NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION DIRECTIVE CONSULTATION ON U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000200120001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 8, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 21, 1986
• Content Type: MEMO

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IN L. I 4P
THE WHITE HOUSE
April 21, 1986
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
SYSTEM II
90309.
Executive Registry
86- 1666X
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY
SPECIAL ADVISOR, AMBASSADOR PAUL NITZE
SPECIAL ADVISOR, AMBASSADOR EDWARD ROWNY
SUBJECT: National Security Decision Directive (NSDD- 222)
Consultations on U.S. Interim Restraint Policy (S)
The President has directed consultations be conducted with
appropriate Allies drawing upon the attached National Security
Decision Directive (NSDD-222). (S)
In view of the special sensitivity of the details of the
approach, it is directed that the NSDD-222 document be held by
the addressees. It is further directed that no copies are to be
made, and that a record of authorized personnel who are provided
access to the document be maintained by the office of each
addressee. (C)
FOR THE PRESIDENT:
Attachment
NSDD- 222 (S)
--&EC' E T
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THE WHITE HOUSE
NATIONAL SECURITY DECISION
DIRECTIVE NUMBER 222
April 21, 1986
CONSULTATIONS ON U.S. INTERIM RESTRAINT POLICY (U)
I have completed my review of the extensive reports provided to
me by the Secretary of Defense and the analyses prepared by the
Arms Control Support Group and the Senior Arms Control Group. I
have also profited from the advice given to me by Members of
Congress and by various Allied leaders. Based upon this advice
and a number of National Security Planning Group discussions of
this issue, I have reached some tentative judgments on how to
proceed with respect to U.S. policy concerning interim restraint
and near-term U.S. responses to the continuing pattern of Soviet
non-compliance with existing arms control agreements. (U)
Before taking any final decisions, however, I would like to share
my tentative judgements with key Congressional and Allied leaders
and once again have the benefit of their views. Therefore, I
direct that these leaders be consulted and briefed along the
lines outlined below. Further, these consultations should be
completed by April 25 so that I have the option of making and
announcing a final decision on this matter before the upcoming
Tokyo summit, if I so choose. (S)
1982 Decision. In 1982, on the eve of the Strategic Arms
Reductions Talks (START), I decided that the United States would
not undercut the expired SALT I agreement or the unratified SALT
II agreement as long as the Soviet Union exercised equal
restraint. Despite my serious reservations about the inequities
of the SALT I agreement and the serious flaws of the SALT II
agreement, I took this action in order to foster an atmosphere of
mutual restraint on force deployments conducive to serious
negotiation as we entered START. I made clear that our policy
required reciprocity and that it must not adversely affect our
national security interests in the face of the continuing Soviet
military buildup. The Soviet Union also made a policy commitment
not to undercut these agreements. (U)
1985 Decision. In June, 1985, I reviewed the status of U.S.
interim restraint policy in light of the continuing pattern of
Soviet non-compliance with its arms control commitments. I found
that the United States had fully kept its part of the bargain and
scrupulously complied with the terms of its commitments. (U)
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By contrast, I noted with regret that the Soviet Union had
repeatedly violated some of its arms control obligations. My
reports to the Congress over the past three years on Soviet
noncompliance enumerate and document in detail our serious
concerns about Soviet violations of the SALT II, and other arms
control agreements, including the ABM Treaty, the SALT I Interim
Agreement, and the Biological Weapons Convention and the 1925
Geneva Protocol. The overall judgment I reached in June, 1985,
was that while the Soviets had observed some provisions of
existing arms control agreements, they had violated important
elements of those agreements and associated political
commitments. (U)
In June, I noted that these are very crucial issues, for to
be serious about effective arms control is to be serious about
compliance. The pattern of Soviet violations increasingly
affects our national security. But, perhaps even,more
significant than the near-term military consequences of the
violations themselves, they raise fundamental concerns about the
integrity of the arms control process, concerns that, if
uncorrected, undercut the integrity and viability of arms control
as an instrument to assist in ensuring a secure and stable future
world. (U)
I also noted that the United States had raised our serious
concerns with the Soviet Union many times in diplomatic channels,
including the US/Soviet Standing Consultative Commission.
