NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B00017R000500150001-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 213
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 8, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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UNITED STATES
TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE
ON INTELLIGENCE
FULL COMMITTEE
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Wednesday, April 8, 1987
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510
1 OCA 87-2437
cy#
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CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF: PAGE
The Honorable John C. Danforth,
A United States Senator from
the State of Missouri 24
The Honorable Christopher S. Bond,
A United States Senator from
the State of Missouri 28
The Honorable William H. Webster,
Nominee to be
Director of Central Intelligence
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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM H. WEBSTER
TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Wednesday, April 8, 1987
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United States Senate,
*Select Committee on Intelligence
Washington, D. C.
The Select Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:13
o'clock a.m., in Room SD-628, Dirksen Senate Office Building,
the Honorable David Boren, Chairman of the Committee,
presiding.
Present: Senators Boren, Nunn, Hollings, Bradley,
Cranston, DeConcini, Metzenbaum, Cohen, Roth, Hatch, Murkowski,
Specter, Hecht and Warner.
Also Present: Sven E. Holmes, Staff Director/General
Counsel; James Dykstra, Minority Staff Director; and Kathleen
McGhee, Chief Clerk.
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PROCEEDINGS
THE CHAIRMAN: The Committee will come to order.
We are here today to consider the nomination of
William H. Webster to be the Director of Central
Intelligence. This hearing itself is a unique occasion
I know of no other nation where the selection of the top
intelligence official would receive so much scrutiny.
This process reflects our determination that while a
democracy must legitimately protect the secrecy of some
information and operations, the intelligence gathering
process must still be ultimately accountable to the
people through their elected representatives.
Through this confirmation process, our
responsibilities as the members of the Select Committee
is to determine whether this nominee is qualified to
serve as the Director of Central Intelligence.
Accordingly, it is our responsibility to undertake a
careful, thorough and fair examination of the background
of this nominee. We do this in troubled times; in the
midst of the present investigations by two special
Congressional Committees and by an independent counsel
of a covert action program involving allegations of
illegal or improper activities by high government
officials, including the CIA.
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This Committee and the Senate have a duty to the
American people to ensure that the new Director of
Central Intelligence will conduct a program of effective
intelligence gathering within the framework.of our laws
and our democratic institutions. It is imperative that
the Director of Central Intelligence be a person of
exceptional ability and integrity, capable of exercising
the independence necessary to protect against any
possible misuse of the Agency and its resources.
Judge Webster, I welcome you and feel certain that
you recognize the magnitude of the new challenge that
you have accepted. I would add to that challenge by
asking that in responding to our questions today, you
keep in mind the pressing need for this nation to bring
order to the disarray in our foreign policy, and the
need for all of us to go forward together in a
bipartisan way to constructively address the urgent and
important problems which we face.
As DCI, you would have three roles to perform:
senior intelligence advisor to the President of the
United States; coordinator of the entire intelligence
community; and Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency. I am sure that part of your deliberation
concerning your decision to accept this nomination
centered upon the tremendous burdens that you know from
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your experience in counterintelligence, rests on the
shoulders of the Director of Central Intelligence.
You have served as the Chairman of the Interagency
Group on Counterintelligence, a committee of the
National Security Council. The first National
Counterintelligence Strategy was developed under your
leardership, improving the coordination between the FBI,
the CIA, and other related agencies.
If confirmed as DCI, you will chair the Senior
Interagency Group on Intelligence of the National
Security Council, which greatly increases your
responsibilities to further develop the overall National
Intelligence Strategy. We must continue to concentrate
on long-term strategic planning to meet the ever
expanding need for timely and accurate information.
The competing demands upon the budget and the
limited resources we have available make this job even
more difficult. Great advances have been made in our
intelligence capabilities, but we must continue to
invest in this most important endeavor.
Our entire intelligence effort depends upon
dedicated and professional career personnel, and this
requires concentrated attention to improve career
incentives and training in order to recruit the best
possible available talent, and also to retain present
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valued employees. And this Committee has again and
again put emphasis on the personnel system and the need
to continue to upgrade it and improve it.
There appears to be some progress in the ongoing
arms control talks between the United States and the
Soviet Union. That makes it imperative for us to
analyze the present methods of verification and to
correct any shortcomings in order to guarantee our
national security. And if you are confirmed to this
post as Director of Central Intelligence, of course
those of us who serve on this Committee jointly have a
heavy responsibility in the area of assuring the ability
to verify any arms control agreement.
This Committee is interested in your activities
with respect to the Iran-contra matter, and we
appreciate your responding to some written questions
that the Vice Chairman and I sent to you to supplement
the standard Committee questionnaire for nominees. We
harve also received letters regarding your nomination
from Representative Don Edwards, Chairman of the House
Judiciary Subcommittee that oversees the FBI, and from
Representative Pat Schroeder. Both are concerned about
recent allegations of improper FBI activity. In
addition, we have received statements from the Center
for Constitutional Rights, the National Committee
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Against Repressive Legislation, and from the Arab
American Institute. Without objection, these statements
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and letters will be
placed in
the record
at this
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point.
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(The documents
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THE CHAIRMAN: Also, I would like to enter at this
point into the record for consideration by the
Committee, the background and financial disclosure
statement filed by Judge Webster with the Committee,
pursuant to Committee Rule 5.6. And I would also
mention that the Committee has taken action to authorize
the Chairman to release unclassified excerpts of the
testimony of Attorney General Meese before the Select
Committee on Intelligence during the preliminary inquiry
into the sale of arms to Iran and possible diversion of
funds to the Nicaraguan resistance. And without
objection, this testimony by Attorney General Meese
before the Committee will be entered into the record at
this point.
(The document referred to follows:)
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THE CHAIRMAN: At this time I will turn to the
other members of the Committee for opening statements
and comments which they might have, beginning with the
Vice Chairman, Senator Cohen.
SENATOR COHEN: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Webster, I want to welcome you to the
Committee this morning along with the two Show-Me
Senators from Missouri. Of course, we have had a chance
to work with you in the past several years in your
capacity as FBI Director, and in that position you have
had primary responsibility for U.S. counterintelligence
activities within this country. And personally, I
believe that your willingness to serve as Director of
Central Intelligence after those nine years as Director
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation really does set
an exemplary standard for public service. I think the
President ought to be congratulated for nominating a man
of your integrity and demonstrated ability to this
important post.
As I understand it, this represents your fifth
confirmation proceeding. I think by this time you know
what to do and we'll see if we can't make it
interesting.
This comes at a time when the CIA and the
intelligence community as a whole are in a degree of
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turmoil, when their involvement in the Iran arms sale
and the assistance to the Nicaraguan contras is the
subject of investigations and of media inquiry, when we
have shrinking budgets that are forcing difficult
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programmatic decisions, and when it appears that there
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are serious deficiencies in the security measures needed
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to protect intelligence operations.
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So in short, today, perhaps more than at any other
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time in this Administration, the job calls for strong
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leadership, for someone who can represent the
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intelligence community's interests effectively and
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credibly, and who can restore the public's confidence in
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the intelligence community and its activities. I
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believe your appointment as Director of Central
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Intelligence would provide that strength and assurance.
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As you know, and as the Chairman has indicated, you
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wear at least two hats, possibly three, one as
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coordinator of the U.S. intelligence activities, and the
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other as head of the Central Intelligence Agency. In
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both capacities, the focus of the DCI's activities is
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external to the United States in collecting and
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analyzing information necessary to support our defense
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and foreign policy objectives and in undertaking other
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types of operations, specifically covert operations.
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These are areas that have not, for the most part,
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been an integral part of your prior professional
training and experience, either as an attorney, a
Federal judge, or more recently, as FBI Director.
Accordingly, neither this Committee nor the
American people have a very clear perception of your
views on a number of fundamental questions, views' which
we ought to know prior to voting on your confirmation as
DCI. These questions would include issues such as
covert action, the strengths and weaknesses of our
intelligence community, how you view the
responsibilities of the DCI toward the President and
especially toward this Congress.
I am hopeful that we can use the public hearing to
explore some of these topics with you and establish a
firmer understanding of your views in these areas for
which you will be responsible if confirmed.
According to today's Washington Post, you intend to
indicate that the Attorney General treated you like a
"shunned lover" on the issue of the FBI's interest in
investigating the Iran arms sale; that you offered your
services, but the phone call never came. I can assure
you that if you are confirmed as the Director, this
Committee will call upon your services. We'll be sure
to call you at least once a day.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Senator DeConcini.
SENATOR DeCONCINI: Mr. Chairman, I, too, welcome
Judge Webster, and concur with our colleagues as to the
outstanding service you have given to this country,
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Judge Webster, even before you were nominated by
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President Carter to be the Director of the FBI, as a
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Federal jurist. I think as FBI Director you have
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brought a tremendous amount of credibility to that
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agency, even though there are still and probably always
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will be certain criticisms of some of its actions, which
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are necessary to be carried out in at least your
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judgment and your subordinates. I welcome your
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nomination, Judge Webster.
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I feel that the CIA itself, though its budget has
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increased immensely under former Director Casey, has
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never, at least in the ten years I have been here, has
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the-CIA been in such shambles. Nor has it had such
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image problems nationally and internationally of being
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an agency which is not tuned in, not under control, and
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doesn't know what it is doing. I don't think that is the
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case, but I believe that at least from my constituents
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and my travel, it is certainly the perception. You will
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face the problem of how do you bring credibility that
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you were able to bring to the FBI.
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I want to assure you that I believe, in my short
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tenure on' this Committee, but even before, looking at
the quality of people who serve as Chairman and Vice
Chairman and the other members on this Committee, that
you have people here who are prepared to assist you and
not be destructive in maintaining and building the
intelligence community capacity to serve this nation.
I hope that you will feel comfortable after you're
confirmed, to confide and to consult with this
Committee, as often as you can.
I am a firm believer that foreign policy, including
covert activities, is based on a consensus, on a
bipartisan basis, and when President Reagan or Carter or
anyone else has run into problems, it is because he has
decided not to buildg a consensus. It is the Director
of the CIA who makes the difference, in my judgment, in
building that consensus. That is one of the reasons I
am so pleased and proud that the President has appointed
you, because I think you have proven you have that
capacity. I wish you every success.
I have some questions, Mr. Director, that I will
ask later, of course. I want you to understand these
are questions that are not of a critical nature, but I
feel should be laid out in the record. Perhaps someone
else with more seniority may already have touched on
those questions, and if so, I will remain silent.
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Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Senator
DeConcini. Senator Roth.
SENATOR ROTH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to welcome you, Judge Webster. I was
very, pleased when the President sent your name up for
this very, very important position.
Judge Webster, I was on the Floor this morning
introducing a package of espionage legislation for the
100th Congress. It is a broad series of measures that
I believe will address some of our most serious problems
in what could be called the Decade of the Spy. Now, my
reason for bringing this up at this time is that I do
intend to ask for your views, both as the Director of
the FBI and as the nominee to be the new Director. of
Central Intelligence. Senator Dole joined me in this
legislation, which will include a number of separate
proposals, and .I will advise you what they are so that
we can proceed when it becomes my turn to raise
questions. The question of restrictions on Soviet bloc
personnel, or the satellite nations, whether we should
have some restrictions on them in this country. The
question of whether there should be the death penalty
for very, very serious spy offenses. The United Nations
is proposing a new office for research and collection of
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domestic information in each member country as to the
political situation, whether or not this offers an
opportunity for spying. And finally, I will be asking
some questions on the current impasse over the new U.S.
embassy in Moscow, whether or not we should permit the
Soviet Union to occupy the proposed buildings in the
city of Washington.
I think these are pertinent questions, and again,
Judge Webster, I want to welcome you here today.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Senator Roth.
Senator Hatch.
SENATOR HATCH: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.,
Judge Webster, I have had a lot of contact with you
as a member of the Judiciary Committee over the last ten
years, and I just want to compliment you for your
selection for this position. And I will be very
interested in the hearings and will pay a great deal of
attention. I have a conflict, because we have the
Catastrophic Health Hearings upstairs in my other
Committee, but I will be coming in and out. We just
appreciate the service you have given to the country.
We'll look forward to these hearings clearing the air
and also Look forward to your confirmation and your
work as the Director of Central Intelligence.
I think you'll find that it will be just as
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interesting if not more so than Director of the FBI, and
I look forward to working with you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Senator Hatch. Senator
Specter.
SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Judge Webster, I join my *colleagues in welcoming
you here this morning. There is no more important job
in the Federal government, perhaps short of the
presidency, than the one that you have been nominated
for, and I think had there ever been any doubt about
that, it would have been dispelled by the events of the
past six months with respect to what has happened on the
sale of arms to Iran and the diversion of funds to the
contras.
Certainly the U.S. intelligence gathering operation
is one of enormous importance in many respects. First,
on foreign policy, if we are to have a successful
foreign policy the CIA has to do its job on intelligence
gathering. Beyond the function of gathering of
intelligence itself, then there is the responsibility to
advise the President on those Findings. And I think
that requires independence and it requires restraint.
And it may require - perhaps does require -- telling
the President what he doesn't want to hear on occasion,
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and perhaps even repeating it when he doesn't want to
hear it. And beyond advising the President, it is the
responsibility to tell the Congressional Oversight
Committees what the Congressional Oversight Committees
have a right to know.
There may be some problem perhaps on the
longstanding issue of serving two masters -- I don't
think so -- because every official has an obligation to
follow the law, and if there is a viblation of law,
especially ranking officials have an obligation to
follow the law on an independent basis.
If our intelligence operations are to be
successful, there is a real need for covert action, and
at this time the covert action has fallen under
disrepute because of the issues of an appropriate
Finding, the issue of timely notice to this Committee.
These questions will obviously be paramount in these
proceedings, because we do not have to ask you
hypothetical questions as to how you would discharge
your duties as Director of the CIA because we have a
case in point where we are trying to define standards
for the appropriate role of timely notification and
appropriate disclosure to the Congressional Oversight
Committees.
As you know from our prior conversations, I have
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certain questions that I want to ask you about Abscam.
And I do join in the welcome here and look forward to
your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Senator Specter. Senator
Warner.
SENATOR WARNER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I join others in welcoming this distinguished
public servant and, on behalf of the citizens of this
country, thank you for taking on this assignment rather
than returning to the private sector and enriching
yourself.
I, too, will join in the questions raised by my
colleague from Pennsylvania concerning your relationship
with the President. Not particularly this President,
but the CIA Direct-or has a very special relationship
with any President - particularly your ability to look
him straight in the eye and say Mr. President, this is
?bad advice you have gotten by someone else, and I
caution you and suggest you change the course of action.
I am sure you have the strength and the conviction
to do that. It is for that reason that you are going to
have my whole-hearted support.
Thank you.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Senator Warner. We are
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privileged this morning to be joined by the former Vice
Chairman of this Committee, the Senator from New York,
Senator Moynihan, who has indicated to me he would like
to also make a brief opening Statement and some remarks
on this occasion.
We're very happy to have you with us this morning,
Senator Moynihan, and I recognize you at this time.
SENATOR MOYNIHAN: You are very generous, Mr.
Chairman, and Judge Webster, I am a bit of a voice from
the past here/ but I have something that I would like
to put on the record, because it is something that will
be part of the situation you come into. It has to do
with the question of the ways in which the Senate
Intelligence Committee is informed about anticipated
covert activities, significant ones.
In 1984, the beginning of 1984, the Agency made the
decision to mine harbors in Nicaragua. This Committee
was not informed. This caused a great deal of distress
with Senator Goldwater and myself and other members.
We decided to see if we could not make a better
arrangement -- have something come out of our
misunderstanding, if that was what it was. And on June
6 of 1984, Mr. Casey, Senator goldwater and I signed ?an
agreement that had been approved by the President and
the National Security Advisor which came to be known as
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if--
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the Casey Accords.
The Accords had a very simple proposition: how
would we define the word "significant"? What does that
word mean. Judges frequently have to do that with
statutes. We said, as a working aefinition, if the
President approves an activity, we will take that to be
significant, because there are only so many things he
can get to and some things that no one would do without
his approval.
That simple three page agreement had ten points,
and the tenth point said that within a year we will
review this agreement and see how it is working. And
indeed an addendum was reached and signed. Only it was
not done within the year. As things will do, it
stretched on. And so the second agreement was not
signed until June 17, 1986. We have first an '84
agreement, then two years later an '86 agreement.
The '86 agreement states that, "The Committee and
the DCI agree that the Procedures," capital P, "have
worked well and that they have aided the Committee and
the DCI in the fulfillment of their respective
responsibilities."
They added a few specific details to be considered
as also automatically requiring notification, one of
which said that even though a President doesn't
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necessarily approve, when "significant military
equipment actually is to be supplied for the first time
in an ongoing operation."
Now, Judge Webster, this agreement, this signed
understanding of June 17, took place five months after
the Presidential Finding to ship arms to Iran. And I
have no more comment than to gay that we have to see it
as profoundly deceptive, and in the circumstances near
to heartbreaking. I mean, the effort to produce an
understanding on notification, made in such good faith
by this Committee, was greeted in the other direction --
I leave it to you to make your own judgments about it,
but that the DCI could sign such a statement in June
1986, co-signed by the Chairman and Vice Chairman of
this Committee, was ruinous of a relationship which has
to be reestablished. I am confident, sir, that you can
do so. But I would want to bring to your attention what
happened and it is really wrenching to know that it
happened.
Mr. Chairman, I would ask that the full text of the
Accords be included with my testimony at this point.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN: ?Thank you, very much, Senator
Moynihan. I think it is always useful to us to have that
perspective and to understand the context in which we
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are now operating. Too often We are not aware enough of
events that have taken place in the past and the
procedures that have been put in place. I think it is
very helpful to us to have that information before us,
and I appreciate your entering it into the record this
morning.
(The documents referred to follow:)
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THE CHAIRMAN: We have been joined by another
member of the Committee this morning, and I believe he
has opening comments to make. Senator Hecht, I am
pleased to recognize you at this time.
SENATOR HECHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Nice to see you this morning, Judge.
Nice to
welcome a Missourian, since I was a native Missourian
before moving to Nevada. I will have some questions for
you after listening to your comments, pertaining to the
local level in Nevada, your tenure -- your present
position on the national level and international level.
Nice to have you here today.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Senator Hecht.
Judge Webster, this morning I notice that you have
two very distinguished members of the Senate here to
introduce you. Let me say you could not be accompanied
by two finer individuals to officially present you to
this Committee this morning. They are widely respected
by members on both sides of the aisle. It is a
privilege to have them here with you this morning, and
to know that those from your home state think highly of
you is a very high recommendation.
At this time I am privileged to recognize the
senior Senator from Missouri, Senator Danforth. Senator
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Danforth, we are glad to have you with us this morning.
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN C. DANFORTH,
UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI
SENATOR DANFORTH: Mr. Chairman, thank you, very
much, members of the Committee. Sitting here listening
to the opening Statements I am reminded of seeingJudge
Webster several weeks before the President designated
him as the next Director of the Central Intelligence
Agency and asking him what he would be doing after his
departure from the FBI in a year. I now find out what
he will be doing.
Mr. Chairman, it is often common for Senators from
a nominee's state to appear before a Committee to give
pro forma remarks about the reputation of the person who
.is being considered by the Committee. I want you to
understand that in this case my remarks are not pro
forma.- In fact, Judge Webster's reputation over the last
nine years since he has served as Director of the FBI
has been well known by every member of Congress. He has
brought great luster to his position at the FBI. He has
restored that fine organization not only to its Past
heights, but to, I think, an unprecedented position in,
the minds of the members of Congress and indeed of the
American people.
I think what I have to add to this Committee's
consideration is the fact that I haven't just known
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Judge Webster over the last nine years; I have known him
over many, many years. When I was a young lawyer just
beginning to practice law in my home town of St. Louis,
I can remember at that time asking other lawyers the
question who were really the fine attorneys of our city;
who were the people with the best reputation. And
always, Judge Webster's name would be on that list./
I knew him as a lawyer. I knew him as a United
States District Judge. I knew him as a member of the
8th Circuit Court of Appeals. Indeed, I believe I have a
unique claim for members of the Senate, in that I think
I am the only person in the Senate ever to have tried a
case in front of Judge Webster. I can say that I did
not agree with his opinion in that case --
(General laughter.)
SENATOR DANFORTH: I can also say that
unfortunately the United States Supreme Court did agree
with his opinion.
(General laughter.)
SENATOR DANFORTH: In addition to my own knowledge
of Judge Webster, my family's knowledge of him even
predates my own. He is a contemporary of my oldest
brother. He serves on the Board of Trustees of
Washington University where my brother is the
Chancellor. My family has known him I guess all of his
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life. And I am well aware of his reputation in his home
community in the minds of people who have literally
known him all his life.
Putting it very briefly, Mr. Chairman, Judge
Webster is the pride of St. Louis.
He is a person about
whom it would be said by everyone who has known him, not
just for nine years, but for decades and decades, that
he is a person of enormous ability, of very great
character, of fine judgment. He is admired. He is
respected by all of those who have known him over the
period of his life. What you have seen for the past
nine years during his service as Director of the FBI is
exactly what he is and what he has been.
And I guess, Mr. Chairman, this sounds more like a
rhapsody than testimony, and indeed it is; it is exactly
that. But it is also a statement on the part of one
Senator and one friend and one constituent, of
appreciation that Judge Webster has given so much of
himself and his enormous talent and ability to his
country, not just for the past nine years, but for
several decades now as a public servant.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Senator
Danforth, for those fine comments, and Judge, the
Committee promises we will not hold against you your
incorrect ruling in that one case cited by Senator
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Danforth.
(General laughter.)
