U. S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000100070003-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 115
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: May 20, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

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Executive Secretary
 IN RELATION TO PD/NSC-53
PD/NSC-58
NSDD-5
NSDD-12
NSDD-13
NSDD-26
Executive Registry
21 May 82
You should also read NSDD # 32, dated 20 May 1982, Subject:
U. S. National Security Strategy.
Also, NSDD# 32, Supersedes PD/NSC-18 and PD/NSC-62 in their entirety.
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NO.NSDD 32
COPY 21 (CIA)
NATIONAL SECURITY
COUNCIL
INFORMATION
Notice
The attached document contains classified National Security Council
Information. It is to be read and discussed only by persons authorized by
law.
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TUf VL.W%%--' SYSTEM II
90283
CONFIDENTIAL WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
UNITED STATES REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
The President has approved the attached National Security Decision
Directive on U.S. National Security Strategy.
Attachment
Tab A NSDD 32
cc Chairman, PFIAB
CONFIDENTIAL WITH
TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT
Review May 20, 1988
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I VI VL.V1%L.s SYSTEM II
90283
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
Nat.ionat Secuh.i,.ty Decia.ion
DiAectLve Numben. 32
I have carefully reviewed the NSSD 1-82 study in its component
parts, considered the final recommendations of the National
Security Council, and direct that the study serve as guidance
for U.S. National Security Strategy.
Our national security requires development and integration of
a set of strategies, including diplomatic, informational,
economic/political, and military components. NSSD 1-82
begins that process. Part I of the study provides basic U.S.
national objectives, both global and regional, and shall serve
as the starting point for all components of our national security
strategy.
The national security policy of the United States shall be
guided by the following global objectives:
- To deter military attack by the USSR and its allies
against the U.S., its allies, and other important
countries across the spectrum of conflict; and to
defeat such attack should deterrence fail.
To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout
the world by strengthening existing alliances, by
improving relations with other nations, by forming
and supporting coalitions of states friendly to U.S.
interests, and by a full range of diplomatic, political,
economic, and information efforts.
To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet control
and military presence throughout the world, and to
increase the costs of Soviet support and use of proxy,
terrorist, and subversive forces.
TOP SECRET
Review May 20, 2002
Classified & Extended by William P. Clark
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)
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To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase its
influence through its use of diplomacy, arms transfers,
economic pressure, political action, propaganda, and
disinformation.
To foster, if possible in concert with our allies,
restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage
Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance
system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of its
economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-term
liberalizing and nationalist tendencies within the
Soviet Union and allied countries.
To limit Soviet military capabilities by strengthening
the U.S. military, by pursuing equitable and verifiable
arms control agreements, and by preventing the flow of
militarily significant technologies and resources to
the Soviet Union.
- To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets, and to
ensure the U.S. and its allies and friends access to
foreign energy and mineral resources.
To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and
investment programs that promote economic development
and the growth of humane social and political orders in
the Third World.
To promote a well-functioning international economic
system with minimal distortions to trade and investment
and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing
and resolving differences.
In addition to the foregoing, U.S. national security policy will
be guided by the operational objectives in specific regions as
identified in Parts I and III of the study.
Threats to U.S. National Security
The key military threats to U.S. security during the 1980s
will continue to be posed by the Soviet Union and its allies
and clients. Despite increasing pressures on its economy
and the growing vulnerabilities of its empire, the Soviet
military will continue to expand and modernize.
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The Soviet Union remains aware of the catastrophic consequences
of initiating military action directly against the U.S. or
its allies. For this reason, a war with a Soviet client arising
from regional tensions is more likely than a direct conflict with
the USSR. In a conflict with a Soviet client, however, the risk
of direct confrontation with the Soviet Union remains.
Unstable governments, weak political institutions, inefficient
economies, and the persistence of traditional conflicts
create opportunities for Soviet expansion in many parts of
the developing world. The growing scarcity of resources,
such as oil, increasing terrorism, the dangers of nuclear
proliferation, uncertainties in Soviet political succession,
reticence on the part of a number of Western countries, and
the growing assertiveness of Soviet foreign policy all
contribute to the unstable international environment. For
these reasons, the decade of the eighties will likely pose
the greatest challenge to our survival and well-being since
World War II and our response could result in a fundamentally
different East-West relationship by the end of this decade.
The Role of Allies and Others
Given the loss of U.S. strategic superiority and the overwhelming
growth of Soviet conventional forces capabilities, together with
the increased political and economic strength of the industrial
democracies and the heightened importance of Third World resources,
the United States must increasingly draw upon the resources and
cooperation of allies. and others to protect our interests and
those of our friends. There is no other alternative. To meet
successfully the challenges to our interests,. the U.S. will require
stronger and more effective collective defense arrangements. U.S.
defense programs will consider the status of these arrangements in
the planning process.
A strong unified NATO remains indispensable to protecting
Western interests. While encouraging all our NATO Allies to
maintain and increase their contributions in Europe, we
should specifically encourage those Allies who can contribute
outside Europe to allocate their marginal defense resources
preferentially to capabilities which could support both out
of area and European missions.
Outside Europe, the United States will place primary reliance
on regional states to deal militarily with non-Soviet threats,
providing security assistance as appropriate. If no other
reasonable alternative exists, the U.S. should be prepared to
intervene, militarily in regional or local conflicts. In Southwest
Asia, we will support the development of balanced and self-contained
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friendly regional forces and will emphasize assistance to certain
key states for regional contingency roles. However, the U.S. will
remain the primary military power for directly resisting the Soviet
Union.
In East Asia, the Japanese should be encouraged to contribute
more to their own and mutual defense efforts. We should
also assist the Republic of Korea in becoming increasingly
self-sufficient in its own defense capabilities.
Regional Military Objectives
In peacetime, our regional military objectives seek to deter
military attack against the United States, our Allies and
friends, and to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet
influence worldwide. The security of Europe remains vital to the
defense of the United States. This means that we must achieve
significant improvements in NATO's conventional defense capa-
bilities while also improving nuclear and chemical forces. For
our part, the United States will maintain its commitments for
forward deployment and early reinforcement. The security of
Southwest Asia is inextricably linked to the security of Europe
and Japan and thus is vital to the defense of the United States.
A key peacetime military objective in Southwest Asia is to
enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving our global capability
to deploy and sustain military forces so as to ensure that, if the
Soviet Union attacks, it would be confronted with the prospect of
a major conflict with the U.S. in-theater and the threat of
escalation.
Wartime planning must consider the likelihood that any U.S.-
Soviet conflict would expand beyond one theater. Within
this context, and recognizing that the political and military
situations at the time of war will bear heavily on strategic
decisions, the following priorities apply for wartime planning:
highest priority is North America, followed by NATO, and the
supporting lines of communication. The next priority is
ensuring access to the oil in Southwest Asia, followed by
the defense of U.S. Pacific allies and the lines of communication
for the Indian and Pacific oceans, and then the defense of other
friendly nations in Latin America and Africa.
Specific policies for both peacetime and wartime regional
military objectives are contained in Part III, Section C of
the study.
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Nuclear Forces
The modernization of our strategic nuclear forces and the achieve-
ment of parity with the Soviet Union shall receive first priority
in our efforts to rebuild the military capabilities of the United
States.
Deterrence can best be achieved if our defense posture makes
Soviet assessment of war outcomes, under any contingency, so
dangerous and uncertain'as to remove any incentive for initiating
attack.
The United States will enhance its strategic nuclear deterrent
by developing a capability to sustain protracted nuclear conflict
in accordance with guidance provided in NSDD-12, NSDD-13, NSDD-26,
PD-53, and PD-58. The strategic force modernization program set
forth in NSDD-12 is reaffirmed except as may be modified by new
decisions in the basing mode for M-X. The U.S. will retain a
capable and credible strategic triad of land-based ballistic
missiles, manned bombers, and submarine-launched ballistic missiles.
While each leg of this triad should be as survivable as possible,
the existence of all three precludes the destruction of more than
one by surprise attack and guards against technical surprise which
could similarly remove one leg of the triad.
General Purpose Forces
Our general purpose forces support U.S. national security
policy in peacetime by deterring aggression, by demonstrating
U.S. interests, concern, and commitment, by assisting the
forces of other friendly nations, and by providing a basis to
move rapidly from peace to war. In wartime,'these forces
would be employed to achieve our political objectives and to
secure early war termination on terms favorable to the U.S.
and allies.
The U.S. shall maintain a global posture and shall strive to
increase its influence worldwide through the maintenance and
improvement of forward deployed forces and rapidly deployable
U.S.-based forces, together with periodic exercises, security
assistance, and special operations.
In a conflict not involving the Soviet Union, the United States
will seek to limit the scope of the conflict, avoid involvement
of the Soviet Union, and ensure that U.S. objectives are met as
quickly as possible.
In a conflict involving the Soviet Union, the U.S. must plan, in
conjunction with allies, for a successful defense in a global war.
Given our current force insufficiencies, however, we must plan
to focus our military efforts in the areas of most vital concern
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first, undertaking lesser operations elsewhere. This sequential
concept shall be a basic feature of our force applications policy.
It is in the interest of the United States to limit the scope of
any U.S.-Soviet conflict, but if global war with the Soviet Union
ensues, counteroffensives are to be directed at places where the
U.S. can affect the outcome of the war. Counteroffensives are not
a substitute for the robust military capabilities necessary to
protect vital interests at the point at which they are threatened
in the first place.
Reserve Component forces shall be an integral part of U.S. military
planning. The reserves provide major combat forces that complement
and reinforce active units, and they provide the majority of the
supporting forces required to sustain the total force in combat.
During crises involving the potential deployment and sustained
employment of sizeable combat forces, the National Command Authority
will provide an early mobilization decision. Mobilization planning
shall be included for all major contingencies.
In order to close the gap between strategy and capabilities, the
U.S. must undertake a sustained and balanced force development
program. First priority is to improve the operational capabilities
of forward or early deploying forces and their associated lift.
Second priority is to be accorded to U.S.-based late deploying
forces and then third priority to expanding the force structure.
The capabilities of these forces are to be improved in the
following general order of priority: by achieving readiness,
upgrading C3, providing adequate sustainability, increasing
Security Assistance
Security assistance is a vital, integral component of our
national security strategy and is an essential complement to
our own force structure in meeting our security objectives
abroad. Security assistance programs are a most cost-
effective means of enhancing the security of the United
States. A priority effort shall be undertaken, to include the
use of White House resources, to secure passage of security
assistance legislative initiatives currently before Congress.
On a longer-term basis, we shall plan for steady real growth in
the security assistance portion of the national security budget
over the next five years; more extensive use shall be made of
multiyear commitments; we will improve our anticipation of and
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planning for Foreign Military Sales (with special emphasis on
the Special Defense Acquisition Fund); and an effort shall be
undertaken to rewrite or substantially revise the Foreign
Assistance Act and Arms Export Control Act. To implement these
actions, appropriate working groups shall be established under
the Arms Transfer Management Group, which will report its progress
on a regular basis to the NSC.
Force Integration
The national security objectives of the United States can be
met only if all defense resources are mutually supporting
and thoroughly integrated and complement the other elements of
U.S. national power.
An examination of our current and projected force capabilities
reveals substantial risks that some regional objectives might
not be achieved, some commitments to some allies might not be
honored, and we might be forced to resort to nuclear weapons
early in a conflict.
These risks are inherent in our current position. They must
be recognized, allocated as best we can, and then be reduced
by an orderly and consistent investment in our defense program.
Comprehensive and imaginative integration of all our capabilities
is required to reduce future risks to our national security.
Deterrence is dependent on both nuclear and conventional
capabilities. Nuclear forces will not be viewed as a lower-
cost alternative to conventional forces. At the same time,
the possible use of nuclear weapons must remain an element
in our overall strategy.
With the growing vulnerability of our strategic deterrent, we
must enhance the survivability of our offensive forces, and
complement those efforts with effective programs to provide
for continuity of government, strategic connectivity, and civil
defense.
Armed conflict involving the US requires that the full
capabilities of all our armed Services be organized, trained,
and equipped so that all can be readily deployed and employed
together. Responding to any large contingency will require
some level of mobilization. We must expand the scope of
mobilization and industrial capabilities and frequently
review manpower policies to ensure adequacy of manpower.
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Reports
The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff will include, as part of their periodic
reports on the state of our defenses, a discussion of progress
made in implementing the provisions of this directive.
Nothing in this directive is intended to superseae or aiter
the provisions of PD/NSC-53, PD/NSC-58, NSDD-5, NSDD-12,
NSDD-13, or NSDD-26.
- 7~2v
PD/NSC-18 and PD/NSC-62 are superseded by this directive.
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Review April 30, 2002
Classified & Extended by William P. Clark
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)
ty...0f.=.copies
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The full articulation of U.S. national security strategy
requires the development and integration of an interlocking
set of strategies which include diplomatic, information,
economic/political, and military components. This study
begins that process.
The national security policy of the United States will
be guided by the following global objectives:
To deter military attack by the USSR and its
allies against the U.S., its allies, and other
important countries across the spectrum of con-
flict; and to defeat such attack should deterrence
fail.
To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout
the world by strengthing existing alliances, by
improving relations with other nations, by forming
and supporting coalitions of states friendly to
U.S. interests, and by a full range of diplomatic,
political, economic, and information efforts.
To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet
control and military presence throughout the
world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support
and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces.
To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase
its influence through its use of diplomacy, arms
transfers, economic pressure, political action,
propaganda, and disinformation.
To foster, if possible in concert with our allies,
restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage
Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance
system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of
its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-
term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies
within the Soviet Union and allied countries.
To limit Soviet military capabilities by strengthening
the U.S. military, by pursuing equitable and verifiable
arms control agreements, and by preventing the flow of
militarily significant technologies and resources to the
Soviet Union.
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To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets, and
to ensure the U.S. and its allies and friends
access to foreign energy and mineral resources.
To discourage further proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and
investment programs that promote economic develop-
ment and the growth of humane social and political
orders in the Third World.
To promote a well-functioning international economic
system with minimal distortions to trade and investment
and broadly agreed and respected rules for managing and
resolving differences.
Threats to National Security
The key military threats to U.S. security during the
1980s will continue to be posed by the USSR and its allies
and clients. Despite increasing pressures on its economy
and the growing vulnerabilities of its empire, the Soviet
Union continues to expand and modernize its military forces.
Current Soviet leaders, moreover, are probably prepared to
accept sacrifices to sustain this expansion, which they see
as the most important element in the growth of their influence.
The Soviets are concerned about current U.S. modernization
programs, but probably anticipate that U.S. defense spending
will be tempered by domestic res'.stance.
Conflict resulting from regional tensions that could
again involve us in a war with a Soviet client is much more
likely than a direct conflict with the USSR. In such a
conflict, the risk of confrontation with the USSR would vary
according to the situation; but, as a result of their
expanded strategic military power, the Soviets are probably
less adverse than in the past to take risks which might lead
to such a confrontation. Such action is most likely in the
region in which they have superiority, face unstable countries,
and do not face U.S. allies--especially in Southwest Asia.
Moreover, they may expect that the burden of avoiding such a
confrontation is shifting to the U.S. We do not believe
that at present the USSR is prepared to initate military
action directly against the U.S. or its allies but rather
sees military power as the necessary backdrop for exerting
pressure along the Soviet periphery and elsewhere, and for
use, if necessary, in conflict with the U.S.
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The Soviet buildup, combined with weak resistance, has
also encouraged Soviet activities in the Third World. Using
proxies and a diversified arsenal of arms, military training,
logistical assistance, propaganda, and economic aid, the
USSR, in opportunistic fashion, exploits indigenous unrest
in many regions to undermine U.S. influence, to bring Soviet
sympathizers to power, and to accruire additional military
bases. A number of Soviet friends act as surrogates for the
USSR and, in the cases of Cuba, Libya, the PLO, and Syria,
as conduits for Soviet-bloc. arms and training to groups that
undertake terrorism.
In Europe, the USSR continues to strengthen its theater
nuclear and conventional forces. Moscow is deeply concerned
about unrest in Poland and engages in exploiting and encouraging
U.S.-West European differences and the West European "peace
movement". In East and Southeast Asia, the Soviets endeavor
to contain China, and to hedge against the possibility of a
Washington-Beijing-Tokyo military "axis" by the buildup of
Soviet military might. Additionally, military threats to
U.S. security in this region includes the possibility of
aggression by North Korea or Vietnam.
In the Middle East, the most severe dangers are that
Iran might succumb to increased Soviet influence and large-
scale military intervention; that friendly states may be
attacked by other local states--most immediately that the
Iran-Iraq war might increase the intensity and scope of the
fighting and threaten other Gulf Arabs--; and that friendly
governments may be toppled by internal insurrections,
possibly stimulated or exploited by the Soviets. In addition,
acute Arab-Israeli tensions continue to threaten a war that
would harm U.S. interests in the region.
In Latin America Communist exploitation of social and
political unrest in Central America will continue to pose
the most serious challenge to U.S. interests in the hemisphere
since Cuba became allied with the USSR. Military threats in
Sub-Saharan Africa are currently quite small. There are,
however, a number of potential flashpoints in Africa that
impinge on U.S. security interests that could draw in the
superpowers while others would probably not result in Soviet
involvement.
The Role of Allies and Others
Given the loss of U.S. strategic superiority and the
overwhelming growth of Soviet conventional forces capabilities,
together with the increased political and economic strength
of the industrial democracies and the heightened importance
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of Third World resources, the U.S. must increasingly draw
upon the resources and cooperation of allies and others to
protect our interests and those of our friends. While our
ability to cooperate with allies and friends offers a
potentially effective counter to Soviet threats, our dependence
on such cooperation is a potential vulnerability at which
the Soviets will continue to probe.
A strong unified NATO is indispensable to protecting
Western interests. To attain this goal, the U.S. must press
for implementation of key conventional enhancement programs
and INF modernization. We must also continue to promote
improvement in integrated logistical support (e.g., host
nation support--HNS). For its part, the U.S. must maintain
its NATO commitments for forward deployment and early
reinforcement.
While encouraging all NATO Allies to maintain and
increase their contributions in Europe, we should specifically
encourage those Allies who can contribute outside Europe to
allocate their peacetime marginal resources preferentially
to dual-purpose capabilities which could support both out-
of-area and European missions. We likewise should urge such
Allies to share the political and military burden outside
Europe, including being prepared to fight along side of (or
instead of) the U.S.
Outside Europe, the U.S. will place primary reliance on
regional states to deal with non-Soviet threats, providing
security assistance as appropriate. The U.S. will remain
the primary power for directly resisting the Soviets. If no
other reasonable alternative exists, the U.S. should also be
capable of intervening militarily in regional or local
conflicts. The effectiveness of U.S. military capabilities
for either Soviet or other contingencies will depend on
access to facilities enroute and in the region of conflict,
and on other tangible forms of support (e.g., HNS and
prepositioning).
In Southwest Asia, the U.S. will support the development
of balanced and self-contained friendly regional forces and
will emphasize assistance to certain key states for regional
contingency roles.
In East Asia, the Japanese should be encouraged to
contribute more to their own and mutual defense efforts
(including economic assistance), although we should not now
ask Japan to expand its defense responsibility beyond the
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protection of sea lines of communication out to 1000 nautical
miles. We should assist the ROK to become increasingly
self-sufficient in its own defense capabilities, while
maintaining the current U.S.-ROK division of labor (predominantly
Korean ground forces and predominantly U.S. tacair); and we
should work to facilitate increased defense cooperation
between Korea and Japan. We can also act to enhance the
durability of the U.S.-Chinese security relationship,
although significant improvement in Chinese military capa-
bilities to oppose the Soviet Union can only come if and as
China can devote substantial additional resources of its own
for that purpose.
Regional Military Objectives
The U.S. must plan, in conjunction with its allies, for
a successful defense in a global war against the Soviet
Union and its allies. This means planning so that the Soviet
Union would be confronted with a major conventional conflict
and the threat of escalation. At the same time, the U.S. will
seek to limit the scope of a U.S.-Soviet conflict to the extent
commensurate with protecting U.S. vital interests.
While recognizing that the political and military
situation at the time of war will dictate strategy decisions,
and that a U.S.-Soviet conflict may well expand beyond one
theater, the following priorities apply for global wartime
planning: highest priority is North America, followed
by NATO, and the supporting lines of communication (LOC5)
The next priority is ensuring access to the oil in Southwest
Asia, followed by the defense of our Pacific allies, support-
ing LOCs and the defense of other friendly nations in Latin
America and Africa. Peacetime priorities may not parallel
wartime priorities. Specific U.S. regional objectives are
keyed to this global context.
In contingencies not involving direct Soviet aggression,
our strategy is to rely on regional states to the extent
possible.
In Europe, our primary objective is to strengthen
NATO's capability to deter or defeat a Soviet attack. In
wartime, the U.S. will support NATO strategy which requires
forward defense with conventional forces supported by the
possibility of nuclear escalation. In peacetime, U.S.
objectives are to enhance deterrence through major improve-
ments in NATO's conventional capabilities; to improve nuclear
and chemical forces; and to obtain increased Allied defense
contributions in Europe and Southwest Asia.
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In the Near East/Southwest Asia, our principal objectives
are to prevent the spread of Soviet influence; to protect
Western access to oil; to maintain Israel's qualitative
military advantage; and to support moderate states against
aggression and subversion. U.S. military strategy is to
deter Soviet aggression; if necessary, to combat the Soviets
in the theater; and to prepare for executing counteroffensives
elsewhere.
In the Far East, our wartime objectives are viewed
primarily in the context of a global war. They are: to
maintain control of Pacific LOCs; to protect U.S. bases; to
fulfill commitments to allies; in conjunction with regional
states, to prevent the redeployment of Soviet forces from
the Far East; and to secure Japanese self-defense including
long-range LOC protection. In peacetime, we seek a more
active defense partnership with Japan, a more durable U.S.-
PRC relationship, and continued stability on the Korean
Peninsula.
In the Western Hemisphere, our primary wartime objective
is the security of the North American Continent, the Caribbean
Basin and the Panama Canal. In neacetime, our objectives
are to modernize North America's strategic air defense
system; to reverse Communist gains in Latin America; and to
increase U.S. military presence.
In Africa, our wartime objectives are to neutralize
hostile forces in strategic locations and to protect Western
access to the region's mineral resources. U.S. peacetime
objectives are to obtain additional facilities access and
transit rights, and to assist countries resisting Soviet-
sponsored subversion.
