political concessions with
considerable suspicion. Unified and sustained Western trade restrictions,
particularly in such areas as energy equipment and agricultural products, however,
could impose substantial costs on the Soviets. They probably would not change
basic policies, particularly if international tensions were high, but would affect
the Soviet calculation of costs and benefits in particular situations.
Moreover, the United States can affect the USSR's behavior in other ways,
chiefly by conditioning the leaders perceptions of the costs and risks involved in
Soviet expansionism. It is the Soviet leadership's respect for US military
capabilities, for example, that has prevented it from becoming involved in
military hostilities in the Middle East over the years. The Soviets recognize,
moreover, that if the US has the political will, it is better positioned to use
its military, economic, and political power on a global scale than they are.
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Soviet perceptions of Western vulnerabilities and weaknesses, on the other
hand, serve to enhance their confidence in their ability to compete with the US.
The Soviets currently view Washington's ability to heighten the economic and
military costs to Moscow as subject to canpeting US domestic economic priorities,-
the ability to rally popular support, and reluctance on the part of US allies to
incur the costs of increased defense expenditures or increased tensions with
Moscow. The Soviets recognize, moreover,-that divergent views within NATO present
opportunities to provoke major divisions between the United States and its
principal allies. Strengthened Western unity and continued US resolve, therefore,
could have a significant impact on future Soviet calculations and behavior.
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II. Meeting the Soviet Challenge
The Soviet propensity for challenging the West and running
risks to undermine U.S. interests requires a sustained*Western
It is also
response i# Soviet ambitions are to-,be frustrated.
clear, that-the necessary firm and measured long-term Western
response to the Soviet challenge requires that the United States
exercise fully its capacity for leadership: -This.demands a
comprehensive, long-term U.S. .effort-to induce Soviet restraint by
shaping the-environment in which Soviet policy decisions are made.
A. Shaping the Soviet Environment
(1~ The Military Balance
Foremost in shaping the military environment Moscow faces is
the US-Soviet military balance. The U.S. must modernize its
military forces so that several goals are achieved:
--Soviet leaders must perceive that the U.S. is determined
never to accept a second-place or deteriorating strategic .
posture. Doubts about the military capabilities of U.S. strategic
nuclear deterrent forces, or about the-U.S. will to use them if
necessary, must never exist;
--Soviet calculations of possible nuclear war outcomes, under.
any contingency, must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to
the USSR that there would be no incentive for the Soviet leaders
to initiate a nuclear attack;
--Leaders and the publics in all states must be
able
to
sition
observe that this indicator of.U.S. strength remains
d that
at-a
S
U
po
capacity
of parity or better. They will then understan
ll
h
.
.
not
be
a
for pursuing the broader-US-Soviet competition s
S
.;
encumbered by direct Soviet coercion of the U.
--The future of U.S. military strength must also appear to.
friend and foe as strong: technological advances must be
exploited, research and development vigorously pursued, and
sensible follow-on programs undertaken so that the viability of
U.S. deterrent policy is not placed in question.
In Europe, the Soviet leadership must be faced-with a rein-
vigorated NATO focused on three primary tasks: strengthening of
conventional forces, modernization of intermediate-range nuclear
forces, and improved mobility and sustainability for U.S. units
assigned rapid deployment and other reinforcing missions to the
NATO area.. and Southwest Asia. ,Worldwide, U.S.. general-purpose
forces must be. ready to move quickly from peacetime to~wartime
roles, and-must be flexible to affect Soviet calculations in a
wide range of contingencies.
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The US-Soviet military balance is also a critical determinant
shaping Third World perceptions of the 'relative positions and
influence of the two major powers. Moscow must know with certainty
that, in addition to the obvious priority of North American
defense, Eurasian and other areas-of vital interest to the U.S.
will be defended against Soviet attacks or threats. But it must
know also that areas less critical to U.S. interests cannot be
attacked or threatened without serious risk' of U.S. military
support and-'of potential confrontation in that or. some other area.
