DRAFT NSSD 11-82

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000300490009-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 40
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 7, 2010
• Sequence Number: 9
• Publication Date: October 27, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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TO:
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
OVP
NSC
ACDA
Commerce
Defense
JCS
Treasury
UNA
USIA
Washinvon. D.C. 20520
7/7
- Mr.
- Mr.
- Mr.
October 27, 1982
Donald P. Gregg
Michael 0. Wheeler
Joseph Presel
Mrs. Helen Robbins
COL John Stanford
LTC Dennis Stanley
Mr. David Pickford
Amb. Harvey Feldman
Ms. Teresa Collins
SUBJECT: Draft NSSD 11-82
There is attached a revised draft of NSSD 11-82 which
will be considered at a meeting of the IG chaired by
Assistant Secretary-designate Burt scheduled for 10:00 a.m.,
Tuesday, November 2 in Room 6226, Department of State. The
purpose of this meeting will be to propose and discuss final
changes in the draft so that it can be submitted to the SIG.
Attendance at the meeting will be principal plus one.
Please telephone the names of your representatives to Mr. Tain
Tompkins at 632-5804 by COB Monday, November 1.
Attachment: Draft NSSD
P h-ts
L. Paul Bremer, III /kw
Executive Secretary
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4
U.S. Relations With The USSR
Introduction and Overview
The record of U.5:-Soviet relations since October, 1917, has been
one of tension and hostility, interrupted by short-lived periods of
cooperation. The Soviet challenge to U.S. interests has many roots,
including: (1) an imperial tradition; (2) threat perceptions rooted
in Russian history; and (3) the nature of the Communist regime, its
superpower ambitions, and its ideologically-mandated antipathy toward
the United States as the "main bastion of capitalism."
Our tensions with the Soviet Union have resulted in substantial
measure from the unrelenting growth of Soviet military power and
Moscow's readiness to use force in ways which threaten our Allies
and pose a threat to the security of the United States. We have
built up our military power vis-a-vis the Soviets, and we have pur-
sued intermittently a policy of containment on the periphery of the
Soviet Union. Such responses are essential, and we must ensure that
the United States sustains the resources and the will to compete
effectively with the Soviet Union in all of these dimensions. This
will remain the primary focus of American national security policy.
Because Soviet aggressiveness has sources in the Soviet internal
system, an effective national strategy requires that our policies
toward that country also take into account their impact on its
internal development. It is inconsistent to raise the defense
budget to meet the Soviet threat and at the same time allow our
economic relations with Moscow to contribute directly to the growth
of Soviet military power. It is also inconsistent to contest the
expansion of Soviet power without exploiting the internal vulner-
abilities that could weaken that power at its source. Finally,
there is a strong and broadly-based concern among Americans about
the human rights situation in the Soviet Union and the lack of
individual freedom in Soviet society. This too compels us to keep
the nature of the Soviet system at the center of our policy.
The Reagan policy toward the Soviet Union proceeds on the
assumption that the maintenance of power by the Soviet regime rests
ultimately on force and that Soviet external aggression stems in
part from the nature of the Soviet political system. Our policy
must therefore have a dynamic thrust which recognizes that a primary
source of Soviet militarism and imperialism is the system itself.
We must, within the limits of our capabilities, design political,
economic, and other measures which advance our long-term objective of
promoting: (1) the decentralization and demilitarization of the
Soviet economy; (2) the weakening of the power and privileged posi-
tion of the ruling communist elite; (3) the creation of a more equi-
table relationship between the ruling Great Russian nation and its
non-Russian subjects; and (4) gradual democratization of the USSR.
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Thus, the first two tracks of our policy toward the Soviet Union
are:
-- To compete effectively on a sustained basis with the Soviet
Union in all international arenas in which our interests conflict,
particularly in the overall military balance and in geographical
regions of priority concern to the United States.
-- To undertake a coordinated, long-term effort to reduce
the threat that the Soviet system poses to our interests.
There is an important third track. We need to engage the Soviet
Union in dialogue and negotiations to convey our concerns clearly
and also to attempt to reach agreements based on strict reciprocity
and mutual interest.
. We need to create and sustain negative and positive incentives
powerful enough to influence Soviet behavior. Moscow must know that
behavior unacceptable to us will incur costs that would outweigh any
gains. At the same time, we must make clear to the Soviets that real
restraint in their behavior would pave the way for a stable and con-
structive East-West relationship that would have important benefits
for the Soviet Union.
The study which follows is in two parts. The first examines in
detail the determinants of Soviet behavior, the strengths and weak-
nesses of the Soviet system, prospects for future development in
Soviet foreign policy and within the Soviet Union itself, and the
degree of vulnerability of the system to external leverage. The
second part sets forth in greater detail a Reagan Administration
policy toward the Soviet Union, with emphasis on the role of the
military balance, relationships with our Allies and developing
countries, interaction with Soviet allies in Eastern Europe and
the Third World, and our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union
itself. Within the latter we have laid particular emphasis on how
our economic relations and expanded political action programs can
be structured and utilized to advance our interests.
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PART I - THE DETERMINANTS OF SOVIET BEHAVIOR
The primary determinants of Soviet international behavior are
geography, an imperial tradition and ideology. The first of these
is immutable; the second was inherited by the Soviet leadership in
1917; and the third has served to reinforce the imperial tradition
and preserve some of its chief characteristics--suspicion,
aggressiveness, and xenophobia.
Communist ideology posits an inevitable struggle between
capitalism and socialism and thus views non-socialist states both as
potential targets for revolution and as potential threats. It sees
class antagonism as the driving force behind political and economic
change, and the policies of other nations as shaped by domestic
economic and social struggles. This view provides the intellectual
prism through which Soviet leaders perceive the outside world,
reinforces the expansionist tendencies inherited from the Russian
tradition, and assures them that history is on their side.
Most importantly, Communist ideology is the main source of the
regime's legitimacy. It explains why there is only one political
party, which controls the state administration and all spheres of
society, why the media are subject to censorship, and why the party
Politburo dominates political life. For a variety of reasons--including
a deeply rooted fear of anarchy and the absence of any regularized
process for transferring power--questions of the regime's legitimacy
continue to be of basic concern to Soviet leaders.
But Soviet authorities also see their own international role in
terms of traditional great power interests. While as Marxists they
believe in the ultimate transformation of the world along socialist
lines, their specific policies and tactics are perforce often shaped
more by geopolitical considerations.
The insecurity and suspicion engendered by Russian history and
Marxist-Leninist ideology have been tempered somewhat by the USSR's
emergence as a military superpower and the concomitant growth of its
political role in world affairs. Soviet leaders see military power
as the essential foundation of an assertive foreign policy. The
pattern of their policies since the mid-1970's suggests increased
confidence in their global power position--expressed in Soviet par-
lance as "the changing correlation of forces in favor of Socialism."
The Soviet leadership also sees continuing opportunities to exploit
and foster international tensions and instabilities to their own
advantage and the detriment of the United States. At the same time
a new element of insecurity probably has been added by the growing
recognition that serious domestic problems seem to defy solution.
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SOVIET STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES
The political sysfem that has evolved out of this historical and
ideological tradition has provided the means for a serious challenge
to U.S. interests. Its leaders have formidable military power and
considerable economic might at their disposal. The highly centra-
lized decision making apparatus enhances the Soviet leadership's
ability to develop a cohesive foreign and domestic policy and to
move quickly to take advantage of international opportunities. At
the same time such centralization often makes Soviet domestic policy
rigid, and ideological orthodoxy inhibits adaptations to changing
internal and international conditions. These strengths and weak-
nesses will be particularly in evidence as the Soviet Union deals
with major global challenges and opportunities in the 1980s.
Internal Factors
The Economy
The USSR has entered a period of slow economic growth that
confronts the leadership with tough policy choices. Shortfalls in
industrial production, and four consecutive harvest failures have
reduced the growth in Soviet GNP to less that 2 percent a year since
1978--its lowest rate since World War II.
This decline indicates that the formula Moscow has used to
stimulate growth over the past 25 years--maximum inputs of labor
and investment--no longer works. During the past few years, the
USSR has experienced:
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a sharp slowdown in oil production growth and a decline
in coal production;
a major rise in raw material costs;
a fall-off in investment and labor-force growth; and
a sharp decline in labor productivity growth.
To judge from 11th Five-Year Plan figures, the Soviet leadership
nevertheless expects GNP to grow 4 percent per year through the
mid-1980s. This goal, however, is based on highly unrealistic
assumptions about labor productivity growth. We estimate that GNP
will continue to grow at less than 2 percent through the mid-1980s.
These economic difficulties have not led the leadership to make
fundamental changes in policy. To maintain the military buildup, it
has lowered the rates of growth for consumption and capital invest-
ment. If these priorities continue, however, the living standard
will hold steady and may decline and investment will be squeezed
further. The defense burden, as measured by share of GNP going to
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defense spending, might approach 20 percent by the early 1990s
compared to its current level of 13-14 percent--sharply restricting
other claimants to resources and heightening political tensions over
allocation decisions.
Despite these gloomy prospects, the USSR continues to possess
great economic strengths. It has:
a wealth of natural resources, leading the world in the
production of such key industrial commodities as oil,
steel, iron ore, and nickle;
the world's largest military-industrial complex; and
a highly centralized economy that has enabled the
leadership to command resources and set priorities between
regions and sectors.
Moreover, although keenly aware of their difficulties, Soviet leaders
apparently believe that the 1990s will bring some relief from at
least two of their major problems--manpower shortages and energy
constraints. They also take comfort in the gloomy projections of
growth for most Western industrial nations and have expressed doubt
publicly and privately about the United States' ability to carry out
its defense buildup.