Nuclear Forces
The overall objectives of U.S. nuclear forces policy as
enunciated in NSDD-13 is reaffirmed. Specifically, our most
fundamental national security objective is to deter direct
attack--particularly nuclear attack--on the United States, its
forces and its allies and friends. Deterrence can best be
achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessment of war
outcomes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous as
to remove any incentives for initiating attack. The nuclear
forces of the United States also, in conjunction with
TnP RFrPPT
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conventional forces, contribute to deterrence of nonnuclear
aggression and to support NATO strategy for the defense of
Europe. This requires that we be convincingly capable of
responding in such a way that the Soviets, or any other
adversary, would be denied their political and military
objectives. Should nuclear attack nonetheless, occur, the
United States and its allies must prevail and in the process
be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination
of hostilities at the lowest possible level of violence and
on terms favorable to the United States.
U.S. strategy to realize these objectives is founded on
the ability to provide the initial, trans- and post-attack
target coverage required by existing National level guidance.
Similarly, the requirements for damage limitation, flexibility
of options, crisis stability, escalation control, support of
allied commitments, preservation of the continuum of con-
ventional and nuclear deterrence, maritime nuclear employment
and forward deployment of non-strategic nuclear forces were
revalidated.
U.S. nuclear employment planning supports this strategy
by ensuring the availability of the greatest amount of
targeting flexibility to the NCA, strengthening the linkage
between nuclear and conventional forces, limiting collateral
damage, and maximizing the Soviet uncertainty regarding
their ability to successfully execute a nuclear attack.
The resulting force requirements and the development
and modernization program for our nuclear forces were found
to be expressed and directed in NSDD-12 and NATO's moderniza-
tion decision.
Arms control can complement military forces in support
of U.S. objectives and national security.
General Purpose Forces
In conflicts not involving the USSR, the U.S.. will rely
primarily upon indigenous forces to protect mutual interests,
with U.S. assistance as appropriate. U.S. conventional
forces should have the capability of meeting Soviet threats.
In either set of contingencies, the U.S. is particularly
dependent upon the assistance of friends and allies.
Because the Reserve Component is an integral part of U.S.
capabilities, mobilization planning must be included in
preparations for non-Soviet as well as Soviet contingencies.
Where quick termination of conflict cannot be assured, the
U.S. must confront adversaries with the prospect of a prolonged,
costly, and ultimately unwinnable war.
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We seek two fundamental objectives in peacetime: to
deter military attack against the U.S., its allies, and
friends; and to contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet
influence worldwide. These objectives require the U.S. to
increase its influence worldwide through the maintenance and
improvement of forward deployed forces and rapidly deployable
U.S.-based forces, together with periodic exercises, security
assistance, and special operations.
Current forces are adequate to maintain most peacetime
forward deployments and to respond to minor crises and non-
Soviet conflicts. However, major risks would exist in
direct conflict with the Soviet Union. In a multi-theater
war, lesser-scale operations will be required in secondary
theaters.
In the event of direct Soviet aggression, if deterrence
fails, our military strateav is to deploy military forces
rapidly to the area to signal U.S. commitment and to deter
further aggression. If this action does not deter further
aggression, U.S. forces will conduct military operations in
conjunction with regional allies with the aim of halting
Soviet aggression. We will also take those steps necessary
to prepare for the possibility of a global U.S.-Soviet
conflict and, if necessary, execute counteroffensives at
other fronts or places where we can affect the outcome of
the war.
In order to close the gap between strategy and capa-
bilities, the U.S. must undertake a major and balanced force
development program throughout the decade. This program
involves major improvements in readiness, command/control/
communications systems, sustainability, mobility, and
essential modernization. While specific priorities among
the type of general purpose forces and among these categories
of expenditures overlap in an often complex manner, general
order of priority will be given to improvements of forward
deployed forces, forces providing flexibility in deployment,
such as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, other units
earmarked for earliest deployment, and associated lift
forces. Some force expansion is also planned for mobility
forces, general purpose naval forces, and tactical air
forces. Consideration should also be given to land force
expansion.
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Security Assistance
Security assistance is a critical instrument for
achieving national security objectives such as Power pro-
jection, deterrence and political influence. While the
Administration has taken several initiatives to make the
program more effective, further work needs to be done.
In the near-term, the FY 82 supplemental and FY 83 program
will require high level Executive Branch support in order to
secure Congressional approval.
Resources in real terms and as a percent of the defense
budget have been declining for two decades. Although the
Administration has begun to turn the situation around, the
outlook for sustaining real future increases is uncertain.
Further, we lack adequate grant and concessional aid to meet
the security requirements of the poorer countries.
We need to be able to use more extensively multi-year
commitments to permit long range planning and to enhance
predictability. The Administration should pursue this issue
vigorously before Congress.
Long lead times, rising prices and the lack of export
versions of high technology items are undercutting the
effectiveness of our programs. We need to take foreign
country requirements into account in U.S. defense procurement
and production planning.
In order to accomplish the above, we need to move
carefully toward more extensive combined planning with host
governments; recognizing there are political sensitivities
involved.
The legislation governing security assistance is flawed:
it is too inflexible and provides for too much congressional
micro-management. While extensive changes may not be attainable
this year, we can begin interagency work promptly and explore
with Congress possibilities for change in FY 84.
Force Integration
By the end of the 1980s, we will have improved capabilities
to deploy and sustain forces worldwide and a better manned
and more balanced total military force. However, under any
realistic conditions, the risks will remain great throughout
the decade. We pursue a strategy which seeks to deter war,
but if war is thrust upon us, to control escalation and to
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prevail. No place overseas where our forces directly confront
those of the Soviet Union do we have enough capability for
these purposes. Our defense capabilities entail substantial
risks that some regional objectives could not be achieved,
some commitments to some allies could not be fulfilled, and,
most importantly, we could be forced to resort to nuclear
weapons in response to conventional aggression. Risks can
and must be attenuated by marshalling all elements of our
national power.
Armed conflict involving the U.S. requires that the
full capabilities of all our armed Services be organized,
trained, and equipped so that all can be readily deployed
and employed together. Responding to any large contingency
will require some level of mobilization. Our ability to
swiftly reinforce forward forces, essential for all theaters,
depends on the contributions of our reserve forces. In any
event, our reinforcement capability is inadequate. Moreover,
even if our initial efforts to stop Soviet aggression were
successful, we would be less able to support a protracted
war than would the Soviets. We must, therefore, expand the
scope of mobilization and industrial capabilities and
frequently review the all-volunteer force to insure adequacy
of manpower.
Deterrence is dependent on both nuclear and conventional
capabilities. The deterioration of the nuclear balance has
eroded the credibility and utility of our nuclear "umbrella".
That danger is compounded by growing Soviet conventional
force capabilities. In redressing the imbalances, nuclear
forces should not be viewed as a lower cost alternative to
conventional forces. At the same time, the possible use of
nuclear weapons must remain an element in our overall strategy
to counter Soviet conventional aggression because it is
unlikely we will have sufficient conventional forces in
peacetime that will alone insure deterrence.
We are faced with growing vulnerability of our strategic
deterrent. As a result, we need to enhance the survivability
of offensive forces complemented by effective programs for
continuity of government, strategic connectivity, and civil
defense.
Over the longer term, control of space will be decisive
in conflict. The military potential of space must be exploited
in support of national security objectives.
i R ET
 PART I NATIONAL OBJECTIVES AND THE INTERNATIONAL Page 1
ENVIRONMENT
- Purpose of National Security Policy
The International Environment
Objectives of National Security Policy
PART II IMPLEMENTING STRATEGIES Page 8
PART III MILITARY COMPONENT OF NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
Section A: Threats to National Security Page 9
Section B: Role of Allies and Others Page 23
Section C: Regional Military Objectives Page 36
Section D: Nuclear Forces Page 46
Section E: General Purpose Forces Page 54
Section F: Security Assistance Page 65
Section G: Force Integration Page 73
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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
PART I
National Objectives and the International Environment
Broad Purposes of U.S. National Security Policy
The national security policy of the United States shall serve the
following broad purposes:
-- To preserve the political identity, framework and
institutions of the United States as embodied in
the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.
-- To protect the United States -- its national territory,
citizenry, military forces, and assets abroad -- from
military, paramilitary, or terrorist attack.
-- To foster the economic well-being of the United States,
in particular, by maintaining and strengthening the
nation's industrial, agricultural and technological base
and by ensuring access to foreign markets and resources.
-- To foster an international order supportive of the vital
interests of the United States by maintaining and
strengthening constructive, cooperative relationships and
alliances, and by encouraging and reinforcing wherever
possible and practicable, freedom, rule of law, economic
development and national independence throughout the
world.
The International Environment
United States national security policy will be guided by the
following assessment of the current international situation and
of trends and prospective developments affecting the pursuit of
our broad objectives..
The Soviet Union is and will remain for the foreseeable future
the most formidable threat to the United States and to American
interests globally. The growth of Soviet military power over the
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Review 30, 2002
Classified & Extended by William P. Clark
Reason for Extension: NSC 1.13(e)
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last decade has called into question the ability of the
United States and its allies to deter attack by the Soviet
Union and its allies across the spectrum of conflict. At
the same time, the Soviet policy of unparallelled global
expansionism challenges the strategic interests and position
of the United States around the world.
The loss of U.S. nuclear superiority means that the
U.S. cannot depend on nuclear forces to offset its general
purpose force deficiencies. This fact, expanded Soviet
conventional capabilities and a growing capability to
project their military power, have increased the relative
importance of U.S. and allied conventional capabilities.
The increased likelihood that a U.S.-Soviet conflict could
be both global and protracted, heightens the need for a
substantial U.S. industrial base for mobilization.
Building on their strengthened military position, the
Soviets have developed a comprehensive and sophisticated
political/military/economic strategy combining selective
use of their own and proxy military and security forces,
arms sales and grants, economic incentives and disincentives,
manipulation of terrorist and subversive organizations,
diplomatic and arms control initiatives, and propaganda and
disinformation activities. The near-term objectives of
their strategy are to extend Soviet influence globally and
to weaken the United States, first by blocking access to
strategic resources and land and sea routes; second, by
isolating the U.S. by fomenting disharmony with allies,
friends, and neutrals, and third, by undermining political
will in the west.
At the same time, the Soviets will continue to have
important vulnerabilities. The economies and the social systems
of the Soviet Union and of most Soviet allies continue to
exhibit serious structural weaknesses. The appeal of
Communist ideologies appears to be decreasing throughout
much of the world, including the Soviet bloc itself. The
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan has'revealed some of the
limitations on the effectiveness of Soviet power projection
capabilities. Non-Russian nationalities are growing relative
to the dominant Russian population. Events in Poland have
underlined, and could contribute further to, the internal
weakness of most Warsaw Pact countries.
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-3-
The passing of the Brezhnev era and the likelihood of
an ensuing succession struggle will make Soviet policy less
predictable. Political and economic vulnerabilities at home
could induce new leaders to seek reduced tensions abroad.
However, greater military strength and possibly a greater
sense of international self-confidence among the younger
generation of leaders could make them more willing to risk
confrontation with the West.
In the Near East and Southwest Asia, the chronic instability
of the region both within and among states, including the
Arab-Israel conflict, the rise of militant nationalist and
religious movements, together with an expanded Soviet
presence, poses a critical threat to Western political,
economic and security interests.
A critical stake in this region is the oil in the
Persian Gulf. The western economic system needs ready
access to it while control of this energy source by the
Soviet Union would give it a strangle hold over the West and
enormously ease the Soviet economic difficulties. Herein
lies an issue of potential superpower confrontation.
The People's Republic of China remains hostile to the
Soviet Union and its Vietnamese client, and appears to have
begun an ideological evolution away from Soviet-style
Communism. As such, China plays an important role in United
States global policy toward the Soviet Union. At the same
time, the uncertainties of China's future internal evolution
and the possibility of a closer relationship with the USSR
pose a latent long-term threat to U.S. and allied interests.
Unstable governments, weak political institutions,
inefficient unproductive economies, rising expectations,
rapid social change, the persistence of traditional conflicts
and the prevalence of violence, create opportunities for
Soviet expansion in many countries of the Developing World.
Acceleration of efforts by several nations to acquire
nuclear weapons threatens the viability of the international
non-proliferation regime, with potentially serious consequences
for regional stability as well as for the security of the
United States.
The unwillingness of our major allies to expand their
military programs significantly and to rethink political and
military strategies in the light of the increasing Soviet
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TOP SEMI
threat are driven by economic requirements, domestic political
conditions and differing views of the nature and objectives
of the adversary. However, the economic strength and shared
interests and values of the nations within the Western
alliance are assets of great importance if effectively
mobilized.
For all of these reasons, the decade of the eighties
will pose the greatest challenge to the survival and well-
being of the U.S. since World War II. Our response to this
challenge could result in a fundamentally different East-
West relationship by the end of the decade.
(TS)
Objectives of U.S. National Security Policy
The national security policy of the United States will
be guided by the following global objectives:
-- To deter military attack by the USSR and its
allies against the U.S., its allies, and other
important countries across the spectrum of conflict,
to defeat such attack should deterrence fail, and
to prevent or neutralize Soviet efforts to intimidate
or coerce the U.S. or others through its military
power.
To strengthen the influence of the U.S. throughout
the world by strengthening existing alliances,
by improving relations with other nations that
have potential strategic importance for us, by
forming and supporting coalitions of states friendly
to U.S. interests, by selective diplomatic and
economic initiatives, by economic policies that
enhance our influence, by helping to resolve
regional conflicts that threaten U.S. interests,
and by expanded political action and information
efforts.
To contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet
control and military presence throughout the
world, and to increase the costs of Soviet support
and use of proxy, terrorist, and subversive forces.
To neutralize the efforts of the USSR to increase
its influence through its use of diplomacy, arms
transfers, economic pressure, political action,
propaganda, and disinformation.
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5_
To foster, if possible in concert with our allies,
restraint in Soviet military spending, discourage
Soviet adventurism, and weaken the Soviet alliance
system by forcing the USSR to bear the brunt of
its economic shortcomings, and to encourage long-
term liberalizing and nationalist tendencies
within the Soviet Union and allied countries.
To limit the growth of, and where possible, to
reduce Soviet military capabilities by demonstrating
the sustained commitment of the U.S. to increase
its military strength, to redress any significant
imbalance favoring the Soviet Union, pursuing
equitable and verifiable arms control agreements
that limit Soviet power, and preventing the flow
of militarily significant technologies and resources
to the Soviet Union.
To ensure the U.S. access to foreign markets, and
to ensure the U.S. and its allies and friends
access to foreign energy and mineral resources.
To discourage further proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
To encourage and strongly support aid, trade, and
investment programs that promote economic develop-
ment and the growth of humane social and political
orders in the Third World. .
-- To promote a well-functioning international economic
system with minimal distortions to trade and
investment and broadly agreed and respected rules
for managing and resolving differences. (TS)
In addition to the foregoing, U.S. national security
policy will be guided by the following operational objectives
in specific regions:
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In Europe, to preserve the NATO alliance, while
strengthening NATO capabilities and, if necessary
adjusting NATO strategy to deter and defeat the
threat posed by dramatically improved Soviet and
Warsaw Pact forces; to counter West European
political trends that inhibit effective U.S. and
allied action in this direction; to encourage the
European allies to provide support for our objectives
in other regions, particularly Southwest Asia; to
work with the Europeans in their efforts to
overcome the serious economic problems that have
limited the freedom of action of certain Western
governments; to increase the costs of, Soviet
repression of popular movements and institutions
in Poland and other East European countries;
and to maximize prospects for their independent
evolution.
In the Western Hemisphere, to blunt and contain
the projection of Soviet and Cuban military power
and influence in the Caribbean Basin and South
America; to reduce and if possible eliminate
Soviet influence in Cuba; to discourage the USSR
from using Cuba as a base for mounting a strategic
threat to the security of the hemisphere; to
strengthen U.S. political and military relationships
with key countries; to promote sustained economic
progress in the Caribbean Basin area, and to
assist friendly governments in combatting Marxist-
Leninist insurgencies.
In Africa, to defeat aggression, subversive and
terror activities sponsored by Libya or other
forces hostile to U.S. interests; to secure the
withdrawal of Soviet and Soviet proxy forces on
the continent; to ensure U.S. and allied access to
strategically important mineral resources, while
promoting improvement in regional racial policies;
and to establish a U.S. presence on the continent
and adjacent areas.
In Asia, to preserve our existing alliances; to
recognize our relationship with Japan as the
cornerstone of U.S. policy in East Asia; to
encourage Japan to increase its military capabilities
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to be able to participate meaningfully with the
U.S. in a rational division of labor in the Asia-
Pacific area by attaining the self-defense power
necessary to provide for regional security in the
Northwest Pacific in this decade; to deter aggression
by North Korea and Vietnam, and to secure the
withdrawal or increase the costs of the Vietnamese
presence in Laos and Kampuchea; while maintaining
our unofficial relationship and fulfilling our
obligations to Taiwan, preserve a broad, effective
working relationship with the PRC, and to encourage
its interest in friendship with the U.S. and to
strengthen its ability to resist Soviet invasion
and intimidation, so that the PRC remains a strategic
counter against the Soviet Union without posing a
threat to U.S. and allied interests over the long
term; to encourage the economic and political
development of the ASEAN states as a source of
stability within Southeast Asia; to strengthen the
U.S. strategic relationship with Australia and New
Zealand within the ANZUS framework.
In the Near East, Southwest and South Asia,
to ensure Western access to Persian Gulf oil; to
gain and maintain sufficient influence and presence
to support U.S. interests in the region; to preserve
the independence of Israel and other key states
in the region and to strengthen their ability to
resist aggression or subversion by a regional or
extra-regional power or movement; to gain the
cooperation of countries outside the region in
accomplishing our various objectives in the region;
to enhance the possibility of resolving the Arab-
Israeli conflict in a manner that respects the
security interests of all parties; to secure the
withdrawal or increase the costs of the Soviet
presence in Afghanistan; to deter or frustrate
further military intervention or subversion by the
Soviet Union, Soviet proxies, or regional states
or movements hostile to Western interests; to
ensure a network of military facilities in the
region for the rapid introduction of sizeable U.S.
forces; to encourage India to seek greater independence
from the Soviet Union, and to establish stable
relations with other states in the region; and to
support the further development of a secure and
independent Pakistan. (TS)
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CONFIDENTIAL
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
PART II
Implementing Strategies
The overall national objectives of the United States
are to be implemented through an interlocking set of strategies
that principally include the following:
-- diplomatic;
-- information;
-- economic/political;
-- military.
The full articulation of U.S. National Strategy requires
the development and integration of each set of strategies
into a comprehensive whole. The various instruments of U.S.
national power and the strategies for their use do not stand
alone; rather, they are inextricably linked and, to be
effective, must be mutually supportive. Part I of this
study provides the common starting point towards this end.
The overall study process will build upon this common
starting point by means of individual study segments. Part
III of this study will consider the military component only.
The other components of U.S. national strategy as outlined
above are the subject of companion studies being undertaken
on an expeditious basis. Additional studies will also be
undertaken concerning the role of intelligence, covert
operations, and arms control in supporting the implementing
strategies.
(C)
CONFIDENTIAL
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US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
PART III, SECTION A
Throughout the 1980s the growing military might of the USSR,
its gradually increasing capacity to operate far from its
frontiers, and its willingness to provide military advisers
and arms to radical governments and insurgency movements in
the Third World will pose growing challenges to the US. The
growth in Soviet strategic nuclear power and conventional
military capability along its borders is especially striking.
However, actual extensions of Soviet power have depended on
perceived opportunities around the world, opportunities
heightened by the absence of effective resistance. Moreover,
it will become increasingly difficult for the Soviets to
sustain their military buildup as their economic growth slows.
Despite the growth in Soviet strength, a premeditated US-USSR
military conflict is much less probable than conflict resulting
from regional tensions, especially in the Middle East, that
could once again involve the US in a war with a Soviet ally or
client. Without attributing to the Soviet leadership a
propensity to assume high risks, increased relative Soviet
power suggests that the USSR might take bolder action in
lower-level crises than in the past.
The sense of enhanced security created by the Soviet military
posture may encourage the USSR to continue to take advantage of
local unrest in the developing world through proxies, the
provision of arms, advisers, and the deployment of its combat
forces in a few countries. It will continue to do so wherever
Moscow perceives that it can undermine pro-Western governments,
especially if this can be done without risking a confrontation
with the US.
In addition, nuclear proliferation will become an increasingly
serious problem in coming years as more countries acquire the
ability to make nuclear weapons and, in some instances,
actually do so.
During the 1970s, the Soviets achieved their long sought-after
goal of superpower status alongside the US. However, Moscow
did not regard "parity" or acceptance of "detente" as requiring
adherence to a global code of conduct acceptable to Washington.
Moscow has perceived the US as politically constrained not only
by the trauma of Vietnam but by an inability to achieve domestic
consensus on foreign policy. In turn, the Soviets have probed US
resolve in the Third World, as witnessed by their military
support ventures in Angola and Ethiopia. The Soviets have also
exploited detente to promote divisions between the US and its
NATO allies, and, most importantly, to encourage neutralism in
West Germany.
9
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The scale of Soviet investment in nuclear forces demonstrates
their importance in Moscow's strategy. They believe that in the
present US-Soviet strategic relationship each side possesses
sufficient strategic capabilities to devastate the other after
absorbing an attack. Soviet leaders state that nuclear war with
the US would be a catastrophe that must be avoided and that they
do not regard such a conflict as inevitable. Nevertheless, they
regard nuclear war as a continuing possibility and have not
accepted mutual vulnerability as a desirable or permanent basis
for the US-Soviet strategic relationship. They have been willing
to negotiate restraints on force improvements and deployments when
it serves their interests, but they prefer possession of superior
capabilities and have been working to improve their chances of
prevailing in a conflict with the US. A tenet in their strategic
thinking appears to be that the better prepared the USSR is to
fight in various contingencies, the more likely it is that
potential enemies will be deterred from attacking the USSR and
its allies and will be hesitant to counter Soviet political and
military actions.
The USSR will continue to improve the striking power and
survivability of its strategic intercontinental and intermediate
range nuclear offensive forces, overcome some of the weaknesses
of its strategic defenses, and improve their supporting command,
control, and communications systems. Because the Soviets rely
heavily on ICBMs, the increasing vulnerability of their ICBM silos
to improving US weapons will cause them to be concerned with the
adequacy of their strategic force capabilities. The Soviets are
expanding the capabilities of their SLBM force and are developing
mobile ICBMs and a new swing-wing intercontinental bomber. Even
with ongoing improvements in their strategic defenses, the
Soviets will be unable to prevent massive damage to the USSR from
surviving US strategic forces.
Soviet efforts in non-acoustic sensors for ASW and directed energy
weapons could have profound consequences if major technological
breakthroughs occur, although we do not foresee such successes in
the near future. It is unlikely that the Soviets could develop
prototype high-powered directed energy weapons for antisatellite
applications until the late 1980s or for ballistic missile
defense until the 1990s. Deployment of operational systems would
require an additional several years to a decade. However, Soviet
military capabilities in space will continue to improve,
especially in the use of manned space platforms and in
antisatellite capabilities.