(2) Cooperation with Our Allies:
One of the central propositions of U.S. foreign policy through
out the post-war period has been that an effective response to the
Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial
democracies. At the same time, there will continue to be
inevitable tensions between our unwillingness to give the allies a
veto over our Soviet policy, and our need for allied support in
making our policy work. More effective procedures for consultation
with our allies can contribute to the building of. consensus and
cushion the impact of intra-alliance disagreemens. However, we
must recognize that, on occasion, we may be forced to act to
protect our vital interests without allied support and even in the
face of allied opposition.
Our allies have been slow to support in concrete ways our
overall approach to East-West relations. In part because of the
intensive program of consultation we have undertaken, allied
governments have expressed rhetorical support for our assessment
of the Soviet military challenge, our rearmament program, and our
negotiating positions in START and INF. Less progress has been
made in obtaining allied action in the vital areas of upgrading
conventional defense and in planning for joint military action to
protect vital Western interests in the developing world, particu-
larly the Persian Gulf. With INF deployments scheduled to begin
in 1983, West European governments will come under increasing
domestic pressure to press us for progress in START and INF. In
the likely absence of an acceptable INF agreement with Moscow, we
may need during 1983 to subordinate some other policy initiatives
with our allies to the overriding objective of obtaining allied
action to move forward on INF deployments.
Although it will-be more difficult to achieve a:.durable
consensus with our allies on East-West economic issues, we must
seek to do so. The current intra-alliance dispute over exports
for the pipeline underscores European (and Japanese) unwillingness
to support a strategy which they see as aimed at undermining the
detente of the 1970s. Nonetheless, we must continue to persevere
in this painful process of reeducating our European partners. At
the same time, our. ability to-convey a sense that the-U.S. is open
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to the possibility of improved relations with the USSR if Moscow
moderates its behavior will be important to obtaining allied.
support..
(3) Third World Cooperation
As in the 1970s, the cutting edge of the.Soviet challenge to
vital U.S.i nterests in this decade is likely to be in the Third
World. Thus-,. we must continue our efforts to rebuild the credi-
bility of our commitment to resist Soviet encroachment on our
interests and those of our allies and friends and to support
effectively those Third World states that are willing to resist
Soviet pressures. We must.where possible erode the advances of
'Soviet influence in the developing world made during the 1970s.
Given the'continued improvement of Moscow's force projection
capabilities and the Soviet emphasis on arms aid to pro-Soviet
Third World clients, any effective U.S. response must involve a
military dimension. U.S. security assistance and foreign military
sales play an important role in shaping the security environment
around the periphery of -the USSR and beyond Eurasia. But security
assistance will not be enough unless we make clear to the Soviets
and to our friends that the U.S. is prepared to use its own-mili-
tary forces where necessary to protect vital U.S. interests and
support endangered friends and allies. Above all, we must be able
to demonstrate the capability and the will for timely action to
bring U.S. resources to bear in response to fast-moving events in
?Third World trouble spots.
An effective U.S. policy in the Third World must also involve
diplomatic initiatives (e.g., the President's Mid-East proposal,
the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the Namibia initiative) to
promote the resolution.of regional crises vulnerable to Soviet
exploitation. The U.S. should counter, and if possible weaken or
displace, Soviet aid relationships, particularly those involving
states that host a Soviet military presence or act as Soviet
proxies. This of course requires corresponding changes in the,
recipient state's international policies. The U.S. must also
develop an appropriate mixture of economic assistance programs and
private sector initiatives to demonstrate the relevance of the
free economies to the economic problems of the developing world,
while exposing the bankruptcy of the Soviet economic and political
model. In this connection, we must develop the means to extend
U.S. support to individuals and movements in the developing world
that share our commitment.to political democracy and individual
freedom. We have forsaken much of the competition by-not having
the kinds'of long-term political cadre and organization building
programs which the Soviets conduct.