Social Issues
The sources of popular discontent in the Soviet Union--a
perceived decline in the quality of life, continuing restrictions on
freedom of expression and belief, and rising national consciousness
among more than 20 major ethnic groups--pose problems of varying
severity for the Soviet leadership. Discontent over the quality of
Soviet life probably represents the most immediate and important
challenge. The Soviet people no longer are confident that their
standard of living will continue to improve. Food shortages have
become more apparent and the availability of some consumer goods has
dropped. The sense of rising expectations, made possible by real
consumer advances until the mid-1970s, has yielded to an apparent
growth of dissatisfaction and cynicism. This is manifesting itself
in declining growth in labor productivity--a trend that will make it
more difficult to achieve the rates of economic growth that the
leaders plan. Recent regime actions--such as massive imports of
grain and the creation of special food distribution systems--indicate
that they are aware of the problems, but their policies are as yet
inadequate to solve them.
The slowing of economic growth, and the consequent near
stagnation in per-capita consumption, has led to a growing malaise
in Soviet society--manifested in growing consumption of alcohol,
increasing labor turnover, sporadic strike activity, a flourishing
black market, and corruption. Such phenomena are not only con-
tributing to the reduction of labor productivity, but also creating
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elite concern over the political implications of this shift in
popular attitudes.
The malaise in SaCiet society is symptomatic of an underlying
loss of commitment to the system and to the political order.
Although impossible to quantify, the ideological underpinings of the
system have clearly been eroding. Some erosion was probably
inevitable as the generation that made the revolution passed from
the scene, but a more fundamental problem has been the increasingly
palpable inconsistency between the socialist ideal -- equality,
community, etc. -- and the reality of a bureaucratic state whose
principal purpose is maintaining in power the present elite. The
threat this loss of moral authority poses to the regime and its
order is hard to determine -- to the Soviet leaders as well as to
ourselves. But from the Soviet perspective the trends are not good,
and it is hard to see how the current set of leaders could lead or
control a reformation that would restore a sense of shared belief in
the rightness of the present order. It seems likely that this
problem will loom larger in the concerns of Soviet leaders, and they
will feel themselves increasingly defensive and vulnerable to
efforts by the West to give succor to the idea that beneficent
change is possible in the USSR.
The Soviet leadership thus far has been successful in isolating
and repressing political, religious, and cultural dissent through
widespread arrests and imprisonment of dissident leaders, confinement
in psychiatric hospitals, and exile. In the long term, dissidence
could become more widespread--because of dissatisfaction with living
standards, a continuing decline in ideological commitment, and an
apparent resurgence of interest in religious faith--and require even
more leadership attention, but over the next 10 years there is
little prospect that such activity will get out of hand and threaten
party rule.
Discontent among the minority nationalities also represents a
latent vulnerability. There is no widespread, disruptive protest
now, however, nor does any appear likely in the near or mid-term.
Regime policies--granting linguistic, territorial, and some cultural
autonomy; improving the standard of living; and expanding the
educational base--combined with the use of police power, have been
largely successful thus far. A rising national consciousness among
many of these groups, however, suggests that discontent could become
more serious over the next several decades. It could result in work
stoppages, demonstrations and greater assertiveness by local
leaders?particularly in the Baltic States, the Ukraine, and Central
Asia--requiring the regime to reassess its basic approach to the
problem.
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Political Process and Structure'
Soviet leaders exercise pervasive control over political activity
in the USSR, and their determination to insure the preeminence of
the party and implementation of its decisions is an important under-
pinning of all national policy objectives. The successful pursuit
of this aim, together with effective restrictions on public dissent,
has given unity and cohesiveness to both domestic and foreign policy.
This focus on the maintenance of party control, however, also
has introduced some rigidity and inefficiency that have been harmful
to the pursuit of national goals. This has been especially evident
in the economy. Party leaders, despite their interest in improving
the efficiency and technological base of the economy, have been
reluctant to back fully the kind of decentralization and economic
incentives that would contribute to this end, mainly for fear that
this would dilute their power. They have also been unwilling to
codify their powers and responsibilities within the political system
and develop an institutionalized process for replacing the top
leader. As a result, political succession creates potentially
disruptive personal and policy conflict. The lack of any mechanism
to ensure rejuvenation of the administrative elite--has reduced the
flow of fresh ideas and lessened the regime's ability to respond
effectively to new challenges.
Foreign Policy
Instruments of Policy
To judge from the USSR's sustained heavy investment in military
forces and weapons research and development, the Soviet leaders
believe that military power is the principal basis of their influence
and status in international relations. In strategic nuclear forces,
the Soviets probably now credit themselves with aggregate nuclear
capabilities at least equal to those of the United States and in
some respects, such as the ability to threaten land-based missile
silos, with superiority. The Soviets have also significantly
improved theater nuclear and conventional forces, thus reinforcing
Moscow's regional superiority vis-a-vis China and Western Europe.
In the Third World, arms sales, military training, and advisors
also are effective instruments of Soviet policy. While such aid
does not necessarily translate directly into political leverage, it
usually is the keystone of Soviet relations with less developed
countries and with revolutionary and insurgent groups. Despite
Soviet interest in garnering hard currency from arms sales, Moscow
has been willing, where it perceives political advantage, to make
major concessions, such as extended repayment periods and payment in
soft currency. This, combined with their apparent responsiveness,
allows the Soviets to depict their actions as manifestations of
solidarity with the Third World.
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Another trend in Soviet Third World involvement is the
continuing use of proxies and other intermediaries, together
with covert Soviet in3olvement in supporting insurgent groups
and in aiding the military ventures of client or dependent regimes.
For the Soviets, the proxy relationship--one that has proven most
successful in Angola and Ethiopia--minimizes the level of direct
Soviet involvement while achieving Soviet aims and projecting the
image of "socialist solidarity" with the recipient regimes.
Foreign debt obligations and hard currency shortages, however,
affect the overall level of Moscow's commitment to client regimes.
The hard currency crunch has made the Soviets reluctant to provide
other clients with economic aid as extensive as that provided to
Cuba or Vietnam. The net result is that Moscow is more dependent
on military aid as an entree of influence in the Third World.
In recent years the Soviets also have strengthened their
traditional diplomatic activities, supplementing them with increased
usage of a broad range of pseudo-official and covert activities that
the Soviets themselves refer to as "active measures." The increased
use of such measures is in part a reflection of the importance Moscow
attributes to the "ideological struggle," which is waged not only
through propaganda, but also with psychological warfare and
subversion.
The Soviet Union and International Communism
The international Communist movement is no longer the unambigious
asset to the USSR that it once was. Threats to Soviet leadership
and control of both ruling and non-ruling parties are growing. The
turmoil in Poland and problems in Romania underscore the limited
effectiveness of Moscow's costly policy of buying stability and
loyalty in Eastern Europe through economic subsidies.
The objective possibilities for continuing to pursue this policy,
moreover, are fading quickly due to Soviet economic problems and
Western resistance to deeper economic involvement in Eastern Europe.
In the coming decade slow economic growth in Eastern Europe will
threaten regime stability in bloc countries. The downfall of a cor-
rupt and incompetent party leadership in Poland, precipitated by the
protests of a popular workers' movement, and the use of the military
to fill the gap, also raise disquieting questions about the legiti-
macy and effectiveness of Communist party rule throughout the bloc.
Despite these problems, Moscow's options are limited. An
economic bailout would be too costly. Economic reform and greater
Western involvement would diminish central control and could
stimulate pressures for political reform. A resort to greater
repression, on the other hand, would further complicate Moscow's
relations in the West and the Third World.
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Beyond Eastern Europe, the most serious challenge to Soviet
control and orthodoxy in the world Communist movement comes from
Eurocommunism. The West European parties are trying to balance
their ties to the Soviet Communist Party with their own national
and political interests. They resist Soviet efforts to subordinate
national parties to Soviet control. Criticism of Soviet policies
has now become common and probably will increase if the Soviets
increase repression at home and political and military expansion
abroad.
The return of the Chinese Communist Party to active involvement
in the international movement and its opposition to Soviet hegemony
also are potentially severe challenges facing the Soviet leadership.
The Chinese are in the process of forming a tacit alliance with
several of the leading West European parties. The Chinese, in
addition, have indicated their intention to compete with the Soviets
for influence with "progressive forces" in the Third World, including
such pro-Soviet radical regimes as Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique.
The Economic Burdens of Empire
The Soviets almost certainly believe that their economic support
of other Communist countries and clients brings substantial strategic
and political benefits, but rising costs and economic stringencies
are prompting a tougher aid posture. Assistance to East European and
Third World clients rose dramatically from $1.7 billion in 1971 to
$23 billion in 1980--some 1.5 percent of GNP. Moscow is prepared to
shoulder a large aid burden for its Communist clients; their econo-
mies are generally in trouble, and their stability is important to
Soviet foreign policy objectives. The Soviet leadership is
attempting to slow the rise in aid costs, however, by cutting subsi-
dized oil deliveries to some East European allies, refusing increased
deliveries of fuel to Vietnam and demanding that allies end their
trade deficits with the USSR.
Moscow's tight-fisted aid policy toward non-Communist LDCs will
almost certainly continue as well. Moscow's present hard currency
problems will make it even more reluctant to extend substantial hard
currency aid to such countries as Nicaragua, despite repeated
requests for it. Several radical clients, such as Ethiopia and South
Yemen, are increasingly unhappy with their inability to augment
Soviet military support with extensive economic cooperation.
Opportunities and Challenges
The Soviets are faced with both opportunities and challenges
abroad. Their international strengths derive for the most part from
their huge military investments; their vulnerabilities stem princi-
pally from changes in the international environment that could
threaten past gains.
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The Soviet Union's growing military power has strengthened its
ability to pursue political goals in Western Europe. By threatening
additional nuclear deployments if NATO's INF decision is implemented,
the Soviets are in effect attempting to force the West Europeans to
accept de facto Soviet military superiority on the continent.
The Soviets also believe Washington's ability to raise the
economic and military costs of the East-West competition is subject
to competing U.S. economic priorities and to reluctance on the part
of U.S. allies to follow our lead. The Soviets think that conflict
between Western Europe and the United States over arms control and
East-West economic relations presents opportunities to provoke
divisions within the alliance. In particular, the failure thus far
of U.S. efforts to dissuade its West European allies from partici-
pation in the Yamal gas pipeline project has probably encouraged the
Soviets in their assumption that differences in the Western alliance
can be exploited to Soviet advantage. Moscow also remains hopeful
that NATO's fragile consensus in favor of new intermediate-range
missile deployments can be broken, perhaps leading to a serious
rupture in the alliance.