THE CHAIRMAN: We are also privileged to have with
us this morning the junior Senator from Missouri. I had
the privilege of serving with him at the time that he
was Governor of Missouri, and now the pleasure of
serving with him in the Senate.. Senator Bond, we are
very happy to have you this morning, and we would
welcome any comments from you at this time.
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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE CHRISTOPHER S. BOND,
UNITED STATES SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF MISSOURI
SENATOR BOND: Thank you, very much, Mr. Chairman
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and members of the Committee.
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It gives me a great deal of pleasure to be able to
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join with our distinguished senior Senator of Missouri
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in recommending to you wholeheartedly and without
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reservation William Webster for the position of Director
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of Central Intelligence. I, too, would associate myself
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with the comments that Senator Danforth has made about
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Judge Webster. I would go a step further to say that
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the entire state of Missouri takes great pride in the
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accomplishments, the record and the high standards which
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Judge Webster has exemplified.
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I have had the privilege of knowing Judge Webster
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both personally and in a professional manner for about
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20 years. It was that close association and very warm
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feeling for him that led me, in 1977, when I heard that
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he was being considered as Director of the FBI, to
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communicate to him a real note of caution. I urged him
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not to take the position of the Director of the Federal
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Bureau of Investigation. Two things led to this
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unsolicited piece of advice. Number one, since as you
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may recall, Mr. Chairman I was returning involuntarily
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to the practice of law at that time, I had hoped to see
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the Bench maintain the highest possible standards. And
certainly Judge Webster exemplified those high standards
for all who practiced law in the state of Missouri and
elsewhere in the 8th Circuit.
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On a more practical level, I was concerned about
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the condition of the FBI. Given its recent past history
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and the then current state of 'affairs, I felt that it
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was an impossible task for someone to go in and to
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restore the Federal Bureau of Investigation to the high
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standards it had once known. However, I should have
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known that Judge Webster was one who handles the
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difficult every day; the impossible takes only slightly
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longer.
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His achievements as the Director of the Federal
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Bureau of Investigation are obviously very well known to
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all the members of this Committee and to most concerned
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citizens throughout this country. I am confident that
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should you confirm him, as I trust dnd hope that you
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will, that he will go on to provide the same high levels
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of service to the people of this country in his new
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position as he has done at the Federal Bureau of
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Investigation.
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It is my great pleasure and an honor once again to
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join with Senator Danforth recommending wholeheartedly
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his confirmation.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Senator Bond.
We appreciate both of you being with us this morning.
Judge Webster, at this time I would like to ask
that you stand and be sworn to present the testimony
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before the Committee this morning. If you would raise
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your right hand.
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Do you, William H. Webster, solemnly swear that the
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testimony that you are about to give is the truth, the
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whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so :help you God?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I do.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. You may be
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seated.
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Judge Webster, again I want to welcome you, and say
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I have never heard finer and stronger introductory
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comments by two Senators from the home state of a
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nominee. They have been impressive indeed.
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I want to ask if you have been provided with a copy
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of the Committee Rules and have had an opportunity to
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examine those Rules?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I believe I have, Mr. Chairman.
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THE CHAIRMAN: At this time we would welcome any
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opening remarks that you might have to make to the
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Committee.
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TESTIMONY OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM H. WEBSTER,
NOMINEE FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
JUDGE WEBSTER: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman,
distinguished members of the Committee. I appreciate
very, much your opening remarks, and I am deeply indebted
to my friends and fellow Missourians, Senator Danforth
and Senator Bond, for the generous comments that they
made this morning.
I have been looking forward to this moment and I
appreciate very much the opportunity to appear before
you today.
As Senator Cohen noted, this is now the fifth time
that a Committee of the Senate has considered my fitness
to serve in an office requiring Presidential
appointment. I am deeply honored by President Reagan's
-nomination of me to be Director of Central Intelligence,
and if the Senate chooses to confirm me, I will bring to
the office the very best that I have in me.
Mr. Chairman, I realize that past confirmations
must stand apart from the process that you begin today.
I know that this Committee will wish to discuss with me
my past stewardship in public office, and my thoughts
and views about the office for which I am now being
considered. Still, I do not exactly come before this
Committee as a blank page. For nine years it has been
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my privilege to appear before this Committee in its
oversight capacity and report to you on the work of the
FBI in counterintelligence and counterterrorism matters
and to discuss with you my views on the broader picture
of national security. I hope you know by now my
unreserved support for your oversight function, and my
deeply held view that this function can and should
provide not only wisdom and guidance, but also reinforce
public support and trust for the work of the
intelligence community. Indeed, as recipients of
sensitive intelligence information which cannot be made
publicly available, you serve as surrogates for the
American people.
The responsibilities of the Director of Central
Intelligence are largely defined by statute and by
Executive Order. The responsibilities are awesome and
no Director of Central Intelligence can succeed without
your full understanding and support. It is a shared
responsibility, and we must succeed.
In my years of association with components of the
intelligence community, I have developed some thoughts,
some ideas and views, principally in
counterintelligence, but also in the broader range and
function of intelligence gathering and activities in
furtherance of the national security. I would not,
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however, want my answers to your questions today to
suggest either that I think I know all the answers or
that there is nothing more for me to learn. Quite the
contrary. But I do have confidence in my own judgment,
and even greater confidence in the enormous wisdom,
talent and selfless dedication of the men and women of
the Central Intelligence Agehdy and of the other equally
competent and dedicated components of the intelligence
community. I believe I can sustain and enhance the
collective momentum of the intelligence community to
serve the national interest aggressively, objectively
and professionally, and to do so with fidelity to our
Constitution, our statutes, and all lawful orders issued
pursuant thereto.
Mr. Chairman, rather than burden you with a lengthy
and potentially presumptuous opening statement, I should
like to conclude by reading two short paragraphs from a
book written some years ago about a man, now in the
twilight of his life, whom I am privileged to know as a
friend. His name is Sir William Stephenson, and the book
which made him more famous than I suspect he would like
to be is titled "A Man Called Intrepid." Bill
Stephenson wrote a forward to that book, and in that
forward he said: "Perhaps a day will dawn when tyrants
can no longer threaten the liberty of any people, when
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the function of all nations, however varied their
ideologies, will be to enhance life, not to control it.
If such a condition is possible, it is in a future too
far distant to foresee. Until that safer, better day,
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the democracies will avoid disaster, and possibly total
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destruction, only by maintaining their defenses.
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"Among the increasingly intricate arsenals across
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the most important. But it is, being secret, the most
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dangerous. Safeguards to prevent its abuse must be
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devised, revised, and rigidly applied. But, as in all
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enterprise, the character and wisdom of those to whom it
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is entrusted will be decisive. In the integrity of
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that guardianship lies the hope of free people to endure
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and prevail."
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Mr. Chairman, I wish that I had written those
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words. I believe them, I subscribe to them, and if
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confirmed will do all that I can to be worthy of your
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Mr. Chairman, that concludes my formal statement.
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As you know, I have completed a number of questions to
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the Senate and also some supplemental interrogatories.
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I should like to make one addition at this time.
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I am aware of a recommendation brought to my
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attention on or about October 30, 1986, to withhold
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certain information from Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North
of the National Security Council. This recommendation
was made by a Department of Justice official who, based
on newspaper articles, concluded that Lieutenant Colonel
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North might be involved in a future criminal probe by a
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special prosecutor concerning United States activities
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in Central America. The official was also of the
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opinion that this dissemination was not necessary
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because it was already available through the media.
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Mr. Chairman, I do not believe that this
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information was contemplated in the question previously
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answered for the record which specifically excludes
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public media sources. But further, the information
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proposed to be withheld from Lieutenant Colonel North
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did not mention Lieutenant Colonel North or any other
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government official. I did not then nor do I now
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believe that any of this information was information,
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the purpose or effect of providing illegal or
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unauthorized assistance to the Nicaraguan resistance
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during the period that such assistance was prohibited by
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statement. And I might add that all pertinent details
regarding this matter have been furnished to the
Independent Counsel.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Judge Webster.
The record will reflect that your answer has been so
supplemented, and I appreciate your providing this
additional information to the 'Committee. I also
appreciate the comments which you have made in your
opening statement. You have eloquently described the
burden which we all have to strike that appropriate
balance between the need for an effective intelligence
operation, one in which confidentiality of sensitive
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information must be maintained, and at the same time an
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operation that must be conducted according to law, and
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under the appropriate oversight of those that have been
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elected by the people to perform that function. I think
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your statement is a well taken and an eloquent one.
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I also appreciate the fact that you have commented
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upon the talent and the dedication of countless numbers
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of staff people, professionals who work at the Central
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Intelligence Agency and throughout the intelligence
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community, because I think all too often it is only the
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problems that get the attention. By the very nature of
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their work, the successes never become a matter of
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public record. Day in and day out, we have an
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exceptional group of people, extraordinarily talented,
courageous, committed and unselfish in many, many ways,
who are performing an outstanding task. I think it is
important that all of Us reaffirm our appreciation to
them because it is an appreciation that too often goes
unstated.
As has been said in the opening comments, and I
know from your own past experiences, you have exercised
these kinds of responsibilities yourself, we all have
the responsibility of making sure today that our inquiry
into your qualifications is complete and thorough. We
hope that it will be fair in every way. I know that you
understand that in directing specific questions to you,.
no hostility is intended, but we are simply meeting our
responsibility to do the job which we are given under
the constitutional process.
We will go through a round of questions. I will
begin that questioning, and we will just continue that
process with the members of the Committeeuntil all of
the members have had an opportunity to ask all the
questions that they wish to ask.. Some members will be
coming and going during the process because of other
Committees that are in session this morping.
I notice in your response as. you discuss the
suspension of the FBI's preliminary Neutrality Act
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investigation of Southern Air Transport on October 30th,
1986, you were informed that sensitive hostage
negotiations were going on. Did you have any idea at
the time that Southern Air Transport might be involved
in both U.S. arms shipments to Iran and private arms
deliveries to the contras in Nicaragua?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Mr. Chairman, I certainly did not
associate the two. We had -- we were opening an
investigation that had to do with the crash of a
transport plane in Nicaragua which had originated from
El Salvador, but which had possibly some connections
with Southern Air in Florida. That was a preliminary
inquiry. I also had some knowledge relayed to me by a
senior FBI official, Mr. Revell, who sits on the
operations subgroup, the group at the National Security
Council, that the same airlines had assisted in the
Iranian initiatives. But that is the extent of the
connection between the two.
THE CHAIRMAN: If you had known that there existed
some connection that might potentially involve the
diversion of funds or any other kind of connection --
JUDGE WEBSTER: Oh, no.
THE CHAIRMAN: -- would it have made a difference
to you in your decision to suspend, whether or not to
suspend the FBI investigation at that point?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I am sure that it would, but there
was no such indication.
THE CHAIRMAN: Let me turn your attention now to
your conversations with Attorney General Meese on
November 21st, 1986, when he informed you of his
prospective inquiry. I want to go to the nature of the
conversation which you had with Mr. Meese on November
21st. Did Mr. Meese explain to you in any kind of
detail why he was conducting this inquiry?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, it was a very casual
conversation; it was not an agenda item. I was just
visiting with the Attorney General. And he indicated to
me that he had been given the ticket or had been asked
by the President to straighten out the various confusing
statements that were coming out of various departments
of government with respect to what actually had
transpired in relation to Iran and that he was going to
try to get the facts straight.
Did you want me to proceed, Mr. Chairman, or did
you have another question?
SENATOR COHEN: Could you clarify the date on which
that conversation took place?
JUDGE WEBSTER: That was Friday, November 21st,
Senator.
THE CHAIRMAN: How long did that conversation take?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Oh, I suppose I was in the Attorney
General's office for probably maybe 20 minutes, and
probably that conversation itself took about a minute
and a half, I guess.
THE CHAIRMAN: So it was a very brief conversation
about this inquiry. And I understand that at that time
you offered assistance. Looking back, do you think --
and we always can look back with more in our minds in
hindsight than we would have understood at the time --
do you think that the Attorney General would have been
better advised to have had someone from the FBI or the
Justice Department with extensive criminal law
experience take part in that inquiry?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I first should emphasize, Mr.
Chairman, that neither of us saw this as a criminal
inquiry. The purpose was to try to get the facts
straight so that the government could be speaking with
one accurate voice. And when I made that offer of
assistance, I was thinking primarily in terms of
manpower resources. Is there anything we can do in that
way for you? He was also thinking in terms of an
inquiry, a fact-finding inquiry to report back to the
President. So neither of us were thinking in criminal
terms.
You can always look back and ask in light of what
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transpired, could the FBI agents have done a better job
of conducting such an inquiry or looking for materials.
I don't think we're in a position yet to know really the
answers to that question. There is also the downside of
sending FBI agents into the White House when there is no
known criminal activity to investigate. So you can say,
sure, maybe we knew better how to ask the questions or
maybe we knew better how to do something else. But it
was not a criminal inquiry. The Attorney General took
his own group of experienced attorneys from the
Department of Justice. And I am just not able to say
that in hindsight we could have done a better job than
they did. But that
THE CHAIRMAN: Had you known that it was going to
indeed turn into a criminal inquiry, which it did four
days later, in essence, when you were asked to bring the
Bureau into it, thinking specifically about the need to
protect records and the need to protect potential
evidence, had you known on the 21st that this was to
become a criminal inquiry, would you at that time have
advised the Attorney General that either the FBI or
those within the Justice Department who have dealt with
a criminal inquiry should have been brought into it
? specifically to protect evidence?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. If I
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might go one step further, I am confident the Attorney
General wouldn't have had to have that; he would have
asked for it had he known it would be a criminal.
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, I gather then it does not
surprise you that the Attorney General in his testimony
before the Committee on December 17th, which we have
released today, testified that: you agreed, and I quote
from this, you agreed that it would not be appropriate
for the FBI to be brought in at that time.
JUDGE WEBSTER: That is correct.
THE CHAIRMAN: This morning you have entered into
the record some comments in regard to a memorandum, an
internal FBI memorandum dated October 30th, which bears
your initials, which indicates that an official at the
Justice Department had speculated that Colonel North
might someday come under a criminal investigation, and
that certain information which was contained in this
memorandum might best be withheld from him at that time.
I wondered if, when you had those discussions with -
Attorney General Meese on November 21st, it must have
been known that Colonel North was one of those involved
with the Iranian matter, if you had in mind or gave any
thought to this information passing across your desk,
that there were at least some people in the Justice
Department who had suspicion that Colonel North might
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become the target of criminal investigation?
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, I have to tell you in all
candor it was not on my mind'. In fact, I don't even
recall seeing it until it was called to my attention
recently in connection with preparing the answers to
these questions. It came up with the kinds of
informational notes that come *up literally by the
dozens, call for no action on my part, had been reviewed
by all of my career subordinates in the criminal line.
I really did not have that in mind.
THE CHAIRMAN: So there was nothing in your mind at
that time that caused you to have any feeling that this
might turn into a criminal investigation.
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, Mr. Chairman. It was entirely
focused on Iran and the Iranian situation, the Iranian
initiative. I frankly have entertained some ill ease
about the role of the National Security Council in those
areas, but I had no question about whether anything
illegal was taking place.
THE CHAIRMAN: Let me go now directly to the point
of oversight responsibility, and of course as you know,
prior notification is to be given to this Committee, or
at least in extraordinary circumstances to the
leadership of this Committee in regard to covert
actions, significant intelligence gathering activities,
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or any illegal intelligence gathering activities that
are brought to the attention of government officials.
These are also to be reported.
Can you think of any circumstances in which the
President should withhold prior notice all together,
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even of the Chairman and Vice Chairman of this Committee
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and the four leaders of the tWo Houses?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Mr. Chairman, it is difficult for
9
me to conjure up situations in which I, based on my own
10
experience with this Committee, would want to see
11
information withheld. This is not to say that the
12
President might take a different view of an
?13
extraordinarily sensitive, potentially life-threatening
14
initiative that could be damaged and lives put at risk
15
if there were some kind of premature exposure. I have
16
difficulty thinking of any such situations. But the
17
President has a more overriding responsibility.
18
THE CHAIRMAN: If for some reason some dire
19
emergency developed where notice were withheld from this
20
Committee, the President, of course, then is required to
21
provide notice after the fact in a timely fashion. How
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would you interpret that phrase, "in a timely fashion"?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, of course, I went to the
24
dictionary, having a name of that kind -- Webster's
25
Dictionary --
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(General laughter.)
JUDGE WEBSTER: I didn't get very much help there
nor really in the legislative history. It speaks about
an appropriate time or in reference to something. In
law, if there is a specific number of days you have to
do something, then you would decide whether you did it
in a timely way, that is, within the time prescribed.
If there is no time, and it appears that this issue was
wrestled out during the legislation, then we have to
fall back on words like appropriate.
And in trying to articulate to you my view of this,
which I knew that you would ask, it seems to me that
notice is timely at the moment when the compelling
circumstances which the President felt called for
deferral ceased to be as compelling as the legitimate
interests of the Congress and its Select Committee in
knowing it. In other words, a deferral is not something
you just put off indefinitely. A deferral goes against
the tide and it should be continually revisited. It
should be a subject of constant agenda review to
determine whether it is appropriate at that point to let
the Committee know.
THE CHAIRMAN: If you had been Director of Central
Intelligence during the period of time in which we have
just passed with the Iranian,arms situation and
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notification had been withheld for many months as it
was, would you have advised the President that you felt
it was inappropriate to withhold notification of this
Committee for that period of time?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I would.
THE CHAIRMAN: If you were the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency and a President took action
to withhold notice for prolonged periods of time over
your repeated objections and your strong feeling that it
was wrong in terms of the spirit of the law and wrong in
terms of public policy to continue to withhold
notification, what course of action would you take?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Mr. Chairman, I believe that the
Director of Central Intelligence clearly has an
obligation directly with the Senate through this
Committee, and that is an obligation of trust which
would be breached by my continued acquiescence in
something that I believed to be arbitrary, and.for all
the reasons that you have just stated, inappropriate.
And I think that I would have to advise the President of
my position on that, and if he would not authorize me to
speak to you, I would have to leave. It is that simple.
THE CHAIRMAN: Let me ask one last question related
to this matter. As you know, the law talks about
intelligence gathering activities, and intelligence
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operations, and it says that this Committee is to be
notified of intelligence gathering activities and
operations conducted by any agency. We have always
assumed in the past that it would be the traditional
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agencies like the Central Intelligence Agency. We have
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learned in this instance that other bodies, including
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the National Security Council, have undertaken
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operations at some point in time that are intelligence
9
activities.
10
If you learned of what appeared to be legal
11
activities by, let us say, the National Security
12
Council, agencies that are not considered traditionally
13
intelligence operative agencies, or if you learned of
14
illegal activities, either .one, about which this
15
Committee had not been notified, would you view it as
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your responsibility -- even though you are Director of
17
Central Intelligence, you wouldn't be director of the
18
National Security Council or any other agency that might
19
be involved -- would you view it as your responsibility
20
as the overseer of intelligence in general, to report
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such legal or illegal intelligence activities to this
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Committee?
23
JUDGE WEBSTER: I would consider it my first
24
obligation to insist that the member of the intelligence
25
Community or the National Security Council make the
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notification itself, and if it refused to do so, I would
consider it my obligation to inform you.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much. Senator Cohen.
4
SENATOR COHEN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
5
Mr. Webster, you had some notice of the activities
6
that were taking place with respect to the sale of arms
7
to Iran, as I recall, in August of 1986.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: That's correct.
9
SENATOR COHEN: The circumstances were such that a
10
deputy of yours had a conversation with Colonel North,
11
is that correct?
12
JUDGE WEBSTER: That is correct, Senator Cohen. It
13
was not a private conversation. It was at the
14
operations subgroup committee meeting at the Executive
15
Office Building.
16
SENATOR COHEN: But you were concerned enough about
17
it to contact Mr. Meese directly?
18
JUDGE WEBSTER: I was concerned enough about it to
19
contact the Attorney General directly.
20
SENATOR COHEN: Were you concerned, for example,
21
that it might be in violation of the Export Control Act?
22
JUDGE WEBSTER: I wasn't focusing so much on
23
specific statutes so much as I wanted to be sure that
24
the initiative was supported by a Presidential Finding
25
as Lieutenant Colonel North had represented to Mr.
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Revell, and that the Attorney General had himself
reviewed it and approved it. We've had experiences in
the past when the Department of Justice has somehow
gotten outside the loop on decisions in which the
Attorney General really should have been involved and
really should have passed judgment. And that was what I
wanted to ascertain for myself and to put the Attorney
General on notice, if in fact he was unaware of it.
SENATOR COHEN: And the Attorney General assured
you that a Presidential Finding had in fact been signed,
or rather that a draft had been considered?
JUDGE WEBSTER: The Attorney General -- I asked the
Attorney General was he aware of the Finding and had he
seen it. He said he was aware of the Finding. He had
seen it or a draft of it and that he had approved it.
SENATOR COHEN: Was that satisfactory in your
judgment, to have a draft simply looked at by the
Attorney General?
JUDGE WEBSTER: It was satisfactory in my judgment
at the time that the Attorney General was aware of
everything I was aware of, and that he had approved it
as Attorney General.
SENATOR COHEN: Did you inquire as to whether or
not Congress had been notified, or was required to be
notified under that Finding?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: No, I didn't.
SENATOR COHEN: Were you aware at the time of
allegations about Iran's participation in the bombing of
the Marine barracks in Beirut?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I probably was, Senator Cohen. I
6
am not certain of the dates, but I probably was. I was
7
informed of everything that was known at that time with
8
respect to the bombing.
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SENATOR COHEN: Was that a matter of some concern
10
to you outside the legality of whether or not the
11
Attorney General was notified about a Presidential
12
Finding as to the propriety and wisdom of engaging in a
13
covert operation of arms transfers to a nation that was
14
listed as a terrorist nation, who had in fact
15
participated in the killing, murder of 241 Marines?