The Soviets are attempting to prepare their leaders and military
forces for the possibility of having to fight a nuclear war and
are training to be able to maintain control over increasingly
complex conflict situations. Soviet leaders are aware that the
course of a nuclear conflict will probably not go according to
plans, but they have seriously addressed many of the problems of
conducting military operations in nuclear war, improving their
ability to deal with the many contingencies of such a conflict
and raising the probability of outcomes favorable to the USSR.
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The Soviets have vigorously modernized and expanded their theater
and peripheral nuclear forces. They are now in a better position
to escalate a European conflict and have acquired increased
capabilities to use peripheral strike forces opposite China and
throughout the Eurasian periphery.
Soviet leaders view their current strategic position as supporting
the conduct of an assertive foreign policy and the expansion of
Soviet influence abroad. They do not believe that they currently
enjoy significant strategic military advantages over the US, and
they do not wish a major confrontation, but they are probably less
fearful of this occurring than they were five years ago. Thus,
although the Soviets are unlikely to initiate military hostilities
in an area of central importance to the US like the Persian Gulf,
they may be prepared to seize opportunities offered by instability
in Iran or Pakistan, and they may increasingly expect that the
burden of avoiding confrontation should shift to the US--reflecting
the change in the "correlation of forces" since the 1962 Cuban
missile crisis.
Although they fear the possible consequences of US military
modernization efforts, the Soviets seem willing to wait for current
US determination to wane as a result of domestic opposition. None
of the current contenders to succeed Brezhnev seems likely to
depart radically from established Soviet priorities. The military
establishment has great influence on current Soviet policy
formulation and that influence may increase during a succession
struggle. As a result, Brezhnev's immediate successors are
unlikely to change the present emphasis on defense spending or
decrease their efforts to project Soviet power.
In the conventional realm, the Soviets have significantly
modernized their massive land and air forces opposite Europe and
China. When fully mobilized after 30 days, the Soviets can bring
to bear concurrently 124 divisions in Central Europe, 28 divisions
against Iran, Turkey, and the Persian Gulf region, and 51 divisions
against China. Significantly, the Soviets have separate forces for
each of these theaters and can take major action in one theater
without drawing down capabilities elsewhere. Although they
have
not developed forces specifically for overseas operations,
they
have
developed an ability to project forces on a modest scale
into
the
Third World, and this is one of the most rapidly expanding
areas
of
Soviet capability. They are significantly increasing
their
airlift capability, VSTOL aircraft carriers and fast sealift
capability. Most significantly, the USSR's 7 airborne divisions
are maintained in a high state of readiness and are a potential
tool of Soviet intervention. For the most part, however, the
Soviets will continue to rely on surrogates in the Third World.
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12
Complementing other efforts is Moscow's involvement in support
of revolutionary violence worldwide. Some radical regimes have
come to power with Moscow's aid, while others have done so largely
on their own--for instance, in Nicaragua and Ethiopia--and later
turned to the USSR for support. The USSR also directly or
indirectly supports a number of national insurgencies and
ethnic-separatist movements by providing them with arms, advice,
military training, and political backing. In addition, the USSR
and Eastern Europe support allied or friendly governments and
entities--notably Libya, certain Palestinian groups, South Yemen,
Syria and Cuba--which in turn directly or indirectly aid the
subversive or terrorist activities of a broad spectrum of
violent revolutionaries. Overall, there will be increasing
terrorist threats to US military and civilian personnel and
facilities which will stem from disparate conditions, political
causes, and groups. An increase in anti-American terrorism is
expected in Western Europe, the Middle East, Latin America and,
to a lesser extent, southern Africa.
The Soviets will undoubtedly attempt to increase hard
currency earnings as well as promote political and strategic
interests through arms sales. Soviet and Soviet-bloc military
sales, military technicians and advisers, and military training
are important sources of political influence in the Third World.
There has been an influx of large numbers of Soviet-bloc military
technicians and civilian advisers in Third World Countries. In
1981 these totalled over 80,000 in the Middle East, about 10,000
in Sub-Saharan Africa, and 11,000 in Asia. The amount of
influence such assistance buys is arguable, but there is no
question the arms sold enable the buyers to engage in stronger
military actions. Although recipients of Soviet aid are capable
of changing policies against Soviet interests--as shown by
Egypt--the Soviets have gained political leverage, a potential
basis for a greater military presence in the future, and, in
some cases, actual battlefield experience. And the military
training of large numbers of Third World nationals in the East
Bloc provides Moscow with a potential cadre of sympathizers.
The Soviets have a number of military vulnerabilities in
each of their five services. At the highest level, there are
serious questions about the reliability of their NSWP allies.
Their strategic bomber force is old and vulnerable to modern
air defenses. Their SSBNS are relatively noisy, and their ASW
systems are inadequate. Their strategic air defenses would in
general perform poorly against low-altitude penetrators. Their
general purpose forces also have deficiencies, for instance,
in advancing under unforeseen and quickly changing
circumstances. They also have logistical vulnerabilities,
including a heavy reliance on rail transportation.
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The Soviets face severe economic problems. Economic growth
throughout the 1980s will probably be 2 percent or less per year.
Contributing to this bleak economic outlook are slow growth in
the labor force, slowing growth of energy production, prolonged
foreign exchange stringencies, greater costs in extracting raw
materials, and continuing difficulties in introducing new
technology. Living standards in the USSR will probably stagnate
owing to the growing defense burden and inefficient investment
practices. As Soviet citizens perceive a decline in the quality
of life, productivity growth will also decline unless dramatic
economic reforms are introduced--an unlikely prospect. These
problems will force Moscow to make difficult choices among
priorities. While it will be increasingly difficult for it to
sustain growth in military spending, the primacy of the
military will continue in Soviet planning.
Although Soviet economic troubles are not dominated by a
shortage of energy, the Soviet economy is consuming increasing
amounts of energy at progressively higher cost. Oil exports,
the biggest hard currency earner, are declining; oil and coal
production at best is stagnant; only natural gas production is
expanding. Moscow will have to decide among domestic needs for
energy, politically sensitive--and highly subsidized--sales to
allies, and oil sales to the West for badly needed hard
currency.
The Soviets have several external problems. Hostility with
China and turmoil along the USSR's borders (e.g., Poland and
Afghanistan) reinforce its obsession with the need for order
and friendly regimes along its frontiers. The potential for
ideological contamination of its allies and friends, due to
recent events in Poland and Afghanistan, also gives them cause
for concern. Moreover, internal unrest and insurgency have
come to plague a number of Soviet clients; these countries
continue to consume scarce resources.
Parallel to Moscow's military effort, the Soviets will
try to pursue an arms control dialogue with the West. The
strategic arms control process in particular remains important
as a means of constraining military competition with the US.
A major Soviet motivation in this dialogue has been to reduce
the possibility of a US technological breakthrough that might
jeopardize Moscow's strategic nuclear status.
So far the Soviets have continued to constrain their
strategic force programs in accordance with the SALT I Interim
Agreement and the key provisions of the unratified SALT II
Treaty. If the Soviets conclude there is no prospect in the
near term for meaningful results from renewed SALT, they may
decide to go beyond the SALT II constraints. Among the
earliest indications that they had decided to do so would be
the failure to dismantle older systems as new ones are deployed,
the testing of ICBMs with more RVs than permitted under SALT II
limits, and the testing of more than one new ICBM. They are
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well positioned for potential force expansion and could increase
the number of MIRVed ICBMs, continue SSBN production without any
SSBN dismantlement, increase Backfire production, and test and
deploy new strategic systems. We are not able to judge whether,
if the Soviets wished to expand significantly several of their
nuclear force capabilities simultaneously, they would encounter
constraints in the availability of fissile material. The
history of Soviet willingness to sign long-term contracts for
the sale of enriched uranium suggests that Moscow has not been
concerned about potential shortfalls in nuclear material for
weapons.
The Soviets probably want to preserve the ABM treaty without
amendments for at least the next few years. They are concerned
that the US could eventually deploy effective ABM systems. Also,
their own systems are still under development, and they are
probably not confident about how effective a widespread ABM
defense might be. There are, however, uncertainties about US
actions and Soviet technical capabilities beyond the mid-1980s
that might cause the Soviets to revise their views of a
widespread ABM defense.
To sum it up, it is doubtful that Soviet leaders perceive a
"window of opportunity" in the next several years, but they very
likely believe that schisms in the West and domestic inhibitions
in the US provide them some latitude for additional actions.
During the next 3-5 years, Moscow may attempt to secure political
advantage from its military arsenal in anticipation of US force
modernization programs. From the perspective of the present
and probable future Soviet leadership, there will remain
important deterrents to major military actions. These include
the dangers seen in a direct conflict with the US, doubts about
the reliability of their Eastern European allies, worries about
Chinese exploitation of any Soviet losses, and an awareness of
the greater Western economic capacity to support extended wartime
operations. These concerns clearly do not preclude action
abroad but they constrain them.
Europe
For the foreseeable future, it will be a Soviet objective
to acquire and maintain forces.capable of winning a war in Europe,
whether conventional or nuclear, and the Soviets have kept a
clear numerical edge over NATO. NATO's strength and the
instability in Eastern Europe make the Soviets very unlikely to
initiate military hostilities against NATO, but they will use
their military advantages to exert political pressure on NATO
members and probably also to continue to encourage US-West
European differences. This effort has been especially strong
against the key NATO ally, West Germany, which remains divided
from East Germany and so is especially susceptible to Soviet
influence.
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 I ui' sLURtl
The Soviets intend any European conflict to take place on
Western, not Eastern, territory and stress the need for large,
combat-ready forces to be in place at the outset of hostilities.
They prefer to achieve theater objectives without using nuclear
weapons. They apparently believe that a theater nuclear war
would arise either if NATO used nuclear weapons to avoid losing
a conventional war--circumstances in which the Soviets would
plan on preemptive use of their nuclear weapons--or, less likely,
if the Warsaw Pact had to use nuclear weapons to halt a NATO
break-through. In such a conflict the Soviets would use, in
addition to tactical nuclear weapons, peripheral and some
intercontinental range missiles and aircraft against NATO's
forward-based nuclear forces.
The military balance in Europe poses a problem for Soviet
policy. The Soviets know that, if they appear too threatening,
they risk galvanizing NATO sentiment in favor of renewed defense
efforts. Thus, Moscow has pursued a dual policy: improving its
military strength--including SS-20 deployments and procurement of
Backfire bombers--while engaging in arms control talks, attempting
to improve trade and diplomatic relations, and undertaking a
massive propaganda campaign--supplemented by covert activities--
designed to undermine public support for NATO's defense effort,
particularly INF. Such Soviet efforts concentrate on West
Germany, the Netherlands, and Belgium.
Potentially the most threatening problem for the USSR is
the questionable reliability of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact
countries in a war with the West, and recent events in Poland
have made it more pressing.
The military balance in Europe and NATO will be affected
by developments in Western Europe. Strains within NATO and the
possible estrangement of some West European neutrals from some
US policies are likely to make US relations with these countries
more contentious. The West European allies will seek
increasingly to coordinate their policies in order to present
the US with agreed alternatives to disputed US positions. This
tendency toward divergence within the Alliance may increasingly
hinder NATO as a mechanism for determining and coordinating
security policy.
East and Southeast Asia
The Far East is second only to Europe in strategic
importance for Soviet military policy. In contrast with Europe,
the USSR directly borders its major potential enemy. Furthermore,
the Soviet supply line, the Trans-Siberian Railroad, is
dangerously close to a hostile China.
l0' L;LU ic.i
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In the coming few years, Soviet military power in East Asia
will seek to contain or reduce China's influence, decrease American
and Japanese influence, discourage anti-Soviet policies on the
part of Asian governments, and encourage the evolution of a
Soviet-sponsored Asian collective security system.
The most immediate threat to peace in Asia that could
involve US forces is in Korea. North Korea is dedicated to
reunifying the Peninsula on its own terms, and the decade-long
North Korean military buildup is aimed at promoting a military
option. The US security commitment and US military presence, the
strength of South Korea's military forces, the stability of its
government, and the desire of the Chinese and the Soviets to
maintain the status quo, are substantial deterrents to a North
Korean move. However, these factors may not be sufficient to
prevent a North Korean attack, particularly if the US were
preoccupied elsewhere.
Moscow's principal concerns in Southeast Asia are to
contain China and diminish US influence. For their sizeable
economic investment in support of Vietnamese policy, the Soviets
have alredy realized substantial returns. They have a highly
visible advisory presence throughout Indochina, and have gained
access to Vietnamese air and naval facilities. These facilities
enable the Soviets better to support Indian Ocean deployments
and to expand intelligence collection capabilities in the region.
Even though Vietnam is a major drain on Soviet economic resources,
Moscow probably will seek greater influence in Southeast Asia.
Action by Vietnam against Thailand is the most likely cause
of expanded regional conflict in Southeast Asia. Vietnamese
forces might strike into Thailand if Hanoi concluded that it
could no longer tolerate Thai support of anti-Vietnamese guerrilla
forces in Kampuchea. A Vietnamese attack would have severe
consequences, especially in view of US and Chinese security ties
to Thailand and the USSR's commitment to Hanoi. China might
initiate a second border war with Vietnam to tie down Vietnamese
forces. Soviet forces might then apply pressure on China. A
Sino-Soviet conflict would sorely test the evolving US-Chinese
relationship, forcing the United States to decide whether it
wished to be involved and, if so, how.
Although the Soviet military position in the Far East is
reasonably secure, the Soviets probably expect no change in
China's hostile posture toward the USSR. At the same time, they
expect intensified US pressure on Japan to assume a greater
security role in Northeast Asia, evolving Sino-Japanese trade
and political ties inimical to Soviet goals, and an evolving
US-Chinese military relationship directed specifically against
the USSR. They have also seen a reaffirmation by the United
States of its commitment to maintain sizeable forces in South
Korea.
i+i Vo-lii1>1
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Whether the Far East would be a defensive theater for the
Soviets in a global war or whether they would attempt to seize and
hold major portions of Chinese territory would depend on their
political objectives and the military situation in other theaters.
In general, the Soviets would want to avoid a "two-front" war. In
a strictly Sino-Soviet war, the Soviets would probably seize
portions of North China and establish new buffer zones along the
frontier. In a NATO-Warsaw Pact war the US would be faced with
coercive threats or military operations designed to prevent the
use of Japanese bases.
China has deployed a small force of ICBMs and MRBMs and is
developing an SLBM. A shared Chinese-US assessment of the Soviet
threat is likely--not certain--to ensure that this missile force
remains trained on Soviet targets. The same circumstances also
lead China to support most US interests in the trilateral
strategic relationship among the US, China, and the USSR. Only
a sharp and prolonged retrogression in Chinese-US bilateral ties
would change this equation significantly and cause China to
reemerge as a threat to US interests in its own right.
The Near East, South, and Southwest Asia
There are a large number of potential military threats to
US interests in this region. The Iranian revolution, the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, and the war between Iran and Iraq have
made the Persian Gulf area the dominant US strategic concern in
the Middle East. The most severe danger is that Iran might
succumb to increased Soviet influence or a large-scale military
intervention with the Soviets using the 1921 Soviet-Iran treaty
as a legal pretext.
Other potential dangers in the region are that friendly
states may be attacked by other local states--most immediately
that the end game of the Iran-Iraq war might increase the
intensity and scope of the fighting and threaten other Gulf
Arabs--and that friendly governments may be toppled by internal
insurrections, possibly stimulated or exploited by the Soviets.
However it might happen., Soviet political or military
control of the principal oil supplies to the west European and
Japanese economies could threaten the dissolution of our
alliance system by subjecting our allies to Soviet pressure.
In addition, the Soviets might view control over some of the
lowest cost energy in the world as a potentially important
contributor to easing their serious economic difficulties. If
friendly governments, dependent on Soviet support, were to
assume power in one or more oil-rich states, the Soviets could
acquire a valuable flow of hard currency.
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The most immediate threats to US interests in the Gulf region
are from Islamic revolutionaries in Iran and the potential of
direct Iranian military attacks on Gulf regimes, or more likely,
acceleration of Iranian-sponsored subversion. In addition,
Pakistan may be subjected to increased Soviet pressure and
possibly military action in retaliation for its support of the
Afghan insurgents. The Soviets already have sought to intimidate
Islamabad by diplomatic warnings, by condoning, if not provoking,
a number of attacks by Afghan helicopters on Pakistani border
outposts, and by supporting anti-government terrorist elements.
The tensions around the Gulf have sharply reduced for the
present the number of Arab forces that could be arrayed against
Israel. Even without this advantage, Israel will maintain its
wide margin of military superiority over the Arab states.
Although this superiority would serve to deter a premeditated
Arab attack, actions in Lebanon or elsewhere could lead to a
wider conflict in which the possibility of Soviet intervention
must be considered.
Another threat is posed by Libya, with its sizeable
equipment inventories, interventions in Africa, and support for
subversion and terrorism. Although Qadhafi may from time to
time modify his activities, his efforts to undermine moderate
regimes and Western influence in the area will continue.
Nevertheless, the Libyan military will remain ineffective in
exploiting its plethora of weapons in conventional combat.
Like Libya's military adventures and support for subversion,
the war in the Western Sahara and developments in Morocco and
Algeria will remain a lesser threat to US interests than the
conditions around the Persian Gulf and the threat of Arab-Israeli
hostilities.
Tensions between Pakistan and India will remain, fed in part
by Pakistan's pursuit of a nuclear program aimed primarily at the
development of a nuclear weapons production capability. India
will become increasingly concerned and might undertake either a
military strike against Pakistan's nuclear facilities or the
production of its own nuclear weapons as, in New Delhi's
calculation, Pakistan begins to acquire significant quantities
of weapons-usable fissile material. Any Indian attack could
rapidly escalate into a full-scale war.
The threat environment in Latin America through the
mid-1980s will be dominated by Communist exploitation of social
and political trends in Central America. However, it is most
unlikely that the USSR would be prepared to engage in a major
confrontation with the United States in the Caribbean or Central
America.
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:r n
Cuba is capable of taking independent action as well as
operating in concert with the USSR--or in response to its wishes.
Perceiving a weakening of US influence and capability and
opportunities to undermine US prestige, Castro since 1978 has
increased assistance to revolutionaries in the region. The
Soviet Union, while allowing Cuba to take the lead, has
gradually expanded its involvement--efforts complemented by
some East European nations, some Communist and Arab states, and
the PLO. Unless faced with important new costs or inducements,
Moscow is unlikely to abandon this tack.
Soviet-Cuban military ties have led to a continuous Soviet
upgrading of the capabilities of the Cuban Armed Forces, have
enabled the USSR to make extensive use of Cuban facilities, and
have resulted in Soviet-Cuban collaboration abroad. By now, the
principal objectives of Cuba and the USSR in Central America are
to consolidate the Sandinista revolution in Nicaragua and to use
Nicaragua as a base for spreading leftist insurgency elsewhere
in the region. External support has enabled the Sandinistas to
build the region's largest standing army, and this buildup is
intimidating governments in the region and will give the
Sandinistas added confidence to expand their export of revolution.
The threats to US security interests from Cuba are
compounded by its capability for effective military action within
the Caribbean region.. While there is little likelihood of Cuban
offensive military action against the US, there are a number of
US targets vulnerable to Cuban actions, such as harassment of
various sea and air routes. It is, however, unlikely that Cuba
would undertake such drastic action unless it felt directly
threatened by US activity. Cuba might act, however, at the
insistence of the Soviets during a time of general war.
A continuation of present trends could result in victory
for the extreme left in El Salvador, and such a victory would
heighten prospects for revolutionaries in Guatemala and
elsewhere in the region. It may be that those Communist and
radical Arab forces providing external support and management
help to the insurgencies intend to make Central America a
battleground over the next few years which would distract,
weaken, and undermine the United States in other parts of the
world. These scenarios could bring revolution to Mexico's
border and to Panama, and this region will come to have even
greater significance for US security interests if present trends
continue.
Elsewhere in the hemisphere, there is little direct military
threat to the US, but other troubles for US security interests.
There has been a trend over the last 15 years away from close
traditional ties with the US which has been reflected in a
reluctance on the part of many Latin American governments to
accept US leadership or to cooperate with the US on a number of
political, economic, and security issues. A neutral or hostile
position on the part of Latin American nations could have
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significant negative consequences for the US, particularly in
the case of the larger, more important countries like Brazil and
Argentina which have the military potential to contribute to US
defense objectives or will have the potential to develop nuclear
weapons during this decade.
There is a potential threat to the Panama Canal and its
facilities which are vulnerable to a variety of actions that could
disrupt operations or close the Canal for varying lengths of time.
In addition, traditional antagonisms between countries such as
Argentina and Chile, although unlikely to lead to major or
sustained armed conflict, could produce border clashes and
short-term hostilities. Political and economic instability in
Latin America will continue to provide opportunities for direct
or indirect Soviet involvement in the future.
Sub-Saharan Africa
Military threats to US interests in Sub-Saharan Africa are
currently quite small and involve the possibility of local
conflicts or domestic instabilities broadening to draw in the
superpowers on the side of local clients. For the most part the
problems are indigenous: racial animosities and ethnic and
tribal communalism.
of the many problems Soviet and Soviet proxy actions in
Africa may create for the US in the next several years, the most
acute could be:
-- Extension of the USSR's influence in Sub-Saharan Africa by
providing military assistance--either directly or through
the Cubans--to Soviet clients in the event of internal
instability in Zaire, Zambia, or Zimbabwe, or by
collaborating with the Libyans to exploit instability
in Chad or Sudan.
-- Soviet provision of significantly larger numbers of
advisers and equipment, or more support for the Cubans, in
order to prop up Moscow's "own" regimes in Angola,
Mozambique, and Ethiopia if threatened with internal
collapse.
-- Military conflict between a Soviet client regime and a
third country--with or without Soviet encouragement.
-- Soviet acquisition of a new foothold in West Africa.
-- An increased Soviet naval and air presence in the region.
-- Stepped-up Cuban and Soviet involvement with southern
African states which may increasingly rely on Moscow and
Havana to counter South Africa's military posture.
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Soviet behavior in Sub-Saharan Africa, however, is unlikely
to endanger long-term Western access to strategic metals or oil.
The Soviets would not be able to seize Sub-Saharan strategic
metals for themselves, or--barring a collapse of political order
in South Africa--to impose a prolonged denial of them to the
West. Rather, the USSR seeks to promote political objectives
and to enhance the USSR's future strategic capabilities in the
area. While not necessarily entailing Soviet involvement, there
are other potential flashpoints that may impinge on US security
interests in Africa through the mid-1980s (e.g., Ethiopia's
activities in the Horn, South Africa's domestic and foreign
policies, and internal conflict in Zaire).
