FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS NEED STRONG CENTRAL OVERSIGHT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B00612R000100030005-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 150
• Document Creation Date: December 23, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 12, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: June 13, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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BY THE COMPTROLLER GENERAL
Report To The Congress
OF THE UNITED STATES
Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts
Need Strong Central Oversight
Despite increasing resources for drug inter-
diction, only a small percentage of drugs
entering this country are seized. The author-
ity and responsibility for Federal drug inter-
diction efforts are split among three executive
departments (Justice, Treasury, and Trans-
portation), each with different programs,
goals, and priorities. The current adminis-
tration has emphasized joint task forces to
improve coordination. Although the estab-
lishment of these groups has improved
operational coordination, no one individual
has the information or responsibility to eval-
uate Federal drug efforts and recommend
corrective actions.
GAO makes recommendations to the Presi-
dent to strengthen central oversight of the
Federal drug enforcement program. Also,
interdiction efforts can be further enhanced
by improving the quality and timeliness of
intelligence data and through well planned
and coordinated use of military assistance.
J - s
,t,ED ST,9 Ott`
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. ICCOUN
GAO/GGD-83-52
JUNE 13,1983
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COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
WASHINGTON D.C. 2060
B-203099
To the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives
This report describes and assesses Federal drug interdic-
tion efforts and recommends ways to improve effectiveness. This
review was made because of long-standing congressional concern
about the smuggling of illegal drugs into the country.
Copies of this report are being sent to the President of
the United States; the Director, Office of Management and
Budget; the Attorney General; the Secretaries of Defense,
Transportation, Treasury, and State; the Acting Administrator of
the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Commissioner of the
U.S. Customs Service; the Director of the Drug Abuse Policy
Office; and other interested parties.
4"A
Comptroller General
of the United States
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COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION
TO THE CONGRESS EFFORTS NEED STRONG CENTRAL
OVERSIGHT
Drug abuse in this country is a persistent and
growing problem. Interdiction of illegal
drugs, one component of Federal efforts to
reduce the drug supply, has had limited impact
on the drug flow. Despite increasing resour-
ces for interdiction, only a small percentage
of drugs entering this country are seized.
WHY THE REVIEW WAS MADE
GAO conducted this review because of the sig-
nificant increases in resources devoted to
drug interdiction programs and because of the
continuing vast amounts of drugs smuggled into
the country. GAO's objectives were to eval-
uate the results of interdiction programs, the
extent of cooperation and coordination among
the various agencies, the role of intelligence
in interdiction efforts, and the ability of
the military to assist in drug interdiction:
INTERDICTION--ONE PART OF
THE FEDERAL DRUG STRATEGY
Federal efforts to attack the supply of ille-
gal drugs have three major components: inter-
national programs aimed at drug-producer coun-
tries, interdiction of drugs at the border,
and domestic law enforcement.
Federal interdiction efforts include inspec-
tions of international travelers and cargo by
the U.S. Customs Service inspectors, air and
marine interdiction efforts of Customs patrol
officers, and sea interdiction by the U.S.
Coast Guard. The Drug'Enforcement Administra-
tion (DEA) supports interdiction through the
provision of intelligence and by investigating
and presenting interdiction cases to U.S.
attorneys. (See pp. 4 to 7.)
Tear Sheet i (GAO/GGD-83-52)
JUNE 13, 1983
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INTERDICTION RESULTS
REMAIN LIMITED
Federal resources devoted to drug interdiction
more than tripled from 1977 to 1982--from $83
million to $278 million. The Coast Guard's
drug interdiction program comprises the major-
ity of this increase. Meanwhile, funds for
other facets of the Federal drug supply reduc-
tion program--international drug activities'and
domestic law enforcement--remained relatively
constant. (See pp. 11 to 13.)
Despite these increases, only 16 prcent of the
marijuana and less than 10 percent' of heroin,
cocaine, and dangerous drugs that are entering
this country are seized through total drug
enforcement efforts. Also, 95 percent of the
individuals arrested in interdiction cases
are low level violators and when convicted
usually spend less than a year in jail. (See
pp. 14 to 19.)
Joint special projects conducted by two or more
agencies have proven especially effective in
attacking drug smuggling. Of particular note
are special DEA investigations that involve
Customs and the Coast Guard resources. (See
pp. 19 to 26.)
PROGRAM FRAGMENTATION LIMITS
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERDICTION
EFFORTS
The authority and responsibility for Federal
drug interdiction efforts are split among three
separate agencies in three executive depart-
ments. Each agency has different programs,
goals, and priorities. And, although the level
of cooperation is increasing, especially in
South Florida, such fragmentation has a certain
amount of inefficiency and interagency conflict
built in. (See pp. 30 to 32.)
1These and other such estimates in the report
were developed by GAO analysis of Customs,
DEA, and National Narcotics Intelligence
Consumers Committee data.
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Congressional oversight and executive branch
resource allocation decisions relative to drug
interdiction are difficult under these circum-
stances. The budgets of the three agencies are
developed in separate departments, reviewed by
different OMB branches, and funds are author-
ized and appropriated by separate congressional
committees. Also, very little information is
available, either by agency or in the aggregate
that can be used as a basis for evaluating pro-
gram results. Aggregate seizure statistics are
sometimes overstated when there is more than
one participating agency, and very little case
disposition information on arrestees is main-
tained. (See pp. 33 to 39.)
Another issue related to program fragmentation
is the lack of a definitive policy regarding
followup investigations of interdiction cases.
Under the current division of responsibilities,
DEA conducts followup investigations on the
Coast Guard's or Customs' arrestees. DEA
usually performs followup investigations only
if the cases (less than 40 percent) will be
prosecuted by a U.S. attorney. Consequently,
information which could be of value to future
investigations is not being obtained on the
majority of the interdiction cases. (See pp.
39 to 46.)
Fragmentation of Federal efforts has long been
recognized as a major problem. To help remedy
this situation, Congress passed legislation in
1972 and 1976 that requires the President to
develop a comprehensive national drug strategy
and to appoint a drug abuse policy coordina-
tor. Wh}le various drug strategies have been
prepared over the years, the most recent in
October 1982, none has adequately defined the
various agencies' drug interdiction roles.
Furthermore, the drug abuse policy coordinator
has never had the authority to exercise the
necessary policy and priority-setting oversight
of Federal drug efforts. (See pp. 46 to 51.)
The current administration has organized or
proposed several new groups. to help coordinate
Federal drug efforts. The South Florida Task
Force, under the direction of Vice President
Bush, was an excellent example of a cooperative
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effort by all the major Federal agencies
involved in drug enforcement efforts. While
these efforts have certainly improved opera-
tional coordination among the various agencies,
these coordination mechanisms still do not pro-
vide a composite picture of all Federal resour-
ces devoted to drug enforcement or provide a
basis for allocating these resources in terms
of budgetary priorities. (See pp. 51 to 53.)
BETTER, MORE TIMELY
INTELLIGENCE NEEDED
The effectiveness of Federal interdiction
efforts depends a great deal on intelligence
support capabilities. Statistics on the use of
prior intelligence to support interdiction, as
well as certain special projects, indicate the
value of good, timely intelligence. (See pp.
57 to 59.)
Drug source and transit countries are valuable
sources of intelligence that can be used to
support interdiction efforts,. However, Customs
and Coast Guard must rely on DEA to provide
this intelligence. Yet, the international
programs of DEA and the Department of State do
not place a high priority on supporting inter-
diction efforts. For example, a stronger in-
telligence program is needed in the Caribbean,
a major transit area for drug smuggling. (See
pp. 59 to 62.)
DEA, Customs, and the Coast Guard all have
domestic intelligence programs, and some
intelligence processing and analysis has been
centralized at the El Paso Intelligence
Center. The Center can be more effective if
better supported and utilized by the agencies
involved in drug interdiction. Moreover, cer-
tain Customs and Coast Guard intelligence anal-
ysis functions should be transferred to the
Center. (See pp. 62 to 69.)
MILITARY ASSISTANCE
INCREASING
The military departments have provided some
limited assistance to drug enforcement agencies
over the last several years. Changes to the
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Posse Comitatus Act in December 1981, which
further defined the extent of allowable military
involvement in support of civilian law enforce-
ment, have resulted in a greater role for mili-
tary resources in drug interdiction. (See
pp. 73 to 79.)
Although military assistance can be beneficial,
it is also necessarily limited because
--major long-term commitments of military
assistance can adversely impact the mili-
tary's primary mission;
--military equipment is expensive to operate
and, for the most part, reimbursement is
beyond the financial capabilities of law
enforcement agencies; and
--disclosure of classified military systems in
court might be required and this could compro-
mise national security. (See pp. 79 to 86.)
RECOMMENDATIONS
GAO recommends that the President
--direct the development of a more definitive
Federal drug strategy that stipulates the
roles of the various agencies with drug
enforcement responsibilities and
--make a clear delegation of responsibility to
one individual to oversee Federal drug
enforcement programs. (See p. 54.)
This report also contains a number of recommen-
dations to the Director, Office of Management
and Budget; the Attorney General; and the Secre-
taries of Treasury, Transportation, and State
to accumulate drug enforcement budgeting data,
develop a management information system, and
strengthen drug interdiction intelligence
efforts. (See pp. 53, 54, and 70.)
AGENCY COMMENTS AND
GAO'S EVALUATION
The Departments of Justice, Treasury, Transpor-
tation, State, and Defense provided written
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comments on the draft report. The draft report
was discussed with OMB officials. The White
House Office of Policy Development and the Of-
fice of Drug Abuse Policy elected not to com-
ment on the draft.
With respect to GAO's recommendations to the
President, the Department`of Transportation
concurred with the recommendations; the Depart-
ments of Treasury, State, and Defense did not
specifically comment on the recommendations;
and the Department of Justice disagreed.
The Department of justice pointed out a series
of actions taken by the Administration toward
achieving a coordinated national drug investi-
gative effort. The Department stated that cur-
rent efforts by the Administration, such as the
South Florida Task Force and the President's
creation of 12 new Drug Enforcement Task
Forces, are intended to foster even closer Fed-
eral agency coordination. The Department of
Justice also noted that legislation to create
an "Office of the Director of National and In-
ternational Drug Operations and Policy" was
passed by the 97th Congress. President Reagan
withheld his approval of this legislation not-
ing that such a drug program manager would cre-
ate a new bureaucracy in the Executive Branch
and compound the problems of coordination.
GAO believes, however, that the current ar-
rangements do not provide a mechanism for opti-
mizing coordination and implementing priorities
for the allocation of limited Federal drug en-
forcement resources within and across all com-
ponents of the Federal drug effort. Giving one
individual the responsibility to oversee the
entire Federal drug program, as GAO has recom-
mended, would be an extension of the efforts to
increase coordination already begun by the
agencies. Such responsibility, however, should
not extend to the day-to-day operations of the
individual agencies, because each agency is
best capable of managing its particular func-
tions within the context of its overall agency
mission.
Legislation to establish a drug operations and
policy office, similar to that passed by the
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Congress last year, has been introduced in the
98th Congress (S. 406). Although GAO has not
specifically analyzed this legislation, GAO's
findings support the concept of central drug
oversight, which is a major objective of the
legislation.
The Department's of Justice and Transportation
supported GAO's recommendation to develop a
management information system. The Department
of the Treasury did not specifically comment on
this recommendation. The Department of Trans-
portation concurred with GAO's recommendation
to accumulate drug enforcement budgetary data.
Other agencies and departments did not comment
on this recommendation. The Departments of
Treasury, Transportation, Justice, and State
pointed out in their comments that development
of intelligence is important to an interdiction
program. However, some of these agencies dis-
agreed on how to improve the intelligence pro-
grams.
The agencies' detailed comments on all of GAO's
recommendations are included in appendixes VIII
through XII and GAO's analysis is presented in
relevant sections of the report and at the ends
of-chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5.
Tear Sheet
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C o n t e n t s
DIGEST
CHAPTER
1
Page
INTERDICTION: ONE PART OF THE FEDERAL
EFFORT TO ATTACK THE DRUG PROBLEM 1
Drug problem persists 1
Efforts to reduce the drug supply 3
Interdiction at the border 4
The Southeastern United States: Gateway
for illegal drugs 7
2 DESPITE LARGE INCREASES IN RESOURCES,
INTERDICTION RESULTS REMAIN LIMITED 10
Resources devoted to interdiction
have increased dramatically 11
Interdiction results are limited 14
Air and sea interdiction programs result
primarily in marijuana seizures 19
Joint interdiction projects result
in large quantities of drugs seized 21
Interdiction would need billions of
dollars in additional resources to
stop drug flow 26
Conclusions 27
Agency comments and our evaluation 27
3 PROGRAM FRAGMENTATION LIMITS THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERDICTION EFFORTS 29
Interdiction programs are incohesive 30
DEA and Customs roles in interdiction
are unclear 39
Fragmentation of Federal drug effort
is a longstanding problem 46
Drug strategies have been inadequate 48
Federal drug groups are proliferating;
central oversight is lacking 51
Conclusions 52
Recommendations 53
Agency comments and our evaluation 54
4 BETTER, MORE TIMELY INTELLIGENCE CAN
IMPROVE INTERDICTION
Intelligence improves interdiction's
effectiveness
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Page
More source and transit country
tactical intelligence needed 59
EPIC--an underutilized resource 62
Conclusions 69
Recommendations 70
Agency comments and our evaluation 71
5 THE MILITARY HAS BECOME MORE INVOLVED
IN AIR-SEA DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS 73
Posse Comitatus limited military
assistance to law enforcement 73
Past assistance to law enforcement 75
Posse Comitatus Amendment has resulted
in more military assistance to law
enforcement 78
Several factors continue to limit
military assistance 79
Requests for military assistance are
now more coordinated 86
Conclusions 88
Agency comments and our evaluation 88
APPENDIX
I Objectives, scope, and methodology 89
II Drug seizures as a percent of drug supply 92
III Violator class of arrestees referred to
DEA by Federal agencies 94
IV Coast Guard and Customs Patrol seizures
as a percent of total Federal seizures 95
V Customs reported arrestees versus DEA
reported arrestee referrals 96
VI Case disposition analysis--Customs Patrol
and Coast Guard cases 97
VII Analysis of Customs and Coast Guard
seizures based on prior information 98
VIII Letter dated February 3, 1983, from the
Department of Justice 99
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Letter dated
Department
January 28, 1983, from the
of the Treasury 107
Letter dated
Department
Letter dated
Department
Letter dated
Department
January 31, 1983, from the
of Transportation 118
January 12, 1983, from the
of State 131
February 10, 1983, from the
of Defense 134
ABBREVIATIONS
AWACS Airborne Warning and Control System
CLEAR Customs Law Enforcement Activity Reporting System
DEA Drug Enforcement Administration
DOD Department of Defense
EPIC El Paso Intelligence Center
FBI Federal Bureau of Investigation
GAO General Accounting Office
NORAD North American Air Defense Command
NOSIC National Oceanic Surveillance Information Center
Office of Management and Budget
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CHAPTER 1
INTERDICTION: ONE PART OF THE FEDERAL
EFFORT TO ATTACK THE DRUG PROBLEM
Drug abuse in this country is persistent and growing.
The retail value of illegal drugs consumed in the U.S. in 1980
is estimated to be $80 billion.
A variety of sources and methods are involved in supply-
ing and smuggling drugs. South American, Caribbean, and Asian
countries as well as Mexico and the United States are sources
for one or more of the drugs. The drugs are being smuggled
through ports-of-entry, within merchandise or with travelers,
and between ports-of-entry by private aircraft and vessels
traveling surreptitiously. Currently, most of the marijuana,
dangerous drugs, and cocaine smuggled between the ports-of-
entry enter the country via Florida and other gulf coast and
southeastern States. This report focuses on Federal efforts
to reduce the smuggling of drugs into the United States
between ports-of-entry.
DRUG PROBLEM PERSISTS
Vast quantities of illicit drugs--heroin, cocaine, mari-
juana, and dangerous drugs--are entering the country. Recent
estimates indicate the quantity of drugs supplied to the illi-
cit U.S. market has increased.
About 7 percent more heroin entered the country in 1980
than in 1979. This reverses the steady decline in the flow of
heroin experienced from 1975 through 1979. While the total
amount of heroin entering the country in 1980 (about 8,800
pounds) was considerably less than in 1975 (about 16,500
pounds), data on smuggling activity, purity levels, and
heroin-related deaths clearly demonstrate a rise in heroin
use. Furthermore, the National Narcotics Intelligence Consum-
ers Committee projects increases through 1984. Southwest
Asian countries (Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Iran) and South-
east Asian countries (Burma, Laos, and Thailand) are supply
sources of 75 percent of the heroin entering the United
States. The supply source for the remaining 25 percent is
Mexico. Most of the Asian heroin is transported by commercial
air passenger couriers while Mexican heroin is transported
predominately by automobiles and pedestrians.
Available quantities and abuse of many types of dangerous
drugs have also increased. The sources of dangerous drugs on
the U.S. illicit market are domestic clandestine laboratories,
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diversion of precursor chemicals and legal drugs from the
legitimate U.S. distribution system, and illicit imports of
diverted and clandestinely manufactured drugs from other coun-
tries. Most of the dangerous drugs smuggled into the United
States are transported over land from Mexico and in private
aircraft and vessels from Colombia.
Percentage increases in the amount of cocaine supplied to
this country overwhelmingly exceeded increases in the amounts
of other drugs. About 46,000 pounds of cocaine entered the
country in 1977 and about 97,000 pounds entered in 1980--an
increase of 110 percent. Cocaine for the U.S. market origi-
nates primarily in the South American countries of Bolivia,
Peru, and Colombia. Although Peru and Bolivia remain the
principal sources for coca leaf, the raw material for illicit
cocaine production, most cocaine is processed in and transits
Colombia. The major transportation means for cocaine ship-
ments is by air--50 percent by air, 35 percent by sea, and 15
percent by land. Both private and commercial passenger
flights as well as air cargo shipments are used.
The supply of marijuana increased in both 1979 and 1980,
with Colombia producing the majority of the marijuana entering
the country. The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers
Committee estimates that over 10,000 tons of marijuana, 75
percent of the total consumed annually, originates in Colom-
bia. Marijuana is also grown in Jamaica, Mexico, and the
United States. These countries produce 10 percent, 8 percent,
and 7 percent, respectively, of the 14,000 tons consumed in
the United States annually. Various modes of transportation
are used to smuggle marijuana. Sixty percent of all imported
marijuana was transported by sea. Air smuggling is the pre-
ferred mode of transporting marijuana from Jamaica. Mexican
marijuana is transported in private aircraft and over land
either in automobiles or with pedestrians. Domestically grown
marijuana travels via all modes of interstate transportation.
The National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee
estimates that through 1984 marijuana and dangerous drug usage
will remain stable while cocaine usage will continue to
increase but at a slower rate than in the last few years. The
National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee also pro-
jects increases in heroin usage through 1984. Illegal drugs
generated retail sales of about $50 billion in 1978, $65 bil-
lion in 1979, and $80 billion in 1980, with cocaine the top
illicit income producer in 1979 and 1980, generating 34 per-
cent and 37 percent of the total retail values during those
respective years.
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EFFORTS TO REDUCE THE DRUG SUPPLY
Federal supply reduction efforts are designed to reduce
the quantity of drugs available for illicit use.as well as
contain and disrupt the distribution systems. The major com-
ponents of supply reduction efforts are international pro-
grams, Federal domestic law enforcement, and border law
enforcement.
The basic goals of the international programs are to
encourage and assist foreign governments to reduce the produc-
tion of illicit narcotics and to interdict the flow of illegal
narcotics and dangerous drugs before they enter the United
States. Reducing the supply of drugs available in the United
States depends strongly on the cooperation and capability of
foreign governments. Past efforts have centered on programs
for crop eradication and substitution, cooperative drug law
enforcement, and diplomatic initiatives to encourage assis-
tance from other nations. The Bureau of International Narco-
tics Matters, within the Department of State, is the lead
agency for coordinating the international programs.
The objectives of Federal domestic drug law enforcement
are to disrupt illicit trafficking organizations and reduce
the availability of drugs for illicit use. This approach
implements the supply reduction strategy in three ways.
First, the arrest, prosecution, and incarceration of traffick-
ers and immobilization of trafficking organizations results in
the elimination of some capabilities to supply illicit drugs.
Second, the removal of drugs from the distribution networks
reduces the supply of drugs. Third, the seizure of equipment
and resources needed to operate the networks cripples or
inconveniences the operations of the traffickers. Provisions
of Reorganization Plan No. 2, effective July 1, 1973,
established the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) within
the Department of Justice and designated it as the lead agency
for domestic enforcement. In addition, in January 1982 the
FBI was granted concurrent investigative authority with DEA.
Interdiction at the border is an important component of
the supply reduction strategy because of the removal of drugs,
the arrest of traffickers, the deterrent effect, and the
potential to obtain valuable information concerning traffick-
ing methods, organizations, and activities. Controlling the
border is the joint responsibility of several Federal agen-
cies. The key agencies involved in interdiction at the border
are the U.S. Customs Service of the Department of the Trea-
sury, DEA, and the U.S. Coast Guard of the Department of
Transportation. The desire to maintain an open border for
facilitating the flow of legitimate traffic complicates the
border control task.
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INTERDICTION AT THE BORDER
Drugs are smuggled into all parts of the country by a
variety of methods including cargo shipments, individual cou-
riers on public transportation conveyances, and clandestine
trips by private aircraft and vessels. These smuggling
methods take place either through the ports-of-entry (predomi-
nately commercial cargo and passengers) or between the ports-
of-entry (mostly private aircraft and vessels). The primary
Federal agency with border control responsibilities is the
Customs Service, which, in general, has inspectors at ports-
of-entry and patrol officers between the ports-of-entry. In
addition, the Coast Guard has a major program targeted at
smuggling by private vessels.
Inspection at the ports-of-entry
The majority of heroin and large amounts of cocaine enter
the United States by private couriers on commercial aircraft
or vessels and through air and sea cargo at ports-of-entry.
For example, according to Customs statistics, all of the fis-
cal year 1981 seizures of heroin greater than 5 pounds were
made in ports-of-entry, and 80 percent of these were from com-
mercial air passengers. In addition, 22 of the 30 fiscal year
1981 seizures of cocaine greater than 10 pounds were from air
passengers or discovered in air and sea cargo or private vehi-
cles. Primary responsibility for discovering drugs at air,
sea, and land ports-of-entry rests with the Customs Service
Office of Inspection.
Air and sea smuggling between
ports-of-entry
The majority of marijuana and a significant percentage of
the cocaine and dangerous drugs that enter the United States
arrive between the ports-of-entry and are carried predomi-
nately by private vessels and aircraft. Information from the
Customs Law Enforcement Activity Reporting System (CLEAR)
shows that of the drugs seized, 65 percent of the marijuana,
22 percent of the cocaine, and 18 percent of the dangerous
drugs were seized between the ports-of-entry. Primary respon-
sibility for combating air and sea smuggling between the
ports-of-entry rests with Customs Office of Patrol and the
Coast Guard.
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Smuggling b_y private aircraft
Private aircraft traveling clandestinely are often used
to smuggle marijuana, cocaine, and dangerous drugs. In gen-
eral, the contraband smuggler uses a propeller-driven, fixed-
wing aircraft, flies under cover of darkness without use of
navigation lights, penetrates the border at low altitudes, and
lands between the ports on clandestine airstrips. A study
conducted by the Stanford Research Institute in fiscal year
1979 stated there were 800 to 1,000 private aircraft involved
in smuggling that were making 5,100 to 8,400 flights into the
United States annually. These air intrusions transported 11
million pounds of marijuana and 17,500 pounds of cocaine
annually. A Customs' Information Services Staff intelligence
study stated that the use of private aircraft is one of the
principal methods for transporting marijuana, cocaine, and
dangerous drugs into the United States from the principal
source countries. Furthermore, this trend is expected to con-
tinue.
The mission of Customs air patrol, the primary defense
against the air smuggler, is to stem the flow of contraband
smuggled into the United States by private aircraft. The air
patrol operations begin when an intruder is detected and iden-
tified as a violator. Then, Customs personnel pursue the air-
craft to its landing point--if the landing point is within
U.S. jurisdiction. The final stage of the process ideally
involves the apprehension of the aircraft and the arrest of
the pilot and passengers.
The Federal Aviation Administration of the Department of
Transportation and the military provide some support to the
air interdiction efforts. Federal Aviation Administration
procedures governing the operations of private aircraft pro-
vide a base from which potential violators can be identified.
Additionally, Customs has used military and Federal Aviation
Administration resources, primarily aircraft and radar facili-
ties, and has explored the use of National Aeronautics and
Space Administration satellites.
Smuggling by private vessels
Maritime smuggling is one of the primary methods used to
import illicit drugs--especially marijuana. According to
National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers Committee estimates,
60 percent of the marijuana imported is shipped by sea. While
several types of vessels are involved in maritime smuggling,
mothership operations predominate. Vessels involved in smug-
gling are either large commercial-type vessels ranging from 60
to 300 feet in length known as "motherships," or smaller
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pleasure-type vessels used as "control boats" or "round trip-
pers." In mothership operations the vessels leave the source
country loaded with contraband, usually marijuana, and travel
until met offshore by contact boats. The contraband is trans-
ferred from the mothership to the contact boats and then smug-
gled into the country between the ports-of-entry. In some
instances, the motherships drop the contraband at stash sites
instead of meeting contact boats. Another maritime operating
method involves round-tripping. Fishing vessels, sailboats,
or yachts make trips from the United States to foreign ports
and return to the United States loaded with contraband.
While exact estimates of the number of private vessels
involved in smuggling do not exist, the El Paso Intelligence
Center (EPIC) reports over 1,000 vessels were placed on look-
out during 1981. EPIC, a facility jointly staffed by several
law enforcement agencies but operated by DEA, serves as a cen-
tral point for collecting, analyzing, and disseminating drug
smuggling related information. Additionally, a Customs intel-
ligence study predicts private vessels will continue to be
used extensively to smuggle contraband, particularly from
South America and the Caribbean to the United States.
The Coast Guard is responsible for enforcing all Federal
laws upon the high seas and waters over which the United
States has jurisdiction and leads the efforts against sea
smugglers. The Coast Guard's primary strategy against smuggl-
ing by sea is to concentrate its resources on intercepting
motherships. To do this, the Coast Guard patrols the princi-
pal Caribbean channels, also known as "choke points," within
the major drug routes used by smugglers.
Marine interdiction operations closer to the shores are
conducted by Customs' marine patrol as well as the Coast
Guard. These efforts are directed toward the small contact
boats often used to transport the drugs from the mothership
to the shore.
The military provides assistance to the marine interdic-
tion efforts by providing information on the movements of sus-
pect vessels and by loaning equipment to the Federal agencies
involved. Additionally, the Department of State coordinates
those marine activities that involve foreign vessels or occur
in foreign waters.
DEA's interdiction responsibilities
Even though Customs and Coast Guard are the principal
agencies responsible for drug interdiction, both between and
within the ports-of-entry, DEA also has a major drug interdic-
tion role. Reorganization Plan #2 of 1973, which created DEA,
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sought to centralize Federal drug law enforcement primarily in
one agency. Under the plan, the drug investigative and for-
eign intelligence-gathering functions and resources of the
Customs Service were transferred to DEA. The Customs Ser-
vice's antidrug role was limited to interdiction of drugs at
the border. As a result, since 1973 DEA has been responsible
for providing foreign intelligence on drug movements and per-
forming postinterdiction investigations of seizure cases. In
addition, many Federal seizures of drugs are the result of DEA
domestic investigations.
Much of the air and sea drug smuggling intelligence is
provided by DEA through EPIC. In support of efforts to combat
air and sea drug smuggling, EPIC's staff prepares threat anal-
yses, provides tactical intelligence on suspect movements,
identifies violators through its lookout system and generally
relays relevant information to the law enforcement community.
THE SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES:
GATEWAY FOR ILLEGAL DRUGS
Currently, most marijuana and cocaine enter the country
through the southeastern States--most notably Florida. Until
approximately 5 years ago, the Southwest border area was the
primary entry point for illicit drugs smuggled into the United
States. At-that time, Mexico was the major source country for
heroin, marijuana, and other illicit drugs. The success of
joint U.S.-Mexican eradication efforts in Mexico had a signi-
ficant impact on the availability of drugs. These successful
efforts resulted in a change in the source country, which in
turn created a shift in trafficking patterns. Colombia,
Jamaica, and other South American countries emerged as prin-
cipal source countries for marijuana, cocaine, and dangerous
drugs.
A recent EPIC report states that, although drug smuggling
and related activities occurred in just about every State and
U.S. territory during 1981, the southeastern and gulf coast
States have become the preferred entry point for smugglers
transporting cocaine, marijuana, and dangerous drugs. This is
due to the location of the source countries and the topography
of these States. The many miles of isolated inland waterways,
the numerous unlit dirt strips, the open beaches, coastal
islands, and undeveloped land enable easy access with little
chance of detection.
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The vast majority of the drugs smuggled into the area
enter through Florida. EPIC estimated that in 1981 Florida
was targeted for 68 percent of all maritime drug smuggling and
47 percent of all air smuggling destined for the United
States.
Intelligence sources indicate the southeastern and gulf
coast States will remain the primary entry area. However,
enforcement efforts are underway in the area which may, if
successful, change this trend.