16
JUDGE WEBSTER: It certainly was of concern to me
17
that if there was to be a departure from our public
18
policy with respect to state-sponsored terrorism, that
19
it be done pursuant to an appropriate Presidential
20
Finding that the Attorney General thought was lawful and
21
appropriate.
22
SENATOR COHEN: Prior to October 30th, were members
23
of your staff concerned about Colonel North's alleged
24
activities in Nicaragua, the funding of the contras?
25
JUDGE WEBSTER: It seems to me that there was quite
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flurry of publicity in the early weeks of October of
1986, ?in which various people including Members of
Congress, speculated on the activities of the United
States in Central America, and I believe, although I am
not absolutely certain, that Colonel North's name
6
appeared in some of those news articles.
7
SENATOR COHEN: Do you know whether or not members
8
of your staff, Mr. Revell in particular, contacted Mr.
9
North to inquire as to whether he was involved in the
10
funding of the contras?
11
JUDGE WEBSTER: I don't know the answer to that
12
SENATOR COHEN: Let me ask you, as of November --
13
JUDGE WEBSTER: Pardon me.
14
(Pause.)
15
SENATOR COHEN: That's a pose guaranteed to put you
16
on the front pages.
17
JUDGE WEBSTER: I can't remember. I can't remember
18
any such conversation being communicated to me. Perhaps
19
in some other way. I do know that from time to time
20
Lieutenant Colonel North or stated -7 made statements in
21
telephone calls to Mr. Revell and at meetings that
22
whatever he was doing he was doing pursuant to
23
authorization. But whether it related to Central
24
America, I cannot now recall.
25
SENATOR COHEN: If the FBI had been asked to
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conduct the preliminary inquiry as of November 21st as
opposed to Attorney General Meese, what would you have
done differently. Strike that. What would you have
done?
JUDGE WEBSTER: First of all, I think I would want
to know -- have a clear understanding of what it is we
were being asked to do. If we were being asked to
assist in a factual inquiry, such as the Attorney
General performed, that would be one thing. If we were
asked to conduct a criminal inquiry, that would be quite
another thing.
SENATOR COHEN: What would you have done, assuming
it was only a preliminary inquiry, to find out what had
been done. A newspaper article had been written
revealing the fact that we had been transferring weapons
to Iran at that point. There was a lot of confusion.
You said you were concerned about the NSC being involved
in this operation from the beginning in terms of its
operational activities on a covert operation. What would
you have done as Director of the FBI in terms of the
initial phase of that investigation? I am talking
specifically about securing documents and preventing
them from being destroyed. What would you have done
with respect to putting your agents into the White
House, contacting officials. What would be the process?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: First, I want you to understand
that in nine years I have never pretended to be the
expert investigator.
SENATOR COHEN: What would your staff have done?
JUDGE WEBSTER: My staff, I am confident, would
6
have made arrangements for interviews, would have made
7
arrangements to review records, would have correlated
8
the public statements that were out there that we're
9
trying to relate to, either confirm or disprove in terms
10
of factual circumstances. They would have developed a
11
game plan before we went there, what it is we were
12
trying to determine, what it is we would be looking for.
13
And I suspect that probably the Attorney General did
14
pretty much the same thing, but I don't know that.
15
SENATOR COHEN: You indicated on December 4th in an
16
interview that you were satisfied that documents were
17
not being destroyed, and that it would not in any way
18
interfere with the investigation. At that time, what
19
led you to conclude that documents were not being
20
destroyed?
21
JUDGE WEBSTER: Is that interview around the 5th of
22
December with a group of reporters?
23
SENATOR COHEN: The 4th.
24
JUDGE WEBSTER: 4th of December. The FBI was fully
25
involved at that time investigating the alleged illegal
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activities. My senior staff officials had reported to
me that they had thus far found no evidence of records
being missing from the files, that there was a
substantial computer record of what was there
5
SENATOR COHEN: There were reports in the paper
6
that documents were being destroyed during the course of
7
that weekend.
8
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I realize that there were
9
reports in the paper, but I am telling you what my
10
senior staff officials advised me. And that at least as
11
of that date and I was very careful in my interview
12
on that date to say as of that date -- we had not
13
determined any evidence of record destruction. And that
14
is still the case. I know of no new information that
15
should have made me alter my statement.
16
SENATOR COHEN: You have not learned of any
17
information since that time that would cause you to
18
reflect upon whether or not it was a mistake not to go
19
in and at least secure the records?
20
JUDGE WEBSTER: I am having difficulty answering
21
your question because this relates to the Independent
22
Counsel's inquiry and that is protected by Rule 6 (E) as
23
you know.
24
SENATOR COHEN: Fawn Hall has been in every
25
newspaper and publication in the country, and already
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admitted publicly that she destroyed documents.
JUDGE WEBSTER: But I am not in a position to
confirm that or deny that, Senator, at this point,
because of the constraints of the Independent Counsel's
investigation. I think the information that I had, that
6
is, the information that the state ofour investigation
7
was accurately stated at that time. Fawn Hall was not
8
cooperating at that time, Senator, and did not cooperate
9
until several weeks later.
10
SENATOR COHEN: Well, I have a number of other
11
questions to pursue. ,My time is up. Thank you very
12
much.
13
THE CHAIRMAN: Senator Nunn.
14
SENATOR NUNN: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
15
Director Webster, I want to ask a few questions
16
that are rather general in nature rather than specific.
17
You mentioned a few minutes ago that you were ill at
18
ease about the National Security Council that you -- I
19
don't remember the exact words, but you said that you
20
didn't sense any illegal activity, but you were ill at
21
ease about certain things with the National Security
22
Council. Would you expand on that and tell us what you
23
were ill at ease about, how that came to your attention
24
and so forth?
25
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I think that a lot of what I
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was ill at ease about is very accurately portrayed in
the Tower Commission Report. There was a lot of
frustration and impatience in the Executive Branch over
the delay in getting the hostages out, and committees
were formed which met in the National Security Council
for the purpose of coming up with new and innovative
ideas about how the hostages their release could be
obtained.
I guess it starts with the title of this committee,
"Operations Subgroup." I kept asking Mr. Revell to be
sure that this committee was not, in fact, operational,
but was simply a think tank for purposes of coming up
with new ideas. It has never seemed to me that the
National Security Council was an appropriate vehicle for
conducting operational activity. That is was a place
where ideas were marshaled and policy was developed
which could go to the President for his approval, and
that people in the National Security Council, staffers
with various types of expertise, largely lacked the
capability and the institutional experience to engage in
operational matters. And that that was better handled
by those to whom operational matters are properly
assigned. So I had ill ease when I felt that the
National Security Council had become the focal point for
operational initiatives. And I expressed that to Mr.
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Revell and asked him to be alert for any indications
that the National Security Council itself was going
operational.
SENATOR NUNN: Who did you stress that to?
JUDGE WEBSTER: To Mr. Oliver Revell, Buck Revell,
my Executive Assistant Director who served as a member
of the Operations Subgroup as 'my representative.
SENATOR NUNN: Did he express his own concern to
you about that? What was his view on it?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I think he shared that
concern and was always very alert at those meetings to
caution members of the committee about the limitations
of their role and responsibility, and was very careful
to report to me any information that came through that
committee that suggested operational activity.
SENATOR NUNN: Judge Webster, you have gotten
involved to some extent, I suppose, in Presidential
Findings. You are familiar with the Findings required
by law and so forth for intelligence operations,' are you
not?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I am a lot more now than I was
then. I was aware of the principle of Findings because
the Attorneys General in the past have had opportunities
to participate, and of course the present Attorney
General sits by invitation as a member of the National
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Security Council. There are some aspects of the
Findings that I am frankly not familiar with, and until
the Findings in the Iranian arms shipments, I don't
believe that I had ever seen one. Nor was I even aware
-- although the statute certainly makes it clear -- that
there was an obligation to inform the Congress in a
particular way about those Findings.
SENATOR NUNN: Have you had a chance since all this
came up to review the statute requiring Findings?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I have indeed.
SENATOR NUNN: You are familiar with that now?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I hope so.
SENATOR NUNN: We had testimony from former General
Counsel Sporkin who testified before this Committee that
he believed that once the President signed a Finding,
that previous activity which had not been part of a
Finding and which could be considered, I suppose prior
to that, unauthorized if not illegal, that that signing
of a Finding made that previous activity legal
retroactively.
How do you view that?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I have not done extensive
legal research on it, and I suppose that a legal
argument can be made for an ex post facto Finding, but
in my opinion an ex post facto Finding is contrary to
the clear spirit of the statutory requirement. It is
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not what was intended, and it simply records the
President's opinions. And I doubt very much that it
would be satisfactory to this Committee and it would not
be satisfactory to me. It was damage control, nothing
less.
6
SENATOR NUNN: How do you feel about the statute as
7
far as a Finding being in writing or oral? Do you have
8
?an opinion on whether oral Findings are in compliance
9
with the law?
10
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, there again I think that
11
probably a strong legal case can be made that an oral
12
-,,Finding may meet the requirements of the statute. I
13
don't happen to think that it, again, meets the spirit
14
of the statute. A Finding has a purpose. A Finding is
15
to state in writing the basis for the action so that it
16
can be reviewed and understood, and the specifics of it
17
made available to all those who have responsibility,
18
including the Oversight Committee. A Finding that is
19
oral is always subject to modification at some other
20
time.
21
We have in our work in the FBI a number of
22
situations in which emergency authorizations can take
23
place orally, by oral approval of the Attorney General,
24
when I seek it because of a very tight timeframe. I am
25
sure there could be situations in which there was such a
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time bind that it was not possible at that moment in
time to execute a written Finding. But that would not
excuse an immediate effort to reduce that oral Finding
to writing so that the full understanding of the
President, his full conclusion and desires could be made
available for oversight.
SENATOR NUNN: I think that is very helpful.
Judge Webster, you have headed up the FBI now how
many years?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Nine years last February.
SENATOR NUNN: What do you think of the statute
that gives a lengthy term to the head of the FBI? Do
you think that has worked fairly well?
JUDGE WEBSTER: The statute is a ten year term. I
have always construed it as a limitation, not as a
guarantee. It has had the effect, and I think with the
help of the Congress, in dis,tancing the FBI from
political activity by having a Director who serves
without reference to a Presidential term. But I do serve
at the pleasure of the President. Any President could
ask me to leave and I would certainly do so. The ten
year term also has an advantage of a certain
expectation, that if you do 'your job well, you will have
ten years in which to achieve substantial goals. And it
tends to relieve - it certainly did in my case -- any
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sense of urgency that I had to achieve something within
2
a year to two years, and permitted me to insist that our
3
progress be along established, acceptable guidelines,
4
and not by any shortcut means.
5
SENATOR NUNN: Would you be willing to stay beyond
6
this Presidential term if requested to do so by the next
7
President? Have you precluded that in your own mind? I
8
am not asking you to give an unequivocal yes now, but do
9
you have in your own mind ?a definite time limit on how
10
long you're willing to serve in this capacity?
11
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, I don't, Senator Nunn. I have
12
no present thoughts on it, and I must be entirely honest
13
with you; I have no thoughts at all about it. I do
14
the one thought that I have is that I would like to see,
15
if it is at all possible, the Director of Central
16
Intelligence be seen, be perceived in the position that
17
I now think the Director of the FBI is seen, as not a
18
political figure.
19
SENATOR NUNN: Well, that was my next question. Is
20
there some value to making the CIA Director as removed
21
from the political atmosphere as possible?
22
JUDGE WEBSTER: I think so; absolutely.
23
SENATOR NUNN: You do see an analogy between the
24
FBI head and the CIA head in that respect?
25
JUDGE WEBSTER: I do, and I think the American
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people want the CIA to perform in that way.
SENATOR NUNN: Judge Webster, there has been, of
course, speculation floating around this town for many,
many years about the relationship between the FBI and
5
the CIA. How would you describe that relationship now,
6
and is there anything you think you can do to improve it
7
in your, new position, in which I think you will be
8
confirmed and which I plan to support.
9
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator Nunn, we have a very -- we
10
being the FBI -- have a very cordial relationship with
11
the Central Intelligence Agency. We share information.
12
We hand off assets to each other. We make some joint
13
assessments. We coordinate our work with each other,
14
having in mind there is a line of responsibility which
15
is clearly the FBI's and a line on the other side of
16
which is clearly the CIA. When I first came into office
17
in 1978, the then Director of Central Intelligence was
18
Admiral Stansfield Turner. We had been classmates in
19
college and friends for over 40 years. And the first
20
thing that we decided to do was to demonstrate by our
21
own relationship to each other, that we wanted the two
22
agencies to work together. it was not something that
23
met massive resistance. It was something that I believe
24
that the executives on both sides of the aisle had
25
wanted to see happen but weren't all that sure would be
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well received by their respective directors.
When Director Casey came on board we continued that
same warm relationship. And I can say the same about
Acting Director Gates. There may well be areas within
5
the two organizations that could do a better job of
6
liaison, and I think that both sides can work towards
7
that. But it represents no mutual distrust, no sense of
8
rivalry. Simply a matter of making the bureaucracies
9
work better together.
10
SENATOR NUNN: Mr. Chairman, I think my time has
11
expired. Iwould say I have had a lot of dealings with
12
Judge Webster over the years, particularly in the
13
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations. I have always
14
found him to be not only skillful and energetic, but
15
also a man of great integrity. I think his nomination
16
at this critical juncture is hopefully going to be well
17
received by the United States Senate and the American
18
people. I think it is a good appointment, and of course,
19
I will listen to the answers of all questions and
20
reserve final judgment, but I do think he is the kind of
21
individual and has the kind of sensitivity that we need
22
in a very, very important and sensitive job.
23
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Senator Nunn.
24
Senator Roth.
25
SENATOR ROTH: Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
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Judge Webster, last year the Congress directed the
President to make a report on the spy activities of the
Soviet Bloc so that Congress could determine whether it
is in our interest'to apply further travel restrictions
5
to Bloc personnel, basically equivalent to those we
6
already have on the Soviets. We have that report, and I
7
think it bears the mark of heavy FBI input. Based on
8
that report and my continuing concern about Soviet use
9
of East European agents to collect sensitive material or
10
for their own purposes, I am introducing last year's
11
bill to apply such restrictions. Could you give us
12
your views on this legislation?
13
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator Roth, I have not ?seen the
14
draft legislation sufficiently to comment on it
15
specifically, but I know its purpose and intent, and
16
certainly support it. The expulsions of numerous Soviet
17
spies as a result of Presidential action a few months
18
ago will undoubtedly increase the tasking
19
responsibilities of Soviet Bloc hostile intelligence
20
officers operating in this country. I see no reason
21
why they should not be included within the same
22
restrictions that apply to the Soviets.
23
SENATOR ROTH: To go along, I reintroduced today,
24
along with Senator Dole, the death penalty legislation.
25
It amends Title 18 of the U.S. Code, which would allow
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such a penalty for certain offenses in time of war, or
if the offense concerned nuclear weaponry, military
spacecraft, early warning systems, warplanes or other
major intelligence capabilities. As an experienced
5
jurist, as well as the head of FBI, .I wonder if you
6
would give us your views on the usefulness of such
7
legislation, recognizing of course that it is very
8
controversial in nature.
9
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator Roth, I have given
1
10
testimony from time to time and before other Committees
11
on my views on the death penalty generally, and in that
12
testimony, in various ways, I have always said that I
13
thought there was a place for the death penalty in our
14
system. And when pressed for examples of that, of
15
course I used the example of the prisoner in prison
16
serving a life term for whom there is no additional
17
punishment to be given when he kills a guard. And then
18
I think in most cases I have used another example. To
19
me, the saddest word in the English language is
20
betrayal, and the foulest word is traitor. If we cannot
21
apply the ultimate punishment to one who is engaged in
22
the kinds of activities that you have described, I do
23
not think we have a sufficient national sensitivity to
24
the enormous damage being done to us as citizens and as
25
a country. So I would support it.
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SENATOR ROTH: Well, I very strongly agree with you
and appreciate your frank comment.
Very recently, Mr. Chairman, the Secretary General
of the UN has authorized the creation of a new office --
my understanding is, it is Soviet inspired -- in the UN
Secretariat. And this new office, heavily staffed by
7
Soviet intelligence personnel; we fear will effectively
8
create a Soviet controlled UN intelligence collection
9
and propaganda agency at the UN. Theoretically the
10
idea is that it would secure information on the domestic
11
situation in each of the member states. But Senators
12
Boren and Cohen joined me in writing to the Secretary
13
General, noting our concern and saying that it was our
14
intention to remove any funding by the Congress. My
15
proposed legislation would do that. I wonder, would
16
the collection of internal domestic information on
17
domestic politics and other internal situations give you
18
concern from the standpoint of intelligence?
19
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, if I understand the proposal,
20
and I think that I do, it would give me the concern that
21
it provides a unique opportunity for the KGB to engage
22
in manipulative activity at our expense. I think we
23
should be bvery careful about it.
24
SENATOR ROTH: My final question in this area,
25
Judge Webster, involves the President's comments
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yesterday about the unacceptable Soviet penetration of
our new embassy complex in Moscow, while they sit atop
Mount Alto here in Washington intercepting our -
government communications. Again, Senator Dole and I
introduced a bill reqUiring the Secretary of State to
negotiate a new proposal on these embassies, and we
would provide that if they don't negotiate such an
agreement that is acceptable within six months, we would
take a number of actions. Let me ask you this: Do you
believe the new U.S. embassy in Moscow can ever be made
secure without bulldozing it and starting afresh, based
on your knowledge about such matters?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator, I want to be as open and
candid as I can in an open session, but that is
necessarily limiting to me. I think I can answer your
question at least to your satisfaction. I think the
focus has to include, at least, how and by whom our
embassy is to be repaired or replaced. As long as we
are dependent upon Soviet workers to do any of that
work, it will not succeed.
SENATOR ROTH: Let me ask you one final question
this round because my time is up. Considering the cost
of securing our government communications in the
Washington area from intercept by the Soviet Mount Alto
site, do you think it would be desirable for us to
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require the Soviets to move to some other site in the
city? At least, say, comparable to our location in
Moscow?
4
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I suppose that that kind of
5
an initiative would be wrapped up in our negotiations
6
with respect to our embassy in the swamps in Moscow.
am not in a position to say in an open meeting, nor am I
8
confident that I have the exact technical awareness, to
9
say how much damage they are doing. But they are
10
currently in a position in their present location to
11
capture enormous amounts of microwave transmissions.
12
And in this city, we seem to be tremendously careless
13
about what we say on our telephones. And we have had a
14
lot of experience with that.
15
If we moved them, I can't say that would end their
16
collection efforts. It might make it more difficult.
17
don't know whether that is enough of a reason, but there
18
are a lot of other reasons why we have to settle this
19
problem with the Soviets.
20
SENATOR ROTH: Thank you, Judge Webster.
21
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Senator Roth.
22
Senator Hollings.
23
SENATOR HOLLINGS: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
24
Judge Webster, with respect to the present security
25
breaches at the Moscow Embassy, we knowthey are
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investigating the Marines. But this seems in some sense
2
-- the Marines ares culpable, obviously, to me -- to be
3
an avoidance of responsibility. We hear you've got to
4
put older people there, or married people. But Jim
5
Bakker was married, too.
6
(General laughter.)
SENATOR HOLLINGS: And they avoid fixing
8
responsibility. We can't find anybody responsible for
9
the Challenger disaster, the Marine barracks -- I can go
10
right on down. Even now, with Irangate, the process is
11
flawed.
12
I am going to ask about your responsibility as
13
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and
14
Title 18 USC 194(E)(1), which states that wherever
15
someone entrusted with the possession of classified
16
material -- I am paraphrasing it -- through gross
17
negligence allows it to be lost, stolen, destroyed, they
18
shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned more
19
than ten years. To me there is gross negligence
20
involved in the Moscow Embassy fracas. I talk as the
21
Chairman of the Subcommittee on State, Justice,
22
Commerce. We have already had a hearing with Secretary
23
of State Shultz. It was a closed hearing, but I can at
24
least say this. There is gross negligence there. The
25
Regional Security Officer and the Ambassador are the
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ones in charge and the ones responsible.
Now, what are we doing about that? I know we're
giving Marines polygraph tests, but we've also been
promoting the RSO and congratulating the Ambassador. I
think if you really want to get security at the
embassies around this world, you nail an ambassador and
a Regional Security Officer, and you won't have to worry
anymore about the Marines and whether they are married
or old or neuter or what.
So let's get responsibility and accountability.
Through gross negligence, we had a time sharing plan out
there with the Soviets in Moscow.
(General laughter.)
SENATOR HOLLINGS: That is gross negligence. And
what are we doing about it? Are you giving a polygraph
to the RSO?
JUDGE WEBSTER: We have not been asked to do that
yet, Senator.
SENATOR HOLLINGS: Yeah, but you're the head of the
FBI. Who is going to ask you? You don't think the
State Department is going to ask you. They're promoting
people, the Ambassador and otherwise. I want to nail
the responsible individuals. If you nail them, that
will be better than buying all new buildings in the
Inman Report for $4 billion. If you fix
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responsibility, you'll change that attitude that
persisted in this particular embassy.
JUDGE WEBSTER: I certainly agree with you,
Senator, that it appears to be a long standing attitude
in the Moscow Embassy, and one that deserves a very
thorough review and change. We have in our other
responsibilities been calling attention for at least two
years to some of the vulnerabilities there. So far as
criminal investigations are concerned, I simply have no
answer for you. I will undertake to discuss this with
the Department of Justice to see whether or not there is
FBI jurisdiction for activities taking place abroad in
this way.