In the Far East, Moscow's military buildup opposite China remains
not only a lever on the PRC but a potential bargaining chip should
Beijing become more serious in its desire to ameliorate Sino-Soviet
tensions. Opportunities in the Far East are also afforded by the
frictions in U.S.-Chinese relations and potential divergences between
the United States and Japan stemming from trade problems, disagree-
ments over economic sanctions against the USSR, and Japanese reluc-
tance to accelerate defense spending.
Moscow believes that its military investment also has improved
somewhat its capabilities for projection of its military power into
more distant regions. Although the Soviets recognize the limitations
of that capability against a major military power, they hope that
their increased capacity will deter U.S. military action against
Soviet proxies or clients and assure the favorable resolution of
regional conflicts. Moscow's increased involvement in the Third
World also reflects a belief that the United States has been con-
strained from direct military intervention there by the trauma of
Vietnam and the difficulty of reaching a domestic political consensus
on foreign policy in general. Indeed, political and economic insta-
bility throughout the Third World, together with the radicalization
of postcolonial elites, have been viewed by the Soviets as major
U.S. and Western vulnerabilities and, conversely, relatively
low-risk opportunities for the Soviet Union to insinuate itself
through offers of military and technical aid.
An overriding issue is the extent to which Moscow's international
posture will be affected by a growing preoccupation with the country's
great, and growing, domestic problems. Economic problems, the loss
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of ideological commitment, a growing malaise in society and the
succession problem should impinge more on the consciousness of the
leaders in the Kremlin, in the coming decade than they did in the
past. It is possible-that a new leadership might wish to turn its
attention to sorting out its own internal political squabbles as it
has in previous successions and try to avoid foreign policy actions
that they perceive as risky and deliberately provocative. They may,
in fact, propose initiatives designed to give them a respite to deal
with internal problems. They also may try to reduce external economic
commitments in order to devote more resources to domestic economic
problems. This would be especially likely if there is growing.
domestic unrest, in the form of strikes and demonstrations, over
declining economic conditions. At this juncture all of these
domestic problems seem manageable, but neither we nor the Soviets can
be confident about what the future may bring.
The deteriorating U.S.-Soviet relationship is a major source of
concern, potentially eroding Soviet military and foreign policy gains
of the past decade. Planned U.S. strategic and theater nuclear
programs also are seen by the Soviets as an attempt to negate the
USSR's strategic advantages and to create a credible 'first strike"
capability.
In the Far East, the Soviets view China's improved relations with
both the United States and Japan as a serious security problem,
raising the possibility that the USSR might be opposed by all three
countries in a conflict in the Far East. More immediately, the USSR
suspects that this trilateral rapproachment portends active U.S. and
Japanese aid in the modernization of Chinese armed forces. Moscow's
territorial disputes with both China and Japan, moreover, are major
obstacles to any dramatic improvement in its relations with either
country.
In the Third World, the Soviets recognize that even where they
have substantial political and military investments their continued
influence is not guaranteed. The defeat of Soviet clients in Lebanon
and Soviet inability to intervene effectively was the most recent
demonstration. Similarly, the Soviets see current U.S. efforts to
broker a more comprehensive peace settlement in the Middle East and
to achieve a settlement in Namibia as potentially leading to a
further erosion of Soviet influence in the Third World.
PROSPECTS FOR CHANGE
Soviet economic and social problems will provide the strongest
impetus for systemic or policy change over the next 10 years. Unless
major changes are forthcoming, economic growth rates will remain at
historically low levels, popular dissatisfaction with a perceived
decline in the quality of life will grow, and resource allocation
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decisions will become more difficult for the leadership. The gravity
of these problems for the Soviet system, however, remains difficult
to measure, and there re important uncertainties in our judgments
about the possibility that they could cause major system or policy
changes.
The Soviet leadership obviously has a more sanguine view of its
problems than we do. While their rhetoric reflects evident concern,
there is no sense of mortal danger to the Soviet state. The gloomier
projections of foreign observers, on the other hand, reflect a per-
ception that Soviet problems are intractable and less optimism that
the added manpower and energy resources the Soviets are counting on
in the 1990s will reverse adverse economic trends.
Even with a more negative assessment of Soviet economic and
social difficulties, however, we believe that the strengths of the
system--its control mechanisms, its economic power, the patriotism
and passivity of its populace--will allow Soviet leaders to manage
whatever internal pressures for systemic change (i.e., changes in
basic philosophy or the nature of Communist party rule) are likely
to develop over the next decade. The regime while facing important
long-term vulnerabilities, does not, in our judgment, appear to be in
imminent danger. Preserving this stability, however, may ultimately
require the regime to devote more attention and resources to its eco-
nomic problems and to maintaining an acceptable standard of living
rather than to foreign adventures or to continuing an expanding rate
of military growth.
While this assessment leads us to believe that the prospect for
major systemic change in the next years is relatively low, the like-
lihood of policy shifts is much higher. The immediate post-Brezhnev
leadership will almost certainly make a more vigorous effort in the
next 3-5 years to reverse the economic slowdown, and in the process
alter sectoral and regional resource allocations, administrative
structures, prices and incentives, and even tighten administrative
controls. Toward the end of the decade and with the emergence of a
new generation of leaders, more far-reaching solutions to this funda-
mental problem could emerge, involving perhaps much greater use of
market forces, cuts in the growth rate for military spending or more
repression. At the same time, any group of leaders almost certainly
will continue to rely on military power as a key instrument of foreign
policy and will seek to maintain its competitive strength vis-a-vis
the United States. They are likely to count on Third World develop-
ments to provide new political and diplomatic opportunities as well.
Changes in the Political System
Despite internal weaknesses, the institutions of political
control remain strong and firmly entrenched in the USSR. Popular
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discontent--although threatening to economic goals--does not as yet
challenge the party'sauthority. Revolutionary collapse or major
alterations in the system are highly unlikely in the next three to
five years.
In the longer run, institutional rivalries will persist, and may
increase as economic growth declines, but the party apparatus will
probably remain the dominant political institution for at least the
next decade. Although the party's potential competitors--the
military, the KGB, and the government bureaucracy--have political
clout that can be especially important during periods of intra-party
strife, none of them is will equipped to supplant the party and none
seems inclined to try in the near term.
A military coup?
There is at most an outside chance of a military takeover within
the next 10 years. Although the military has the organizational
skills and certainly the muscle to take charge, its has been indoc-
trinated from the regime's beginnings to stand aside from higher
politics and historically has rarely been a major political actor.
Moreover, its interests have been well served by the current party
leadership. It has, for example, been given a large role in defining
the security threat and in determining the programs required to deal
with it--its two main political interests. The party, in addition,
has developed a wide array of checks and controls to forestall a
military coup. The military probably would attempt to assume power
only in the event of a significant "liberalization" of the political
system that was viewed as undermining social discipline and threaten-
ing the military's priority claim to resources or under conditions of
political and economic chaos similar to that in the Polish crisis.
Return to One-Man Rule
Within the framework of the existing system of party rule,
however, a variety of changes are possible. During the next decade,
for example, a leader who exercised power far in excess of that
wielded by Brezhnev or Khrushchev could emerge. Such a development
(perhaps a 20 percent possibility) could result from frustration with
the lack of clear national direction, a perception that more disci-
pline is needed in the party and society, and a confluence of serious
domestic and international problems. Although no leader who succeeds
Brezhnev will initially have such authority, the time required for
his consolidation of power could be far shortened by a shared sense
of urgent national tasks. The emergence of such a leader, less con-
stricted by the need for consensus, would make major policy shifts
and changes much more likely. Domestic policies probably would take
an authoritarian turn, but external policies could range from highly
aggressive to pragmatic.
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"Liberalization" of the System
Another possibility would be some liberalizing reform that would
allow for much greateepersonal freedom and decentralization of poli-
tical and economic authority. This seems a less likely prospect (per-
haps a 10 percent possibility over the next decade), considering the
absence of effective popular pressure for such change, the strength
of the regime's control mechanisms, and the apparent lack of signifi-
cant sentiment in that direction within the Soviet establishment.
Given the nature of the great power rivalry, however, a "liberal"
Soviet regime would not necessarily be more accommodating to U.S.
interests. Indeed, such a regime might be more effective at over-
coming some of the Soviet Union's systemic and policy weaknesses,
making it an even more formidable adversary.
Changes in Policies through the Mid-1980s
More likely than systemic change are changes in specific
policies, some probably following shortly on Brezhnev's departure.
Although our knowledge of Soviet internal debate is limited, there
have been discernible differences among Politburo members on several
key issues. Conflict over these and other issues, heightened by
political jockeying and the complexity of the country's problems,
could lead to major policy shifts in the next three to five years.
Economic Policy
The most immediate changes are likely in economic policy, where
the current investment strategy has provided considerable debate.
Differences in priorities already have emerged between the pronounce-
ments of one group (represented by Kirilenko, Shcherbitskiy, and
others) that has advocated the priority development of heavy indus-
try, and another (represented mainly by Chernenko) that has empha-
sized the need to increase the availability of consumer goods.
Whatever the outcome of this debate, a major reallocation of
resources almost certainly will be undertaken in the immediate
post-Brezhnev era, with agriculture--in the absence of its principal
parton--becoming a likely target for cuts. Other sectors also will
be affected by the political fortunes of their sponsors, however,
making the eventual economic beneficiaries laregly uncertain.
Military Spending
Concern about the domestic economy also could eventually impel
one or another leader to propose in the mid-1980s some reduction in
the rate of growth of military spending, if not an absolute cut as
Khrushchev did in the mid-1950s. A number of additional factors,
however, make even symbolic reductions in the growth of the defense
budget unlikely in the near term, including
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the poor state of U.S.-Soviet relations;
the political commitment of most Soviet leaders to a strong
defense;
the challenge of planned U.S. defense programs; and
the momentum of weapon development and production programs
that are underway.
