IMPLEMENTATION OF NSDD-19 ON PROTECTION OF CLASSIFIED NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL AND INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01013R000100040007-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 6, 2008
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: February 22, 1982
• Content Type: MEMO

Approved For Release 2008/11/06 : CIA-RDP90BO1013R000100040007-6
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Security Committee
MEMORANDUM FOR: Directorof Central Intelligence
VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence
FROM:
SUBJECT: Implementation of NSDD-19 on Protection of
Classified National Security Council and
Intelligence Information
REFERENCE: Assistant to the President for National Security
Affairs Memorandum dated 2 February 1982
1. Action Requested: Your approval of proposals to implement
tasking to the DCI in re erence.
2. Background: The President signed NSDD-19 on 12 January
1982, establishing certain procedures to protect NSC and intel-
ligence information, and directing Mr. Clark to implement its
policy guidelines. Strong, adverse press reaction prompted White
House reconsideration of this policy. Current policy is stated in
referenced memorandum, which rescinded earlier NSDD-19 implementation,
dropped all mention of mandatory advance approval at very senior
levels for all contacts with the news media, and softened language
on investigation of leaks. The DCI is now directed to draft pro-
cedures for intelligence similar to those prescribed by Mr. Clark
for the protection of NSC information. Your draft procedures are
to be cleared within the Community and submitted for NSC consider-
ation no later than 15 March 19,82, with any dissents noted.
3. Discussion: The first round of proposals on NSDD-19
implementation sur aced a consensus that we should use this
opportunity to tighten control over intelligence information in
a manner that recognizes resource limitations and timeliness
imperatives, and which would give us better tools to resolve
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unauthorized disclosures. We believe that consensus still pre-
vails notwithstanding the softening'of White House policy. I
attended an NSC Staff organized meeting on NSDD-19 implementation
held on 19 February. Nothing was surfaced there indicating that
we should change this proposed policy for the Community.
4. Staff Position: Our proposals on implementation of this
a. Definition of "classified intelligence infor-
mation" which is to be subject to strict controls
comparable to those for NSC material -- we propose
that this be defined as Sensitive Compartmented Infor-
mation (SCI), Operations Directorate Blue Border series
material, and, within Defense, special access program
b. Access limitations -- we propose to task
NFIB/NFIC members to review their current access and
dissemination practices against strict "must know"
criteria.
c. Document controls -- we propose to restate
current requirements that SCI, etc., material bear
cover sheets identifying authorized recipients.
d. Personal accountability and responsibility --
we propose slight modifications of existing procedures
on use of nondisclosure agreements. Signature of such
agreements is now a condition of access to SCI. Current
policy encourages but does not mandate having those
agreements include specific prepublication review
requirements. The absence of such may blur a signa-
tory's sense of responsibility. Accordingly, we propose
mandatory use of nondisclosure agreements containing
specific pre-publication review requirements.
e. Unauthorized Disclosure Investigations -- we
propose to require Senior Intelligence Officials to
conduct internal investigations whenever they determine
that SCI, etc., in their custody has been compromised,
and to report their determinations to you. Further,
we propose that you tell the Community that you will
refer significant leaks to Justice, requesting FBI
investigation, and that NFIB/NFIC members will need
to give the FBI access to their internal investigative
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results when Justice tasks the Bureau to open a case.
We also propose that Senior Intelligence Officials be
informed that the polygraph may be used in leak investi-
gations.
f. News Media Contacts -- we propose to limit
contacts to senior officials on the basis of individual,
advance approvals by cognizant NFIB/NFIC members, with
the latter to keep you informed of contacts likely to
result in publicity. Routine "no comment" responses to
press inquiries would be exempted.
S. Recommendation: That you review these proposals and sign
the attached memorandum to communicate them to the Community
for information and comment.