Our review focused on Federal interdiction programs
because of the significant increases in resources devoted to
these programs and because of the continuing vast amounts of
drugs being smuggled into the country. The review objectives
were to evaluate the results of the interdiction programs, the
extent of cooperation and coordination among the various agen-
cies, the role of intelligence in the interdiction efforts,
and the ability of the military to assist in drug interdic-
tion. To accomplish these objectives, we focused primarily on
the interdiction-related operations of the Coast Guard, Cus-
toms Service, DEA, Department of Defense, and the military
services. Details of our scope and methodology are contained
in appendix I.
On December 15, 1982, a draft of this report was provided
to the following individuals for their comments:
--The Assistant to the President for Policy Development.
--The Director of the White House Drug Abuse Policy
Office.
--The Attorney General.
--The Secretary of the Treasury.
--The Secretary of Transportation.
--The Secretary of State.
--The Secretary of Defense.
--The Director, Office of Management and Budget.
Written comments were received from all of these individuals
except the Director, OMB, the Assistant to the President for
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Policy Development, and the Director of the White House Drug
Abuse Policy Office. We discussed the draft report with offi-
cials of OMB.
The agencies' comments have been addressed in the rele-
vant report sections as well as at the ends of chapters 2, 3,
4, and 5. Copies of the agencies' comments are included as
appendixes VIII through XII.
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 I! I. I._ .II I _.,.! I lI ! I _ I_
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CHAPTER 2
DESPITE LARGE INCREASES IN RESOURCES,
INTERDICTION RESULTS REMAIN LIMITED
Federal resources devoted to interdiction more than
tripled from 1977 to 1982 while funds for other facets of the
Federal drug supply reduction program--international drug
activities and domestic drug enforcement--have remained rela-
tively constant. The Coast Guard's drug interdiction program
comprises the majority of this increase. Despite these
increases, however, interdiction results remain limited.
--Cocaine, heroin, and dangerous drug seizures for fis-
cal years 1977 through 1982 comprised less than 10
percent of the estimated supply of these drugs.
--Less than 20 percent of the estimated marijuana supply
was seized over this same time frame.
--Drug price and purity statistics, measures of
availability, indicate little change.
--Most individuals arrested in interdiction cases are
low-level violators.
--The bulk of those arrested spend less than a year in
jail.
Furthermore, because the predominant drug smuggled into
the United States by private aircraft and vessels is mari-
juana, most-air and sea interdiction seizures are of mari-
juana. Most of the other drugs are seized through DEA inves-
tigations or Customs port-of-entry inspections.
Joint special projects conducted by two or more agencies
have been shown to be the most effective means to attack drug
smuggling. Such programs are costly, however, and may have
only limited long-term impact.
Even though interdiction resources have increased and
more drugs have been seized, more drugs are entering the
United States now than entered 5 years ago. Consequently,
while the volume and street value of drugs seized are most
impressive, the seizures are dwarfed by estimates of the total
drugs available.
Current Federal resources have been inadequate to stop
or even substantially impair drug smuggling. The Coast Guard
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has estimated that it would take $2 billion in additional
resources to interdict 75 percent of the marijuana entering
the United States from the Caribbean. Estimates to seize 75
percent of the cocaine, heroin, and dangerous drugs entering
the United States are not available, but clearly the funds
necessary would run into the billions of dollars.
RESOURCES DEVOTED TO
INTERDICTION HAVE INCREASED
DRAMATICALLY
Our analysis of budget and expenditure data for the
Coast Guard, Customs Service, and DEA showed that resources
devoted to interdiction more than tripled for the 6-year
period from 1977 through 1982. During the same period,
resources for other facets of the Federal supply reduction
program (domestic law enforcement and international programs)
increased in dollars, but declined when adjusted for infla-
tion, as shown in the following table.
1977 to 1982
Drug supply
reduction
Percent
increase
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982
Real
percent
increase
(decrease)
facet
1977
te a)
--------------------(millions)------------------
(no
Interdiction
$ 83.0 $121.0 $165.6 $164.7 $291.8 $277.9 236
110
Domestic law
47
7
4 207
183
(8)
enforcement
.
.
141.2 160.1 158.4 175.1
Inter-
18
0
7 61
7
(26)
national
.
.
51.7 61.1 57.6 62.4 5
Total
$275.9 $342.2 $381.6 $402.2 $532.9 $546.6
/Represents the percent of increase (decrease) in dollar amounts when adjusted for
inflation.
Adjusting these figures for inflation shows that expendi-
tures during this period for domestic law enforcement and
international programs decreased by 8 percent and 26 percent,
respectively. During the same period interdiction expendi-
tures increased 110 percent in real terms.
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Increase in interdiction
ex end tures attributable
mostly to Coast Guard
The majority of expenditures for drug interdiction are
made by the Coast Guard, Customs Service, ;nd DEA. Since
these agencies do not accumulate cost data for drug interdic-
tion, we analyzed various resource utilization, budget, and
other data from the three agencies to estimate the amount of
money spent for interdicting drugs. Our analysis showed the
following.
Agency
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Percent
increase
Real
percent
increase
(decrease)
Coast Guard
$17.6
$ 47.9
$ 87.1
$ 86.2
$196.7
$179.1
919
(note a
539
Customs
58.0
65.0
67.7
70.2
86.2
88.2
52
(5)
7.4
8.1
10.8
8.3
8.9
10.7
43
(10)
Total
$83.0
$121.0
$165.6
$164.7
$291.8
$277.9
I/Represents the percent of increase (decrease) in dollar amounts when adjusted for
inflation.
As shown, the Coast Guard's drug interdiction program has com-
prised most of the increase in resources devoted to interdic-
tion. The Coast Guard's drug enforcement expenditures
increased over 900 percent from 1977 to 1982.
Coast Guard expenditures for drug interdiction are
included in its overall budget for law enforcement. Drug
enforcement and fisheries enforcement comprise most of the
Coast Guard's law enforcement program expenditures. The total
law enforcement budget increased from $94 million in 1977 to
$306 million in 1982. The primary Coast Guard resources used
in drug interdiction are medium endurance cutters, patrol
boats, and aircraft. We calculated the estimated cost for
drug enforcement using operating statistics for these vessels
and aircraft. Total operating hours for these vehicles
charged to drug enforcement increased from an estimated 19,051
hours in 1977 to 106,100 hours in 1982.
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Customs cost of interdicting drugs is also an estimate.
Customs Tactical Interdiction Program expenditures generally
consist of the activities of Customs Patrol Division. Customs
officials told us that 90 to 95 percent of the activities of
Customs Patrol concern drug interdiction. Customs Inspection
Division also is involved in drug interdiction. Customs
inspectors are given specialized training in detecting and
interdicting drugs that are smuggled through cargo and passen-
ger processing locations. The drug interdiction activities of
Customs inspectors are performed as an integral part of their
other duties at airports and seaports. We therefore did not
include Inspection Division resources in our estimate of
Customs drug interdiction costs.
Our estimate of the amount DEA spends on drug interdic-
tion is based on the number of hours DEA special agents spend
on referral cases from Customs and Coast Guard. Most of these
referrals are interdiction cases. This estimate does not
include DEA's costs associated with special interdiction proj-
ects. These costs were neither available nor possible to rea-
sonably estimate.
Costs for the other two facets of the Federal drug supply
reduction effort: international supply reduction and domestic
enforcement are estimated based on DEA and State Department
budgets. International supply reduction is comprised of,the
State Department's budget for International Narcotics Control
and DEA's overseas budget. Domestic enforcement is comprised
of the remainder of DEA's budget after interdiction and over-
seas costs are subtracted. In addition, 1982 domestic
enforcement expenditures include an estimated $5.3 million
spent by the FBI for drug enforcement.
In commenting on our draft, the Departments of Transpor-
tation and Justice disagreed with our drug interdiction cost
estimates. Transportation officials using a different basis
for allocating costs, estimated that their drug enforcement
expenditures increased from $25 million in 1977 to $150 mil-
lion in 1981. Justice said our estimates of interdiction
costs were understated by the amount of time DEA spent on
special projects and other interdiction activities. However,
Justice did not provide estimates of these additional costs.
These agencies do not specifically account for drug
interdiction expenditures. There are a variety of reasonable
ways to estimate such costs. We believe our estimates are
sound, but, more important, the disagreement over how such
estimates are made demonstrates the need for the development
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of better ways to calculate interdiction expenditures, an
issue we discuss more fully in chapter 3.
INTERDICTION RESULTS ARE LIMITED
Although Federal agencies are seizing increasing amounts
of drugs, drug availability has been on the increase and sei-
zures represent only a small portion of total supply. Fur-
ther, individuals arrested in. interdiction cases are typically
low level violators and when convicted, more often than not
spend less than a year in jail.
Drug availability has
not been diminished
Drug seizures by DEA, Customs, and the Coast Guard con-
tinue to represent a small portion of the total drug supply as
estimated by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers
Committee. The Committee is composed of Federal agencies with
drug enforcement, policy, treatment and research, and intelli-
gence responsibilities and produces, among other things, an
annual estimate of the supply of drugs on the U.S. illicit
market.
Comparing Federal drug seizures with the Committee's
estimates of the drug supply, total Federal drug seizures from
fiscal year 1977 through 1982 comprise less than 10 percent of
the heroin, cocaine, and dangerous rug supply and less than
16 percent of the marijuana supply.' The graphs on the next
page show the percent of drugs seized from fiscal years 1977
to 1982.
1NNICC estimates for each drug represents the total amount on
the U.S. market and include amounts grown or produced
domestically. For example, NNICC estimates that 7 percent of
the marijuana supply is grown in the United States and that
the majority of illicit dangerous drugs are manufactured or
diverted in the United States. Domestically produced drugs
obviously are not usually seized at the border. On the other
hand, our drug seizure information includes all Federal drug
seizures both at the border as well as within the United
States.
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PERCENT OF DRUG SUPPLY SEIZED
FISCAL YEARS 1977-1982
Percent
307
15
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In addition to the percent of the drug supply seized,
another indicator of interdiction's limited impact on drug
availability is the fact that street prices of drugs have
remained relatively constant. Street prices are considered by
DEA to be a barometer of drug availability. An increase in
street prices indicates a decline in drug supply. Street
prices of heroin and cocaine over the past 4 years have
remained relatively constant and have actually declined when
adjusted for inflation. Street drug prices compiled by DEA
for the past 4 years are shown below.
Street Prices (note a)
1979 1980
Heroin (mg) $2.25 $2.,21
Dangerous Drugs 2.78 3.36
(see note c)
Cocaine (mg) .65 .67
Marijuana (gm) 1.29 1.57
1981
1982
(note b)
$2.34
$2.13
3.74
4.21
.69
.62
1.67
1.70
a/Prices for each calendar year are an average of quarterly
street prices as reported by DEA.
b/1982 prices for dangerous drugs and marijuana are for the
period January to September 1982.
c/Prices for amphetamines and barbiturates are in units.
Adjusting these prices for inflation shows a decline in
the price of heroin and cocaine from 1979 to 1982: heroin
declined from $2.25 to $1.66 and cocaine declined from $.65 to
$.52. Marijuana prices remained relatively constant when
adjusted for inflation rising slightly from $1.29 in 1979 to
$1.32 in 1982. The Department of Justice in commenting on our
draft report stated that drug street prices should not be
adjusted for inflation since illegal drugs are outside of
legal commerce. We believe that inflation must be considered
if prices are to be used as a barometer of availability. The
$2.25 spent for a miligram of heroin in 1979 clearly is not
the same as $2.25 in 1982.
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Recent street drug prices also show declines. Comparing
drug street prices for the first quarter of fiscal year 1982
with the last quarter of 1982 shows the following:
--heroin declined from $2.27 per miligram to $2.04;
--cocaine declined from $.63 per miligram to $.53;
--marijuana declined from $1.78 per gram to $1.64; and
--dangerous drugs declined from $4.77 per unit to $4.04.
Drug purity statistics also indicate an*increased availa-
bility of drugs. DEA, which maintains purity statistics for
heroin and cocaine, regards an increase in the purity of these
drugs as an indication of an increase in availability. The
chart below shows that the purity of both heroin and cocaine
are at their highest levels in 4 years.
Year
Heroin
Cocaine
--------percent--------
1979
3.6
12.5
1980
3.8
12.9
1981
3.9
11.6
1982
5.0
13.6
The low percentage of the drug supply seized, decreasing
street drug prices and increasing drug purity indicate that
drug availability, the primary target of interdiction, has not
been seriously affected. Although Federal agencies have
seized large drug quantities, a seemingly inexhaustible supply
offsets that being seized.
Interdiction arrestees are
low-level violators
Individuals involved in transporting drugs are typically
not high-level violators. DEA classifies drug violators into
four categories with Class I being the most important. For
example, Class I violators can be the head of major drug traf-
ficking organizations dealing in large quantities of drugs.
Occasionally, interdiction may apprehend a Class I violator
who may be transporting drugs by air, or an individual or
small group of individuals who may have purchased and be
importing the drugs themselves. But, on the whole, those
arrested are Class III and IV violators who transport, but do
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not control, their drug cargo. High-level violators leave
this phase of the work to someone else.
Complete data on the classes of violators arrested by
Customs and the Coast Guard is not available since many viola-
tors are either deported or referred to State and local
authorities for prosecution. However, data on the violator
class of arrestees referred to DEA by Customs and the Coast
Guard during fiscal years 1977 to 1982 show that only 5.1 per-
cent of the 8,344 referred were Class I or II violators;
almost 95 percent (7,922) were Class III and IV.2 (See app.
III.)
Most interdiction arrestees
spend little time in prison
Only limited data is available on the court disposition
of individuals arrested by Coast Guard and Customs. Our anal-
ysis of this limited data shows that more often than not smug-
glers arrested and prosecuted spend very little time in jail.
Neither the Coast Guard, Customs, nor DEA maintains com-
plete data on the judicial disposition of cases involving
individuals arrested for drug smuggling. These agencies do
not know whether arrestees were accepted for Federal or local
prosecution, whether arrestees were convicted, or what sen-
tences were imposed. Some case disposition data is maintained
by DEA for some of the cases it accepts for further investiga-
tion and prosecution; however, this information is not com-
plete. For example, we attempted to determine the results of
court cases brought against 348 individuals arrested in 172
randomly selected air and sea interdiction cases.3 Using
data available at DEA and the FBI's Computerized Criminal
History program of the National Crime Information Center, we
could find court disposition information on only 128 of the
348 individuals arrested in these cases.
Court disposition data for these 128 violators are shown
in the table below.
2The data includes arrestees referred to DEA by all Federal
agencies, but, according to DEA officials, more than 90 per-
cent of all referrals are from Customs and Coast Guard.
3A description of our random sample procedures is contained
in appendix I.
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Length of
Sentence Number of total percent
Percent Cumulative
No prison sentence
(see note a) 42
32.8
32.8
Up to 1 year 19
14.8
47.6
1 - 2 years 14
(see note b)
10.9
58.5
2 - 3 years 18
14.1
72.6
3 - 5 years 17
13.3
85.9
5 - 10 years 11
8.6
94.5
More than 10 years 7
5.5
100.0
Total
128
100.0
-
a/Includes such sentences as fine or probation only; or
suspended sentence.
b/Length of sentence "1 - 2 years" means that the sentence was
from more than 1 year up to and including 2 years;. "2 - 3
years" is more than 2 up to and including 3 years; etc.
As the table shows, almost a third of those arrested received
no prison sentence, and almost three-fourths received a prison
sentence of 3 years or less. Because of parole and other fac-
tors, Federal prisoners usually serve only about one-third of
their prison sentences. Therefore, individuals receiving a 3-
year sentence or less (nearly 75 percent of those arrested for
smuggling) probably spend no more than a year in jail.
Federal prosecutors told us that prison sentences are not
very long because most of those arrested in interdiction cases
are not major violators. They noted that Federal judges have
been reluctant to impose longer prison sentences on these low-
level violators.
AIR AND SEA INTERDICTION PROGRAMS
RESULT PRIMARILY IN MARIJUANA
SEIZURES
Because marijuana is the primary drug smuggled into this
country by private aircraft and vessels, most Customs Patrol
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and Coast Guard seizures are of marijuana. On the other hand,
as might be expected, air and sea drug interdiction results in
few seizures of other types of drugs. Instead, the bulk of
these drugs seized are the result of domestic DEA investiga-
tions and port-of-entry inspections by Customs inspectors.
Drug seizures by agency as a percentage of total drugs
seized is shown in the table below.
Total Drugs Seized By Agency
Fiscal Years 1977-1982 (note a)
Dangerous
Heroin Drugs Cocaine Marijuana
------------------ (percent) ------------------
DEA 66 63 35 20
Coast Guard 0 6 0 38
Customs 30 22 61 29
Patrol (4) (12) (21) (26)
Inspection (26) (10) (40) (3)
(see note b)
State/Local/
Federal
Cooperative 4 9 4 13
(see note c)
100 100 100 100
a/Fiscal year 1982 data are for the first 9 months (October
1981 to June 1982).
b/Includes seizures by inspectors, inspection teams, and a
small number of seizures by other Customs personnel.
c/Seizures made by State, local, or other Federal agencies for
which Customs took possession of the seized drugs.
As the table shows, the Coast Guard and Customs Patrol seized
4 percent of the heroin, 18 percent of the dangerous drugs,
and 21 percent of the cocaine. In contrast, DEA seized 66
percent of the heroin, 63 percent of the dangerous drugs, and
35 percent of the cocaine. On the other hand, Customs Patrol
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and the Coast Guard, through their interdiction programs,
seized 64 percent of the total marijuana seized.
JOINT INTERDICTION
PROJECTS RESULT IN LARGE
QUANTITIES OF DRUGS SEIZED
Special interdiction operations involving several Federal
agencies have been more successful than single agency activi-
ties. These joint operations have allowed Customs and the
Coast Guard to tap DEA's overseas intelligence resources and
overall drug expertise, and resources have been better orga-
nized and focused on interdiction. Although joint interdic-
tion operations have resulted in increased drug seizures and
cooperation, the most successful joint projects occurred when
DEA investigations utilize Customs and Coast Guard resources.
These operations result not only in large quantities of drugs
seized, but also many major traffickers arrested.
Marine interdiction
projects
There have been several successful joint agency efforts
in the maritime area, beginning in 1978 with Operation Stopgap
and continuing with various phases of Operation Tiburon.
The basic strategy in these maritime operations has been
to provide as much choke point coverage (see map on the next
page) as possible at the end of the harvest seasons when much
of the marijuana is shipped. Although these operations began
essentially only as concentrated enforcement efforts at the
choke points, these maritime efforts have become excellent
examples of interagency cooperation and coordination. The
Coast Guard commits the cutter (vessel) resources, DEA pro-
vides overseas intelligence and photographs on those vessels
likely to be carrying the marijuana, and Customs and DEA pro-
vide air support to the cutters.
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MAP OF CARIBBEAN SHOWING THREE PRIMARY
CHOKE POINTS: YUCATAN CHANNEL, WINDWARD
PASSAGE, AND MONA PASSAGE
United States
Gulf of Mexico
Yucatan Channel
Windward Passage
Atlantic Ocean
Mona Passage
Caribbean Sea
Colombia
The table below shows the timeframes and results of these
special projects.
Marijuana
Vessels seized
Project
Time frame
Arrests
Stopgap
Jan. - Feb. 1978
202
Tiburon I
Nov. - Dec. 1980
64
Tiburon II
Feb. - Mar. 1981
62
Tiburon III
Oct. 1981 -
Jan. 1982
368
Total
696
seized (pounds)
29 860,405
12 90,000
13 652,000
70
124
2,535,368
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Air interdiction special projects
Customs has been involved in several major air interdic-
tion operations where the use of multiple agency resources
provided advance intelligence on potential targets. One such
operation, conducted jointly by DEA and Customs, was Operation
Boomer Falcon I & II in the fall of 1979 and spring of 1980.
This operation was an intensified air interdiction enforcement
strategy targeted at air smugglers flying through the Windward
Passage into the Caribbean and entering the southeast Florida
coast. The operation involved the use of radar detection and
prior intelligence supplied by Customs and DEA. DEA and
Customs aircraft were utilized during the operation for inter-
ception and surveillance of air smugglers in route to the
United States. Boomer Falcon results are shown in the chart
below.
I II Total
Drug seized (pounds)
Cocaine 785 0 785
Marijuana 15,494 13,741 29,235
Dangerous drugs 1,203 1,695 2,898
In addition to the results shown above, the coordination
among the agencies involved was noteworthy. This coordination
resulted in EPIC generating 57 aircraft lookouts, receiving
and analyzing over 100 international flight plans, and
developing files on approximately 500 suspect aircraft.
DEA investigations involving
Customs and Coast Guard resources
Joint marine and air interdiction projects have had
positive results. The most successful joint operations have
involved investigations conducted by DEA and employing Customs
and Coast Guard resources. These investigations not only have
resulted in large quantities of drug seizures but also the
arrest of several major traffickers. Linking interdiction to
broader drug enforcement investigations not only aids inter-
diction but improves overall drug enforcement by associating
higher level violators with the drugs seized.
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An excellent example that demonstrates the benefits of
this combined approach was an investigation that culminated in
March 1981 entitled Operation Grouper. DEA penetrated,
through undercover operations, numerous sophisticated mari-
juana trafficking organizations throughout the Southeast and
Gulf States as well as the Bahamas. As a result of DEA,
Customs, Coast Guard, and other enforcement units' efforts,
several of these organizations were put out of business, large
quantities of drugs were seized, and top-level violators were
indicted. The operation resulted in a total of 155 indict-
ments, of which 81 were Class I or II violators; 1.2 million
pounds of marijuana, 831 pounds of cocaine, and 3 million
methaqualone tablets were seized; and about $20 million in
cash, vehicles, vessels, and aircraft was seized. In addi-
tion, a great deal of intelligence was generated on smuggling
operations in the Southeast and Caribbean. This operation,
while primarily DEA-based, involved the Coast Guard seizing
vessels on the high seas on the basis of prior intelligence,
interdiction by Customs, and arrests and seizures by State and
local enforcement units throughout the Southeast.
Although these operations were highly successful, most
interdiction efforts are not tied to drug enforcement investi-
gations.
South Florida Task Force:
increased drug seizures
but high cost
The most recent and by far the largest Federal special
project against drug smuggling is the South Florida Task Force
(a.k.a. Operation Florida). During January 1982, the Presi-
dent established a cabinet-level Task Force on crime in
Florida, especially drug-related crime, and appointed the Vice
President to direct the operation. On March 15, 1982, Opera-
tion Florida began and is scheduled to continue as permanent
drug interdiction task force.
Although designed to be a broad, multifaceted anticrime
program for South Florida, the bulk of the Task Force, both in
terms of activities and resources, focuses on drug interdic-
tion. Assistance for the Task Force was obtained from several
Federal agencies. Customs, in cooperation with the lead
agency DEA, formed the Florida Joint Task Group as a part of
the Task Force. During the first 90 days, 256 Customs person-
nel and 81 DEA personnel were detailed to support the effort.
Additionally, Customs increased its efforts to reduce air
smuggling activities. To assist this effort, the Department
of Defense furnished U.S. Navy E-2C aircraft and U.S. Army
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Cobra helicopters. Other support has included an increase in
the number of Coast Guard cutters operating in the waters of
South Florida and the transfer of additional personnel from
the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms; FBI; and U.S.
Marshals Service.
Official cost estimates for the Task Force have not been
made by the Executive Branch; however, we estimate, on the
basis of the number of personnel assigned and other projected
expenditures, that the total cost of the Task Force from March
through December 1982 exceeded $66 million.
Reports of the results achieved from the Task Force
efforts have been mixed. The Departments of Justice and Trea-
sury have reported some very positive achievements. They note
that:
--The crime rate in South Florida has dropped signifi-
cantly.
--Drug arrests and seizures in Florida have increased.
--Followup drug interdiction investigations have been
carried out in almost every case with positive results.
--Overall drug enforcement program cohesiveness has been
strengthened.
Statistics provided by the Treasury Department comparing
drug seizures and arrests in the State of Florida for the
period March 15 through December 31, 1982, with the same
period in 1981 showed:
--marijuana seizures increased from 1,094,000 pounds to
1,245,000 pounds.
--cocaine seizures went up from 1,617 pounds to 2,891
pounds, and
--arrests rose from 742 to 945.
The Treasury Department also noted that the Task Force appears
to have shifted drug smuggling activity to other parts of the
country. For example, even though marijuana seizures in the
Southeastern United States showed little change between 1981
and 1982, marijuana seizures increased more than 400 percent
in the Northeast during this period.
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On the other hand, DEA data shows that most of the
arrests associated with the Task Force are low level viola-
tors. According to DEA statistics, only 5 percent of Task
Force arrests are major drug violators (Class I or II).
Nationally about 17 percent of DEA arrests are major viola-
tors. Several DEA and other agency officials said that, even
though the Task Force has caused many traffickers to curtail
or move their smuggling operations, it is doubtful whether the
Task Force can have any substantial long-term impact on drug
availability.
Although the Task Force has been successful, especially
in demonstrating the benefits of a cohesive attack on drug
trafficking, the overall pervasiveness of the drug problem is
demonstrated by the national statistics on drug availability.
As pointed out earlier in this chapter, drug price and purity
data in 1982 indicates increased availability of most drugs.
INTERDICTION WOULD NEED BILLIONS
OF DOLLARS IN ADDITIONAL
RESOURCES TO STOP DRUG FLOW
The primary objective of interdiction is to reduce the
amount of drugs entering the United States. However, it is
generally recognized that current interdiction programs have
only a limited impact on drug traffickers. Although estimates
of the additional resources necessary to impede the drug flow
are difficult to make, officials of the primary Federal agen-
cies involved have stated that the additional resources would
be substantial. For example, the Coast Guard has estimated
that it would have to seize 75 percent of the marijuana enter-
ing the United States before drug traffickers would be driven
out of business. The Coast Guard has said it would need $2.3
billion in additional operating funds including 35 new air-
craft, and 156 new medium endurance cutters and patrol and
utility boats to seize 75 percent of the marijuana coming
through the Caribbean. Estimates to seize 75 percent of the
cocaine, heroin, and dangerous drugs entering this country are
not available, but it would also take billions of dollars.
In commenting on our draft report, the Department of
Transportation said that its $2.3 billion estimate to seize 75
percent of the marijuana transiting the Caribbean was no
longer current. The Department noted that "* * * the substan-
tial increase in drug trafficking intelligence and the coordi-
nation of efforts among law enforcement agencies * * *" has
resulted in a revised estimate. Transportation said that
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"Assuming the Coast Guard would have
access to timely tactical intelligence, we
believe we can essentially deny the sea-
borne routes to the smugglers and signifi-
cantly disrupt the maritime trafficking in
marijuana for a dollar figure considerably
less than previously stated."
However, Transportation did not provide a revised estimate.
The Treasury Department in its response to our draft
report said that an effective air interdiction strategy aimed
at smuggling by private aircraft could be maintained for less
than $30 million per year. The Department said such a strat-
egy is currently being developed in conjunction with the
Department of Defense. However, Treasury did not provide
estimates of the initial investment costs, the cost of mili-
tary resources necessary, nor the details of how the addi-
tional resources would be used.
CONCLUSIONS
Clearly interdiction plays an important role in the Fed-
eral effort to stem the flow of drugs. Interdiction removes
drugs from the illicit market, increases the risk to drug
traffickers, and discourages some would-be traffickers from
attempting drug smuggling.
Increasing the amount of Federal resources over the past
few years has increased the amount of drugs seized, albeit
without really gaining much on the problem of drugs being
readily available. But interdiction alone cannot, and is not
intended to,.provide the answer to our drug supply problem.
The other Federal drug supply reduction thrusts of crop eradi-
cation/substitution in the international area and domestic
enforcement are vital.
The Federal agencies involved in drug interdiction have
seized tremendous amounts of drugs over the years with limited
resources. Many important improvements have been and are
being made to increase drug seizures. But more needs to be
done. These areas are discussed in detail in the following
chapters.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND
OUR EVALUATION
The Justice Department said, in commenting on our draft
report, that we failed "* * * to address the role and limita-
tions of interdiction in the context of the entire Federal
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drug law enforcement effort." Justice said that interdiction
is only one part of the Federal drug strategy and it is
unrealistic to expect current drug interdiction programs to
eliminate the flow of illegal drugs. Commenting on the limi-
tations of interdiction, Justice said
"Years of experience have shown that this
'band-aid' approach to controlling illegal
drugs--stopping them midway along the
delivery chain--is nothing more than a
maintenance effort which, standing alone,
will never have any permanent effect on
drug traffic."
Justice also noted that
"Unfortunately, the GAO report leads one
to believe that the Federal Government
should allocate more resources to the
interdiction effort as the answer to the
drug problem."
We believe our report clearly identifies the limitations
of interdiction within the context of the total Federal drug
enforcement effort. Chapter 1 identifies all of the compo-
nents of the Federal drug supply reduction program and the
central theme of this chapter is that interdiction results
have remained limited despite the substantial increases in
resources. And, as discussed in chapter 3, any increases in
interdiction resources need to be considered in light of the
other Federal drug supply reduction components--international
programs and domestic enforcement.
The Justice Department also was very critical in its com-
ments of our failure to include more current data on the South
Florida Task Force. Justice pointed out that
"* * * a most serious shortcoming is the
report's failure to concentrate on the
South Florida Task Force in assessing the
degree of cohesiveness with which inter-
diction efforts are accomplished."
Subsequent to receiving Justice's comments, we learned that
DEA had prepared an assessment of the operations of the South
Florida Task Force through December 1982. We requested a copy
of the report from Justice, but have not received it. Conse-
quently, we have not been able to recognize in the final re-
port the specific accomplishments of the task force to which
Justice alluded in its comments.