SENATOR HOLLINGS: I would appreciate it, because
what we're doing is concentrating on the Marines, and
that is fine; we call them in from all around the world
and investigate. But we are avoiding the responsible
individual. We are promoting him, and act like there is
no responsibility. The process is flawed. I am tired
of hearing that in this town. And if you nail a
Regional Security Officer and an ambassador, who's
really in charge, all ambassadors will wake up, and it
won't cost us an extra cent. ?We won't have to build any
more of these turrets that they're building, and
pillboxes all around.
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Let me ask another question quickly, because we're
voting upstairs on the Budget Committee. Please,
Judge, take cognizance of the House report on the
counterintelligence and security with respect to the
CIA. They made a very thorough study, and I have the
report here and we'll file it for you. But I take
pride in the Central Intelligence Agency.
investigated it for the Hoover Commission back in 1954
and '55, when we had Allen Dulles, General Cabel and the
others there. But now it seems to have fallen down on
discipline. And the selecting of personnel is a key
threat they list down here. The same old troubles that
we found years ago with respect to ensuring that one
particular agency informs the other of various security
breaches. And of course you know the handling of the
Yurchenko case. That was a disgrace. Nobody was
responsible. I bet you they didn't discipline a top
fellow at CIA for letting that fellow wander out of the
Washington restaurant down ?the -street back to the Soviet
Embassy. I bet you if they had nailed the top fellow in
charge of that particular program, that would never
happen again. But they didn't. Nobody is responsible.
We've got the Howard Case. How did he skip
surveillance. You folks, the FBI, had him under
surveillance, and he's in Moscow. What about that one?
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We've got to get that one. Larry Chin and other are just
part of a general breakdown. Maybe it is because of our
good friend Mr. Casey's health or otherwise, but you've
got a lot of work to do, taking over this particular
5
agency, to bolster it. And I am confident you are the
6
right man to, do it. I support you. But look at that
7
House report and go over that very thoroughly for me,
8
please.
9
JUDGE WEBSTER: I will, indeed.
10
SENATOR HOLLINGS: Thank you a lot, Mr. Chairman.
11
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Senator Hollings.
12
Senator Hatch.
13
SENATOR HATCH: Judge Webster, you've had some
14
criticism for the time delay with regard to your first
15
meeting with Attorney General Meese with regard to the
16
Iran problem. Would you tell the Committee and the
17
public at large how these investigations are really
18
initiated and what really happened there.
19
JUDGE WEBSTER: Are you referring, Senator Hatch,
20
to my meeting on November 21st?
21
SENATOR HATCH: Yes. I am referring to the 10 day
22
delay that occurred.
23
JUDGE WEBSTER: You're referring to the Southern
24
Air Freight matter?
25
SENATOR HATCH: That, plus the alleged criticism
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that you failed to follow up when you knew there was a
problem here. Let's start with Southern Air Transport.
JUDGE WEBSTER: All right. Your question has to do
with the Attorney General's request through his
5
Associate Attorney General, Stephen Trott, that we
6
suspend for 10 days any unnecessary investigation of
7
Southern Air Freight.
8
SENATOR HATCH: That was on October 30th.
9
JUDGE WEBSTER: On October 30th.
10
SENATOR HATCH: Right.
11
JUDGE WEBSTER: I received a telephone call from
12
Mr. Trott relaying a message from the Attorney General.
13
He wanted to know if it would be possible for us to
14
suspend any unnecessary investigation -- and those were
15
his words -- for about 10 days pending some sensitive
16
hostage negotiations; that he did not want to interfere
17
with the investigation, but he wanted to create, if
18
possible, a good climate in which those negotiations
19
could take place.
20
It is not unusual for the FBI itself to coordinate
21
investigations that overlap each other where one
22
investigation might get in the way of another
23
investigation or available resources. I do what I
24
normally would do. This was unusual in the sense that I
25
do not normally get that kind of a request from the
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Attorney General, but I called Assistant Director Floyd
Clarke, who is in charge of our criminal investigative
division, told him of the request, asked him about the
status of our preliminary inquiry about Southern Air,
5
and asked him whether the Attorney General's request
6
would present any problems to us.
7
Mr. Clarke told me it would present no problems at all.
8
We were barely into this investigation; that there was
9
not much to do; that we had one more interview, second
10
interview with an informant that would complete this
11
relatively short inquiry; and he had no problems with
12
accommodating this request.
13
I made that request a matter of record, and in that
14
formal memorandum of my conversation, I instructed Mr.
15
Clarke to inform me immediately if at any time that
16
request became a problem for him in the investigation.
17
On -- without an exact date, I have it -- but about
18
10 days later they informed me, as they always do that
19
the 10 days were up and would it be all right to go
20
ahead with the investigations. And I said yes, indeed,
21
10 days are 10 days, and I called for Mr. Trott. Mr.
?22
Trott returned my call the next day. I asked if there
23
were any problems in our going forward. Mr. Trott, on
24
October 12th said he wasn't certain, he would get back
25
and let us know. On October 20th, Mr. Trott advised
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Mr. Revell, our Executive Assistant Director, that it
was okay to proceed, and the bureaucratic process
started in the Bureau to draft a Teletype to the field
with those instructions. It took us longer than I was
5
aware of, over a weekend and four or five or six days to
6
get the teletype out, but I think that was indicative of
7
the fact that a lot was going on at the time and that
8
this investigation was never considered at that time to
9
be one of major overriding importance.
10
But that is the process by which the Attorney
11
General made the request, the process which I honored
12
SENATOR HATCH: As I understand it, the Attorney
13
General did not ask you to suspend urgent
14
investigations; only non-urgent investigations.
15
JUDGE WEBSTER: Absolutely not. And that is
16
included in my memOrandum.
17
SENATOR HATCH: Right. I also noticed that in a
18
memorandum, Subject: Investigation of Southern Air
19
Transport, dated November 12th, 1986, from John L.
20
Martin, Chief of the Internal Security Section of the
21
Criminal Division, to William F. Weld, Assistant
22
Attorney General, he attaches your memorandum dated
23
October 31st, to Assistant Director Floyd Clarke of the
24
Bureau's Criminal Investigative Division. The memo
25
mentions that this matter involves Eugene Hasenfus.
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This memorandum is dated November 12th, and said, "The
Bureau is anxious to resume its investigation, but even
though the 10 day period requested by Stave Trott has
4
expired, it is unwilling to do so without the
5
Department's approval. Unless you advise to the
6
contrary, I intend to advise the Bureau that it is free
7
to resume its investigation without further delay." And
8
so that is another memorandum --
9
JUDGE WEBSTER: This is being handled at the level
10
of the operational level between the Bureau people in
11
charge of that program and Mr. Martin in the Department.
12
So it was a dual contact with the Department on getting
13
it going.
14
SENATOR HATCH: As I understand it, the first time
15
you had any idea that there might have been a diversion
16
of funds to the contras from the Iranian arms sales was
17
when Mr. Meese gave his press conference on November
18
25th, I believe it was.
19
JUDGE WEBSTER: That is correct, Senator Hatch.
20
SENATOR HATCH: So you had no tip-off before that
21
time.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: None.
?23
SENATOR HATCH: Okay. That is all I want to ask at
24
this time, Mr. Chairman.
25
SENATOR COHEN: Senator Bradley.
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SENATOR BRADLEY: Thank you, very much, Mr.
Chairman. I see we have a vote on. I assume we just
proceed until the five bells.
Mr. Webster, I have been on the Intelligence
Committee for about two and a half years now. The last
Congress was referred to in some circles as the Congress
of the Spy. We have had already today mention made of
8
Howard and Whitworth and Walker and Pollard and Chin,
9
etc. And one of the things that has struck me is how
10
many Americans have actually sold information for money.
11
I imagine American citizen who enjoys the freedom of our
12
country betraying it for money. When things get tight
13
at ,home or you think you want to get rich quick, just
14
sell some information. Doesn't matter if it endangers
15
the national security of your country.
16
And the thing that occurs to me and I think it
17
occurs to a lot of people is what would cause somebody
18
to commit such an act and what can be done about it.
19
We have heard today from various Senators who have
20
talked about actions Congress can take and when that
21
happens you always hear about extended use of
22
polygraphs, tougher punishment, death penalty, etc., and
23
then you usually hear Congress saying well, we need to
24
revise procedures, and when the procedures are revised
25
then we will have taken care of the problem.
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But it occurs to me that those are not sufficient
answers to what we have witnessed in the last couple of
years. To me, the answer is probably more basic, more
painful, more demanding, and maybe even more idealistic.
And as someone who has had a remarkable record in 10
years at an institution such as the FBI, I wonder if you
have given any thought to the larger question about what
is it that causes people to sell information for money,
to betray their country for money.
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator Bradley, I think we have
all thought about this, because you are absolutely
right. In my entire time in the FBI I cannot think of
any American citizen who was found and convicted of
selling out to hostile intelligence services who did not
accept money, with one exception. And that was an Air
Force employee who gave away secrets because he was
angry at the Air Force. But he did not have any
ideological convictions that caused him to betray his
country.
There is, in a sense, a rough, very rough analogy
to the problems we face in our number one crime problem,
drugs. We can do all the things in law enforcement and
in legislation to make conduct illegal, but as long as
there is demand for drugs, drugs will continue to come.
And that is an educational process.
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The number of people we have found who have
betrayed their country -- and I am focusing on those who
walked in, not those who were undone by various skilled
recruiting devices of the Soviets - is a relatively
5
small number of people to the total numbers of people in
6
this country who love the country, who honor its
7
freedoms and would do nothing intentionally to betray
8
it. So whatever I might say ?to you in answer to your
9
question is not an indictment of the American people in
10
whom I have tremendous confidence.
11
But I think where we do find these incidents and we
12
track them back, we might -- and I am only speculating
13
-- we might find in their education the absence of
14
values. The concept of value neutral that I am hearing
15
these days in the teaching profession is of concern to
16
me It seems to me that we have some traditions and
17
loyalties that need to be fostered. When I was a child
18
in school, history was very important to me. I don't
19
think that we're teaching history in the way that we
20
used to teach it. When I was a child in school, Nathan
21
Hale was a hero and Benedict Arnold was a traitor, and
22
the distinction was very, very clear. I am not sure
23
that in today's world that there is not some numbness
24
about national secrets and the damage that the selling
25
of those national secrets can mean to us as a society,
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as a country, and to us as individuals.
I think that everything I have said probably
applies to those individuals who were found and
convicted. I wouldn't want it to be any kind of
indictment of our people as a whole. But we need some
6
shoring up and we need to be sure that the importance of
7
the work that individuals have who come into possession
8
of our national secrets needs to be made as clear to
9
them, the worthiness of their work, the trust that is
10
represented by our allowing them to have these secrets
11
should weigh in their conscience and in their, minds
12
before they knowingly sell out all that is so important
13
to us.
14
I am not a psychologist. I am not a teacher, but I
15
do believe that an awareness of our history and our
16
traditions, a sense of worthiness of work, and the
17
importance of preserving trust can be infused better
18
than we seem to be doing it today with those people to
19
whom much is entrusted. But I am glad that we only
20
have a handful of these to deal with. I think the vast
21
numbers of the people in. the Central Intelligence
22
Agency, the FBI, the NSA, the DIA and all the other
23
places fully realize the importance of the
24
responsibilities that have been given to them.
25
But it is something that I am glad to hear you ask,
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and I hope others along the way will ask and find ways
to build and reinforce that sense of responsibility and
trust that is so important in our society.
SENATOR BRADLEY: Thank you very much, Mr.
5
Director. I guess I have to go vote. Let me just say
6
that I appreciate your statement and I take it to be a
7
kind of resonance to something. de Tocqueville once said
8
when he said in America the spirit of liberty and the
9
spirit of religion are in fundamental agreement.
10
SENATOR COHEN: The Committee is going to stand in
11
recess for five minutes. Senator Boren will return.
12
(A brief recess was taken from 12:05 to 12:14 p.m.)
13
THE CHAIRMAN: We will resume the hearing at this
14
point, and I will recognize Senator Specter. I believe
15
that Senator Bradley had a small amount of time
16
remaining to him when he had to leave to go to vote, and
17
if when he comes back he has one last question to ask,
18
we'll recognize him after Senator Specter has completed
19
his round of questioning. Senator Specter, you are
20
recognized.
21
? SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you, Mr. 'Chairman.
22
Judge Webster, when you started your testimony this
23
morning you had commented about a memorandum dated
24
October 30th relating to certain information which had
25
been withheld from the National Security Council. Would
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you care to amplify the circumstances surrounding your
adding that to your testimony before you began your
prepared statement this morning.
JUDGE WEBSTER: I think that the facts are that the
5
information was reported to the Senate staff, and the
6
Chairman and possibly the Vice Chairman asked for an
7
explanation which was provided to them last night by
8
members of my staff who had coordinated all of the
9
records that might bear on this subject. And I
10
concluded that I should add it even though I did not
11
believe that the question, in letter or spirit, required
12
it, but in order that you might have a full record.
13
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, the Committee's
14
questionnaire had the question as to your knowledge of
15
any possible illegal _activities of U.S. officials in aid
16
of. the contras. And as you have noted, you had not put
17
that on your response. As I understand the facts, there
18
was a memorandum provided by Independent Counsel to the
19
Intelligence Committee which contained your initials and
20
where the FBI had decided not to make certain
21
information available to the National Security
22
Council --
23
JUDGE WEBSTER: - To Lieutenant North.
24
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, it was to the National
25
Security Council, because Lieutenant Colonel North might
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have access to it in the context that there was a
possible criminal prosecution which might be brought or
the appointment of Independent Counsel to investigate
Lieutenant Colonel North's activities with respect to
5
the contras. Is that essentially the situation?
6
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator, have you had a chance to
7
read my statement?
8
SENATOR SPECTER: I heard and made notes of the
9
statement that you gave this morning, Judge Webster.
10
JUDGE WEBSTER: I am not sure I understand your
11
question. I would like to answer it carefully.
12
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, my first question is that
13
the addendum which you added this morning was due to the
14
fact that Independent Counsel advised the Intelligence
15
Committee yesterday of a memorandum dated October 30th
16
which was initialed by you where the FBI had decided not
17
to make certain information available because of concern
18
that it might come to the 'attention of Lieutenant
19
Colonel North who might be the subject of an
20
investigation by an Independent Counsel.
21
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, that is substantially
22
correct. The document said that the Department official
23
had recommended that Lieutenant North not be informed
24
about the information contained in the memorandum.
25
SENATOR SPECTER: According to the information I
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have, the Counsel for the Intelligence Policy of the FBI
was concerned in somewhat direct language about Colonel
North potentially being in trouble, Colonel North
potentially being flaky, and concerned that the
5
information which the FBI had acquired not be made
6
available to Lieutenant Colonel North because he might
7
be the subject of an investigation where Independent
8
Counsel might be involved. Is that correct?
9
JUDGE WEBSTER: The memorandum contained a note
10
from an FBI employee saying that with respect to that
11
information, the Departmental official had recommended
12
that it not be given to Lieutenant Colonel North because
13
he might become the subject of an Independent Counsel --
14
I want to correct that -- that he might be involved in
15
an Independent Counsel probe and besides, it was
16
redundant because that information was already available
17
in the media.
18
SENATOR SPECTER: And the recommendation by the FBI
19
official that Lieutenant Colonel North not have access
20
to this information because he might be involved in a
21
probe initiated by Independent Counsel, that
22
recommendation was approved by you and initialed by you
23
on a memorandum.
24
JUDGE WEBSTER: This was not a recommendation --
25
coming to me in a recommendation form. This was an
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information note, the kind that I get dozens of a day,
that simply put on there that it had recommended. I did
not participate. I did not sign an approval. My
initials are just scribbled on the bottom of the page.
5
It was for my information.
6
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, your initials, though, were
7
scribbled, as you point out, on the bottom of the page,
8
indicating your agreement with the recommendation not to
9
make the information available to Lieutenant Colonel
10
North.
11
JUDGE WEBSTER: It really didn't indicate anything
12
other than I had read the memorandum, because I was not
13
the one making that decision. It was not sent to me for
14
approval; it was sent to me for information.
15
SENATOR SPECTER: Judge Webster, the issue becomes
16
somewhat important in the context of the fact that that
17
memo was simply one day before you wrote this memorandum
18
to Mr. Clarke which you have already testified about,
19
requesting that there be a delay in the investigation of
20
Southern Air Transport. This memorandum asks to suspend
21
the investigation of any non-urgent work that could --
22
and you used the word -- wreck the investigation. Did
23
you see any connection between the information which had
24
come to the FBI concerning the contras and concerning
25
Hasenfus and the request which you made the very next
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day to delay this investigation.
JUDGE WEBSTER: Let me make a couple of
observations
can.
First,
to answer as candidly
I have no independent
memorandum at all, other than that
it. It was typical of the
batches of an informational
and completely as I
recollection of that
my initials appear on
kind that came ?in large
variety in which I was not
being asked to act, but simply being informed.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, you say you have no
independent recollection of it when you filled
Intelligence Committee questionnaire. But how
JUDGE WEBSTER: That's right. And it was
out the
about --
certainly
not on my mind at the time that the Attorney General
called through his Associate Attorney General. I do
not even know, Senator, that I read that particular
piece -- had read it by the time that I had that
conversation with him. Often those informational notes
are taken home. Sometimes they may be a day or two if I
am in travel. These are not action things; they are
informationAL things. So I can't explain it. I had no
recollection of it. I certainly know that I did not
have it in my mind at the time that Mr. Trott called to
inquire whether I would have any problem.
Further, I have consulted with Mr. Clarke who is
the Assistant Director in charge of the Criminal
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Investigative Division who is .the one I consulted to
determine whether there would be any problem in
suspending it, and he has no recollection of that
memorandum, although he also saw it on an informational
basis. I am trying to suggest that that information was
acted on at a very low level.
And as I emphasized in my statement -- and then I
will take your next question -- but as I emphasized in
my statement there is nothing in the memoranda, that is,
that contains the information that the Justice
Department official proposed not be given to Mr. North,
Colonel North, there is nothing in that memorandum that
refers to Lieutenant Colonel North or to any other
United States government official or in any way suggests
that any United States government official was involved
in illegal activity in Central America. And therefore
I did not believe and I do not believe now that it was
called for as an answer to your question. But I wanted
to put it in because you had raised it.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, I can understand your point
that you may not have remembered it when you filled out
the Intelligence Committee questionnaire. But here we
have two events, one on October 30th and one on October
31st, and it seems to me that it is not so
inconsequential that confidential information comes to
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the FBI which the FBI decides not to transmit to a
circle where it may come to the attention of Lieutenant
Colonel North, and that even as you characterize your
scribbling notes, that it is a fairly significant matter
on your making a notation of any sort in agreement
apparently not to have the disclosure to Lieutenant
Colonel North. This is especially so in the context
wherein the very next day you send a memorandum
requesting a delay of 10 days in the investigation
relating to Southern Air Transport.
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator Specter, it was the same
day, if you want to be precise. I wrote the memorandum
the next day.
SENATOR SPECTER: Okay, the same day.
JUDGE WEBSTER: But I have already told you, I
don't even know whether I read that memorandum on the
same day. This is reading material, the kind of stuff
that went home with me.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, now, wait a --
JUDGE WEBSTER: And I don't remember it at all.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, Judge Webster, are you
saying you scribbled your initials on a piece of paper
that you don't even know if you read?
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, I didn't say that. I said I
don't know-- I don't know when I read it. By putting
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my initials on it, I meant I had read it.
SENATOR SPECTER: Are you saying that you may have
read it after October 31st?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Yes, I may have.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, if you read it after
October 31st, didn't you make any connection between
some information that the FBI had decided not to make
available to Lieutenant Colonel North and --
JUDGE WEBSTER: I did'not make the --
SENATOR SPECTER: -- and a request to have a
suspension for 10 days of an investigation relating to
Southern Air Transport which involved the same locale
and perhaps overlapping areas.
JUDGE WEBSTER: I did not, Senator, and if you look
at the --well, you don't have -- I assume that you've
had access to the memorandum. It has apparently been
provided to you. The memorandum doesn't talk about
Lieutenant Colonel North.
SENATOR SPECTER: The memorandum has not been
provided to us, Judge Webster. I have a memorandum of
the staffer who read the memorandum, and I think we
ought to have the memorandum, and I intend, speaking for
myself, to make an effort to get it.
JUDGE WEBSTER: You understand, Senator, that
memorandum is in the possession of the Independent
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Counsel and was provided by the FBI.
SENATOR SPECTER: Let me ask you one more question.
We have a vote on and perhaps I can come back to this in
a later round. You have testified that you had no
5
reason to suspect that there was a criminal
6
investigation or a potentially criminal investigation
7
when you had the conversation with Attorney General
8
Meese on November 21st. You have testified that the
9
issue of the Iranian arms sale came to your attention,
10
believe you said, in the summer of -- when was it, in
11
response to Senator Cohen's question, that you said you
12
had some information about --
13
JUDGE WEBSTER: As nearly as we can determine by
14
tracking it back to a Criminal Investigative Division
15
briefing, it was on October 5, 1986.
16
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, Judge Webster, you have had
17
a number of indications which surround the issue. Some
18
information comes to your attention on October 5th,
19
1986, which you consider to be of sufficient importance
20
to call to the attention of the Attorney General to see
21
if he knows about it and to see if there has been a
22
Finding. Shortly before that time there, is information
23
which comes to the FBI that you decide ought not to be
24
made available to Lieutenant Colonel North. At about
25
the same time there is a request which comes to you, and
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it is obviously an important matter because you put it
in this memorandum. And then on November 21st you have
a conversation with the Attorney General about the
4
Iranian arms sale and there must have been some question
5
about compliance with the Export Administration Act or
6
the Arms Export Control Act. Why in that context, given
7
your experience, was there no red light flashed that
8
perhaps there ought to be some greater concern about an
9
appropriate role for the FBI.
