DRAFT NSSD 11-82

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 2, 2010
• Sequence Number: 13
• Publication Date: September 9, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
c - - .. .. C. .7 F."O J.1 J_ V C
I R7-574611 1
September 9, 1982
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Interagency Group No. 30
TO :OVP
NsC"
ACDA
USDA
.CIA
Commerce
Defense
JCS
Treasury
UNA
USIA
Mr. Donald P. Gregg
- Mr. Michael 0. Wheeler
Mr. Joseph Presel
Mr. Raymond Lett
Mrs. Helen Ro ins
COL John Stanford
MAJ Dennis Stanley
Mr. David Pickford
Amb. Harvey Feldman
Ms. Teresa Collins
SUBJECT: Draft NSSD 11-82
In response to tasking assigned by Interagency Group No. 30
on August 27, the attached State draft, with Defense inputs,
addresses topics 4 & 5 of NSSD 11-82. In accordance with
instructions contained in NSSD 11-82, addressees should handle
this material on a strict need-to-know basis.
There will a meeting of the IG chaired by Assistant
Secretary Designate Richard Burt at 3:00 p.m., September 14 in
Room 6226, Department of. State. The meeting will consider the
draft submissions by State/Defense and CIA and consider next
steps in the policy review process.
Yu- Ill rBy-elf -;
1. State Draft
SECRET/SENSITIVE
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
II. Meeting the Soviet Challenge
The Soviet propensity for challenging the West and running
risks to undermine U.S. interests requires a sustained Western
response if. Soviet ambitions are to be frustrated. It is also
clear that the necessary firm and measured long-term Western
response to -th Soviet challenge requires that the United States
exercise.-. -y its capacity for leadership. This demands a
comprehensive, long-term U.S. effort to induce Soviet restraint by
shaping the-environment in which Soviet policy decisions are made.
A. Shapin the Soviet Environment
(1) The Military Balance
Foremost i. shaping the military environment Moscow faces is
the US-Soviet Military balance.. The U.S. must modernize its
military forces so that several goals are achieved:.
--Soviet 1'a.ders must perceive that the U.S. is determined
never to accept a second-place or deteriorating strategic
posture. Doubts about the military. capabilities of U.S. strategic
nuclear deterrent forces, or about the U.S. will to use them if
necessary, mush never exist;
--Soviet. calculations of possible nuclear war outcomes, under
any contingenck, must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to
the USSR that here would be no incentive for the Soviet leaders
to initiate a uclear attack;
--Leaders Ind the publics in all states must be able to
observe that tli.s indicator of U.S. strength remains at a position
of parity or'b4t.ter. They will then understand that U.S. capacity
for pursuing the broader-US-Soviet competition shall not be
encumbered by 4irect Soviet coercion of the U.S.;
--The-futu e of U.S. military.strength must. also.appear to.
friend and foe Ias strong: technological advances must be
exploited, research and development vigorously pursued, and
sensible follow-on programs undertaken so that the viability of
U.S. deterrent policy is not placed in question.
In Europe, the Soviet leadership must be faced with a rein-
vigorated NATO focused on three primary tasks: strengthening of
conventional. forces, modernization of intermediate-range nuclear
forces, and- improved mobility and sustainability for U.S. units
assigned rapidldeployment and other reinforcing missions to the
NATO area and Southwest Asia. Worldwide, U.S. general-purpose
forces must be ready to move quickly from peacetime'to wartime
roles, and -muse. beflexible to affect Soviet calculations in a
wide range of contingencies.
SECRET
Declassify on: OADR
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02: CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
SECRET
-2-
The US-Soviet military balance is also a critical determinant
shaping Third world perceptions of the'relative positions and
influence of of the two major powers. Moscow must know with certainty
that, in addition to the obvious priority of North American
defense, Eurasian and other areas of vital interest to the U.S.
will be defended against Soviet attacks or threats. But it must
know also that areas less critical to U.S. interests cannot be
attacked or'_threatened without serious risk of U.S. military
.support and: _.of potential confrontation in that or_.some other..area.