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CHAPTER 3
PROGRAM FRAGMENTATION LIMITS THE
EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERDICTION EFFORTS
The authority and responsibility for Federal drug inter-
diction efforts are split among three separate agencies in
three executive departments. Each agency has different pro-
grams, goals, and priorities. And, although the level of
cooperation is increasing, especially in South Florida, such
fragmentation has a certain amount of inefficiency and inter-
agency conflict built in.
Congressional oversight and resource allocation decisions
relative to drug interdiction are extremely difficult under
these circumstances. None of the agencies involved identify
resources devoted to drug interdiction for budget purposes and
very little information is available, either by agency or in
the aggregate, to evaluate program results. Aggregate drug
seizure statistics are sometimes inflated due to double count-
ing of seizures when there is more than one participating
agency, and very little case disposition information on
arrestees is maintained.
Under the current division of responsibilities, DEA con-
ducts followup investigations on the Coast Guard's or Customs'
arrestees. DEA usually performs followup investigations only
if the cases (less than 40 percent of Customs Patrol and Coast
Guard cases) will be prosecuted by a U.S. attorney. Conse-
quently, information which could be of value to future inves-
tigations is not being obtained on the majority of the inter-
diction cases.
Fragmentation of Federal efforts has long been recognized
as a major problem. To help remedy this situation, Congress
passed legislation in 1972 and 1976 that requires the Presi-
dent to direct the development of a comprehensive national
drug abuse prevention strategy and to appoint a drug abuse
policy coordinator. While various drug strategies have been
prepared over the years, the most recent in October 1982, none
has adequately defined the various agencies' drug interdiction
roles. Furthermore, the drug abuse policy coordinator has
never had the authority to manage all Federal drug efforts.
The current administration has organized and proposed several
new groups to help coordinate Federal efforts to fight the
drug problem making it all the more important that someone
have clear authority to oversee these efforts.
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INTERDICTION PROGRAMS ARE
INCOHESIVE
Federal interdiction efforts are not planned, controlled,
or directed by any single department, agency, or individual
but are split among three major agencies in three separate
cabinet departments. DEA has overall responsibility for drug
enforcement, Customs interdicts smugglers at the border, and
the Coast Guard interdicts drugs on the high seas.
Unfortunately, the drug trafficking organizations do not
conveniently divide their operations to match the Federal
structure. In many cases, these independent programs address
separate elements of the same threat. The same organization
that smuggles drugs may also be involved in money laundering
and domestic distribution operations, often national in scope.
Essentially, Federal drug interdiction efforts are an
amalgamation of these individual agency programs resulting in
differing interdiction goals, priorities, and resource deci-
sions. Resource allocation decisions that transcend agency
boundaries are not possible. Moreover, very little informa-
tion is available that would permit an evaluation of the rela-
tive effectiveness of the various programs and operations.
Agencies have different
goals and priorities
Even though Customs, the Coast Guard, and DEA are all
involved in interdiction, they do not have common goals or
priorities. Differences exist in
--the overall goals of the agencies' programs,
--the priority of drugs targeted, and
--the level of violators focused on.
In addition, the Coast Guard's overall interdiction
objective does not consider the roles of DEA or Customs.
Different goals
The overall goals of the Coast Guard's and Customs' drug
enforcement programs are to seize drugs, while DEA's major
objective is to immobilize major trafficking organizations.
DEA's approach to immobilizing trafficking organizations is
three pronged: arrest of major violators, forfeiture of the
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organization's assets, and seizure of the drugs. DEA believes
that, unless all facets of the organization are attacked, the
organization will not be put out of business. Because of dif-
ferent goals, the Coast Guard and Customs measure success on
the volume of drugs seized and DEA, on the number and level of
violators arrested as well as drugs and assets seized. As
noted in chapter 2, drug seizure cases rarely involve major
traffickers.
Overall, the Coast Guard has established a program goal
to interdict 75 percent of the marijuana entering the United
States by sea. This goal was developed on the basis of the
theory that a 75-percent interdiction rate would make drug
trafficking unprofitable and would therefore act as a deter-
rent. However, the likelihood of achieving this goal is
affected by such things as shifting smuggling routes, alterna-
tive smuggling methods, and changes in sources of marijuana.
In addition, the goal was developed without considering
the Coast Guard's relationship with other agencies' enforce-
ment efforts. Such consultation is important because, for
example, the shift in smuggling routes resulting from an
increase in Coast Guard drug interdiction resources, would
impact Customs' programs to deter smuggling by private air-
craft or through ports-of-entry. Increases in Coast Guard's
interdiction efforts would also require increases in DEA's and
Justice's programs to investigate and prosecute Coast Guard
cases.
A March 1982 study of the Coast Guard's Roles and Mis-
sions conducted by Department of Transportation and Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) officials was critical of the
Coast Guard's unilateral development of the 75-percent goal.
The study poses the following questions:
"What if the Coast Guard did in fact approach
the 75 percent program goal? What impact would that
have on DEA and/or Customs interdiction strategies?
Surely any significant increase in marine interdic-
tion by the Coast Guard would likely cause a shift
to other routes and other transportation modes."
On this point, the study concluded that "The relatively narrow
perspective of the goal * * * points out the lack of strategic
coordination among Federal law enforcement agencies."
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Different priorities
Not only do interdiction agencies have different goals,
they also often target different drugs and levels of traffick-
ers. Up until 1982, DEA had established national drug priori-
ties to direct its investigative resources to the most harmful
drugs. DEA's national priorities were (1) heroin, (2) danger-
ous drugs, (3) cocaine, (4) other depressants and stimulants,
and (5) marijuana. DEA's drug priorities are now formulated
on a localized basis at its Divisional Offices. During fiscal
year 1982 more than 63 percent of DEA's investigative resour-
ces were focused on heroin and cocaine investigations.
The Coast Guard and Customs Patrol on the other hand,
focus their efforts predominately on marijuana. Although
neither agency has established drug priorities per se, they
have concentrated their resources against marijuana smugglers
because the predominant drug smuggled by private vessel and
aircraft is marijuana.
As noted earlier, Customs Patrol drug enforcement efforts
are concentrated between the ports-of-entry. Drug seizures
within the ports-of-entry are generally made by Customs
Inspectors, as a part of their general inspection duties.
Coast Guard and Customs Patrol activities result in the
majority of Federal marijuana seizures, a smaller portion of
cocaine and dangerous drug seizures, and almost no heroin
seizures. From the beginning of fiscal year 1977 through June
30, 1982, the Coast Guard and Customs Patrol seized more than
60 percent of the marijuana seized during the last 6 years,
but less than 25 percent of total cocaine and dangerous drug
seizures, and only 4 percent of total heroin seizures. (See
app. IV.)
Differences also exist between the types of violator
arrested as a result of DEA's priorities and those arrested as
a result of Customs and Coast Guard activities. DEA attempts
to concentrate its investigative resources on Class I and II
violators, those violators at the top of the organizations,
whereas the type of violator arrested by Customs and the Coast
Guard for smuggling most often is a Class III or IV.1 While
data on the class of violators arrested by Customs and Coast
Guard is limited, information available on those arrestees
referred to DEA shows that only 5 percent referred from 1977
to 1982 were Class I or II. Available violator classification
1DEA classifies violators from I to IV with Class I being the
most important and Class IV the least important.
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data for Customs and Coast Guard arrestees are shown in appen-
dix III.
Effective drug enforcement
resource management is difficult
Because drug interdiction responsibilities are split
among three Federal agencies in three different departments,
effective management of the resources devoted to interdiction
is complicated. The budgets of the three agencies are devel-
oped in separate departments, and reviewed by different OMB
branches, and funds are authorized and appropriated by sepa-
rate congressional committees. Consequently, no one organiza-
tion or individual is responsible for formulating or approving
these budgets or expenditures for interdiction activities.
Additionally, these agencies do not separate the cost of drug
interdiction from their other programs. Without adequate
information on total interdiction resources, both agency
management and congressional oversight of drug interdiction
resources are difficult. A table showing the budget process
for the three agencies involved in interdiction appears on the
following page.
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 L I I III 11
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DRUG INTERDICTION BUDGET APPROVAL PROCESS
Agency Budget
Formulation
and Approval
Coast
Guard
Department
Approval
0MB Review
(Branch)
Justice &
Personnel
Management
House
Authorization
Committee
Treasury &
General
Government
Ways &
Means
Merchant
Marine &
Fisheries
Senate
Authorization
Committee
Commerce,
Science &
Transportation
House
Appropriation
Subcommittee
Justice, State,
the Judiciary
and Related
Agencies
Senate
Appropriation
Subcommittee
State, Justice,
Commerce, the
Judiciary
Treasury, Postal
Service, &
General
Government
Treasury, Postal
Service &
General Government
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As interdiction programs have grown over the last 6 years
more drug enforcement expenditures are being made by agencies
other than DEA. When DEA was created in 1973 as the lead
agency for drug enforcement, it was envisioned that by cen-
tralizing responsibilities and resources in one agency in the
Department of Justice, management of resources would be more
effective. Now, as the table below shows, more money is being
spent by Customs and Coast Guard together on drug enforcement
than by DEA.
Estimated Drug Enforcement ExMenditures
1977 vs 1982
Amount
(millions)
Percent
of total
Amount
(millions)
Percent
of total
DEA
$168.2
69
$239.1
47
Customs
58.0
24
88.2
17
Coast Guard
17.6
7
179.0
35
FBI
5.3
1
Total
$243.8
100
$511.6
100
The increasing amounts of drug enforcement expenditures
by Customs and the Coast Guard have further decentralized
resource management. The scope and magnitude of interdiction
programs--primarily involving Customs and the Coast Guard--
have grown far too large not to be reviewed as part of the
overall drug enforcement function.
No system for evaluating
interdiction results
The lack of aggregate information on interdiction results
is another product of the fragmented interdiction programs.
No one has comprehensive information on what is seized or what
happens to interdiction arrestees. Specifically,
--Double counting of drug seizures makes it impossible to
get an accurate count of drugs seized.
--Information on whether and why Customs and Coast Guard
cases are declined by Federal, State, and local prose-
cutors is not accumulated.
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--Court disposition results are not known by DEA, Cus-
toms, or the Coast Guard.
Without such data, we question how agency managers can make
decisions on interdiction.
Some drug seizures are
counted twice
Statistics on drugs interdicted are overstated because of
double and triple counting. Each agency participating in a
particular seizure claims credit for the drugs seized--the
rationale is that any agency involvement, however limited,
merits recognition. A pound of marijuana seized by Coast
Guard in the Caribbean is also claimed by Customs because it
took custody of the drugs at the dock. If intelligence came
from an agency other than the one making the seizure, both or
more agencies claim the seizure.
Although determining which seizures are counted by more
than one agency is difficult, some information is available.
First, Customs claims credit for all Coast Guard seizures of
drugs, since the Coast Guard always turns its seizures over to
Customs. In compiling statistics, DEA separates from its own
seizures the drug seizures that are the result of referrals
from other Federal agencies. DEA, however, sometimes categor-
izes Customs and Coast Guard seizures as a DEA seizure rather
than as a Federal referral. This results in additional
double counting.
We could not determine the extent of double counting, but
some examples were noted:
--In the New Orleans region at least five drug seizures
were counted separately by Customs, the Coast Guard,
and DEA. In these cases over 200 tons of marijuana
were seized. Because all three agencies took credit
for the 200 tons of marijuana, there was a 400-ton
overstatement of marijuana seized in fiscal year 1981
in the New Orleans region.
--The largest cocaine seizure in history--3,245 pounds--
which was made in March 1982 at Miami International
Airport was counted by both DEA and Customs.
--Our analysis of DEA seizures involving more than
10,000 pounds of marijuana, 10 pounds of cocaine, and
5 pounds of heroin during the first 6 months of fiscal
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year 1981 showed that 25 percent were counted by both
DEA and Customs.
Even though we could not determine the extent'of double
or triple counting of drug seizures occurring among Customs,
the Coast Guard, and DEA, the amount that we identified demon-
strates substantial overreporting, especially of marijuana
seizures. The table below compares total reported seizures of
marijuana in fiscal year 1981 with our estimate of the amount
actually seized after adjustment for known double counting.
Comparison of Reported Marijuana
Seizures to GAO Estimate
Fiscal Year 1981
Agency
Reported
GAO estimate
----- (thousands of pounds) -----
Customs
5,110
2,452
Coast Guard
3,262
2,671
DEA
11131
1,131
Total
9,503
6,254
As the table shows, the total marijuana seizures reported by
the agencies were 50 percent more than the total amount we
estimate was actually seized.
The Department of Transportation's comments on our draft
report stated that we underestimated the amount of marijuana
seized by the Coast Guard. Transportation said total Federal
seizures of marijuana were 6,766 pounds and it believed the
Coast Guard's portion of total marijuana seizures was greater
than we gave it credit for. Transportation said that our
estimates do not include drugs which were destroyed at sea or
turned over to DEA directly. However, Transportation did not
provide estimates of these amounts.
We believe our estimates are sound. We used Customs'
CLEAR system to estimate Coast Guard seizures. This system
shows the actual weight of the drugs seized. Coast Guard, on
the other hand, usually estimates the drug weight by only a
visual observation.
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Information on case disposition
of arrestees ;lbt mni tanned
None of the agencies maintains comprehensive data on the
case disposition of persons arrested during Federal interdic-
tion efforts. These agencies do not know
--how many cases were accepted for prosecution;
--who prosecuted each case (Federal, State, or local
jurisdictions); or
--the results of the prosecuted cases.
Although Customs, the Coast Guard, and DEA make numerous
drug interdiction violation arrests, only DEA presents cases
involving violations of Federal narcotics laws to the U.S.
attorney for Federal prosecution. As discussed later in this
chapter, in addition to Federal prosecution, interdiction
cases may also be prosecuted in State or local courts or not
be prosecuted at all.
If interdiction arrestees are accepted for Federal prose-
cution, DEA sometimes tracks the results of the case. How-
ever, if cases are not prosecuted in Federal court, little is
known by DEA, Customs, or the Coast Guard about court disposi-
tion. None of these agencies maintains information on what
jurisdiction prosecuted the case, if any. Besides being pros-
ecuted in Federal, State, or local courts, arrestees may be
deported if they are foreign nationals or they may be allowed
to plea to a misdemeanor.
Customs maintains data on the number of individuals
arrested for drug violations in Customs and Coast Guard inter-
diction cases. And DEA reports the number of arrestees refer-
red to it by Customs and the Coast Guard and accepted for Fed-
eral prosecution. A comparison of Customs and DEA data indi-
cates that many arrestees are not prosecuted in Federal court.
Eighty-five percent (47,673) of the 56,0172 persons that
Customs and the Coast Guard arrested from fiscal year 1977
through June 1982 for drug violations were not prosecuted in
Federal courts. (See app. VI.) Several things could have
happened to these 47,673 arrestees. They could have been
prosecuted in State or local courts, deported, pled guilty to
2This data includes individuals arrested for drug violations
by Customs Patrol as well as Customs Inspectors at ports-of-
entry.
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misdemeanors, or released. However, no data is maintained to
show what happened to them.
With such limited data on who is prosecuting interdiction
arrestees, it is not surprising that very little information
is available on the courts' disposition of cases. We attemp-
ted to determine court results of 348 arrestees involved in
our sample of 172 air and sea interdiction cases. Neither
Customs nor the Coast Guard had any information on the court
disposition of the arrestees. DEA had court disposition
information on 73 of the 348 arrestees, and by checking the
remaining individuals with the FBI's Computerized Criminal
History file we were able to determine the court disposition
of an additional 55 arrestees.
The Department of Transportation in its comments on our
draft report agreed that historic data on the disposition and
outcome of those arrested for drug smuggling is lacking, but
said that the Coast Guard's Seventh District (Miami) had some
recent information on the court disposition of arrested drug
traffickers. However, data included in the Department of
Transportation's comments show that of 615 Coast Guard drug
arrests in 1981, 419 were accepted for prosecution. The data
does not indicate what happened to the other 196 arrestees.
DEA AND CUSTOMS ROLES IN
INTERDICTION ARE UNCLEAR
Reorganization Plan #2 of 1973 gave the Department of
Justice primary responsibility for drug enforcement and
created DEA as the lead agency. Under the Plan, Customs
does not conduct followup drug investigations; DEA performs
followup investigations of Customs and Coast Guard drug inter-
diction arrestees and presents the case to the U.S. attorney
for prosecution.4 Customs has long taken the position that
it cannot effectively carry out its interdiction responsibili-
ties without the authority to conduct drug investigations
relative to interdiction cases.
3However, the Attorney General may request assistance from
other Federal agencies, including Customs.
4Although the Coast Guard was not part of Reorganization Plan
#2, DEA performs followup investigations of the Coast Guard
drug cases acceptable for Federal prosecution. In addition,
in January 1982, the FBI was granted authority by the
Attorney General to conduct drug investigations.
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Even though Reorganization Plan #2 is almost 10 years
old, the roles of Customs and DEA remain unclear. Namely:
--Longstanding conflict has existed between Justice and
Treasury on what authority Customs should have
regarding drug investigations.
--Large numbers of Customs and Coast Guard interdiction
arrestees are being refused for prosecution by Federal
authorities.
--Investigative followup of interdiction cases is
inadequate.
Customs officials believe DEA should perform followup
investigations on more interdiction cases. DEA officials said
they prefer to concentrate DEA's limited resources on high-
level trafficker investigations rather than low-level inter-
diction cases. This issue needs to be resolved.
Disagreement between Justice
and Treasury continues
Almost from the time Reorganization Plan #2 was imple-
mented nearly 10 years ago, disagreement between the Depart-
ments of Justice and Treasury over their respective roles in
drug enforcement investigations began to surface. In December
1975 DEA and Customs signed a memorandum of understanding to
"emphasize and clarify the roles and the need for cooperation
between the two respective agencies." This agreement recog-
nized that DEA has "full responsibility for any narcotics
related follow up investigation * * * related to narcotics
interdiction."
Evidence of the continuing disagreement between Justice
and Treasury is found in a January 1982 letter from the Attor-
ney General responding to a request from the Secretary of the
Treasury for greater Customs authority in drug investigations:
"I am informed that DEA is indeed willing to accept
greater Customs participation in drug enforcement. How-
ever, the critical issue--and the one upon which I under-
stand no consensus has been reached by our staffs--is the
manner in which to utilize Customs' resources."
"We believe that Customs' role in drug enforcement should
be increased within its existing jurisdiction. In 1973,
the President and Congress reorganized drug enforcement
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efforts, gave the Department of Justice primary responsi-
bility for drug enforcement and created DEA as our lead
agency. Prior to 1973, a fragmented national response,
involving a handful of agencies in several Departments,
had proven ineffective * * *. In light of this history,
we believe it would be a grave mistake to repeat the mis-
takes of the past and return to a fragmented system of
drug enforcement."
It is obvious that there is still no clear understanding
between DEA and Customs regarding their respective roles in
drug enforcement. A recent court decision algo highlights the
need for clarification of interdiction roles. In August
1981 the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
California granted a motion for suppression of evidence in a
drug prosecution resulting from a Customs search warrant. In
his opinion, the Judge states:
"As both the text of the Reorganization
Plan and the Presidential transmittal
memorandum make plain, the purpose of the
Reorganization Plan was to remove all
investigatory and enforcement functions
vis-a-vis the drug laws from the Customs
Service and to place those functions in
the newly formed Drug Enforcement Adminis-
tration. The primary reason for the reor-
ganization was the conviction that the
enforcement efforts of the United States
would be far more effective and efficient
were they concentrated in a single
agency."b
The Judge felt that this case did not fall within the
"border exception" granted to Customs in the Reorganization
Plan.7 The Court reconsidered the decision at the
5United States v. Harrington, 520 F. Supp. 93 (E.D. Cal.)
aff'd on rehearing, 524 F. Supp. 292 (1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 681 F 2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982).
6520 F. Supp. at 94.
7Customs authority for drug enforcement was limited to the
border by Reorganization Plan #2 of 1973. Whether an action
falls within the "border exception" would be difficult to
make in many cases. Often drugs known to be smuggled into
the United States are not seized at the border but
domestically at a later time.
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Government's request in September 1981 and upheld the initial
decision.8 In so doing the Court went even further in criti-
cizing Customs' interpretation of Reorganization Plan No. 2:
"The legislative history of the Reorgani-
zation Plan makes it clear that Congress
thought long and hard about the wisdom of
taking Customs out of the drug-enforcement
business, see 119 Cong. Rec. 18465, et
sec. It appears, however, that all of the
deliberations of Congress were for
naught, because attorneys for the govern-
ment have indicated that the Customs Ser-
vice has instructed its officers that the
Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 has had
no effect on the authority and powers of
the Customs Service. Statutory law is
currently being, and has been for the past
eight years, disregarded. 'Exclusion of
the evidence seized is the only effective
deterrent of such disregard.' United
States v. Soto-Soto, id. at 550."
This case and the District Judge's decision were eventually
overturned by the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals in July 1982.
Customs in its response to our draft said that this case
does not seem germane to our discussion because the District
Court decision was overturned. Customs said that the eviden-
tiary hearing in this case made clear that the investigation
was a joint Customs Patrol-DEA investigation approved by the
Justice Department in advance.
Although the case was overturned, we believe the District
Judge's discussion of Customs' authority and the legislative
history of Reorganization Plan #2 provides insight into the
problem. In addition, even though this case was reversed, the
appellate decision did not specifically address the broader
question of Customs' authority in drug investigations.
Many Customs and Coast Guard
interdiction cases not accepted
for Federal prosecution
Data on Coast Guard and Customs Patrol drug interdiction
cases, show that many--at least 63 percent--are not accepted
8524 F. Supp. 292.
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for Federal prosecution. U.S. attorneys often refuse to pro-
secute interdiction cases because there are no arrests, the
amount of drugs is too small to warrant prosecution, or State
and local involvement in the case makes Federal prosecution
unwarranted.
As stipulated in Reorganization Plan No. 2,'DEA is the
agency that submits violations of narcotics laws to U.S.
attorneys for prosecution. The U.S. attorney then determines
whether to accept or deny the case. In reality, however, in
Federal court districts with a large volume of interdiction
cases (such as the Southern District of Florida) DEA decides
whether to accept the case for prosecution on the basis of
guidelines prepared by the U.S. attorney.
Although case disposition data is limited, some informa-
tion is available that demonstrates the extent that interdic-
tion cases are not prosecuted in Federal courts. The table
below shows case disposition for Customs and the Coast Guard
cases as reported in Customs' CLEAR system.
Case Disposition Analysis--Customs
Patrol and Coast Guard
Cases
Fiscal Years 1977-1982
(note a)
Case disposition
Number
Cases with arrests
Refused by U.S. Attorney
2,294
Accepted by U.S. Attorney
1,523
Accepted by State and Local
413
.No Information
1,220
5,450
Cases without arrests
2,016
Total cases
7,466
1 Fiscal year 1982 data for first 9 months (Oct. 1-Jun.30).
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The table shows that of the 7,466 total Customs Patrol
and Coast Guard cases, 2,294 were refused for prosecution and
in an additional 2,429 cases, either the case was initially
accepted for State and local prosecution or an arrest was not
made. Therefore, at least. 63 percent (4,723 of 7,466) of Cus-
toms Patrol and Coast Guard cases did not result in Federal
prosecutions. The number of these cases not resulting in Fed-
eral prosecutions declined slightly over the period decreasing
from 67 percent in 1977 to 59 percent in 1982. Annual case
disposition data is shown in appendix VII. This data does not
include numerous cases made by Customs Inspectors and other
personnel at ports-of-entry and other locations. An analysis
of these cases over the same period shows that 85 percent
(59,337 of 69,960) are not prosecuted in Federal court.
An analysis of the type of case refused for prosecution
shows that most involve seizures of small amounts of mari-
juana. Of the 2,294 cases refused by U.S. attorneys for pros-
ecution, 1,442, or 63 percent, involved quantities of mari-
juana less than 10 pounds. Also, of the 2,294 cases refused
for Federal prosecution, 930 cases were released to State and
local authorities for prosecution.
In commenting on our draft, the Department of Transporta-
tion said that Customs and Coast Guard arrests should be con-
sidered separately when analyzing the percentage of interdic-
tion arrestees prosecuted in Federal court. The Department
said that enactment of the Biaggi-Gilman Act in September 1980
(Public Law 96-350), which made it easier to prosecute indivi-
duals arrested for drug trafficking on the high seas, had
resulted in an increase in the number of Coast Guard cases
prosecuted in Federal court. Our data shows that since pas-
sage of the Biaggi-Gilman Act, 31 percent of Coast Guard cases
have been refused for Federal prosecution compared with 55
percent prior to enactment of the act. More than 65 percent
of Customs Patrol cases were refused for Federal prosecution
over this same period.
Limited investigative followup
of interdiction cases
Because DEA generally investigates only interdiction
cases that are acceptable to U.S. attorneys for prosecution,
many interdiction cases are not investigated after the
arrest. As noted in the previous section, more than half of
Coast Guard and Customs Patrol cases are not accepted for Fed-
eral prosecution.
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Information gleaned from interdiction cases can be valu-
able to develop conspiracy investigations or provide intelli-
gence for future interdiction efforts. Although individually,
many of the seizures provide an insufficient base for a major
investigation, by analyzing patterns of ownership on seized
vessels and aircraft and developing other information, drug
seizures can be linked to persons profiting from the traffick-
ing.
As noted earlier, Customs and the Coast Guard do not per-
form followup investigations of interdiction cases. The
memorandum of understanding between Customs and DEA signed in
1975 clearly limits Customs' involvement in the followup
investigations. The memo stipulates that Customs' "Question-
ing of arrested violators will be limited to obtaining per-
sonal history and seizure information for Customs' forms.
Further questioning is the responsibility of DEA."
Although DEA has the responsibility to investigate inter-
diction cases, DEA officials believe better alternatives exist
for using their investigative resources. DEA officials point
out that interdiction cases typically involve low-level viola-
tors, not the major violators they attempt to focus their
resources on.
DEA statistics for fiscal years 1979 through 1981 show
the small amount of time agents spend on interdiction cases.
Nationwide, less than 5 percent of DEA's special agent staff-
hours are devoted to cases referred to DEA by other Federal
agencies. Even in DEA's Miami Region, the percent is just
under 10 percent.
Because of the relatively small amount of DEA investiga-
tive resources spent on Customs and Coast Guard interdiction
cases, Customs and Coast Guard officials believe that valuable
information is being lost. Officials told us that for many
cases, interdiction arrestees are not adequately debriefed,
nor the cases adequately investigated. Customs officials
pointed out that even cases with no arrests can provide poten-
tially helpful information.
Recognizing the problems associated with followup inves-
tigations of interdiction cases, a joint DEA/Customs task
group was formed in South Florida as a part of the South
Florida Task Force. The group, which is composed of DEA
agents and Customs patrol officers and agents, was established
to investigate interdiction cases. As a part of this task
group, the Attorney General in a letter dated March 20, 1982,
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granted limited authorization to Customs' officers, working
under the direction of DEA, to investigate drug smuggling
cases. The authority was limited to the activities of the
South Florida Task Force.
According to the Treasury Department, followup drug
investigations in Florida have been carried out in almost
every case since inception of the Task Force. These investi-
gations have resulted in
--the development of 70 new informants,
--the opening of 77 new investigative cases, and
--the arrests of an additional 114 individuals and sei-
zures of drugs, vessels, aircraft, firearms, and cash.
Treasury Department officials told us that because of the
success of this joint DEA/Customs task group, it will be made
permanent in South Florida to conduct followup investigations
of interdiction cases; although the staff level will be
reduced. Staffing will decline from 337 DEA and Customs per-
sonnel to 157. They also told us that negotiations were cur-
rently underway with the Department of Justice to extend the
task group concept to an additional four or five areas. At
present, no agreement has been reached on the organization,
staffing, or timing of these additional groups.
FRAGMENTATION OF FEDERAL DRUG
EFFORT IS A LONGSTANDING PROBLEM
Soon after Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1973 went into
effect, it became clear that the creation of DEA as the
Nation's lead agency for drug enforcement had not solved all
of the problems of fragmentation and interagency competition,
especially with regard to interdiction. For example:
--In June 1974, OMB proposed that a single agency should
be responsible for each element of border enforcement:
ports, between ports, and air and sea. After studying
the problems outlined by OMB, the House Committee on
Government Operations concluded that more work needed
to be done before a solution to the border problem
could be found.
--In September 1975, the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task
Force issued a "White Paper on Drug Abuse." This com-
prehensive study of drug abuse policy highlighted seve-
ral jurisdictional disputes between DEA and Customs
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regarding interdiction roles and responsibilities. It
stated that "prompt resolution is essential; continued
failure to resolve these issues hinders the effective-
ness of the entire program to reduce the flow of
drugs."
--In December 1977, the President's Reorganization Pro-
ject issued a draft report entitled "Reorganization
Options Related to Border Management." The Project
supported the concept of centralized border management
and presented several options for improving the air and
sea interdiction capability, ranging from making no
changes in the present structure to a major agency
realignment into a single border management agency.
In addition to these studies and recommendations, we
have issued several reports containing recommendations for
improved management of interdiction and overall border manage-
ment efforts.
--In 1975 we reported that Federal drug law enforcement
was not effective due to a lack of interagency cooper-
ation.9
--In 1977, we reported that there was no comprehensive,
coordinated control plan for the Southwest border.10
We recommended that the agencies involved develop an
integrated strategy and comprehensive plan for border
control, considering a single agency approach as an
alternative. We also recommended that OMB prepare an
annual analysis of law enforcement along the U.S.-
Mexican border which would bring together the separate
budget requests of the various border enforcement agen-
cies involved.