Increased Soviet activity in Sub-Saharan Africa will not
necessarily assure heightened future Soviet influence. The
Soviets are probably worried by the possibility of a peaceful
Western-sponsored Namibian settlement, by their failure to back
the right horse in Zimbabwe, by US success in winning a grant of
military facilities from Kenya, by the pro-Western stance of
Nigeria, and by the tendency even for clients like Angola and
Mozambique to seek economic ties with the West. And in the 1980s
the Soviets will be vulnerable to Western counteraction in areas
of current Soviet influence.
Continuing Uncertainties
Although the future portrayed here is fraught with problems
for the US, it is quite possible that on balance this assessment
is too optimistic. Soviet willingness to employ military force
on a larger scale than they have so far might be substantially
increased by the late 1980s if events move in their favor more
strongly than suggested above: the US does not sustain its
military buildup, the growth of "peace" sentiment in the US, the
spread of neutralism in Western Europe--especially West Germany--a
deterioration in Sino-US relations, or greater disarray in the
Middle East and Southwest Asia.
The following are the key intelligence issues of continuing
concern for further collection and analysis:
-- Will the Soviets continue to remain within SALT limits for
their strategic forces even though existing agreements have
expired?
Are the Soviets likely to break out from the ABM treaty?
How would they respond to a US abrogation of this treaty?
Is it likely that the Soviet Union would significantly
reduce defense spending in response to domestic economic
problems? How severe will these problems be? Will there
be any radical change in the policy objectives of the
current and post-Brezhnev leaders?
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-- Is any major change likely in the current situation in the
Far East, to include Sino-Soviet relations, Sino-Soviet-
Japanese-US relations, and the Korean Peninsula?
-- is it likely that the USSR will exploit opportunities or
weaknesses in Iran, Pakistan, or elsewhere in the Persian
Gulf region by means of direct military intervention?
-- Will the Soviets react to INF deployments in Western Europe
with similar deployments in Cuba?
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4. F.:
U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
PART III, SECTION B
The Role of Allies and Others
Since the establishment of a Western security framework
in the years immediately following World War II, global power
relationships have shifted in several ways. First, there has
been a shift in the U.S.-USSR nuclear balance from clear U.S.
superiority to a state of rough parity with the prospect of U.S.
inferiority. Equally marked, however, is the altered balance,
especially in economic and political terms, between the U.S. and
its industrial allies. The latter group (NATO Europe, Canada,
Australia, New Zealand, and Japan) now produces a considerably
larger share of the world product than the U.S. In addition,
the post World War II decolonization process has made the
industrial democracies increasingly dependent for a number of
critical resources upon nations of the Third World, some of
which are vulnerable to Soviet and proxy activity and many of
which find it easier to blame their problems on the West than to
face up to them directly.
As a result of these changes, the U.S. must increasingly
draw upon the resources and cooperation of our allies and
friends to oppose growing Soviet and Soviet surrogate military
power, and to protect interests threatened from other sources
as well. While our ability to translate cooperation with allies
and friends into an effective counter to Soviet threats offers
us an important strength, our dependence on such cooperation is
a potential vulnerability at which the Soviets will continue to
probe.
Europe
A strong and unified NATO is indispensable to the protec-
tion of Western interests. Although U.S. conventional military
power together with our nuclear umbrella remains a large and
significant component of the NATO arsenal, the political and
economic resurgence of Western Europe has meant both that our
NATO Allies are better able to contribute to their own defense
and that they expect to have a greater voice in Alliance
decisions.
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Western interests require the improvement of the defense
capabilities of all members of the Alliance, even during
periods of economic difficulty. The U.S. must emphasize the
need for Allies to achieve measurable, real increases in
annual NATO defense spending and improve their forces to re-
dress imbalances between NATO and the Warsaw Pact. We should
maintain -- in concert with our Allies -- strong conventional,
theater nuclear, and strategic nuclear forces to provide a full
spectrum of deterrence and defensive capabilities adequate to
defeat Soviet/Pact aggression should deterrence fail. While
nuclear forces, particularly U.S. nuclear forces, are essential
to deterrence, they do not constitute a balanced defense force
and should not be allowed to serve as an excuse for avoiding
conventional defense improvements. We should, therefore, press
for Alliance implementation of key conventional enhancement
programs, e.g., force goals, LTDP (particularly readiness, re-
inforcement, reserve mobilization, air defense, logistics, EW,
and C3), armaments cooperation, and host nation support. The
Alliance must also continue to move forward on the INF moderni-
zation program, while the U.S. and the Soviets continue to
negotiate an INF Agreement in Geneva.
Concomitantly, the U.S. should adhere to its forward de-
ployment and early reinforcement commitment of having ten Army
divisions with corresponding Air Force and Marine support in
Europe within ten days of a reinforcement decision. Notwith-
standing the fact that our NATO Allies contribute a majority of
the active ground combat and tactical air forces and two-thirds
of the total (active and reserve) NATO force structure, U.S.
force commitments -- particularly ground combat and tacair
commitments -- are required by the sheer magnitude of the direct
Soviet threat which is unparalleled in any other strategic theater.
Allied doubts about our willingness to maintain a significant
ground and tacair commitment would undercut our efforts to press
them to improve their own conventional capabilities and would risk
lowering of the nuclear threshold.
In addition, to improve further Alliance military capabili-
ties and the efficiency of resource allocations, member nations
must be prepared to cooperate and integrate their defense efforts
beyond current levels, sometimes at the expense of national
preferences. To that end, we should pursue opportunities with
our Allies for the development and production of interoperable
and/or standardized armaments which yield increased combat effec-
tiveness and more efficient use of defense resources. At the
same time, we must recognize that there are limits on standardi-
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! i 110 SLUKLI
zation (e.g., the desire of each major NATO nation to design and
procure its own tanks and tactical aircraft). Our goals should be
realistic and emphasize interoperability as a complement or an
alternative to standardization.
As a further effort at cooperation and integration, we have
obtained or are seeking host nation support (EiNS) from our NATO
Allies. Germany has agreed to establish a 93,000 man contingent
in their Army reserve to provide wartime HNS for U.S. forces.
The UK, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg have agreed to
provide extensive HNS. In addition, we have signed Line-of-
Communications (LOC) and Collocated Operating Base (COB) agree-
ments with many NATO countries which also involve substantial
HNS. Our European Allies also have agreed to make available
some of their own civilian airlift and sealift to support the
reinforcement and resupply of Europe (although there is room for
further improvement in this area).
Because of their geographic location and industrial resources,
we should continue to support the sovereignty, independence and
neutrality of the European neutral/non-aligned countries. Accor-
dingly, we should assist these nations in developing sufficient
conventional military capability to protect their territorial
integrity and independence, while accepting the fact that their
policies dictate they maintain a distance between East and West.
In addition, the U.S. and its Allies must be prepared to
conduct unconventional warfare operations in Eastern Europe to
take advantage of Soviet political vulnerabilities in the non-
Soviet Warsaw Pact. Unrest in Poland and other Eastern European
countries offers fertile ground on which NATO might build in
wartime through psychological and other operations.
Rather than attacking the Alliance directly, the Soviets are
more likely to pursue aggressive policies in regions outside
Europe where there is less risk of superpower confrontation,
while at the same time hoping to erode NATO's political concensus.
The region in which events could most severely test Alliance
cohesion is Southwest Asia (SWA), where the West faces two inter-
related threats.
The larger threat is that of direct Soviet military inter-
vention. Only the United States has the power to deter or
counter Soviet intervention in SWA. With the exception of naval
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forces, European support in such a contingency would be more
significant politically than militarily. The more proximate
threats, however, arise out of regional conflict and domestic
instability in the regional states. European powers, acting
in concert with regional states, have the capability of res-
ponding to some lower order threats and may in some cases be
better placed to do so. Additionally, intervention by European
instead of American forces would generally be a less escalatory
step and would provide less of a pretext for Soviet interven-
tion in a regional conflict.
Thus, in addition to asking the Allies to improve their
defense posture in Europe (including, in come cases, compen-
sation for U.S. forces diverted to SWA), we must continue to
urge those Allies in a position to do so (primarily the UK and
France) to share the political and military burdens outside
Europe in areas where regional conflicts and internal strike as
well as Soviet threats could harm Western interests. Such
burden sharing outside Europe should include being prepared to
fight along side (or instead of) the U.S. Such Allied assis-
tance out-of-area could, in some cases, compensate for specific
U.S. force'deficiencies against the Soviet threat (e.g., French
minesweeping capabilities for SWA contingencies). We should
also pursue bilateral arrangements with some of the Allies
(e.g., combined contingency planning such as took place with
the UK and France during the first phase of the Iran-Iraq War).
In Turkey, we must provide major security assistance
support for the Turkish defense modernization effort. We need
also to complete negotiations on and to improve Turkish co-
located operating bases (COBS). During negotiations on the
NATO COB program, the Turks have emphasized that use of these
bases will be limited to NATO contingencies. It is neither
necessary nor desirable to force the SWA issue with Turkey now,
since improvements in Turkish capabilities and facilities would
make a contribution in both NATO and SWA contingencies. At the
same time, a satisfactory outcome of the COB negotiations and
further progress in the Turkish modernization effort, together
with the more general effort to engage NATO further in South-
west Asian security issues, will prepare the ground to draw
Turkey more deeply into Southwest Asian security planning and
possibly gain Turkish support for using their bases for South-
west Asian contingencies.
Within Spain, we must ensure that its integration into
NATO is accompanied by a renewal of the bilateral arrangements
(similar to the Turkish or Portuguese models) which place our
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L
military presence there on the firm basis of mutual security
interests. At the same time, Spanish inclusion under NATO's
security umbrella should facilitate the task of persuading
Spain to support ouf-of-area NATO actions, e.g., en route
access.
We also need mobility support (both lift and facilities
access) for U.S. forces that might be deployed to either NATO
or SWA. Building upon their political and economic relations
with countries in SWA, the Allies can provide security,
economic and training assistance to local states. According
to their capabilities, certain Allies can cooperate in main-
taining peacetime military presence, conducting combined ex-
ercises in SWA, and enhancing their capabilities for military
operations in the event of hostilities. In addition, we would
expect former colonial powers to play a leading role in ex-
ternal security assistance in Africa.
En route access is a function that every strategically
located NATO nation can contribute, especially the UK, the FRG,
France, the the nations of the Southern Region (including
Spain). In addition to our own efforts, we should also encourage
the Allies to help improve Turkish military capabilities given
Turkey's role in European defense and its potential contribu-
tion to security in Southwest Asia. Equally important, we
should foster among all NATO members a political climate which
applauds rather than criticizes ouf-of-area efforts and which
eventually gives specific credit (e.g., through NATO force goals)
for such efforts.
We must, however, recognize that only a few European
countries, primarily the UK and France, have the capabilities
to influence events outside Europe, and even they are not fully
committed to out-of-area combined security efforts. The FRG
has the capabilities, but is inhibited by its history and the
current legal interpretation of its constitution from such a
role, except for economic and, in some cases, security assistance.
In brief, our strategy should be one which encourages all
Allies to maintain and increase their contributions in Europe
while specifically encouraging those who can contribute out-
side Europe to allocate their marginal resources to capabilities
which could support both out-of-area and European missions. At
the same time, our own efforts in other regions (e.g., SWA) of
necessity are relatively independent of what our Allies con-
tribute.
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Southwest Asia (SWA)
The security environment in SWA bears little resemblance
to that in Europe. The greater likelihood of regional conflicts
and/or internal instabilities considerably complicates the
problems of security planning. Moreover, not only is there no
formal security framework, but the Arab-Israeli and other
regional conflicts sometimes set our regional friends against
one another. Nonetheless, while an alliance structure is un-
obtainable, a set of well-defined bilateral security coopera-
tion relationships should be pursued.
For direct response to regional (non-Soviet) conflicts and
local instability, the U.S. will rely primarily upon forces
indigenous to the region (or in some cases, UN peacekeeping
forces), with the possibility of ultimately backing them up with
quick reaction forces from the U.S., if necessary, and from our
European Allies, if possible and appropriate. For non-U.S. con-
tingency forces, U.S. lift may be necessary. Such a division of
responsibility is both politically advisable and necessary to
preserve the flexibility of U.S. forces for involvement in
cntingencies with the Soviets.
In order to contain such crises and ensure that direct U.S.
military involvement is not required or is minimal, regional
states will require capabilities which are sufficient to respond
to contingencies without outside augmentation. To that end,
regional states will need access to arms, logistical support,
technological expertise, and training. Some states, e.Q., Egypt,
Israel, Jordan, and Pakistan, will require security assistance
to pay for these arms and associated transfers. Some will also
require economic assistance to help maintain stability, absorb
the impact of military spending, and deny opportunities which
could be exploited by the Soviets and their proxies. The United
States, together with other external allies and the more affluent
states of the region, must be prepared to provide such assistance.
Should external military assistance be necessary to main-
tain the security of a friendly regional state in the face of
non-Soviet threats and/or to foreclose opportunities for sub-
version or intervention by Soviet surrogates, the prime candidates
to aid embattled governments should be other regional states.
To ensure that such capabilities exist within the region, the
U.S. will support the establishment and maintenance of appropriate
regional contingency forces by certain key regional states.
The U.S. would have to be prepared to provide the necessary lift
for such forces.
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If additional or alternative assistance is necessary, U.S.
allies from outside the region, e.g., the UK or France, may,
if possible and appropriate, be preferable to the U.S. both
politically (for the recipient) and in order to avoid escalating
to the possibility of a superpower confrontation. U.S. lift
support may be necessary, however. In any case, the U.S. should
also be capable of intervening militarily in regional or local
conflicts. It should not be necessary, however, to tailor
significant U.S. forces to hedge against such contingencies.
In response to the threat of direct Soviet aggression (which
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan highlighted), only the U.S.
can provide the full spectrum of capabilities necessary to deter
or counter a Soviet attack. However, the U.S. cannot stand alone.
Without the cooperation and participation of friendly regional
states and external allies, we are unlikely either to deter the
Soviets or to contain conflict to the region. In this regard, the
capabilities of regional states (and possibly of certain European
Allies) to respond to lower order (non-Soviet) contingencies will
also contribute to deterring or countering the Soviets. In
particular, friendly regional air defense capabilities can cover
the initial projection of U.S. forces into SWA. Israeli capa-
blities could also provide a considerable benefit in contingencies
involving direct Soviet attacks into the region and in a war in-
volving U.S. and Soviet Naval/Air Forces in the Mediterranean.
Nonetheless, the U.S. will have to provide the primary forces for
resisting the Soviets.
Moreover, because of continuing political sensitivities in
the region, it is important that U.S. rapid deployment capabili-
ties be perceived as focusing on the Soviet threat. Such emphasis
by the U.S. should make easier the task of drawing our European
Allies into regional security efforts and should help allay
regional concerns regarding unsolicited U.S. involvement in purely
local/regional security affairs.
Because the Soviet threat is not paramount in the eyes of
many of our regional friends, however, their willingness to appear
closely associated with the U.S. is limited by the political
vulnerability of some governments in the region, the Arab-Israeli
conflict, and the closeness of U.S.-Israeli relations. Conse-
quently, access, HNS, and prepositioning will have to be pursued
with both persistence and flexibility.
As in Europe, the U.S. cannot militarily help regional
states in opposing the Soviets without access to regional
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facilities and support from host governments. To maximize the
value of facilities access both for deterrence and during con-
tingencies, such cooperation must, if possible, be manifest
in peacetime through public agreements, contingency planning
and/or exercises. In some instances, infrastructure improve-
mnts will also be necessary, most likely involving U.S.
military construction funds. In addition, both to demonstrate
cooperation politically and to enhance capabilities militarily,
the U.S. must seek host nation logistical support (HNS) and
facilities at which to preposition certain types of U.S. equip-
mnt and supplies.
In Egypt, Oman, Kenya, and Somalia, we will need to main-
tain and develop the facilities to which we have access, as
quickly as possible. In Saudi Arabia, contingency discussions
between USMTM and the Saudi Ministry of Defense and Aviation
(MODA) should seek to identify as quickly as possible the
facilities and support which would be available to deploying
U.S. forces. Saudi concerns regarding more visible contingen-
cies, e.g., the threat from Iran and recent associated events,
may improve the prospects for engaging them in a more purposeful
dialogue with us on security cooperation.
Following on our strengthening of U.S.-Pakistani security
relations over the past year, we should continue to examine
the possibility of facilities access and HNS in Pakistan for
both regional contingencies and in the event of Soviet aggression
against Pakistan (taking care not to increase Indian anxieties
about, or to incite retaliatory actions against, Pakistan in the
process). An access agreement and plans for improvement and
utilization of Moroccan air facilities should be completed as
soon as possible. A decision whether to seek access to Sudan is
needed. The potential contribution of en route access in Sub-
Saharan Africa should also be evaluated.
Overall, given the combination of military requirements
and political feasibility, we should concentrate U.S. defense
resources allocated for facilities access and improvements in
the region in Egypt and Oman. If, however, the political
feasibility were to increase, Saudi Arabia (to the extent that
U.S. resources were necessary) and Turkey should receive the
same priority as Egypt and Oman.
To bolster both our capability and our credibility with
regional states regarding our intent to participate in their
defense against Soviet threats, the U.S. will need to maintain
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an important peacetime presence in the region. In the near-
term, we will maintain U.S. presence by continuous naval
deployments in the Indian Ocean and operations in the Persian
Gulf, as well as by periodic Army and Air Force deployments
to the region to participate in combined exercises with local
friends and external allies. In the longer-term, we must seek
arrangements to allow forward deployments of U.S. ground, naval,
and air forces in the region, including forward elements of the
RDJTF, should the political environment permit.
In conclusion, we should support (through our own and allied
security assistance) the development of balanced and self-contained
forces in regional states to deal with local and regional threats,
with emphasis on Egypt, Jordan, and possibly Pakistan for regional
contingency roles. We should size and structure U.S. forces for
contingencies involving the Soviets and publicly portray those
forces as intended for such missions. Additionally, with respect
to Soviet contingencies, regional states can provide certain types
of logistical support, and both regional states and external allies
can augment our combat capabilities, as well as provide en route
or in-theater access to facilities. We should also recognize that
in preparing to fight the Soviets, we will be providing a hedge
against the possibility that we may have to intervene in local or
regional contingencies.
East Asia and the Pacific Basin
The amount and extent of the Japanese defense effort is
limited by its constitution and history. Nevertheless, Japan
and the U.S. have agreed on a division of defense responsibili-
ties. Japan's Prime Minister has indicated that Japan can provide
legally for the self-defense of its territory, its surrounding
seas and skies, and the sea lanes out to 1000 nautical miles
from the Home Islands. The Japanese should be encouraged to
contribute more to their own and mutual defense efforts. To
the extent that their contribution does increase, it will
increase the flexibility to use U.S. forces for other missions
in the Pacific or elsewhere.
Beyond expanding their self-defense effort to enhance the
overall air/naval balance in the North Pacific, the Japanese
are being asked to provide wartime Host Nation Support in the
form of facilitative assistance to U.S. forces in Japan. Studies
of such assistance to U.S. forces engaged in a Korean contingency
began in January 1982. It is expected that other scenarios
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will be considered subsequently, and longer-term goals should
include discussion of topics such as Japanese provision of
mobility assets (el civil aviation and merchant marine) for
U.S. deployments t
o outhwest Asia. Public discussion of such
goals should be avoided, however, until such time as the GOJ
has prepared the appropriate political and legal foundation.
As we expect a favorable Japanese policy decision on
defense technology transfers'in the next several months, we
should make a major study of mutual defense needs which might
be served by U.S. and Japanese industry working together on
weapons-related projects. We should continue to press Japan
to bring its POL, munitions, other war reserve stocks and
related infrastructure up to full inventory objective levels.
As a priority, Japan should also increase further its over-
seas development assistance, particularly to critical states
in Southwest Asia such as Pakistan, Egypt, Sudan, and Turkey
though not at the expense of its defense effort.
In addition, we should attempt to facilitate greater
defense cooperation between Japan and Korea, recognizing that
any significant level of cooperation is unlikely in the near-
term. While we should not now ask Japan to assume any other
active defense roles beyond its current geographic area of
responsibility, we should seek an expansion of Japan's defense
perspective in the longer-term. We should, however, concentrate
on ways to make increased Japanese resources available to our-
selves and others for defense purposes. NSSD-6 on Japan should
include consideration of specific functional and geographical
areas in which the Japanese security contribution should be
concentrated.
The PRC causes the Soviets to devote resources against it
that might otherwise go elsewhere. In addition, it provides
a constraint upon Vietnamese actions against Thailand. It
also lends political-military support and Third World credibility
to U.S. opposition to Soviet expansionism in Afghanistan,
Ethiopia, and Angola (though not in other areas such as Latin
America) . -
We can enhance the durability of the U.S.-Chinese strategic
relationship and improve Chinese capabilities to oppose the
Soviet Union by supplying appropriate arms and other military
technology, by associated training, and by military exchanges.
However, over the short-term and mid-term, it is unlikely that
we can bring about significant improvement in Chinese military
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capabilities so long as China is unwilling or unable to allocate
substantial resources of its own to that purpose. We also
should seek closer U.S.-PRC coordination on security relations
with Thailand and Pakistan and perhaps en route access through
China for a Pacific airline of communication to Southwest Asia.
The U.S. and the PRC might also cooperate to support Soviet
equipment inventories of states we are seeking to draw away from
Soviet arms relationships.
In addition to Japan and the PRC, the ROK also plays a
beneficial role in supporting U.S. interests in East Asia. Our
policy should be directed at making the ROK increasingly self-
sufficient in its own defense capabilities. At present, by
virtue of its strong armed forces, the ROK, together with forward
deployed U.S. forces now in the region, maintains stability on
the Korean peninsula. Moreover, the basic strength of its
economy (despite its current problems) is such that the ROK should
be able to pay for a significant percentage of its own defense
for the foreseeable future, backed up by the continuation of the
U.S. force presence, security guarantee, and FMS program. Addi-
tional economic assistance from Japan would also be helpful. Any
increases in Korean defense investment, however, should maintain
the current division of labor (predominantly Korean ground forces
and predominantly U.S. tacair).
In the Southeast Asian region, Australia and New Zealand
are allied with us in a solid ANZUS relationship. Both Australia
and New Zealand are seeking to improve security cooperation with
Malaysia and Singapore bilaterally, and through the Five Power
Defense Arrangement which includes the UK. Such cooperation
strengthens deterrence against the Vietnamese/Soviet threat in
the region. Australia also could provide expanded base and other
support facilities, in addition to its potential direct military
contribution in the Indian Ocean as well as the Southwest Asian
region.
