APRIL 12 INTERAGENCY REVIEW GROUP MEETING ON NSSD 1-82

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000200210016-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 15
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 28, 2013
• Sequence Number: 16
• Publication Date: April 9, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON. D.C. 20506
CONFIDENTIAL WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR L. PAUL BREMER III
Executive Secretary
Department of State
April 9, 1982
LIEUTENANT COLONEL ROBERT P. MEEHAN
Assistant for Interagency Matters
Office of the Secretary of Defense
THOMAS B. CORMACK
Executive Secretary
Central Intelligence Agency
COLONEL CHARLES F. STEBBINS
Executive Assistant to the
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
SUBJECT: April 12 Interagency Review Group Meeting
on NSSD 1-82
OSD has asked that we circulate the attached draft of Part III,
Section C (Regional Military Objectives) for discussion at the
Interagency Review Group meeting on April 12, 1982.
Attachment
as stated
CONFIDENTIAL WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
Review April 9, 1988
Micriael 0. Wheeler
Staff Secretary
TS823167/F/1
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NSSD 1-82, PART III, SECTION C Itir. ?LURE'
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REGIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES -
SUMMARY
The US must plan for a successful defense in a global war. The Soviet Union must be
prevented from forcing the US to choose between initiating nuclear war and accepting
permanent loss of vital Western interests. The US will seek to limit the scope of any
conflict, but will plan options for military actions in regions of clear US advantage.
Such options will be a part of US strategy, but is not a substitute for military capa-
bility to defend where threatened. Soviet options for like action and the linkage
between geographical expansion and nuclear escalation must be considered.
While recognizing that the political and military situation at the time of war will
dictate strategy decisions, and that a US-Soviet conflict may well expand beyond one
theater, the following priorities apply for global wartime planning: highest priority
is North America, followed by NATO, and the supporting lines of communication (LOCs).
The next priority is ensuring access to the oil in Southwest Asia, followed by the
defense of our Pacific allies, supporting LOCs and the defense of other friendly nations
in Latin America and Africa. Peacetime priorities may not parallel wartime priorities.
Specific US regional objectives are keyed to this global context.
In contingencies not involving direct Soviet aggression, our strategy is to rely on
regional states to the extent possible.
In Europe, our primary objective is to strengthen NATO's capability to deter or
defeat a Soviet attack. In wartime, the US will support NATO strategy which requires
forward defense with conventional forces supported by the possibility of nuclear
escalation. In peacetime,. US objectives are to enhance deterrence through major
improvements in NATO's conventional capabilities; ?to improve nuclear and chemical forces;
and to obtain increased Allied defense contributions in Europe and Southwest Asia.
In the Near East/Southwest Asia, our principal objectives are to prevent the spread
of Soviet influence; to protect Western access to oil; to maintain Israel's qualitative
military advantage; and to support moderate states against aggression and subversion.
US military strategy is to deter Soviet aggression; if necessary, to combat the Soviets
in the theater; and to prepare for executing counteroffensives elsewhere.
In the Far East, our wartime objectives are viewed primarily in the context of a
global war. They are: to maintain control of Pacific LOCs; to protect US bases; to
fulfill commitments to allies; in conjunction with regional states, to prevent the
redeployment of Soviet forces from the Far East; and .to secure Japanese self-defense
including long-range LOC protection. In peacetime, we seek a more active defense
partnership with Japan, a more durable US-PRC relationship, and continued stability DU
the Korean Peninsula.
In the Western Hemisphere, our primary wartime objective is the security of the
North American Continent, the Caribbean Basin and the Panama Canal. In peacetime, our
objectives are to modernize North America's strategic air defense system; to reverse
Communist gainsin Latin America; and to increase US military presence.
In Africa, our wartime objectives are to neutralize hostile forces in strategic
locations and to protect Western access to the region's mineral resources. US peacetime
objectives are to obtain additional facilities access and transmit rights, and to assist
countries resisting Soviet-sponsored subversion.