--In 1979, we advocated the creation of a single border
management agency "to overcome organizational diffi-
culties and better respond to the problems created by
9"Federal Drug Enforcement: Strong Guidance Needed,"
(GGD-76-32, Dec. 18, 1975).
10"Illegal Entry at the United States-Mexico Border--
Multiagency Enforcement Efforts Have Not Been Effective in
Stemming the Flow of Drugs and People," (GGD-78-17, Dec. 2,
1977).
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drug smuggling."11 During testimony before a subcom-
mittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee on
October 25, 1979, the Comptroller General said:
"* * * actions needed to fully support
Federal drug strategy implementation have
just not materialized. Differing views
among Government agencies make it diffi-
cult to attain the necessary legislative,
executive, and judicial actions."
DRUG STRATEGIES HAVE
BEEN INADEQUATE
Recognizing the need for drug enforcement program coordi-
nation, in 1972 Congress enacted the Drug Abuse Office and
Treatment Act which directed the President to establish a
Strategy Council whose primary responsibility was the develop-
ment of a Federal drug strategy. In 1976, Congress amended
the 1972 act to authorize the creation of the Office of Drug
Abuse Policy within the Executive Office of the President.
The legislative intent of these laws made it clear that the
Congress was dissatisfied with inconsistent and sometimes con-
flicting Federal drug abuse policies which had no clear over-
all direction.
The Congress wanted a specific, comprehensive Federal
drug strategy and a central accountability mechanism to insure
a coherent drug abuse policy throughout the executive branch.
The office's responsibilities were to oversee all organiza-
tional and policy issues for drug abuse and drug traffic pre-
vention, coordinate the performance of drug abuse functions by
Federal departments and agencies, and recommend and implement
resource and program priorities. These responsibilities have
never been fully carried out.
Past administrations have established drug policy offices
and strategy councils have developed Federal drug strategies.
Under Presidents Nixon and Ford, the Strategy Council for Drug
Abuse published a "Federal Strategy for Drug Abuse and Drug
Traffic Prevention" annually from 1973 through 1976. Only one
strategy was published under the Carter Administration, in
1979. In 1977, President Carter established the Office of
Drug Abuse Policy and such an office has existed in the Execu-
tive Office of the President (although under different names)
since that time.
11"Gains Made In Controlling Drugs, Yet the Drug Trade
Flourishes," (GGD-80-4, Oct. 25, 1979).
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Although past Federal drug strategies have established
drug enforcement program objectives and priorities, they have
neither included all the strategy components required by the
1972 act nor adequately addressed the specific roles of the
various Federal law enforcement agencies. The 1972 Drug Abuse
Office and Treatment Act requires that the Federal drug
strategy include
"(1) an analysis of the nature, character, and extent of
the drug abuse problem in the United States, including
examination of the interrelationships between various
approaches to solving the drug abuse problem and their
potential for interacting both positively and negatively
with one another;
"(2) a comprehensive Federal plan, with respect to both
drug abuse prevention functions and drug traffic preven-
tion functions, which shall specify the objectives of the
Federal strategy and how all available resources, funds,
programs, services, and facilities authorized under rele-
vant Federal law should be used; and
"(3) an analysis and evaluation of the major programs
conducted, expenditures made, results achieved, plans
developed, and problems encountered in the operation and
coordination of the various Federal drug abuse prevention
functions and drug traffic prevention functions." (21
U.S.C. 1163)
None of the previous strategies provided an evaluation of
the major programs conducted or specified how all available
resources should be used. Given the limited data available on
drug program costs and results, as discussed earlier in this
chapter, developing a strategy that meets these requirements
would be very difficult without first solving the information
problem.
Additionally, the previous strategies have not adequately
described the roles of the responsible agencies, especially
with regard to interdiction. The following examples from pre-
vious Federal strategies demonstrate this point:
1) The 1974 Federal strategy noted that Customs
"has a significant role in interdiction of
illicit drugs at United States ports of
entry and on land and water borders.
[and] After detection, all cases of drug
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smuggling are referred to DEA for appro-
priate investigation * * *."
The strategy did not say how DEA should integrate this
responsibility with its overall priority focus towards
heroin or major traffickers.
2) The 1976 Federal Strategy stated:
"Federal policy calls for giving priority
in both supply and demand reduction
efforts to those drugs which inherently
pose a greater risk to the individual and
to society--heroin, and the so-called
'dangerous drugs.' Additionally, priority
in law enforcement should be given to
high-level traffickers of all illicit
drugs * * *."
The strategy failed, however, to adequately address how
interdiction should fit into these priorities or how
specific interdiction objectives should be implemented.
3) Similarly the 1979 Strategy said that border agencies
should place "greater emphasis upon interdiction * * *
based on prior information" but failed to say how or what
agency should develop this prior information.
Current administration
also lacks a definitive
strategy
As with previous strategies, the current administration's
strategy does not include all components required by the Drug
Abuse Office and Treatment Act and does not describe how the
various law enforcement agencies' roles fit into the overall
drug enforcement program. The current strategy neither esta-
blishes a framework for evaluating drug program components nor
stipulates how resources should be used. For example, the
objectives of the border operations component of drug law
enforcement include
--"improving follow-up investigations of interdiction
seizures and arrests to enhance the quality of drug
smuggling intelligence and prosecutions" and
--"improving the quality and availability of intelligence
for all participating enforcement agencies."
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But the strategy does not address how these objectives should
be pursued. Should DEA devote more resources to Customs and
Coast Guard interdiction investigations or develop more intel-
ligence for interdiction at the expense of its other pro-
grams? Or should Customs be given additional investigative
authority or intelligence responsibilities?
FEDERAL DRUG GROUPS ARE
PR LIFERATING; CENTRAL
OVERSIGHT IS LACKING
As we pointed out in our 1979 report,12
"If any improvement is to be made in coor-
dinating Federal drug control efforts,
someone is needed who has a clear delega-
tion of authority from the President to
monitor activities and demand corrective
actions."
Since that time even more groups have been established with
responsibility for formulating and coordinating drug enforce-
ment policy and efforts. Also, additional groups are being
given drug investigative responsibilities. The FBI in January
1982 was granted concurrent drug investigative authority with
DEA, and, in October 1982, President Reagan announced plans
for creation of 12 additional Drug Enforcement Task Forces.
The current administration has organized or proposed
several groups to help coordinate Federal drug efforts. For
example, at the national level the following groups have been
charged with the responsibility for some aspect of drug
enforcement coordination.
--The Office of Drug Abuse Policy in the White House.
--The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy chaired by the
Attorney General.
--The Narcotics Working Group chaired by the Associate
Attorney General.
--The new regional Drug Task Forces administered by the
Justice Department.
--The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System
headed by the Vice President.
12"Gains Made In Controlling Drugs, Yet the Drug Trade
Flourishes," (GGD-80-4, Oct. 25, 1979).
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Additionally, in October 1982, President Reagan announced
that he would establish three other groups to help coordinate
law enforcement efforts, including drug law enforcement--a
Presidential Commission on Organized Crime, a Governors Proj-
ect, and a Cabinet-level Committee on Organized Crime. At the
local level numerous coordination groups have also been esta-
blished. The addition of the FBI and-the Drug Enforcement
Task Forces to the drug enforcement effort, as well as the
creation of the numerous drug enforcement coordination groups
make it all the more important that someone have clear author-
ity to oversee these efforts.
On December 22, 1982, Congress passed a Crime Bill which
included provisions to establish an "Office of the Director of
National and International Drug Operations and Policy" to
manage all Federal drug enforcement programs. President
Reagan withheld his approval of this legislation noting that
such a drug program manager would create a new bureaucracy in
the executive branch and compound the problems of coordina-
tion. On February 2, 1983, similar legislation was introduced
in the 98th Congress (S-406) to coordinate Federal drug en-
forcement efforts. Although we have not specifically studied
this legislation, we believe that central oversight of Federal
drug enforcement, the concept embodied in the legislation, is
needed.
CONCLUSIONS
The interdiction component of the Federal drug enforce-
ment program is fragmented. Customs, the Coast Guard, and DEA
have different drug enforcement programs, priorities, and
goals. Evaluating the benefits of interdiction is difficult
because of scanty information on overall interdiction
results. Effective congressional oversight of the interdic-
tion efforts is complicated by the separate budget processes
of the agencies with drug interdiction responsibilities. Even
though DEA is the lead agency for drug enforcement, its share
of total drug enforcement expenditures fell from 69 percent in
1977 to 47 percent in 1982. Now Customs and Coast Guard com-
bined expenditures for drug enforcement exceed DEA's expendi-
tures.
Disagreement exists between Customs and DEA over the
value of investigating and prosecuting Customs and Coast
Guard interdiction cases. More than 60 percent of these
interdiction cases are not prosecuted in Federal court and
many are not afforded postarrest investigations. The results
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of the joint DEA-Customs task group in South Florida have
shown the value of increased postarrest investigations of int-
erdiction cases and the task group concept will be made per-
manent in South Florida. However, no decision has yet been
made on the policy question of whether the role of Customs
should be expanded on a permanent basis in other locations to
assist in such investigations.
Drug interdiction programs will remain disjointed unless
a strong definitive Federal drug strategy is prepared and
implemented. This strategy should address how to combine the
separate agencies' programs which have differing priorities
and goals into a cohesive Federal drug enforcement effort.
Interdiction difficulties are only one manifestation of a
broader coordination problem that we have previously reported
on. Clearly the need for drug program coordination and over-
sight, both with regard to interdiction as well as the total
drug enforcement program, has been recognized by the executive
and legislative branches of Government. Central oversight of
Federal drug control efforts has become more critical with the
addition of the FBI to the drug effort and creation of the
Drug Enforcement Task Forces. Although the establishment of
numerous coordination groups at the national and local levels
may improve operational coordination, no one person has the
information or responsibility to evaluate Federal drug efforts
and recommend corrective actions.
Under the current arrangement there is no mechanism for
optimizing the allocation of limited Federal drug enforcement
resources. For example, currently no one can determine wheth-
er the $179 million spent on marijuana interdiction by the
Coast Guard could be used more effectively on the internation-
al narcotics control program. One individual must be given
the responsibility and authority to plan and oversee all Fed-
eral drug law enforcement programs. Such authority, however,
should not extend into the direction of each agency's day-to-
day operations, because the individual agencies are best cap-
able of managing their particular functions within the context
of their overall agency missions.
We recommend that, to develop a reliable information base
for evaluating the effectiveness of interdiction program com-
ponents, the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Treasury
and Transportation direct DEA, Customs, and Coast Guard offi-
cials to work together to develop a management information
system(s) which accumulates interdiction program results such
as drug seizures, level of prosecution, and case disposition,
and identifies the resources devoted to drug interdiction pro-
grams.
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To ensure that the Congress is informed of all drug
enforcement expenditures, we recommend that the Director,
Office of Management and Budget, accumulate budgetary data on
drug enforcement costs that are provided by Coast Guard,
Customs, and DEA, and submit this information to the Congress
concurrent with these agencies' budget submissions.
Recommendations to the President
We recommend that to promote more cohesiveness and
central oversight of drug enforcement programs, the President,
(1) direct the development of a more definitive Federal drug
strategy that stipulates the roles of the various agencies
with drug enforcement responsibilities, to include a
determination of whether the role of the U.S. Customs Service
should be expanded to assist in followup investigations of
interdiction cases, and (2) make a clear delegation of
responsibility to one individual to oversee Federal drug
enforcement programs. Such responsibilities should include:
--Developing and reviewing U.S. Government policy with
respect to illegal drugs.
--Coordinating Federal efforts to control the production,
halt the flow into the United States, and stop the sale
and use of illegal drugs.
--Developing a unified budget that will present a compos-
ite picture of all Federal resources being devoted to
the drug war and present recommendations for ration-
alizing these efforts in terms of budgetary priorities.
--Collecting and disseminating information necessary to
implement and evaluate U.S. policy with respect to
illegal drugs.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION
The Departments of Justice and Transportation supported
our recommendation to develop a management information
system. The Department of the Treasury did not specifically
comment on our recommendation in its entirety. The Department
of Justice said
"Presently DEA's statistical systems are
being improved internally (to detect over-
lap), and resources are already earmarked
for 12 new Organized Crime/Narcotics Task
Forces to develop compatible systems."
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In commenting on the need for data on court results, the
Department of the Treasury noted
"Since Customs is precluded from present-
ing cases to the U.S. attorneys, tracking
arrestees through the judicial process
would be, at best, a difficult process and
would require the dedication of resources
which can better be used in performing our
authorized functions."
We believe all three agencies need to work together to develop
reliable management information.
The Department of Transportation supported our recommen-
dation to the Director, OMB, to accumulate drug enforcement
budgetary data. The other departments and agencies did not
comment on this recommendation.
The Department of Justice disagreed with our recommenda-
tions to the President that a more definitive Federal drug
strategy be developed and that one individual be given the
responsibility to oversee Federal drug enforcement efforts.
The Department of Transportation agreed with our recommenda-
tions to the President and the Departments of State and Trea-
sury did not comment on these recommendations.
The Justice Department in explaining its position said
that, although there are areas where coordination and effi-
ciency of Federal law enforcement efforts can be improved,
this is being accomplished through existing administrative
structures. Justice pointed out that the Cabinet Council on
Legal Policy and the White House Office on Drug Policy "* * *
are an integral part of the Administration's process by which
a coordinated narcotics enforcement policy is carried out. "
Justice further noted that
"This process has resulted in the creation
of 12 National Task Forces to combat
organized crime and narcotics trafficking
in the field, which is precisely where the
action needs to be focused."
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It is obvious to us from the recently established
coordination groups and the Drug Enforcement Task Forces that
the need for increased coordination has been recognized by the
administration. However, the current coordination mechanisms
still do not provide a composite picture of all Federal re-
sources devoted to the drug war or a basis for rationalizing
these resources in terms of budgetary priorities. The Depart-
ment of Justice in its comments said that international pro-
grams designed to stop "* * * drugs at their source is the
single most effective action that can be taken." Yet, over
the last 5 years, international drug program expenditures have
remained constant, while interdiction expenditures have more
than tripled. Giving one individual the responsibility to
oversee all Federal drug programs, as we have recommended,
would be an extension of the efforts to increase coordination
which the agencies have already begun.
An example of why central drug program oversight is still
needed was contained in comments on our draft report. Com-
ments by the Departments of Justice and Treasury manifest the
continuing difference of opinion on the value of postinterdic-
tion arrest investigations. The Treasury Department said that
the followup drug interdiction investigations done in all
interdiction cases as a part of the South Florida Task Force
"* * * have developed significant cases which have impacted,
in a positive way, against drug smugglers and drug trafficking
operations." The Treasury Department further noted that the
benefits of postinterdiction investigations have "* * * been
proven conclusively during the activities of the South Florida
Task Force." On the other hand, the Justice Department said
that followup investigations are not needed in all interdic-
tion cases. Justice pointed out that
"The functions of Justice are to investi-
gate and prosecute those cases and traf-
fickers which present the greatest poten-
tial impact on drug trafficking."
As noted in our report more than 60 percent of interdic-
tion cases are not afforded followup investigations. An
agreement between Justice and Treasury has not been reached
regarding the expansion of Customs' drug investigative author-
ity beyond South Florida. A determination of whether Customs'
drug investigative role should be expanded needs to be made.
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CHAPTER 4
BETTER, MORE TIMELY INTELLIGENCE
CAN IMPROVE INTERDICTION
The effectiveness of Federal interdiction efforts
depends a great deal on intelligence support capabilities. If
accurate, timely intelligence is available on drug smugglers,
chances are good that Customs or the Coast Guard can make the
interdiction. Statistics on the use of prior intelligence to
support interdiction, as well as certain special projects,
indicate the value of good, timely intelligence.
Drug source and transit countries are valuable sources of
intelligence that can be used to support interdiction
efforts. Since Customs and the Coast Guard do not have the
authority to gather intelligence data overseas, they must rely
on DEA to provide this intelligence. DEA's foreign intelli-
gence program, however, does not place a high priority on
developing intelligence that can be used.to support interdic-
tion efforts. A much stronger interdiction intelligence pro-
gram is needed in the Caribbean. Neither DEA nor the State
Department has developed an adequate international program in
the Caribbean to support interdiction.
DEA, Customs, and the Coast Guard all have domestic
intelligence programs, but information gathering as well as
processing and analysis are uncoordinated and sometimes dupli-
cative. Some intelligence processing and analysis has been
centralized at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). EPIC
can be more effective if better supported and utilized by the
agencies involved in drug interdiction. Moreover, certain
Customs and Coast Guard intelligence analysis functions should
be transferred to EPIC.
INTELLIGENCE IMPROVES
INTERDICTION'S EFFECTIVENESS
Having prior tactical intelligence) about the time and
place drug shipments are to take place greatly improves an
agency's ability to interdict. Such instances, however, are
rare. More often tactical intelligence gathering consists of
'Tactical intelligence provides the identification of
specific traffickers and their methods of operation. This is
distinguished from strategic intelligence which provides a
situation overview and information on the magnitude of the
problem.
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analyzing individual pieces of intelligence from a variety of
sources in order to narrow the choices of where to deploy
resources to effect a drug seizure.
Data from the CLEAR system which identifies the source of
intelligence used in connection with a drug seizure, shows
that more major seizures are based on prior information than
are smaller seizures. An analysis of thg CLEAR information
for all Customs and Coast Guard drug seizures from October
1976 through June 30, 1982, is presented in appendix VII. Our
analysis of this information shows that 55 percent of major
seizures made from fiscal years 1977 through the first 9
months of 1982 were based on prior information, while only 7
percent of other seizures during the same period were based on
prior information.
Joint Coast Guard-DEA special maritime projects--begin-
ning in 1978 with Operation Stopgap and continuing under the
various phases of operation Tiburon--also demonstrate the
value of intelligence to support interdiction. As discussed
in chapter 2, these operations consisted essentially of Coast
Guard cutters patrolling the choke points in response to DEA-
generated intelligence (principally from Colombia) to effect
seizures of marijuana-laden "mother ships." DEA-generated
intelligence from Colombia and intelligence from a classified
Coast Guard operation were instrumental in many of the Opera-
tion Tiburon seizures. For example, of the 70 vessels seized
during Operation Tiburon III, 46 had been placed on lookout by
EPIC on the basis of intelligence information provided by DEA
and the Coast Guard. Both DEA and Coast Guard officials
believe the Tiburon operations demonstrate the value of intel-
ligence to support interdiction. A Coast Guard Seventh
District evaluation of Tiburon noted:
"Overall we considered operation Tiburon
as a successful exercise in obtaining
information * * *. This information
allows us to program our resources for
maximum use in intercepting the suspect
vessel."
DEA's evaluation of Operation Tiburon III said:
"'Intelligence elements' have made a dra-
matic contribution to the successes during
Operation Tiburon III * * *. The value of
EPIC data available to operating units is
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obvious. The tactical intelligence, pro-
vided [by Coast Guard's classified intel-
ligence project] has surpassed any single
previous collection activity. In the
future, these intelligence elements will
continue to be refined and make greater
and greater contributions to the enforce-
ment units."
MORE SOURCE AND TRANSIT COUNTRY
TACTICAL INTELLIGENCE NEEDED
Basically, tactical intelligence to support interdiction
can be gathered domestically or overseas. Clearly, intelli-
gence from drug source or transit countries is especially use-
ful for the deployment of interdiction resources. Development
of overseas tactical intelligence, however, is not under the
control of Customs or the Coast Guard but is the responsibi-
lity of DEA. Except for a few special interdiction projects,
DEA has provided only limited intelligence from its overseas
operations. Although DEA has developed overseas tactical
intelligence operations in Mexico, Colombia, and other source
countries, and provides some support to the Caribbean through
its offices in Puerto Rico, Santo Domingo, and Miami, neither
DEA nor the Department of State has developed adequate intel-
ligence programs for the most important drug transit area--the
Caribbean islands.
DEA provides limited
interdiction intelligence
Reorganization Plan #2 of 1973 gave DEA the responsibil-
ity for overseas tactical drug intelligence development.
Prior to this reorganization, Customs had the authority to
gather and develop foreign intelligence. Since 1973, Customs
has frequently complained that the quantity and quality of
foreign intelligence it receives have been inadequate.
DEA, as a part of special interdiction projects, has pro-
vided various types of overseas tactical intelligence. In
support of special maritime interdiction projects, DEA agents
and informants have identified and passed on the names of sus-
pect vessels on the Colombian coast. To assist Customs' air
interdiction, DEA has provided information on suspected air
smugglers, so that they can be tracked and intercepted as they
near U.S. borders. DEA in other instances has provided intel-
ligence on suspected smugglers entering the United States as
well as intelligence on smuggling patterns and organizations.
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Even though DEA has provided specific intelligence as a
part of these special projects, intelligence on smugglers has
been generally limited. Customs CLEAR system shows that the
Coast Guard and Customs made 5,810 seizures from September
1976 through June 1982 which involved the use of prior infor-
mation. Only 14 percent of these cases involved intelligence
provided by DEA.
Another indicator of the limited amount of foreign intel-
ligence generated is our analysis of the source of information
contained in the EPIC data base. Most DEA-developed intelli-
gence is provided to Customs and the Coast Guard through
EPIC. We analyzed EPIC records for a sample of 46 aircraft
and 39 vessels. These files contained 514 items of informa-
tion. Only 30 (5.8 percent) were from DEA's foreign opera-
tions.
DEA officials agreed that more intelligence in support of
interdiction efforts is desirable but pointed out that genera-
tion of more intelligence is constrained by its foreign staff
limitations. They also stated that the development of inter-
diction intelligence is only one of their numerous overseas
drug enforcement responsibilities.
The Caribbean: A Major Drug
Transhipment Point Receiving
Little Attention
Although the State Department and DEA have established
drug control programs in source countries such as Colombia and
Mexico, the Caribbean area has received little attention by
either agency. Because of the growing use of the Caribbean
for drug transhipment, we believe that both the Department of
State and DEA should devote additional resources to this
region.
t
" Trafficking routes for at least 70 percent of the cocaine
and marijuana and a major portion of the illicitly produced
dangerous drugs entering the United States pass through the
Caribbean. Traffickers often operate from islands in the
Caribbean which have innumerable isolated airstrips and
harbors.
Despite the importance of the Caribbean as a drug tran-
shipment point, DEA has assigned only three agents there. In
contrast, 20 agents and 12 agents have been assigned to Mexico
and Colombia, respectively. Also, the Department of State's
International Narcotics Control Program has put very little
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emphasis on the Caribbean area. State's program.is the pri-
mary thrust of the international aspect of the Federal drug
control program. This program utilizes a three-pronged
approach:
--illicit production control and interdiction through
enforcement;
--drug income alternatives where necessary; and
--demand reduction and prevention.
To carry out this approach, the Department of State provides
funds for country projects, training, and support for inter-
national organizations' programs. The Department of State
also is both a collector and consumer of strategic intelli-
gence to support its international drug control program
responsibilities. In addition, the State Department, through
diplomatic efforts, tries to secure the cooperation of the
producing and transit countries in the fight against drug
trafficking.
Over the past 5 years, State Department international
narcotics assistance to Caribbean island countries has
totalled only $400,000. This includes programs to support the
Inter American Marine Intelligence network and to purchase
vessels for the Bahamas and Haiti.,
Both the Departments of Justice and State noted in com-
ments on our draft report that the Caribbean area is also
supported by activities conducted by their South and Central
American offices. The Department of Justice said that DEA
supports the Caribbean nations from its offices in South
America, Puerto Rico, and Miami. The State Department said
that in addition to the projects noted above, interdiction in
the Caribbean is supported by two additional projects:
--a $2.2 million project by the Colombian Customs
designed to interdict trafficking in the Caribbean, and
--the provision
of
a
ship valued
at
$2.2
million which
will be used
by
the
Colombian
Navy
for
narcotics
patrols.
The State Department also noted that it funds international
antinarcotics training which is provided by DEA and Customs.
In the past 2 years, 225 persons from the Caribbean islands,
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as well as 233 persons from. Central America have been
trained.
On the other hand, more than $117 million was spent on
all Latin American projects from September 1976 through June
1982. The primary countries involved werL Mexico ($64 mil-
lion) and Colombia ($29 million).
Not only have Caribbean island countries received very
little financial assistance, but the State Department has not
developed a Narcotics Assessment and Strategy Paper for the
region. These documents are developed to provide a long-term
strategy for assisting a country and describe the goals,
objectives, programs, and all sources of resources (i.e., host
government, international organization, and U.S. bilateral)
being spent and what would be necessary to achieve the goals.
State Department officials told us that the Caribbean
area has received little International Narcotics Control
assistance because they believe such efforts would not be
beneficial in terms of their priorities and limited budget.
They said their priority is to attack drugs at the source by
funding programs designed to control or eradicate drug crop
production.
In commenting on our draft report, the State Department
said: "While our priority is crop control, we do recognize
the necessity of interdiction efforts in the Caribbean." How-
ever, to date, Caribbean island assistance has comprised only
a small portion of international narcotics assistance to Cen-
tral and South America. Given the importance of the Caribbean
as a major drug transit area, we believe the Department of
State and DEA should increase their commitment to this area.
EPIC--AN UNDERUTILIZED
RESOURCE
EPIC, the multiagency drug intelligence center on world-
wide drug movement by land, sea, and air, is a valuable
resource that needs to be better supported and utilized by the
participant agencies. The success of drug interdiction
efforts depends heavily on the intelligence base supporting
them. Each agency has developed its own intelligence sources
in support of its particular mission, as well as drawing, but
not depending, on the others for their intelligence.
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Even though EPIC was created to centralize information on
drug smuggling, it is not being fully supported by participat-
ing agencies. Discussions with agency officials and our anal-
ysis of information in the EPIC data base indicate that agen-
cies are not providing all known information to EPIC. Several
special interdiction projects of these agencies were imple-
mented without EPIC input. Furthermore, some intelligence and
analysis functions of Customs and Coast Guard should be trans-
ferred to EPIC.
Organization, staffing,
and purpose of EPIC
EPIC was established in El Paso, Texas, in 1974 as an
interagency clearinghouse for southwest United States border
intelligence information. Initially a DEA and Immigration and
Naturalization Service operation, EPIC has been expanded both
in number of participating agencies and geographical scope.
In addition to DEA and the Immigration and Naturalization Ser-
vice, Federal agencies now participating in EPIC are Customs;
the Coast Guard; Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms;
U.S. Marshal's Service; Federal Aviation Administration;
Internal Revenue Service; and the FBI.
The primary objective of EPIC is to provide a complete
and accurate intelligence picture of drug movement by land,
sea, and air throughout the world. Major emphasis is focused
on trafficking organizations whose narcotics are destined for
the United States. Direct tactical intelligence support is
provided to participating agencies. The EPIC mission is
accomplished by the accumulation of raw intelligence, analysis
of data, and the provision of tactical intelligence to agen-
cies having direct or related statutory law enforcement
responsibilities. In the process of analyzing raw data from
participating and associated agencies, trafficking organiza-
tions are identified and analytical reports are prepared and
disseminated.
EPIC's operations can be divided into two primary areas:
watch and analysis. The "watch" activity is the heart of the
facility and is staffed 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The
watch receives inquiries from agents in the field regarding
suspect individuals, vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and docu-
ments. Watch personnel then query the various automatic data
processing systems available at EPIC and provide any informa-
tion obtained to the requester. In the course of this proc-
ess, EPIC may obtain additional information from the caller
regarding the suspect and add this to the appropriate data
base.
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The other primary area of EPIC activity is the analysis
section. Here EPIC analyzes information received from parti-
cipating agencies, attempts to tie it to other information,
and processes it for future use. Analysis is divided into
three sections: air, maritime, and general. In addition to
their day-to-day analysis functions, annalysts also produce
special reports and intelligence documents on such subjects as
mother ships, smuggling by general aviation aircraft, elec-
tronic warfare by drug traffickers, and drug movement indica-
tors and profiles.
As of March 1982, EPIC had 92 full-time and 8 part-time
personnel on board assigned from 9 participating agencies.
The three agencies most involved in interdiction had the fol-
lowing staff assigned to EPIC: DEA - 60, Customs - 10, and
Coast Guard - 6. EPIC's operating cost according to its annual
report for fiscal year 1981 was $479,000; however, this does
not include personnel costs. A conservative estimate for the
100 staff on board would be $2.5 million, bringing EPIC's
total cost to approximately $3 million annually.
EPIC has been a
valuable resource
There is little argument about the overall value of a
centralized multiagency intelligence center. EPIC's tactical
intelligence support and intelligence products have aided the
interdiction effort. Participant agencies have utilized EPIC
more each year since its establishment.
Both interviews with agency officials and our analysis of
information in the EPIC system demonstrate the value of the
center. Coast Guard officials, for example, said that before
they board any vessel thought to be smuggling drugs they query
EPIC to determine whether any information on the vessel is
available. They noted that often EPIC has some information on
the vessel. Customs air patrol officials also thought EPIC to
be useful. Miami Air Support Branch personnel said they con-
tact EPIC several times a day to place "aircraft lookouts" or
to determine what information is available on specific air-
craft.
Our analysis of information available at EPIC shows the
value of the center. We queried the EPIC system to determine
if information was available on a sample of 75 vessels and 56
aircraft that were seized by Customs or the Coast Guard during
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the 15-month period ending December 1981. Of these 131 ves-
sels and aircraft, significant information2 was in the EPIC
system for 38, or 30 percent, prior to their seizure. Data is
not available, however, that shows whether EPIC was actually
used to assist in the interdiction.