O Cooperation with Our Allies:
One of the central propositions of U.S. foreign policy through-
out the post-waf period. has been that an effective response to the
Soviet challenge requires close partnership among the industrial
democracies. A~ the same time, there will-continue to be
inevitable tensions between our unwillingness to give the allies a
veto over our Soviet policy, and our need for allied support in
making our policy work. More effective procedures for consultation
with our allies can contribute to the building of consensus-and
cushion the impact of i.ntra-alliance disagreements. However, we
must recognize that, on occasion, we may be forced to act to
protect our vital interests without allied support and even in the
face of allied opposition.
Our allies have been slow to support in concrete ways our
overall approach to East-West relations. In part because of the
intensive program of consultation we have undertaken, allied
governments have expressed rhetorical support for our assessment
of the Soviet military challenge, our rearmament program, and our.
negotiating positions in START and INF. Less progress has been
made in obtaini g allied action-in the vital areas of upgrading
conventional defense and-in planning for joint military action to
protect vital Western interests in the developing world, particu-
larly the Persian Gulf. With INF deployments scheduled to begin
in 193, West European governments will come under increasing
domestic pressure to press us for progress in START and INF. In
the likely absence of an acceptable INF agreement with.Moscow, we.
may-noed during 1983 to subordinate some other policy initiatives
with our allies to the overriding objective of obtaining allied
action to move forward on INF deployments.
Alithough it will be more difficult to achieve adurable
consensus with our allies on East-West economic issues, we must
seek to do so. The current intra-alliance dispute over exports
for the pipeline underscores European (and Japanese) unwillingness
to support a stI~ategy which they see as aimed at undermining the
detente of the 1970s. Nonetheless, we must continue to persevere
in this painful process of reeducating our.-European partners. At
the sc
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90BO1013R000300490013-8
SECRET
-3-
to t
mode
supp
e possibility of improved relations with the USSR if Moscow
ates its b havior will be important to obtaining allied
rt.
3) Third World Cooperation
s in the 1970s, the cutting edge of the Soviet challenge to
vita U.S._Lmterests in this decade is likely to be in the Third
World. Thus,.-we-must continue our efforts to. rebuild the credi-
bility of. our commitment to resist Soviet. encroachment on our
interests and.. those of our allies and friends and to support
effectively-those Third World states that are willing to resist
Soviet pressures. We must where possible erode the advances of
Soviet influenc in the developing world. made during the 1970s.
capa.
Thin
mili
sale:
arou:
assi;
and
tary
suppi
to di
brin4
-Thiri
dipl
the
prom
expl
disp
stat
prox
reci
deve
priv
free
whil
mode
U.S.
that
free
the
prog
iven the continued improvement of Moscow's force projection
ilities and the Soviet emphasis on arms aid to pro-Soviet
World clients,- any effective U.S. response must involve a
ary dimension. U.S. security assistance and foreign military
play an important role in shaping the security environment
d the periphery of the USSR and beyond Eurasia. But security
tance will not be enough unless we make clear to the Soviets
o our friends that the U.S. is prepared to use its own mili-
forces where necessary to protect vital U.S. interests and
rt endangered friends and allies. Above all, we must be able -
monstrate the capability and the will for timely action to
U.S. resoirces to bear in response to fast-moving events in
World tro6ble spots.
n effective U.S. policy in the Third World must also involve
matic initiatives (e.g.,.the President's Mid-East proposal,
aribbean Basin Initiative, and the Namibia initiative) to
te the resolution of regional crises vulnerable to Soviet
itation. The U.S. should counter, and if possible weaken or
ace, Soviet aid relationships, particularly those involving
s that host a Soviet military presence or act as Soviet
es. This of course requires corresponding changes in the.
ient states international policies. The U.S. must also
op an appropriate mixture of economic assistance programs and
to sector initiatives to demonstrate the relevance of the
economies to the economic problems of the developing world,
exposing the bankruptcy of the Soviet economic and.. political
In this connection, we must develop the means to extend
support to individuals and movements in the developing world
share our commitment.to political democracy and individual
om. We have forsaken much of the competition by not having
inds of long-term political cadre and organization building
ams which the Soviets conduct. .