10
JUDGE WEBSTER: It was a judgment call, Senator.
11
I did not see it. You can fault me for not seeing it,
12
but I didn't see it. And I certainly didn't remember
13
that piece of paper that you're talking about or have it
14
in my mind.
15
SENATOR SPECTER: Had Mr. Meese told you that the
16
issue did involve the sale of arms to Iran when you
17
talked to him on November 21st?
18
JUDGE WEBSTER: The conversation was relatively
19
brief. I was the one who told him what I had been
20
informed, and he confirmed that yes, he was aware of
21
that, and that yes, he had seen the Finding or a draft
22
of it and had given his approval to it.
23
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, that is the October 5th,
24
1986 conversation between you and Mr. Meese, where you
25
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JUDGE WEBSTER: No, I think that would be shortly
after August. August 5th was the --
SENATOR SPECTER: About August the 5th.
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, it would have been within a
5
few days. It might have been that same day or a few
6
days after that.
7
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, all right. You have this
8
conversation with him on August 5th. Leave out the
9
business as to keeping information from Lieutenant
10
Colonel North and the Southern Air Transport matters
11
which occur on October 30th and 31st or thereabouts, and
12
just pick up the August 5th conversation with Mr. Meese
13
about the sale of arms to Iran. Also, pick up on your
14
concern about whether arms are being sold to a state
15
which sponsors terrorism, and on the information of
16
November 21st where you have a conversation with Mr.
17
Meese about his inquiries relating to the Iranian arms
18
sale. Wasn't there some concern on your part about
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possible violation of the Export Administration Act or
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the Arms Control Export Act, that there may be some
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criminal overtone to this matter.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I can tell you that there was
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not. Most of those acts relate to Customs, and the
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Attorney General was not -- we were not thinking in
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terms of or speaking in terms of looking for what kinds
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of laws had been violated, but looking for what had
actually happened -- trying to get the facts straight.
SENATOR SPECTER: But, there was the sale of arms
to Iran and the Export Administration Act bars the
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export of goods and commodities to any nation which the
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Secretary of State has determined supports international
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Communism. And Secretary Shultz had made that
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determination. And the Arms Export Control Act
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regulates transfers of arms generally and specifically
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bars items on the munitions list to any nation which the
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President determines supports international terrorism.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I could raise the question of
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whether a Presidential Finding would have superseded any
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Finding by the Secretary of State, but there's really no
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point in that because we were not thinking about the
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Export/Import Arms Control Act which is not normally an
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area in which the FBI is active.
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SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you, Judge Webster. My
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time has expired. I'll come back to it the next round.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Senator
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Specter. Senator Bradley has returned, and he has three
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minutes remaining on his time for questioning, and then
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we will continue with questions by Senator DeConcini.
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So, the Chair will go over to the floor to vote. And,
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so, Senator DeConcini if you would take up the
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questioning just as soon as Senator Bradley completes
his line of questioning, by then I should be back.
SENATOR BRADLEY: Mr. Chairman, do I understand
that we will have Mr. Webster for a closed hearing?
THE CHAIRMAN: If there are any classified
questions that need to be asked, we will. We had
planned to come back in open session this afternoon at
two o'clock. There are many more questions that Members
have indicated to me they wish to address in the open
session. If Members do have matters dealing with
classified information or questions about which you'd
like a ruling as to whether or not they deal with
classified information, if you would inform the Chair.
Then we will decide either later this afternoon or
tomorrow about a closed session. But, we'll resume an
open session at two o'clock. We'll complete your
questions and then Senator DeConcini's and see if there
are others that wish to ask questions before we break.
We'll break no later than about ten minutes to one.
SENATOR BRADLEY: Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman. Mr. Webster, I'd like to move to another
area. I appreciate your response to the last one, and I
really hope that people read your response because I
think it was an important response given our current
environment.
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One of the challenges that you will face is how to
take the CIA to a new level of public acceptability and
responsibility. In this connection, how you conduct
yourself in the position as the head of the whole
Central Intelligence apparatus is very important. To
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the extent that you are almost above politics, as you
7
have been, that is also very important. That leads me
8
to a question relating to the criteria that you would
9
apply to your public speeches and your writings. The
10
question has arisen in the immediate past as to whether
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the Director didn't actually become a part of the policy
12
advocacy process; didn't actually take a very direct
13
and even quasi-partisan position on issues before the
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Congress. And I wonder if you could share with us the
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criteria you would have for determining what you would
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speak out on and what you would write about.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I think, Senator Bradley, that
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first of all I would probably proceed pretty much as I
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have done during the past nine years in the FBI, and
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that is wherever possible and appropriate to take
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advantage of opportunities to explain to the American
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people the role of Central Intelligence, the need for
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it, how intelligence is gathered in general terms, and,
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at least in those areas that can be publicly.discussed,
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made as clear as possible. I have great confidence in
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the American people to support something that makes
sense and something that they know is necessary. From
time to time over the last nine years it has been
necessary for me to publicly explain, and often defend,
techniques, operations, events that are understandably
confusing to the public. And, I presume I would be
prepared to do that. I do not. believe that I would be
asked to, nor would I want to engage, in any advocacy of
political policy. I've tried to stay as far away from
that as I can in order not to create the perception that
I am -- that either I am politically motivated or that
the quality of intelligence upon which our policymakers
are expected to act is influenced by political or
personal bias. I am concerned that on some campuses we
are beginning to see signs that the CIA may not be as
welcome as we would like it to be. And that concerns me
because of the enormous pool of tremendously talented
scholars and thinkers and analysts that we have to draw
on in order to produce the quality analysis that makes
the CIA the premier intelligence agency in the world.
And, unless we continue to have support and
understanding on our campuses and in other places of
education and advanced knowledge, we are not going to
have that kind of person to continue to work in the CIA.
So I need to be out talking to those people. If your
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question was directed, would I be a partisan advocate
for particular causes, the answer is no. If someone
were to ask me while I was making a speech what is
behind a particular policy and I understand it, I think
I would try to answer the question in the same way that
I answer similar questions in the FBI. What was the
7
reason for the President's decision to punish Libya for
8
the LaBelle discotheque.
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?I think that needs to be explained. But I think I
10
must be always careful to do it in ways that would not
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suggest that the intelligence is --
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SENATOR BRADLEY: Let's say that --
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SENATOR COHEN: The Senator's time has expired.
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There are two others waiting. Do you want to yield?
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SENATOR DeCONCINI: Not necessarily. But I think
16
it's a unanimous consent to let him finish that
17
question. I thought he was in the middle of something.
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SENATOR BRADLEY: If I could just -- very quickly.
19
Let's assume you,got a call from a White House, and
20
there was a big vote coming up in Congress, and then
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sometime in the next three weeks it would be very
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helpful for the head of Central Intelligence to make a
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statement that could be used in the overall effort to
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achieve the policy objective.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I'd view that with a lot of
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suspicion. I've had requests from time to time to state
views on such things as the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act, and I think that in the sense that it
effects anything -- any legislation that effects the CIA
-- I would be entitled to make a statement. But just
6
simply to roll drum beats to make room for high level
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speeches is not the role of the Director of Central
8
Intelligence.
9
SENATOR BRADLEY: Thank you. And thank you, Mr.
10
Chairman.
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SENATOR COHEN: Senator DeConcini.
12
SENATOR DeCONCINI: Mr. Chairman, thank you very
13
much.
14
Judge Webster, I want to go back in time because
15
I've never quite understood the problem in the Donovan
16
confirmation and the FBI's involvement in that hearing.
17
At the time of that confirmation hearing for the
18
Secretary of Labor, before the Senate Committee on Labor
19
and Human Resources, the FBI told the Committee that its
20
investigation of Mr. Donovan had been "thorough and
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complete." Those are quotes. And, " had surfaced no
22
information which would reflect unfavorable upon Mr.
23
Donovan." Yet, according to a Teletype sent from the
24
New York field office to the FBI Headquarters, dated
25
January 10, 1981, with which I presume you're familiar.
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The Tumcon cases Masselli tapes revealed
conversations in which schemes to defraud the New York
Transit Authority, through the use of a phony minority
business enterprise, JOPEL Construction Company, and
other misdeeds of overcharging and what have you,
were discussed by William Masselli and the executives at
Shiavone Construction Company. Mr. Donovan and his
fellow Schiavone executives,are now standing trial, as
you know, in New York on evidence taken from these tapes
and other evidence. I want to know, Judge Webster, can
you tell the Committee why these serious allegations
about Ray Donovan's social and business ties to
organized crime and his possible involvement in
fraudulent contracts were not revealed to the Senate
Labor Committee during the confirmation proceedings.
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator DeConcini, there was a lot
that was wrong with that investigation. And in
extensive hearings chaired by Senator Hatch those facts
came out fully.
SENATOR DeCONCINI: In the confirmation hearings?
Excuse me?
JUDGE WEBSTER: In confirmation hearings and even
in separate hearings before that. The FBI executive who
made that statement I really believe thought it was true
at the time, but the investigation was not as thorough
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and complete as we would expect in any present day
confirmation. It was done in a manner consistent with
past Presidential nominations, but in reviewing it I
have to say very candidly that the summaries that we
5
provided the White House, which was consistent with past
6
practice, were inadequate -- inadequate to alert the
7
President's counsel that there were serious and specific
8
problems that he might want to address and, in fact,
9
inform the Congress about. When we gathered up'what
10
information that we had -- and we really did try in that
11
one to reach further than we had in the other Cabinet
12
offices. We didn't capture it all. Very substantial
13
changes have taken place since that time and the systems
14
-- the automation systems, the rules, the practices.
15
Even the form in which we supply information to the
16
White House with respect to Presidential nominations
17
has been substantially changed so that nothing we say
18
will mislead.
19
SENATOR DeCONCINI: Judge Webster, when the
20
confirmation hearings and report was sent up did you
21
have already in your possession the January 10, 1981,
22
Teletype from the New York FBI office? Or do you know?
23
JUDGE WEBSTER: I just don't know the answer to
24
that, Senator.
25
SENATOR DeCONCINI: Could you find out for me? I'm
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concerned that this type of information
JUDGE WEBSTER: We'll certainly answer it promptly
for the record.
4
SENATOR DeCONCINI: I'm concerned that this type of
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information, a copy of which was provided to be by the
6
District Attorney's office, may not have been given to
7
the Labor Committee. Do you know what happened to it?
8
Maybe it wasn't sent to the Headquarters as they say it
9
was. But if it was sent to Headquarters, how would it
10
not wind up in the file for either your review or your
11
chief deputy's review?
12
JUDGE WEBSTER: I'm confident today that would not
13
happen.
14
SENATOR DeCONCINI: It would not because of
15
procedural changes?
16
JUDGE WEBSTER: Yes.
17
SENATOR DeCONCINI: Did anyone from the White
18
House, or particularly Fred Fielding, request that these
19
allegations, or this type of information, not be sent
20
to the Committee?
21
JUDGE WEBSTER: There was one time when there was
22
some question about further interviews and whether
23
further interviews were necessary, and I think Mr.
24
Fielding said that he didn't believe that they were.
25
And I believe that our agent working the case didn't
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think so either. But I know of no situation in which
White House counsel intentionally withheld any
information the White House counsel had. I think the
problem was that we gave some of that information in
such summarized form and then those working with it
really believed that that information was all
incorporated in some very general summaries. Now we
provide all derogatory information in the form in which
it is received, so there can be no doubt about what the
counsel was actually told.
SENATOR DeCONCINI: Judge Webster, my question is
did the White House, particularly Fielding or anybody
else, request that these particular allegations or any
other allegations not be forwarded to the Committee? '
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator DeConcini, I can recall no
such request by the White House.
SENATOR DeCONCINI: Can you also provide us
perhaps you don't have this at your fingertips -- when
you did learn of these allegations and the information
which was not available to the Committee during Mr.
Donovan's confirmation process, and then how much time
elapsed before you transmitted it. If that period of,
time was longer than a reasonable time of 30 or 60 days,
? why was it not transmitted?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I am trying to relate your question
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to what I knew. I did not know the substance of M
Mullin's testimony until later that summer when I as
I recall, I received a letter from Senator Hatch
referring to the testimony, and suggesting that perhaps
5
it was incomplete. It had to do with information that
6
was on lengthy wiretaps, some 1500 hours of wiretaps in
7
New Jersey. One -- as I recall one, possibly two
8
references to Mr. Donovan's company had been made on
9
those tapes that had been reported to me before the
10
confirmation began, with the information that those
11
references did not refer to anything criminal, any
12
criminal activity.
13
SENATOR DeCONCINI: You mean as to the information
14
that was referred to you.
15
JUDGE WEBSTER: That was referred to me.
16
SENATOR DeCONCINI: Not as to the whole tapes
17
JUDGE WEBSTER: No. No. The full tape was not
18
actually transcribed until the Independent Counsel was
19
appointed, and it took some six or eight of his people
20
several weeks to listen to those tapes, and I think that
21
they found five or six additional references to the
22
company and possibly even to Mr. Donovan in doing that.
23
That information was really not available to us in
24
the form in which it was held. We did know that there
25
were references in the tape to Mr. Donovan -- rather, to
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his company, at least -- and that information was not
given to the Senate during his confirmation. I did not
know that --
SENATOR DeCONCINI: That it was not given.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: -- that it was not given, and I did
6
not know that it had been asked for.
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SENATOR DeCONCINI: Judge Webster, can you tell us
8
what is the procedure that you have implemented to
9
prevent this from happening today? If we had a nominee
10
for another Cabinet position, what guarantees do we
11
have that, in fact, the Director or your chief
12
subordinate would have all the information that you know
13
of within the Federal Bureau, and that all available
14
information would be sent up to the appropriate
15
Committee and its Chairman and Ranking Member.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I missed the first part. You say
17
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SENATOR DeCONCINI: What procedures have been
19
implemented now so that this won't happen again and
20
doesn't happen now. What is the change in procedures?
21
JUDGE WEBSTER: We now have procedures for calling
22
infield information and for automating the information
23
that is available to us, both from the field and at
24
headquarters. We have procedures for identifying
25'
derogatory information and giving it in the form in
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which it is received to the White House so that it is
not incorporated in some sort of gross summary of the
facts. I think the reviewing procedures have been
tightened up, and I could supply for the record, if you
wish, a list of those changes.
SENATOR DeCONCINI: I would like to see them,
Judge, if you could provide the. My time is up.
But let me say that I think this is very candid of
you and very typical of the way you operate. Indeed, it
appears from the little bit that I know, and I am not on
the Labor Committee, that indeed something was left out
in that confirmation hearing -- a very important
something as to Mr. Donovan. I ended up voting against
him, and I can't even remember exactly why now, but in
retrospect I am very glad I did. But it might have been
my concern that all the information wasn't there.
Still, I can appreciate that errors happen or procedure
change. I think it would be helpful to this Senator and
perhaps the record if you would supply what those
changes are and what the process is now, by providing a
summary position paper which could be put in the record.
JUDGE WEBSTER: I would be happy to do that.
SENATOR DeCONCINI: Thank you, Judge Webster.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much, Senator
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DeConcini.
Let me explain to the members of the Committee the
situation in which we find ourselves. We have some
members of the Committee who have been waiting to ask
5
their questions who cannot return this afternoon. As I
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understand it, they have other conflicts. What I would
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like to do is give them an opportunity, Judge Webster,
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if we could go on maybe another 20 minutes or so this
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morning.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Mr. Chairman, I am at your service,
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as long as you would like.
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THE CHAIRMAN: We will return about 2:10 after
13
that. If I could ask my colleagues, since we've had the
14
Judge here now for almost three hours, if there is any
15
way you can constrain the length of the questions. We
16
want to give you every opportunity and we'll have more
17
rounds of questioning this afternoon. But we want to
18
give you a chance, because I know some have scheduling
19
problems.
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Senator. Hecht.
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SENATOR HECHT: Good afternoon Judge, how are you?
22
JUDGE WEBSTER: Good afternoon Senator.
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SENATOR HECHT: Judge, in my particular state of
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Nevada, there's been a lot of question about how you
25
have handled some FBI agents and I'm bringing this up
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because this is very relative to your confirmation, how
you hope to handle CIA agents.
Maybe the question I'd like to submit have been
raised by newspapers, the Las Vegas Sun, with your
permission I'm going to have a lot of these articles
included in the record.
(The newspaper artidles referred to follow:)
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SENATOR HECHT: As you are aware, last year the
Senate voted to impeach Judge Claiborne and remove him
from office. At the same time, the Senate approved an
investigation into the way Judge Claiborne was targeted
by the FBI and the conduct of those who conducted the
investigation. Are you satisfied with that
investigation, headed by then FBI Las Vegas Chief Joseph
Yablonsky, was conducted properly by the book?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator Hecht, I am satisfied that
with respect to the investigation of Judge Claiborne,
the head of our office in Las-Vegas carried out his
responsibilities in the manner appropriate and in a
lawful manner. I guess that's your question, did he
break any laws or break any rules. There were other
things that occurred out there that I'm not so proud of,
but in terms of the investigation, I am satisfied that
there was a proper predicate to initiate the
investigation. That evidence came forward that formed
the basis for a Grand Jury investigation and an
indictment. There was a hung jury, and the case was
retried. Senator Claiborne was convicted. He had
exhausted his appeals before he came before this Senate
on impeachment charges. In no where in any of that did
I find anything that would require a disciplinary action
or administrative action of my officials out there.
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That investigation was under the supervision of the
public integrity division section of the Department of
Justice. I was a participant in passing on and
carefully reviewing various proposals to deal with
Senator Claiborne during that investigation.
SENATOR WARNER: Judge Claiborne.
JUDGE WEBSTER: I beg your pardon. What did I say?
SENATOR WARNER: He was here for only a short time.
THE CHAIRMAN: I think you referred to him as
Senator Claiborne.
JUDGE WEBSTER: I would withdraw and apologize for
that. But I say won't that I agreed with everything
that was proposed to be done, because I didn't, and I
exercised my responsibility to modify various proposals.
But I am not aware that the special agent in charge went
beyond his authority when I gave it to him.
SENATOR HECHT: Why was Judge Claiborne targeted by
Mr. Yablonsky?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I would, Senator, very respectfully
disagree with the term targeting. He was not targeted.
Information came to the FBI through a fugitive in, at
that time, another country, that he wanted in exchange
for favorable consideration of his situation to give
evidence to the government of a bribe paid by him to
then Mr. Claiborne, and I think -- I'm not sure of the
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exact time -- of a bribe to Judge Claiborne. We
interviewed the prospective witness, got further
information. Other collaborative information came from
other individuals including a former Assistant United
5
State Attorney. We went forward with that
6
investigation. And in the course of that investigation,
7
evidence of income tax evasion came forward and that
8
formed the basis for an additional charge, in fact, for
9
the charge for which he was finally convicted. That was
10
handled with the Internal Revenue Service and of course
11
the United States Attorneys out there were in charge of
12
the investigation locally.
13
SENATOR HECHT: For the record I want to point out
14
that the individual which was from another country was
15
an American citizen, and a man of questionable
16
integrity, the owner of a licensed brothel, and on this
17
particular type of an individual you relied on his
18
testimony.
19
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator, we didn't rely on his
20
testimony, we took his testimony and reached out for
21
other collaborating facts to determine whether or not he
22
was telling the truth. We get information from the
23
worst kind of people.
24
(General laughter.)
25
JUDGE WEBSTER: And it doesn't mean their evidence
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is untrue. It means we have to be careful about it.
SENATOR HECHT: Why did you send Mr. Yablonsky to
Las Vegas?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I sent, I chose Mr. Yablonsky for
5
Las Vegas, and I take responsibility for having done so.
6
He was doing a very good job in the Cincinnati Office.
7
He was, he had developed a significant reputaiion in
8
undercover activity. I was concerned that while we had
9
substantial indications of organized crime involvement
10
in Las Vegas and the casinos with tentacles reaching
11
from Chicago and Kansas City, we had not been successful
12
in dealing with organized crime out there, and I thought
13
he was the one to go out and do something about it.
14
SENATOR HECHT: How do you feel about the situation
15
now?
16
JUDGE WEBSTER: I think he did a very good job.
17
Las Vegas is a difficult climate in which to live, and I
18
think he made some mistakes, some personal mistakes, for
19
which he was accountable and was held to account. But
20
in terms of his investigative efforts, when I look at
21
the indictments that came down during his tenure there,
22
I am very pleased that I sent him.
23,
SENATOR HECHT: How often were you briefed by M
24
Yablonsky during the course of the Claiborne
25
investigation?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: The normal course of events is that
the special agents in charge do their reporting to the
Criminal Investigative Division, and then I receive
informational notes from that division which manages the
5
programs. And that is the way this generally occurred.
6
From time to time, Mr. Yablonsky would request authority
7
to do certain things of .a sensitive nature, and those
8
would be elevated to senior officials and often to me
9
for determination. If I thought it were necessary to
10
talk to him personally, I would do so, and on at least
11
one trip, to Las Vegas, I had an extensive conference.
12
with him and with the people out there with respect to
13
their work.
14
SENATOR HECHT: Did you ever caution him to stay
15
within the bounds of the law during the investigation?
16
JUDGE WEBSTER: I don't know that I ever used those
17
terms, because he never proposed to do anything outside
18
the law. But from time to time, I exercised my
19
responsibility in limiting certain activities in order
20
to protect -- what I cOnsidered to be -- to protect the
21
investigation from possible compromise by a very wily
22
subject.