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MILITARY OBJECTIVES
I. Global
A. Introduction
The wartime strategy of the U.S. is to employ
military force to achieve our political objectives and
secure early war termination on terms favorable to-the U.S.
and its allies. In doing so, the U.S. must plan,- in conjunction
with allies, for a successful defense in a.global war against
the Soviet Union and its allies. At the same time, the U.S.
will seek to limit the scope of a U.S.-Soviet conflict to
the extent commensurate with protecting U.S. vital interests.
Contingency planning should, however, include options for %
military actions in regions of clear U.S. advantage to
dissuade the Soviets from continuing their attack. In this
context, the threat of counteroffensives elsewhere is an.
essential element of U.S. strategy, but is not a substitute
for adequate military 'capability to defend U.S. interests in
the area in which they are threatened. Moreover, a decision
to expand a war geographically must take account of the
facts that the Soviet Union enjoys options of attacking on
other fronts at least as attractive as ours, and that
geographic expansion and nuclear escalation considerations
are linked.
In contingencies involving direct Soviet aggression,
the U.S. would expect to play a major role in defending U.S.
and allies interests. .In lower order, non-Soviet contingencies,
we plan to rely on regional states and other friends and
allies to the extent possible to deter or counter threats to
common interests.
B. Priorities for Wartime Resource Allocation
Due to the global military capabilities of the
Soviet Union and the interrelationship of strategic theaters,
the likelihood that any U.S.-Soviet conflict would expand
beyond one theater to other theaters must be recognized and
planned for. This does not mean that we must have the
capability to successfully engage Soviet forces simultaneously
on all fronts. Rather, this means procuring balanced forces
and establishing priorities for sequential operations among
theaters to ensure that we, in conjunction with our allies,
apply our military power-in the most effective way. This
includes preventing the Soviet Union from being able to
force the U.S. to choose between initiating nuclear war and
accepting the loss of vital Western interests. While
recognizing that the political and military situations at
the time of war will, bear heavill, on strategic decisions,
the following priorities will apply for wartime planning:
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. .
The highest priority is the defense of North
America (including Hawaii, Alaska and Caribbean
SLOCs), followed by the NATO areas and the
LOCs leading there to.
The next priority is ensuring access.to the
oil in Southwest Asia, followed by defense of
U.S. Pacific allies and the LOCs for the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the defense of
other friendly nations in Latin America and
Africa.
In areas other than NATO and Southwest Asia, U.S. actions
will be designed to protect essential U.S. interests, take
advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities, and divert Soviet
attention and forces from Europe and Southwest Asia.
Priorities for peacetime resource allocation may not always
correlate to the above wartime priorities since special
emphasis on specific capabilities may be required.
C. Equitable Burdensharing. Many nations with living
standards equal to the U.S. contribute markedly less to the
common defense. In 1982 and beyond, U.S. "quiet diplomacy"
must be much firmer in insisting upon increased defense
efforts by affluent nations which possess the potential to do
more in the defense realm.
II. Regional Objectives
In the event of war with the Soviet Union,- regional
objectives provide only rough guidelines and must be viewed
? in a global perspective.
A. Europe
The security of Europe is closely linked to that
of the United States. The unprecedented challenges to
Western security, coupled with a continuing growth in
? economic interdependence, mandate a firm commitment by
nations on both sides of the Atlantic to the coalition
warfare strategy of NATO. While intra-Alliance problems
such as burdensharing and anti-nuclear moVements exist, it
will remain important that we continue to recognize that the
defense of Europe is vital to the national security of the
United States.
NATO strategy MC14/3 stresses defense along the
forward edge of NATO territory, supported by the possible NATO
initiation of nuclear escalation if NATO is losing conventionally.
This nuclear linkage -- and uncertainty -- is important to
deterrence- -But the Europeans must not be permitted to use
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nuclear linkage as an excuse for not funding conventional
defense forces. Our policy should be to support MC14/3,
while stressing that nuclear parity means a strong con-
ventional defense is necessary for deterrence as well as for
defense. While improvements are required across the full
spectrum of the Alliance's military capabilities, a major
increase over current efforts is especially required from
all other members with regard to conventional capability.