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
SECRET
-4-
Possibly the greatest obstacle we face in carrying out this
appr ach in the developing world is the problem of obtaining
adequate budgetary resources. As in the case of our rearmament
program, pressures for budgetary restraint are certain to generate
call for reduction of the resources devoted to meeting the Soviet
.chal enge in the developing world. These pressures must be
.resi ted if we are to be able to meet our commitments and secure
our ital _i.n-terests.-,
4) Tbe-Soviet Empire (Eastern Europe,
Cuba, Third World Alliances).
As noted ablve,.there are a number of important vulnerabilities
and weaknesses within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should seek
to a acerbate and exploit. This will involve differentiated
poli ies, e.g. $ngola is different from Poland, Cuba is different
from Vietnam. We will need a different mix of tools for each. The
pros ects for change may be greater on the extremities of Soviet
powe (Soviet alliances in the developing world) than closer to
the enter of the Soviet empire (Eastern Europe) -.- though the
latt r obviously offers potential as well.
astern Europe: Although the Polish crackdown cut short a pro-
cess of peaceful change, the continuing instability in that country
is certain to have far-reaching repercussions throughout Eastern
Euro e. In addition, the deteriorating economic position of East
Euro can countries and the possible long-term drying up of Western
reso rces flowing to the region will force them to face some
diffcult choices: greater dependence on the Soviets and relative
stag ation; or reforms to generate a renewal of Western resources.
he primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen
Mosc w's hold on the region. We can advance this objective by
care ully discriminating in favor of countries-that show relative
inde endence from the USSR in their foreign policy, or show a
Brea er degree Hof internal liberalization. This policy of
diff rentiation in Eastern Europe is the subject of NSSD 5-82.
Afghanistan: Possibly the. most important single vulnerability
in tie Soviet Empire is Afghanistan, where Moscow's imperial reach
has ogged Soviet forces down in a stalemated struggle to suppress
the fghan resistance. A withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghani-
stan followed by a real exercise of self-determinat,ion.by the
Afgh n people would encourage other democratic and nationalist
forc s within the Soviet Empire and increase the likelihood that
othe .Third..World countries would resist Soviet pressures. Thus,
our bjective:sihould be to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for
with rawal and to ensure that the Soviets' political and other
cost remain high while the occupation continues.:
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
SECRET
-5-
Cuba: The challenge to U.S. interests represented by Moscow's
alliance with Cuba requires an effective U.S. response. The
Soviet-Cuban challenge has three critical dimensions (as well as
numerous otherlproblems):
-- Soviet deliveries of advanced weapons to Havana: The flow
of advanced_Sotiet weapons to Cuba has accelerated so as to repre-
sent a growitng threat to the security of other Latin American
countries and, in the case of potentially nuclear-capable systems,
the U.S. itself. We must be prepared to take strong counter-
measures to offset the political/military impact of these
deliveries.
-- Soviet-supported Cuban destabilizing activities in Central
America: The U.S. response must involve bilateral economic and
military assistance to friendly governments in the region, as well
as multilatera] initiatives to deal with the political, economic,
and social sources of instability. We should retain the option of
direct action against Cuba, while making clear our willingness
seriously to address Cuba's concerns if Havana is willing. to
reduce its dependence on and cooperation with the Soviet Union.
We should also take steps to prevent or neutralize the impact of
transfers of advanced Soviet weapons to Nicaragua.
-- Soviet-Cuban interventionism in Southern Africa: We should
counter and reduce Soviet and Cuban influence by strengthening our
own relations sith friendly African states, and by energetic
leadership of he diplomatic effort to bring about a Cuban with-
drawal from Angola in the context of a Namibia settlement and
appropriate extiernal guarantees of Angola's security.
Soviet Third World Alliances: Our policy should seek to
weaken and, where possible, undermine the existing links between
the Soviet Union and its Third World allies and clients. In
implementing this policy, we will need to take into account the
unique circumstances which influence the degree of cohesion
between the Soviet Union and each of its Third World allies. In
some cases, these ties are so strong as to make the Third World
state a virtual proxy or surrogate of the Soviet Union. We should
be prepared to work with our allies and Third World friends to
neutralize the activities of these Soviet proxies. In other cases,
ties between the Soviet Union and a Third world client may be
tenuous or subject to strains which a nuanced U.S.-policy can
exploit to move the Third World state away from the Soviet orbit.