In the succession environment, no new leader, unless he perceives an
existing consensus, is likely to risk antagonizing the military
establishment and conservative forces in the party by proposing cuts
in the growth of defense spending. Indeed, the military could even
come away from the coming power struggle with some increase in the
rate of growth of defense spending for a few years.
Over time, as the post-Brezhnev leadership struggles with
declining economic growth, there may be greater pressure to reduce
the growth in military spending in order to free up the labor and
capital resources urgently needed in key civilian sectors. In this
connection, the cost-avoidance benefits of arms control agreements
could assume greater importance. Even in the mid-1980s, however,
absolute reductions in the defense effort seem unlikely, barring
economic catastrophe. Moreover, Soviet military investment is now
so large that even with reduced growth--or indeed with no growth at
all--military capabilities would continue to increase well into the
1990s.
Economic Reforms
In addition to investment disputes, succession politics may bring
forth new proposals to improve the economy's efficiency. Concern
over declining growth apparently has led some leaders to reevaluate
economic and administrative reforms they earlier found unacceptable.
Since 1978 several Soviet leaders have publicly endorsed Hungary's
"New Economic Mechanism"--a system based on centrally formulated
plans and economic goals but using some market forces to guide the
economy at the micro-level.
Although there is little prospect that the Soviet Union will adopt
changes so sweeping, some administrative reforms may well be enacted.
The multitude of functionally related and overlapping ministries might
be placed under more centralized management. This could be accompained
by some decentralization of operational authority--a move that already
has been at least started in the agricultural sector. (It is in this
area that the Hungarian model has been most closely studied and
emulated.) Changes that are politically feasible, however, probably
will not significantly improve the economic situation.
Foreign Policy
The existing consensus on foreign policy is stronger than that
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on domestic issues, and major changes are less likely in that area
in the next few years. Some issues, nonetheless, could become a
bone of contention in?,the post-Brezhnev Politburo. Although these
issues will be determined largely by the international situation at
the time, a successor regime will have to deal with both the
challenges and opportunities outlined above.
? Rival claimants to leadership in the immediate post-Brezhnev era
are likely to share a commitment to sustain the global dimensions of
Soviet policy. This commitment could be reinforced by a possible
tendency on the part of a younger generation of Soviet leaders to
equate the growth of military power with the growth of global power
and influence. Supporting such thinking, moreover, are factors that
go beyond tangible or measurable indexes--ideological conviction, a
sense of insecurity and of hostile encirclement, and a contrasting
confidence and sense of achievement in the USSR's emergence as a
global superpower.
Soviet leaders probably will wish to continue an arms control
dialogue with the United States for at least the next few years,
seeking new agreements that will slow U.S. weapons programs, thereby
facilitating Soviet planning, reducing weapons costs, and lessening
the possibility of technological surprise. Although the Politburo
as a whole now seems to believe the prospects for improved Soviet-U.S.
relations are dim, in the past some leaders (such as Andropov and
Chernenko) have seemed more enthusiastic about pursuing this goal
than others (such as Kirilenko). The price the Soviet leadership
is willing to pay for an arms limitation agreement, therefore, may
depend in part on the outcome of the succession.
A new Soviet leadership may, in addition, undertake new
initiatives designed to alter the geopolitical environment. They
may, for instance, attempt a breakthrough in relations toward West-
ern Europe or China. Moscow's principal assets in these instances
would be the ability to offer greater intercourse between East and
West Germany and to offer China significant concessions on conten-
tious military and border issues.
The Soviet Union's other future policy options will depend on
events beyond its control. A collapse of the Saudi monarchy, for
example, could usher in an anti-Western regime, presenting the
Soviets with major new possibilities for expanding its influence in
the area. Likewise, the outcome of the Iran-Iraq war might also
create significant opportunities or dangers from Moscow's
perspective that could lead to policy shifts.
Longer-Range Undertainties
For the next 3 to 5 years, the Soviet leadership will continue
to be dominated by Brezhnev's current colleagues in the Politburo.
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Present policy already reflects their influence, and they may be
less willing than their younger colleagues waiting in the wings to
push for major policy of systemic change.
Soviet policies will become less predictable in the late 1980s
and early 1990s, however, as the gap between economic performance
and leadership expectations widens, as the basis for optimism about
future economic performance erodes, and as the generational change
in the Soviet leadership takes hold. The policy preferences of this
younger generation are largely unknown. Although they have discre-
tionary authority in implementing the Politburo's domestic policies,
these officials now hold positions--in the Central Committee
apparatus, regional party organizations, and the government
bureaucracy--that provide little involvement in foreign policy.
What little evidence we have of this younger group's views
reveals no clearly dominant orientation and no apparent consensus
regarding the direction of future policies. Their eventual domestic
course will probably reflect elements of both orthodox and reformist
views, perhaps undertaking some decentralization of economic manage-
ment, while at the same time tightening labor discipline.
Their foreign policy course is even more difficult to predict.
Conceivably, some members of this group might favor a more accom-
modating foreign policy stance in order to increase trade with the
West and ease domestic economic problems. The same pressures,
however, might lead others to urge the adoption of economic
self-sufficiency (autarky) at home and a more adventurist policy
abroad, increasing the risk of a U.S.-Soviet confrontation.
IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY
Changes in the Soviet system or policies over the next decade,
could affect Soviet behavior in areas that the United States con-
siders important. The succession and difficult internal problems
could lead a new leadership to be more circumspect in using Soviet
power and resources abroad and even cause it eventually to restrain
the rate of growth of its military machine. Limited accommodations
in the areas of arms control or other bilateral issues may by pos-
sible, but a more encompassing accord on bilateral relations or geo-
political behavior is precluded by fundamentally divergent attitudes
regarding desirable political or social change in the international
order.
Although the Soviets will not wish a major confrontation with
the United States, their belief that they now enjoy strategic
equality and some advantages enhances the prospects for a more
assertive foreign policy. Soviet leaders probably also can be
expected to seize new opportunities offered by instability in the
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Third World to enhance Soviet geopolitical influence and divert U.S.
attention from areas of direct U.S.-Soviet interaction, even in
situations where the 1.3"sR has little prospect of making significant
gains for itself. If-the Soviets are able to ameliorate some of
their current internal and external weaknesses--for example, by
stemming the decline of economic growth--this also would improve
their ability to compete with the United States for global influence.
It is doubtful, however, that Soviet leaders perceive a 'window
of opportunity" stemming from an overweening of confidence in present
Soviet nuclear forces relative to future prospects. From the per-
spective of the Soviet leadership, there will remain important deter-
rents to major military actions that directly threaten vital U.S.
national interests. These include the dangers of a direct conflict
with the United States that could escalate to global proportions,
doubts about the reliability of some of their East European allies,
and an awareness of the greater Western capacity to support an ex-
panded defense effort. These concerns do not preclude action abroad,
but they act as constraints on military actions in which the risk of
a direct U.S.-Soviet confrontation is clear.
U.S. Influence on Soviet Behavior
The future of the Soviet political system and its basic values
will be determined primarily by internal political forces that the
United States has only marginal ability to influence. Although also
limited, we have greater ability to affect Soviet behavior in the
international arena.
Impact on the Political System
U.S. and Western influence over the ongoing Soviet political
succession process is highly limited. Even if this were not the
case, a contender whose stance appears more favorable to Western
interests today may alter his position when he becomes party chief.
In the initial stages of the Lenin succession, for example, Stalin
appeared to be one of the more moderate Soviet leaders. During the
Stalin succession, Khrushchev at first adopted a hardline internal
position and later shifted to a more moderate course.
The West's ability to influence the nature and evolution of the
Soviet system is almost certainly limited. The degree of vulner-
ability of the USSR is difficult to judge, for the Soviet system has
never undergone the kind of passage it will be taking in the 1980s
and the West has not in the post-war period made change in the Soviet
Union an explicit objective of its dealings with the USSR, and taken
steps to give practical meaning to that objective. Clearly, the
Soviet system is extremely formidable in its ability to command
control of its population, perhaps the most formidable in the modern
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era. And it would be very difficult for the West to be confident
that its actions, even if affecting change in the USSR, would affect
change that was democratic or otherwise positive for the Soviet
people and the USSR's dealings with the West. Indeed, in the short
term, a Soviet regime that felt itself genuinely threatened would
likely make life even tougher for the Soviet people and those within
Soviet society who had the tenacity to suggest that a less
repressive system was needed.
U.S. policies, however, may be able to exacerbate several
continuing weaknesses in Soviet foreign and domestic policy.
Foreign policy actions which the Soviets perceive as necessary to
preserve existing equities--such as repressive measures in Eastern
Europe--tend to isolate them in the world and complicate achievement
of other goals. Moreover, the attraction some Western values hold
for the Soviet people will cause the regime to expend considerable
effort to protect them from foreign contagion and to prevent the
development of a stronger dissident movement. The Soviet economy
also will be hard pressed to keep pace with rising consumer
expectations, probably resulting in more leadership attention to
work stoppages, strikes, and other manifestations of social unrest.
Past U.S. efforts to use trade leverage to influence specific
Soviet policies, however, have had only limited success. Moscow
has circumvented most economic restrictions and refused to modify
its policies substantially in return for increased trade.
Western goods and technology however are becoming more important
to the USSR's strained economy; the volume of imports tripled in the
1970s and imports have been crucial to completion of several major
production projects and to overcoming production shortfalls. But
Moscow almost certainly will remain resistant to attempts at trade
leverage. Unilateral U.S. trade restrictions could create short-run
difficulties for the Soviets in some sectors--such as the oil and
gas and chemical industries--but would probably not persuade Moscow
to alter major domestic or foreign policies. Similarly, the Soviets
also certainly would view renewed U.S. offers of increased trade for
certain political concessions with considerable suspicion. Unified
and sustained Western trade restrictions, particularly in such areas
as energy equipment and agricultural products, however, could impose
substantial costs on the Soviets. They probably would not change
basic policies, particularly if international tensions were high,
but would affect the Soviet calculation of costs and benefits in
particular situations.