Without such an increase the nuclear threshold could be
lowered and the Allies become more vulnerable to nuclear
threats as the Soviets continue increasing their capabilities.
Additionally, NATO should enhance deterrence through closer
Allied coherence,. and clearer expression of political will.
Within the context outlined above, the following are the
specific U.S. military objectives for the European region:
Wartime Objectives
To protect the territorial integrity of Western
Europe.
To defeat a Warsaw Pact conventional attack with
conventional forces'in a forward defense, and to
deter Soviet, use .of chemical or nuclear weapons in
accordance with current NATO strategy.
To fully engage all NATO members in the conflict.
To be able to sustain a war at least-as long as
the Warsaw Pact can.
To weaken the Warsaw Pact's ability to wage war by
engaging Pact -forces on their own territory,
disrupting their LOCs, and fragmenting the cohesion
of the Pact alliance.
To establish and maintain control of Atlantic
LOCs.
Peacetime Military Objectives
To enhance deterrence through improvements in
NATO's conventional defense capabilities while
? .also improving nuclear.and chemical forces.
To achieve increased Allied contributions to the
defense of Western Europe and from Allies capable
of doing so increased contributions in other areas
of mutual benefit, to include Southwest Asia.
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To secure a more effective division of labor
within NATO through cooperative efforts, such as
'Host Nation Support Agreements.
B. Near East/Southwest Asia. The United States has
two primary national security interests in the region. The
first-is to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring political-
military hegemony in the region. This requires that the
U.S. support the sovereignty-of regional states friendly to
the U.S. The second is to maintain continued access to
Persian Gulf oil. This means that the U.S., in concert with
intra-.and extraregional allies and friends must be *prepared
to meet threats of. any magnitude, from internal subversion
to large scale. Soviet aggression..
In this context, defense policy has three overriding objectives:
1. Deter Soviet overt military aggression and
protect Western access to oil. To do this, U.S. defense
planning has three tiers. First, we must plan for and
demonstrate our ability to project the RDJTF -- Rapid Deployment
Joint Task Force -- quickly into the region to prevent a
Soviet fait accompli. Additional support from intra- and
extraregional allies and friends must be obtained to support
RDJTF requirements. Our private pressure upon them for
realistic.combined planning must be unremitting. Second, if
deterrence fails, We must plan to combat the Soviets-in the
theater to dissuade them from continued aggression. The
third tier of Defense planning, is to prepare for executing
counter-offensives on other fronts where the U.S. has
advantages. Throughout this planning process, the potential for
this conflict to become global must be recognited'and planned for.
2. Maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage
over any realistic combination of Arab foes. The latest SNIE
concludes that Israel's military superiority is much stronger
today than at. the time of the 1973 war and projects that it will
be much stronger in FY 87 than .today. As the most militarily
powerful state in the region, Israel's assistance would be
of considerable benefit in the course of a conflict with the
Soviets, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean, as
augmentation for the Southern.Flank.
- 3. Support moderate states against external
aggression and subversion. This requires U.S. arms sales to
help strengthen substantially .the self-defense capabilities
of key states in the region.
To accomplish these objectives for the region,
the U.S. expects regional states to contribute to the extent
possible to their own defense as well as assisting in supporting
the employment' of U.S. forces. ?Allies will be expected to
offer their facilities for the deployment of U.S. forces to
Southwest Asia. Additionally, they should be encouraged to
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contribute militarily to meeting specific threats if such
participation would not substantially reduce their war
fighting capability in their home region and would provide a
beneficial contribution to the conflict.
Within the context outlined above, the following are the
specific U.S. military objectives for the Near East, Southwest
and South Asia region:
Wartime and Crisis Objectives
To secure the oil fields, transshipment points and
sea lines of communications essential-to Western
security. (This includes threats of all magnitude
from internal subversion to Soviet aggression.)
To preserve the independence of Israel.