Our policy should be flexible enough to take advantage of these
opportunities.I
Finally, we should seek.where possible and prudent to encourage
democratic movements and forces to bring about political change
inside these countries.
SECRET.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
SECRET
-6-
(5) China
The continuing Sino-Soviet rift -- motivated by racial enmity,
ideological competition and security concerns -- provides the U.S.
with some leverage over Soviet international behavior. However,
our ability to capitalize on these potential strategic advantages
depends upon. the durability of the Sino-American rapprochement.
Given the. -Soviets' strategic interest in undermining Sino-American
relations, and particularly in preventing U.S. arms assistance to
China, we. can expect that Moscow will seek to disrupt our rela-
tions with.Beijing. We will have to remain alert to such Soviet
maneuvers and be prepared to counter them with initiatives of our
own. Equally, we will need to manage carefully our relations with
Beijing to avoid giving Moscow any exploitable opportunities.
B. Bilateral Relationships
It will be important to develop policies which give us maximum
leverage over Soviet internal policies. Even though we recognize
the limits of our capabilities to influence Soviet domestic trends
and developments, the U.S., especially when working together with
our allies, does have some capability to influence Soviet resource
allocation through a variety of policy initiatives, such as our
own defense spending and East-West trade policies. Through our
radio broadcasting and other informational programs directed toward
the Soviet Union, we may be able to accelerate the already advanced
erosion of the regime's credibility with its own people, thus
weakening the ideological basis for Soviet external expansionism.
We also can offer private. and other forms of assistance to forces
seeking to promote democratic change. We can publicly and through
quiet diplomacy seek to advance the cause of individual human
rights in the Soviet Union.
Despite the post-Afghanistan, post-Poland attenuation of
US-Soviet bilateral ties, there remain sectors of the bilateral
relationship that are important to Moscow and thus to any effort
to induce moderation of Soviet conduct.
(1) Arms Control
Arms control negotiations, pursued soberly and without illu-
sions, are an important part of our overall national.. security
policy. We should be willing to enter into arms-control negotia-
tions when they serve our national security objectives. At the
same time,. we must make clear to the allies as well as-to the USSR
that our ability to reach satisfactory results will inevitably be
influenced by the international situation and the overall state of
US-Soviet relations. However,'we'should be under no illusions that
ongoing arms control negotiations will give us leverage sufficient
to produce Soviet.restraint on other international issues.
SECRET'
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
SECRET
-7-
U.S. arms control proposals should be consistent with necessary
force modernization plans and should seek to achieve balanced, sig-
nificant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable
armaments. The START, INF, and MBFR proposals we have tabled meet
these criteria and would, if accepted by the Soviets, help ensure
the survivability of our nuclear deterrent and thus enhance U.S.
national security. The fact that START and INF negotiations have
begun has--for the present somewhat reduced public pressure on us
and on Allied Governments for early arms control agreements with
Moscow. .Ia the absence of progress in START and INF, however, we
should expect that pressure to grow again.
(2) 'Economic Policy
U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must be seen
in a strategic context. At a minimum, we must ensure that US-
Soviet economic relationships do not facilitate the buildup of
Soviet military power. We must also bear in mind that U.S.
controls on the critical elements of trade can also influence
Soviet prospects for hard-currency earnings, and raise the cost of
maintaining their present rate of defense spending. We need, to
develop policies which use the leverage inherent in U.S.. and
Western economic strength to modify Soviet. behavior over time.
Thus, our economic policies should provide negative and, where
appropriate, positive incentives for more responsible Soviet
behavior, while avoiding any subsidies of Soviet economic develop-
ment. Although unilateral steps may be necessary for certain
strategic or political imperatives, agreement with the Allies on
the fundamental ground rules of trade will be essential if we are
to take advantage of Soviet economic weaknesses.
There are, however, real limits to Western leverage on. the
Soviet economy. The Soviet system is still basically autarchic,
and the USSR can substantially protect itself against foreign
economic pressure. The difficulty of organizing effective multi-
lateral restrictions on trade with the USSR. is illustrated by our
experience with the grain trade. Given the enormous Soviet
difficulties in agriculture and the growing Soviet dependence on
grain imports, suspension of grain trade by all Western and Third
World suppliers would be a potentially important source of leverage
over Soviet behavior.