Unfortunately, despite long and repeated U.S. efforts to resolve
these issues, my assessment was that the Soviet Union had neither
provided satisfactory explanations nor undertaken corrective
action. Instead, Soviet violations had expanded as they
continued to modernize their strategic forces. Consequently, in
that June assessment I was forced to conclude that the Soviet
Union was not exercising the equal restraint upon which our
policy had been conditioned, and that such Soviet behavior was
fundamentally inimical to the future of arms control and to the
security of this country and that of our allies. (U)
At the same time, given our goal of reducing the size of
nuclear arsenals, I made the judgment that it remained in the
interest of the United States and its allies to try to establish
an interim framework of truly mutual restraint on strategic
offensive arms as we pursued with renewed vigor our goal of real
reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals through the
ongoing negotiations in Geneva. However, the U.S. cannot
establish such a framework alone. It requires the Soviet Union
to take the positive, concrete steps to correct its
noncompliance, resolve our other compliance concerns, and reverse
or substantially reduce its unparalleled and unwarranted military
build-up. While the Soviet Union had not demonstrated a
willingness to move in this direction, in the interest of
ensuring that every opportunity to establish the secure, stable
future we seek is fully explored, I announced that I was prepared
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to go the extra mile to try to establish an interim framework of
true, mutual restraint. (U)
To provide the Soviets the opportunity to join us in
establishing an interim framework of truly mutual restraint which
could support ongoing negotiations, i decided that the United
States would continue to refrain from undercutting existing
strategic arms agreements to the extent that the Soviet Union
exercised comparable restraint and provided that the Soviet Union
actively pursued arms reductions agreements in the Nuclear and
Space Talks in Geneva. I also indicated that the Soviet Union
should reverse its unparalleled and unwarranted military
build-up. Further, I decided that the United States would
constantly review the implications of this interim policy, on the
long term security interests of the United States and its allies.
In doing so, we would consider Soviet actions to resolve our
.concerns with the pattern of Soviet noncompliance, continued
growth in the strategic force structure of the Soviet Union, and
Soviet seriousness in the ongoing negotiations. (U)
As an integral part of the implementation of this policy,
I announced that we would take those steps required to assure the
national security of the United States and our allies made
necessary by Soviet noncompliance. Appropriate and proportionate
responses to Soviet noncompliance are also called for to make it
perfectly clear to Moscow that violations of arms control
arrangements entail real costs. Therefore, I stated clearly that
the United States would develop appropriate and proportionate
responses and it would take those actions necessary in response
to, and as a hedge against the military consequences of,
uncorrected Soviet violations-of existing arms control
agreements. (U)
Finally, I decided that, to provide adequate time for the
Soviet Union to demonstrate by its action a commitment to join us
in an interim framework of truly mutual restraint, the U.S. would
deactivate and disassemble, according to agreed procedures, an
existing older POSEIDON submarine as the seventh U.S. Ohio-class
submarine put to sea in August, 1985. However, I directed that
the U.S. keep open all future programmatic options for handling
such milestones as they occur. I made it clear that, as these
later milestones are reached, I would assess the overall
situation and make a final determination of the U.S. course of
action on a case-by-case basis in light of the overall situation
and Soviet actions in meeting the conditions cited above. (U)
The 8th TRIDENT. On May 20, the eighth TRIDENT submarine
will begin sea trials. As called for by our policy, I have
assessed our options with respect to that milestone. I have
considered both Soviet behavior since my June, 1985, decision and
U.S. and Allied security interests in light of both that behavior
and our programmatic options. (U)
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With respect to the criteria that I established for gauging
Soviet movement to join us in establishing a truly mutual
framework of interim restraint, (i.e., correction of Soviet
noncompliance, reversal of the Soviet military build-up, and
effort to move forward in negotiations), the situation is not
encouraging. (U)
While we have seen some modest indications of improvement in
some areas of U.S. concern, for example with respect to the
production rate of BACKFIRE bombers, there has been no real