Another indication of EPIC's value is the steady increase
in EPIC activity since its inception in 1974. According to
EPIC statistics, total transactions increased from 16,745 in
1975 to over 196,000 in fiscal year 1981. From fiscal year
1979 to fiscal year 1981, transactions increased over 78 per-
cent from 109,784 to 196,206. Our analysis of EPIC's statis-
tics revealed a sizable increase in transactions directly
related to interdiction support. For example, "pilot/aircraft
inquiries" increased from 6,328 in fiscal year 1979 to 51,878
in fiscal year 1981, a 720 percent increase. Similarly, "ves-
sel inquiries" increased from 18,424 to 51,801--a 181 percent
increase. The following table shows EPIC transactions for
DEA, Customs, and the Coast Guard in fiscal years 1978-81. An
EPIC official told us that, while fluctuations in data occur-
red due to minor adjustments in statistical reporting methods
and increased activity during "special operations," this data
represents general trends in participation.
EPIC Activity By Agency
Fiscal Years 1978-81
Percent
Increase
Agency 1978 1979 1980 1981 1978-81
DEA 37,084 30,905 67,468 79,161 113
Coast Guard 14,673 19,397 21,203 45,726 212
Customs 3,780 5,478 15,144 10,906 189
Others 60,395 54,004 60,299 60,413 -
Total 115,932 109,784 164,114 196,206 69.
Clearly, EPIC has been increasingly used by the primary inter-
diction agencies in recent years.
2Significant information includes items such as lookouts
placed on the vessel, sighting reports, and specific
arrival, departure, and destination information.
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EPIC could be utilized more
Even though participating agencies have increased their
use of EPIC, the center could be used more.- For its maximum
potential to be realized, participating agencies must provide
all intelligence information to EPIC. However, the partici-
pating agencies are neither providing all their information to
EPIC, nor are they utilizing EPIC's resources to plan all of
their special projects.
The information in EPIC is dependent on agents, patrol
officers, and inspectors of the participating agencies. EPIC
can provide only as much specific information as it receives
from these officials in the field. EPIC is not an investiga-
tive agency and has no agents in the field.
Not all information generated by interdiction agencies is
provided to EPIC. EPIC officials told us that while some
information is transmitted to EPIC in the form of DEA investi-
gative reports, Customs' Memorandums of Information Received,
and Coast Guard Reports of Investigation, other information is
not given to EPIC. Although we could not determine the speci-
fic amount of information that is not sent to EPIC, we anal-
yzed EPIC's information to see if a sample of 131 seized ves-
sels and aircraft had been reported to EPIC. If a substantial
number of seizures were not reported to EPIC, then it can be
assumed that other information also is not provided to EPIC.
Our analysis showed that of 131 vessels and aircraft seized
only 56, or 43 percent, were reported to EPIC.
We also found that several special interdiction projects
were not coordinated with or did not utilize the resources
available at EPIC. The EPIC charter signed by all participat-
ing agencies in March 1981 states:
"It shall be the policy of EPIC to provide
continuing narcotics intelligence and
related support to participating agencies
to which EPIC can make a contribution * * *
EPIC can also make a unique contribution to
special projects."
Despite this charter statement and the obvious benefits of
EPIC, several special interdiction projects were planned and
implemented without input from EPIC. For example, Customs air
interdiction project, Operation Thunderbolt, was not discussed
with EPIC. EPIC managers said they did not even know about
the project until it was implemented.
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Certain intelligence functions
should be centralized at EPIC
Both Customs and the Coast Guard have-drug intelligence
activities that should be transferred to EPIC. Customs Office
of Border Operations provides intelligence reports on drug
movements and the Coast Guard has a drug vessel intelligence
unit at its Atlantic Area Command Office in New York. We
believe those two functions should be transferred to EPIC.
Customs drug intelligence function
should be transferred to EPIC
Both EPIC and Customs Office of Border Operations produce
valuable intelligence information on the overall situation and
magnitude of various aspects of drug smuggling. EPIC produces
various reports on drug smuggling as a part of its overall
responsibility for air and vessel intelligence. Customs has
centralized its intelligence functions in its office of Border
Operations. Customs intelligence responsibilities encompass
information on all types of smuggling, including narcotics.
Each of these organizations has produced studies which
have duplicative elements as shown in the following examples.
--In January 1979, Customs produced a study entitled
"Smuggling of High Value Drugs Via Private Aircraft."
In August 1980, EPIC issued a study: "Assessment of
Drug Smuggling Aboard General Aviation Aircraft."
--In July 1980, EPIC issued a report entitled "Move-
ment of Southwest Asian Heroin." In November 1980, Cus-
toms published a study on "Southwest Asian Ethnic
Groups and Heroin Smuggling."
--In August 1978, EPIC published a report entitled "Smug-
gling Via Commercial Air Freight Utilizing Fraudulent
Air Waybills." In August 1979, Customs issued a study
on "Air Waybills: A Tool for Identifying Potential
Narcotics Shipments."
In addition to issuing similar studies on drug smuggling,
both organizations' reports are sometimes based on incomplete
data. For example, Customs' study on "Southwest Asian Ethnic
Groups and Heroin Smuggling" was, in part, based on Customs
heroin seizure statistics as reported by CLEAR from 1978
through the first half of 1980. However, CLEAR statistics do
not include drug seizures by DEA. In fiscal years 1978
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through 1980, DEA accounted for more than two-thirds of the
total heroin seizures. EPIC studies also can be based on
incomplete information. As discussed in the previous section,
not all drug seizures are reported to EPIC.
Coast Guard drug vessel
intelligence unit should
be transferred to EPIC
The Coast Guard also has a drug intelligence function
that if combined with EPIC would enhance overall intelligence
on drug smuggling. The Coast Guard's Atlantic Area Command,
located in New York, includes a unit responsible for maintain-
ing photographs and other information on suspect drug ves-
sels. This vessel file, which has been computerized, is used
as a basis for preparing weekly lists of suspect drug vessels
that are sent to various Coast Guard, Customs, and DEA units.
EPIC also maintains a computerized file on information on ves-
sels suspected to be involved in drug smuggling. Both offi-
cials at the Coast Guard's Atlantic Area Command and EPIC
agreed that overall vessel intelligence could be enhanced by
combining the operations. We believe this Coast Guard acti-
vity should be transferred to EPIC.
EPIC needs additional staff
Even though the workload has increased and additional
responsibilities have been assigned to EPIC, staff levels have
not increased. This has resulted in delays in inputting
information into the EPIC system and diminished information
analysis. Participating agencies need to increase their sup-
port for EPIC by assigning additional staff.
As mentioned, EPIC activity increased
from
about
116,000
requests in 1978 to over 196,000 in 1981.
Also,
EPIC
has been
tasked with additional responsibilities since its inception.
Originally designed to concentrate on smuggling activities
along the United States-Mexico border, EPIC now is responsible
for information on movement of drugs worldwide. Recently,
EPIC was given the responsibility for drug intelligence
received from the military brought about by the changes to the
Posse Comitatus law. Military support for drug enforcement is
discussed in chapter 5.
Despite increasing workloads and responsibility, staff
assigned to EPIC increased only about 10 percent since fiscal
year 1978. The following table shows the number of personnel
on board at EPIC by agency.
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Staff assigned to EPIC 1978-1982
AAge n
1978 1979 1980
1981
1982
60
60
20
18
6
6
9
10
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
101
100
DEA 52 63 61
INS 18 21 22
Coast Guard 6 6 6
Customs 11 12 9
ATF 2 2 2
FAA 1 1 1
U.S. Marshals 0 0 1
FBI 0 0 1
IRS 0 0 0
Total 90 105 103
EPIC officials said that the limited staff causes delays
in entering data into computerized files and hampers effective
analysis of information. We believe that participating agen-
cies need to assign additional staff to EPIC.
CONCLUSIONS
An analysis of drug seizure cases and special projects
demonstrates the value of intelligence in aiding interdic-
tion. Tactical intelligence developed from drug source and
transit countries is especially helpful to the interdiction
agencies, but the responsibility for developing this intelli-
gence rests with DEA, not with the Coast Guard or Customs.
Tactical intelligence support from overseas has been
limited, especially from the important Caribbean drug transit
area. Neither DEA nor the Department of State has put much
emphasis on developing an international narcotics program in
the Caribbean. Both agencies believe their limited interna-
tional drug resources should be focused on drug source coun-
tries such as Colombia, where resources can be devoted to
stopping drugs where they originate. We recognize that
resources are limited and that an increase in staff in the
Caribbean may well require a concomitant decrease in staff
currently devoted to drug source programs in Latin American
countries. However, we believe that such a reallocation of
resources is warranted in light of (1) the growing importance
of the Caribbean as a transhipment point for drugs destined
for the United States and (2) the commitment of the Federal
Government to reduce the drug supply through interdiction.
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EPIC has proved to be a valuable aid to drug interdic-
tion. EPIC can be an even more valuable resource if partici-
pating agencies provide all information they have on smuggling
activity to EPIC. In addition, the Customs Office of Border
Operations drug analysis function and the Coast Guard's
Atlantic Area marine drug intelligence function should be
transferred to EPIC in order to centralize all such intelli-
gence functions and avoid duplication of effort. Also, EPIC
needs additional staff.
RECOMMENDATIONS
In view of the Federal Government's strong commitment to
reduce drug smuggling, the importance of intelligence to sup-
port drug interdiction efforts, and the growth of the Carib-
bean as a major drug transit area, we recommend that
--the Attorney General direct the Administrator of DEA to
review current overseas staffing to determine whether
additional personnel could be reassigned and used more
effectively in the Caribbean.
--the Secretary of State prepare a Narcotics Assessment
and Strategy Paper and, if it is found to be warranted,
follow up with projects designed to aid interdiction
efforts.
We recommend that, to improve overall coordination of
interdiction intelligence activities and strengthen the qual-
ity of that intelligence:
--The Attorney General and the Secretaries of Treasury
and Transportation (1) direct DEA, Customs, and Coast
Guard units to recognize the importance of promptly
reporting all information on drug smuggling to EPIC and
(2) provide additional staff to EPIC.
--The Secretary of the Treasury direct the Commissioner
of Customs to transfer to EPIC the drug intelligence
analysis activities in the office of Border Operations
that are similar to those at EPIC and assign the staff
necessary to carry out such activities.
--The Secretary of Transportation direct the Commandant
of the Coast Guard to transfer to EPIC the marine drug
intelligence activities at the Atlantic Area Command.
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AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION
The Departments of Treasury, Transportation, Justice, and
State pointed out in their comments that development of intel-
ligence is extremely important to a successful interdiction
program. However, some of those agencies disagreed on how to
improve the intelligence programs.
Concerning our recommendations to strengthen the inter-
diction intelligence programs in the Caribbean, both the
Departments of Justice and State said the Caribbean area was
supported by staff and programs from areas bordering the
Caribbean. On the other hand, both the Customs Service and
the Coast Guard, in their comments, stressed the need for
additional interdiction intelligence, especially from the
Caribbean. The Treasury Department said in its comments that
DEA's "* * * overseas priorities and commitment of intelli-
gence resources is obviously not related to border interdic-
tion."
The State Department commented that a strategy paper out-
lining assistance to the Caribbean region was prepared in 1981
and is currently being revised on the basis of a regional drug
control conference which was held in October 1982. State also
provided a copy of the strategy paper with its comments. We
believe that this document and conference represent positive
steps for developing a drug control program in the Caribbean.
However, we'still believe that given the importance of the
region to interdiction, a formalized Narcotics Assessment and
Strategy Paper is needed that includes clearly defined long-
and short-term goals, specific projects aimed at those goals,
and quantifiable criteria for evaluating project progress.
The strategy paper State provided does not contain the detail-
and action-oriented plans of a formal Narcotics Assessment and
Strategy Paper.
In their comments, all of the agencies recognized the
value of EPIC as a central clearing house of interdiction
intelligence which can correlate information from many sour-
ces. Both the Department of Transportation and Treasury said
that EPIC should be strengthened. The Justice Department said
10 new special agent positions had been assigned to EPIC and
steps have been taken to increase DEA analysts positions.
Treasury said that 2 additional Customs analysts were being
recruited for assignment to EPIC.
The agencies did not agree, however, on the transfer of
certain intelligence functions to EPIC. The Department of
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Transportation said that it did not concur with our recommen-
dation to transfer the photo-intelligence program to EPIC,
noting that the program involves only part of the time of one
staff member. The Justice Department, however, supported the
transfer of the this function to EPIC. Treasury, noting that
Customs' intelligence analysts do not deal exclusively with
drugs, disagreed with our recommendation to transfer some of
Customs' Office of Border operations intelligence analysis
functions to EPIC. Justice said that it opposed transferring
any strategic intelligence function to EPIC, but it did not
specifically comment on the transfer of the types of Customs
intelligence analysis functions we identified in our report.
We recognize that each of the agencies should maintain
separate strategic intelligence activities. However, we
believe that the drug interdiction intelligence programs of
all agencies will benefit by concentrating at EPIC those
intelligence and analysis functions that are similar and that
relate specifically to drug interdiction.
In response to our recommendation that DEA, Customs, and
Coast Guard provide all interdiction intelligence to EPIC, the
Department of Transportation said that the Coast Guard is
already sending all vessel sighting and drug seizure informa-
tion to EPIC. The Departments of Justice and Treasury did not
comment on this recommendation.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MILITARY HAS BECOME MORE
INVOLVED IN AIR-SEA DRUG
INTERDICTION EFFORTS
The military departments have provided some limited
assistance to drug enforcement agencies over the last several
years. Changes to the Posse Comitatus Act in December 1981,
which further defined the extent of allowable military
involvement in support of civilian law enforcement, have
resulted in a greater role for military resources in drug
interdiction. Military assistance, however, is necessarily
limited because
--major long-term commitments of military assistance can
adversely affect the military's primary mission;
--operation of military equipment is expensive and, for
the most part, reimbursement is beyond the financial
capabilities of law enforcement agencies; and
--concern exists within the military establishment that
classified information on military systems might be
required to be disclosed in court, thus raising the
potential for compromising national security.
Initially, after enactment of the amendments to the Posse
Comitatus Act, law enforcement agencies independently
requested military assistance with little coordination among
themselves. The result was some poorly planned projects that
did not make the most of military resources. Coordination is
critical in this area because military assistance is costly,
not only from a financial point of view, but also in terms of
its potential impact on national security. To better coordi-
nate future projects, officials of the Department of Defense
and law enforcement agencies formed a special group to discuss
all military assistance requests from law enforcement
agencies.
POSSE COMITATUS LIMITED MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
Although in the past the Armed Forces provided some
assistance to drug law enforcement efforts, the scope of this
assistance was limited by the Posse Comitatus Act. Due to
ambiguities in this act regarding the allowable scope of mili-
tary involvement in civil law enforcement operations, the
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military departments were very cautious in providing assis-
tance. Desiring greater involvement of the military in stem-
ming the drug flow, the Congress passed and the President
signed legislation on December 1, 1981, that further defined
the extent of military cooperation allowed under the act.
. The Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. 51385, was an 1878
amendment to the Army appropriations bill in response to
actions taken by U.S. Marshals in occupied southern States
following the Civil War. Willful violation of the act consti-
tutes a felony punishable by a fine not greater than $10,000
or imprisonment of up to 2 years or both. The act prohibits
the use of any part of the Army or Air Force as a posse comi-
tatus, a group of individuals summoned by law enforcement
officials to enforce civilian laws. The act embodies the
principle that the Armed Forces should be separate from and
not interfere with the work of domestic law enforcement, thus
minimizing the possibility of a police state and detracting
from the military's primary function. Although the act does
not mention the Navy, this branch has adopted regulations
which extend the application of the act to Navy Department
operations.
The Posse Comitatus Act permits military assistance if
specifically authorized by the Constitution or act of Con-
gress. Furthermore, while the act prohibits "active" or
"direct" assistance, "passive" or "indirect" aid is permit-
ted. Prior to the 1981' amendment, clear definitions of and
distinctions between "active" and "passive" did not exist.
Consequently, military leaders were very cautious in providing
assistance.
Both military personnel and law enforcement officials
told us the Posse Comitatus Act was the primary factor limit-
ing assistance. A research paper prepared for the Industrial
College of the Armed Fqrces states that Posse Comitatus was
the reason most cited by field representatives of law enforce-
ment agencies as to ihy defense organizations were not provid-
ing more assistance. While only a few of the denials iden-
tify Posse Comitatus as the basis for denial, the terms and
language of many of the agreements reflect concern over the
restrictions in the act. Furthermore, law enforcement offi-
cials hesitated to request assistance for similar reasons.
1"The Use of DOD Assets in the Interdiction of Drug Traffic,"
May 1980. This document is a group effort research paper,
written to fulfill an academic requirement of the Industrial
College of the Armed Forces and the opinions and conclusions
do not necessarily represent official policies of the
National Defense University or DOD.
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Desiring greater involvement of the military to help stem
the flow of drugs to the United States, the Congress passed
and the President signed the Posse Comitatus Amendment on
December 1, 1981 (Public Law 97-86). This amendment was
designed to remove certain restrictions and ambiguities and
facilitate cooperation between military and civilian offi-
cials. As was noted in the December 16, 1981, Congressional
Record:
"Clearly in these times of fiscal
restraint, it is imperative that all pos-
sible resources be utilized to combat nar-
cotics trafficking and all relevant agen-
cies cooperate. Perhaps the greatest
untapped resource is the Department of
Defense."
The specific forms of military-civilian cooperation per-
mitted under the legislation are stipulated in the various
sections:
--Sections 371 to 373 authorize military officials to
furnish information, lend equipment and facilities, and
provide training and advice.
--Section 374 expands military support in connection with
tracking and communicating the movement of vessel and
aircraft traffic.
--Section 375 prohibits direct participation by military
personnel in searches, seizures, and arrests.
--Section 376 prohibits providing assistance if such aid
would adversely affect military preparedness.
--Section 377 provides that reimbursement may be
required.
--Section 378 makes it clear that authorization of assis-
tance under this law is not to be construed as preempt-
ing assistance under any other law.
PAST ASSISTANCE TO
LAW ENFORCEMENT
Despite the limitations imposed by the Posse Comitatus
Act, in the past the military still assisted law enforcement.
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Since 1971, various offices within DOD have been responsible
for coordinating requests from non-DOD agencies for the
use of military resources. Currently this responsibility
rests with the Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics staff
of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.
Records maintained by this office indicate the extent of
military assistance to drug law enforcement that has been pro-
vided since 1971. Assistance has been provided by the Army,
Air Force, and Navy and has included training, assistance in
transporting drug smugglers, loan of equipment, use of facili-
ties, and use of personnel. Specifically, between 1971 and
1981, there were 156 requests for military assistance, of
which 90 percent (140) were approved. Customs was the major
law enforcement agency requesting assistance with more than 70
percent (111) of the requests. A summary of the types of
assistance provided by the various military departments is
shown below.
Source and Type of Military Assistance
To Drug Law Enforcement
1971-1981
Navy
Army
Air
Force
Marines
Other
Total
Equipment loans
(see note a)
11
28
8
3
7
57
Use of
facilities
5
2
11
-
-
18
Training
10
5
1
-
1
17
Misc.
10
13
20
2
3
48
(see note b)
Total
36
48
40
5
11
140
A/Includes requests to extend previous loan agreements.
b/Includes requests to transport people or things, to provide
support services, and to purchase equipment on behalf of the
law enforcement agencies.
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In addition to the assistance noted above, there have
been numerous unofficial minor types of assistance authorized
by local military commanders. During our review at selected
locations throughout the United States, law enforcement offi-
cials gave us examples of how local military units had cooper-
ated with them in various drug enforcement activities.
Often the major assistance provided by the military has
been an integral part of special interdiction projects of drug
law enforcement agencies. For example:
--During November 1978, Naval surface vessels partici-
pated in a 20-day fleet exercise in the Gulf of Mexico
with the Coast Guard that was designed to identify drug
smuggling vessels.
--In June 1979, the Navy provided two E-2C aircraft to
assist the Coast Guard in determining the density and
trafficking patterns of smuggling vessels in the Yuca-
tan passage.
--From November 1980 to March 1981, OV-1C aircraft on
loan from the Army were an integral component of Cus-
toms Air Program Module Test designed to intercept air
smugglers.
--During,August 1979, the Navy assisted the Coast Guard
in a special project entitled RAKE I. The Navy pro-
vided E2-B aircraft to conduct sea surveillance of
marijuana shipments off the South American Coast.
Agency personnel told us that military assistance in these
projects was valuable and demonstrated the potential for the
use of military resources for drug interdiction.
Not all projects involving the military have been as suc-
cessful. One project carried out under a June 1978 agreement
between the Coast Guard and the Navy called for the Navy to
provide sighting information on suspected drug smuggling ves-
sels. Basically, the project consisted of the Coast Guard
providing periodic lists of suspect drug smuggling ships and a
general mother ship profile. As a part of their normal opera-
tions, if naval vessels or aircraft sighted these vessels,
they were to report the sighting to the Coast Guard. Accord-
ing to Coast Guard officials, reported sightings by the Navy
were infrequent. Our analysis of all Coast Guard drug sei-
zures from 1978 through 1981 showed that only 3 of 564 were
based on sightings by Navy personnel.
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A joint Air Force-Customs project involving the Air
Force's E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) also
proved to be unsuccessful. In June 1978, Customs signed a
memorandum of understanding which essentially allowed Customs
air officers to fly aboard AWACS aircraft when missions were
in areas of interest, to conduct surveillance to detect drug
traffickers and low flying aircraft, and to direct Customs
aircraft in the interception of targets of interest. During
fiscal year 1979, Customs assigned six personnel to the pro-
gram. From August 1978 through September 1979, Customs per-
sonnel participated in 97 AWACS flights that detected 268
potential targets. Customs aircraft intercepted 31 of these
targets, but none of these targets proved to be a smuggling
aircraft. An August 1980 Customs-AWACS program evaluation
noted that few AWACS flights were in locations or at times
that met the high threat air smuggling profile. Citing this
evaluation, Customs reduced its participation in the AWACS
program to one air patrol officer in late 1980. Recently, as
a part of the South Florida Task Force, AWACS flights have
been used to detect smuggling aircraft.
POSSE COMITATUS AMENDMENT HAS
RESULTED IN MORE MILITARY
ASSISTANCE TO LAW ENFORCEMENT
With the enactment of the Posse Comitatus Amendment in
December 1981, military assistance to drug law enforcement
increased. As required by the legislation, DOD issued a
directive (DOD Directive 5525.5) on March 22, 1982, that
establishes uniform DOD policies and procedures governing
support provided to Federal, State, and local civilian law
enforcement efforts. The policy stipulates that DOD will
cooperate with civilian law enforcement agencies to the
maximum extent practicable, consistent with the needs of
national security, military preparedness, and the historic
tradition of limiting direct military involvement in civilian
law enforcement activities.
Since December 1981, DOD has been providing increasing
assistance for drug interdiction. For example:
--In March 1982, the Navy began flying E2-C aircraft
equipped with APS 125 radar in South Florida to assist
Customs in identifying and tracking air smugglers as a
part of the South Florida Task Force.
--Also as a part of the South Florida Task Force, the
Army loaned two Huey helicopters to DEA and four Cobra
helicopters to Customs to aid in air interdiction.
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--In April 1982, the Air Force agreed to allow Customs to
use a tethered balloon airborne radar facility, known
as Seek Skyhook, in the Key West area of-Florida to aid
in identifying air smugglers. The AirForce also
agreed to install an additional Seek Skyhook-type radar
facility at Patrick Air Force Base (near Cape
Canaveral) to provide greater radar coverage of South
Florida.
--In April 1982, the Navy agreed to provide information
on drug vessels sighted as a part of the Navy's regular
flights of P-3 aircraft in the Caribbean.
--In May 1982, the Navy agreed to assist the Coast Guard
by towing vessels seized by the Coast Guard and trans-
porting arrested crew members of those vessels.
Clearly, the changes to the Posse Comitatus Act have
encouraged greater participation by the military in the Fed-
eral drug interdiction effort. The full impact such assis-
tance will have on drug smuggling cannot yet be determined.
SEVERAL FACTORS CONTINUE TO
LIMIT MILITARY ASSISTANCE
Although military assistance to law enforcement has
increased, several factors necessarily limit such assistance.
First, military systems and activities often are not compat-
ible with the needs of law enforcement. Adjusting military
activities to fit law enforcement needs can adversely affect
military preparedness. In addition, unless assistance pro-
vided to law enforcement is an incidental part of a military
mission, DOD is required to obtain reimbursement under certain
circumstances. Such reimbursement could severely strain
limited civilian law enforcement budgets. Also, there is con-
cern that use of sophisticated military systems for law
enforcement could result in disclosure of classified informa-
tion on those systems in criminal court proceedings. Accord-
ing to some military officials, this disclosure could compro-
mise national security.
Military systems and activities
not designed for law enforcement
needs
Although many military systems and ongoing activities
have the potential to assist law enforcement, they are
designed and operated for national security needs. Often the
characteristics of systems required for national defense are
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not consistent with the needs of law enforcement. Also, mili-
tary activities, such as training, are not automatically
suited to benefit drug interdiction.
One military system that has limited law enforcement
potential is the Air Force's North American Air Defense Com-
mand (NORAD) long range radars. NORAD's long range radars are
one part of the NORAD system which is designed to detect and
identify hostile aircraft. Agreements were signed between
Customs regions and NORAD regions in 1975 and 1976 to allow
for the use of these radars for the Customs air interdiction
program. Customs data indicates that of 1,013 air interdic-
tion missions launched in fiscal year 1981, only 26 utilized
NORAD radar. Our analysis of Customs seizure data indicated
that from fiscal years 1977 through 1981 only three drug sei-
zures resulted from NORAD information.
NORAD's capability to assist in detecting and apprehend-
ing aircraft involved in smuggling is limited by the capabili-
ties of the radar and the operating procedures of the Air
Force. NORAD's ground-based radar is limited to line-of-sight
coverage. Since NORAD is interested in fast high-flying air-
craft for national defense purposes, "gaps" exist at lower
altitudes. Pilots involved in smuggling, who generally fly at
low altitudes, are aware of radar "gaps" and use them to enter
the country virtually undetected by NORAD radar. For example,
an aircraft flying at 8,000 feet can be detected by a line-
of-sight radar within 126 miles. However, an aircraft flying
at 500 feet must be within 32 miles of the radar to be
detected. The map on the following page shows the extent of
ground-based NORAD coverage at an altitude of 1,000 feet.
NORAD's operating procedures also limit its effectiveness
for law enforcement purposes by generally excluding the
typical smuggling aircraft. Generally, NORAD resources are
interested only in aircraft flying at speeds greater than 207
miles per hour. Typically, the drug smuggler uses propeller-
driven, fixed-wing aircraft that travel at lower speeds.
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RADAR COVERAGE AT 1,000 FEET FOR
SOUTHEASTERN UNITED STATES
North
Carolina
So
South
Car
Carolina
Mississippi Georgia
Louisiana
Texas
Gulf of
Mexico
Alabama
Atlantic
Ocean
The Navy's National Oceanic Surveillance Information
Center (NOSIC) is another example of a military system that
has limited usefulness for drug interdiction. NOSIC is a sys-
tem that accumulates data on worldwide vessel movements uti-
lizing information from a variety of sources. The Coast Guard
maintains a liaison at NOSIC and has utilized the system in a
few instances for drug law enforcement.
However, NOSIC has limited use for drug interdiction
because the system is designed primarily to monitor movements
of vessels greater than 300 feet in length. Such vessels are
not the type typically used for drug smuggling. Of the 675
drug smuggling vessels seized by the Coast Guard from 1973 to
1981, only 2 were longer than 300 feet.
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Not only are many military systems of limited benefit to
law enforcement, but also certain military activities, such as
training, often cannot be used for drug interdiction without
impairing the effectiveness of the training. In congressional
discussions on the amendment to the Posse Comitatus Act, pro-
ponents of increased military assistance argued that military
training missions could be designed for interdiction pur-
poses. For example, it was argued that training flights of
radar aircraft, such as the Air Force's E-3A (AWACS) and the
Navy's E-2C, could be used to detect aircraft involved in drug
smuggling. However, military officials told us that detecting
drug smuggling aircraft provided "little meaningful training."
The officials explained that smuggling targets are relatively
slow and small and do not adequately train the military crews
to intercept enemy movements.
Military officials said that occasional support of law
enforcement as a part of ongoing military activities does not
adversely affect training, but long-term commitment of mili-
tary resources could hurt training and other military pre-
paredness factors.
Long-term commitments of military
assistance could impact preparedness
DOD policy stipulates that military assistance cannot be
provided to law enforcement if it adversely affects military
preparedness. Military officials expressed concern, and at
least one special project demonstrated, that major long-term
commitments of military assistance can result in a degradation
of military readiness.
DOD Directive 5525.5, issued March 22, 1982, regarding
support to civilian law enforcement efforts states: "Assis-
tance may not be provided * * * if provision of such assis-
tance could affect adversely national security or military
preparedness." This regulation was issued to implement the
amendments to the Posse Comitatus Act and reflects the desire
of the Congress to prohibit the provision of military assis-
tance to civilian law enforcement if it would harm national
security.
One special project carried out from October through
December 1981, prior to issuance of the DOD regulation cited
above, demonstrates that the long-term commitment of military
resources can affect military readiness. Project Thunderbolt,
a Customs operation conducted in Southeast Florida, was
designed to deter drug smuggling by aircraft and to evaluate
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the effectiveness of the Navy's E-2C aircraft to detect drug
smuggling aircraft. Thunderbolt utilized dedicated E-2C's
flown for 367 hours over a 90-day period. Three Navy squad-
rons were involved in this project.