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Possibly the greatest obstacle we face in carrying out this
approach in the developing world is the problem of obtaining
adequate budgetary resources. As in the case of our rearmament
program, pressures for budgetary restraint are certain -to generate
calls for reduction of the resources devoted to meeting the Soviet
challenge in the developing world. These pressures must be
resisted if we are to be able to meet our commitments and secure
our vital. interests.
(4) The Soviet Empire (Eastern Europe,.
Cuba, Third World Alliances)
As noted above, there are a number of important vulnerabilities
eases wi in-the Soviet empire which the U.S. should seek
r
t exace
polic' e.g. Angola is different from Poland, Cuba is different
from Vietnam. We will need a different mix of tools for each. The
prospects for change may be greater on the extremities of Soviet
power (Soviet alliances in the developing world) than closer to
the center of the Soviet empire (Eastern Europe) -- though the
latter obviously offers potential as well.
~, ~tea~cn
ate and 1oit. This will involve differentiated
Eastern Europe: Although the Polish crackdown cut short a pro-
cess of peaceful change, the continuing instability in that country
is certain to have far-reaching repercussions throughout Eastern
Europe. In addition, the deteriorating economic position of East
European countries and the possible long-term drying up of western
resources flowing to the region will force them to face some
difficult choices: greater dependence on the Soviets and relative
stagnation; or reforms to generate a renewal of Western resources.
The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen
Moscow's hold on the region. We can advance this objective by
carefully discriminating in favor of countries that show.relative
independence from the USSR in their foreign policy, or show a
greater degree of internal liberalization. This policy of
differentiation in Eastern Europe is the subject of NSSD 5-82.
Afghanistan: Possibly the most important single vulnerability
in the Soviet Empire is Afghanistan, where Moscow's imperial reach
has bogged Soviet forces down in a stalemated struggle to suppress
the Afghan resistance. A withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghani-
stan followed by a real exercise of self-determination by the
Afghan people would encourage other democratic and. -nationalist
forces within the Soviet Empire and increase the likelihood that
other Third. World countries would resist Soviet pressures. Thus,
our objective should be to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for
withdrawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political and other
costs remain high while the occupation continues..
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Cuba: The challenge to U.S. interests represented by Moscow's_
alliance with Cuba requires an effective U.S. response. The
Soviet-Cuban challenge has three critical dimensions (as well as
numerous other problems):
-- Soviet deliveries of advanced, weapons to Havana: The flow
of advanced. Soviet weapons to Cuba has accelerated so as to repre-
sent a growing threat to the security of other Latin American
countries and, in the case of potentially nuclear-capable systems,
the U.S. itself. We must be prepared to take strong counter-.
measures to offset the political/military impact of these
deliveries.
-- Soviet-supported Cuban destabilizing activities in Central
America: The U.S. response must involve bilateral economic and
military assistance to friendly governments in the region, as well
as multilateral initiatives to deal with the political, economic,
and social sources of instability. We should retain the option of
direct action against Cuba, while making clear our willingness
seriously to address Cuba's concerns if Havana is willing to
reduce its dependence on and cooperation with the Soviet Union.
We should also take steps to prevent or neutralize the impact of
transfers of advanced Soviet weapons to Nicaragua.
-- Soviet-Cuban interventionism in Southern Africa: We should
counter and reduce Soviet and Cuban influence by strengthening our
own relations with friendly African states, and by energetic
leadership of the diplomatic effort to bring about a Cuban with-
drawal from Angola in the context of a Namibia settlement and
appropriate external guarantees of Angola's security.
Soviet Third World Alliances: Our policy should seek to
weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links between
the Soviet Union and its Third World allies and clients. In
implementing this policy, we will need to take into account the
unique circumstances which influence the degree of cohesion
between the Soviet Union and each of its Third World allies. In
some cases, these ties are so strong as to make the Third World
state a virtual proxy or surrogate of the Soviet Union. We should
be prepared to work with our allies and Third'World friends to
neutralize the activities of these Soviet proxies. In other cases,
ties between the Soviet Union and a Third World client may be
tenuous or subject tq strains which a nuanced U.S.. policy can
exploit to move the Third World state away from the Soviet orbit.