progress in meeting U.S. concerns in those areas of most obvious
and direct Soviet non-compliance. The Krasnoyarsk radar remains
.a clear violation. The deployment of the SS-25, a forbidden
second new ICBM type, continues apace. The Soviet Union
continues to encrypt telemetry associated with its ballistic
missile testing. (U)
We see no abatement of the Soviet strategic force
improvement program. In fact, we have recently observed the
Soviets' attempt to launch what probably is another new follow-on
heavy ballistic missile. The test failed in an accident that
destroyed the missile and its silo -- but certainly the program
associated with this missile will continue. (S)
Finally, after a hopeful meeting in Geneva, we have yet to
see the Soviets follow-up in negotiations on the commitment made
in the Joint Statement issued by General Secretary Gorbachev and
myself to seek common ground, especially through the principle of
50% reductions. appropriately applied and through an INF
agreement. (U)
In light of these circumstances, it is my judgment that the
Soviet Union has not, as yet, taken those actions that would
indicate by deed its readiness to join us in a framework of
mutual interim restraint. At the same time, as we consider
options associated with the milestone next month of the sea
trials of the eighth, TRIDENT, we must also look at the
programmatic options available to the U.S. and judge these in
terms of their overall net impact on U.S. and Allied security.
(U)
When I issued guidance on U.S. policy in June 10, 1985, the
military plans and programs for fiscal year 1986 were about to be
implemented. The amount of flexibility that any nation has in
the near-term for altering its planning is modest at best, and
our military planning will take more time to move out from under
the shadow of previous assumptions. This shadow lengthens and
darkens with each reduction made in the funds available for our
defense. Operating under such a shadow, especially in the
budgetary conditions which we now face, makes it essential that
we make the very best possible use of our resources. (U)
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We had long planned to retire two older POSEIDON submarines
when the NEVADA, the eighth TRIDENT submarine entered sea trials.
It is my judgment that military and economic realities argue that
the common sense path to pursue at this milestone is to retire
and dismantle these submarines, according to agreed procedures,
as planned at this particular milestone. (S)
In the near-term, I believe the most essential response to
the continued pattern of Soviet non-compliance with its
commitments remains the full implementation of our carefully
planned strategic modernization program. My decision to retire
these two older POSEIDON submarines is fully in accordance with
that program. Under any set of assumptions, our modernization
program is, and will always be, designed to guarantee that our
nation always has modern forces in sufficient quantities to
underwrite our security and that of our allies -- nothing more
and nothing less. This goal ensures that the appropriate, best
and proper use is made of our national resources. It also
attests to the fact that we do not seek to retain nuclear forces
for their own sake, but only if they clearly contribute in a
direct way to our national security and that of our-allies. This
is the heart of my judgment that, at this particular milestone,
the proper course with respect to these two older POSEIDON
submarines is to retire them in the manner planned. (S)
Additional Steps. On the other hand, last June I announced
that the U.S. would take appropriate and proportionate actions
when needed. It is my view that certain additional steps are now
warranted by the lack of Soviet movement up to this point. (U)
First, our highest priority remains the full implementation
of the U.S. strategic modernization program, to underwrite our
deterrence today, and the pursuit of the SDI research program to
provide better alternatives in the future. The U.S. strategic
modernization program, including the deployment of the second 50
PEACEKEEPER missiles, was called for by the Scowcroft Commission
and is fully supported by our military leadership. This program
was very carefully crafted by our best defense planners. It is
the foundation for all future U.S. options and provides a solid
basis which can and will be adjusted over time to respond most
efficiently to continued Soviet noncompliance. It is absolutely
critical that this program not be permitted to erode. That would
be the worst way to respond to the continuing pattern of Soviet
noncompliance, would increase the risk to our security and that
of our allies, would undercut our ability to negotiate the
reductions in existing arsenals that we seek, and thus, send
precisely the wrong signal to the Soviet leadership. (U)
Secondly, Soviet actions to continue the accelerated