Navy officials told us this program adversely affected
readiness of the E2-C squadrons. Specifically, they noted
that, because of their commitment to Project Thunderbolt
--one squadron lost 105 pilot training hours, resulting
in a drop in pilot readiness from 85 percent to 40 per-
cent;
--aircraft modifications programs were delayed by 3
weeks; and
--another squadron lost much of its home station time,
seriously affecting the unit's morale.
We did not independently evaluate this information.
Military officials also said that military readiness can
be degraded not only by long-term commitments but also by
providing sophisticated equipment that is in short supply. In
April 1982 Customs requested the Army loan four Blackhawk
helicopters to assist in its air interdiction program. Army
officials were hesitant about providing these helicopters
because of a'shortage of Blackhawks and spare parts. Army
officials said that the Blackhawk helicopters could not be
provided to Customs without adversely affecting preparedness.
DOD agreed to loan Customs one Blackhawk helicopter on a 6-
month trial basis. The Blackhawk will be taken directly off
the assembly line and the manufacturer has agreed to provide
the spare parts.
In general, DOD officials are concerned that long-term
dedicated military missions for law enforcement or loaning
certain sophisticated military equipment could result in a
degradation of military preparedness.
Military equipment and
operation is expensive
The cost and operation of many types of military equip-
ment is extremely expensive relative to civilian law enforce-
ment funding. DOD policy requires reimbursement for assis-
tance provided for law enforcement if such assistance is not
part of a normal military activity. Therefore, in many cases
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civilian law enforcement agencies cannot afford dedicated
military assistance for law enforcement outside of normal
military operations.
DOD Directive 5525.5 provides that "to the extent
assistance * * * [to civilian law enforcement] requires DOD
Components to incur costs beyond those that are incurred in
the normal course of military operations" reimbursement may be
required. DOD policy states that reimbursement may be waived
in the following circumstances:
--Assistance is provided as an incidental aspect of an
activity conducted for military purposes.
--Assistance provides DOD with training or operational
benefits that are substantially equivalent to the bene-
fit of DOD training or operations.
--Reimbursement is not otherwise required by law and it
is determined that waiver of reimbursement will not
have an adverse impact on military preparedness.
Much of the military equipment being requested by law
enforcement agencies is expensive and costly to operate and
maintain. For example, an E-3A AWACS aircraft costs $15,000
per hour to operate. The Navy's E2-C aircraft costs about
$2,100 per hour to operate. The cost per day for fuel and
lubricants for a Navy destroyer is $34,000.
Compared to the limited budgets of law enforcement agen-
cies, the cost of operating certain military equipment, even
for short periods, is significant. For example, Customs'
Project Thunderbolt involved the use of Navy E-2C aircraft for
air smuggler detection. The Navy required reimbursement from
Customs of about $796,000 for 367 flight hours. The total
budget for Customs' Miami Air Support Branch in fiscal year
1981 was $3.56 million. Thus, the cost to Customs for the
Navy's E2-C aircraft for only 367 hours (which equates to less
than 16 days) was more than 20 percent of total Customs expen-
ditures for air interdiction in Miami for the entire year.
Other costs related to military assistance for drug
enforcement involve the potential replacement of damaged mili-
tary equipment. One such example involves the loan of four
Army OV-1C aircraft to Customs. Two of the four have been
damaged, for which the Army plans to request reimbursement.
The reimbursement amount has not yet been determined, but the
cost of the aircraft exceeds $1,000,000 each.
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Given the expense of operating military equipment, law
enforcement agencies cannot afford major commitments of dedi-
cated military assistance. Unless ways can be found to
include support to law enforcement as a part of regular on-
going military activities, military assistance to law enforce-
ment will be limited by the expense involved.'
Disclosure of classified military
systems could compromise
national security
Military officials are concerned about the possible dis-
closure of information on classified military systems in court
if the systems are used to assist law enforcement. They
stated that such disclosure could do irreparable damage to
national security. For example, it was said that if a secret
military system were used to detect an aircraft which culmi-
nated in the arrest of the pilot for drug trafficking, the
defendant might be able to show a need to know that he was
detected by the military system. Depending on the case, there
was concern that a judge could require disclosure of the tech-
nical specifications of the system that resulted in the detec-
tion. This concern is expressed in view of the principle that
the judiciary controls the evidence in a criminal trial and on
the possibility that a defendant could successfully demon-
strate a need for such evidence.
However, Congress has addressed these concerns involving
cases where national security secrets are likely to arise in
the course of criminal prosecutions. On October 15, 1980,
Congress passed Public Law 95-456, the Classified Information
Procedures Act. This law provides certain pretrial, trial,
and appellate procedures for criminal cases involving classi-
fied information. For example, it provides pretrial proce-
dures that permit a trial judge to rule on questions of admis-
sibility involving classified information before introduction
of the evidence in open court. The purpose of this particular
procedure is to permit the Government to ascertain before
trial the potential damage to national security. Under this
procedure, the judge determines whether and the manner in
which the information in issue may be used in a trial or pre-
trial proceeding.
Nonetheless, several military officials expressed concern
to us that using a secret military detection system for law
enforcement could result in disclosure of the system. For
example, officials at a defense agency expressed apprehension
concerning the use of a classified military system for law
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 I I I I Ill I-- I .; I I .III
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enforcement. These officials noted that, if a judge wou.L,
allow a defense attorney to reveal the capabilities of the
system in court, they would recommend that the U.S. attorney
drop the case.
Similar concerns were noted with regard to the use of the
Navy's E-2C aircraft for drug interdiction as a part of Cus-
toms Project Thunderbolt. The Customs proposal for the proj-
ect noted:
"If at anytime [sic] during the judicial
process it appears that the Government
will be ordered to reveal E-2C participa-
tion, Customs will request that the U.S.
Attorneys' [sic] Office initiate dismissal
of the charges."
REQUESTS FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE
ARE NOW MORE COORDINATED
Encouraged by the December 1981 changes to the Posse
Comitatus Act, law enforcement agencies began requesting mili-
tary assistance for a variety of drug interdiction activi-
ties. Unfortunately, in some instances these requests were
neither well planned nor coordinated among the various law
enforcement agencies resulting in inefficient projects. Sub-
sequently, a committee comprised of DOD, Customs, Coast Guard,
and DEA officials was established to coordinate requests for
military assistance.
As was pointed out earlier in this chapter, law enforce-
ment agencies have requested a variety of equipment from the
military to assist in their drug interdiction efforts. Some
of these requests have not been adequately planned or coordi-
nated. For example, Customs' Operation Thunderbolt air inter-
diction project conducted from October through November 1981
utilized airborne radar coverage provided by the Navy's
E2-C's. The E2-C's were used to detect and track suspect drug
smuggling aircraft entering South Florida. As was noted
earlier, Customs was charged $796,000 for the E2-C's on this
project. During the same time period, DEA and Coast Guard
were conducting a Caribbean marine interdiction project:
Project Tiburon. When planning Project Tiburon, DEA and the
Coast Guard had requested the Navy to provide airborne radar
coverage to detect drug smuggling vessels, but when the Navy
said such coverage would cost about $800,000, DEA and the
Coast Guard decided against the assistance.
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Navy officials told us that the E2-C aircraft had the
capability to detect both air and sea targets and could have
been used for both projects. Officials at DEA and EPIC said
they were not aware of Customs plans to use the E2-C's in
Project Thunderbolt until "a few days" before the project
commenced. Although the projects were not conducted in
exactly the same location, the coverage provided by many of
the Project Thunderbolt E2-C flights could have aided the
DEA-Coast Guard Operation Tiburon III. For example, 34 of the
70 vessel seizures in connection with Operation Tiburon III
were made either off the coast of Florida or in the Bahamas,
areas that were frequently covered by the E2-C's in Project
Thunderbolt.
Customs in its response to our draft report, said the
E2-C "was not all that effective in detecting and tracking
small vessels of 30 feet and under." Despite this limitation,
the E2-C would still be valuable to detect vessels for the
Coast Guard. More than 80 percent of the vessels Coast Guard
seized in 1981 were longer than 30 feet.
Another example of an inadequately planned and coordi-
nated request for military assistance involved the air inter-
diction portion of the South Florida Task Force. As in
Project Thunderbolt, E2-C's were used to detect air smugglers
entering Florida. From March 15 through June 30, 1982, Navy
E2-C's flew 435 hours at a cost of more than $715,000 and Navy
E-2B aircraft flew 129 hours at a cost of more than $82,000.
These expensive resources were deployed with little plan-
ning or coordination. In addition to not using E2-C's for
concurrent air and sea drug smuggler detection, the project
managers did not assess existing radar facilities before
deciding to use these Naval aircraft. Some low altitude radar
coverage of South Florida is available from the Air Force's
balloon-borne radar facility in the Florida Keys. This
facility--named Seek Skyhook--provides low altitude radar
coverage of much of the air smuggler threat corridor in South
Florida. For example, nearly three-fourths of the air inter-
dictions during Project Thunderbolt were in the coverage area
of Seek Skyhook. The Air Force has since agreed to provide
Seek Skyhook radar coverage without reimbursement.
These two examples demonstrate that as a result of poor
planning and coordination, valuable military resources were
not used to their full advantage and interdiction was less
effective than it could have been. In addition to poor plan-
ning, the projects were implemented without an agreement on
who was going to pay for the military assistance.
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Concerned about this lack of coordination and planning,
the Joint Chiefs of Staff noted in a March 1982 memorandum to
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense that:
"There must be a central civil authority
which assimilates and coordinates all
requests to DOD for assistance to civil
law enforcement agencies. A.decision on
the source of funding must be reached, as
the military departments have not budgeted
for these operations."
In response to this concern a committee comprised of
Coast Guard, DEA, Customs, and DOD officials was formed to
discuss requests for military assistance. The group has met
monthly and has discussed both long-term plans and specific
requests for military assistance.
CONCLUSIONS
The military can provide valuable assistance to law
enforcement in the area of air and sea interdiction, with cer-
tain limitations. The recent amendment to the Posse Comitatus
Act has made such assistance much more frequent. Initially,
requests by law enforcement agencies were inadequately planned
and coordinated, resulting in projects that were less effec-
tive than they could have been. The formation of a DOD-law
enforcement agency group should ensure better planned projects
and more efficient use of military equipment in the future.
AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION
The Department of Defense, in its comments on our draft
report, agreed with all of our conclusions concerning military
assistance for drug enforcement. The Customs Service said
that the negative tone concerning the lack of coordination
between agencies in requests for military assistance was
inappropriate in view of the establishment of a military
assistance coordinating committee. The Departments of Justice
and Transportation did not comment on the conclusions con-
tained in this portion of the report.
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APPENDIX I APPENDIX I
OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY
We visited numerous sites to assess program effectiveness
at various activity levels. We conducted our review at the
following offices.
--Headquarters offices in Washington, D.C. of the Coast
Guard, Customs, DEA, DOD, Army, Navy, Air Force,
Department of Justice, and Department of State;
--DEA regional and district offices in Miami, New
Orleans, Los Angeles, Tucson, Phoenix, San Diego,
Wilmington (North Carolina), and the Nassau Bahamas
Resident Office;
--Customs regional and district offices in Miami, Tampa,
Charleston (South Carolina), New Orleans, Nogales
(Arizona), and San Diego;
--Coast Guard district offices in Miami, New Orleans,
Norfolk, and Long Beach, and Coast Guard area command
offices in San Francisco and New York;
--U.S. attorney offices in the Southern District of
Florida, Eastern District of Louisiana, Central
District California, Southern District of California,
and District of Arizona; and
--the El Paso Intelligence Center in El Paso, Texas.
Additionally, some work was conducted at the headquarters
offices of the Office of Management and Budget, Federal Avia-
tion Administration, National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration, Office of Drug Abuse Policy in the Executive Office
of the President, as well as at the Naval Oceanic Surveillance
Information Center in Suitland, Maryland; the Navy's Atlantic
Area Fleet headquarters in Norfolk; the Air Force Tactical Air
Command in Langley, Virginia; and the Air Force 20th North
American Air Defense Command headquarters at Ft. Lee,
Virginia. Limited assistance was also provided by the FBI.
Our work included:
--Discussions and interviews with agency officials and
personnel at all levels.
--Review of budgetary, expenditure, and resource utiliza-
tion data.
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--Examination of intelligence reports and records, pro-
ject evaluations, and case files.
--Analysis of seizure, arrest, court disposition, and
sentencing data.
--Evaluation of requests for military assistance.
--Verification of Customs seizure report data.
--Review of laws, policies, and procedures.
--Examination of studies and audits pertaining to inter-
diction efforts.
This review was performed in accordance with generally
accepted Government auditing standards. The fieldwork for
this review was conducted from November 1981 through September
1982.
Computer analysis
Many of the statistical analyses contained in this report
were based on information contained in the Customs Law
Enforcement Activity Reporting (CLEAR) System. The CLEAR sys-
tem includes information on all drug seizures made directly by
Customs and the Coast Guard, as well as seizures by State,
local, and other Federal agencies in which Customs was a par-
ticipant. We independently analyzed information contained on
magnetic tapes (provided by Customs) for more than 75,000 drug
seizures made from fiscal years 1977-81 and the first 9 months
of fiscal year 1982. Information contained in the CLEAR sys-
tem includes not only the quantity, location, and time of the
drug seizure, but also which agencies participated in the
seizure, what type of prior information was used to aid in the
interdiction, which agency took custody of the arrestees,
descriptive information on the type of conveyance used, and
what other property was seized by Federal authorities.
Data contained in the CLEAR system is based on informa-
tion from Customs Search/Arrest/Seizure Reports (Customs form
151), which are prepared at the time of the seizure or when
Customs takes possession of the seized drugs (as in Coast
Guard seizures). To verify the accuracy of the data in the
CLEAR system with information contained on Customs 151 forms,
we randomly sampled the universe of all Customs Patrol and
Coast Guard seizures for fiscal year 1981 in 6 of Customs 46
districts. Our sample comprised 172 of the 602 seizures in
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APPENDIX I APPENDIX I
the 6 districts. For each of the selected 172 cases, we com-
pared 6 information items (1,032 total items: 6 x 172) listed
on the Customs 151 form with information contained in the
CLEAR system. We found that 1,028 of the 1,032 items, or 99.6
percent, were identical. If a 99-percent confidence interval
were used, the accuracy of the data based on our random sample
would be at least 99.1 percent.
As a part of our evaluation of interdiction results,
we also determined court disposition of the violators arrested
in connection with the cases in this selected sample of drug
seizures . We attempted to determine the court disposition of
all violators arrested in each of the drug seizure cases, up
to a maximum of five individuals for a single case. A total
of 348 people were arrested in the 172 cases. Using informa-
tion available in DEA's court disposition file and the FBI's
Computerized Criminal History system, we obtained case dispo-
sition data for 128 of these arrestees. Data was not avail-
able on 220 of the individuals arrested.
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
DRUG SEIZURES AS A PERCENT OF DRUG SUPPLY
Fiscal Year 1977 - 1982
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Heroin:
(note a)
Supply
Seizures
Percent
seized
Dangerous drugs:
12,128
1,323
10.9
9,041
897
9.9
8,159
647
7.9
8,710
688
7.9
9,000
598
6.6
10,000
988
9.9
(note b)
Supply
5,054
4,960
5,217
5,060
5,000
5
000
Seizures
19
21
40
77
103
,
47
3
Percent
seized
.4
.8
1.5
2.1
.
.9
Cocaine:
(note c)
Supply
46,305
48,510
61,740
97,020
132,300
149,940
Seizures
1,802
2,292
2,721
8,329
6,464
16
183
Percent
seized
3.9
4.7
4.4
8.6
4.9
,
10.8
Marijuana:
(note )
Supply
S
i
30,098
23,263
26,460
28,224
31,046
31,046
e
zures
2,061
6,048
4,590
2,976
6
254
4
857
Percent
seized
6.8
26.0
17.3
10.5
,
20.1
,
15.6
aData is in pounds and also includes opium and morphine.
Millions of dosage units.
c/Data is in pounds.
d/Includes hashish. Units are thousands of pounds.
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APPENDIX II APPENDIX II
Sources of Information:
Drug supply - Drug supply figures for 1977 through 1980
are estimates by the National Narcotics Intelligence
Consumers Committee. Drug supply figures for 1981 and
1982 are GAO estimates based on projections of supply
trends by the National Narcotics Intelligence Consumers
Committee. Dangerous Drug supply is a GAO calculation
based on the National Narcotics Consumer Committee's
estimates of the annual retail value for dangerous drugs.
Drug seizures - Drug seizures are the combined seizures
of DEA, Customs, and Coast Guard. DEA seizures are based
on DEA statistics. Customs and Coast Guard seizures were
obtained from Customs' CLEAR system.
Note: NNICC estimates for each drug represent the total
amount on the U.S. markets and include amounts grown or
produced domestically. For example, NNICC estimates
that 7 percent of the marijuana supply is grown in the
United States and that the majority of illicit danger-
ous drugs are manufactured or diverted in the United
States. Domestically produced drugs obviously are not
usually seized at the border. On the other hand, our
drug seizure information includes all Federal drug sei-
zures both at the border as well as within the United
States.
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VIOLATOR CLASS OF ARRESTEES REFERRED TO
DEA BY FEDERAL AGENCIES
Fiscal Year (note a)
APPENDIX III
Class of
Violator
(note b)
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Total
No.
Percent
of total
Class I
45
35
39
42
57
23
241
2.9
Class II
31
24
19
23
72
12
181
2.2
Class III
628
645
505
514
874
382
3,548
42.5
Class IV
1,817
942
497
343
411
364
4,374
52.4
Total
2,521
1,646
1,060
922
1,414
781
8,344
100.0
a/Fiscal year 1982 data for first 9 months (October 1981-June 1982).
b/DEA classifies drug violators into four categories with class I being
the most important. For example, class I violators can be the head of
major trafficking organizations dealing in large quantities of drugs.
Source of information: DEA statistics
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APPENDIX IV
COAST GUARD AND CUSTOMS PATROL SEIZURES
AS A PERCENT OF TOTAL FEDERAL SEIZURES
Fiscal Year 1977-1982 (note a)
-
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
Total
Marijuana
(note b)
Amount
1,265
3,647
2,973
1,828
4,125
2,828
16,666
Percent of
total
61
60
65
61
66
72
65
Cocaine
(note c)
Amount
299
559
359
1,891
1,723
2,389
7,220
Percent of
total
13
23
27
20
22
Dangerous Drugs
(note d)
Amount
.5
1.5
15
18
21
.1
56.1
Percent of
total
Heroin
(note c)
Amount
21
8
37
41
24
68
199
Percent of
total
2
1
6
6
4
7
4
a/Fiscal year 1982 data for first 9 months (October 1981-June 1982).
b/Thousands of pounds.
c/Pounds.
/Millions of dosage units.
Sources of information: Customs and Coast Guard seizures based
on information from Customs' CLEAR system. Total seizures used
to calculate percent are the combined seizures of DEA, Customs,
and Coast Guard. DEA seizures based on DEA statistics.
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CUSTOMS REPORTED ARRESTEES VS.
DEA REPORTED ARRESTEE REFERRALS
Fiscal Years 1977-1982 (note a)
APPENDIX V
Interdiction
arrestees 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total
Customs 15,981 9,796 6,940 6,901 8,704 5,075 53,397
Coast Guard 87 478 392 240 727 696 2,620
Total 16,068 10,274 7,332 7,141 9,431 5,771 56,017
Referrals to
DEA 2,521 1,646 1,060 922 1,414 781 8,344
Arrests not
referred to
DEA (note b) 13,547 8,628 6,272 6,219 8,017 4,990 47,673
Percent not
referred 84 84 86 87 85 86 85
a/ Fiscal year 1982 data for first 9 months (Oct. 1981-Jun. 1982).
b/Difference between Customs reported arrests and DEA reported referrals.
Sources of information: Customs and Coast Guard arrests based on data
in Customs CLEAR system. "Referrals to DEA' is based on information
provided by DEA.
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APPENDIX VI
CASE DISPOSITION ANALYSIS--CUSTOMS
PATROL AND COAST GUARD CASES
Fiscal Years 1977-1982 (note a)
Cases with
arrests 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 Total
Refused by U.S.
attorney 503 433 412 344 420 182 2,294
Accepted by U.S.
attorney 284 225 238 274 324 178 1,523
Accepted by State
and Local 67 45 41 92 106 62 413
No information 150 155 157 229 326 203 1,220
Total cases
with arrests 1,004 858 848 939 1,176 625 5,450
Cases without
arrests 326 329 266 326 470 299 2,016
Total cases 1,330 1,187 1,114 1,265 1,646 924 7,466
a/ Fiscal year 1982 data for first 9 months (Oct. 1 to Jun.30).
Source of information: Data based on Customs CLEAR system.
97
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APPENDIX VII APPENDIX VII
ANALYSIS OF CUSTOMS AND COAST
GUARD SEIZURES BASED ON
PRIOR INFORMATION
(F sca Year)
W or Seizures
(note a)
198
265
239
244
388
237
1,571
No. based
on prior
information
111
122
145
141
206
141
866
Percent based
on prior
information
Other Seizures
(note
No. based
on prior
information
Percent based
on prior
information
56.1 46.0 60.7 57.8 53.1 59.5 55.1
20,337 14,712 12,580 11,340 10,320 6,555 75,844
910' 704 677 854 1,095 703 4,943
4.5 4.8 5.4 7.5 10.6 10.7 6.5
/Seizures of more than 10,000 pounds of marijuana, 10 pounds of cocaine, or 5
pounds of heroin.
WAll other seizures not included under major seizures.
Data for the first 9 months (Oct. 1-June 30).
Source of information: Data based on Customs CLEAR system.
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Mr. William J. Anderson
Director
General Government Division
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
U.S. Department of Justice
FEB 3.1983
This letter responds to your request to the Attorney General for the comments
of the Department of Justice (Department) on your draft report entitled
"Strong Central Management and a More Definitive Strategy Needed to Improve
Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts."
The draft report does contain some useful observations and suggestions but
suffers in two serious respects. First, the report is already out of date in
that it does not fully recognize the positive actions which have been taken
in the last 2 years. The report was obviously prepared before the President
announced his Drug Task Force Program, however, a most serious shortcoming
is the report's failure to concentrate on the South Florida Task Force in
assessing the degree of cohesiveness with which interdiction efforts are
accomplished. The General Accounting Office (GAO) audit staff left South
Florida at the precise time when the Task Force effort was getting off the
ground. Additionally, the report virtually ignores the increased resources
in drug law enforcement which have been added with the Federal Bureau of
Investigation's (FBI) involvement in drug investigations.
Second, perhaps the greatest weakness of the GAO report is its failure to
address the role and limitations of interdiction in the context of the entire
Federal drug law enforcement effort. In terms of its role, interdiction is
only one, albeit important, part of the Federal drug strategy. It is
unrealistic to expect current drug interdiction programs to eliminate the
flow of illegal drugs, given the enormous resources that would be required
to accomplish such an objective. Any drug interdiction program must be an
acceptable compromise with the need for a free flow of commerce across our
borders, the convenient movement of travelers and tourists into and out of
the United States, and the resources that drug enforcement agencies can
realistically expect to allocate to the program in view of current budgetary
constraints. Given our current border policy, interdiction, and particu-
larly drug interdiction, is a necessary function, but one of limited value in
controlling the amount of drugs that annually cross our 96,000 mile border.
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APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII
-2-
With regard to its limitations, the GAO report found that "despite increasing
resources for interdiction, only a small percentage of drugs entering this
country are seized." While we agree with this finling, we do not believe
that the report provides the recommendations needed to change this situation.
The report recommends strong central management, a more definitive strategy,
accurate and timely intelligence and well planned and coordinated use of
military assistance. While these are all good points, the recommendations
fall short. Stopping drugs at their source is the single most effective
action that can be taken. In testimony before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on December 14, 1982, flominick L. DiCarlo, Assistant Secretary of State for
International Narcotics Matters stated "Crop control, which can he achieved
through government bans, chemical or manual eradication at the source, or
controlled reduction to legitimate quotas, is the most effective, efficient
and economical means of reducing the availability of opium, cocaine, cannabis
and their derivatives." Unfortunately, the GAO report leads one to believe
that the Federal Government should allocate more resources to the interdic-
tion effort as the answer to the drug problem. Years of experience have
shown that this "band-aid" approach to controlling illegal drugs--stopping
them midway along the delivery chain--is nothing more than a maintenance
effort which, standing alone, will never have any permanent effect on drug
traffic. GAO could do much to place its evaluation of interdiction efforts
.in proper perspective by discussing interdiction in the context of the
entire Federal drug law enforcement effort.
Chapter 2 of the report discusses the "fragmentation" of the Federal inter-
diction program. Unfortunately, fragmentation is a poor choice of words to
simply note that drug interdiction responsibilities are divided among three
agencies, the preponderance of these responsibilities resting with Customs.
This is not a unique or indeed undesirable situation. Interdiction responsi-
bilities are divided for many other smuggled goods such as firearms,
endangered species, even aliens. Federal agencies have been sharing these
kinds of responsibilities for years and will continue to do so. In point of
fact, all drugs, whether they are interdicted by Customs, Coast Guard or DEA,
are turned over to DEA for disposition. Since the enactment in 1973 of
Executive Reorganization Plan Number 2, (5 U.S. Code App.), DEA has been the
lead agency in drug law enforcement. The President's message to Congress
transmitting the Reorganization Plan cited coordination and greater
effectiveness as a primary purpose in centralizing narcotics enforcement
activities in DEA. The roles of the various involved agencies were, and still
are clearly defined in this plan. While there are areas where cooperation can
be improved, law enforcement agencies have generally been able to strengthen
their cooperative relationships as they work together on problems of mutual
concern. Recently, for example, Customs Commissioner, William C. von Raah,
publicly stated that cooperation is at a very high level. Now, the ?resident's
Drug Task Force Program is expected to further significantly strengthen agency
coordination of drug law enforcement activities.
GAO recommends to the President that he designate one entity "to monitor and
evaluate activities." (We presume GAO means interdiction activities, although
this is not clearly stated in the recommendation. One could interpret the
recommendation to mean the entire drug enforcement program.) The recommenda-
tion strongly infers that this group or individual should manage the drug
interdiction effort since the three agencies cannot effectively do so. This
recommendation for what appears to be a national "drug czar" was, as rAO is
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APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII
aware, endorsed by the 97th Congress in the passage of the 1982 crime bill.
In a letter to the Office of Management and Budget the 'lepartment adamantly
opposed the creation of an "Office of the Director of National and Inter-
national Drug Operations and Policy" to direct all Federal drug enforcement
activity and recommended a Presidential veto, which subsequently occurred.
In vetoing the hill, the President expressed concern that it fails to address
some of the most serious problems facing Federal law enforcement and would
impact adversely on the Administration's current efforts to combat drug
abuse. Creation of a new bureaucracy within the executive branch with the
power to coordinate and direct all Federal drug efforts, including law
enforcement operations, would produce friction, compound the problem of
coordinating information, and threaten the integrity of the criminal investi-
gative and prosecutorial decisionmaking process, which is the very opposite
proponents of the hill expect would take place. Although the aim of the
bill was to promote coordination, hearings were never held and the concept
was never really evaluated in any detail. Although the President agrees
with the need for improvement in coordination and efficiency of Federal law
enforcement efforts, this is heing accomplished through existing administra-
tive structures. The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, which is chaired by
the Attorney General and consists of Cabinet officers with narcotics law
enforcement responsibilities, and the White House Office on Drug Policy are
an integral part of the Administration's process by which a coordinated
narcotics enforcement policy is carried out. This process has resulted in
the creation of 12 National Task Forces to combat organized crime and
narcotics trafficking in the field, which is precisely where the action
needs to b4 focused.
The need for coordination and more effective management of the national drug
effort is not a new theme. Executive Reorganization Plan Number 2 of 1973
was a first major step in centralizing narcotics enforcement activities.
The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy and its Task Force on Interdiction, and
the White House Office of nrug Abuse Policy were further responses to
coordinate national drug enforcement efforts. In January 1982, the Attorney
General issued a directive delegating to the FBI concurrent jurisdiction with
DEA for investigations of violations of the Controlled Substances Act. This
action was another positive effort toward achieving a coordinated national
drug investigative effort. Current efforts by the Administration, such as
the South Florida Task Force and the President's creation of 12 new national
Narcotics Task Forces are intended to foster even closer Federal agency
coordination. This level is where the true test of cooperation and coordina-
tion takes place and not at the "drug czar" level. Moreover, these types of
cooperative activities virtually negate GAO's contention that "Federal inter-
diction efforts are not planned, controlled, or directed by any single
department, agency or individual."
In addition to the aforementioned comments, the following comments address
specific issues of the report identified by page title or number.