 Approved For Release 2008/11/06: CIA-RDP90B01013R000100040007-6
SUBJECT:- Implementation of NSDD-19 on Protection of Classified
National Security Council and Intelligence Information
Distribution:
Orig - Return C/SECOM w/att
1 - DCI w/att
1 - DDCI w/att
2 - ER w/att
1 - D/ICS w/att
1 - D/OCC/ICS w/att
1 - ES/NFIB w/att
1 - ICS Registry w/att
 Ll~V _. ~ ~ 1.. ... ~ A.'. La ?Oemo
SUBJECT: Implementation of NSDD-19 on Protection of Classified
National Security Council and Intelligence Information
REFERENCE: Assistant'to the President for National Security
Affairs Memorandum dated 2 February 1982
1. Referenced memorandum provides new national policy
guidance on protection of certain types of sensitive infor-
mation in implementation of NSDD-19. Mr. Clark has directed
me to develop draft procedures for protection of classified
intelligence information similar to those prescribed for
National Security Council material, and to submit my procedures
for NSC consideration no later than 15 March 1982.
2. My proposed implementing procedures are attached. I
request that you provide me any specific concerns you have
with these no later than 10 March, and that you include
suggested alternatives to alleviate any such concerns. If
addressees indicate sufficient need, we will discuss these
procedures at an early NFIC meeting.
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This responds to the instructions of the Assistant to the
President for National Security Affairs that the DCI develop pro-
cedures to protect classified intelligence information similar to
those established for National Security Council (NSC) information.
Sensitive Intelligence Information
For purposes of this policy sensitive intelligence information
means (1) all classified intelligence information bearing Intel-
ligence Community special access controls formally limiting access
and dissemination (equals Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI));
(2) all CIA/DDO Blue Border series material; and (3) all other
information directly related to intelligence and which is controlled
by special access programs established by department/agency heads
in accordance with the provisions of Executive Order 12065.
Access Procedures
Departments and agencies that originate or receive sensitive
intelligence information shall keep the number of their personnel
having access to such information to the absolute minimum. Senior
Intelligence Officials (members of NFIB or NFIC) are directed to
take immediate action to review current access and dissemination
practices. The review is to ensure that inertia and out-dated
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justifications do not contribute to continued access by persons
who have no current "must know." All accesses to sensitive intel-
ligence information shall be on the basis of strict application of
"must know."
Cover Sheets
Cover sheets shall be used on all sensitive intelligence infor-
mation in hard copy form. These shall identify the office(s)/per-
son(s) to which/whom such information is disseminated. Current
cover sheets for SCI and other information may be used if they
provide this identifying data.
Personal Accountability
No person may be granted access to sensitive intelligence
information without having first signed a nondisclosure agreement
which contains a specific requirement for pre-publication review
of information concerning or related to intelligence matters. A
person's signature of such an agreement is considered sufficient
indication that he or she is aware of personal responsibilities
to protect sensitive intelligence information, and of the duty to
cooperate fully in any investigation of unauthorized disclosure
of that information.
Investigation of Unauthorized Disclosures
Senior Intelligence Officials are directed to conduct timely
internal investigations when they determine that an unauthorized
disclosure of sensitive intelligence information in their custody
has occurred. The polygraph is an appropriate means for use in
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unauthorized disclosure investigation. All such determinations
shall be reported to the DCI, with assessments of the disclosure's
damage and the degree of known dissemination of the disclosed
information. The DCI will refer significant unauthorized dis-
closures to the Department of Justice requesting FBI investigation.
Whenever Justice directs an FBI investigation, the FBI shall be
provided access to the full scope of internal investigation results.
Contacts with the News Media
There should be no reason for any but the most senior intel-
ligence officers to have any contacts with the news media, and
those contacts must be severely limited and subject to specific
advance approval. When a senior level contact with the news media
is deemed absolutely necessary in a Community department or agency,
it may be made only with the specific advance approval of the
cognizant Senior Intelligence Official. In no case may approval
be given to discussion of classified intelligence sources or methods
in any contacts with the news media. Whenever a Senior Intelligence
Official believes that a contact he is authorizing may result in
publicity concerning intelligence activities or information, he
shall advise the DCI or his designee of the circumstances by
appropriate and timely means.