development of their ICBM force are of great concern. Last June,
I cited the Soviet Union's flight-testing and deployment of the
SS-25 missile, a second new type of ICBM prohibited under the
SALT II agreement, as a clear and irreversible violation. I
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noted that since the noncompliance associated with the
development of this missile cannot, at this point, be corrected
by the Soviet Union, the United States, therefore, reserved the
right to respond appropriately. At that time, I also noted that
the U.S. small ICBM program was particularly relevant in this
regard. Given the events that have occurred since last June,
including the deployment of over 75 SS-25 mobile ICBMs, I intend
to call upon the Congress to join with me in restoring
bi-partisan support for a balanced, cost effective, long-term
program to restore both the survivability and effectiveness of
our own ICBM program. (S)
The program we require should include the full deployment of
the PEACEKEEPER ICBM. The PEACEKEEPER is fully permitted by
existing arms control agreements. Furthermore, it was originally
designed specifically to meet U.S. security needs under these
agreements. It simply makes both good military and economic
sense to fully exploit the great technical success that we have
had with this missile. But, our program must also look beyond
the PEACEKEEPER and toward additional U.S. ICBM requirements in
the future., Our small ICBM program-makes a significant
contribution not only in this regard, but also as an appropriate
and proportionate U.S. response to the irreversible Soviet
violation associated with their SS-25 mobile missile. (S)
To ensure that I have a more robust range of options as I
approach future milestones, I intend to direct the Department of
Defense to provide to me by November, 1986, an. assessment of the
best options for carrying out such a comprehensive ICBM program.
In doing so, and in light of continued Soviet ICBM development,
this assessment should address options to:
-- exploit more fully the success of the PEACEKEEPER
program to include recommendations on the basing of the next 50
PEACEKEEPER missiles;
-- accelerate, if I so choose, the current small ICBM in
roughly its current configuration;
-- institute an alternative program focused on a MIRVed
mobile MINUTEMAN-like ICBM; and,
-- consider programs which build upon the PEACEKEEPER
deployment but also include in an appropriate mix with the
PEACEKEEPER deployments either a small, single warhead mobile
ICBM with a relatively early initial operational capability or
MIRVed mobile MINUTEMAN-like ICBM which could be deployed with a
later initial operational capability, or both. (S)
Finally, I also intend to direct the Secretary of Defense to
take the steps necessary, working with the Congress, to
reallocate funds currently in the Defense budget to permit us to
accelerate the production of the Advanced Cruise Missile. I
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would not, at this time, direct any increase in the total program
procurement, but rather establish a more efficient production
rate that both saves money and accelerates the availability of
additional options for the future. (S)
Implications for the Future. In addressing U.S. deployment
milestones as they occur on a case-by-case basis, we must look
primarily to the future rather than the past. In implementing
the judgments that I have just outlined, we should fully
recognize that, while our policy remains under constant review,
we will face the next programmatic milestone near the end of this
year as the 131st U.S. heavy bomber is modified for cruise
missile carriage. (U)
By that late-1986 milestone, the Soviet Union will have had
about one and one-half years to demonstrate by deeds its desire
to join us in establishing a truly mutual framework of interim
restraint. Also, under current U.S. plans, we will not have an
older POSEIDON readily available due for scheduled retirement at
that particular time. The conditions that are associated with
this milestone in late 1986 will be significantly different than
those faced as the NEVADA begins sea trials. (S)
When we approach the conversion of the 131st U.S. heavy
bomber to cruise missile carriage, near the end of this year,
under the SALT II limit of 1320 total MIRVed delivery systems,
the U.S. would either have to halt the conversion of U.S. heavy
bombers or to take extraordinary action to begin dismantlement of
one of our MINUTEMAN III ICBM silos; or one of our cruise-missile
carrying heavy bombers; or yet another POSEIDON submarine. Some
of these alternatives may be unavailable or involve the loss of
badly needed military capabilities. In short, significantly
increased military costs will come directly to bear at that
point. (S)
The United States has exercised considerable restraint in
the face of Soviet behavior. It should be recognized clearly, by
all concerned, that I can not prudently continue dismantling U.S.