To engage friendly regional states, Weste?n Allies
and other extra-regional states in the execution
of our strategy.
Peacetime Military Objectives
To prevent Soviet hegemony and extension of influence.
To acquire, by the end of the decade, sufficient
capability to have reasonable assurance of achieving
U.S. wartime objectives in Southwest Asia while
seeking to limit the likelihood of expansion of the
conflict beyond the region and its supporting lines
of communication (LOCs).
To maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage
over any combination of Arab foes;
To support moderate states against external
aggression and subversion.
To ensure access to a network of military facilities
in the region for the rapid introduction and
sustainment of sizable U.S. forces.
To obtain overflight, landing, bunkering and
access to enroute facilities for the deployment
and support of U.S. combat forces.
To obtain military contributions (including
agreements for combat forces) from selected Allies
in support of U.S. objectives in the region.
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To maintain a strong naval presence in the area,
together with as substantial a presence on land as
can be managed given regional sensitivities and '
political constraints.
To increase peacetime planning with regional
states for wartime contingencies, including host
nation support, prepositioning and combat roles
for indigenous forces. -
C. Far East. Our, foremost peacetime objective in the
Far East is, in conjunction with our allies and other
friends in the region, to prevent the Soviet Union from
expanding its influence in East Asia and the Pacific. Asian
security relationships are fundamental to offsetting success-
fully Soviet global ambitions. U.S. strategy in East Asia
and the Pacific is predicated on the stabilizing relationship
between two security anchors. One anchor in Northeast Asia
depends on cooperation among the U.S., Korea, and Japan, as
well as the U.S. relationship with China. The other anchor
in the Pacific Basin binds the U.S. to Australia, New Zealand,
the Philippines, the somewhat more loosely.to the remainder
of ASEAN. Continued U.S. and allied force improvements and
strengthened U.S. security relationships are required to
establish and maintain an effective defensive network
secured at both ends of the region. A direct U.S.-Soviet
conflict in Asia is unlikely except in the context of a
global war. Therefore, although other contingencies in the
region could involve U.S. forces in hostilities short of
U.S.-Soviet conflict; regional wartime objectives in Asia
listed below are those supportive of global wartime objectives.
Wartime Objectives
To maintain control of the Pacific lines of
communication, including those to the Indian
Ocean, and the bases needed to support the global
strategy.
To fulfill commitments to the Asian allies, given
particular emphasis to protection of U.S. bases in
the region, obtain allied support in the conflict,
and seek to preclude a Soviet decision to redeploy
forces for use against NATO.
To have Japan provide for its own defense, including
SLOC and air protection to 1,000 miles, and if possible,
contribute more? broadly to regional defense efforts.
To have the PRC maintain military initiatives that
would fix Soviet ground, air and naval forces in
the USSR's Far Eastern territories.
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Peacetime Military Objectives
To transform our relationship with Japan into an
active defense partnership in. which Japan significantly
increases its own defense capabilities and, over
time, contributes more broadly to regional defense.
To continue to develop our relationship with .the
PRC in ways which maintain the PRC as a.counterweight
to the Soviet Union, enhance the durability of
U.S.-PRC ties, and lay the foundation for'closer
future cooperation as appropriate.
To maintain sufficient U.S. and allied strength on
the Korean Peninsula to ensure stability there,
and, if deterrence fails, assist the ROK in
defeating hostile forces. Enhance deterrence,
primarily by assisting the ROK. to become increasingly
self-sufficient in its defense capabilities. .
To increase peacetime planning with our allies for
wartime contingencies.
To have other regional states assume a greater
share of the responsibility for the common defense
and assist them in improving their capabilities to
fulfill it.
To improve the support of regional states for U.S.
power projection from the Western Pacific to the
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.
To prevent the Soviet Union or Vietnam from
achieving a dominant presence in Southeast Asia
from which to foster actions inimical to our
interests and those of our allies.