Appendices II-VII. Most of the appendices include 9-month data for fiscal
year The figures for the entire year are now available and should be
included.
nigest, Pa a iv. The reason that 60 percent of Customs Patrol and Coast Guard
drug interdiction cases are not prosecuted by Justice is not a result of
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fragmentation. Rather, it is merely the result of the different functions of
Customs and Coast Guard on the one hand and Justice on the other. The
functions of the Customs Patrol and Coast Guard are to patrol and seize
all drug contraband on the high seas possessed by traffickers regardless of
how small or large the quantity or how sophisticated or unsophisticated the
trafficker or his trafficking methods. The functions of Justice are to
investigate and prosecute those cases and traffickers which present the
greatest potential impact on drug trafficking. Obviously, not every seizure
by Customs or Coast Guard requires or warrants further investigation or
prosecution; many cases are adequately dealt with by simple arrest and
seizure. Justice's exercise of prosecutorial discretion is based upon a
number of factors, including criminal history, evidence, special aggravating
or mitigating circumstances, uniqueness of the case and local or regional
priorities. Contraband seizures on the high seas frequently involve
extremely small amounts of drugs. In the past, GAO has been critical of DEA
for not pursuing higher level drug traffickers. If law enforcement agencies,
prosecutors and the courts spend more time on these lower level cases, the
costs of prosecution will clearly outweigh the benefits to the public. In
sum, GAO's finding shows not fragmentation, but rather that the system works
as would be expected. Not every seizure requires further investigation and
prosecution. Certainly, Customs and Coast Guard should not refuse to seize
contraband just because, in a particular case, there is no need for follow-up
investigation or prosecution.
Pages 11-13. GAO states that resources devoted to interdiction have
increase ramatically. While this is true in the aggregate, it should be
noted according to the chart on page 13 that DEA expenditures have actually
decreased from fiscal year 1979 and have remained relatively unchanged from
fiscal year 1977 through fiscal year 1981.
Page 14. In paragraph 2, the amount DEA spends on drug interdiction is
based on the number of hours DEA agents spend on referral cases from Customs
and the Coast Guard. Unfortunately, this estimate does not include or even
mention the South Florida Task Force, special operations such as Tiburon,
specific intelligence collection programs in foreign countries, or investi-
gations where DEA learns of a smuggling operation and passes the information
to Customs or the Coast Guard. Consequently, the amount of time DEA spends
on interdiction would be somewhat higher than that reported in the GAO study.
Page 15. We believe that GAO fails to give sufficient credit to such
successful cooperative interdiction efforts as Grouper, Banco Shares and the
South Florida Task Force. Interdiction efforts have had an impact on
marihuana supply; however, the substantial increase in domestic marihuana
production must also be addressed by intensified enforcement.
Page 17. GAO's section on street drug prices is inaccurate. Our figures,
whTch GAO had access to, show that prices of street drugs have increased or
remained relatively unchanged. The street prices of June 1982 show that the
price of marihuana has increased to $1.71 per milligram, up from $1.38 in
1980, while cocaine, at $.65 per milligram, has remained at its 1979 price.
Heroin prices have remained relatively stable, dropping slightly from $2.25
in 1979 to $2.20 in 1982. DEA noes not adjust these figures for inflation
nor should GAO. Adjustments for inflation for illegal drugs outside of
legal commerce are artificial. Our studies have shown that in some cases
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APPENDIX VIII
APPENDIX VIII
illegal drug prices go counter to the normal inflationary cycle due to
availability, popularity of the drug and relative purity level. Consequently,
we would recommend that the study report the OEA figures and drop the
adjustments for inflation.
Pages 25-26. This portion of .the report discusses the South Florida Task
Force. AS stated earlier in this response, GAO's failure to concentrate on
the South Florida Task Force in assessing the degree of cohesiveness with
which interdiction efforts are accomplished is of concern to us. It is this
portion of the report which has received the most publicity, however mis-
leading the publicity might be. This Task Force initiative and the
President's creation of 12 new national Narcotics Task Forces represent
significant efforts by the Administration to provide the degree of cohesive-
ness needed in managing Federal drug enforcement activities. Yet, the report
commentary on the South Florida Task Force is not much more than one page.
It is apparent that GAO's analysis was completed only a couple of months
after the Task Force had commenced operation in March 1982. The only
critical comments regarding the Task Force contained in the draft report are
references to "newspaper accounts" about statements from "several local
police officials" regarding the failure of the Task Force to date (i.e.,
June or July 1982) to reduce the cocaine and dangerous drug traffic. On the
other hand, the report states that officials at the El Paso Intelligence
Center (EPIC) believed that already, as of July 1982, there had been a sub-
stantial reduction in smuggling due to Task Force operations. Any analysis
of the Administration's current Federal drug interdiction efforts must
include a detailed study of its current initiatives. Unfortunately, GAO
chose to release its draft report prematurely and no such study was made.
In our opinion the report is seriously in need of updating.
Page 31. This page discusses DEA drug priorities dating back to 1979. DEA's
si cal year 1983 national priority objectives do not include inflexible
national drug priorities. DEA special agents-in-charge now establish their
division priorities according to local needs; thus in Miami, DEA's emphasis
is on marihuana and cocaine and not on the former national number one
priority--heroin. GAO needs to revise this section of the report to correctly
describe the flexibility allowed in establishing DEA's national drug priority
objectives.
Page 32. The report states that interdiction efforts have been unsuccessful
ec~ ause only 5 percent of those arrested are Class I or II violators. In
all probability, only 5 percent of all actual drug violators do fall into
Class I or II. There are only so many "bosses" in any organization. Most
people in any organization, legal or illegal, are the regular "workers."
The definitions of Class I and II violators are restrictive in that large
quantity requirements must be satisfied. The violator must then be either
the head of a structured illegal organization or its financier. (Other
potential Class I or II violators like laboratory operators or registrants
are not normally arrested as a result of interdiction activities on the part
of Customs or the Coast Guard.) Further, most interdiction arrests are for
crewmen and the like. Subsequent investigation i:, required to lead to the
Class I or II violator behind the smuggling activity. Sometimes these
followup investigations can last several years before arrests occur, as in
Operation Grouper, in which over 2 years elapsed between the time contraband
was initially seized off the boats and the time that the major violators
were finally arrested.
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APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII
Page 37. The statement that only nEA has authority to present cases
involving violations of Federal narcotics laws to the U.S. Attorney for
Federal prosecution is inaccurate. The FBI also has this authority.
Page 37. The report states that "If interdiction arrestees are accepted for
Federal prosecution, DEA sometimes tracks the results of the case." GAO
should be aware that DEA maintains defendant statistical records for all
arrestees Federally prosecuted in DEA initiated or adopted cases. These are
available from DEA's Offender Based Transaction System. It is also important
to remember that, given court time, it normally takes years for most (75%) of
the dispositions in a case to be reported.
Page 51. GAO recommends that DEA, Customs, and Coast Guard work together to
develop compatible management information systems for drug interdiction
programs. DEA supports this recommendation. Presently DEA's statistical
systems are being improved internally (to detect overlap), and resources are
already earmarked for 12 new Organized Crime/Narcotics Tas Forces to develop
compatible systems.
Page 52. This section again alludes to the "drug'czar" concept which was
d;icuss ed earlier. It also calls for a more definitive Federal strategy
stipulating the roles of the various agencies with drug enforcement
responsibilities. We believe that the combination of existing laws such as
Executive Reorganization Plan Number 2, Memorandums of Understanding between
DEA and Customs and DEA and the Coast Guard, concurrent jurisdiction guide-
lines for DEA and the FBI, and the President's 1982 Federal Strategy for Drug
Abuse and Drug Trafficking Prevention amply answer our current needs for
defined roles and a definitive strategy. Implementation of this strategy and
meeting the responsibilities inherent in these roles should be our paramount
concern.
Page 56. The study found that "Despite the importance of the Caribbean as a
drug trans-shipment point, DEA has assigned only three agents there." While
DEA's Puerto Rico office is technically in the West Indies, the 16 agents
assigned to that office do work investigations in the Caribbean. Special
agent strength should include the hundreds of workyears provided to Caribbean
investigations by agents, analysts and other support personnel in both the
field and Headquarters. Also, DEA has opened an office in Santo Domingo to
enhance enforcement presence in the Caribbean. Further, the report does not
recognize the FBI's involvement in drug investigations. The, FBI now has
concurrent jurisdiction and has significant resources in the Southeast working
drug cases. Furthermore, as you know, the process by which we assign our
agents overseas is lengthy, involving foreign governments and the State
Department. Sometimes there are factors outside of our control which prevent
us from assigning a full complement of personnel overseas. In the Caribbean
area, we have made a conscious decision to support the Caribbean nations in
large part through our Miami, South America, and Puerto Rico offices.
Page 63. The GAO study recommends that the Customs' strategic drug intelli-
gence function be transferred to EPIC. This statement is based on a
misunderstanding of what strategic intelligence is and how it is used by an
agency. We adamantly oppose such an action just as we would oppose the
transfer of any other agency's strategic intelligence function, including
DEA's, outside of agency Headquarters. Tactical intelligence, often of a
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APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII
time-perishahle nature, serves the individual operational needs of an agency.
Strategic intelligence, on the other hand, is of a more comprehensive nature;
situations and systems, hoth past and present, are assessed toward predicting
future trends and prospects. The development and analysis of strategic
intelligence are functions which must be performed at a Headquarters level,
where analysts and managers can benefit from agency and department policies
and can contribute to the formulation of long-range planning. Furthermore,
EPIC, as GAO points out, is a tactical and operational intelligence organiza-
tion. To add a strategic intelligence function to its operation would dilute
its effectiveness as a quick response watch and command center.
Page 64. Given the tactical and operational nature of the suspect vessel
photo file maintained by the Coast Guard's Atlantic Area Command in New York,
we support its transfer to EPIC.
Pages 64-65. Ten new DEA special agent positions have been assigned to the
EPIC Watch since the report was prepared and steps have been taken to
increase DEA analyst positions. The staffing chart on page 65 should be
updated to reflect this increase.
Pages 64-67. GAO recommends that DEA, Customs, and Coast Guard provide
additional staff and resources for increased computer services to EPIC.
GAO also references a 1978 Justice internal audit report which was critical
of EPIC's computer capability.
The information in the internal audit report which GAO quotes is almost 5
years old and is no longer current. 1/
During fiscal year 1982 additional computer capacity was installed at EPIC
which meets most of the Center's current needs except for the additional
processing and disk storage needed to support an Internal Revenue Service
requirement and on-line word processing. During the current fiscal year,
efforts will he made to fund and commence operation of the word processing
equipment.
Page 77. GAO correctly demonstrates the limitations of the 16 North American
it Defense Command long-range radar. PEA strongly believes that while this
map is not classified, it is in the public interest not to have this
information widely disseminated.
Page 94. The chart should identify the seizures as Customs seizures since
ey are based exclusively on the Customs Law Enforcement Activity
Reporting System.
In final analysis, we recommend that the report be updated to recognize the
latest Administration initiatives relating to the South Florida Task Force,
the President's program for an additional 12 regional task forces under his
direction, and delegation to the FBI of concurrent jurisdiction with DEA for
investigations of violations of the Controlled Substances Act. These
initiatives are significant in assessing the degree of cohesiveness with
which interdiction efforts are expected to he accomplished in the future,
thus alleviating the coordination problems revealed in the report. Finally,
the report should he reconstructed to stress that drug interdiction is only
one aspect of the Federal drug enforcement strategy.
JThe comments on EPIC's computer capability refer to information contained
in the draft report sent to the agencies for comment. This section was
eliminated from the final report.
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APPENDIX VIII APPENDIX VIII
We are pleased to have the opportunity to comment on the draft report.
Should you desire any additional information, I trust you will let me know.
Assistant Attorney General
for Administration
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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220
JAN281983
This memorandum is in response to your letter of
December 15, 1982, to Secretary Regan requesting comments
on your draft report entitled "Strong Central Management and
A More Definitive Strategy Needed To Improve Federal Drug
Interdiction Efforts." The U.S. Customs Service's comments,
with which we concur, are forwarded herewith.
This report draws some excellent conclusions and makes
some recommendations which we will pursue. It is a generally
helpful report and it supports our efforts to reduce the flow
of drugs into the U.S. by means of an effective nationwide
interdiction strategy. There are, however, some sections
which are inaccurate and which should be revised. For
example, the report alleges that despite increased resources
for interdiction only a small percentage of drugs that enter
this country are seized. In fact, Customs resources devoted
to interdiction have not increased by significant amounts
over the five year period from 1977-1981. This is particu-
larly striking when inflation is factored into the overall
dollar growth picture. The report also gives the impression
that increases in resources devoted to the Air Interdiction
Program have been significant and are of sufficient quality
and quantity to counter the air smuggling threat. In reality,
air interdiction resources have not been significantly in-
creased in recent years either in the quality or quantity of
equipment needed. Customs air interdiction resources have,
however, been concentrated in the Florida area since the
inception of the Florida Task Force. Therefore, to indicate
that vast amounts of drugs continue to be smuggled into the
country despite significant resource increases does not
give a balanced picture of the problem as far as Customs
resources are concerned.
The report states that the Coast Guard portion of the
drug interdiction program comprises the majority of the
increase in Federal resources from 1977-1981. Yet another
section of the report appears to lump together both the
Coast Guard and the Customs Service resource increases into
statements such as: "GAO conducted this review because of
the significant increases in resources devoted to air and
sea drug interdiction programs and because of the continuing
vast amounts of drugs smuggled into the country."
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We believe the GAO report substantially over-states
the amount of money which would be needed to develop and
implement a nationwide air interdiction strategy with the
resources needed to carry it out. Such a program is in the
process of being developed by the U.S. Customs Service in
cooperation with the Department of Defense. This program
involves the long-term loan of equipment such as aircraft
and radar from the military to the Customs Service. This
program, when fully developed, could he maintained with a
cost of less than 930 million a year. It is our judgement
that when fully operational, this program will significantly
impact on the smuggling of marijuana and cocaine into the
country by use of private aircraft. In any case, the GAO
report would be inaccurate if it states that the funds neces-
sary to run an effective air interdiction program would run
into the billions. I would be pleased to have representatives
from this department concerned with the air interdiction
program explore this matter with you in much greater detail.
Your report should reflect the fact that in Florida
follow-up drug interdiction investigations have been carried
out in almost every case since the inception of the Florida
Task Force in March 1982. These drug interdiction investi-
gations have developed significant cases which have impacted,
in a positive way, against drug smugglers and drug trafficking
operations. Results of these interdiction investigations in
Florida include the development of 70 documented informants
and the opening of 77 new investigative cases based on infor-
mant information. These cases have led to 114 arrests and
significant seizures of drugs, vessels, aircraft, firearms and
cash. It is suggested that your report should also reflect
that a very high percentage of the interdiction cases, followed
up by the Florida Joint Task Group, are being prosecuted in
the Federal courts in Florida. These follow-up investigations
represent a joint cooperative effort between DEA and the U.S.
Customs Service working together in a Task Force Group in the
Florida area. The success of the Joint Task Group in the
Florida area has resulted in an agreement between the Justice
and Treasury Departments that will be the basis for additional
DEA and Customs joint interdiction investigation response task
groups in other selected areas of the country. In the interest
of accuracy and for the benefit of policy makers, the GAO
report should reflect this significant development.
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The draft report states that most individuals arrested
in interdiction cases are low-level violators; that the cost
of interdiction has become or is becoming prohibitive, and
that there is some question about the value of increasing
interdiction efforts further. We must recognize that there
is no magic bullet for drug control any more than there is
for crime in general and that interdiction must be one part
of the enforcement process. It is our view that a total
attack on the drug problem must involve attempts to eradicate
at their source, concentrated interdiction efforts at our
borders, and concentrated investigation efforts domestically
against drug trafficking organizations. All three facets
of such a program are very important -- interdiction is an
essential ingredient. It is at the border where drugs enter
this country in their purest form and largest quantity.
The criminal stature of the individual who actually smuggles
drugs into the U.S. ranges from the high-level, sophisticated
smuggler with organized crime connections to the low-level
"mule" commissioned specifically to serve as a courier.
Whether this individual is a high-level smuggler or a low-
level "mule" he or she will still have intelligence which
can be developed by an investigation aimed at the foreign
source of the drugs and the individual or place where the
drugs are to be delivered. Hence, the smuggler establishes
an investigative trail between the foreign origin of the
drugs and the points of domestic delivery. Historically,
some of the biggest conspiracy cases in drug enforcement
have been initiated by the capture or detection of the
courier who, either unwittingly or in a cooperative manner,
lead investigators to top violators. The fact that most
individuals arrested in interdiction cases are typically
low-level violators cannot justify a failure to follow-up
and investigate these arrests. Even the low-level smuggler
knows where and from whom he got the drugs and knows where
and to whom he is to deliver them. For Customs purposes,
the low-level smuggler has information which can lead to
significant seizures and arrests.
This report contains a lengthy discussion about dis-
agreements between Justice and Treasury regarding their
respective interdiction roles and the claim that there is
inadequate investigative follow-up of interdiction cases.
while the report fails to highlight the very significant
accomplishment of the joint fEA/Customs Task Group in
Florida which was established to investigate interdiction
cases. DEA and Customs agents have been working together in
a highly cooperative and successful effort in Florida for
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the past ten months. Customs agents have had during this
period a delegation from the Attorney General to work drug
smuggling investigations under DEA control. There is every
indication that the Florida operation will serve as the
model for other cooperative Customs/DEA efforts with respect
to the investigation of interdiction cases. The Florida
operation represents a major accomplishment toward a resolu-
tion of past DEA and Customs problems and should be high-
lighted as such in the report.
The report notes correctly that the cooperative effort
and the delegation of investigative authority to Customs was
limited to the State of Florida and to the activities of the
South Florida Task Force. What the report fails to reveal
is the fact that Florida was the main entry point for 80
percent of the cocaine and marijuana smuggled into the United
States.. Hence the impact of the Florida Task Force operation
had national significance with respect to drug smuggling.
It is also suggested that this report might include
mention of the recent formation of an Interdiction Coordination
Group chaired by the Treasury Department. Members of this
group include the Coast Guard, Justice Department, FBI, DEA,
Customs and the Department of Defense. This group is in the
process of developing a national strategy for air and sea
interdiction. This report may also want to consider the out-
standing results of an ongoing cooperative maritime inter-
diction effort involving Coast Guard, DEA, Customs and the
Department of Defense with respect to large scale marijuana
smuggling originating in Colombia. This project is an out-
growth of the Florida Task Force operation and represents
the highest degree of cooperative interagency effort.
I would like to suggest a meeting between you and/or
members of your staff with representatives of my office to
discuss some of the points in this letter and also to dis-
cuss some additional facets of your report. I think that
such a discussion would be helpful, particularly in terms of
some fairly recent developments in the drug interdiction area
which may not have been available to your staff at the time
that your report was written. I would also appreciate the
ability to have such meetings since no members of my staff
were consulted during the period of the inquiry. I look
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forward to an early response to my request and to working
cooperatively with you in arriving at the most accurate
portrayal possible of the serious problems facing Federal
drug interdiction efforts.
A'I~ - Avd-ko, ~
M. Walker, Jr.
Mr. William J. Anderson
Director
General Government Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
Assistant Secretary
(Enforcement & Operations)
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JAN 28 1983
APPENDIX IX
The opportunity to comment on the General Accounting Office
draft report, "Strong Central Management and a More Definitive
Strategy Needed to Improve Federal Drug Interdiction Efforts," is
appreciated. In general, we found the report to be well written
and historically accurate. The tone and style of the report
reflect my views regarding the seriousness of the threat to the
United States posed by drug smuggling and the difficulties encoun-
tered in controlling this activity.
However, despite general agreement with much of the report,
some parts warrant comments which I hope will receive due consid-
eration before the final report is published.
For instance, the statement is made on page 14 that "most drug
seizures made by inspectors are done incidental to other duties at
airports or seaports." This statement, which is repeated in other
sections of the report, would lead an unknowledgeable reader to
conclude that drug seizures made by Customs inspectors are made by
accident. In fact, seizures made by Customs inspectors are a
result of specialized training given to inspectional personnel in
cargo and passenger processing locations throughout the country,
and by the creation of Contraband Enforcement Teams (CET) which
are dedicated to detecting/interdicting major narcotic violations.
On December 26, 1982, inspectors seized 19.25 pounds of Mexican
brown heroin secreted in a false gas tank in the port of Hidalgo,
Texas. This seizure, alone, refutes the statement that seizures
by inspectors are "done incidental to other duties at airports and
seaports."
The references to drug availability beginning on page 14 and
continuing in other parts of the report fail to note that the
total drug supply as estimated by the National Narcotics Intelli-
gence Consumers Committee includes amounts grown or produced
domestically. Obviously, these amounts would not be subject to
interdiction.
An issue is made of the fact that most (95 percent according
to the report) arrestees referred to DEA by Customs and Coast
Guard were Class III and IV violators. This should not be used
as a basis for criticizing the arresting agencies whose only
mission is intercepting those actually involved in smuggling. It
is readily apparent that major (Class I and II) violators very
seldom engage in activities which subject them to arrest during
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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX
an interdiction at the border. It should, however, be recognized
that skillful debriefing of Class III and IV violators and aggres-
sive follow-up investigations will lead to Class I and II violators,
and the identification of assets gained from smuggling ventures
which then become subject to seizure.
Related to the above are statements to the effect that Customs
does not maintain data on the court results of individuals arrested
for drug smuggling. Since Customs is precluded from presenting
cases to the U.S. Attorneys, tracking arrestees through the judicial
process would be, at best, a difficult process and would require the
dedication of resources which can better be used in performing our
authorized functions.
To state, as is done on page 25, that few Customs interdiction
cases are based on investigative work and that Customs air interdic-
tion efforts are based not on investigations, but on radar detection,
is to reveal a critical lack of knowledge of the operational techni-
ques of the Customs Patrol. Our officers and pilots use a variety
of investigative techniques which include developing informants;
conducting surveillances; checking intelligence files; and working
undercover as boat, aircraft, or off-load crews.
On pages 39 through 41, much discussion is devoted to a U.S.
District Court case in the Eastern District of California which
resulted in the District Court Judge's suppressing evidence result-
ing from a Customs search warrant. None of the discussion of this
isolated case seems germane in view of the fact that the District
Court decision was overturned by the 9th Circuit Court where the
Judge refused to suppress the evidence. During the evidentiary
hearing in this case, it was made clear that the investigation was
a joint Customs Patrol/DEA investigation with full participation
by DEA which was approved by the Department of Justice in advance.
In a discussion of U.S. Attorney's refusing to prosecute inter-
diction cases, it is stated that one reason for refusal is that
cases lack probable cause for the seizure. This is not true.
Customs interdiction seizures are made at the border where Customs
search and seizure authority does not require probable cause. This
has been reaffirmed by several Supreme Court Decisions, for example,
United States versus Ramsey, U.S. Supreme Court 1977.
Chapter 3 provides a good discussion of some of the problems
faced by Customs, as well as other agencies, in fulfilling our drug
interdiction responsibilities. In particular, this Chapter out-
lines the benefits which can accrue from post-interdiction investi-
gations and clearly makes a case for Customs' having authority to
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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX
-3-
conduct these investigations, given DEA's lack of priority in this
area and lack of resources to commit to post-interdiction investi-
gations. These investigations have led to higher Class violators
and to the identification of assets accrued from smuggling ventures
with these assets being forfeited to the government. This has been
proven conclusively during activities of the South Florida Task
Force.
I do take exception to one theme found throughout Chapter 3.
This is that Customs (and other agencies) does not or cannot identify
the resources committed to drug interdiction, yet the chart on page
34 purports to show drug enforcement expenditures for 1977 vs 1981.
In addition, a sentence below this chart states: "The scope and
magnitude of interdiction programs--primarily involving Customs and
Coast Guard--have grown far too large not to be reviewed as part of
the overall drug enforcement function." This, in spite of the fact
that the chart shows Customs percent of the total reduced from 24 in
1977 to 17 in 1981, and that Customs dollar increase during these
years was $28.2 million while DEA's increase was $46.4 and Coast
Guard's was $179.1. The inconsistency between stating that resources
cannot be identified, then identifying them in a chart, and finally
drawing incomplete conclusions from the chart, is disturbing.
The issue of double and triple counting is greatly overempha-
sized. Many seizures result from joint efforts and as the report
states, credit should be, and is, shared. However, new procedures
adopted in Customs clearly identify seizures resulting from joint
operations and are, in turn, identified as such in background mate-
rial submitted with the Customs budget requests.
The chart on page 36 also does not lend credence to the narra-
tive of Chapter 3. The GAO auditors estimate reduces Customs'
reported marijuana seizures by 55 percent, Coast Guard by 12 percent,
and DEA not at all. The auditors relied heavily throughout the
report on the Customs Law Enforcement Activity Report (CLEAR) system,
yet the chart on page 36 and the discussion surrounding it implies
a considerable lack of faith in CLEAR, which is unjustified.
The value of timely and accurate intelligence to the interdic-
tion effort is clearly and effectively stated in Chapter 4 of the
report. Again, the case for Customs to have authority to gather
intelligence in source and transit countries is clearly made. The
statement that DEA has provided only limited intelligence from its
overseas operations is accurate. Their overseas priorities and
commitment of intelligence resources is obviously not related to
border interdiction.
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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX
The majority of Chapter 4 is devoted to a discussion of EPIC.
The value of this facility to drug' interdiction is well stated.
However, a reader of the report can be left with a few misconceptions
as to the mandate and functions of EPIC, as well as its use and sup-
port by participating agencies.
The study states on page 53 that "Most intelligence processing
and analysis has been centralized at EPIC." This is not a true
reflection of the facts, since strategic intelligence analysis is
conducted at DEA headquarters in Washington, D.C. And, as you know,
EPIC is controlled by DEA.
The draft report emphasizes the mini-computer capability at
EPIC and describes it as having an inadequate storage capacity.
Totally ignored is the PATHFINDER I capability at EPIC which is
described in the EPIC User's Guide as follows:
"PATHFINDER I provides DEA's Office of Intelligence, DEA's
Office of Enforcement and the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC)
with integrated, centralized capability for the automated storage,
retrieval, and correlation of intelligence relevant to illicit
drugs, illegal aliens, weapons smuggling and other activities.
PATHFINDER I can correlate the information in the data base, which
is comprised of individuals and/or activities, aircraft, vessels,
vehicles, observations and movements. PATHFINDER I retains data
on the results of most inquiries and lookouts, whether they result
in positive information or not. In this manner, an inquiry which
results in a negative response will be preserved for future use.
At a later date the same subject, vehicle, aircraft or vessel, etc.,
may be the subject of an inquiry from another source. At that time,
the results and the existence of the initial inquiry will be reported.
This procedure makes interregional linkages possible and welds data
from independent and mutually exclusive sources together for inter-
regional use. This provides an opportunity for investigators to
'get together' on the case, even though they may be located in dif-
ferent geographic areas of the country."
EPIC is and should continue to be a bulwark of tactical inter-
diction. It is not, nor has it ever been, an intelligence center
which produces analytical products which are strategic in nature and
provide sufficient substance to allow agencies receiving their pro-
duct to plan the placement of their assets to respond to a changing
and dynamic narcotics threat.
The EPIC and Customs studies which the report states are dupli-
cative, are in fact not duplicative. In preparing its studies,
Customs relies heavily on similar EPIC studies, as well as all other
available sources, to produce studies specific to the needs of our
mission and responsibilities.
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Chapter 4 ends with certain recommendations. Included is the
recommendation that Customs transfer our strategic drug intelligence
activities to EPIC and assign the staff necessary to carry out such
activities. As was explained to the GAO auditors, no analyst in
Customs deals exclusively with drugs. Although six analysts deal
primarily with drug-related problems, they are also used to support
Customs intensified enforcement efforts in the area of currency vio-
lators, the export of critical technology, and other highly important
enforcement programs.
At the present time, Customs has 10 positions at EPIC. Two
of these are analysts and two more analysts are being recruited
for assignment at EPIC. If we can be assured that EPIC will pro-
vide Customs with additional and more effective support, including
interdiction intelligence from source and transit countries, we
will consider the commitment of additional resources.
Much space is devoted in Chapter 5 to the problem of lack of
coordination between agencies in requests for military assistance.
This projects a negative tone which is inappropriate when it is
also stated in the Chapter that the problem has been solved by the
formation of a "military assistance coordinating committee."
Customs has been the lead agency in utilizing military sup-
port as far back as 1970. The military assistance to the Customs
Air Program has been very beneficial and effective. This assis-
tance has included, but not been limited to, the loan of S-2D,
OV-l, 0-1, 0-2, U-10, T-39, UH1B, AH-1, and OH-6 aircraft; the
loan of land based radars; as well as a great deal of cooperative
use of NORAD radar and communications facilities.
The lack of usage of NORAD radar facilities is not for the
reason stated in the report. The same data fed to the NORAD
centers is being utilized by Customs, but at FAA centers instead
of NORAD at the present time. This is for the purposes of con-
venience and organizational structure. The point that the NORAD
radar has limited low level coverage is well taken. However, the
reason for this has little to do with the military. Most of the
radar antennas used by NORAD are owned and, almost all, controlled
by FAA. Because of FAA's safety requirements, the antennas are
quite appropriately aimed high for air traffic control.
Criticism that the use of the E-2C aircraft wasted flight
time when the balloon (SEEK SKYHOOK) was available, indicates a
lack of knowledge or understanding of the capabilities of each in
relation to the requirements of air and sea interdiction. The
statement that the E-2C has the capability of detecting both air
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APPENDIX IX APPENDIX IX
and sea targets is misleading. This capability is not well utilized
when trying to work both air and marine simultaneously. Some use
of the E-2C was made in marine interdiction but it was not all
that effective in detecting and tracking small vessels of 30 feet
and under.
In closing and in spite of our voluminous comments on the
draft report, I want to commend your data collectors for the
overall thorough job done in this effort. Again, I appreciate
having had the opportunity to comment.