The Philippines and Thailand are also treaty allies which
are important to U.S. security interests in Asia. The Philippines
provide a major and perhaps irreplaceable U.S. base network for
support of our military posture in the region and en route access
to Southwest Asia. Thailand can also provide en route access.
In return, the U.S. helps these two countries deal with their
security problems and supports Thailand as a buffer against
Vietnamese expansionism, essentially through security assistance.
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As in Southwest Asia, the U.S. relies in Southeast Asia
primarily on local states to deal directly with internal
instability, with U.S. and other security assistance as nec-
essary. Should external threats or externally supported security
problems require direct outside assistance, the U.S. would in the
first instance look for ways to support the threatened govern-
ment's own efforts with the forces of other states of the region,
while seeking to maintain our own flexibility to deal with direct
Soviet threats.
The increasing Soviet threat in East Asia at a time when
extra-regional demands on U.S. forces, (e.g., Persian Gulf) also
are increasing dictates greater reliance on each regional state
to provide for its own defense, with U.S. security assistance
where required. However, recent fears of U.S. withdrawal from
the Pacific -- now quiescent -- could resurface quickly if U.S.
pressure on East Asian states for greater defense efforts were
seen as a ploy for reducing U.S. forces and commitments.
Latin America
The primary direct Soviet threat in this region emanates
from Cuba. In a major contingency or war against the Soviet
Union, U.S. military forces would be responsible for neutrali-
zing Cuba as a potential base for operations against the U.S.
or its lines of communication. Should Nicaragua serve as a
staging area for threats against the Panama Canal or Caribbean
or Pacific lines of communication, the U.S. would also be res-
ponsible for neutralizing that threat. In the South Atlantic
and South Pacific, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile might contri-
bute to the defense of sea lines of communication, through
access for U.S. forces and the employment of their own naval
forces. Additional analysis, however, is required to determine
the parameters of such cooperation.
As in Southwest and Southeast Asia, the U.S. would prefer
to rely upon local states to deal with local insurgencies. To
aid such efforts, we must be prepared to provide political
support and emphasize security and economic assistance. In
some instances, we may seek facilities access to allow us to
project power into the region. We should also seek to keep the
remaining UK, French, and Dutch presence in the region.
Should local forces fail to stem insurgent efforts, we
probably cannot depend upon the support or direct intervention
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 of external allies. In fact, the Europeans, except for the
British, have been opposed to our policy in Central America, and
we should seek their political neutrality if we cannot gain
their support.
U.S. military forces, therefore, represent the essential
back-up should local forces be unable to counter the insurgencies.
We should, however, make a maximum effort to employ U.S. forces
under a multilateral umbrella, whether under the Rio Treaty or a
sub-regional grouping such as the Central American Democratic
Community of El Salvador, Honduras, and Costa Rica.
Africa
The Soviet Union mainly seeks to gain advantage in Africa
through the use of surrogates, chief among them Libya and Cuba.
Because of Libya's international behavior, the U.S. has sought
to rein in its activities through political and military means.
While we would prefer to deal with Libyan threats exclusively
through friendly states and must help those states to strengthen
their military capabilities so they can stand up to Libya, we
must be prepared to act directly against Libya should the situa-
tion warrant it.
Because the possibility of confrontation with the Soviets
is greater in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean (stemming
from conflicts in other regions) and because the threats from
Soviet surrogates (Libya and Ethiopia) are also greater in
this area, our support for and reliance on friendly states of
the North African littoral and the Horn region is greater. In
Morocco, Egypt, Somalia, Kenya, and perhaps Zaire and Liberia,
in return for our providing security assistance, host nations
can provide facilities access (either en route or final destina-
tion) to ensure that Western interests can be defended with U.S.
or Allied rapid reaction forces.
Against other local and regional threats, we rely primarily
on local and regional forces. We are prepared to assist with
security and economic assistance, and we ask our external allies
and affluent friends to do the same. In former colonial areas,
we expect the former colonial power, if appropriate, to take
the lead where external assistance is necessary. France, the UK,
and Belgium are the major actors in that regard. We may also
support regional peacekeeping efforts such as the OAU in Chad.
U.S. lift and logistical support for either Allied or regional
security efforts probably would be necessary.
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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
PART III, SECTION C
Military Objectives
The wartime strategy of the U.S. is to employ military
force to achieve our political objectives and secure early
war termination on terms favorable to the U.S. and its
allies. In doing so, the U.S. must plan, in conjunction
with allies, for a successful defense in a global war
against the Soviet Union and its allies. This means planning
so that the. Soviet Union would be confronted with a major
conventional conflict and the threat of escalation. At the
same time, the U.S. will seek to limit the scope of a U.S.-
Soviet conflict to the extent commensurate with protecting U.S.
vital interests. Contingency planning should, however,
include options for military actions in regions of clear
U.S. advantage to dissuade the soviets from continuing their
attack. In this context, the threat of counteroffensives
elsewhere is an essential element of U.S. strategy, but is
not a substitute for adequate military capability to defend
U.S. interests in the area in which they are threatened.
Moreover, a decision to expand a war geographically must
take account of the facts that the Soviet union enjoys
options of attacking on other fronts at least as attractive
as ours, and that geographic expansion and nuclear escalation
considerations are linked.
In contingencies involving direct Soviet aggression,
the U.S. would expect to play a major role in defending U.S.
and allies interests. In lower order, non-Soviet contingencies,
we plan to rely on regional states and other friends and
allies to the extent possible to deter or counter threats to
common interests.
Priorities for Wartime Resource Allocation
Due to the global military capabilities of the Soviet
Union and the interrelationship of strategic theaters, the
likelihood that any U.S.-Soviet conflict would-expand
beyond one theater to other theaters must be recognized and
planned for. This does not mean that we must have the
capability to successfully engage Soviet forces simultaneously
on all fronts. Rather, this means procuring balanced forces
and establishing priorities for sequential operations among
theaters to ensure that we, in conjunction with our allies,
apply our military power in the most effective way. While
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recognizing that the political and military situations at
the time of war will bear heavily on strategic decisions,
the following priorities will apply for wartime planning:
The highest priority is the defense of North
America (including Hawaii, Alaska and Caribbean
SLOCs), followed by the NATO areas and the
LOCs leading there to. .
The next priority is ensuring access to the
oil in Southwest Asia, followed by defense of
U.S. Pacific allies and the LOCs for the
Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the defense of
other friendly nations in Latin America and
Africa.
In areas other than NATO and Southwest Asia, U.S.
actions will be designed to protect essential U.S. interests,
take advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities, and divert Soviet
attention and forces from Europe and Southwest Asia.
Priorities for peacetime resource allocation may not
always correlate to the above wartime priorities since
special emphasis on specific capabilities may be required.
Equitable Burdensharing. Many nations with living standards
equal to the U.S. contribute markedly less to the common
defense. In 1982 and beyond, U.S. "quiet diplomacy" must be
much firmer in insisting upon increased defense efforts by
affluent nations which possess the potential to do more in
the defense realm.
In the event of war with the Soviet Union, regional
objectives provide only rough guidelines and must be viewed
in a global perspective.
Europe
The security of Europe is closely linked to that of
the United States. The unprecedented challenges to western
security, coupled with a continuing growth in economic
interdependence, mandate a firm commitment by nations on
both sides of the Atlantic to the coalition warfare strategy
of NATO. While intra-Alliance problems such as burdensharing
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and anti-nuclear movements exist, it will remain important
that we continue to recognize that the defense of Europe is
vital to the national security of the United States.
NATO strategy MC14/3 stresses defense along the forward
edge of NATO territory, supported by the possible NATO
initiation of nuclear escalation if NATO is losing conventionally.
This nuclear linkage -- and uncertainty -- is important to
deterrence. But the Europeans must not be permitted to use
nuclear linkage as an excuse for not funding conventional
defense forces. Our policy should be to support MC14/3,
while stressing that nuclear parity means a strong con-
ventional defense is necessary for deterrence as well as for
defense. While improvements are required across the full
spectrum of the Alliance's military capabilities, a major
increase over current efforts is especially required from
all other members with regard to conventional capability.
Without such an increase the nuclear threshold could be
lowered and the Allies become more vulnerable to nuclear
threats as the Soviets continue increasing their capabilities.
Additionally, NATO should enhance deterrence through closer
Allied coherence, and clearer expression of political will.
Within the context outlined above, the following are
the specific U.S. military objectives for the European
region:
Wartime Objectives
To protect the territorial integrity of Western
Europe.
To defeat a Warsaw Pact conventional attack with
conventional forces in a forward defense, and to
deter Soviet use of chemical or nuclear weapons in
accordance with current NATO strategy.
To be able to sustain a war at least as long as
the Warsaw Pact can.
To weaken the Warsaw Pact's ability to wage war by
engaging Pact forces on their own territory,
disrupting their LOCs, and fragmenting the cohesion
of the Pact alliance.
To establish and maintain control of Atlantic
LOCs.
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To enhance deterrence through improvements in
NATO's conventional defense capabilities while
also improving nuclear and chemical forces.
To achieve increased Allied contributions to the
defense of western Europe and from Allies capable
of doing so increased contributions in other areas
of mutual benefit, to include Southwest Asia.
To secure a more effective division of labor
within NATO through cooperative efforts, such as
Host Nation Support Agreements.
Near East/Southwest Asia
The United States has two primary national security
interests in the region. The first is to prevent the Soviet
Union from acquiring political-military hegemony in the
region. This requires that the U.S. support the sovereignty
of regional states friendly to the U.S. The second is to
maintain continued access to Persian Gulf oil. This means
that the U.S., in concert with intra- and extraregional
allies and friends must be prepared to meet threats of any
magnitude, from internal subversion to large scale Soviet
aggression.
In this context, defense policy has three overriding
objectives:
1. Deter Soviet overt military aggression and
protect Western access to oil. To do this, U.S. defense
planning has three tiers. First, we must plan for and
demonstrate our ability to project the RDJTF -- Rapid Deployment
Joint Task Force -- quickly into the region to prevent a
Soviet fait accompli. Additional support from intra- and
extraregional allies and friends must be obtained to support
RDJTF requirements. Our private pressure upon them for
realistic combined planning must be unremitting. Second, if
deterrence fails, we must plan to combat the Soviets n the
theater to dissuade them from continued aggression. The
third tier of Defense planning is to prepare for executing
counter-offensives on other fronts where the U.S. has
advantages. Throughout this planning process, the potential
for this conflict to become global must be recognized and
planned for.
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For at least the next several years, we are
unlikely to succeed in achieving our objectives against a
determined Soviet attack in Southwest Asia. Furthermore, it
is questionable whether either superpower could restrict to
one theater a war which would impact critically upon the
economies of the U.S., Western Europe, and Japan.
2. Maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage
over any realistic combination of Arab foes. The latest
SNIE concludes that Israel's military superiority is much
stronger today than at the time of the 1973 war and projects
that it will be much stronger in FY 87 than today. As the
most militarily powerful state in the region, Israel's
assistance would be of considerable benefit in the course of
a conflict with the Soviets, particularly in the Eastern
Mediterranean, as augmentation for the Southern Flank.
3. Support moderate states against external
aggression and subversion. This requires U.S. arms sales to
help strengthen substantially the self-defense capabilities
of key states in the region.
To accomplish these objectives for the region,
the U.S. expects regional states to contribute to the extent
possible to their own defense as well as assisting in supporting
the employment of U.S. forces. Allies will be expected to
offer their facilities for the deployment of U.S. forces to
Southwest Asia. Additionally, they should be encouraged to
contribute militarily to meeting specific threats if such
participation would not substantially reduce their war
fighting capability in their home region and would provide a
beneficial contribution to the conflict.
Within the context outlined above, the following are
the specific U.S. military objectives for the Near East,
Southwest and South Asia region:
To secure the oil fields, transshipment points and
sea lines of communications essential to Western
security. (This includes threats of all magnitude
from internal subversion to Soviet aggression.)
To engage friendly regional states, Western Allies
and other extra-regional states in the execution
of our strategy.
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To enhance deterrence by sufficiently improving
our global capability to deploy and sustain military
forces so as to ensure that, if the Soviet Union
attacks in Southwest Asia, it would be confronted
with the prospect of a major conflict with the US
in-theater and the threat of escalation.
This language is understood to mean that it is a
peacetime military objective to develop a capability
for in-theater military operations consistent with
the Southwest Asia force goals of the FY 84-88 Defense
Guidance, while recognizing that funding shortfalls
may result in lesser capability.
To maintain Israel's qualitative military advantage
over any realistic combination of Arab foes.
To support moderate states against external
aggression and subversion.
To ensure access to a network of military facilities
in the region for the rapid introduction and
sustainment of sizable U.S. forces.
To obtain overflight, 'anding, bunkering and
access to enroute facilities for the deployment
and support of U.S. combat forces.
- To obtain military contributions (including
agreements for combat forces) from selected Allies
in support of U.S. objectives in the region.
To maintain a strong naval presence in the area,
together with as substantial a presence on land as
can be managed given regional sensitivities and
political constraints.
To increase peacetime planning with regional
states for wartime contingencies, including host
nation support, prepositioning and combat roles
for indigenous forces.
Far East
Our foremost peacetime objective in the Far East is, in
conjunction with our allies and other friends in the region,
to prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its influence in
East Asia and the Pacific. Asian security relationships are
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fundamental to offsetting successfully Soviet global ambitions.
U.S. strategy in East Asia and the Pacific is predicated on
the stabilizing relationship between two security anchors.
One anchor in Northeast Asia depends on cooperation among
the U.S., Korea, and Japan, as well as the U.S. relationship
with China. The other anchor in the Pacific Basin binds the
U.S. to Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the somewhat
more loosely to the remainder of ASEAN. Continued U.S. and
allied force improvements and strengthened U.S. security
relationships are required to establish and maintain an
effective defensive network secured at both ends of the
region. A direct U.S.-Soviet conflict in Asia is unlikely
except in the context of a global war. Therefore, although
other contingencies in the region could involve U.S. forces
in hostilities short of U.S.-Soviet conflict, regional
wartime objectives in Asia listed below are those supportive
of global wartime objectives.
Wartime Objectives
- To maintain control of the Pacific lines of
communication, including those to the Indian
Ocean, and the bases needed to support the global
strategy.
To fulfill commitments to the Asian allies, given
particular emphasis to protection of U.S. bases in
the region, obtain allied support in the conflict,
and seek to preclude a Soviet decision to redeploy
forces for use against NATO.
To have Japan provide for its own defense, including
SLOC and air protection to 1,000 miles, and if
possible, contribute more broadly to regional
defense efforts.
- To have the PRC maintain military initiatives that
would fix Soviet ground, air and naval forces in
the USSR's Far Eastern territories.
To transform our relationship with Japan into an
active defense partnership in which Japan significantly
increases its own defense capabilities and, over
time, contributes more broadly to regional defense.
To continue to develop our relationship with the
PRC in ways which maintain the PRC as a counterweight
to the Soviet Union, enhance the durability of
U.S.-PRC ties, and lay the foundation for closer
future cooperation as appropriate.
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To maintain sufficient U.S. and allied strength on
the Korean Peninsula to ensure stability there,
and, if deterrence fails, assist the ROK in
defeating hostile forces. Enhance deterrence,
primarily by assisting the ROK to become increasingly
self-sufficient in its defense capabilities.
To increase peacetime planning with our allies for
wartime contingencies.
To have other regional states assume a greater
share of the responsibility for the common defense
and assist them in improving their capabilities to
fulfill it.
To improve the support of regional states for U.S.
power projection from the Western Pacific to the
Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf.
To prevent the Soviet Union or Vietnam from
achieving a dominant presence in Southeast Asia
from which to foster actions inimical to our
interests and those of our allies.
Western Hemisphere
The defense of North America is this nation's primary
security concern. Since World War II, defense of the Western
Hemisphere has meant that the U.S. would maintain strategic
nuclear deterrence, develop closer relations with Canada and
Mexico, and foster collective security arrangements among
Latin American countries. It is becoming increasingly clear
that a secure hemisphere is no longer a foregone conclusion.
The U.S. must continue to build on interests shared with
Canada and Mexico, while viewing Latin America not as a
Third World area removed from the traditional focus of U.S.
strategy, but as a contiguous region whose future bears
directly on the security of the hemisphere as a whole.
Latin America, and especially the Caribbean/Central
American region, is an area with which we are closely
associated by virtue of our Gulf Coast and Mexican borders,
our dependence in Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, and
the critical Panama Canal waterway. Nearly half of our
trade and two-thirds of our imported oil pass through the
Caribbean. Moreover, in event of war, half of NATO's
supplies would transit by sea from Gulf ports through the
Caribbean to Europe.
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The South American continent is also a focus of major
U.S. interests. Though strategically less pivotal to us
than the Caribbean, South America includes several nations
with which we enjoy long-standing close relations and which
are among our most important trade partners. In addition,
the east coast of South America faces the South Atlantic sea
routes which represent a major petroleum lifeline for Europe
and the United States.
Wartime and Crisis Objectives
To defend North :rerica (including Hawaii, Alaska
and the continguous Caribbean Basin).
- To neutralize Soviet and other hostile forces in
the Caribbean Basin.
To control LOCs in the Caribbean, South Atlantic,
and South Pacific including the Panama Canal.
To prevent further aggression and subversion
against regional states by forces hostile to U.S.
interests.
Peacetime Military Objectives
To modernize the strategic air defense system for
North America.
To reverse Communist gains in El Salvador, Nicaragua,
Grenada and other areas in Latin America.
To broaden regional military-to-military contacts
and seek the active military cooperation of key
countries in regional territorial defense, in the
security of Caribbean Basin, South Atlantic and
South Pacific sea lines of communication and in
facilitating air and ocean movement.
To maintain, or acquire as needed, base and
facilities access, logistical support, and operating,
transit, and overflight rights.
To increase the level and exercise tempo of U.S.
military presence in the region.
Africa
Africa's mineral resources (including oil), plus its
strategic location astride the sea lanes from the Persian
Gulf, make it of prime importance in economic (and therefore
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political) terms; the military requirement for the West is
essentially preemptive: to deny the Soviets (and Libya)
control over key African states and territory from which
they could interdict the subtly of minerals and oil from
Africa and the Middle East. In case of a military struggle
for control of the middle East, Africa is important as a
strategic territory for the movement of major Western
forces to the area via the Mediterranean, across North
Africa, or across Central Africa. It is also equally
important, as a base for facilities from which both air and
naval forces could operate to destroy Soviet naval threats
to the sea lines of communication in the Indian Ocean,
around the Cape, and the south Atlantic.
In peacetime, in addition to being a major source for
minerals important to U.S., West European, and Japanese
industry, Africa remains an important area for the political
contest of Western and Soviet Bloc values in the Third
World. The West must counter, and the U.S. must play a
larger role in meeting, the Soviet/proxy challenge. Principal
elements currently available are economic, security assistance,
and special operations. Successful implementation of a
counter-Soviet strategy in Africa will also require the
development of a climate of supportive Congressional and
public opinion, and the restoration of substantial "internal
security" and covert action capabilities.
Wartime and Crisis Objectives
- To employ air and naval forces to neutralize
Soviet or other hostile. forces (especially Libya)
in strategic locations in the region and adjacent
waters.
To protect access to and deny Soviet use of the
region's mineral resources, key facilities, and
LOCs.
Peacetime Military Objectives
To gain base access and transit rights in pro-
Western African states for the deployment and
subsequent support of U.S. forces to Africa,
Southwest Asia, South Atlantic, and contiguous
areas and work to deny the Soviets similar access.
To assist countries throughout Africa that are the
targets of Soviet proxy, Libyan and Ethiopian
aggressive, subversive or terrorist actions.
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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
PART III, SECTION D
U.S. Nuclear Forces
The basic national guidance on U.S. nuclear force employment
and acquisition policy is provided in NSDD-13, Nuclear Weapons
Employment Policy, signed in October, 1981. NSDD-13 was this
Administration's initial review of U.S. national nuclear policy
and superceded the Carter Administration's PD-59. This section
has reexamined that guidance and found it to remain valid. The
following discussion of U.S. nuclear policy is fully consistent
with NSDD-13.
It should be noted that given today's forces and related
command, control, communications and intelligence (C31), not all
elements of our strategy are fully executable. NSDD-12, Strategic
Forces Modernization Program, signed in October, 1981, outlines
this Administration's program for improving our capability to
execute national strategy. It mandates improvements in the areas
of: strategic C31 to improve the survivability and endurance of
our ability to control our forces and our basic connectivity to
those forces at all times; our offensive forces themselves to increase
their survivability, endurance, and effectiveness; and our active
and passive capabilities to limit damage to the U.S. through
strategic defense. The improvements outlined in NSDD-12 will not
be fully completed until well into the next decade.
By July 1982 the Department of Defense will provide a
Master Plan which identifies where specific capability shortfalls
exist and how specifically we intend to synchronize our employment
and acquisition policies to minimize risk.
Objectives
Our most fundamental national security objective is to deter
direct attack--particularly nuclear attack--on the United States,
its forces and its allies and friends. The nuclear forces of the
United States also, in conjunction with conventional forces,
contribute to the deterrence of non-nuclear aggression and to
support NATO strategy for the defense of Europe. Deterrence can
best be achieved if our defense posture makes Soviet assessment
of war outcomes, under any contingency, so uncertain and dangerous
as to remove any incentives for initiating attack. This requires
that we be convincingly capable of responding in such a way that
the Soviets, or any other adversary, would be denied their political
and military objectives. Should nuclear attack nonetheless occur,
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Review 4/30/2002
Classified & Extended by
William P. Clark
Reason: NSC 1.13(a)
 the United States and its allies must prevail and in the process
be able to force the Soviet Union to seek earliest termination of
hostilities at the lowest possible level of violence and on terms
favorable to the United States.
The United States remains committed to a deterrent use of
military strength; our objective is to deter aggression or to
respond to it should deterrence fail. As a consequence our
strategy is designed to insure the realization of our objectives
after the enemy has seized the first initiative to deny him his
political and military goals and to counterattack so strongly that
we inflict an unacceptably high cost on the enemy. Specifically,
our strategy will reflect the following elements with respect to
nuclear forces:
Initial Target Coverage. We will deploy and maintain forces
capable, under all conditions of war initiation, of attacking a
wide range of targets. U.S. strategic nuclear forces must be able
to render ineffective the Soviet (and Soviet allied) military
and political power structure through attacks on nuclear and
conventional military forces, political/military leadership and
associated control facilities, and industry critical to military
power. This includes the ability to deny the Soviet Union a
military victory at any level of conflict.