systems if the criteria, which I outlined in June, 1985, are not
met before the milestone associated with the conversion of the
131st U.S. heavy bomber to cruise missile carriage is reached.
I state this as a simple fact, not as an ultimatum.
Acknowledging it directly now is necessary to ensure that none
miss the implications of the actions I am prepared to take as the
NEVADA enters sea trials. it also provides both strong military
and political incentives to the Soviet Union to join us in
establishing the interim framework of truly mutual restraint that
remains our preferred course. (S)
Conclusions. The United States has been exercising, and
will continue to exercise, greater restraint than the Soviet
Union in modernizing its nuclear deterrent. However, we will
take those actions needed to provide sufficient, modern forces to
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underwrite our security and that of our allies. (U)
In June, 1985, I committed to go the extra mile, dismantling
a POSEIDON submarine, to give the Soviet Union adequate time to
take the steps necessary to join us in establishing a mutual
framework of interim restraint. It is my judgment that, in light
of the circumstances I have described, we should undertake the
immediate responses outlined above. The end of the "extra mile"
is now in view if the Soviet Union does not take the positive
steps required. We must, together with our friends and allies,
face this reality and call upon the Soviet Union to take the
necessary, positive steps now. (U)
Closing Observation. I closed my June, 1985, decision document
with the following paragraph.
"I firmly believe that if we are to put the arms reduction
process on a firm, lasting foundation, our focus must remain
on making best use of the promise provided by the currently
ongoing negotiations in Geneva. The policy outlined above
involving the establishment of an interim framework for
truly mutual restraint and proportionate U.S. response to
uncorrected Soviet noncompliance is specifically designed to
go the extra mile in giving the Soviet Union the opportunity
to join us in this endeavor. My hope is that if the Soviets
.will do so, we will jointly be able to make progress in
framing equitable and verifiable agreements involving real
reductions in the size of existing nuclear arsenals through
the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Such an achievement would
not only provide the best and most permanent constraint on
the growth of nuclear arsenals, but it would begin the
process of reducing the size of these arsenals." (U)
Time has not altered the basic truth of this statement.
Even if the Soviet Union does choose to join with us in
establishing such a framework of truly mutual restraint, as I
hope that they do, this is at best an interim step. It is not a
substitute for an agreement on deep reductions in offensive
nuclear arms. Achieving such reductions has received, and
continues to receive, my highest priority. (C)
It remains my hope the Soviet Union will take the necessary
steps to give substance to the agreement I reached with General
Secretary Gorbachev in Geneva to negotiate 50 percent reductions
in nuclear arms, appropriately applied, and an interim agreement
on intermediate-range nuclear arms. If the Soviets take those
steps, together we can achieve greater stability and a safer
world. (C)
An Afterword on Encryption. My guidance on the content of
consultation is contained in the paragraphs above. This guidance
does not include any discussion of the issue of encryption. I
have reviewed the recommendations made by the Senior Arms Control
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Group on this issue, and I approve those recommendations. (C)
The U.S. will continue to press the Soviets to resolve our
legitimate concerns and to cease their encryption practices which
impede U.S. verification of compliance. However, we will not
discuss the option of the encryption of U.S. ballistic systems as
a programmatic response to Soviet non-compliance in this area.
(S)
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