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PART II. - Meeting the Soviet Challenge
The foregoing analysis indicates clearly that we face a sustained
Soviet challenge which requires a firm and measured long-term Western
effort. This will be forthcoming only if the United States exercises
fully its capacity for leadership. The Reagan Administration policy
toward the Soviet Union must therefore address the immediate require-
ment to contain and reverse Soviet expansion and the need to begin a
longer-term process of promoting change within the USSR itself that
will reduce the Soviet threat to our interests and those of our
allies. Our policy towards the Soviet Union is not designed to
preserve the status quo, but to bring about peaceful change in our
direction.
In addition to these two tracks of our policy -- effective and
sustained competition with the Soviet Union and promotion of internal
change -- there is an important third track. We need to engage the
Soviet Union in a dialogue and negotiations to convey our concerns
clearly and also to attempt to reach agreements based on strict
reciprocity and mutual interest.
We need to create and sustain negative and positive incentives
powerful enough to influence Soviet behavior. Moscow must know that
behavior unacceptable to us will incur costs that would outweigh any
gains. At the same time, we must make clear to the Soviets that
real restraint in their behavior would pave the way for a stable and
constructive East-West relationship that would have important
benefits for the Soviet Union.
This approach to U.S.-Soviet relations could involve important
opportunities and benefits for the United States. It assigns appro-
priate priority to the task of meeting the Soviet military threat
with a credible deterrent and Soviet aggression in third areas with
appropriate countermeasures. By identifying the promotion of evolu-
tionary change within the Soviet Union itself as an objective of
U.S. policy, this approach enables the United States to take the
long-term strategic offensive. It therefore contrasts with the
essentially reactive and defensive strategy of containment, which
concedes the initiative to the Soviet Union and its allies and
surrogates. While entertaining no illusions that this kind of
change can be affected easily or quickly, this strategic approach
does hold out the possibility of an ultimate reduction of the Soviet
threat to U.S. interests and the level of U.S. resources that must
be devoted to countering that threat.
The strategic approach outlined above also has potential risks
and costs which we must minimize if the strategy is to succeed:
1. Some opponents of an offensive American strategy believe
that such an effort would involve the abandonment or downgrading of
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U.S.-Soviet negotiating efforts, especially in the arms control
area. We must be particularly conscious of Congressional and Allied
concerns on this score,. We can, to some extent, address and minimize
those concerns by emphasizing that our approach is gradual and peace-
ful and that our ultimate objective is not confrontation, but a stable
and constructive basis for East-West relations. At the same time, we
must recognize that our policy will not gain universal acceptance in
the West, and that energetic American leadership to implement it will
at times be divisive domestically and within the Alliance.
2. There is also the danger that our policy might provoke a more
militant Soviet response designed to utilize the USSR's current mili-
tary advantage to maximum effect before our efforts to redress the
military balance and exploit Soviet internal vulnerabilities have
time to succeed. While recognizing that this is not a negligible
risk, we nevertheless believe that the combination of our increased
vigilance, our military buildup, and our diplomatic offensive in
areas such as the Middle East will limit Soviet options, particularly
at a time of leadership succession.
3. As noted above, our knowledge of the structure and dynamics
of the Soviet regime is at best imperfect, and we cannot be certain
what kinds of U.S. policies would be effective in promoting evolu-
tionary change within the Soviet system. Indeed, U.S. policies which
forced the USSR to undertake economic reform or otherwise modify in-
ternal practices mandated by communist ideology might actually enable
the Soviet Union to compete more effectively with the West. Never-
theless, we believe that, with appropriate recognition of the neces-
sity for flexibility and a pragmatic approach, an effective strategy
for promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Union is possible.
Shaping the Soviet Environment: Arenas of Engagement
Implementation of our strategy must focus on shaping the
environment in which Soviet decisions are made both in the wide
variety of functional and geopolitical arenas in which our interests
are engaged and in the U.S.-Soviet bilateral relationship.
(A) Functional
(1) The Military Balance
Foremost in shaping the military environment Moscow faces is the
US-Soviet military balance. The U.S. must modernize its military
forces so that several goals are achieved:
--Soviet leaders must perceive that the U.S. is determined never
to accept a second-place or deteriorating strategic posture. We must
act to minimize doubts about the military capabilities of U.S.
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strategic nuclear deterrent forces, and about the U.S. will to use
them if necessary;
--Soviet calculations of possible nuclear war outcomes, under any
contingency, must always result in outcomes so unfavorable to the USSR
that there would be no incentive for the Soviet leaders to initiate a
nuclear attack;
--Leaders and the publics in all states must be able to observe
that this indicator of U.S. strength remains equal to or greater than
that of the USSR. They will then understand that U.S. capacity for
pursuing the broader US-Soviet competition shall not be encumbered by
direct Soviet coercion of the U.S.;
--The future of U.S. military strength must also appear to friend
and foe as strong: technological advances must be exploited, research
and development vigorously pursued, and sensible follow-on programs
undertaken so that the viability of U.S. deterrent policy is not
placed in question.
--We must tighten our controls over transfer of military related/dual
use technology, products, services and know-how in order to protect the
lead-time on which the qualitative advantage of our military strength
depends.
In Europe, the Soviet leadership must be faced with a reinvigorated
NATO focused on three primary tasks: strengthening of conventional
forces, modernization of intermediate-range nuclear forces, and
improved mobility and sustainability for U.S. units assigned rapid
deployment and other reinforcing missions to the NATO area and
Southwest Asia. Worldwide, U.S. general-purpose forces must be
ready to move quickly from peacetime to wartime roles, and must be
flexible enough to affect Soviet calculations in a wide range of
contingencies.
The US-Soviet military balance is also a critical determinant
shaping Third World perceptions of the relative positions and
influence of the two major powers. Moscow must know with certainty
that, in addition to the obvious priority of North American defense,
other areas of vital interest to the U.S. will be defended against
Soviet attacks or threats. But it must know also that areas less
critical to U.S. interests cannot be attacked or threatened without
risk of serious U.S. military countermeasures.
(2) Economic Policy
U.S. policy on economic relations with the USSR must serve our
strategic and foreign policy goals as well as our economic interests.
Economic policy should therefore be seen in the context of our
larger, long-term effort to encourage evolutionary change in the
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Soviet Union and to moderate Soviet external policies. Economic
measures alone cannot realize these goals, but economic diplomacy
can be a critical co9ponent in a larger strategy to meet the Soviet
military, political and economic challenge to the US and our Allies.
To be effective, such an economic policy must be sustainable over
the long-term; hence, we must be realistic about what we can or
cannot achieve and specific in our aims.
Within this overall framework, our economic objectives should
be to:
- -
Above all, ensure that East-West economic relations do not
facilitate the Soviet military build-up. This requires
that we prevent the transfer of critical technology and
equipment which would make a significant contribution
directly or indirectly to Soviet military power.
Seek to restrict Soviet military and foreign policy
options through appropriate long-term measures of
economic diplomacy.
Seek to minimize the potential for Soviet exercise of
reverse leverage on western countries based on trade,
energy supply, and financial relationships.
Avoid subsidizing the Soviet economy or unduly easing the
burden of Soviet resource allocation decisions, so as not
to dilute pressures for structural change in the Soviet
system.
Permit mutually beneficial trade with the USSR in
non-strategic areas, such as grains.
A strategy of sustained, disciplined economic diplomacy must
flow from these objectives. While uncertainties remain about the
exact effects on Soviet policy of the economic constraints analyzed
in Section One, it is clear that the Soviets, faced with grim eco-
nomic prospects in the 1980s, look to inputs of Western equipment,
technology, and products to ease the increasingly difficult choices
they face between military spending on the one hand and consumption
and investment on the other. Diminished Soviet prospects for growth
in hard currency exports make the availability of western credit
important to maintain current import levels. As Section One points
out, unilateral US trade restrictions could create short-run
difficulties for the Soviets in some sectors but would probably not
persuade Moscow to alter major domestic or foreign policies. Unified
and sustained western trade restrictions on credits, militarily cri-
tical technology, and other selected controls on exports or imports,
however, could impose substantial costs on the Soviets by forcing
them to face hard choices over the next decade, increase their
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preoccupation with domestic problems, and thereby decrease their
expansionist tendencies. The possibility of foreign policy sanctions
on some or all non-stTategic items remains for extreme situations
where, on a unified basis, the west can affect Soviet calculations
of costs and benefits for particular decisions.
The U.S. can and should seek to restrict Soviet military and
foreign policy options through economic policies. Because US-Soviet
trade is only a fraction of total western trade with the USSR, we
need the support of our European Allies and other key trading part-
ners. Indeed, the USSR's best hope of improving its strained hard
currency position in the longer run is to secure the cooperation of
Western Europe in building new large pipelines for the delivery of
additional natural gas in the late 1980s and 1990s. At the same
time, our policies should be based on our special responsibilities
within the Alliance and not on the lowest common denominator.
We must therefore, exercise strong leadership with our Allies
and others to develop a common understanding of the strategic impli-
cations of East-West trade. Under present circumstances, this does
not encompass economic warfare against the USSR. We pay a heavy
cost in terms of alliance cohesion when our policies are perceived
as including economic warfare measures. West European reluctance to
accept restrictions on trade and credits to the USSR to the extent
we believe are strategically and economically justified stems from
economic as well as political considerations. Although trade with
the Soviet Union and its CEMA partners is not of critical importance
to any Western country, it is more significant economically to our
West European Allies than to the U.S., especially in some sub-sectors
(e.g., steel pipe). They are reluctant to restrict export credits
that might enhance their ability to export to the East. They oppose
stopping construction of the Yamal pipeline, in part, because it
will enhance Soviet hard currency earnings and hence Soviet ability
to purchase more goods from them. They perceive not only such
short-term economic self interests but also a contribution to
long-term improvement in East-West political relations resulting
from increased trade with the Soviets.