However, it proved impossible.to organize effective, sustained
multilateral restrictions on international grain trade with the
Soviet Union during the'period of the post-Afghanistan grain
embargo.' This permitted the Soviets to shift their grain
purchases from-the U.S. to other suppliers,.thus minimizing the
impact of the grain embargo. 'Other major grain suppliers remain
unwilling-to contemplate restrictions on-.grain exports to the
USSR, thus-. unilateral. restrictions by the U.S. would impose costs
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
SECRET
on U.S. farmers without giving us additional leverage over Soviet
behavior. Under these circumstances, U.S. grain sales should be
permitted to proceed, while still subject to overall foreign
policy control.
While recognizing the problems and difficulties inherent in
developing a unified Western approach to economic relations with
Moscow, we---should nonetheless seek a consensus including the
following basic elements:
1. Credits. The key objective is agreement on common
restrictions on official credits and guarantees to the USSR
and establishment of a mechanism to monitor official credits
and guarantees.
2. Technology Transfer. The policy should include a unified.
and strengthened. position on military-related high technology
and equipment containing that technology.
3. Energy. The objectives here are twofold: a) to reach
consensus on the need to minimize Western dependence on Soviet
energy supplies; and b) to enhance Western leverage in this
key sector by agreement on the equipment and technology to be
made available to the USSR.
4. Foreign Policy Controls. There must be allied consensus
that foreign policy, i.e. non-strategic, controls on trade
with the Soviets may be imposed, primarily in crises, in
support of clear objectives and with criteria for removal of
the controls.
5. Differentiation. The traditional approach of treating
each of the East European countries as distinct entities on
the basis of their own policies will be maintained. This
offers the best opportunity to encourage pluralism and
independence in East European countries.
(3) Official Dialogue
We can expect the Soviets to continue to press us-for a return
to a US-Soviet agenda centered on arms control. We must continue
to resist this tactic and insist that Moscow address the full range
of our concerns about their international behavior if' our relations
are to improve. US-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues
can serve our interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow
for responsible behavior and to drive home that we will act to
ensure that the costs of irresponsibility are high. We can also.
use such contacts to make clear. that the way to pragmatic solutions
of regional problems is open if Moscow is willing seriously to'
address'our concerns.. At the same time, such contacts must be,
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
SECRET
-9-
handled with care to avoid offering the Soviet Union a role in
regional questions which it would not otherwise secure.
A continuing dialogue with the Soviets at the level of Foreign
Minister is essential, both to facilitate necessary diplomatic
communication with the Soviet leadership and to maintain allied
understand-ing. and support for our approach to East-West
relations- Secretary Haig met with Gromyko on three occasions
between September 1981 and June 1982, and this pattern of frequent
Ministerial-level contacts should be maintained in the future.
We can expect that the question of a possible US-Soviet summit
will continue to be raised by the Soviets, our allies, and impor-
tant segments of domestic opinion. Every American President since
Franklin Roosevelt has met with his Soviet counterpart. In some
cases, U.S. Presidents have.attended summits for the purpose of
establishing personal contact with their counterparts (e.g. Kennedy
in Vienna) or in the vague expectation that an improvement in US-
Soviet relations would flow from the summit (e.g. Johnson at
Glasboro). In other cases,'allied pressures for East-West dialogue
at the Head'of State level have played a major role in the Presi-
dential decision to meet at:the summit (e.g. Eisenhower at Geneva
and Paris).
The approach to summitry which prevailed throughout the 1970s
held that American Presidents should not meet with their Soviet
counterparts until there were concrete US-Soviet agreements ready
to serve as the centerpeice'of the summit. However, these summits
did not always produce durable improvements in US-Soviet relations,
and sometimes complicated management of US-Soviet relations by
generating expectations that could not be realized.