Our policy should be flexible enough to take advantage of these
opportunities.
Finally, we should seek where-possible and prudent-to encourage.
democratic movements and forces to bring about political change
inside these countries.
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(5) China
The continuing Sino-Soviet rift -- motivated by racial enmity,
ideological competition and secur-ity concerns -- provides the Q.S.
with some-leverage over Soviet international behavior. However,
our ability to capitalize on these potential strategic advantages
depends upon the durability of the Sino-American rapprochement.
Given the-Soviets' strategic interest in undermining Sino-American
relations, .and particularly in preventing Q.S. arms assistance to
China, we can expect that Moscow will seek to disrupt our rela-
tions with Beijing. We. will have to remain alert to such Soviet
maneuvers and be prepared to counter them with initiatives of our
own. Equally, we will need to manage carefully our relations with
Beijing to avoid giving Moscow any exploitable opportunities..
B. Bilateral Relationships
It will be important to develop policies which give us maximum
leverage over Soviet internal policies. Even though we recognize
the limits of our capabilities to influence Soviet domestic trends
and developments, the U.S., especially when working together with
our allies, does have some capability to influence Soviet resource
allocation through a variety of policy initiatives, such as our
-own defense spending and East-West trade policies. Through our
radio broadcasting and other informational programs directed toward
the Soviet Union, we may be able to accelerate the already advanced
erosion of the regime's credibility with its own people, thus
weakening the ideological basis for Soviet external expansionism.
We also can offer private. and other forms of assistance to forces
seeking to promote democratic change. We can publicly and through
quiet diplomacy seek to advance the cause of individual. human
rights in the Soviet Union.
Despite the post-Afghanistan, post-Poland attenuation of
US-Soviet bilateral ties, there remain sectors of the bilateral
relationship that are important to Moscow and thus to any effort
to induce moderation of Soviet conduct.
(1). Arms Control .
Arms control negotiations, pursued soberly and without illu-
sions, are an important part of our overall national security
policy. We should be willing to enter into arms control negotia-.
tions when they serve our national security objectives. At the
same time., we must make clear to the allies as well as to the USSR
that our ability to reach satisfactory results will inevitably be
influenced by the international situation and the overall state of
US-Soviet"relations. However, 'we'should be under no illusions that
ongoing arms control negotiations will give us leverage sufficient
to produce Soviet restraint on other international issues.
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U.S. arms control proposals should be consistent with necessary
force modernization plans and should seek to achieve balanced, sig-
nificant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of.-comparable
armaments. The START, INF, and MBFR proposals we have tabled meet
these criteria and would,-if accepted by the Soviets, help ensure
the survivability of our nuclear deterrent and thus enhance U.S.
national-security. The fact that START and'INF negotiations have
begun has tor the present somewhat reduced public pressure on us
and on Allied Governments for early arms control agreements with
Moscow. Z a the absence of progress in START and INF, however, we
should expect that pressure to grow again.
(2) Economic Policy
U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must be seen
in a strategic context. At a minimum, we must ensure that US-
Soviet economic relationships do not facilitate the buildup of
Soviet military power. We must also bear in mind that U.S.
controls on the critical elements of trade can also influence
Soviet prospects for hard-currency earnings, and raise the cost of
maintaining their present rate of defense spending. We need to
develop policies which use the leverage inherent in U.S... and
Western economic strength to modify Soviet behavior over time..
Thus, our economic policies should provide negative and, where
appropriate, positive incentives for more responsible Soviet
behavior, while avoiding any subsidies of Soviet economic develop-
ment. Although unilateral steps may be necessary for certain
strategic or political imperatives, agreement with the Allies on
the fundamental ground rules of trade will be essential if we are
to take advantage of Soviet economic weaknesses.