23
SENATOR HECHT: Mr. Chairman, my time is up, but I
24
wish to have time to continue this pursuit of questions
25
at a later time.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Certainly Senator Hecht. We'll have
more rounds of questions this afternoon and every Member
of the Committee will hive a chance to ask every
question they wish to ask.
SENATOR,HECHT: Thank you very much.
THE CHAIRMAN: Senator Cranston.
SENATOR CRANSTON: Thank you Mr. Chairman. I
welcome you to this Committee.
JUDGE WEBSTER: Thank you Senator.
SENATOR CRANSTON: You come before us at a time of
strain and stress for the Intelligence Community in the
wake of the Iran/Contra matters. It is very important
to have someone of experience and integrity and very
good judgment assuming the role of leading the
Intelligence Community. From all that I've gathered
this far, you're highly qualified for this nomination,
and subject to whatever may come up in the scope of
these hearings, I expect you're going to be confirmed,
and I will be one of those very happy to join in that
confirmation.
I do want to ask you some questions that relate to
something that happened in California a while ago. This
hearing gives me the opportunity to do that. According
to press reports the FBI started an investigation of the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine some three
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years ago. Some of my questions you may not want to
answer in open session, some you may want to go back to
look at the files, but let me ask you what prompted your
investigation at that time of the PFLP?
5
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator, I appreciate your
6
understanding the constraints that I am under in
7
responding to that question. The PLFP is a world-wide
8
organization which has been extremely violent in its
9
activities. It has claimed credit and been involved in
10
such incidents as the shootings in Munich and the
11
hi-jacking of the famous plane that went to Entebbe. A
12
number of Americans have been victims of the PFLP
13
terrorist activity. There was a substantial basis under
14
the Attorney General Guidelines to conduct
15
investigations of this organization and the individuals
16
in that organization who might -- who we had ?reason to
17
believe might be engaged in terrorist activity. That
18
was the basis for opening the investigation.
19
SENATOR CRANSTON: Did you have any reason to
20
believe that the group was actually engaged in or
21
planning to engage in terrorist activities in this
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country?
23
JUDGE WEBSTER: Taken as a whole, I think we had
24
reason to believe that there were plans in operation of
25
a terrorist nature. With all that is going on in the
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Middle East we have an awareness of infrastructures in
the United States which could form the basis for support
mechanisms if individual groups chose to retaliate or to
engage in terrorist activities here in this country, and
that goes across a number of such organizations. The
individuals who were arrested in talifornia had not been
found to have engaged themselves in terrorist activity.
SENATOR CRANSTON: I understand that the
Immigration Service actually carried out the arrest of
the PFLP members for deportation purposes. But the
arrests were based on information provided by the FBI
concerning the organization and activities of the
individuals, is that correct?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I believe that is correct, Senator.
SENATOR CRANSTON: Press reports allege there was
mistreatment of the arrested people by the Immigration
Service agents, not by FBI agents. Were FBI agents
present during the arrest?
JUDGE WEBSTER: FBI agents were present at the
arrest for the purpose of being in a position to
interview any of those arrested who wished to cdoperate.
We did not make the arrest.
SENATOR CRANSTON: Are you looking into the charges
of mistreatment of the people during the arrest by the
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Immigration officials, or do you have any information on
that?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Of course I have spoken to Mr. Allen
Nelson, the head of the Immigration Service, and he has
ordered an Office of Professional Responsibility
investigation into the allegations. WQe had originally
had started a civil rights investigation but were
advised by the Department that we did not have a basis
for that and that we should close our investigation and
rely upon what should be developed by the Immigration
and Naturalization Service, which was looking into it.
We've also conducted some internal inquiries ?as a result
of some of the news reports, particularly an article by
Mr. Anthony Lewis, that referred to mistreatment of a
woman. I think her name is Vitar; it's close to that,
Vitar. We do not believe -- we know that no agent of
the FBI participated in it. We do not have any evidence
of any others. Mr. Nelson is looking for any that he
can find, and the attorney for the woman has not made
her available for us to interview, so that we can do
anything further about it. But if there is any way for
us to put that to rest, I certainly want to do so.
SENATOR CRANSTON: What was the reason' for the
arrests being made for deportation purposes of the
alleged members? Was that a technical, legal reason,
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were they apprehended for deportation because they were
"members of a Communist" organization.
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator Cranston, I believe that
some of them were out of status and that would be
5
information, I believe, developed by the INS. But all
6
of them were arrested because they are alleged to be
7
members of a world-wide Commudist organization which
8
under the McCarran Act makes them eligible for
9
deportation as foreign nationals.
10
SENATOR CRANSTON: So in a way, it was like
11
arresting a gangster for parking by a fire hydrant?. Do
12
you think that we need to revise the laws that are
13
available for this purpose? Are we using the wrong tool
14
to address a legitimate concern about terrorism and
15
terrorist operatives in the United States?
16
JUDGE WEBSTER: That's entirely up to Congress,
17
because in this particular case if these individuals had
18
been United States citizens, there would not have been a
19
basis for their arrest.
20
SENATOR CRANSTON: Is there any law that would
21
enable you to focus more narrowly on aliens who are
22
actively involved in clandestine terrorist activities,
23
rather than needing this broader law about membership in
24
a Communist apparatus? In your opinion, would it be
25
helpful to have a law that would be more precise?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I think it would be helpful to have
a law that was more precise and was treated as a more
serious incident than just civil deportation.
4
SENATOR CRANSTON: Under what circumstances does the
5
FBI conduct warrantless searches for intelligence
6
purposes? Is the PFLP the kind of group that might fit
7
the criteria for a warrantless' search based on inherent
8
executive powers?
9
JUDGE WEBSTER: Our warrantless searches are based
10
upon, first they are based upon the inherent authority
11
of the President to protect the national security and
12
his ability to delegate that authority to the Attorney
13
General, who has in turn, formulated foreign
14
counterintelligence guidelines which include
15
international terrorist activity. I'm not able to
16
respond to the question specifically because the
17
guidelines themselves are classified. I simply can give
18
you the basis upon which, if a search were conducted, it
19
would be under that line of authority that I described
20
to you.
21
THE CHAIRMAN: Senator Cranston, we could either
22
pursue that further in a sclosed session or if you wish
23
to have the Director answer a classified question in
24
writing, that could also be done and made a part of the
25
classified part of our record.
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SENATOR CRANSTON: If you could respond in writing,
that would be helpful.
THE CHAIRMAN: Senator Cranston will direct the
question in writing and there could be a response in
writing which would be a classified portion of the
6
record.
7
SENATOR CRANSTON: My tithe is about up, so I, thank
8
you very much.
9
THE CHAIRMAN: Senator Warner.
10
SENATOR WARNER: Thank you Mr. Chairman. Again
11
Judge Webster, I'm speaking as a citizen. I'm very
12
pleased that you are willing to take on this challenge
13
and put in an additional period of public service.
14
I want to return to the discussions that I think my
15
colleagues, Senator Nunn and Senator Cohen probed about
16
the role of the President's Chief Advisor on
17
Intelligence matters and the relationship with a
18
President. And your reference to the thought as to what
19
role politics plays in this. Would you care to sort of
20
set the foundation here of your views as to how you hope
21
to relate to your President and particularly what role,
22
if any, politics plays. Now I notice that you've never
23
sought political office; you've apparently have not been
24
a member of a political party; and with your nomination,
25
we've come full circle from your predecessor who was one
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of the campaign managers for the President, to a person,
yourself, who has not been affiliated in any way. I
think it would be helpful to me if you would clarify
your views with respect to what if any role politics
5
plays in your discharge of your responsibilities in the
6
office and with your relationship with the President.
JUDGE WEBSTER: Senator Warner, I have to make a
8
confession that for the first 30 years of my life I
9
harbored the idea that I wanted to be a United States
10
Senator.
11
(General laughter.)
12
THE CHAIRMAN: Fortunately, that may be the most
13
damaging admission so far.
14
(General laughter.)
15
JUDGE WEBSTER: Fortunately, as you see from the
16
gentleman who -- distinguished gentleman who introduced
17
me this morning, I didn't have to pursue that arduous
18
task. But I do believe that there are certain jobs in
19
which you, if you're going to hold them properly, you
20
have to stand away from political activity and political
21
concerns even to the point of missing some fund-raising
22
dinners from time to time, which hasn't been all that
23
arduous.
24
SENATOR WARNER: I clearly agree with you in terms
25
of partisan political activities. But the CIA,
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particularly now that we're going to strip from the
National Security Council the responsibility, which I
doubt they ever really had, for covert operations.
.You're going to be the Chief Operator for this
5
President and perhaps the next President. Of covert
6
operations, and indeed the very essence of a covert
7
operation, it is a political judgment by a President
8
that certain assets of this nation shall be employed in
9
a foreign land to further the interest of our country,
10
primarily our national security. Now that's a political
11
decision. Let's suppose that you were called into the
12
Oval Office by a President, and he indicated that he has
13
made a finding, that it is his judgment that we should
14
pursue a certain covert action. Having had some
15
knowledge of this beforehand, you did your own
16
independent research and you wish to disagree with the
17
President. I'm sure, because I have known you
18
peronally and professionally, you would in the
19
strongest of terms necessary, take him by the collar,
20
say Mr.President, you've received bad advice and I
21
caution you in the interest of our country. But then
22
after receiving your advice and all the other advice, he
23
makes a decision, we will, the United States, follow
24
this covert course of action. It seems to me that you
25
have one of two choices and they are very clear. You
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either salute, march off and implement that cover
action. Or you submit your resignation. Now have I
succinctly stated that case as you understand it?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I think that's correct ?Senator, and
I think the choice would depend upon whether I thought
6
that my disagreement was so fundamental and that the
7
President's decision was so arbitrary that I could not
8
remain a part of it. I don't expect that in positions
9
like Director of Central Intelligence or the Director of
10
the FBI that in relation to the Attorney General, that
11
you have the right to thumb your nose at the authority
12
that has been placed there by the American people in the
13
President,. just because you disagree. But if your
14
disagreement is fundamental, and.you know that the
15
action is arbitrary and wrong, you can't stay, and you
16
cannot in conscience support it, you've got to leave.
17
There isn't any option.
18
SENATOR WARNER: I'm most reassured by that
19
response and it clarifies that area. Now I bring you to
20
an example on the 30th of October which we reviewed in
21
the hearing this morning. Attorney General Meese asked
22
the FBI to suspend its investigation. Did you, at that
23
time, try to make any independent inquiry into why that
24
was being asked and to whether or not you should
25
exercise your judgment to say to the Attorney General, I
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disagree with the propriety of that course of action or
did you just accept his request and act accordingly?
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, Senator. The first thing that I
did was to ask my own executive gubordinates who are in
5
charge of those programs whether suspension would
6
adversely infect the investigation. In other words,
7
sought a professional opinion 'on the impact of the
8
request. From what I already knew, that there were
9
sensitive arms initiatives going on in Iran and efforts
10
to release the hostages, and that the hostage activity
11
was getting sensitive, that was in my view a reasonable
12
request with which I did not disagree because my own
13
people had told me that it would not get in the way of
14
our operation. I was careful, I thought, to include in
15
my confirming memorandum making it a matter of record,
16
that I wanted to know if at any time, it became a
17
problem. And I think that this is one of the important
18
aspects of my responsibility if I'm selected for DCI --
19
that in these findings, or these decisions, that we make
20
sure that they be revisited, that they be reviewed and
21
that they be tested in the light of new circumstances.
22
And I wanted to be sure that in that particular case
23
that I knew if something changed -- why we should be
24
back in to this rather low-level investigation if it
25
became important. They were to tell me, and they would
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have.
SENATOR WARNER: You've had an extensive record of
distinguished public service and now you take on this
new post following the confirmation of the Senate of
which I am certain. Do you bring to this office your
6
own agenda, a set of goals that you would like to see
7
accomplished and would those goals in any way vary from
8
those of your immediate predecessor? Or from, should we
9
say, the traditional role of the Director of Central
10
Intelligence?
11
JUDGE WEBSTER: I hesitate to answer that question,
12
because naturally, I don't know all of the goals of my
13
predecessor. I know the many great things he achieved
14
for the CIA in terms of morale and resources and
15
momentum. I think it would perhaps be a mistake for me
16
to speak as to his goals when he is not able to speak
17
for them himself.
18
I tend to a traditional view of the role of the
19
Director of Central Intelligence. I believe that the
20
most important thing that that agency does, that the CIA
21
does, and the coordinate elements of the intelligence
22
community is to gather intelligence -- intelligence
23
about capabilities abroad, intelligence about intentions
24
abroad -- that will help the policymakers make sound
25
decisions. Not to make them for them, but to provide
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them with information upon which they can give the
maximum amount of confidence in making their decision.
I think it's my responsibility to say in the councils of
which I am a member what I think that intelligence
5
means. But not to shape it or manipulate it but to give
6
it all the integrity that I know how.
7
I believe that that intelligence must come from a
8
variety of techniques including human intelligence,
9
especially in the area of intentions. If we had better
10
human intelligence in Iran, we might have anticipated
11
what was going on there. Intelligence in the street,
12
rather than in the embassy, that's just a private
13
opinion. And I'm not faulting anyone, any other
14
predecessor, I just simply think human intelligence is
15
very, very important because there is really no other
16
agency in government which can carry out that function.
17
There will from time to time be calls on the agency to
18
engage in certain kinds of covert activity -- activity
19
in furtherance of a legitimate national foreign policy
20
goal that would not succeed if third countries had to
21
face ?the fact that our government was openly and
22
militarily involved in that effort. Those efforts are
23
controlled by a careful analysis of the ideas and
24
evolution of the plans, a Finding by the President that
25
supports them and authorizes them and oversight by the
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Intelligence Committees of the Congress to represent the
American people in terms of what we are doing. All of
those things, I think are important responsibilities of
the Director of Central Intelligence and I believe, too,
that it is very important that he exercise his role as
6
the President's principal intelligence advisor.
7
Now if I may without pressing your time too far,
8
I'd like to say in that respect that I have had a
9
conversation with the President in the company of his
10
chief of staff and principal advisors from the National
11
Security Council.
12
SENATOR WARNER: That would be Howard Baker and
13
Frank Carlucci?
14
JUDGE WEBSTER: Yes, Frank was not there, but
15
General Powell was there in his place and memorandized
16
the conversation. In that conversation, I suggested
17
that I would think it best for me to return to the
18
traditional role of the Director of Central Intelligence
19
and not be a member of the President's cabinet. The
20
President told me that he agreed and had come to the
21
same conclusion. That I think will help to minimize the
22
perception that the Director of Central Intelligence is
23
a political officer of the President's, in the
24
President's immediate political staffing. But I felt
25
that it was very important that in making that move, it
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be very clear that I would continue to have direct one
on one access to the President. Both Mr. Baker and I
know Mr. Carlucci from direct conversations with him and
his deputy subscribe to that principle, as does the
5
President. And I will exercise that one on one access
6
as well as other opportunities. I also asked for and
7
promptly was given assurances 'of what I call the
8
awareness principle, that I be made aware of emerging
9
issues and be invited to attend meetings of the cabinet
10
and other inner circle functions in which issues that
11
would depend upon accurate intelligence would come to me
12
at an early enough date to be of assistance in guiding
13
the President to a correct opinion. So if I have access
14
and awareness I do not need, nor want to be involved, in
15
a cabinet level function and I think we're all straight
16
on that and all in agreement on it.
17
SENATOR WARNER: Judge Webster, I thank you for
18
those responses. I think they are among the more
19
important ones for the Senate to consider as we pass.on
20
your nomination. You have my support. Good Luck.
21
JUDGE WEBSTER: Thank you.
22
THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you very much Senator Warner.
23
Judge Webster, we've kept you far past the time
24
that I indicated we would this morning before breaking.
25
I think, therefore, it would be more appropriate for the
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Committee to wait to resume until 2:30 this afternoon.
So we'll stand in recess until the hour of 2:30 this
afternoon.
(Whereupon, at 1:22 o'clock p.m., the Committee was
recessed, to reconvene at 2:30 o'clock p.m., the same
day.)
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AFTERNOON SESSION
THE CHAIRMAN: We'll resume our questioning at this
point. We will continue having rounds of questions in
the order that we did this morning until the Members of
the Committee have had an opportunity to complete the
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questions which they wish to ask. Judge Webster, I will
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remind you that you are still *under oath from this
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morning's testimony.
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Let me begin the questioning this afternoon. In
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regard to the question you were asked by Senator Cohen-
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this morning, I believe that he quoted a newspaper
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article, I believe it was in early December, quoting you
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as stating that as of that time, you felt there had been
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no destruction of records in the course of the
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investigation conducted by the Attorney General.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Mr. Chairman, because I know these
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are important questions, I believe I said that nothing
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had been called to my attention. I didn't have a
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feeling about it.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Well, I just wonder on what basis
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you felt that there had not been a destruction. Was it
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merely that nothing had been called to your attention?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Mr. Chairman, that's why I
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interrupted you because I didn't say I felt that there
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had not been a destruction; I just said that we hadn't
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found any yet.
THE CHAIRMAN: You had not found any evidence of
destruction of records. Did you make any attempt on
your own to check as this matter began to unfold during
that four day period.
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Did you make any attempt to discuss the possible
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destruction of records with anyone or did you endeavor
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to have the FBI check in any way independently to
9
determine whether records had been destroyed?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Now, are we back -- we're on
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December 5th --
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THE CHAIRMAN: Between November the 21st and
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November the 25th.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: When I met with the Attorney
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General following his and the President's announcement
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at the White House and I met with -- I was waiting for
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them when he returned to his office in the Department of
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Justice. We convened a meeting there to discuss the
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implications of what had been 'announced. And during
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that discussion, a question of preserving the records
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came up. And it was my understanding that the
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Department was taking steps to ask the appropriate
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officials to preserve their, records.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Did you do anything to assure -- or
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what did you do yourself with FBI resources to determine
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whether or not any records had been destroyed?
JUDGE WEBSTER: The Attorney General stated that he
had turned the question of responsible criminal
involvement over to the Criminal Division of the
Department of Justice, which was considering what, if
any, statutes may have been violated. And so there --
at that point -- the FBI was not authorized to conduct
an investigation.
THE CHAIRMAN: Did you simply take the word of the
Attorney General and the Department of Justice that
there had been no destruction of records, or did you
endeavor independently to assure that there was no
destruction of records?
JUDGE WEBSTER: The Attorney General did not make
that representation. We discussed as a group -- and I
considered myself apart of that senior management --
what should be done. One of the things that we decided
that should be done was that the records should be
preserved and the Department undertook to make -- to
notify those -- the appropriate officials.
Now, as it happens
THE CHAIRMAN: You mean, they just simply -- this
seems to me to be a very naive approach in all honesty
and all candor -- to simply say, here we're dealing with
people that have records in their custody that are
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suspected of criminal wrongdoing. I assume that in most
cases you would simply not notify someone that you
suspect of a criminal act; we don't want you to destroy
your records now that might implicate you in any
wrongdoing.
I mean, are we simply relying upon the good offices
of the people under suspicion not to destroy the
records?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, we're talking about the
National Security Council. We do not have an opinion
from the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice
as to what criminal statutes, if any, form the basis for
a criminal investigation as of this conference that I'm
discussing and that form of notification is not unlike
the forms of notification that the Senate sends out to
agencies in the Executive branch not to destroy records.
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, now we go back to November
25th when the press conference was held and it became
clear that we were into a criminal investigation.
JUDGE WEBSTER: That's the afternoon I'm talking
about.
THE CHAIRMAN: The afternoon of November 25th.
On that afternoon, at that point the FBI was asked
to step in,. I believe.
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, Mr. Chairman, the FBI was not
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asked to step in until Wednesday morning. The Criminal
Division was still considering what criminal laws were
implicated by what the Attorney General and his staff
had developed over the weekend.
THE CHAIRMAN: Now, Wednesday morning was what
date?
JUDGE WEBSTER: The 26th:
THE CHAIRMAN: The 26th?
On the 25th, what action did you take or what
assertions did you make in terms of preserving the
records?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Only what I have related to you,
that there was a discussion in the Attorney General's
office about preserving the records and the Attorney
General undertook, through the Department, to notify the
appropriate heads to preserve the records.
THE CHAIRMAN: On November 26th when the FBI was
called in, what actions did you take at that point to
assure the preservation of records?
JUDGE WEBSTER: The FBI checked to determine
whether or not the NSC records had been secured and were
informed that they had been secured the night before, on
Tuesday.
THE CHAIRMAN: Who informed you that they had been
secured?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I'm informed that the individual
who reported this to us was Mr. Jay Stevens of the
President's Counsel's office.
THE CHAIRMAN: The President's Counsel's office
5
informed you that they had been secured?
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What action did you take to independently verify
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whether or not they had been secured other than just
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taking the word of the White House Counsel who might
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well have been not an unbiased source in this matter.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Mr. Chairman, I was in Chicago at
11
that point. But the agents who were involved were
12
investigating, conducting interviews, and I am sure they
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did whatever was appropriate.
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THE CHAIRMAN: What action have you taken to make
15
sure they did whatever was appropriate? What check have
16
you made of their actions?
17
We've had this report which was alluded to by the
18
Vice Chairman this morning. It's been in the press that
19
Fawn Hall, among others, have indicated that there were
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large amounts of records shredded and destroyed during
21
this period of time.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Which period of time, Mr. Chairman?
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THE CHAIRMAN: Well, from November 21st on.
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And, therefore, I'm wondering what independent
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check you made or what personal attention you gave to
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the protection and preservation of those records at the
time when it would be somewhat, I think, negligent to
simply rely upon the assurances of say, the President's
Counsel's office.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Well -- that was the first check
6
that was made. I can't answer because I said I was in
Chicago. But the -- I received reports from time to
8
time from my officials on the investigative steps that
9
were taking place. And when the Independent Counsel was
10
appointed, he, of course, assumed responsibility on
11
December 19th.