In any summit between President Reagan and his Soviet counter-
part we would want to ensure that concrete, positive results were
achievable. We would also need to ensure that any summit were
timed to achieve.the maximum possible positive impact in terms of
U.S. interests. '
.(4) Assertion of Values
The U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union must have an'ideo-
logical content which asserts the superiority of Western values of
freed-om, individual dignity, and political democracy over the
repressive and authoritarian character of Soviet society. We need
to create a sense that history is' moving in the direction of forces
which support-free elections, free enterprise, a free press, and
free trade unions. We need specific programs to support this
offensive.. Among the instruments which we should'employ are:
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 r Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90BO1013R000300490013-8
SECRET
-10-
--Increased U.S...informational efforts directed at the Soviet
Union,._particularly VOA and RFE/RL;
--A systematic and energetic U.S. effort to counter Soviet
disinformation and "active measures" campaigns directed at
U.S. Interests;
--A positive and assertive effort to support democratic
elements in both communist and non-communist countries, taking
into account the special requirements and vulnerabilities of
democratic forces seeking to survive in a hostile environment.
The role of US-Soviet cultural, scientific, and other coopera-
tive exchanges should be seen in light of our intention to maintain
a:strong ideological component in our relations with Moscow. We
should not further dismantle the framework of cooperative exchanges
which remains from the 1970s unless new incidents of Soviet
irresponsibility require us further to attenuate the US-Soviet
bilateral relationship. We should look at ways exchanges can be
used to further our ideological offensive.
III. Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing our
Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behavior
The interrelated tasks of rebuilding American capacity for
world leadership and constraining and, over time, reducing Soviet
international influence cannot be accomplished quickly.
We face a critical transition period over the next five years,
and our success in managing US-Soviet relations during this period
may well determine whether we are able to attain our long-term
objectives. Despite the long-term vulnerabilities of the Soviet
system, we can expect that Soviet military power will continue to
grow throughout the 1980s. Moreover, the Soviet Union will have
every incentive to prevent us from reversing the trends of the
last decade which have shifted the world power balance in Moscow's
favor. Thus, the coming 5-10 years will be a period of consider-
able uncertainty in which the Soviets will test our resolve.
These. uncertainties, moreover, will be exacerbated by the fact
that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the. unpredictable process
of political succession to Brezhnev. As noted above, we cannot
predict with confidence what policies the various succession
contenders-will espouse. Consequently, we should not seek to
adjust our policies to the Soviet internal conflict, but rather
try to create incentives (positive and negative) for any new
leadership to adopt policies less detrimental to U.S. interests.
Our posture should be one of a willingness to deal,-on the basis
of the policy approach we have taken.since the beginning. of the
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90BO1013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
SECRET
-11-
Administration, with whichever leadership group emerges. We would
underscore that we remain ready for improved US-Soviet relations
if the Soviet Union makes significant -changes in policies of
concern to us; the burden for any further deterioration' in
relations would fall squarely on Moscow.
We shouldibe under no illusion about the extent of our capa-
bilities--to.-restrain the Soviet Union while American strength is
being rebuzlt.i Throughout the coming decade, our rearmament
program will be subject to the uncertainties of the budget process
and the U..S.. domestic debate on national security. In addition,
our reassertion of leadership with our allies, while necessary for
the long-termirevitalization of our alliances, is certain to create
periodic- intea!-alliance disputes that may provide the Soviets with
opportunities for wedge driving. Our effort to reconstruct the
credibility ofj U.S.. commitments in the Third World will also depend
upon our ability to sustain over time commitments of resources,
despite budgetlary stringencies. As noted above, these constraints
on our capacity to shape the Soviet international environment will
be accompanied by real limits on our capacity to use the US-Soviet
bilateral relaationship as leverage to restrain Soviet behavior.
The existing and projected gap between our finite resources
and the level of capabilities needed to constrain Soviet inter-
national behavior makes it essential that we: 1) establish firm
priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will
have the greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and 2)
mobilize the resources of our European and Asian allies and our
Thi rd World f lends who a e willing to join with us in containing
t1ie expansion of Soviet Power.