There are, however, real limits to Western leverage on the
Soviet economy. The Soviet system is still basically autarchic,
and the USSR can substantially protect itself against foreign
economic pressure. The difficulty of organizing effective multi-
lateral restrictions on trade with the USSR is illustrated by our
experience with the grain trade. Given the enormous Soviet r
difficulties in agriculture and the growing Soviet dependence on
grain imports, suspension of grain trade by all Western and Third
World suppliers would be a potentially important source of leverage
over Soviet behavior.
However, it proved impossible to organize effective, sustained
multilateral restrictions on international grain trade with the
Soviet Union during the-period of the post-Afghanistan grain
embargo. This permitted the Soviets to shift their grain
purchases from the U.S. to other suppliers, thus minimizing the
impact of the grain embargo. Other major grain suppliers remain
unwilling-to contemplate restrictions on.grain exports to the
USSR, thus unilateral restrictions by the U.S. would impose costs
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on U.S. farmers without giving us additional leverage over Soviet
behavior. -Under these circumstances, U.S. grain sales should be
permitted to proceed, while still subject to overall foreign
policy control.
While recognizing the problems and difficulties inherent in
developing-a unified Western approach to economic relations with
Moscow, we--should nonetheless seek a consensus including the
following basic elements:
1. Credits. The key objective is agreement on common
restrictions on official credits and guarantees to the USSR
and establishment of a mechanism to monitor official credits
and.guarantees.
2. Technology Transfer. The policy should include a unified
and strengthened position on military-related high technology
and equipment containing that technology.
3. Energy. The objectives here are twofold: a) to reach
consensus on the need to minimize Western dependence on Soviet
energy supplies; and b) to enhance Western leverage in thisbe
key sector by agreement on the equipment and technology
made available to the USSR.
4. Foreign Policy Controls. There must be allied consensus
that foreign policy, i.e. non-strategic, controls on trade
with the Soviets may be imposed, primarily in crises, in
support of clear objectives and with criteria for removal of
the controls.
5. Differentiation. The traditional approach of treating
each of the East European countries as distinct entities on
the basis of their own policies will be maintained. This
offers the best opportunity to encourage pluralism and
independence in East European countries.
(3) Official Dialogue
We can expect the Soviets to continue to press us for a return
to a US-Soviet agenda centered on arms control. We must continue
to resist this tactic and insist that Moscow address the full range
of our concerns about their international behavior if our relations
are to improve. US-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues
can.,serveour interests-if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow
for' responsible behavior and to drive home that we will act to
ensure that the costs of irresponsibility are high. We can also
use such contacts to make clear.that the way to pragmatic solutions
of regional problems is open if Moscow is willing seriously to
address our concerns.. At the same time, such contacts must be
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handled with care to avoid offering the Soviet Union a role in
regional questions which it would not otherwise secure.
A continuing dialogue with the-Soviets at the level of Foreign
Minister is essential, both to facilitate necessary diplomatic
communication with the Soviet leadership and to maintain allied
understanding and support for our approach'to East-West
relations. Secretary Haig met with Gromyko on three occasions
between September 1981 and June 1982, and this pattern of frequent
Ministerial-level contacts should be maintained in the future.
We can expect that the question of a possible US-Soviet summit
will continue to be raised by the Soviets, our allies, and impor-
tant segments of domestic opinion. Every American President since
Franklin Roosevelt has met with his Soviet counterpart. In some
cases, U.S. Presidents have attended summits for.the purpose of
establishing personal contact with their counterparts (e.g. Kennedy
in Vienna) or in the vague expectation that an improvement in US-
Soviet relations would flow from the summit (e.g. Johnson at
Glasboro). In other cases, allied pressures for East-West dialogue
at the Head of State level have played a major role in the Presi-
dential decision to meet at the summit (e.g. Eisenhower at Geneva
and Paris).
The approach to summitry which prevailed throughout the 1970s
held that American Presidents should not meet with their Soviet
counterparts until there were concrete US-Soviet agreements ready
to serve as the centerpeice of the summit. However, these summits
did not always produce durable improvements in US-Soviet relations,
and sometimes complicated management of US-Soviet relations by
generating expectations that could not be realized.