Mr. William J. Anderson
Director, General Government Division
United States General Accounting Office
Washington, D.C. 20548
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D
a
TransIxwkelon
Mr. J. Dexter Peach
Director, Resources, Community
and Economic Development Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C. 20548
Assistant Secretary 400 Seventh St., S.W.
for Administration Washington, D.C. 20590
JAN 31 1983
We have enclosed two copies of the Department of Transportation's (DOT)
reply to the General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report, "Strong Central
Management And A More Definitive Strategy Needed To Improve Federal
Drug Interdiction Efforts," dated December 15, 1982.
GAO concluded that drug abuse in this country is a persistent and growing
problem. Interdiction of illegal drugs has limited impact on the drug flow.
The report contains a number of recommendations, which GAO believes will
improve the overall management and impact of Federal drug interdiction
efforts.
We concur with all of the recommendations in the report with the exception
of transferring marine drug intelligence activities conducted at Coast
Guard's Atlantic Area Command to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).
Being a central clearinghouse which can correlate information from many
sources, EPIC is a valuable source of information. However, EPIC does not
have the capability to receive, handle, process, store or disseminate the
highly classified intelligence information produced by the national
intelligence community. Therefore, the intelligence community probably will
not provide that classified material to EPIC for use by the Coast Guard and
others. In summary, EPIC should continue to be the central clearinghouse
for drug related intelligence. Our detailed comments on this and the other
recommendations are contained in the enclosed statement.
If we can be of further assistance, please let us know.
Sincerely,
obert airman
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DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REPLY
TO
GAO DRAFT REPORT OF DECEMBER 15, 1982
STRONG CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AND MORE DEFINITIVE STRATEGY
NEEDED TO IMPROVE FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS
SUMMARY OF GAO FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
GAO has observed that interdiction of illegal drugs has had
limited impact on the drug flow. GAO finds that strong central
management and a more definitive strategy are needed because the
authority and responsibility for Federal drug interdiction
efforts are split among three executive departments. GAO also
finds that Federal interdiction programs can be further strength-
ened by improving the quality and timeliness of intelligence and
by making well planned and coordinated use of military
assistance.
GAO's objectives in this study were to evaluate the results of
drug interdiction programs, the extent of cooperation and coordi-
nation among the various agencies, the role of intelligence in
interdiction efforts during fiscal years 1977 through part of
1982, and the ability of the military to assist in drug
interdiction.
GAO recommends (on pages vi or 52) that the President:
--direct the development of a more definitive Federal drug
strategy that stipulates the roles of the various agencies
with drug enforcement responsibilities, and
--make a clear delegation of responsibility to one group to
monitor and evaluate activities and demand corrective actions.
GAO makes the following recommendations (on pages 51, 52 and 67)
which affect the Department of Transportation and the U. S. Coast
Guard:
--the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Treasury and
Transportation direct DEA, Customs, and Coast Guard officials
to work together to develop a management information sys-
tem(s) which accumulates interdiction program results such as
drug seizures, level of prosecution, and case disposition, and
identifies the resources devoted to drug interdiction
programs.
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APPENDIX X APPENDIX X
--the Director, Office of Management and Budget accumulate
budgetary data on drug interdiction costs that is provided by
Coast Guard, Customs, and DEA, and submit this information to
Congress concurrent with these agencies' budget submissions.
--the Attorney General and the Secretaries of Treasury and
Transportation (1) direct DEA, Customs, and Coast Guard units
to promptly report all information on drug smuggling to EPIC,
and (2) provide additional staff and resources for increased
computer support to EPIC.
--the Secretary of Transportation direct the Commandant of the
Coast Guard to transfer to EPIC the marine drug intelligence
activities at the Atlantic Area Command and assign the staff
necessary to carry out such activities.
SUMMARY OF DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION POSITION
GAO has done outstanding work in developing this document. We
specifically want to note the fine research work of Denise
Strickley and David Houdelick, who worked at Coast Guard Head-
quarters for several months collecting data. We concur with all
of the recommendations made in this study with the exception of
transferring marine drug intelligence activities conducted at our
Atlantic Area Command to EPIC. As in any work of this magni-
tude, some problems have been found in the study methodology.
One important fact that is not mentioned is that the Coast Guard
has reprogrammed existing resources to expand its drug interdic-
tion involvement and not increased the numbers of people, cutters
or aircraft. in addition to modification to the GAO recommenda-
tions noted below, the following are areas where revision would
make the report more accurate:
1. GAO use of USCG drug interdiction budget expense
estimates are misleading.
2. USCG drug seizures are understated.
3. USCG court results are incomplete.
4. El Paso Intelligence Center's (EPIC) role is overstated.
5. Outdated USCG cost projections are used.
POSITION STATEMENT
A. Recommendation page 52: We concur that the Office of Manage-
ment and Bu get (OMB) should accumulate budgetary data on drug
interdiction costs; however, the method used to compare the
affected agencies should be subject to agency review and approval
to ensure accurate costs and interagency comparability. This
would assist OMB in assessing the various agency costs attribut-
able to drug interdiction.
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B. Recommendation page 67: The Coast Guard (USCG)-is already
sending all vessel sighting and drug seizure information to EPIC.
Also, unclassified USCG intelligence information is routinely
passed to EPIC through a computer data link.
C. Recommendation page 67: We do not concur with the transfer
of marine drug intelligence activities from Atlantic Area to
EPIC. Tactical intelligence analysis is necessary for the
Operational Commander of USCG units to effectively employ his
resources. The Atlantic Area law enforcement staff is small and
does not have a large "intelligence staff". The photo-
intelligence program is the only program targeted by GAO for
transfer, but it takes only partial time of one staff member.
(See the discussion of EPIC below in item D.4.)
D. Discussion of Recommended Revisions:
1. DRUG INTERDICTION BUDGET EXPENSES ARE MISLEADING -
While USCG expenditures on drug interdiction have increased from
FY77 to FY81, the increases have not been as dramatic as the
study indicates. The reasons for the increases are of interest,
but are not discussed in the study. It should be clearly stated
that the growth in drug interdiction expenditures is primarily
the result of reprogramming within existing Coast Guard resources
rather than the acquisition of new resources.
a. The shift of drug trafficking to maritime transpor-
tation led to the logical increase in USCG involvement. USCG '
resource involvement went from 22,000 hours in FY77 to 57,000 in
FY78 and 99,000 in FY81 (vice 19,000 in FY77 to 109,000 in FY81
as stated on page 13, paragraph 3). Prior to FY79 the Coast
Guard did not differentiate in its record keeping between drug
interdiction and fisheries law enforcement resource hours.
Therefore,.FY77 and FY78 are estimates. Table I contains a
detailed break-down of our budget and resource involvement
figures.
b. The cost of USCG operations can be difficult to
determine. Seldom are resources dedicated exclusively to a
single mission. They do other jobs, many times concurrently.
Costs submitted with the USCG budget must be used carefully since
they may not be a precise reflection of the cost for any single
mission. Changes in actual expenditures for programs reflect
both changes in the budget, which affect the resources available,
and the allocation of those resources among the programs. The
amounts submitted in the budget (Standard Form 300), which were
apparently used by the GAO study; were estimates even trough
labelled "actual". Unfortunately, the data necessary to
determine actual costs is not available until several months
after that submission. Revised actual costs are submitted to the
Congressional Record when they become available. For the two key
years, FY77 and FY81, the actual costs for law enforcement were
different from budget estimates as allocations of resources
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varied widely from projections. The total Enforcement of Laws
and Treaties (ELT) OE expenditures were $133M in FY77 and $288M
in FY81 (vice $94M and $318M on page 13 paragraph 3). Drug
enforcement expenditures are determined by the proportion of the
ELT resources dedicated to it as distin-guished from fisheries
and other enforcement. The table on page 13 should be revised
accordingly.
C. GAO's study group staff, while working at USCG
Headquarters, did a detailed analysis of USCG drug interdiction
and other ELT resource allocations and costs. The results of
their analysis provided an accurate representation of the drug
interdiction costs in relation to total ELT costs. That analysis
showed that the Coast Guard's drug interdiction activities as a
percentage of their total law enforcement program was as follows:
The results have been very useful in our own planning and
analysis work; yet we could find no application of these findings
in the draft report. For FY77 the drug enforcement costs total-
led $25M and for FY81 they were $150M, including all support and
overhead costs. This contrasts with $18M and $197M as stated in
the table on page 13 of the GAO report.
d. Much of the increase in the USCG's drug interdic-
tion costs can be attributed to general inflation, especially in
fuel and maintenance. Drug interdiction operating expenses
increased 6 fold from FY77 to FY81, but in real terms using a
very conservative inflation rate of 10 percent the increase was
about 4 fold (vice 11 fold as stated on page 13 paragraph 1).
The actual hours spent on drug interdiction in FY81 were about
4.5 times the FY77 level. Much of the increased time was spent
by less expensive units, such as smaller patrol boats, but costs
for all resources have gone up.
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2. SEIZURE STATISTICS ARE INACCURATE - The use of the
Customs Law Enforcement Activity Report (CLEAR) system for both
Customs and USCG seizure data results in gross errors. CLEAR
does not contain all of the USCG's seizures. Our seizure cases
where drugs are destroyed at sea or are turned over to DEA will
not involve Customs and will not be included in CLEAR. We
believe implementation of the report's recommendation that
subject agencies develop compatible management information
system(s) including seizure, prosecution and resource level data
will be a major step in improving accuracy of such statistics.
a. The USCG seizure data base contains no double-
counting. We do not receive marijuana from other agencies for
disposal and those cases in which we assist other agencies are
easily identified. Our data base should be used to remove the
double-counting in the aggregated federal drug seizure statis-
tics. Table II is attached to show our seizures and arrests for
USCG and USCG assistance cases. For example, in FY81 the USCG
seized 3.774M pounds of marijuana and the total of all marijuana
seized was probably about 6.766M pounds (close to the GAO esti-
mate on page 36). These USCG seizures represent about 55.8
percent of the total marijuana seized. Pages 20 and 36 of the
report should be revised.
b. The CLEAR data base has not been verified by the
USCG for completeness or accuracy. We believe it does not accur-
ately reflect USCG interdiction operations. Also, we did not
find any indication that the EPIC data base was used to either
verify the CLEAR seizure data or to explore agency information
submission to EPIC.
c. Page 15 of the report states that a cumulative
percent of drugs seized from fiscal years 1977 to 1982 is a good
indicator of impact. By using this procedure, the drug seizure
impact for each year is masked by the accumulation of past data
and gives only average values from FY77. The impact of recent
enforcement is diluted as more of the previous years' efforts and
seizures are accumulated. A better reflection of impact should
be derived from the annual percent of drugs seized because it
relates to changes in the budget, changes in strategy, how
resources are employed and other time dependent factors.
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APPENDIX X
3. U.S. COURT RESULTS ARE INCOMPLETE - It is true that
historic data on the disposition and outcome of those arrested
for drug smuggling is lacking. However, the study fails to focus
on recent information.
a. Table III, Seventh District Drug Seizures Prosecu-
tion Profile, shows the effect of the passage of Public Law 96-
350 which was signed by the President and became effective on
15 September 1980. Due to a Congressional oversight in 1970 the
part of the law which made mere possession of illicit drugs on
the high seas a crime was deleted, and it became necessary to
prove a conspiracy to import to convict smugglers. PL 96-350
corrected this problem, but this oversight had a significant
impact on the prosecution of smugglers over most of the period of
this study. Since passage of PL 96-350, significantly greater
numbers of those individuals arrested for drug trafficking are
prosecuted and the percentage of those tried and convicted has
increased from below 50 percent to approximately 90 percent.
b. Customs and USCG case results should initially be
considered separately. Aggregating them tends to
indiscriminately complicate findings on not only the maritime
versus air modes of transportation but the effectiveness of the
agencies and the quality of the laws they are enforcing.
c. The basic problems pointed out in the study concern
the courts and U.S. Attorneys themselves. Short prison sentences
are surely a judicial problem. We suggest that recommendations
concerning the judicial system be developed to correct these
short-comings.
d. It is incorrect to state on page 37 that only DEA
has authority to present cases involving violations of Federal
narcotics laws to U.S. Attorneys for Federal prosecutions. Both
Customs and the USCG have such authority.
e. The Attorney General has authorized both Customs
and the USCG to conduct investigations in narcotics cases. The
statement on page 38 that only DEA can perform follow-up investi-
gations and present those cases to the U.S. Attorney should be
corrected (see U.S. v. Harrington, 681F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1982)).
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4. EPIC's ROLE IS-OVERSTATED - The value of intelligence
in drug interdiction is undeniable. However, it is doubtful that
all our problems with intelligence can be solved by bolstering
EPIC as it is presently constituted.
a. EPIC is a valuable source of information and
analysis, being a central clearing house which can correlate
information from many sources.
b. The various agencies operate differently and have
specific jurisdictions. This leads to unique needs for intelli-
gence. The USCG generally deals with catching smugglers "in the
act", which requires timely receipt of any information regarding
actual smuggling trips. Other agencies may spend months develop-
ing a case against a particular person or group, so intelligence
requirements are less time sensitive. Dealing with the often
conflicting information requirements of several agencies is
difficult.
c. EPIC does not control nor target the intelligence
gathering operations. Even intelligence gathering by the Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) is decentralized to a great
extent to meet the quick-response, tactical needs of the agency.
The USCG and other agencies have this same need for regionalized
intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination.
d. EPIC does not control the resources which will
respond to intelligence; nor should it. In managing interdiction
operations the USCG responds to a flow of information regarding
smuggling vessels. This is an interactive process where the
balance between mission needs and available resources must be
continually evaluated.
e. EPIC does not have the capability to receive,
handle, process, store or disseminate the highly classified
intelligence information produced by the national intelligence
community. Therefore, the community probably will not provide
that classified material to EPIC for use by the USCG and others.
f. In summary, EPIC should continue to be the central
clearing house for drug related intelligence. The availability of
other agency data is vital to conducting enforcement operations.
However, the majority of an agency's intelligence needs can only
be met by operations tailored to its particular enforcement
methods, controlled and directed by the agency itself, and close-
ly tied to the command and control of its other resources. Both
EPIC and individual agency intelligence operations should be
enhanced.
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5. OUTDATED USCG COST PROJECTIONS ARE USED - The section
on page 27 of the report entitled "Interdic"-ion Would Need
Billions of Dollars in Additional Resources'to Stop Drug Flow"
contains cost and percentage of interdiction estimates ($2.3B,
75% interdiction) which were first developed in 1979. Since
that time however, the substantial increase in drug trafficking
intelligence and the coordination of efforts among law
enforcement agencies fighting against smuggling by land, sea or
air have allowed us to revise those early estimates.
Assuming the Coast Guard would have access to timely tacti-
cal intelligence, we believe we can essentially deny the seaborne
routes to the smugglers and significantly disrupt the maritime
trafficking in marijuana for a dollar figure considerably less
than that previously stated.
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$2/89
1/4/83
OG EXPEND17UPES FOR DRUG INTEIMICTION
IN MI I ,
FISCAL YEAR
% (MANGE FY77-81
us r
FY77
FY78
FY79
FY80
FY81 Gross
10 % Inflation
ELT Resource BYs (1) 116K
151K
148K
171K
145K
25%
Drug Resource We (1) 22K (9)
57K (9)
93K
91K
99K
350%
Drug % of ELT Resource
Bra 19% (9)
38% (9)
63%
53%
68%
Drug % of ELT $ (2) 19% (9)
35% (9)
44%
37%
52%
Total OG Budget (3) $ 836M
921M
986M
1113M
$1336M
60%
9%
ELT Budget
(including support)(3) 94M
143M
166M
203M
318M
238%
131%
ELT Actual (w/o
support) (4) 95M
122M
133M
17914
21114
122%
52%
% of Budget For
Support Prog (5) 28.5%
23.7%
25.7%
25.7%
26.1%
ELT Actual (in-
cluding support) (6) 133M
159M
179M
241M
286M
ELT Actual (adjusted
support) (7) 133M
159M
180M
242M
28814
Drug Enforcement
Expenditures 25M
56M
79M
90M
150M
Non-Drug Enforceaent
Expenditures (8) - $10814
10314
10IN
152H
$13814
NOTffi: (1) Based on Abstract of Operations.
(2) Based on Abstract of Operations and cost by resource type.
(3) From OG congressional stage budget, breakdown by program is tensed
'Actual' but is really. an estimate as Final Abstract of operations
not available. The real ELT expenditures are in line labeled
'ELT Actual (adjusted support)'.
(4) Actual expenditures based on Final Abstract of Operations, not including
cost of support programs (all actual expenditures including operating
and support programs provided for Congressional Record).
(5) Tbtal by Support Program costs - total OG CE Budget.
(6)- Pro rata cost of support based on strict I.
(7) Adjusts for higher 'usage' of some support progress by some operating
programs,
(8) The non-drug ELT budget is about 90% fisheries and 10% other enforosaent,
except for FY80, when it was about 45% fisheries and 55% other due to
Cuban Exodus.
(9) Estimated - abstract of OPS did not breakdown law Enforcement by drug,
fisheries and other enforcement until FY79.
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APPENDIX X
TABLE II
COASI GUAR MARIJUaNA SEIZURES
(THOUSANDS OF FOUNDS)
APPENDIX X
$3/A5
G-OLE
12/29/82
m m
m
1 m
By USC6
754
3,005
2,850
1,175
3,774
3,514
BY OTHER AGENCIES
WITH C6 ASSIST-
137.
267
340
316
287
183
INCLUDES MJ SEIZED ON VESSELS AND MJ FOUND FLOATING AT SEA-
COAST GUARD ARRESTS
(NUMBER OF INDIVIDUALS)
m
m
m
=
m
m
By USCG
185
736
510
319
939
1,052
BY OTHER AGENCIES
WITH CG ASSIST.
54
90
112
89
61
79
SOURCE: USCG LAW ENFORCEMENT INFORMATION SYSTEM
DRUG INTERDICTION STATISTICS 12/8/82
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G-OLE
M6-A8
9 AUGUST 1982
TOTAL SEIZURES
WITH PERSONS ON BOARD (P08)
SEIZURES WITHOUT POB
U.S. VESSELS SEIZED
WITH POB
SEVENTH DISTRICT DRUG SEIZURES PROSECUTION PROFILE
(ELEVENTH CIRCUIT. FORT SLY FIFTH CIRCUIT)
ON SEPTEMBER 15, 1980, PUBLIC LAW 96-350 WAS PASSED AND REMOVED THE
REQUIREMENT TO PROVE CONSPIRACY TO IMPORT CONTRABAND? NOW ONLY THE INTENT TO
IMPORT AND DISTRIBUTE CONTRABAND MUST BE PROVEN. THE FOLLOWING TABLE TRACKS
THE VESSEL SEIZURES AND ARRESTS THROUGH THE LEGAL SYSTEM AND SHOWS THE
CHANGES IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS IN THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT DUE TO PL-96-350 AS
COMPILED ON JANUARY 18, 1982.
1 JAN14 SEP 15 S~ 31 DEC
~ 14$1
TABLE III
25 65 118
6 11
21 58
FOREIGN
WITH VESSEL SEIZED 2
SATELESS VESSELS SEIZED
ES 2 6
STATE PROSECUTION OF CASE 1 5
FEDERAL PROSECUTION ACCEPTED 16 51
FEDERAL CASES IN WHICH
AT LEAST ONE DEFENDANT
CONVICTED 10 33
FEDERAL CASES DISMISSED
OR ALL DEFENDANTS ACQUITTED 3 3
NUMBER OF FEDERAL CASES 0 1
PENDING PROSECUTION
STATUS OF FEDERAL PROSECUTION
UNKNOWN AT TIME OF COMPILATION 3 14
INDIVIDUALS ARRESTED 126 373
97
15
6
7
91
33
53
4
615
*6 CASES RESULTED IN PARTIAL ACQUITTAL/CONVICTIONS, THE REMAINDER RESULTED IN
THE CONVICTION OF ALL DEFENDANTS-
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TABLE III
SEVENTH DISTRICT DRUG SEIZURES PROSECUTION PROFILE
(ELEVENTH CIRCU11, EQM~RLY-FIFTH CIRCUIT)
1 JANJAN 14 SEP 15 S
INDIVIDUALS ACCEPTED FOR
PROSECUTION
NUMBER OF DEFENDANTS TRIED 51
BY DATE OF COMPILATION
NUMBER OF DEFENDANTS
CONVICTED AT TRIAL
31 DEC
143
1581
419
162
23 136 139
R RCENT OF CASES WHERE
DERAL PROSECUTION ACCEPTED 64% 78% 77%
(ANY PROSECUTION) (68%) (86x) (83%)
PERCENT CONVICTION OF CASES
GOING TO TRIAL IN WHICH AT
LEAST ONE DEFENDANT CONVICTED 77% 92% 97%
PERCENT OF DEFENDANTS TRIED
WHICH WERE CONVICTED 45% 95% 86%
THE 1981 STATISTICS SHOW THAT AS OF JANUARY 18, 1982, 86% OF THOSE INDIVIDUALS
HAVING BEEN BROUGHT TO TRIAL WERE CONVICTED-
A REVIEW OF THE SENTENCES RECEIVED AS A RESULT OF THESE CONVICTIONS INDICATED THE
AVERAGE IMPRISONMENT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA IS 1.9 YEARS WHILE ALL
OTHER DISTRICTS SHOWED A 4.1 YEAR AVERAGE. IT IS ANTICIPATED THAT PL 96-350 WILL
CONTINUE TO HAVE A VERY SIGNIFICANT EFFECT ON THE JUDICIAL RESULTS OF COAST GUARD
SEIZURE CASES.
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I*1'\HT\II:NT OF S'I''\TE
( ornp(rolbv
Il n..hnrgtrrn. I).('. 20510
12 JAN 1983
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM
CLASSIFIED ATTACHMENT
Mr. Frank C. Conahan
Director
International Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, D. C.
I am replying to your letter of December 15, 1982 which
forwarded copies of the draft report: "Strong Central
Management and More Definitive Strategy Needed to Improve Drug
Interdiction Efforts."
The enclosed comments on this report were prepared by the
Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of International Narcotics
Matters.
We appreciate having had the opportunity to review and
comment on the draft report. If I may be of further
assistance, I trust you will let me know.
Sincerely,
Rogers B. Feldman
Enclosure:
As Stated.
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED WHEN SEPARATED FROM CLASSIFIED
ATTACHMENT
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GAO DRAFT REPORT: STRONG CENTRAL MANAGEMENT AND A DEFINITIVE
STRATEGY NEEDED TO IMPROVE FEDERAL DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORTS
Comment on Recommendation
The report recommends (page 67) that "the Secretary of
State prepare a Narcotics Assessment and Strategy Paper and, if
found to be warranted, follow up with projects designed to aid
interdiction efforts."
The Department (Bureau of International Narcotics
Matters-INM) has prepared a strategy paper for the Caribbean.
A copy of the 1981 strategy is attached. While not in the form
of a Narcotics Assessment and Strategy Paper (NASP) which are
country-specific, this regional strategy identifies relevant
narcotics issues, describes programs, and outlines plans for
the Caribbean. It is currently being revised to reflect the
recommendations made at our regional conference in Panama in
October, 1982, where we met with Federal agencies involved in
drug control, including those agencies concerned with
interdiction in the Caribbean: the U.S. Coast Guard, Customs,
and the Drug Enforcement Administration. A copy of the revised
Caribbean strategy will be forwarded to GAO when completed.
Specific Comments on text
The Department of State is both an important collector of
narcotics intelligence information and the primary consumer of
finished intelligence on policy-level international narcotics
developments. The Department took the lead in pressing
National Foreign Intelligence Boaid ;NFIB) agencies to expand
their narcotics intelligence collection roles. The Department
has been a long-time advocate of closer coordination between
NFIB collectors and U.S. law enforcement organizations which
collect foreign narcotics information in the performance of
their international roles. The Department has particularly
sought enhanced coordination of these activities under the
guidance of the Director of Central Intelligence.
DEA has the responsibility for tactical narcotics
intelligence development, which is most frequently used in
support of interdiction efforts. The Central Intelligence
Agency -- not mentioned in this report -- is an important
source of strategic narcotics intelligence and, under Executive
Order, is responsible for coordinating foreign intelligence on
narcotics. Considerable strategic information is developed by
State Department officers in the course of their duties.
We suggest that the references on these pages to State's
role in intelligence be modified to reflect this information.
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The draft report states that "State's program has spent
very little in the Caribbean area over the past 5 years. To
date only a few individuals from Caribbean area countries have
been trained; also, limited support has been provided to the
Coast Guard in its role in the Inter American Marine
Intelligence Network which includes some Caribbean area
countries. Financial assistance has also been provided to
purchase a vessel for the Bahamas. The total cost of these
projects is less than $25,000."
The draft report is incorrect on the extent of INH efforts.
While our priority is on crop control, we do recognize the
necessity of interdiction efforts in the Caribbean. We have
and will continue to support programs in the Caribbean designed
to aid the interdiction effort, and we support other U.S.
agencies by obtaining the support of foreign governments.
INM obligations for interdiction programs in the Caribbean
over the five years covered by the report are about $5
million. This includes $2,224,000 in INM funding for a project
by Colombian Customs which is designed to interdict trafficking
in the Caribbean; a special project undertaken by the
Colombian Navy which includes INM providing a ship (valued at
$2,210,000) which will be used for narcotics patrols in the
Caribbean and Pacific; and, more than $400,000 in other
interdiction projects throughout the region.
INM funds international anti-narcotics training which is
provided by the DEA and U.S. Customs. In just the past two
years, 225 persons from the Caribbean islands, as well as 233
persons from Central America and Mexico, received INM-funded
enforcement training, either in the U.S. or their own
countries. These 458 persons represent approximately 20
percent of foreign nationals trained through INM programs in FY
1981 and 1982.
Dominick DDiCarlo
Assistant Secretary
Bureau of International Narcotics Matters
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APPENDIX XI APPENDIX XI
MANPOWER.
RESERVE AFFAIRS
AND LOGISTICS
Mr. William J. Anderson
Director, General Government Division
U.S. General Accounting Office
Washington, DC 20548
10 FEB 1983
This is in response to your December 15, 1982, letter to the
Secretary of Defense forwarding copies of your draft report,
"Strong Central Management and a More Definitive Strategy Needed
to Improve Drug Interdiction Efforts." (GAO Code 263850, OSD Case
/6155)
As indicated in the attached outline of the major Findings
and Conclusions relative to the Defense Department, we concur
entirely in your views. It is suggested, however, that you amend
your statement on Page 84 that "According to DoD officials, all
current agreements now stipulate whether reimbursement by law
enforcement agencies is required." While it remains DoD policy
to seek reimbursement where costs are incurred, not all
agreements address the issue of reimbursement directly. For
instance, where no costs are incurred by DoD in lending requested
support, the agreement is likely to be silent on the matter.
Thank you for affording us the opportunity to comment on the
draft report.
rtpa! Dtbu)j Assistant
((Manpower, Reserve Atf-9n, and Logistics)
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FINDINGS
o FINDING A: Posse Comitatus Act (the Act) limited military
assistance to law enforcement. GAO found that while the Act
permits "passive" or "indirect" aid, military leaders are
cautious in providing assistance since clear definitions of
these terms do not exist; that law enforcement officials
hesitated to request assistance because of the Act; and that
the Act was amended in December 1981 to remove certain
restrictions or ambiguities and facilitate cooperation between
military and civilian officials. (pp.69 and 70)
o FINDING B: Despite the Act, in the past the military still
assisted law enforcement. GAO states that between 1971 and
1981, 90 percent of requests for assistance were approved and
provided training, transportation, equipment, facilities and
use of personnel. In addition, local commanders have
authorized numerous unofficial minor types of assitance. Drug
Enforcement Agency personnel provided examples and told GAO
representatives that military assistance in these projects was
valuable and demonstrated the potential for use of military
resources for drug interdiction. (pp. 71 to 73)
o FINDING C: Several factors continue to limit military
assistance. GAO found that although assistance has increased,
the different purposes of military systems and law enforcement
in terms of compatability, cost, and national security still
limit military participation. (p. 75)
o FINDING D: Concerned about a lack of coordination and
planning, the Joint Chiefs of Staff in March, 1982 noted that
there must be a central civil authority which assimilates and
coordinates all requests to DoD for assistance to civil law
enforcement agencies. In response to this concern, a
committee comprised of Coast Guard, DEA, Customs, and DoD was
formed, has met monthly to discuss both long term plans and
specific requests, and (according to DoD officials) all
current agreements now stipulate whether reimbursement by law
enforcement agencies is required.
DoD Comment: Not all agreements so stipulate.
CONCLUSIONS
o CONCLUSION 1: GAO concluded that although changes to the law
since 1981 have increased military participation in drug
interdiction, military assistance is necessarily limited
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APPENDIX XI APPENDIX XI
because of potential adverse military mission impact, its high
cost with reimbursement requirements beyond law enforcement
means, and protection of national security. (p. 68)
o CONCLUSION 2: Based on examples provided, GAO concluded that
the 1981 changes to the Posse Comitatus Act have encouraged
greater participation by the military in drug interdiction
efforts, but that the full impact cannot yet be determined.
(pp. 74 and 75)
o CONCLUSION 3: On the basis of its review, GAO concluded that
the military can provide valuable assistance to law
enforcement in the areas of air and sea interdiction, with
certain limitations. The formation of a DoD/law enforcement
agency group should ensure better planned projects and more
efficient use of military equipment in the future. (p. 84)
(2G3850)
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AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER
UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20548
OFFICIAL BUSINESS
PENALTY FOR PRIVATE USE,$300
POSTAGE AND FEES PAID
U. S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE
SPECIAL FOURTH CLASS RATE
BOOK
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