Tar et Coverage Throughout Protracted Conflict. U.S. nuclear
forces will be survivable an enduring in order that we can maintain
sufficient forces throughout a protracted conflict period and
afterwards. We must have the capability to inflict unacceptable
levels of damage against a broad range of targets of the
Soviet Union and its allies. This will provide the Soviets
strong incentive to seek conflict termination short of an all-out
attack on our cities and economic assets.
Target Coverage for Protection and Coercion. We will
maintain in reserve, under all circumstances, survivable nuclear
offensive capability for protection and coercion during and after
a prolonged nuclear conflict. We must deny the Soviet Union or
any other country the opportunity to coerce the United States,
our allies or third countries, or to dominate the post-war situation.
Damage Limitation. U.S. nuclear forces, by offensive actions
and in conjunction w th active and passive defense measures, should
be capable of limiting damage to the United States and its allies.
Strategic Defense. U.S. nuclear forces, in conjunction with
conventional forces should seek to:
-- control access to U.S. airspace in exercise of our
sovereignty;
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-- preclude a surprise precursor attack by air breathing
weapons which could disrupt our prompt retaliation;
-- provide active defense against atmospheric attack to
limit damage to the U.S. as specified above;
-- provide post-attack privacy from hostile reconnaissance;
-- provide the capability to negate targets in space and
ensure our rights of free access to space;
-- and support passive defensive measures against both
atmospheric and ballistic attack.
Range of Options. We will maintain the capability for a
full range of options, and, by holding at risk targets which are
important to an aggressor, demonstrate the risks inherent in
initiating or continuing aggression.
Crisis Stability. Our force posture should minimize the
extent to which Soviet nuclear threats could be used in a crisis
to coerce the United States and our allies, and should ensure
that in crisis conditions the USSR has no incentive to initiative
a nuclear attack and that the United States is not under pressure
to do so.
Escalation Control. U.S. nuclear weapon employment plans
should provide the NCA with the ability to conduct military
operations at all levels of conflict in ways that will be militarily
effective and will maximize the chance of controlling escalation.
Plans for the controlled use of nuclear weapons should seek, in
conjunction with other political and military actions, to:
-- provide the U.S. and its allies with leverage for a
negotiated termination of fighting;
-- reverse an unfavorable military situation for a sufficiently
long period to cause an enemy to pause and provide him the
opportunity to reconsider the consequences of his continued
aggression;
-- diminish the enemy's expectations of success both by
the direct military effect of the attacks and by evidencing U.S.
willingness to respond as appropriate, while indicating clearly
the limited character of the U.S. response executed to that point;
-- convince an enemy that previously calculated risks and
costs were in error and that early termination of the conflict
or a reconsideration of his course of action is the most attractive
alternative;
-- and leave the enemy with sufficient remaining political,
and economic resources clearly still at risk so that he has a
strong incentive to seek conflict termination.
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Support for Alliance Commitments. The United States will
maintain nuclear forces to support our alliance commitments
including those expressed in agreed NATO strategy (MC 14/3).
Preserving the Defense Continuum: Regional Role of Nuclear
Forces. We must ensure on a worldwide basis that nuclear forces
are available in various regions to establish and maintain a
continuum of deterrence with a force posture and associated em-
ployment plans which reflect the facts that:
-- non-strategic nuclear forces provide the essential link
between the conventional and the strategic nuclear forces;
-- nuclear forces cannot be viewed as a substitute for a
strong conventional warfighting capability; the use of nuclear
weapons would represent a basic qualitative change in warfare;
-- nuclear forces will be configured to provide a wide range
of options, from highly selective and limited strikes up to and
including general nuclear release;
-- SIOP planning must not become dependent on a contribution
from non-strategic nuclear forces for achievement of key objectives;
-- nuclear forces, as with all force elements, must have the
capability to conduct offensive and defensive operations in a
nuclear or chemical environment;
-- U.S. nuclear forces may be used to place at risk targets
in geographic areas other than that in which the main thrust of
aggression is being made in order to draw enemy resources away
from the initial theater of operations;
-- U.S. nuclear capabilities must support planning for counter-
offensives to threaten the aggressor including Soviet and Warsaw
Pact assets.
-- and release authority for the use of nuclear weapons will
be neither immediate nor automatic.
Maritime Nuclear Employment. Response to Soviet nuclear
attacks at sea will not necessarily be limited to the sea. Therefore,
nuclear assets must be available and capable of putting at risk
selected targets vital to the Soviets in order to confront them
with massive uncertainties when considering nuclear release at sea.
Forward Deployment of Non-Strate is Nuclear Forces. Forward
deployment o non-strategic nuclear forces will be made to:
-- provide for maximum flexibility and capability for forward
defense by their continued deployment in Europe and in the Western
Pacific;
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-- provide for early deployment from peacetime locations in
a crisis for survivability. Such deployments should be as far
forward as is consistent with their range and expected use;
-- reflect the fact that the only currently deployed non-
strategic nuclear land-attack system outside Europe and Korea
are carrier-based, and as such they should be planned for possible
use in conflict scenarios involving Soviet forces or Soviet nuclear
weapons support;
-- and maintain adequate stocks of nuclear weapons in those
theaters that pose high risks of developing into nuclear conflict,
such as Europe and Korea. The ability to deploy non-strategic
nuclear forces rapidly, and to reinforce that deployment, into
those areas in which non-strategic nuclear forces are not normally
deployed, will be maintained.
Nuclear Employment Planning
Types of Planning Required. In order to provide the greatest
degree o flexibility to t e NCA and to regain the initiative
necessary to realize our objectives, U.S. nuclear employment planning
will include:
-- preplanned options against targets in the Soviet Union,
its allies, and other potential enemies; these options will be
the primary vehicles for selective use of nuclear forces;
-- rapidly developable selective use options to provide the
capability to attack significant targets that emerge during a
conflict and to integrate nuclear and general purpose force options;
-- the capability to plan adaptively. We must establish an
improved capability for identifying and destroying military leader-
ship targets, including those which are hardened, mobile, and
reconstituted.
Plannin Guidance. Planning should be developed which will
strengthen t e linkage between U.S. strategic and non-strategic
nuclear forces.
Methods of attack on specific targets should be chosen to
limit collateral damage consistent with effective accomplishment
of the attack objective. Where appropriate, overall plans should
include the option of withholds to limit such collateral damage.
While it will remain our policy not to rely on launching our
nuclear forces in an irrevocable manner upon warning that a
Soviet missile attack has begun, we must leave Soviet planners
with strong uncertainty as to how we might actually respond to
such warning.
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And we must be prepared to launch our recallable bomber
forces upon warning that a Soviet nuclear attack has been
initiated.
Plan non-strategic nuclear forces primarily for selective
use in direct defense with priority given to stopping the thrust
of enemy offensive action, or for escalatory options with emphasis
on interdiction and attack of second echelon forces, including
theater nuclear delivery capacity and C31 assets. Use of non-
strategic nuclear forces in SIOP support roles will be planned as
a secondary function.
To the extent feasible, and without unacceptable degradation
of our ability to execute the SIOP, strategic nuclear forces which
are capable of executing non-strategic nuclear options may be
tasked for those missions; however, release of strategic nuclear
forces to such missions is not automatic, and non-strategic nuclear
planning should not depend on strategic force contributions.
In order to maximize the uncertainty of Soviet Union risk
assessments and employment planning, United States non-strategic
nuclear forces deployment and normal operations will maintain a
survivable retaliatory strike capability and a high state of
readiness to support rapid response to NCA direction. Operations,
to include C31 and exercises, will be conducted to minimize the
likelihood of, and incentives for, a Soviet pre-emptive strike.
Resulting Force Requirements
U.S. nuclear forces and supporting C31 also must be:
-- capable of assuring warning and attack characterization
and capable of controlling the forces in the prosecution of the war;
-- capable of responding to any initial attack on the
United States with preplanaed strike options;
-- capable of carrying out controlled nuclear counter-attack
.over a protracted period while maintaining a reserve of nuclear
forces sufficient for trans- and post-attack protection and coercion;
-- capable of attacking a full range of targets, to include
hard and superhard installations, both on a time urgent and on
a sustained basis;
-- and capable of being integrated effectively with general
purpose forces to achieve theater campaign objectives.
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Nuclear Force Development and Modernization
U.S. nuclear forces development and modernization should be
designed to continue to deter nuclear attack on the United States
and its allies. The cornerstone of our modernization efforts is
the program ennunciated in NSDD-12 and the NATO decision to
modernize its deterrent force. Consequently, our programmatic
steps must:
-- provide greater emphasis on a multiplicity of nuclear
systems and basing modes to strengthen the overall capability of
our nuclear forces;
-- provide forces and associated C31 that achieve greater
survivability, endurance and effectiveness through active and
passive measures;
-- include a subset of strategic offensive forces and
associated C31 systems that have a high probability of enduring
survival in a nuclear war to provide protection and coercion in
the post-major exchange situation;
-- implement, as the highest priority for non-strategic
nuclear force modernization, the program to modernize NATO's
armory with deployment of GLCM and of Pershing-II;
-- give high priority for non-strategic C31 systems which
assure the ability to execute nuclear strike plans. This must be
followed by the integration of national and tactical capabilities
which contribute to the acquisition and tracking of second and
third echelon mobile targets; poststrike reconnaissance and damage
assessment of those targets;
-- provide a national level C31 system that has a high
probability of assuring connectivity between the NCA, and forces,
and sensors;
-- provide for modernization of strategic defense including
air and space defenses; a vigorous research and development
program will be conducted on a ballistic missile defense sytem;
-- emphasize development programs for nuclear warheads which
reduce the usage of special nuclear materials; and for modernized
nuclear systems having improved military effectiveness, safety,
security, survivability, and endurance; and for upgrading stockpile
weapons to enhance safety and security.
-- and recognize that either threshhold or comprehensive
bans on the testing of nuclear devices can have a significant
impact on the achievement of the above and on the reliability of
our existing nuclear stockpile.
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Relationship
to Arms Control
Arms control can complement military forces in support of
U.S. objectives and national security. It is essential that arms
control agreements provide the opportunity for the U.S. to
develop and possess sufficient military capability relative to
that allowed to potential adversaries to execute the U.S. national
military strategy with reasonable assurance of success.
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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
PART III, SECTION E
General Purpose Forces
Force Application
Conventional Force Objectives
Peacetime. In peacetime, general purpose forces serve US
poli'cy 0jectives by deterring aggression against the US and
its friends and allies, by demonstrating US interest, concern,
and commitment, by assisting the forces of other nations to
develop their own capabilities, and by providing a basis to
move rapidly from peace to war. To accomplish these objectives,
both in the near term and beyond, the US must have both
active and reserve forces to provide the total warfighting
capability.
Low IntensityTi' Conflict. Total US conventional forces should
avF a the capa i~lity to meet a broad range of Soviet-inspired
and non-Soviet threats by:
Supporting security assistance programs and providing
foreign military training in support of the internal
defense efforts of our friends and allies as they
seek to shoulder the responsibilities for their
own security.
Providing appropriate support and support forces
to supplement the military combat capabilities of
friends and allies in their efforts at internal
defense.
Providing, if necessary, US combat forces to
supplement the capabilities of indigenous forces
when other menas are ineffective, in the context
of a statement of clear US political objectives
and national will.
Maintaining area-oriented special operations
forces capable of supporting the internal defense
of friendly countries.
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US-Soviet Conflict. US conventional forces should have the
capability for meeting the Soviet global threats by:
- Defeating Soviet aggression in many regions:
Europe, Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, Northeast
Asia, Southeast Asia, Latin America and the LOCs,
with the priority by region to be determined by
the extant situation.
Putting the Soviet interests at risk, including
those in the Soviet homeland.
Seeking to terminate hostilities quickly and
decisively on terms favorable to the United States.
Where quick termination cannot be assured, the
United States must confront adversaries with the
prospect of a prolonged, widespread, costly, and
ultimately unwinnable conflict. The US must have
forces which are capable, after a prolonged conflict,
of denying the Soviet Union or any other country
the opportunity to coerce the US or allies or to
dominate the post-war situation.
Policy Guidelines for Force Application
Regional Wartime Priorities
General Policies. Forces are and will remain insufficient
for simultaneous operations in a global conflict with the
Soviet Union. Therefore, the political and military situation
at the time of war will bear heavily on strategic decisions,
and the sequence of force employment may not necessarily be
dictated by previously established priorities. Within this
context, the following policies are applicable for both the
near-term and mid-term.
It is in the interest of the US to limit the scope of any
conflict with the Soviet Union.
Counteroffensives will be directed at places where the US
can affect the outcome of the war. The United States should
not consider counteroffensives in other areas as a substitute
for robust military capabilities to protect vital interests
at the point at which they are threatened.
Plannin for Sequential O erations. US actions in other
parts o t e wor will be designed to protect essential US
interests, take advantage of Soviet vulnerabilities, and
divert Soviet attention and forces from Europe and Southwest
Asia. In the event of war with the Soviet Union originating
in Europe, the need for sequential operations may limit the
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deployment of augmentation forces to Southwest Asia or to
the Pacific. For war with the Soviet Union originating in
the Pacific, forces available for augmentation to Europe or
Southwest Asia would be reduced. For war with the Soviet
Union originating in Southwest Asia, forces available for
subsequent employment in Europe or the Pacific would be
reduced. Supporting plans should exist for lesser scale
operations in secondary theaters during a major war in a
primary theater.
Regiona Instability.
in Economic, religious, political, and
ethnic stabilities in much of the world impinge directly
on US interests and, at times, provide opportunities to the
Soviet Union to project direct or indirect military power
and influence to the affected locations. In this environment,
and for the foreseeable future, the United States may be
faced with the need to respond to crises or conflict in a
single country or region in which there is no direct Soviet
involvement.
In responding to internal or intraregional conflict situations,
the US will rely primarily upon indigenous forces to protect
their own interests. At the same time, the planning process
should not prejudge the direction of US support. Each set
of circumstances will stand on its own merits.
For planning purposes, the actual commitment of US combat
forces will be made, in any case, only when other means are
ineffective, political objectives have been established, US
political will has been made clear, and appropriate military
capabilities are available.
Whether US support is to be security assistance, military
support, US military presence, or introduction of US combat
forces, US actions should be designed to supplement the
military capabilities of the forces being helped.
Coalition Framework of US National Security Policy. As a
nation with global interests, the US is particularly dependent
upon the assistance of friends and allies. There is no
doubt that successfully meeting the challenges to our interests
will require stronger and more effective collective defense
arrangements. Our strategic reserve of US-based forces
cannot be deployed, employed or sustained without significant
support from allies and friends. Therefore, it will be the
policy of the United States to:
- Seek agreements to permit overflight and access to
ports and airfields during peacetime and in time
of crisis.
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Encourage the upgrading of selected allies and
friendly facilities that might be used by US
forces during crisis or war.
- Continue to secure host nation support agreements
for forward deployed forces and those forces
scheduled for deployment in the event of crisis
and war.
Urge our inter- and intraregional Allies and
friends to join us in further developing a credible
deterrent to aggression.
Seek additional contributions from our NATO allies
to improve the reinforcement capability of US-
based combat and support forces.
US defense programs will consider the status of these coalition
programs in the planning process.
Mobilization Policy. Reserve Component forces are an integral
part of US capabilities. The reserves not only provide
major combat forces that complement and reinforce active
units, but they also provide the majority of the supporting
forces required to sustain the total force in combat.
Mobilization planning must allow adequate responses under
conditions of ambiguous warning. These responses must be
repeatable, sustainable, and able to achieve mobilized
manpower objectives.
Objectives. Existing Presidential callup authority
or partial mobilization may be necessary in a
conflict not involving the Soviets to provide
sustaining forces for the conflict and to backfill
essential capabilities normally required in the
European theater. In a crisis with the Soviets
and before initiation of hostilities, the US
should consider full mobilization as a precautionary
measure to deter conflict and protect vital interests.
Any mobilization will include actions to prepare
for total mobilization, if necessary. The initiation
of conscription to meet personnel requirements
must be an integral part of mobilization planning.
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Policies. Given the reliance our force structure
places on reserve components, during crises involving
the potential deployment and sustained employment
of sizeable combat forces, an early mobilization
decision will be provided by the National Command
Authorities. Mobilization planning is an integral
part of capability planning and as such is based
upon the same policies and priorities as those
used for force application and development.
In peacetime, US military strategy for general purpose
forces is designed to support our overall national security
strategy by the peacetime application of military power. In
the broadest terms, we seek to achieve two fundamental
objectives: first, to deter military attack against the
United States, its allies and friends; and second, to
contain and reverse the expansion of Soviet influence
worldwide. Both of these objectives require the United
States to increase its influence worldwide.
Forward deployments, rapidly deployable US-based military
forces, assistance and special operations, and the demonstration
of our rapid deployment capability through periodic exercises
serve both objectives. These components, taken together,
comprise our peacetime military strategy.
Forward De tor~men~ts. Current US forward-deployed forces
wil a maintained in peacetime to provide a capability for
timely and flexible response to contingencies and to demonstrate
resolve to honor US commitments. US forward-deployed force
presence will be postured to facilitate the transition from
peacetime to wartime posture, to foster military and non-
military relations, to demonstrate US power and interest,
and to assist in the retention of US rights, authorizations,
and facilities abroad.
US ground, naval, and air forces will remain deployed overseas
in Europe, in the Western Pacific, in Southwest Asia, and in
Panama. Naval forces will maintain a presence with combatant
forces in the North Atlantic, the Caribbean Basin, the
Mediterranean, the Western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean/Southwest
Asia regions.
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Intermittent deployments will be made to waters contiguous
to Latin America, Africa, and Southwest Pacific. Ground and
air deployments will be made periodically to Southwest Asia
as political considerations permit. US naval, air, and
ground forces may also deploy to other selected areas
worldwide on a periodic basis.
Flexible Forces/Rapid Deployment. The US will maintain a
strategic reserve of US-based forces which can rapidly
deploy where necessary to protect interests worldwide.
Assistance and Special Operations. In peacetime, the US may
provide military support to forces of other countries.
Assistance may also be appropriate to resistance forces
within some countries in which the Soviet Union or its
proxies have achieved some degree of control. The US should
provide assistance with a minimum of delay or dislocation of
US units. Moreover, the US should be able to use the assets
of DOD and other agencies to conduct special operations to
support friendly governments and resistance movements.
Assistance programs should include the expansion of US
foreign military training. This will assist indigenous
friends and allies to defeat insurgencies, to maintain
stability, and to reduce diversion of US military capabilities.
The US should take steps to strengthen US security assistance
programs to provide Third World friends and allies with the
means to meet subversion and surrogate conventional threats,
thereby reducing diversion of US military capabilities and
precluding Soviet extension into critical strategic locations.
Exercises. The rapid deployment capability of US combat
forces to regions where the US has essential interests will
be periodically demonstrated. Where possible, these exercises
will include Allied and friendly participation.
Current general purpose forces are adequate to maintain most
peacetime forward deployments and to respond to minor crises
and non-Soviet conflicts. There are, however, attendant
strains on manpower and readiness to maintain these capabilities.
These forces currently contribute to deterring direct aggression
in Europe, Southwest Asia, or Northeast Asia.
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Because of the continuing increases in Soviet conventional
force capabilities, major risk would confront US forces if
they should become engaged in direct conflict with Soviet
forces in any of those theaters. Current general purpose
forces are not adequate to assure success in the event of
simultaneous conflict with the Soviets in more than one
theater.
Strategy Guidelines
Conventional Conflict Not Involving the USSR. The United
States will seek to llimit the scope of the conflict, avoid
involvement of the USSR, quickly end US military involvement,
and ensure that US military objectives are met. A partial
mobilization may be necessary to provide reinforcements and
sustaining capability and to backfill those capabilities
normally assigned an early NATO role.
Threatened regional allies must provide combat forces to the
extent of their capabilities. US forces will provide air,
naval, logistic, and advisory support. If necessary, US
ground combat troops could be deployed.
Depending on the nature of the conflict, US combat force
participation may involve a demonstration of force, protection
of US lives or critical resources, interposition between
contending parties, or direct combat.
Direct US military involvement should cease when the threatened
ally is able to conduct successful operations without assistance.
Logistic support will continue until the threatened ally can
end the conflict on favorable terms.
Conventional Conflict Involving the USSR. While US allies
are expected to contribute to the defense of their own
interests, US forces will be employed to limit or counteract
Soviet involvement. Before or upon initiation of direct US-
Soviet hostilities, the United States will take precautionary
actions worldwide to protect its vital interests from Soviet
counter-escalatory threats and will undertake mobilization
steps, preparing for total mobilization if necessary. If
deterrence fails, US military strategy is to:
Deploy military forces rapidly to the area to
signal US commitment and to deter further aggression.
Failing to deter further aggression, conduct
military operations in conjunction with regional
allies with the aim of halting Soviet aggression.
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- Take those steps necessary to prepare for the
possibility of a global US-Soviet conflict and, if
necessary, execute counteroffensives at other
fronts or places where we can affect the outcome
of the war.
Near-Term Shortfalls. Current forces are generally adequate
to execute the strategy described above for the non-Soviet
case. US military strategy envisions that a war with the
Soviet Union may be global in nature and possibly protracted.
The strategy is intended to limit a United States-Soviet
confrontation to conventional warfare, while maintaining
appropriate nuclear and chemical deterrents.
Because there is a serious c!isparity between Soviet conventional
forces and US conventional forces, the United States does
not now possess a credible capability to achieve all military
objectives simultaneously. Thus, in the near term, execution
of the strategy involves a considerable degree of risk.
The inability to simultaneously employ sufficient force in
Europe, Southwest Asia, and essential lines of communication
will likely require the United States to, choose between
geographic escalation, nuclear escalation, or an unacceptable
outcome in a vital theater. Use of nuclear weapons in any
theater must, however, take into account the fact that the
Soviet Union has theater nuclear advantages. Moreover, in a
multi-theater war there is no way to be sure that the enemy
will restrict any retaliatory use of non-strategic nuclear
forces to the theater in which we initiate their use.
Mid-Term Shortfalls. The political and military situation
at the time of war will continue to dictate strategy decisions.
Continued real growth will permit some force expansion as
programmed forces achieve desired readiness, sustainability,
and modernization levels. These improvements will enhance
the likelihood of being able to achieve wartime objectives
in one theater.
However, the execution of our wartime strategy in a global
conflict against the Soviet Union will still be characterized
by difficult choices among theaters. We will remain unable
to meet the requirement for simultaneous global operations.
Given the Soviet threat, there is a substantial risk that
current force capabilities are insufficient to attain the
military objectives enunciated in this section. Notwithstanding
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substantial improvements over the course of the next five
years, US military forces will remain unable to carry out
fully US wartime military strategy.