In any summit between President Reagan and his Soviet counter-
part we would want to ensure that concrete, positive results were
achievable. We would also need to ensure that any summit were
timed to achieve the maximum possible positive impact in terms of
U.S. interests.
(4) Assertion of Values
The U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union must have an'ideo-
logical content which asserts the superiority of Western values of
freedom, individual dignity, and political democracy over the .
repressive and authoritarian character of Soviet society. We need
to create a sense that history is moving in the direction of forces
which support free elections, free enterprise, a free press, and
free trade unions. We need specific programs to support this
offensive. Among the instruments which we should employ are:
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--Increased U.S. informational efforts directed at the Soviet-
Union, particularly VOA and RFE/RL;
--A systematic and energetic-U.S. effort to counter Soviet
disinformation and "active measures" campaigns directed at
U.S. interests;
--A-positive and assertive effort to support democratic
elements in both communist and non-communist countries, taking
into account the special requirements and vulnerabilities of
democratic forces seeking to survive in a hostile environment.
The role of US-Soviet cultural, scientific, and other coopera-
tive exchanges should be seen in light of our intention to maintain
a strong ideological component in our relations with Moscow. We
should not further dismantle the framework of cooperative exchanges
which remains from the 1970s unless new incidents of Soviet
irresponsibility require us further to attenuate the US-Soviet
bilateral relationship. We should look at ways exchanges can be
used to further our ideological offensive.
III. Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing our
Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behavior
The interrelated tasks of rebuilding American capacity for
world leadership and constraining and, over time, reducing Soviet
international influence cannot be accomplished quickly..
We face a critical transition period over the next five years,
and our success in managing US-Soviet relations during this period
may well determine whether we are able to attain our long-term
objectives. Despite the long-term vulnerabilities of the Soviet
system, we can expect that Soviet military power will continue to
grow throughout the 1980s. Moreover, the Soviet Union will have
every incentive to prevent us from reversing the trends of the
last decade which have shifted the world power balance in Moscow's
favor. Thus, the coming 5-10 years will be a period of consider-
able uncertainty in which the Soviets will test our resolve.
These uncertainties, moreover, will be. exacerbated by the fact
that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process
of political succesdion to Brezhnev. As noted above, we cannot
predict with confidence what policies the various succession
contenders will espouse. Consequently, we should not seek to
adjust our policies to the Soviet internal. conflict, but rather
try to create incentives (positive and negative) for any new
leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.?S. interests.
Our posture should be one of a willingness to deal,-on the basis
of the policy approach we have taken since the beginning of the
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Administration, with whichever leadership group emerges. We would
underscore that we remain ready for improved US-Soviet relations
if the Soviet Union makes significant changes in policies of
concern to us; the burden for any further deterioration in
relations would fall squarely on "t4oscow.
We should be under no illusion about the extent of our capa-.
bilities to-restrain the Soviet Union while American strength is
being rebuilt. Throughout the coming decade, our rearmament
program will be subject to the uncertainties of the budget process
and the U.-S. domestic debate on national security. In addition,
our reassertion of leadership with our allies, while necessary for
the long-term revitalization of our alliances, is certain to create
periodic intra-alliance disputes that may provide the Soviets with
opportunities for wedge driving. Our effort to reconstruct the
credibility of U.S. commitments in the Third World will also depend
upon our ability to sustain over time commitments of resources,
despite budgetary stringencies. As noted above, these constraints
on our capacity to shape the Soviet international environment will
be accompanied by real limits on our capacity to use the US-Soviet
bilateral relationship as leverage to restrain Soviet-behavior.
The existing and-projected gap between our finite resources
and the level of capabilities needed to constrain Soviet inter-
national behavior makes it essential that we: 1) establish firm
priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will
have the greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and 2)
mobilize the resources of our European and Asian allies. and our
Third World friends who are willing to join with us in containing
the expansion of Soviet power.