(1) U.S. !Priorities
Underlyingli the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be
aistrong military, capable of acting across the entire spectrum of
potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and
military strategy. The heart of U.S. military'strategy is to'deter
attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., our allies, or
other important countries, and to defeat such an attack should
deterrence fail. Achieving this strategic aim largely rests, as
in the past, on a strong U.S. capability for unilateral military
action. Strategic nuclear forces remain an important element of
that capability, but the importance of other force's'-- nuclear and
conventional - has risen in the current era of strategic nuclear
parity.
Although uinilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuild-
ing Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the
protection of Western interests will require increased U.S.. coop-
eration with allied and other states and greater utilization of
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
SECRET
-12-
their resources. U.S. military strategy must be better integrated
with national strategies of allies and friends, and U.S. defense
programs must consider allied arrangements in the planning stage.
U.S. military strategy for successfully contending with peace-
time, crisis, and wartime contingencies involving the USSR on a
global basis is detailed in NSSD 1-82. This military strategy
must be combined with a political strategy focused on the
following objectives:
-- Creating a long-term western consensus for dealing with the
Soviet-Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong
leadership in developing policies to deal with the multi-
faceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will also
require that the U.S. take allied concerns into account. In
this connection, and in addition to pushing the allies to
spend more on defense, we must attach a high priority to a
serious effort to negotiate arms control agreements consistent
with our military strategy, our force modernization plans, and
our overall approach to arms control. We must also develop,
together with our allies, a unified Western approach to
East-West economic-relations consistent with the U.S. policy
outlined in this study.
-- Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its
position in Afghanistan. This will require that we continue
efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a nego-
tiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, we
should keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that
Soviet costs on the ground remain high.
-- Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit
a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer
term increase in diversity and independence throughout
Eastern
Europe. This will require that we continue to impose
costs on
the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also
require that we maintain a U.S. policy of differentiation
among East European countries.
-- Building and sustaining a major ideological political
offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed
to bring about change inside the Soviet Union itself. This
must be a long-term program, given the nature of the Soviet
system.
-- Maintenance of our strategic relationship with China, thus
minimizing opportunities for .a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.
-- Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national
security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship.
SECRET
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8
SECRET
-13-
This will require that we use a variety of instruments,
including diplomatic efforts such as the Contact Group Namibia/
Angola initiative. U.S. security and economic assistance in
Latin America will-also be essential. However, we must retain
the option of direct use of U.S. military forces to protect
vital U.S. security interests against threats which may arise
from the Soviet-Cuban connection.
(2) Cooperation with our Allies
As noted throughout this paper, we must cooperate with our
allies to restrain Soviet expansionism. Only the U.S. can
diirectly counterbalance Soviet power, but our allies can often
more effectively intervene in regions of historic interest to
maintain peace, limit opportunities for Soviet opportunism, and
oppose Soviet surrogate activity.
While rejecting a unilateralist approach, we cannot permit our
approach to US-Soviet relations to reflect only the lowest common
denominator of allied consensus. The challenge we face from the
Soviet Union requires U.S. leadership which will inevitably lead
to periodic disagreements in an alliance of free nations, such as
NATO. This is an enduring dilemma which has confronted American
Administrations throughout the postwar period. It cannot be
finally resolved, but it must be managed effectively if we are to
maintain the unity of purpose among free nations on which U.S.
security depends.
IV. Articulating Our Approach: Sustaining Public
and Congressional Support
The policy outlined above is a strategy for the long haul. We
should have no illusions that it will yield a rapid breakthrough
in our relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic
near-term victories in our effort to moderate Soviet behavior,
pressure is likely to mount for change in our policy. We can
expect appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a
more "normal' US-Soviet relationship. This is inevitable given
the historic American intolerance of ambiguity and complexity in
foreign affairs. Moscow may believe that if pressure from allies
and publics does not drive this Administration back to Soviet-
style peaceful coexistence and detente, the USSR can hunker down
and concentrate on neutralizing the Reagan foreign policy until a
new, more pliable U.S. Administration emerges.
We must therefore demonstrate that the American people will
support the policy we have outlined. This will require that we
avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress
in US-Soviet relations. At the same time, we must demonstrate
credibly that our policy is not.a blueprint for an:open-ended,
sterile confrontation with Moscow, but a -serious - search for a
stable and constructive long-term basis for US-Soviet relations.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/09/02 : CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490013-8