Our task is to shift their emphasis to a more realistic
appreciation of strategic realities in order to forge a common
approach to East-West economic relations. At the same time we must
take into account the interests of specific U.S. constituencies,
e.g., grain, to avoid constant policy oscillations because of
domestic pressures. We must be prepared for the Europeans to raise
the issue of U.S. agricultural exports and we must argue it. We
must also recognize that the Allies have groups whose interests
cannot be ignored, analagous to U.S. grain farmers.
While there is general agreement with the Allies on the need for
control of military-related equipment and technology exports to the
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Soviets, there is no consensus on which of three basic approaches to
the management of East-West economic relations we should take.
:=
The detente policy of the 1970s, postulated that growth in
East-West trade would, over the long term, induce more
responsible Soviet behavior. A condition of this policy
was that Soviet failure to respond as expected could lead
to the withdrawal of benefits. However, the resultant
Soviet appetite for western equipment, technology and
credits has been turned to western political and strategic
advantage in only limited ways. Producer pressures and
concern about the ripple effects of a financial squeeze
prevented the West from using trade as political leverage
except for relatively modest measures. Moreover, the
detente policy did not avoid Soviet misbehavior in Poland
and Afghanistan.
A second approach starts from the premise that a sustained
strategy of economic diplomacy employing long-term selective
controls can limit Soviet options over the short term and
move toward long term structural change. This approach does
not, however, embody full scale trade war. It recognizes
that trade is beneficial to both sides but must be conducted
in a larger strategic context. It must also be managed so
as to minimize Soviet reverse leverage, and ensure that the
West is the net economic beneficiary.
Such an approach, although it cannot significantly reduce Soviet
freedom of action in the short term, could affect the Soviet cal-
culation of costs and benefits of fundamental policy approaches over
time. Implementing such a policy will pose major problems, as it
will require extensive consultations with the Allies on the relative
priority of objectives toward the USSR and on clarifying our common
assumptions and approaches. The more emphasis the U.S. places
publicly on internal change in the USSR and on linkage to Soviet
external behavior, the harder it will be to obtain allied consent.
Nevertheless, this approach offers the best chance for achieving a
common understanding with the Allies on the strategic implications
of East-West trade and on a set of basic ground rules and mechanisms
to safeguard western interests and take long-term advantage of
Soviet economic vulnerabilities.
-- The third approach, characterized as 'economic warfare,' is
not formally advocated by any U.S. Government agency even though
some Europeans allege this is the basic goal of our sanctions policy.
Economic warfare would be a virtually total denial of Western trade
and finance with the USSR to force fundamental changes in the USSR
by accelerating a collapse of the Soviet economy. Economic warfare
most closely would resemble the measures taken by the UK against
Argentina during the Falklands war and is a measure usually con-
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ceived of as one step short of full-scale war. Economic warfare
is unreasonable and unacceptable to the Allies and unnecessary to
further US objectives.,
For now, US policy should be the second approach of long-term
selective controls including either the present set of sanctions on
Poland or similar alternatives. If any alternative package is agreed
to, it must be at least as painful to the Soviet Union and must be
broadly supported by Europe and Japan.
The specific Polish sanctions should be lifted if the NATO
January 11 conditions for improvement in Poland are satisfied.
However, our longer-term objective of limiting Soviet options and
encouraging systemic change in the USSR must be pursued even if the
situation in Poland should improve. We will need to engage the
Allies in extended discussions and negotiations to achieve a common
understanding of the strategic implications of East-West trade. To
succeed, our objectives must be precise, realistic and sustainable,
and we must assure our Allies that we are seeking a balance of
benefits and sacrifices. We have already made progress in reaching
agreement on some basic considerations of East-West economic policy:
that it does not make sense to provide the USSR with technology it
can use to enhance its military potential; that it makes no sense
to subsidize the Soviet economy, and that we must not contribute
to Soviet strategic advantage.
These basic understandings create the framework in which we can
begin to study specific issues in the appropriate fora to set the
stage for agreement on a common approach. The program which would
flow from this common approach should aim at elements, within the
Western purview of influence, currently assisting the Soviet military
buildup. These include principally Western military-related tech-
nology, European markets for Soviet gas and Western subsidized
credit. The following specific measures would make more difficult
the decisions the USSR must make among key priorities in the 1980's:
- -
Enhanced controls through COCOM on the flow of critical
and certain non-critical military items used in the Soviet
military and critical technology and equipment used in
Soviet defense priority industries. In the long run,
tighter COCOM restrictions on militarily sensitive
technology would perhaps be the most valuable action
for the West.
Developing alternative energy proposals so that the
Europeans eschew future gas projects with the USSR. This
could cause the USSR to lose up to an estimated ten billion
dollars a year in hard currency earnings in the 1990s.
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Restriction of the export of oil and gas technology on any
future contracts with the USSR. Here the Europeans may be
unwilling tooagree with us, and they have powerful vested
interests. However, they might be brought to accept a
limited and reversible export embargo linked to NATO's
three conditions for Poland. The USSR depends on the West
for specialized oil exploration, drilling, pumping and
processing equipment. Denying all Western oil equipment
and technology would cost the USSR an estimated ten billion
dollars annually for several years, but a decreasing amount
thereafter.
Agreement to stricter limits on the terms and volume of
Government supported credits. Eliminating interest
subsidies could cost the Soviets some five hundred million
dollars a year. European acceptance of credit restraints
and the need to end credit subsidies may be a realistic
goal over time and we may be able to construct a common
regime.
Enhance the stature and scope of activities of the NATO
Economic Committee and the OECD in East-West trade analysis
and policy consideration.
Looking to the longer term, we can go either of two ways. If
Soviet behavior should worsen i.e. an invasion of Poland, we would
need to consider extreme measures such as a total trade boycott, in-
cluding grain, in which allied cohesion would be essential. Should
Soviet behavior improve, there is room at the margins to calibrate
the program of sustained economic measures while still retaining its
basics so as to force the Soviets to face up to the defects of their
economic system.
(3) Political Action
The U.S. relationship with the Soviet Union must have an
ideological thrust which clearly demonstrates the superiority of
U.S. and Western values of individual dignity and freedom, a free
press, free trade unions, free enterprise and political democracy
over the repressive character of Soviet communism. We should state
openly -- as the President did in the British Parliament -- our
belief that people in communist countries have the right to demo-
cratic systems. We need to stress that, 65 years after the October
Revolution, the Soviet regime continues to deny its people funda-
mental human rights and to pour enormous economic resources into the
military sector at the cost of continuing to fall behind the U.S.,
the Western democracies and Japan in agricultural and industrial
productivity and in the provisions of basic economic benefits.
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We need to review and significantly strengthen our instruments
of political action to encourage democratization. These should
include:
-- The President's London initiative to support democratic forces:
This initiative seeks concrete support for building democratic
institutions such as a free press, labor unions, political parties,
an independent judiciary, and churches. This will include training
of journalists, support for regional institutes that promote demo-
cratic values, and support for organizations that promote democratic
procedures and principles.
-- Focus on Soviet human rights violations: We should
emphasize Soviet responsibility for human rights violations in
Afghanistan and Poland. It should also be our objective to gather
information on Soviet violations of the human rights of their own
population and to maintain effective means for publicizing these
violations. We should consider strengthening the reporting capa-
bility of the foreign (particularly U.S.) press corps in the USSR.
We might, for example, consider providing Russian language training
for U.S. journalists assigned to the USSR, thus easing their access
to Soviet society. We should encourage private and official contact
with non-official Soviet citizens, including dissidents.
-- U.S. policy should recognize the diversity of Soviet
nationalities and, to the extent of our capabilities, promote the
emergence of a more equitable relationship between the ruling Great
Russian nation and non-Russian nationalities. This emphasis of our
policy is reflected in formation of an inter-agency committee on our
policy toward the nationality question in the USSR.
-- Broadcasting Policy: Additional resources should be devoted
to RFE and RL; technical means to penetrate Eastern jamming should
be developed on a priority basis. RFE/RL should be given access to
USG information on events in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.
We would have to be cautious in sourcing, but the requirement that
news be in the public media before RFE/RL can quote it is an
unnecessary handicap.
-- Other Measures: Political action is the least developed
of our tools to influence Soviet policy. We have done and are doing
much more in the defense and economic areas. But the potential
impact of political measures is so substantial that much more
thought needs to be given to how to develop them.
(B) Geopolitical
(1) The Industrial Democracies:
One of the central propositions of U.S. foreign policy throughout
the post-war period has been and continues to be that an effective
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response to the Soviet challenge requires close partnership among
the industrial democracies. To meet successfully the challenges to
our interests, the U.8. will require stronger and more effective
collective defense arrangements. There will continue to be inevi-
table tensions between our determination to exercise leadership and
our need for allied support in making our policy work. More effec-
tive procedures for consultation with our allies can contribute to
the building of consensus and cushion the impact of intra-alliance
disagreements. However, we must recognize that, on occasion, we may
be forced to act to protect our vital interests without allied
support and even in the face of allied opposition.
Our allies have been slow to support in concrete ways our
overall approach to East-West relations. In part because of the
intensive program of consultation we have undertaken, allied gov-
ernments have expressed rhetorical support for our assessment of the
Soviet military challenge, our rearmament program, and our negotiat-
ing positions in START and INF. Less progress has been made in
obtaining allied action in the vital areas of upgrading conventional
defense and in gaining Allied support for our military planning to
protect vital Western interests in the developing world, particularly
the Persian Gulf. With INF deployments scheduled to begin in 1983,
West European governments will come under increasing domestic pres-
sure to press us for progress in START and INF. If we cannot obtain
an INF agreement with Moscow acceptable to us, we may need during
1983 to subordinate some other policy initiatives with our allies to
the overriding objective of obtaining allied action to move forward
on INF deployments. Improving conventional defense, however, should
remain a high priority goal.