The most significant factor contributing to this reality is
the need to devote the bulk of available resources to assure
the responsiveness and fighting capabilities of existing
forces. On the one hand, we must maintain a credible deterrent
today; on the other hand, we cannot assume that there will
not be a war in the near term. At the same time, defense
programs must also achieve balanced force improvements if we
are to close the gap between strategy and capabilities.
The priorities for force development which follow are intended
to provide broad guidance for the difficult decisions in
resource allocation necessary in a fiscally constrained
environment. The operational capabilities (e.g., readiness,
sustainability, etc.) which must be enhanced are those
subelements of total military capability in which emphasis
must be placed to reduce risk. They should not be regarded
as discrete categories which are mutually exclusive. Indeed,
they overlap in an often complex and not readily identifiable
manner. For example, the procurement of repair parts contributes
directly to both readiness and sustainability. The priorities
which follow take into account these interrelationships.
Priorities for Existing and Programmed Forces
First priority is to improve the operational capabilities of
forward deployed forces, forces providing flexibility in
deployment, such as the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
(RDJTF), other units earmarked for earliest deployment, and
their associated lift forces.
Second priority will be improving the operational capabilities
of those US-based forces not earmarked for earliest deployments.
Third priority will be expanding force structure.
Priorities for Operational Capabitlities Improvement. Force
capabilities will be improved in ie following general order
of priority:
Achieving necessary readiness. US forces must be
prepared for war at any time. Since the warning
time we can safely assume is shorter than the lead
times needed to correct readiness deficiencies, it
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is necessary that we maintain high peacetime
readiness. Moreover, warning is likely to be
ambiguous, requiring responses that can be repeated
and sustained until the ambiguity is resolved.
Readiness and the perception of it enhance deterrence
as well as being critical in responding successfully.
Upgrading C3. Given their essentiality, command/control/
communications systems should be selectively
improved, the survivability of critical nodes
enhanced, and operational procedures rigorously
exercised.
Providing adequate sustainability. Given the
expectation o short warning, provisions for
sustainability must be made in advance. We cannot
foretell the duration of any conflict, but the
goal is to ensure support of the forces from the
initiation to the end of the hostilities, and
hence, in the mid-term, to be at least equivalent
to the sustainability of the forces of the Soviet
Union and its allies.
- Ideally, we should have sufficient stocks on hand
to sustain the forces until such time as defense
production could support our wartime demand rates.
In most cases, we do not have this capability and,
given the projected funding availability, it is
unlikely to be attained in the mid-term. Therefore,
sustainability improvement programs will focus on
raising stockage levels, expanding industrial
preparedness, and restarting or maintaining production
capabilities in the industrial base.
Increasing mobilit ca abilit . Inter- and intra-
theater mobility s oul a increased until balanced
with the required deployment schedule of current
forces.
maintaining essential modernization. Investment
(R&D plus procurement) in systems for all forces
should provide for acquisition to preclude a
decline in force capability in the FY 84-88 or FY
89-95 period (except where policy or other changes
are made).
Force Structure. Modern warfare requires force structure
that is balanced between combat and support forces and among
all essential combat arms. Currently, large portions of our
combat forces cannot be brought to bear on an enemy in a
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timely enough manner nor sustained in combat. Increased
capabilities to deploy forces, protect the LOCs, control the
seas, and seize ports are necessary to enhance responsive-
ness and the flexibility of current land, air, and amphibious
forces. Thus, striking a better balance in our current
force capabilities to meet global objectives requires expansion
as well as improvements in naval, mobility, tactical air,
and sustaining support forces. Consideration should also be
given to land force expansion.
Chemical Warfare. In view of the overall military balance
between the US and the Soviets, we cannot rely on other
components of our military capabilities to deter chemical
warfare. The US has been unable to eliminate the chemical
threat through negotiations or unilateral US restraint.
Consequently, to deter, the US needs to improve its defensive
and retaliatory CW capabilities sufficiently to deny the
Soviets the significant military advantage they would gain
from using chemical weapons.
The objective for the retaliatory element is to maintain the
safest, smallest chemical munitions stockpile that denies a
significant military advantage to any initiator of CW.
Therefore, US forces will continue modernization initiatives
for the production of binary chemical munitions to achieve
and maintain a credible deterrent.
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U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
PART III, SECTION F
Security Assistance
This paper discusses the role of security assistance*
in US foreign and defense policy and identifies issues for
further consideration.
Security assistance is a critical element in supporting
this Administration's national security objectives. It is
designed to extend US influence abroad, to help deter conflict,
and if deterrence fails, to enable friends and allies to
defend themselves. Security assistance provides US forces
with access to bases and overflight and other rights enabling
coordinated operations of US and friendly forces. Security
assistance also strengthens the US economy and the defense
production base.
It should be clear from the above that security assistance
is one of the hardest currencies circulating in the international
security community and it must be emphasized that the Soviet
Union fully appreciates this fact. The USSR has demonstrated
a capacity and flexibility in the arms transfer business
that in many important respects exceeds our own. This is
particularly marked in their ability to offer quick delivery
and concessional financing.
By contrast the US security assistance program is not
able to meet satisfactorily the ambitious set of objectives
set forth above. There are several reasons:
resources are inadequate and often of the wrong
kind;
the annual budget cycle constrains both long-range
defense planning with aid recipients and coherent
FMS procurement planning by the Defense Department;
procurement lead times, high cost and potential
technology compromise have seriously reduced the
responsiveness of the security assistance program;
and
*Security assistance consists of Foreign Military Sales credits
(FMS), grant military assistance (MAP), International Military
Education and Training (IMET), Economic Support Funds (ESF) and
Peacekeeping Operations (PKO).
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legislative restrictions in the various acts
covering security assistance reduce Executive
Branch ability to react appropriately to emergencies
or unforeseen events. Congressional earmarking,
advance notification, and other oversight and
control provisions make it very difficult to get
the best possible return out of the security
assistance resources Congress makes available.
Fulfillment of the global and regional objectives set
forth in earlier sections of this study -- including support
of key Southwest Asian states, maintenance of existing
alliance relationships, strengthening our friends in the
Caribbean and Southeast Asia -- depend in part on the availability
of security assistance resources. Security assistance is an
essential complement to our own force structure in meeting
our security objectives abroad.
Resources
Security assistance is and will remain a critical
element of our foreign and defense policy and, as such, will
require significant budget resources for the indefinite
future. While eight countries* account for over 85 percent
of the 1982 Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credit program new
and important recipients continue to appear -- the states of
Central America and the Caribbean being a recent case in
point. The marginal return for the dollars spent on small
programs can be extremely high. This is particularly true
of the International Military Education and Training (IMET)
program, but applies equally to the modest FMS programs that
now exist in Latin America and Africa. In the large programs
such as Korea and Turkey, security assistance becomes a
potent force multiplier -- an important characteristic where
the US has explicit security commitments. In the small
programs, the resources usually buy basic transportation,
communications, and other military capabilities for dealing
with low-level external threats and internal security problems.
During the 1950s, the security assistance budget ranged
from 5-10 percent the size of the defense budget, and was
provided primarily as outright grants. In recent years, our
assistance has increased from $4.3 billion in FY 1980, when
it equalled 1 percent of the US defense budget (an all-time
low) to $7.5 billion in FY 1982, but it is still only about
1.5 percent the size of the defense budget. One direct
effect of this decline in purchasing power is that, except
for Egypt and Israel, no country program is large enough to
cover the purchase of modern fighter aircraft, something
that a number of countries, like Turkey, desperately need.
*Israel 37%; Egypt 23%; Turkey 9%; Greece 7%; Korea 4%; Spain 3%;
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We have begun to turn the situation around by raising
resource levels to meet urgent requirements. The FY 1983
budget calls for an increase of $1.2 billion or 16 percent
over FY 1982 appropriations, which itself represents a
significant increase over its predecessor. However, the
political climate for sustaining needed increases this year
and in the future is uncertain. The FY 1983 request will be
a major test for the Administration; positive results will
help to establish a firm foundation for the program for the
next several years.
Beyond the issue of levels, there is a need for a
better mix of assistance:
of the FMS credits, authorization for a certain
portion at 3 percent interest instead of market
rates now running about 14 percent (currently we
have no authority to offer concessional interest);
revised costing rules for FMS-financed training
and increased use of the IMET program because of
their high returns for each dollar spent.
maintenance of significant levels of Economic
Support Funds (ESF), which provide balance of
payments support for countries devoting significant
resources to defense. (Seventy percent of the
current funds are absorbed by Egypt, Israel, and
Turkey, leaving very little for other worthy
recipients.)
Our assistance programs are not meeting the needs of
the 1980s. In FY 1982, grants fell to 50 percent of the
total program, and most of this was for ESF, little grant
money was available for FMS programs. Needs for increased
security assistance rarely arise in prosperous countries;
however, the requirement for increased concessionality,
grant aid, economic assistance, and IMET grows as our
support is required in a large number of economically weak
countries.
Multi-year Commitments
We also need the ability to make more extensive use of
multi-year commitments to permit longer-range planning and
predictability in our programs for the benefit both of the
US and recipient countries. Multi-year commitments assist
the US in planning procurement, thus helping to keep production
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lines going and unit costs down. Foreign security assistance
recipients are also better able to manage the acquisition
of expensive and complex weapons systems, rationalize force
planning, and develop a sense of confidence in US support.
Currently we have three types of multi-year commitments
in security assistance programs:
-- formal Executive Branch commitments over a specific
period as part of formal base agreements (e.g.,
Spain, Philippines, Portugal);
an Executive Branch "best effort" commitment
(e.g., Zimbabwe and Pakistan); and
"cash flow" arrangements with Israel and Egypt,
which presume outyear funding at levels no less
than those of the current year.
All of these multi-year commitments nonetheless depend
on annual appropriations by Congress. It is unlikely in the
future any more than in the past that Congress will compromise
its budgetary flexibility by guaranteeing funding levels in
outyears. Thus, we do not see multi-year commitments as a
legislative issue but rather a determination by the Administration
to exercise its right to make such "commitments" in the
interest of conducting a more rational foreign policy and to
defend that right vigorously on the Hill.
Procurement and Security Assistance
Because of budgetary uncertainties and legal restrictions,
neither the military services nor the Defense Department
systematically take foreign requirements into account in
terms of sizing the production base or planning production
runs. Thus, to meet urgent security assistance commitments,
our own forces must often absorb unplanned diversions. We
do not take full advantage of the fact that security assistance
procurement could provide smoother production runs, an
expanded industrial base, shorter leadtimes, and reduced
costs for us. Security assistance procurement also enables
us to maintain a production base for current systems that
are being replaced, while the new production capability is
coming on line. We must develop an approach to US defense
procurement and production planning that prudently takes
into account likely requests by foreign governments. For
example:
we can demonstrate that a certain percentage of
our production capacity for specific systems
historically serves security assistance requirements;
thus we should plan on it from the beginning.
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where sensitive technologies are involved that we
do not want to release worldwide, we should plan
from the outset to provide export versions of new
equipment.
where a current model is being replaced we should
examine the opportunities offered by co-production/co-
assembly arrangements abroad. These arrangements
offer an alternative to selling front-line equipment
and provide a fall back for ourselves. To make
this work, we would have to be willing to permit
the use of FMS credits to buy equipment produced
abroad and be prepared to defend this decision on
the Hill.
The Special Defense Acquisition Fund
The purpose of the newly-established Special Defense
Acquisition Fund (SDAF) is to allow the Defense Department
to buy defense articles in anticipation of eventual foreign
sales. The SDAF, operating as a revolving fund, will enhance
the President's ability to fulfill urgent requirements
quickly. It will reduce procurement leadtimes both for
delivery of equipment to foreign customers and paybacks to
US forces when equipment is diverted from production or
withdrawn from stocks. The SDAF can be used to smooth
production rates or extend the production line of older
equipment still in demand (e.g., the M-60 tank).
The SDAF account has been established, but we are
limited to a capitalization level of $600 million by the end
of FY 1983. Moreover, we do not yet have authority to
spend. We are seeking such authority and an increase in the
size of the fund to $900 million. Both deserve and will
need strong support from White House and Cabinet officials.
Although consideration has been given to a higher
capitalization target, a $900 million level gained through
three consecutive years would allow a test of SDAF effectiveness.
Since most production cycles run in the two- to three-year
time frame, money from the sale of SDAF procured items would
begin returning to the fund in the third year of operation.
This could permit planning for procurement in the fourth
year without new capitalization. However, the potential
need to procure an intermediate fighter aircraft in addition
to high-cost air munitions and Army equipment demand a
minimum capitalization level of $900 million if we are not
to continue the pattern of diverting equipment intended for
our own forces.
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The major example of an emergency diversion was when US
war reserve stocks in Europe were decimated in order to rush
tanks and other items to Israel during the 1973 war. This
pattern has continued: Since 1978, almost seven battalions
of tanks have been diverted or withdrawn from the Army.
Similarly, the tactical aircraft equivalent of
1.5
fighter
wings has been diverted or withdrawn from the
Air
Force.
Diverted equipment is, of course, paid back, although this
may take as long as three years.
Combined Planning
Our ability to improve production planning and to use
the SDAF efficiently will depend heavily on our ability to
forecast both demand and resources over a three-to five-year
period. This in turn suggests a requirement for far more
extensive combined planning with major recipients of security
assistance and also with those countries rich enough to
finance purchases by themselves.
We have successfully conducted such combined planning
for several years with Korea and Jordan, and we are beginning
it with Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, and Morocco. There are
others we will need to engage in this effort. Such planning
may require expansion of security assistance organizations
overseas and broader authorities for them.
Success will be gradual, since few third-world countries
have strong planning capabilities, and estimating future
resource availabilities will be difficult. Moreover, there
are certain liabilities involved. Combined planning carries
with it implications of commitments that may be impossible
to fulfill. In addition, such planning must invariably
touch on sensitive systems and technologies (e.g., advanced
aircraft, precision guided munitions) that could raise
serious Congressional reactions, whether or not the systems
were ever sold. The US will have to accept security risks
in providing available threat analyses to foreign countries.
In addition, we will have to make available comparative
performancd, cost and other data on specific systems, even
though we might not ultimately be willing to sell all such
systems to the country in question. A genuine joint planning
activity will require comparative data if countries are to
make rational decisions. We are developing procedures to
accomplish this end.
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Finally, it should be noted that countries may for
political or other reasons be reluctant to engage in complete
planning. In any event, combined planning will serve little
purpose if we cannot respond decisively when country decisions
are made and formal requests put forward. This brings us
back to the weaknesses of the current production base,
delivery lead times, and resource limitations. All of these
must be improved in tandem if we are to fulfill the ultimate
goal of putting needed equipment in the hands of friends and
allies in a timely way.
Legislation
There are a number of flaws in the legislation governing
security assistance. For example, by its nature, a portion
of security assistance should be available to respond to
emergencies. Heretofore, Congress has balked at appropriating
any significant sum of unallocated money for this purpose,
although it has provided limited emergency drawdown authority
under strict Congressional control. We should be prepared
to make an energetic effort to persuade Congress to provide
such contingency funds.
The analysis and input that goes into the formulation
of the budget is well over two years old before any money is
actually disbursed and at least twice that before materiel
is actually delivered. Moreover, the budget is formulated
and presented to Congress on a country basis, that is, each
country is allocated a certain level of assistance and that
level is defended in the hearing process. Once that budget
is passed, it is extremely cumbersome to reprogram resources
from one country to another as priorities change. And it is
virtually impossible when Congress earmarks funds, as it
does in the case of Israel and Faypt.
While Congress is unlikely to give up earmarking, we
should try to get relief from rigid reprogramming procedures,
easing of conditions for emergency drawdowns, and a reduction
of Congressional micro-management of the arms transfer
process. We should also try to get rid of burdensome and
largely meaningless reporting requirements, country specific
conditions (e.g., Angola), restrictions on police training,
differing methods of computing costs for cash and grant
training, and similar outdated or inappropriate provisions
of law. It should be noted that the Congressional veto
authority over arms sales, which is one of the most intrusive
aspects of Congressional oversight, may be settled by the
Supreme Court in a related legislative veto case later this
year. It is not something, however, that we are likely to
be able on our own to negotiate out of the legislation.
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72_
Very few of these changes are attainable this year
because of the 1982 election. However, late this fall,
prior to the reconvening of Congress in January 1983, it
should be feasible to begin to explore with the appropriate
Congressional staffs a proposal to revise extensively,
rationalize, or conceivably even rewrite both the Arms
Export Control Act and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.
Issues
1. FY 1982 Supplemental and FY 1983 Program -- Should we
initiate a to riorit Administration drive to win Congressional
approval for our FY 1983 program and other security assistance
related legislation as an integral part o t e overall budget
strategy. Success would enable us to meet top priority strategic
objectives and establish a firm foundation for the program for
the next several years. Failure, on the other hand, would set
back the Administration's efforts to strengthen American security
interests and could have disastrous international ramifications.
2. Resources -- Should we plan for steady real growth in
the security assistance pro ram over the next five ears? The
importance of security assistance to our foreign an defense
policies suggests not only that real growth will be essential
if we are to meet our national security objectives, but that the
rate of growth perhaps should be indexed to that of the defense
budget.
3. Multi- ear Commitments -- Should we make more extensive
use of various forms of mu ti- ear commitments (formal Executive
Branch commitment, best-e fort, cash low ? Even with t e
vulnerabilities associated with commitments that depend on annual
Congressional appropriations, such commitments do have the virtue
of establishing the reliability of the US and of allowing more
rational force planning, procurement, and program management for
both the US and the aid recipient.
4. Procurement -- Should we improve our security assistance
Tannin activities and extend combined planning activities to
more countries? Such planning could improve estimates of future
resources and equipment demands, and consequently our own pro-
curement planning, including the integration of foreign military
sales into US service procurements. Such planning would also
serve to nudge countries toward greater compatibility and
cooperation with US forces.
5. Legislation -- Should we undertake a major effort to
rewrite and rationalize the Arms Export Control Act and the
Foreign Assistance Act? The present legislation is technically
comp ex and con using and contains restrictions, prohibitions,
and procedures that work not only against the objectives of
security assistance but also seriously complicate the management
of the program. Early 1983 would be an appropriate time to
submit any major revision or rewrite to the Congress.
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PART III, SECTION G
Force Integration
The Challenge
For at least the remainder of the decade, the objectives of
US national security policy cannot be met without risk. Our interests
are global, and they conflict with those of a state which pursues
worldwide political and economic policies inimical to our own. The
Soviet Union maintains the largest military establishment in history,
and now possesses the capability to project its military forces into
Latin America and Africa as well as into countries on the Eurasian
periphery. Their ability to establish or to maintain military
presence (and a certain degree of political control) in various countries
beyond the Warsaw Pact, such as Vietnam, Afghanistan, South Yemen,
Ethiopia, Libya, Angola, Cuba, and Grenada, aggravates our defense
problems. Compared with our own forces, in general, theirs will
continue to be quantitatively superior and, in many cases, qualitatively
equivalent. As a result, there is a dangerous imbalance in military
strength which would favor the Soviet Union in several important con-
tingencies (e.g., Southwest Asia, Europe). Even if we and our allies
sustain 7% real growth in our defense efforts, this imbalance cannot
be rectified before the end of the decade. Even then, the change
in relative strength will depend upon future Soviet build-ups.
Our political and social heritage militates against our raising
and supporting large forces in peacetime, and impels us rather to
seek security in our national genius for technological innovation
and industrial efficiency, and in our alliances. But requirements
for domestic development and welfare will continue to weigh heavily
upon our national decisions of overall resource allocation, and will
constrain our force structure, and the pace and extent of our force
modernization. While the same factors affect our allies, uncertainty
about their resolve puts into question not only their collective
ability to sustain in peacetime the needed response to the continuing
Soviet military build-up, but also their reaction in a crisis or war.
We pursue a strategy which seeks to deter war, but if war is
thrust upon us, to control escalation and to prevail. No place over-
seas where our forces directly confront those of the Soviet Union
do we have enough capability for these purposes. Rather, deterrence
rests on our ability to reinforce rapidly our forward deployed forces,
and upon their evident capability, when reinforced, to inflict
heavy losses in the event of aggression. Were a global war to break
out, we could not reinforce everywhere at the same time. Rather,
we would have to fight in some regions and avoid combat in others
so as to help gain force superiority for counteroffensives in places
and at times of our choosing. Such policy is, however, dependent
on force mobility and ability to selectively mass our forces. Our
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Review April 30, 2002 73
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own force insufficiencies made all the more important effective
coalition warfare, with allied forces deployed in coordination
with our own. Initially, our purpose would be to slow, interdict,
disrupt, and attrite the aggressors to gain time for mobilizing
and deploying for counterstrikes, while maximizing nuclear capabilities
to deter the Soviets from using their nuclear weapons and complement,
as necessary, our other military capabilities. We would then launch
operations calculated to achieve our objectives.
Our defense capabilities, in short, entail substantial risks
that some regional objectives could not be achieved in the initial
stages of a conventional war, risks that some commitments to some
allies could not be fulfilled, and most importantly, risks that we
could be forced to resort to use of nuclear weapons. Therefore, it
is essential that the United States improve its capability to
mobilize additional forces rapidly and to expand defense production
rapidly. Such a defense expansion would have to augment both con-
ventional and nuclear forces. The purpose would be to reverse any
setbacks during the initial campaigns by changing the balance of
forces in our favor, or in favor of our Alliances. This very
capability to mobilize and expand defense production will also help
to strengthen deterrence.
Our risks can be attenuated if the US concerts all elements of
its national power--political, economic, military, and national will--
toward achievement of its security objectives. Our defense effort
alone, unsupported by other policies, cannot cope with the threats
to our vital interests during this decade. While the political and
economic elements are beyond the purview of this study, they are
nonetheless essential to national security, and, as ensuing dis-
cussions will make evident, must be considered together with military
elements.
Requirements for Integration
To optimize the potential of US forces, national security policy
must direct the following:
Unified Forces. Modern warfare demands that we be prepared to
use the full capabilities of all our armed Services in a truly unified
effort. No one Service or one element within a single Service is
sufficient to support the full gamut of modern warfare requirements.
Balanced Forces. Sustaining combat requires balance among
combat and support forces. Neglect of any form of support severely
limits the operational range and endurance of combatants. Balance
is also needed between air, sea, and land forces; active and reserve
forces; and forces based overseas and in the United States. More-
over, all must be organized, trained, and equipped so that all can
be readily deployed and employed. Included must be mobility means
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necessary to deploy forces rapidly and resupply them, and requisite
communication and intelligence means. In this respect, provisions
for readiness, training, sustainability, modernized weaponry, and
force structure require adroit defense investments: modernization
can upgrade readiness and sustainability. Where force structure
is out of balance between combat and support forces, acquisition
of support structure can enhance readiness and sustainability. Fund-
ing priorities must go to functions that are most out of balance
with strategy. For example, current emphasis is being placed on
the strategic modernization plan, mobility, and naval forces.