D. Western Hemisphere
The defense of North America is this nation's
primary security concern. Since World War II, defense of
the Western Hemisphere has meant that the U.S. would maintain
strategic nuclear deterrence, develop closer relations with
Canada and Mexico, and foster collective security arrangements
among Latin American countries. It is becoming increasingly
clear that a secure hemisphere is no longer a foregone
conclusion. The U.S. must continue to build on interests
shared with Canada and Mexico, while viewing Latin America
not as a Third World area removed from the traditional focus
of U.S. strategy, but as a contiguous region whose future
bears directly on the security of the hemisphere as a whole.
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Latin America, and especially the Caribbean/Central
American region, is an area with which we are closely
associated by virtue of our Gulf Coast and Mexican borders,
our dependence in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and
the critical Panama Canal waterway. Nearly half of our
trade and two-thirds of our imported oil pass through the
Caribbean. Moreover, in event of war, half of NATO's
supplies would transit by sea from Gulf ports through the
Caribbean to Europe.
The South American continent is also a focus of
major U.S. interests. Though strategically less pivotal to
?
us than the Caribbean, South America includes several
nations with which we enjoy long-standing close relations
and which are among our most important trade partners. In
addition, the east coast of South America faces the South
Atlantic sea routes which represent a major petroleum
lifeline for Europe and the United States.
Wartime and Crisis Objectives-
To defend North America (including Hawaii, Alaska
and the continguous Caribbean Basin).
To neutralize Soviet and other hostile forces in
the Caribbean Basin.
To control LOCs in the.Caribbean, South Atlantic,
and South Pacific including the Panama Canal.
To prevent further aggression and subversion
against regional states by forces hostile to U.S.
interests.
Peacetime Military Objectives
To modernize the strategic air defense system for
North America.
To reverse Communist gains in El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Grenada and other-areas in Latin America.
To broaden regional military-to-military contacts
and seek the active military cooperation of key
countries in regional territorial defense, in the
security of Caribbean Basin, South Atlantic and
South Pacific sea lines of communication and in
.facilitating air and ocean movement.
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To maintain, or acquire as needed, base and
facilities access, logistical support, and operating,
transit, and overflight rights.
To increase the level and exercise tempo of U.S. .
military presence in the region.
E. Africa. Africa's mineral resources (including
oil), plus its strategic location astride the-sea lanes from
the Persian Gulf, make it of prime importance in economic
(and therefore political) terms; the military requirement
for the West is essentially preemptive: to deny the Soviets
(and Libya) control over key African states and territory
from which they could interdict the supply of minerals and
oil from Africa and the Middle Fast. In case of a military
struggle for control of the Middle East, Africa is important
as a strategic territory for the movement of major Western
forces to the area via the Mediterranean, across North
Africa, or across Central Africa. It is also equally
important, asa base for facilities from which both air and
naval forces could operate to destroy Soviet naval threats
to the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean,
around the Cape, and the south Atlantic.
In peacetime, in addition to. being a major source'
for minerals. important to U.S., West European, and Japanese
industry, Africa remains an important area for the political
contest of Western and Soviet Bloc values in the Third
World. The West must counter, and the U.S. must play a
larger role in meeting, the Soviet/proxy challenge. Principal
elements currently available are economic,' security assistance,
and special operations. Successful implementation of a
counter-Soviet strategy in Africa will also require the
development of a climate of supportive Congressional and
public opinion, and the restoration of substantial "internal
security" and covert action capabilities.
Wartime and Crisis Objectives
To employ air and naval forces to neutralize
Soviet or other hostile forces (especially Libya)
in strategic locations in the region and adjacent
waters.
To protect access to and deny Soviet use of the
region's mineral resources, key facilities, and
LOCs.
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Peacetime Military Objectives
To gain base access and transit rights in pro-
Western African states for the deployment and
subsequent support of U.S. forces to Africa,
Southwest Asia, South J?tlantic,.and contiguous
areas and work to deny the Soviets similar access.
To assist countries throughout Africa that are the
targets of Soviet proxy, Libyan and Ethiopian
aggressive, subversive or terrorist actions.
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