(2) The Third World
As in the 1970s, the Soviet challenge to U.S. interests in the
Third World will continue. Thus, we must continue our efforts to
rebuild the credibility of our commitment to resist Soviet encroach-
ment on our interests and those of our allies and friends and to
support effectively those Third World states that are willing to
resist Soviet pressures. We must where possible erode the advances
of Soviet influence in the developing world made during the 1970s.
Given the continued improvement of Moscow's force projection
capabilities and the Soviet emphasis on arms aid to pro-Soviet Third
World clients, any effective U.S. response must involve a military
dimension. U.S. security assistance and foreign military sales play
an important role in shaping the security environment around the
periphery of the USSR and beyond Eurasia. But security assistance
will not be enough unless we make clear to the Soviets and to our
friends that the U.S. is prepared to use its own military forces
where necessary to protect vital U.S. interests and support
endangered friends and allies. Above all, we must be able to
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demonstrate the capability and the will for timely action to bring
U.S. resources to bear in response to fast-moving events in Third
World trouble spots.
An effective U.S. policy in the Third World also depends
critically upon diplomatic initiatives (e.g., the President's
Mid-East proposal, the Caribbean Basin Initiative, and the
Namibia/Angola initiative) to promote the resolution of regional
crises vulnerable to Soviet exploitation. The U.S. should counter,
and if possible weaken or displace, Soviet aid relationships, par-
ticularly those involving states that host a Soviet military presence
or act as Soviet proxies. The U.S. must also develop an appropriate
mixture .of economic assistance programs and private sector initia-
tives to demonstrate the relevance of the free economies to the eco-
nomic problems of the developing world, while exposing the bankruptcy
of the Soviet economic and political model. In this connection, we
must develop the means to extend U.S. support to individuals and
movements in the developing world that share our commitment to
political democracy and individual freedom. Long-term political,
cadre and organization building programs, long a strongly emphasized
instrument of Soviet policy, must become a regular, and more
developed, part of our policy.
Possibly the greatest obstacle we face in carrying out this
approach in the developing world is the problem of obtaining ade-
quate budgetary resources. As in the case of our rearmament program,
pressures for budgetary restraint are certain to generate calls for
reduction of the resources devoted to meeting the Soviet challenge
in the developing world. These pressures must be resisted if we are
to be able to meet our commitments and secure our vital interests.
(3) Weakening the Soviet Empire (Eastern Europe,
Cuba, Third World Alliances)
As noted above, there are a number of important vulnerabilities
and weaknesses within the Soviet empire which the U.S. should seek
to exacerbate and exploit. This will involve differentiated policies
that recognize the need for a different mix of tools for each
problem. The prospects for change may be greater on the extremities
of Soviet power (Soviet alliances in the developing world) than
closer to the center of the Soviet empire (Eastern Europe) -- though
the latter obviously offers potential as well. The central point is
that we should not accept the notion that, once a communist or
pro-Soviet regime has come to power in a state, this situation is
irreversible. Indeed, we should seek whereever possible both to
encourage such states to distance themselves from the Soviet Union
in foreign policy and to move toward democratization domestically.
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Eastern &grope: Although the crackdown in Poland cut short a
process of peaceful change, the continuing instability in that
country is certain-,to have far-reaching repercussions throughout
Eastern Europe. In addition, the deteriorating economic position
of East European countries and the possible long-term drying up of
Western resources flowing to the region will force them to face some
difficult choices: greater dependence on the Soviets and relative
stagnation; or reforms to generate a renewal of Western resources.
The primary U.S. objective in Eastern Europe is to loosen
Moscow's hold on the region. We can advance this objective by
carefully discriminating in favor of countries that show relative
independence from the USSR in their foreign policy, or show a greater
degree of internal liberalization. Western influence in the region
is limited by Moscow's willingness to use force against developments
which threaten what it perceives as its vital interests. The United
States, however, can have an important impact on the region,
provided it continues to differentiate in its policies toward the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries, and among the countries
of Eastern Europe, so as to encourage diversity through political
and economic policies tailored to individual countries. While the
impact of differentiation in some cases may be marginal, it offers
the best vehicle for achieving the primary U.S. goal of weakening
overall Soviet control. This policy of differentiation in Eastern
Europe is the subject of NSSD 5-82.
Afghanistan: A significant vulnerability in the Soviet empire
is Afghanistan, where Moscow's imperial reach has bogged Soviet
forces down in a stalemated struggle to suppress the Afghan resis-
tance. A withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan followed by
a real exercise of self-determination by the Afghan people would be
perceived as a major foreign policy defeat for the Soviet Union and
thus might well increase the likelihood that other Third World
countries would resist Soviet pressures. Thus, our objective should
be to keep maximum pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and to ensure
that the Soviets' political and other costs remain high while the
occupation continues.
Cuba: The challenge to U.S. interests represented by Moscow's
alliance with Cuba requires an effective U.S. response. The
Soviet-Cuban challenge has three critical dimensions (as well as
numerous other problems):
-- Soviet deliveries of advanced weapons to Havana: The flow of
advanced Soviet weapons to Cuba has accelerated so as to represent a
growing threat to the security of other Latin American countries,
U.S. sea lines of communication and, in the case of potentially
nuclear-capable systems, the U.S. itself. We must be prepared to
take strong countermeasures to offset the political/military impact
of these deliveries.
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-- Soviet-supported Cuban destabilizing activities in Central
America: The U.S. response must involve bilateral economic and
military assistance.to friendly governments in the region, as well
as multilateral initiatives to deal with the political, economic,
and social sources of instability. We should retain the option of
direct action against Cuba, while making clear our willingness
seriously to address Cuba's concerns if Havana is willing to reduce
its dependence on and cooperation with the Soviet Union. We should
also take steps to prevent or neutralize the impact of transfers of
advanced Soviet weapons to Nicaragua.
-- Soviet-Cuban interventionism in Southern Africa: We should
counter and reduce Soviet and Cuban influence by strengthening our
own relations with friendly African states, and by energetic
leadership of the diplomatic effort to bring about a Cuban with-
drawal from Angola in the context of a Namibia settlement and
appropriate external guarantees of Angola's security.
Soviet Third World Alliances: Our policy should seek to weaken
and, where possible, undermine the existing links between the Soviet
Union and its Third World allies and clients. In implementing this
policy, we will need to take into account the individual vulner-
abilities of Soviet Third World allies and the unique circumstances
which influence the degree of cohesion between them and the Soviet
Union. In some cases, these ties are so strong as to make the Third
World state a virtual proxy or surrogate of the Soviet Union. We
should be prepared to work with our allies and Third World friends
to neutralize the activities of these Soviet proxies. In other
cases, ties between the Soviet Union and a Third World client may
be tenuous or subject to strains which a nuanced U.S. policy can
exploit to move the Third World state away from the Soviet orbit.
Our policy should be flexible enough to take advantage of these
opportunities.
Finally, we should seek where possible and prudent to encourage
democratic movements and forces to bring about political change
inside these countries.
(4) China
We view China as a friendly country with which we are not allied
but with which we share many common interests. China continues to
support our efforts to strengthen the world's defenses against Soviet
expansionism, and its perception of the Soviets as the number one
threat to world peace influences its policies in various areas. The
PRC has supported the Khmer coalition effort and provided supplies
and equipment to the resistance forces, mainly the Khmer Rouge, which
is the most effective armed resistance to the Soviet-supported Viet-
nam occupation of Kampuchea. It ties down as many North Vietnamese
(500,000) in northern Vietnam as it ties down Soviet troops along
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the entire Soviet border and in Mongolia. It openly stresses the
importance of improved Japanese defense efforts and close U.S.-Japan
relations, works hard to reduce Soviet influence in North Korea and
to restrain Kim Il=sung, and provides military and economic aid to
Pakistan. And it also provides defense-related equipment to Egypt
and some military assistance to Syria, the Yemens, and Somalia in
an effort to reduce Soviet influence.
U.S.-China relations have cooled over the past year as we
struggled with the issue of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. As we now
move forward to develop renewed dialogue, our aim should be, over
time, to achieve enhanced strategic cooperation and policy coordina-
tion. In this regard, we will continue to pursue a policy of sub-
stantially liberalized technology transfer in keeping with the
President's policy, which states that "Our strategic interests
dictate the preservation of China as an effective counterweight
to growing Soviet military power and the strengthening of strategic
cooperation with China." We will also be willing to consider the
sale of military equipment to China on a case-by-case basis within
the carefully constructed parameters of the policy approved by the
President in 1981.
We will be developing the relationship on its own merits as
well. U.S.-China trade has expanded five fold since normalization
in 1979. China is now our 14th largest trading partner and fourth
largest market for agricultural products. Bilateral exchanges in
the areas of culture, science, and technology have expanded rapidly.
Each year, for example, approximately 9,000 Chinese study in the U.S.
and some 100,000 Americans visit China.
(C) Bilateral Relationships
Despite the post-Afghanistan, post-Poland attenuation of
US-Soviet bilateral ties, there remain sectors of the bilateral
relationship that are important to Moscow and thus to any effort
to induce moderation of Soviet conduct.
(1) Arms Control
Arms control negotiations and agreements, pursued soberly and
without illusions, are an important part of our overall national
security policy. We should be willing to enter into arms control
negotiations and seek agreements when they serve our national secu-
rity objectives. At the same time, we must recognize that arms con-
trol agreements are not an end in themselves but are, in combination
with continued efforts by the U.S. and its Allies to maintain the
military balance, an important means for enhancing national security
and global stability. We must make clear to the allies as well as
to the USSR that our ability to reach satisfactory results will
inevitably be influenced by the international situation, the overall
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state of US-Soviet relations and the difficulties in defining areas
of mutual agrement with an adversary who often seeks unilateral gain.
However, we should not assume that ongoing arms control negotiations
will give us leverale sufficient to produce Soviet restraint on
other international issues.