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THE CHAIRMAN: On December 19th?
13
JUDGE WEBSTER: He was appointed on December 19th.
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He asked us to continue our investigations until he
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actually took over.
16
THE CHAIRMAN: Who took physical custody of those
17
records?
18
In other words, were they put under lock and key,
19
under guard? Who took physical custody? Do you know?
20
Of those documents in the period -- Say if we start with
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November 21st, when the Attorney General began his
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inquiry on through the morning of November 26th when the
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FBI was officially called in up to the the date in
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December when the Special Counsel wasappointed -- who
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assumed responsibility for physical control and custody
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of the documents in the period from November 21st
through the date in Dedember when the Independent
Prosecutor was appointed?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I'm informed by Mr. Clarke, who is
5
in direct charge of that investigation who is present
6
here this morning, the Assistant Director, that agents
7
were sent promptly to the National Security Council to
8
verify that they were in fact sealed and to make
9
arrangements to have access to the sealed documents for
10
inspection and investigation.
11
THE CHAIRMAN: So, an agent, you may feel free to
12
turn to Mr. Clarke, on what date were agents sent to
13
verify that the documents were sealed in a manner in
14
which they could not be tampered with?
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MR. CLARKE: On the 26th.
16
THE CHAIRMAN: That was on the 26th.
17
Let me go back to the question of your colleagues
18
and associates bringing to you concerns. Senator Cohen
19
asked you this morning about colleagues, I believe the
20
Deputy Director Mr. Revell and others had mentioned to
21
you concerns about the activities of Colonel North.
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I want to recall your answers as to what kinds of
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concerns your colleagues brought to you about Colonel
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North?
25
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well these concerns which we
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discussed at various times had to do with a free-
wheeling kind of atmosphere. I want to be careful of
what I'm saying about someone who is not charged here.
I think we worried about his influence in the National
5
Security Council. He was a very gung ho person, a very
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tunnel visioned, outgoing -- rather result oriented
without what I could only term a broader gauge approach
8
to the implications of what he was doing.
9
That may or may not be true. That was the kind of
10
concern that we had -- that these think tanks might turn
11
into action tanks, and that we might not know about it.
12
THE CHAIRMAN: Did you have any question as to
13
whether or not he was acting within the bounds of
14
instructions or powers or authority given to him by
15
those above him?
16
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I think there was some
17
anxiety on our part to be sure that that was the case,
18
but we were never -- we were never -- I know that Mr.
19
Revell was checking -- we were never tasked that I can
20
remember to do anything so it didn't come into an issue
21
of his authority. But there was just some general
22
concern that something foolhardy might take place
23
without the proper scrutiny by others who might have a
24
more balanced judgment.
25
THE CHAIRMAN: Roughly, during what period of time
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did you and Mr. Revell and perhaps others in the Bureau
have discussions among yourselves regarding concern
about Colonel North?
JUDGE WEBSTER: It was going on for a long time.
don't want to suggest that we were panicked by it or
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that we were -- we had high anxieties pains. We just
7
regarded him as a different kind of person than we
8
normally associate with the National Security Council
9
and its proper function. And we tried to be a little
10
more watchful about the activities in which he took a
11
role.
12
THE CHAIRMAN: To whom did you or Mr. Revell
13
express these concerns that you felt over this period of
14
time?
15
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, it was more of a matter of
16
opinion expression rather than asking anybody to do
17
about it. I discussed this with the Attorney General.
18
He was aware -- he was aware of 011ie North as the kind
19
of personality that he was and my concern that we stay
20
on top of what was going on in the National Security
21
Council to be sure that things were not getting out of
22
hand.
23
THE CHAIRMAN: Now we know that on October 30th,
24
there was this memorandum we have referred to where this
25
person in the Justice Department was quoted as
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expressing concern about the possible criminal
prosecution of Colonel North. You've said that over a
period of time, you, Mr. Revell and perhaps others had
discussions among yourselves about concern as to the
judgment of Colonel North.
JUDGE WEBSTER: I think that's it, in judgment. I
don't think any of us questioned his regard for the law
and certainly he was a likable kind of person, but he --
THE CHAIRMAN: You had some discussions at least
with the Attorney General about it. You had --
JUDGE WEBSTER: In general -- in general terms,
yes.
THE CHAIRMAN: In general terms.
You had the investigation of Southern Air
commencing earlier which was suspended on October the
3rd. I presume the investigation was of whether or not
appropriate or inappropriate activities were being
undertaken to aid the resistance in Nicaragua.
presume that those investigations might have also
touched upon concern about Colonel North as well. I'm
sure Colonel North's name would have popped up in that
he was very much involved in the recruitment and raising
of funds for these various operations.
My question is did you ever express this concern to
the President as to whether or not the President was
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fully aware of activities of Colonel North?
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, I did not. I didn't have any
solid information in that area at all that would have
warranted my expressing that kind of opinion even to the
Attorney General.
THE CHAIRMAN: Senator Cohen?
SENATOR COHEN: Mr. Chairman, the question about
the memo should not be seen as raising exaggerated
concerns on the part of the Committee, Judge Webster.
Part of the difficulty is, as Senator Moynihan pointed
out earlier, there have been several occasions in the
past several years, including the mining of the harbors
13
in Nicaragua and several other cases in which the
14
Committee was not notified of certain items, and then we
15
had a Deputy Secretary of State Department come up and
16
publicly acknowledge that he thought he had successfully
17
circumvented the nature of this specific question asked.
18
And I think the question that was posed to you was
19
perhaps inartfully asked. I don't know why, in question
20
number three, that we said on what date did you learn,
21
either directly or indirectly, from sources other than
22
public media. I don't why we excluded the public media,
23
but we did. And, for that reason, you concluded that it
24
was not necessary to inform the Committee about this
25
memo.
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It really comes down to how specific do we have to
be? Do we always have to ask the right question or be
precluded from getting at least the spirit of the answer
we are looking for. I think that is the context in
which many of the questions are now being asked of you.
Had it not been for the Special Prosecutor --
Independent Counsel.-- we would not have known about
this and we didn't learn about it until last evening.
And so it raises an issue as to how specific we have to
be in the future in terms of getting information.
With respect to that --
JUDGE WEBSTER: May I say something about that;
Senator? I certainly agree with what you are saying.
As I pointed out in my statement to you that the public
source thing was only part of the equation. The other
equation was that there was just simply nothing in that
memorandum that pointed towards the illegal activities
of U.S. government officials, which is what the question
asked for. And I don't think any of us felt that it was
included in that equation. And not that we were trying
to hide anything from you. I didn't even remember that
memorandum.
SENATOR COHEN: For the benefit of the press who
has been inquiring -- it has nothing to do with Iran.
Colonel North himself is not mentioned in the memo. But
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it does, according to your answer, include that a
Justice Department official, based on her reading of
newspaper articles concluded that Colonel North might be
involved in a future criminal probe by a Special
Prosecutor concerning U.S. activities in Central
America.
So, there was at least some concern ata certain
level that he might be prosecuted at some future time.
I guess the question I have is that if, in fact,
you were worried about the influence of Colonel North
within NSC as you have just stated to Senator Boren, if
in fact you were concerned about NSC being involved in a
covert operation as far as actually carrying out the
covert operation, why weren't you also concerned about
the possible destruction of records once the matter
started to come to public light and there was going to
be an investigation?
In other words, if you have a man who, according to
-one official, may be subject to criminal prosecution
sometime in the future, you have concerns about an
individual who is gung ho and perhaps a bit too
aggressive or whatever, are generally concerned about
his activities in terms of judgment, and then a matter
of this magnitude erupts suddenly -- now got a major
investigation or inquiry going -- undergoing the
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process, why wouldn't you also have a concern about what
would be taking place over that week -- in that four or
five day period -- about who's in charge of the NSC?
What's happening in that office? I didn't detect that
5
in your response.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, if you're asking me to
7
inquire into my state of mind, which I think you are,
8
you have to get rid of that memorandum that supplied
9
some information about -- that had had attached to it a
10
note that the government official -- Bob, maybe that
11
ought to be shown to -- I just had no recollection
12
that was not in my mind. It was -- and not considered
13
to be important. I really still don't consider it to be
14
important.
15
Be it the substance of the memorandum or the
16
comment of the United States Attorney. So what I had, I
17
think it --
18
SENATOR COHEN: Does it adopt any importance in
19
your mind now after the fact, looking back saying that
20
here's a man who may be under possible indictment by a
21
Special Prosecutor for perhaps obstruction of justice?
22
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, because the Department official
23
was just observing what was in the newspaper. With no
24
extra information at all on that subject. But I think
25
your question is a legitimate one about preservation of
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records.
I was not - I was frankly not concerned over the
weekend, because at that time, I did not believe that
there was concern about a criminal violation touching on
5
the Iranian arms shipment. I had been informed that
6
there was a Finding, that it had been reviewed by the
7
Attorney General, and that the. action was lawful. I had
8
no reason to believe that either the National Security
9
Advisor or Colonel North had any reason to conceal
10
information about a lawful activity.
11
If that was naivete, I confess to it. But
12
sometimes in twenty-twenty hindsight, things seem a lot
13
clearer than they did at the time. That's the way it
14
was. That was the way we were looking.
15
When we became aware of the new issue -- that is
16
the diversion of funds to the Contras -- it may be that
17
I and indeed the other members of the senior management
18
of the Department should have been more aggressive in
19
more rapidly freezing information. I believe, and I
20
can't comment on this without getting into the
21
Independent Counsel's business, that any damage that was
22
done was done prior to that Tuesday afternoon meeting.
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And, as I said, the FBI, who was given jurisdiction,
24
moved in promptly on its own to make sure those areas
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were taken care of.
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Now, you can say yes we should have done it a day
earlier. And I won't quarrel with that. I'm certainly
willing to be second-guessed, and I try to second guess
myself on that. But I can only tell you the way it was
and how it appeared to me.
SENATOR COHEN: On Southern Air Transport, what was
the nature of the FBI's investigation into Southern Air
Transport that began in late October after a plane was
shot down in Nicaragua?
JUDGE WEBSTER: The plane was shot down in
mid-October or early October. It did not involve -- it
was not a Southern Air airplane. But reports circulated
13
quickly in the newspapers that the plane that had
14
started in El Salvador and it landed -- it crashed in
15
Nicaragua, had been maintained in some way at the
16
Florida facility of Southern Air Transport. And so we
17
opened a preliminary inquiry --
18
SENATOR COHEN: What was the nature of the inquiry?
19
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, the nature of the inquiry was
20
to ask for records which were not readily destructible.
21
That is records from official agencies about the tail
22
number, registration
23
SENATOR COHEN: What was the purpose of it -- to
24
find whether there was a violation on Congressional ban
25
on assistance to Nicaragua? What was its purpose?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I think it was a Neutrality Act
predicate, that is, whether or not we were furnishing
arms or anything of that kind that was specifically
banned by statute, and to a neutral nation -- I mean to
enemies of a nation with whom we are not at war. And we
were looking to see if there was a connection. We
wanted some records. We had an informant. We had
interviewed the informant. All that we needed to do at
that point was to have a second interview with the
informant.
SENATOR COHEN: Now, when you were contacted by the
Attorney General's office -- the Attorney General or
Oliver North had contacted your office?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Mr. Trott, the Associate Attorney
General, called me.
SENATOR COHEN: On behalf of the Attorney General?
JUDGE WEBSTER: On behalf of the Attorney General.
SENATOR COHEN: Okay. And he said that he would
ask that you would delay for ten days so that you
wouldn't jeopardize the sensitive negotiations?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I want to emphasize that he said if
we would suspend for ten days any non-urgent
investigative business.
SENATOR COHEN: Were there any urgent aspects to
your investigative --
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Not that I am aware of. I asked Mr.
Clarke that specific question, and he said absolutely
not.
SENATOR COHEN: Were you curious as to how your
investigation into the relationship between Southern Air
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Transport and the plane that was down in Nicaragua could
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somehow jeopardize these delicate negotiations? ,
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Weren't you curious to say well how in the world is
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that possible?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: No, Senator Cohen. I was not. I
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was not as curious as you might think because in early
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October, Colonel North had called - after the crash --
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Colonel NOrth had called Mr. Revell, who was then at a
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meeting in Nashville. I had attended the same meeting
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but had left the city. And he called to let him know
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that the ?same place -- he was aware that we were
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investigating something at Southern Air and that he
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wanted us to know that that was the airplane company
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that had helped them on the other operation, I think was
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the way he described it. Which he -- over in the other
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place and --
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SENATOR COHEN: Assuming that to be the case, that
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this airline was operating in Iran and in Central
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America, again, wouldn't you be curious as to why your
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investigation as to its operations in Central America
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would somehow jeopardize the release of hostages over in
Iran?
I mean I don't understand the connection.
JUDGE WEBSTER: The question that the -- the way
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the Attorney General put it through Mr. Trott was that
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they were trying to preserve a safe environment for
hostage negotiations that were. going on at that time.
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And the concern was that any public awareness of
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Southern Air's involvement in the Iran would -- now this
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is not coming from the Attorney General, this is what
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I'm deriving from my conversation with Mr. Revell
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might expose the hostage negotiations.
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SENATOR COHEN: But at that point your
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investigation was confined really to seeing what the
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relationship was of Southern Air Transport to Nicaragua?
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It had nothing to do with Iran?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: That's right.
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SENATOR COHEN: I guess the question is how do you
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make the leap to get into Iran that the Iranians somehow
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might be upset to see that the FBI was investigating the
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nature of Mr. Husenfus' s activities in Central America
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that somehow might jeopardize the negotiations currently
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underway in Iran?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, there was great sensitivity
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over there as evidenced by the fact that the Congress
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was not -- that you were not told of what was going on
about having any information about what was going on or
who was supporting that activity get out in the public
domain in any way.
SENATOR COHEN: So that it really was not a
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question of directly jeopardizing the negotiations, but
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rather that if Congress got any wind of your
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investigation into Southern Air, we might start
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inquiring further, and that might unravel the
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negotiations.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I didn't tie Congress into it. I
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tried to use that as an illustration that -- for the
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same reason --
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SENATOR COHEN: That's a pretty good illustration.
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I mean I don't disagree with what you've said. That
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probably was the rationale, wasn't it?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I didn't ask what the
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rationale was. It did not seem unreasonable to me since
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the -- Mr. Clarke said there was no problem with that
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investigation, that it was not that kind of an urgent
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investigation and it could wait for ten days.
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When you are talking about very sensitive hostage
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negotiations, we were all aware that the efforts were
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being made to get the hostages out. That there is a lot
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of sensitivity at that time and no one wants to, rock the
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boat. And, as long as it did not interfere with an
ongoing investigation, I had no problems with it.
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SENATOR COHEN: Time has expired. Thank you.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Senator Metzenbaum was not able to
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ask his questions this morning so I'm going to turn to
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him next.
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SENATOR METZENBAUM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As
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you know, I had a bill on the Floor and was not able to
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be here at that time.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Correct.
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SENATOR METZENBAUM: Judge Webster, I'm happy to
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see you again and welcome you.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Thank you, Senator.
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SENATOR METZENBAUM: I'm concerned, Judge Webster,
15
about the question of maybe who is watching the chicken
16
coop and whether the fox is in the coop. I'm concerned
17
about instances when the press reports a case of
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possible wrongdoing by an Administration official, such
19
as in the Wedtech case, involving Mr. Nofziger and Mr.
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Wallach and now, perhaps, Mr. Meese. The question is
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what does the FBI do? In the Wedtech case, we have in
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Mr. Wallach a man who prides himself on his close
23
relationship, in fact says that he had been approached
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by Wedtech, quote, "because of my notoriety as a good
25
friend of Ed Meese," unquote.
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And in that case, the Attorney General causes to be
set up at their instance a meeting in the White House
-- and thereafter Wedtech gets a 32 million dollar
no-bid military contract. The Army had been opposed to
it. The Army dropped its objections. Now we know about
Mr. Nofziger's involvement and we know about the
involvement of another individual -- Jenkins. But Mr.
Wallach comes in from out of nowhere and is hired by
this company because he is very close to Mr. Meese.
My question is what does the FBI do when they read
stories of this kind? What is your role as Director?
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There may or may not have been law violations here, but
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the person involved may be the Attorney General of the
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United States. And he's the one who calls for the
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appointment of an Independent Counsel. What are you
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doing or what do you intend to do with reference to this
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kind of matter?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I think that the procedure,
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Senator Metzenbaum, is pretty well set out in the ethics
20
in government -- rather the Independent Counsel statute
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which sets out that we will promptly consult with the
22
officials in the Department of Justice -- not the
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Attorney General, but the people in the public integrity
24
section, the career people -- and advise them of any
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allegations or information that has come to our
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attention. Then under the statute there is a period of
time during which we attempt through means other than
grand jury process to obtain any additional information
that will help the Attorney General decide whether or
not to appoint an Independent Counsel. He must make a
finding to the court designated for the appointment of
Independent Counsel within a stated period of time.
While I don't have all those procedures firmly in my
head, it is a self-driving procedure under the statute.
SENATOR METZENBAUM: But you missed my point. He
may be the one who ought to be investigated. There may
12
have to be a special Independent Counsel appointed in
13
connection with his activities. I don't know that, but
14
I think the people of this country are entitled to have
15
a satisfactory answer. And the only one who can make
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the investigation and to go forward with the matter is
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your arm of government. And my question to you is not
18
alone with revolving around Mr. Wallach and Wedtech. We
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know that in the Whittlesley case --
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Which case, sir?
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SENATOR METZENBAUM: Whittlesley. Ambassador
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Whittlesey. W-H-I-T-T-L-E-S-L-E-Y, where the Attorney
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General was involved, where he decided not to -- there
24
was no need of Independent Counsel. We also know that
25
in the Schmults case there was an Independent Counsel in
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connection with one other person in that matter.
SENATOR NUNN: Mr. Olsen.
SENATOR METZENBAUM: In that case that there was
the withholding from the Congress in an executive
privilege dispute, of certain papers that were in the
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EPA. And Deputy Attorney General Schmults reportedly
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took it upon himself to withhold from Congress hundreds
8
of pages of handwritten notes without telling the
9
Committee he was doing that, and finally Attorney
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General Meese was forced to ask for an Independent
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Counsel. But he has refused to let that Counsel
12
investigate Mr. Schmults or Miss Dinkins.
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Now as a matter of fact, the Independent Counsel
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even went to court asking for the right to investigate
15
Mr. Schmults. Mr. Schmults is also a friend of Mr.
16
Meese's. Miss Whittlesley is a friend of Mr. Meese's.
17
There is also another matter. We know of Mr.
18
Meese's involvement. As we read in the paper yesterday,
19
Meese learned about sale of arms -- and a probe that was
20
being done having to do with arms sales-- to the
21
Contras. And Mr. Meese sticks his nose into a pending
22
investigation that is being conducted by the Justice
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Department. And Mr. Meese is asked why he is sticking
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his nose in. He says I wanted to see if he had such an
25
investigation going on because I had seen it in the
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newspaper.
Well, all of these things involved special
interests of Mr. Meese. And my question is, how can the
American people rely upon the investigative arm of the
United States Government to do something, to find out
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whether there is and has indeed been a law violation, if
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everything that you do stops with the man who himself
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may be the investigatee?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: There have been a lot of problems
10
with the statute over the last several years. And
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interpreting all the way to the questions going to the
12
constitutionality of the statute. The statute, in some
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respects, is confining on the investigative arm because
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if a protected person, rather not a protected person
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.excuse me -- a covered person, that is a person who is
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subject to the provisions of the Independent Counsel
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act, is under investigation, then we must necessarily
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confine the scope of our investigation in order not to
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step on the shoes of the Independent Counsel if one is
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appointed. These all follow a statutory scheme and if
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there is a problem with the Act of the kind you suggest,
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Senatot, then I think the Congress ought to look at the
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Act and see if it needs improvement --
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SENATOR METZENBAUM: But I don't think that's the
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end of it. I don't think it's enough to say that we
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ought to look at the Act to change it.
The question I'm really asking you is, has the FBI
in the past, or do they intend to, investigate these
four separate issues that have to do with the Attorney
General himself and his conduct? And if you don't
investigate them,,nobody will investigate them. If you.
investigate them and then you 'say to the Attorney
General, we believe an Independent Counsel ought to be
appointed to investigate the Attorney General, that
would be one thing. Or you 'could say, we believe that
there is enough involved in this matter to submit it to
a grand jury without going through the Independent
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Counsel,
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But absent that, here you have four separate
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instances, and I think I can dig up another four without
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too much difficulty, regarding the Attorney General's
17
conduct itself, and there is no action -- and even one
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case where the Independent Counsel, is saying I want to
19
investigate. And the Attorney General is standing there
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protecting his friend.
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Wallach was his friend. Schmults was his friend.
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Whittlesley was his friend. And in the Contra arms
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sale, there was a question of friendship, but a question
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of ostensibly attempting to advance Administration
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policy.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: I believe the courts have passed
some judgment on what an Independent Counsel can do and
what the scope of the Independent Counsel's authority is
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when it comes to a question of appointing or not
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appointing an Independent Counsel. The Attorney General
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has to give his report to the Congress. I would expect
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that an Attorney General would always consider whether
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or not the matter requires his recusal. And I am sure
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that that has been done, but I really don't know how to
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answer your question. We will investigate just as
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vigorously as possible any matter within our
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jurisdiction. If it happens to come within the
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provisions of the Independent Counsel statute, then'we
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are required to coordinate our work through the career
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department officials who will determine the timing and
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the scope of our investigation.