(1) U.S. Priorities
Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be
a strong military, capable of acting across the entire spectrum of
potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and
military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to`deter
attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., our allies, or
other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should
deterrence fail. Achieving this strategic aim largely rests,.as
in the past, on a strong U.S. capability for unilateral military
action. Strategic nuclear forces remain an important element of
that capability, but the importance of other forces'-- nuclear and
conventional -- has1risen in the current era of strategic nuclear
parity. .
Although 'unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuild-
ing Western military strength to counter the Soviet, threat, the
protection of Western interests will require increased U.S.. coop-
eration with allied and other states and greater utilization of
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their resources. U.S. military strategy must be better integrated
with national strategies of allies and friends, and U.S. defense
programs must consider allied arrangements in the planning stage.
U.S. military strategy for successfully contending. with peace-
time, crisis, and wartime contingencies involving the USSR on a
global basis is detailed in NSSD 1-82. This military strategy
must be combined with a political strategy focused on the
following objectives:
-- Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the
Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong,
leadership in developing policies to deal with the multi-
faceted-Soviet threat to Western interests. It will also
require that the U.S. take allied concerns into account. In
this connection, and in addition to pushing the allies to
spend more on defense, we must attach a high priority to a
serious effort to negotiate.arms control agreements consistent
with our military strategy, our force modernization plans, and
our overall approach to arms control. We must also develop,
together with our allies, a unified Western approach to
East-West economic relations consistent with the U.S. policy
outlined in this study.
-- Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its
position in Afghanistan. This will require that we continue
efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a nego-
tiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, we
should keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that
Soviet costs on the ground remain high.
-- Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit
a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer
term increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern
Europe. This will require that we continue to impose costs on
the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also
require that we maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation
among East European'countries.
-- Building and sustaining a major ideological political
offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed
to bring about change inside the Soviet union itself. This
must be a long-term program, given the nature of the Soviet
system.
-- Maintenance of our strategic relationship with China, thus
minimizing opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.
-- Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national
security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship.
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This will require that we use a variety of instruments,
including diplomatic efforts such as the Contact Group Namibia/
Angola initiative. U.S. security and economic assistance in
Latin America will also be essential. However, we must retain-
the option of direct use of Q.S. military forces to protect
vital U.S. security interests against threats which may arise
from the Soviet-Cuban connection.
(2) Cooperation with our Allies
As noted throughout this paper, we must cooperate with our
allies to-restrain Soviet expansionism. Only the U.S. can
directly counterbalance Soviet power, but our allies can often
more effectively intervene in regions of historic interest to
maintain peace, limit opportunities for Soviet opportunism, and
oppose Soviet surrogate activity.
While rejecting a unilateralist approach, we cannot permit our
approach to US-Soviet relations to reflect only the lowest common
denominator of allied consensus. The challenge we face from the
Soviet Union requires U.S. leadership which will inevitably lead
to periodic disagreements in an alliance of free nations, such as
NATO. This is an enduring dilemma which has confronted American
Administrations throughout the postwar period. It cannot be
finally resolved, but it must be managed effectively if we are to.
maintain the unity of purpose among free nations on which U.S.
security depends.
IV. Articulating Our Approach: Sustaining Public
and Congressional Support
The policy outlined above is a strategy for the long haul. We
should have no illusions that it will yield a rapid breakthrough
in our relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence-of dramatic
near-term victories in our effort to moderate Soviet behavior,
pressure is likely to mount for change in our policy. We can
expect appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a
more 'normal' US-Soviet relationship. This is inevitable given
the historic American intolerance of ambiguity and complexity in
foreign affairs. Moscow may believe that if pressure from allies
and publics does not drive this Administration back to Soviet-
style peaceful coexistence and detente, the USSR can hunker down
and .concentrate on neutralizing the Reagan foreign policy until a
new, more pliable U.S. Administration emerges.
We must therefore demonstrate that the American people will
support the policy we have outlined. This will require that we
avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress
in US-Soviet relations. At the same time, we must demonstrate
credibly that our policy is not .a blueprint. for an open-ended,
sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a serious-search for a
stable and-constructive long-term basis for US-Soviet relations.
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