U.S. arms control proposals should be consistent with necessary
force modernization plans and should seek to achieve balanced, sig-
nificant, and verifiable reductions to equal levels of comparable
armaments. The START and INF proposals we have tabled meet these
criteria and would, if accepted by the Soviets, help ensure the
survivability of our nuclear deterrent and the viability of NATO's
conventional defenses and thus enhance the national security of the
U.S. and its Allies and reduce the risk of war. While the commence-
ment of these negotiations served to somewhat reduce public pressure
on us and on Allied Governments for early arms control agreements
with Moscow, in the absence of progress in START and INF we should
expect that pressure to grow. This is particularly relevant in INF
as we near deployment dates for Pershing II and GLCMs in Europe.
(2) Official Dialogue
We can expect the Soviets to continue to press us for a return
to a US-Soviet agenda centered on arms control. We must continue to
resist this tactic and insist that Moscow address the full range of
our concerns about their international behavior if our relations are
to improve. US-Soviet diplomatic contacts on regional issues can
serve our interests if they are used to keep pressure on Moscow for
responsible behavior and to drive home that we will act to ensure
that the costs of irresponsibility are high. We can also use such
contacts to make clear that the way to pragmatic solutions of
regional problems is open if Moscow is willing seriously to address
our concerns. At the same time, such contacts must be handled with
care to avoid offering the Soviet Union a role in regional questions
which it would not otherwise secure.
Foreign Minister Level Dialogue: A continuing dialogue with the
Soviets at the level of Foreign Minister is essential, both to faci-
litate necessary diplomatic communication with the Soviet leadership
and to maintain allied understanding and support for our approach to
East-West relations. Secretary Haig met with Gromyko on three
occasions between September 1981 and June 1982, and this pattern of
frequent Ministerial-level contacts should be maintained in the
future.
Summitry: We can expect that the question of a possible US-Soviet
summit will continue to be raised by the Soviets, our allies, and
important segments of domestic opinion. Every American President
since Franklin Roosevelt has met with his Soviet counterpart. In
some cases, U.S. Presidents have attended summits for the purpose
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of establishing personal contact with their counterparts (e.g.,
Kennedy in Vienna) or in the vague expectation that an improvement
in US-Soviet relations would flow from the summit. In other cases,
allied pressures for East-West dialogue at the Head of State level
have played a major role in the Presidential decision to meet at the
summit (e.g., Eisenhower at Geneva and Paris).
The approach to summitry which prevailed throughout the 1970s
held that American Presidents should not meet with their Soviet
counterparts until there were concrete US-Soviet agreements ready
to serve as the centerpeice of the summit. However, these summits
did not always produce durable improvements in US-Soviet relations,
and sometimes complicated management of US-Soviet relations by
generating expectations that could not be realized.
In any summit between President Reagan and his Soviet counterpart
we would want to ensure that concrete, positive results were achiev-
able. At the same time, the experience of the 1970s demonstrates
that the signature of pre-negotiated agreements may not necessarily
be the most effective substantive focus of a summit from the per-
spective of U.S. interests. It might also be valuable for a summit
to reflect both the current strains in the U.S.-Soviet relationship
and our desire to see those strains reduced if the Soviet Union is
prepared to demonstrate restraint. Thus, we should retain the option
of a sober and serious summit that would not necessarily involve
signature of major new U.S.-Soviet agreements. We should also be
sensitive to the possibility that a summit might play a critical
role in shoring up Allied support for our East-West strategy. We
would therefore need to ensure that any summit were timed to achieve
the maximum possible positive impact in terms of U.S. interests.
U.S.-Soviet Cooperative Exchanges: The role of U.S.-Soviet
cultural, educational, scientific and other cooperative exchanges
should be seen in light of our intention to maintain a strong ideo-
logical component in our relations with Moscow. We should not
further dismantle the framework of exchanges; indeed we should expand
those exchanges which have the potential for advancing our objective
of promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet system.
III. Priorities in the U.S. Approach: Maximizing our
Restraining Leverage over Soviet Behavior
The interrelated tasks of containing and reversing Soviet expansion
and promoting evolutionary change within the Soviet Union itself can-
not be accomplished quickly. Our success in managing US-Soviet rela-
tions during the next five to ten years may well determine whether we
are able to attain our long-term objectives. Despite the long-term
vulnerabilities of the Soviet system, we can expect that Soviet mili-
tary power will continue to grow throughout the 1980s. Moreover, the
Soviet Union will have every incentive to prevent us from reversing
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the trends of the last decade which have seen an unprecedented growth
of Soviet military power relative to that of the U.S. Thus, the
coming 5-10 years will be a period of considerable uncertainty in
which the Soviets will test our resolve by continuing the kind of
aggressive international behavior which this Administration finds
unacceptable.
These uncertainties, moreover, will be exacerbated by the fact
that the Soviet Union will be engaged in the unpredictable process
of political succession to Brezhnev. As noted above, we cannot pre-
dict with confidence what policies Brezhnev's successors will adopt.
Consequently, we should not seek to adjust our policies to the Soviet
internal conflict, but rather try to create incentives (positive and
negative) for any new leadership to adopt policies less detrimental
to U.S. interests. Our posture should be one of a willingness to
deal, on the basis of the policy approach we have taken since the
beginning of the Administration, with whichever leadership group
emerges. We would underscore that we remain ready for improved
US-Soviet relations if the Soviet Union makes significant changes
in policies of concern to us; the burden for any further deteriora-
tion in relations must fall squarely on Moscow.
Throughout the coming decade, our rearmament program will be
subject to the uncertainties of the budget process and the U.S.
domestic debate on national security. In addition, our reassertion
of leadership with our allies, while necessary for the long-term
revitalization of our alliances, is certain to create periodic
intra-alliance disputes that may provide the Soviets with oppor-
tunities for wedge driving. Our effort to reconstruct the credi-
bility of U.S. commitments in the Third World will also depend upon
our ability to sustain over time commitments of resources, despite
budgetary stringencies. As noted above, these constraints on our
capacity to shape the Soviet international environment will be
accompanied by real limits on our capacity to use the US-Soviet
bilateral relationship as leverage to restrain Soviet behavior.
The existing and projected gap between our finite resources and
the level of capabilities needed to implement our strategy for
U.S.-Soviet relations makes it essential that we: 1) establish firm
priorities for the use of limited U.S. resources where they will
have the greatest restraining impact on the Soviet Union; and 2)
mobilize the resources of our European and Asian allies and our
Third World friends who are willing to join with us in containing
the expansion of Soviet power.
(1) U.S. Priorities
Underlying the full range of U.S. and Western policies must be
a strong military, capable of acting across the entire spectrum of
potential conflicts and guided by a well conceived political and
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military strategy. The heart of U.S. military strategy is to deter
attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S., our allies, or
other important co4ptries, and to defeat such an attack should deter-
rence fail. Achieving this strategic aim largely rests, as in the
past, on a strong U.S. capability for unilateral military action.
Strategic nuclear forces remain a crucial element of that capability,
but the importance of other forces -- nuclear and conventional -- has
risen in the current era of strategic nuclear parity.
Although unilateral U.S. efforts must lead the way in rebuilding
Western military strength to counter the Soviet threat, the protec-
tion of Western interests will require increased U.S. cooperation
with allied and other states and greater utilization of their
resources. U.S. military strategy must be better integrated with
national strategies of allies and friends, and U.S. defense programs
must consider allied arrangements in the planning stage.
U.S. military strategy for successfully contending with peacetime,
crisis, and wartime contingencies involving the USSR on a global
basis is detailed in NSSD 32. This military strategy must be com-
bined with a political strategy focused on the following objectives:
-- Creating a long-term Western consensus for dealing with the
Soviet Union. This will require that the U.S. exercise strong
leadership in developing policies to deal with the multi-
faceted Soviet threat to Western interests. It will also
require that the U.S. take allied concerns into account. In
this connection, and in addition to pushing the allies to spend
more on defense, we must make a serious effort to negotiate arms
control agreements consistent with our military strategy, our
force modernization plans, and our overall approach to arms
control. We must also develop, together with our allies, a
unified Western approach to East-West economic relations
consistent with the U.S. policy outlined in this study.
-- Building and sustaining a major ideological/political
offensive which, together with other efforts, will be designed
to bring about evolutionary change inside the Soviet Union
itself. This must be a long-term program, given the nature of
the Soviet system.
-- Effective opposition to Moscow's efforts to consolidate its
position in Afghanistan. This will require that we continue
efforts to promote Soviet withdrawal in the context of a nego-
tiated settlement of the conflict. At the same time, we should
keep pressure on Moscow for withdrawal and ensure that Soviet
costs on the ground remain high.
-- Maintenance of international pressure on Moscow to permit
a relaxation of the current repression in Poland and a longer
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term increase in diversity and independence throughout Eastern
Europe. This will require that we continue to impose costs on
the Soviet Union for its behavior in Poland. It will also
require that we-lnaintain a U.S. policy of differentiation among
East European countries.
-- Maintenance of our strategic relationship with China, thus
minimizing opportunities for a Sino-Soviet rapprochement.
-- Neutralization and reduction of the threat to U.S. national
security interests posed by the Soviet-Cuban relationship. This
will require that we use a variety of instruments, including
diplomatic efforts such as the Contact Group Namibia/Angola
initiative. U.S. security and economic assistance in Latin
America will also be essential. However, we must retain the
option of direct use of U.S. military forces to protect vitAl
U.S. security interests against threats which may arise from
the Soviet-Cuban connection.
IV. Articulating Our Approach: Sustaining Public
and Congressional Support
The policy outlined above is a strategy for the long haul. We
should have no illusions that it will yield a rapid breakthrough in
our relations with the Soviet Union. In the absence of dramatic
near-term victories in our effort to moderate Soviet behavior, pres-
sure is likely to mount for change in our policy. We can expect
appeals from important segments of domestic opinion for a more
normal" US-Soviet relationship. This is inevitable given the
historic American intolerance of ambiguity and complexity in
foreign affairs.
We must therefore demonstrate that the American people will
support the policy we have outlined. This will require that we
avoid generating unrealizable expectations for near-term progress
in US-Soviet relations. At the same time, we must demonstrate credibly
that our policy is not a blueprint for an open-ended, sterile confron-
tation with Moscow, but a serious search for a stable and constructive
long-term basis for US-Soviet relations.
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