Total Force, Active and Reserve. US forces are presently
structured for these basic tasks:
-- Peacetime operations (training, deterrence, presence,
vigilance), including overseas/CONUS rotation.
We have insufficient active forces to fight a global war, or even
to meet major lesser contingencies. The United States maintains an
active duty force structure to deter conflict, to respond to minor
contingencies, and to delay the achievement of an enemy's objective
until US mobilization becomes effective. These forces are, however,
dependent upon responsive, well-trained, and well-equipped reserves
for all but the most minor contingencies, especially for airlift,
medical, and other types of support. We must, therefore, bring
more reserve units to a higher readiness status through equipment
procurement and personnel increases. Decisions as to which
capabilities to maintain in the reserve component should consider
political as well as fiscal needs. Currently, there is an inordinate
dependence on many types of support forces in the reserves, which
unbalances active forces, and reduces overall readiness, responsive-
ness, and global flexibility. Responding to any large contingency
will thus require some level of mobilization and expansion of force
structure.
Mobility
Chart 1 represents general purpose combat force structure and
forward deployments. They are positioned out of regard for
US presence, political acceptability both at home and abroad,
and the need to maintain a pool of forces in the US both to
respond flexibly to reinforce critical regions during con-
tingencies and to sustain overseas units by rotating personnel
and equipment. There is no prospective theater of war in which
forward deployed forces would not have to be reinforced should
war threaten. Our ability to swiftly reinforce them is the
very heart of deterrence.
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Chart 2 portrays the general case for force generation in an
overseas theater and is based on empirical data relating to
specific theaters: forces ready to fight are a function of time,
the amount of forward deployed forces, equipment and supplies
prepositioned in-theater, and the availability of airlift
and sealift. Forward deployed forces will be our first line
of defense. They could be the only line unless pre-conflict
measures have implemented an early reinforcement decision. Initial
land-based reinforcements will, in most hypothesized circum-
stances, arrive by airlift. However fast, this is a very
limited capability over great distances. The availability of
prepositioned equipment and supplies can expand the impact of
airlift capabilities by requiring only the movement of personnel
and high value or unstorable equipment or otherwise reducing
immediate transportation requirements. Fast sealift, which
consists of ships that are readily available, are easily
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loaded, and travel in excess of 20 knots, can arrive in theater
prior to the arrival of conventional sealift. The latter will
provide the vast majority of movements in a long contingency.
However, where airlift may be effective within hours, conventional
sealift may require weeks. Because of the mass delivery
capability of sealift, pre-conflict measures to load and even sail
ships may be essential to providing effective opposition and
defending our objectives. These capabilities must be integrated
with force movement requirements and made adequate to meet the
inter-theater and intra-theater deployment, employment, and
sustainability requirements of global war. The present difficulty
is depicted by the dashed line. Our ability to put additional
forces in the field falls significantly short of the requirement
based on current lift capability and expected warning times.
Improvements in all areas which contribute to enhanced mobility
are crucial, each makes a unique contribution to our capacity to
respond to an overseas contingency.
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There are significant decisions that will be required in an actual
deployment of forces. The difficulties are likely to be compounded
when one or more theaters are competing for available lift and
sustaining capabilities. Because of the number of possible
scenarios, our limited forces, and the uncertainty surrounding
Soviet intentions in any conflict, mobility enhancements offer a
hedge against incorrect deployment of forces and provide the means
for their redeployment. This is provided through a mix of lift
capability and highly mobile forces.
To be effective globally, our military mobility forces must have the
capability and flexibility to provide rapid and sustainable support
for independent operations in geographic regions where little or
no modern, sophisticated airports or seaports are available. Even
if our forces are capable of traveling thousands of miles, if they
cannot disembark and transit a port or travel the remaining hundreds
or even dozens of miles to an objective area, the operation will be
unsuccessful. Responsive intra-theater mobility will be vital to
battlefield success, especially in the case where total enemy forces
outnumber our own.
Mobilization
Active duty forces are our primary line of defense during peacetime and
small contingencies. Even so, they are routinely augmented by
reserve forces and civil assets in a great variety of functions.
However, when preparing for a major crisis, exercising the
Presidential 100,000 selective reserve callup authority will
probably be required. Our reserve airlift and support forces
are essential for any sizable deployment of general purpose forces.
When a major crisis occurs, three levels of mobilization are
available, depending on the severity of the situation: partial
(1 million personnel), full (all reserve forces), and total
(expansion beyond existing force structure). Effective mobilization
capabilities, if exercised early in a major crisis, can serve as
a deterrent. However, due to the requirement for Presidential
or Congressional approval and the major associated fiscal and
economic impacts, mobilization at any level is a very significant
action.
Our near-term security concerns are often driven by our estimates
of the speed with which the Soviet forces might threaten our
interest, constrained as we are by the inadequacies of our
current military capabilities. However, if our initial efforts
to forestall or stop Soviet aggression were successful, we would
find ourselves unable to support our forces for protracted
conflict. In this respect, the can now outlast us. We must,
therefore, expand the scope of our mobilization and industrial
planning to consider protracted conflict.
To strengthen deterrence of Soviet aggression, or to cope with
aggression should it occur, it is important to strengthen and to
develop preparation for mobilizing the armed forces and for carrying
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out a massive, rapid expansion of defense production. We must
increase the responsiveness of our industrial base, especially
our surge capability, and that of our national mobilization
programs. Although the ability to fight a protracted conflict
is dependent first upon adequate initial warfighting capability,
programs addressing the early demands of a conflict must not be
funded to the exclusion of the capability needed to endure and
eventually prevail. Expansion to enhance military capabilities
in peacetime also provides the basis for expediting the attainment of heeded
wartime production levels. Together with our own efforts, our
friends and allies need to strengthen the responsiveness of their
own industrial and mobilization bases. We must recognize that
a political decision may be taken to massively expand our forces
and defense produciton well in advance of a major involvement of
US forces in war. It is important that the planning and the
industrial base exist in order to reduce the time required to
implement such a decision.
Providing the manpower for active and reserve forces, especially
the latter, will remain problematic. The decisions to maintain
all-volunteer force and draft registration must be frequently
reviewed in light of the threat and the changing economy. While
present trends are favorable, they may not remain so when the
economy improves. Even if the coiubination of high pay and
emoluments and poor performance in the economy remain, the
declining number of 18 year olds in the coming decade and
programmed force growth may make a return to the draft essential.
The availability of adequate numbers of trained manpower is the
key both to maintaining deterrence and providing the training
base for wartime expansion. An effective Selective Service System
is necessary to sustain our mobilized force.
Lower Level Conflicts
Our ability to influence the outcome of low level conflicts not
directly involving the United States depends, in part, on the
peacetime relationships we have established with the factions
involved. An integrated program of economic aid and military
assistance can enhance US influence to prevent crises and
conflicts from developing and increase the ability of friendly
states and factions to defend themselves without involving US
combat forces or to establish some degree to compatibility
between US and indigenous forces in order to improve our ca-
pacity to work together in combat, if necessary. These outcomes
can be facilitated by properly implemented security assistance
programs. In the absence of an effective security assistance
program, the likelihood of conflict increases, the likelihood of
direct US involvement in conflict increases, and the effectiveness
of US and regional forces decreases. The object of these
programs must be to insure that US interests are protected in the
most efficient and effective manner possible. Moreover, we must
insure that no power vacuums and other sources of instability are
created that tempt the Soviets or their surrogates.
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Deterring or avoiding conflict requires that we are aware of the
potential sources of discord and disharmony. We require comprehensive,
objective intelligence not only of Soviet capabilities,
preparations, and intent, as well as those of the states in
potential conflict regions, but also those of our friends and
allies and the vulnerabilities and desires of all concerned
parties. We need this intelligence to reduce the period of
ambiguity prior to a potential conflict and to increase the
time in which the US can implement such measures as raising
readiness conditions, callup or mobilization of reserve forces,
movement of resources and forces forward within a theater, increased
reconnaissance activity, or precautionary reinforcement of a
theater. These actions should be accompanied by diplomatic
activities to include prudent expanion of intelligence sharing
with affected friends and allies.
The inherent danger of pre-conflict measures is that they could
provoke instead of deter conflict. Therefore, they must be
integrated with appropriate diplomatic consideration to insure
that no side feels impelled to wage war. These signals must
make it clear to potentially hostile nations or forces that,
by aggressive acts, they may bring their forces into battle
with US forces and, in the case of the Soviet Union, risk
a wider war or risk provoking US use of nuclear weapons. The
latter case, by itself, is a deterrent, since it would mean
crossing a distinct conflict threshold.
While our responses to crises must always have diplomatic direction
with the hopes of averting or curtailing hostilities, economic
and indirect military contributions can further US interests without
bringing US forces into direct combat. Specific examples are
the provision of military training, hardware, supplies, medical
assistance, and airlift. However, our willingness to respond
to the needs of other states must be tempered by our own
depleted stocks. The Special Defense Acquisiton Fund will
help in this regard as will our current build-up to higher levels
of production. Training and other less direct involvement of US
forces may be enhanced by the use of Special Operations Forces.
Special Operations Forces can also be used to precede,
complement, or enhance the effectiveness of regular forces,
especially when the employment of more conventional forces is
inappropriate due to political, terrain, or economy of effort
considerations. Wherever non-combatant assistance can be provided,
through security assistance, crisis settlement, or other aid,
the costs must be weighed against those of direct intervention
which are bound to be greater than any other aid program.
Undoubtedly, one effective element of national power must be our
national will to stand by friends. The perception of steadfast
support and the confidence of trust with the United States has
the proven potential to resolve crises or maintain a friendly
state's will to resist and to persuade an aggressor to consider
other, less provocatove courses of action.
Should our vital interests be threatened in conflict not involving
the. Soviet Union and should local or regional forces prove unable
to contain the threat, the US will be prepared to use its own forces.
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Worldwide Conflict
Current US military capability does not permit us to engage success-
fully in simultaneous multi-theater operations. As a result, our
military response must be based on regional priorities as described
in Section C, the nature and sequence of the initial attack, the
degree of preparation by both ourselves and our allies pior to
the initiation of conflict, and the possibilities for nuclear war.
A timely deployment of military force provides the possibility of
deterring war, or of limiting conflict to a low level both in terms
of forces engaged and intensity. A flexible global force projection
capability can present the Soviets with effective opposition at the
point of attack or, if we choose, another region important to the
Soviets. The difficulty for the United States is that we will
probably be forced to react to any crisis or aggression with great
speed to avoid a fait accompli. However, in many scenarios in-
volving Soviet forces, current US mobility capability cannot deliver
sufficient forces soon enough to sustain them. Thus, our mid-term
actions to increase the readiness and sustainability of our current
forces, increase mobility assets, and strengthen our mobilization
and industrial base are necessary first steps. We seek to be able
to respond to a major threat in any region, and to reduce the
Soviets' ability to force the United States into a choice of the
surrender of vital interests, the spreading of the war to other
theaters, or the employment of nuclear weapons in response to a
conventional attack.
Nuclear and Conventional Force Integration
To deter, especially in light of our current conventional inferiority,
nuclear forces must be capable of responding flexibly, confronting
the enemy with the risk of further escalation in the event
deterrence fails, and presenting a credible response. This implies
an ability to execute a broad range of possible responses to achieve
military objectives, to control escalation, and to terminate con-
flict on favorable terms at the lowest possible level of violence.
It also implies that our response would not be inhibited or deterred
by the counterthreat posed by the Soviet Union. At present, the
relative nuclear balance has eroded the credibility and utility of
our nuclear "umbrella". This means that the US may be increasingly
unwilling to escalate to the nuclear level in accordance with our
strategy. The danger of having less viable escalatory options is
compounded by Soviet conventional force capabilities, and the con-
sideration that once the nuclear threshold is crossed, even if
by only the use of low yield, limited range weapons, the possibilities
for controlling escalation are diminished. A further danger lies in
Soviet use of chemical weapons which might impel us to cross the
nuclear threshold.
The visible inclusion of strategic systems in general war planning
and exercises increases the credibility of our nuclear deterrence
(NSDD-13 provides Presidential guidance on this issue). The un-
certainty of intent and the possibility of misinterpretation
associated with the use of any nuclear weapons dictate that extreme
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caution be used when deciding on their use. Specifically, the use
of strategic systems in a role other than strategic nuclear exchange or
non-strategic systems against strategic targets may carry particular
danger of generating an escalatory response. However, the advent
of new long range non-strategic nuclear systems (e.g., PERSING II,
GLCM) and increased flexibility on the employment of strategic
systems blurs traditional distinctions between the two. This will increase
our potential adversary's uncertainty. The role of our declaratory
policy is to create uncertainty in the minds of the Soviets as to the
nature of our nuclear options. This uncertainty, however, does not
imply that we cannot employ nuclear weapons in a manner that can be
understood by our adversaries in support of escalation control or that
there is uncertainty in our minds as to the role of nuclear forces
in our general war planning.
The risks of nuclear war initiation are too great to permit nuclear
forces to be viewed as a lower cost alternative to conventional forces.
The use of nuclear forces to salvage a deteriorating conventional
situation must be reserved for situations in which interests truly vital
to the continuation of our fundamental security and freedoms are
threatened and, most importantly, in which the use of such forces will
not cause our position to deteriorate still further. The policy for the
initial employment of non-strategic nuclear forces must carefully
weigh the full implications of such employment, and an objective
reevaluation of the nature of our threatened interests.
It is unlikely that we will ever in peacetime attain a conventional
force posture that alone can assure deterrence or achieve our military
objectives in a major conflict. Therefore, the possible use of
nuclear weapons must remain an element in our overall strategy. While
strong conventional forces play a major role in deterring nuclear
conflict by providing response options other than capitulation or nuclear
war, a strong nuclear capability decreases the probability of a Soviet
conventional attack due to the potential for escalation to nuclear war.
For these reasons, negotiations for the control or limitation of any
arms must consider the implications on our integrated forces and the
overlap potential of all systems.
In certain regions, such as NATO Europe, our interests are so vital that
the United States is committed to the use, if necessary, of nuclear
force to counter aggression. The United States should, however, avoid
creating relationships with other states that have as a basic tenet the
substitution of our nuclear capability for indigenous conventional
forces. US commitments for the possible use of nuclear weapons must
balance the deterrent value of such commitments with the danger
that we could be drawn into escalatory actions when our fundamental
objectives are not directly threatened. These commitments also undermine
the incentives to these states to build or maintain adequate
conventional forces.
Strategic Defensive Force Integration
In the face of the growing vulnerability of land-based missiles and
hardened targets to ICBM and potentially SLBM attack, we need to enhance
the survivability of land based systems. An active ballistic missile
defense, if technologically feasible and affordable, is one measure
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that could enhance survivability. The United States should pursue
the development of effective BMD technology, evaluate its role in
our overall strategic posture, and preserve the options to modify or
withdraw from international agreements that would limit the deployment
of a BMD system. However, we must recognize that our near and
mid-term strategic vulnerability cannot be solved by BMD. Therefore,
planned improvements to strategic offensive forces which enhance
survivability must continue.
Strategic defenses need not be impenetrable to enhance our nuclear
strategy. They can still enhance deterrence by increasing both our
civil survivability as well as the certainty that sufficient
offensive strategic power will remain after an attack. This would
reduce Soviet perceptions of advantages to be gained by initiating
a nuclear attack.
A modernized retaliatory capability must also be combined with an
effective program for continuity of government (PD/NSC-58), survivable
telecommunications (PD/NSC-53) and a credible civil defense program
(NSDD-26) which provide for population protection, and defense of key
defense industries. Taken together, these amount to a more credible
warfighting potential, thereby enhancing deterrence.
Military Use of Space
Space systems currently provide surveillance and communications for
land, sea, undersea, and aerospace operations. Over the longer
term, control of space will be decisive in conflict, and nations
will vie for its control. The United States, with its increasing
dependence on space-based systems, must maintain the capability
to operate in space throughout the conflict spectrum, while denying
any enemy the use of space in war, especially as autonomous space
warfare systems are developed. The question is not whether space will
be a medium for warfighting, but when, and who will dominate.'.
The military potential of space must be exploited in support of
potential combat operations in the air, on land, and on and under
the sea. The integration of this potential, as well as the
interface with the civilian space community, should be reviewed
for possible assignment to the Secretary of Defense.
Civilian space systems, equipment, and personnel training should
incorporate the capability to support military requirements in
wartime and be made available to support military operations of
conditions crequire.
Complementary Measures
The costly realities of our own defense build-up, domestic opposition,
and uncertain allied cooperation dictate that we strive to restrict
the Soviet build-up. It is not enough merely to plan for a steady
increase in US and allied defense spending, at present or even
higher projected rates. Such a policy would be both dispirited
and risky. With the momentum of a massive 20-year defense build-up,
the Soviets could continue to outpace us during this decade. Our
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political support for the continued growth in defense spending
might be lost if the competition appeared like a futile "arms race,"
with no end in sight. Hence, as an essential complement of our
defense effort, we need a policy to engender and sustain pressure
on Soviet defense spending (such as efforts to restrict western
credits and military technology). In addition, measures are
needed to generate or encourage political pressures on the Soviet
government, so as to deflect it from its relentless pursuit of
great military power.
The transfer of advanced Western technology to the Soviet Union
and its allies undermines Western national security efforts in all
other areas. For years, whatever edge we had over the Warsaw Pact
was primarily of a qualitative nature. Uncontrolled, or even
loosely controlled, transfer of Western technolgoy to the Warsaw Pact
allies merely accelerates the elimination of that edge. We must,
therefore, act in concert with our Allies to insure that the
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact do not benefit from the technological
and industrial efficiencies and advances that we have developed.
In particulary, we must act with greater care to limit the flow
of dual use technology, whose military applications often are not
obvious to the West while they are a boon to our potential adversaries.
Risk Assessment
The decade of the 1980s will be a very dangerous period for the
West due to the variety of conditions outlined in Section A. Recent
increases in Defense expenditures that allow the United States
to begin redressing the shortfalls between forces and requirements
and reverse the trends of the previous decade of declining US military
strength in the face of growing Soviet capabilities are a welcome
first step toward reducing those dangers.
Near-Term Risks. US forces, in conjunction with appropriate allied
forces, must be capable of dealing with Soviet aggression on a
worldwide basis. The resources required to accomplish this
objective have not been provided in previous years. The resulting
risks will be greatest in the following areas: the balance between
the US and USSR strategic nuclear forces; the balance of non-
strategic nuclear forces; the relative conventional force
generation capabilities of the United States and the USSR in
regions of vital interest;lack of sufficient mobility assets to
meet global strategy requirements for flexibility; the lack of
material to sustain forces until industrial-based production rates
can be increased to satisfy demands; and the need for modernization
of nuclear, chemical, and conventional forces. All are essential
to our strategy and, in short, we are deficient in nearly every area.
Addressal of these risks must be balanced with the need for increased
force structure and readiness against a continually more potent and
dangerous Soviet threat.
Nuclear Forces. Although the US no longer possesses clear nuclear
superiority, the programs to modernize and upgrade US nuclear
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deterrent capability will provide enhanced prospects, albeit not
superiority, for viable nuclear deterrence into the 1990s. Without
these investments, the risks of nuclear blackmail that unduly
restrict our international political latitude and nuclear war,
would dangerously increase by the second half of this decade.
General Purpose Forces
Current general purpose forces are adequate to maintain most peacetime
forward deployments and to respond to minor crises, but attendant
strains on manpower and readiness to maintain these capabilities
remain. These forces currently contribute to deterring direct Soviet
aggression in Europe, Southwest Asia, and Northeast Asia. However,
because of the continuing increases in Soviet conventional force
capabilities, major risks would confront US forces if they should
become engaged in direct conflict with Soviet forces in any of those
theaters.
Regarding global conflict with the Soviets, current general purpose
forces are not adequate to assure success in the event of major
conflict. A most pressing difficulty is our current inability to
transport currently available forces to potential crisis regions
in a timely manner and sustain them in combat. If engaged and
another crisis occurs elsewhere,land and air forces cannot be re-
deployed rapidly to the other regions, nor may they be reinforced
or adequately sustained due to lack of sufficient lift.
By the end of the 1980s, US force posture, although still involving
significant risk, will have improved capabilities to deploy and sustain
general purpose forces worldwide and a better manned and more
balanced total military force within realistic resource constraints.
However, the relative risk faced today may endure if the Soviets
continue their current pace of force capability development.
Throughout the decade,our capabilities to successfully oppose the
Soviets in any global region will remain dependent upon the
productive use of available warning time, timely decisions, and
the adequate readiness, manning, and equipping of US and allied
forces that will enable them to deploy rapidly and fight effectively.
An inherent risk will remain should the US become involved in any
theater. Forces available for ensuing crises in other geographic
regions will be greatly reduced and deployment times increased.
However, the programmed increased capabilities, sustainability,
and readiness of US forces for global deployment and employment
will better serve to deter actual tests of our military prowess.
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As Chart 3 indicates, our current defense program does not achieve
the force levels required to secure our national objectives with a
high degree of certainty. The FYDP leaves us with a set of
inadequacies which may tempt the Soviet Union to press its advantage.
If the FYDP is fully funded, and if the military component of our
national strategy as outlined in Part III is fully addressed, the
risks are considerably reduced. If, however, these conditions are
not met, and if funding falls below the FYDP, the risk will remain
high.
FORCE REQUIREMENTS
BJECT
REOVIRED TO MEET O
1N pMED~rT`i
? BASED ON
THREAT AND
STRATEGY
Continued Assessment. Based upon the projected threat throughout
this decade and into the 1990s, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will
provide an annual assessment of the effectiveness of current
and programmed US forces, and force levels and capabilities
required to attain national security objectives with reduced risk.
This assessment will identify risks inherent in current and
programmed capabilities. These required force levels and risk
assessments will be used to guide the development of annual
peacetime defense programs and as the basis for rapid total
mobilization that would be required in any sustained global conflict.
Strategy Alternatives. Within the scope of our generalized global
strategic approach, there are numerous opportunities and near-term
requirements to examine alternative approaches that deal with the
threats to our vital interests. Such alternatives cannot resolve
or eliminate the need for improvements upon the current military
force posture. At best, they can only redistribute risks, for
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clearly, in view of the worldwide Soviet threat, the demands of
any viable strategy will overtask our military capability
throughout this decade. However, the potential for technological
breakthroughs, use of space, exploitation of cruise missile
technology, ongoing force improvements, and the ever-changing
international order suggest that we cannot remain bound by a
single strategic view. Approaches, such as the counter-offensive
options, should be developed to improve the opportunities to
defend our vital interests within expected constraints. In all
cases, these must be a compendium of integrated political, economic,
and military policies.
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