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SENATOR METZENBAUM: Will you investigate the
18
Wedtech matter and the Attorney General's personal
19
involvement in that matter?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: It's my understanding that we did
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participate in the preliminary inquiry.
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We are, and that is a pending investigation, I'm
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just not at liberty to comment on what we are doing.
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SENATOR METZENBAUM: I'm sorry.
25
'JUDGE WEBSTER: I say, there has been and there is
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a pending investigation. I'm just not at liberty to
comment on the details of it because it is a pending
investigation.
SENATOR METZENBAUM: I think that this goes to the
5
integrity of the process, because it is the Attorney
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General who is involved -- to the extent that he is
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involved, and I don't know whether he violated any laws
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or not, but I think the American people are entitled to
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know. And I would hope that will there be some report
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or some indication at the conclusion of your
11
investigation.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: There will be a report which will
13
go to the court and whether it's signed by the Attorney
14
General, or, if he should recuse himself by the person
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who stands in his shoes, I'm not in a position to say at
16
this time. But it is a report that is required of the
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senior official in the department acting at that time in
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that capacity.
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SENATOR METZENBAUM: Director Webster, my time has
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expired and I'm not sure whether I will be able to have
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another round of questioning, but either today or
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tomorrow I do want to get into the entire Varelli
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matter.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: Certainly.
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SENATOR METZENBAUM: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you, Senator Metzenbaum.
Senator Murkowski, I know you were otherwise tied
up this morning. You may wish us to go on to Senator
Specter before we come back to you. Are you prepared to
ask your questions now, or would you like to defer to
Senator Specter?
SENATOR MURKOWSKI: No, r think I'll wait a little
. further. I think there will be time.
THE CHAIRMAN: Senator Specter?
SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you very much, Mr.
Chairman.
Judge Webster, since this morning's round of
questioning, I have had an opportunity to review the
memorandum of October 30th, 1986, that you had addressed
as an addendum in your opening remarks. And there are
two portions of this memorandum which seems important to
me. One portion of the memorandum which contains a
notation that Lieutenant Colonel North may soon be
involved in a criminal probe concerning United States
activities in Central America by a special prosecutor.
And a second notation in the memorandum that it would
not be possible-to advise other persons in the NSC --
National Security Council -- and be assured that the
information would not be made available to Lieutenant
Colonel North.
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Your initials appear on the face of the memo. My
question to you is are those two matters of sufficient
importance that had you read this memo you would have
recollected?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I have already told you, Senator,
that I did not in fact recollect it. And those are my
initials, so I did read it.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, I ask you specifically,
Judge Webster,'in the context of those two comments;
I had not asked you about those comments before because
I'd only had a summary memo from Intelligence Committee
staff. Now I have seen the memo itself. I focus on the
language about Lieutenant Colonel North and that he may
soon be involved in a criminal probe concerning U.S.
activities in Central America by a Special Prosecutor.
And I come back to the questions which were asked by
Senator Boren earlier about your taking this up with
higher officials in the Executive branch and you
testified that you had with Attorney General Meese, in a
general way, you used expressions that North was gung ho
and had tunnel vision. That's substantially different
from the statement in a FBI memo on an evaluation that
he might be involved in a criminal prosecution.
And my question is -- and I don't know if it's
useful to pursue it if you don't remember having read
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this -- but isn't this the kind of serious matter
relating to somebody in the White House, and the
National Security Council's key position where the
Director of the FBI ought to take that up with the
Attorney General or even the President.
JUDGE WEBSTER: I don't think so. But you can
fault my judgment on it. It was an informational
memorandum. It was a speculative comment by a
Department official, not an official advice. It was a
speculative comment. It was not taken seriously by
anyone else who was actually working those
investigations. I received no further communications
from my own people about it. And so I simply have to
put it in the context at the time. And it probably
explains why I don't remember it. I'M sure I read it,
but I didn't remember it because there are a lot of
things that I have read that I don't now remember that
are just informational.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, Judge Webster, I don't know
that it is speculative. And on the face of this memo, I
candidly don't agree with that.
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, the official says it was
speculative. And the official says that it was based
upon newspaper reports exclusively.
We've talked to the official about
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SENATOR SPECTER: Well, this memo says that the
information would be redundant with that publicly
available. But the memo itself does not say that the
information is based on newspaper sources.
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, the information contained in
the main memorandum which was not about Lieutenant
Colonel North was redundant.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, what is your basis for
saying that it was speculative that Lieutenant Colonel
North might be the subject of criminal investigation
involving a Special Prosecutor?
JUDGE WEBSTER: " Might" or "may" is speculative.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, if it is speculative, is it
not serious? Is it not something to be pursued with
substantial concern?
JUDGE WEBSTER: If there is an investigation in
fact, Senator Specter, I hope it would come to me by
some other means than by an officer not involved in that
speculating about the newspapers. That was just
informational. That is the way it must have been taken
by me. But as I have testified, I regret that I have to
tell you I don't remember that memorandum.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well the memo doesn't say that
it's either speculative or based upon newspapers. You
may conclude that it's speculative. I don't read it
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that way. My judgment is that if their reading is not
that, but even if it were, it's pretty serious.
If you add to it, Judge Webster, that the
conclusion is reached not to advise other purposes in
the NSC because there is no assurance that the
information would not be made available to Lieutenant
Colonel North, isn't that a serious matter? If you have
information which comes to the FBI and that matter is
such that it ought to be referred to the NSC, pretty
important material, and you can't do so because North
will see it, isn't that a serious matter?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I won't argue with you, Senator.
If you want to call it a serious matter and say that I
was negligent in failing to view it as a serious matter,
I'll accept your verdict on that.
But if you were to ask the person who made that
report, that person would tell you it was based entirely
on newspaper reading.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, I don't have a judgment on
it, Judge Webster. I'm just asking questions. I'm
trying to figure out -- I'm trying to figure out your
role in it. But it seems to me that if the FBI is not
going to pass information on to the National Security
Council because North may have access to it and if North
even speculatively may be the subject of a criminal
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probe by a Special Prosecutor, that's serious business.
And that when the FBI Director reads it, he ought to
note it. And he ought to tell the Attorney General
about it. And may be he ought to tell the President
about it.
This language just can't be blown away. And now we
7
have, a few months later, North, under investigation by
8
a Special Prosecutor. And we have North being involved
9
in calling up the FBI and saying this is the same outfit
10
which is taking care of our business in Iran. This is
11
the same man who is handling a great many matters. This
12
is a man who you say is flawed with tunnel vision, he's
13
gung ho, that he's result oriented, that he has no broad
14
gauged concern.
15
Now those aren't the characterizations of a
16
criminal. But those are red flags. Those are danger,
17
signals.
18
Well, I have asked the questions and I think I've
19
gotten your answers.
20
Let me come on to the subject of the information
21
you had about the sale of arms to Iran where you had
22
been informed, as you said, about August 6th of 1986,
23
that there was a sale of arms to Iran and you had taken
24
it up with the Attorney General. And I had touched on
25
this briefly in the opening round of questions and
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really didn't get finished with it. And had asked you
in the albeit brief conversation which you had with
Attorney General Meese on November 21st, 1986, what was
said, if anything, specifically about the sale of arms
to Iran?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I believe my response, Senator
Specter, was that I was the one who outlined what I
knew, or what I, rather, what I had been told and asked
him whether that was correct.
SENATOR SPECTER: Which conversation are you
talking about?
JUDGE WEBSTER: We're talking about the only one we
had about this thing, November 21, on Friday.
SENATOR SPECTER: And what did you say specifically
to Attorney General Meese, if anything, about the sale
of arms to Iran?
JUDGE WEBSTER: All right, it ?went something like
this, as best I can recall. It was following a luncheon
or breakfast meeting in his dining room. I followed him
into his office and I said that I had been advised by
Buck Revell that at an OSG meeting, Oliver North had
said that there was a -- that they, were working on a new
Iranian initiative which involved some backwater or back
channel negotiations to reopen relations with certain
parts of the Iranian people, that it might involve a
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shipment of -- or would involve a shipment of arms and
possibly some hostage negotiation -- some assistance
with the hostages, that I understood that there had been
a Presidential Finding supporting this and that he had
5
seen it and approved it. And I just wanted to be sure
6
that he had seen and that he had approved it. That's
7
the substance of the conversation.
8
SENATOR SPECTER: That's November 21st, 1986?
9
JUDGE WEBSTER: That's correct.
10
SENATOR SPECTER: And at what point did Mr. Meese
11
say to you that he was going to conduct some inquiry and
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where you agreed to?
13
JUDGE WEBSTER: I beg your pardon. I've been
14
focusing on the wrong date. This information came to me
15
16
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, I thought you might have.
17
That's why I came back to August --
18
JUDGE WEBSTER: Yes, I'm sorry. I apologize for
19
that that.
20
Everything that I said is correct, but it occurred
21
shortly after August 5th, which was the day that I
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received the information from Mr. Revell. I beg your
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pardon.
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SENATOR SPECTER: All right. So on that day there
25
had been--
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May I have about three minutes, Mr. Chairman, until
I can come back to another round?
THE CHAIRMAN: Please go ahead and complete your
line of thought.
SENATOR SPECTER: All right, thank you very much,
Mr. Chairman.
So on August the 5th you had the conversation with
Attorney General Meese about the backchannel
negotiations and the shipment of arms to Iran and some
hostages being involved.
Now, what conversation did you have with Mr. Meese
on November 21st, 1986?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Yes, that was a -- following some
other reason for my being there, I think we were -- we
had been working on a National -- on our department
resources board meeting as I best recall. I'm not
certain.
The Attorney General mentioned to me as I was
getting ready to leave - I think it probably was
prompted by some comment of mine about the confusion of
statements in the press about what was going on, what
happened in Iran -- that the President had asked him to
determine the facts. And that he was going over and was
going to talk to the various people involved and was
going to try to get the facts straight. Get them
accurate.
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SENATOR SPECTER: Was it at that point that you
made an offer of personnel?
JUDGE WEBSTER: At that point, I said, "Can we be
of any help?"
SENATOR SPECTER: And he said what?
JUDGE WEBSTER: As best I can recall, he said, "No
I don't think so. I don't think there's any need for
it, there's nothing criminal about this that I can see, .
do you?" And I said, "Well no, not on the basis of what
I know now.
And we agreed. And that was the end of the
conversation.
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, the question which comes to
my mind, Judge Webster, was the one which I had started
to pursue with you this morning. And that was that in
the context of the conversation you had shortly after
August 5th, 1986, about the backc'hannel negotiations and
the hostages, and the sale of arms to Iran, and the
federal laws, the Export Administration Act which bars
exports of goods to nations which support terrorism and
Iran had been so classified in the Export Arms Control
Act which regulates transfers of munitions and requires
Congressional approval. The President can't handle it
on his own Finding. You have to have Congressional
notification and be overruled. In the totality of that
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context, why did you not consider that there might be
some criminality involved or allegation of criminality
or possibility of it?
4
If I can supplement it as the final comment I have,
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you said earlier, Judge Webster, that when Senator Cohen
6
asked you what you would have done differently and then
7
he said what would you have done. You responded that
8
you are not an expert investigator and I can understand
9
that. You're the Administrator of the FBI. The
10
Attorney General is not an investigator either. When
11
you start to ask questions, you have to 'give Miranda
12
warnings, and you have custodial interrogations, you
13
have investigative techniques, preservation of
14
documents, sealings, a tremendous number of very complex
15
matters people only know when they're in it day in and
16
day out.
17
Where you had the information about the sale of
18
arms, why was there not a danger signal at.all that this
19
was something that the FBI really ought to be involved
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in?
21
JUDGE WEBSTER: I didn't see any danger signals at
22
the time. On the basis of the facts as I knew them, my
23
confidence that the Attorney General had reviewed the
24
legal predicate for the actions that were being taken
25
over there. He wasn't going over there to find out if a
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crime had been committed. He was going over to find out
exactly what had happened. Who had authorized this.
Who had authorized that. He was going to talk to the
people. They were all making statements that it seemed
5
at times to be inconsistent. And inaccurate.
6
Certainly, I would not have felt that it was
7
necessary to take the FBI in there on the basis of a
8
customs management export-import control violation. My
9
assumptions were that if the Attorney General was a part
10
of the National Security Council, had reviewed the
11
Findings, had been brought into it, given an opportunity
12
to consider the legal aspects of what was taking place
13
over there, that that was what was important.
14
I just wanted to be sure they weren't off running
15
around without legal advice.
16
SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you very much, Judge
17
Webster. Thank you.
18
THE CHAIRMAN: Senator Hecht?
19
SENATOR HECHT: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's been
20
a hot afternoon, and before we get on with the security
21
questions, I'll go back to the x rated questions we were
22
on before, about brothel owner Joe Conforti and the
23
Judge Claiborne case and your handling of agents in the
24
FBI.
25
Brothel owner Joe Conforti was offered millions in
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tax breaks to testify against Judge Clairborne. Was
that your call, Judge?
JUDGE WEBSTER: That was not my call and I don't
believe it to be true. But it was not my call.
5
SENATOR HECHT: That was not your call and you do
6
not believe it to be true?
7
JUDGE WEBSTER: And I am Unaware of it today.
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SENATOR ?HECHT: What do you know about allegations
9
that Mr. Yablonski directed --
10
JUDGE WEBSTER: Let me, if I may, correct the
11
record a little.
12
SENATOR HECHT: Yes.
13
JUDGE WEBSTER: I think there might have been some
14
suggestions of that kind of a basis for a plea bargain.
15
But it was not my. call.
16
SENATOR HECHT: I will have to research that out.
17
And I will give you a prepared question on that.
18
My recollection at the time was in the newspaper
19
that he was given tax breaks.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: He may very well have been. I was
21
listening to the amounts you were talking about and I
22
don't really know that to be true but it may be part of
23
the plea agreement. But it was not my call.
24
SENATOR HECHT: It was not your call. That's the
25
main point. Okay.
'
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What do you know about allegations that Mr.
Yablonski directed a break-in at Judge Claiborne's home?
Did the FBI or Justice Department ever investigate those
allegations?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I believe those allegations were
6
investigated as part of an overall Office of
7
Professional Responsibility investigation following
8
various allegations of that kind that were made. We did
9
not authorize such a break-in. I do not, in fact, know
10
that such a break-in occurred.
11
SENATOR HECHT: What resulted from the
12
investigation of allegations Yablonski's wife was
13
intimidating local casinos into buying fresh shrimp from
14
a company she was associated with?
15
JUDGE WEBSTER: That investigation was -- there was
16
an investigation of that and it was concluded that it
17
was unfounded.
18
SENATOR HECHT: Was it not true though that Mr.
19
Yablonski's wife was in that business and did sell
20
shrimp to the hotels?
21
JUDGE WEBSTER: Yes, indeed. It was true. And
22
that's why we conducted the investigation.
23
SENATOR HECHT: But there was no implication that
24
she was using her husband's influence to do -- to get
25
this contract?
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JUDGE WEBSTER: That was the result of the
investigation, Senator.
SENATOR HECHT: Were you aware that while Joseph
Yablonski was heading the Las Vegas field office, he
kept a forty thousand dollar bank error in his favor
until the bank found the mistake on its own three years
later, after the FBI official had left office?
Were you aware of that?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I was aware of it after he had left
office. I became aware of it after the matter surfaced,
but he was already retired at that time.
There was an investigation conducted. And, again,
no action was deemed indicated by the Department of
Justice.
SENATOR HECHT: Do you condone any of your FBI
field agents or future CIA agents engaging in these
types of activities?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Which types, Senator?
SENATOR HECHT: Keeping quiet of a forty thousand
dollar bank error.
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, I don't condone that.
His explanation was he was not aware of it, that
his wife was entirely in charge of the finances. If he
had knowingly kept it secret, I would not have condoned
it.
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SENATOR HECHT: If that was by any other citizen,
would he have been prosecuted for that?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I don't know the answer to that.
That's a prosecutor's discretion, and I can't answer the
5
question. It would depend on the intent.
6
SENATOR HECHT: In October 1982, the head of the
7
Las Vegas FBI Office, Joseph Yablonski, apparently
8
attempted to derail Brian McKay's bid for Attorney
9
General. According to news media accounts, Mr.
10
Yablonski solicited the help of an intelligence
11
investigator at Nellis Air Force Base in an apparent
12
attempt to dig up the reported inflammatory information.
13
He also had someone check McKay's military central
14
files in St. Louis. I should like to point out that no
15
derogatory information was found and Brian McKay won the
16
election.
17
Judge Webster, would Mr. Y-ablonski activities not
18
constitute a violation of the Hatch Act which bars
19
federal officials from interfering in political races?
20
JUDGE WEBSTER: That matter was investigated by our
21
Office of Professional Responsibility. It was not found
22
that he was engaging in political activities. His
23
explanation was that he wanted to know more about Mr.
24
McKay who was about to come in to see him during the
25
election.
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Since there was no evidence that he was engaging in
political activities, that matter stood as I have
described it. Mr. Yablonski was, however, disciplined
by me for what I consider to be extremely bad judgment
5
in utilizing the files of another agency to inquire
6
about Mr. McKay for a reason that I did not consider
7
adequate or sufficient.
8
SENATOR HECHT: So you would classify this as bad
9
judgment, not any type of a crime?
10
JUDGE WEBSTER: That's correct.
11
SENATOR HECHT: Were you aware of other prominent
12
Nevadans who were targeted for investigation by the FBI?
13
JUDGE WEBSTER: Again, I would like to say that --
14
it would be very sensitive to use that word targeting
15
because we target programs. We target organized crime.
16
We target scheme scams. We should not be targeting
17
individuals.
18
There were at various times individuals under
19
investigation in Las Vegas as there are all over the
20
United States. But they are based upon something we
21
believe they've done and not because we have some
22
interest in getting something on them.
23
SENATOR HECHT: There were newspaper reports, and I
24
just use the term newspaper reports, that certain heads
25
-- pictures were. on Mr. Yablonski's walls and he would
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throw darts at them and -- you know anything about
anything like that?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I really don't..
SENATOR HECHT: In your opinion, why has the Las
5
Vegas Sun been on such a vendetta -- and just show
6
you a couple of headlines. "-Hecht to Grill Webster on
7
YablonSki Vendetta," " Will Heeht Give Webster
8
Indigestion?" And one thing after another like this for
9
the last two years.
10
Why, in your opinion, does the Las Vegas Sun take
11
this on in such a manner?
12
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I don't want to impugn the
13
motives of its editor. He was deeply involved in the
14
Conforti -- rather the Claiborne investigation. He had
15
strong views about it. He even tried to arrange a
16
meeting with a Senator at the White House to protest the
17
investigation.
18
Things get pretty heated out in Las Vegas as you
19
know, Senator-. And it took a pretty strong SAC to stand
20
up to that.
21
So I'm not at all surprised that the feuding
22
continued as it did.
23
SENATOR HECHT: SAC? Give us the --
24
JUDGE WEBSTER: Special Agent in Charge.
25
SENATOR HECHT: I see.
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So you have nothing in your mind that would have
triggered this?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well I have something in my mind,
but I don't think I ought to say it.
5
(General Laughter.)
6
SENATOR HECHT: Well, why not?
7
SENATOR COHEN: And that's why he's a judge and
8
you're a Senator.
9
(General laughter.)
10
SENATOR HECHT: I nearly had him talking. Now shut
11
up.
12
(General Laughter.)
13
SENATOR HECHT: Would you care to proceed on that
14
or would you not?
15
JUDGE WEBSTER: I'd really rather not. I will if
16
you insist. But I'd really rather not.
17
SENATOR HECHT: Well, if it has any bearing on this
18
hearing I would ask you to. If you don't think it does
19
have any bearing, I cannot force you to.
20
JUDGE WEBSTER: I don't think it does, Senator.
21
Newspaper people form opinions, particularly if they own
22
the newspaper. And it's -- and you can have your
23
article on the front page. I really believe the editor
24
believes what he is writing, but he is out of line.
25
SENATOR HECHT: Thank you.
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You have mentioned that Mr. Yablonski was guilty of
bad judgment numerous times. However, when he retired,
you have him a glowing recommendation. Is that not
correct?
5
JUDGE WEBSTER: I don't remember a glowing
6
recommendation. I remember writing ?him a letter of
7
appreciation for all that he had done for the Bureau.
8
SENATOR HECHT: I got one minute left and let me
9
ask you a question. I'll lead into the intelligence
10
area:
11
You chair the Government's highest level o
12
counterintelligence coordination group, and you are a
13
member of the Government's key defensive security
14
planning coordinating group. You were a respected
15
jurist. Based on your perspective from all three of
16
these areas, what is your analysis of our ability to
17
build an effective defensive security system? Is there
18
something wrong in government management or there
19
something inherent in our national political
20
philosophies and way of life which makes it impossible
21
for us to prevent these previous losses? Does our
22
tendency in the Congress to politicize these matters
23
have a bad impact?
24
JUDGE WEBSTER: I believe that we can develop
25
within the Intelligence Community a better system of
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what we call countermeasures. That ?is not
counterintelligence, we can do better there too, but
countermeasures are systems for protecting our national
secrets which exist within the Community itself and
within those public contractors with whom -- private
contractors with whom the government must share its
secrets.
That is only half the equation. The other half of
the equation has to do with how we in government
publicly act about such things as leaking. Official
leaking is bound to reduce the level of concern about
private leaking and create a numbness among other
government employees about the importance of protecting
classified information.
So it starts at the top, in my opinion, if we are
going to ever change an attitude about protecting
secrets in government.
SENATOR HECHT:
I thank you very much. Mr.
Chairman, will we have a chance at another time to
question Judge Webster on classified matters?
THE CHAIRMAN: Yes we will. We will definitely if
there are Members that have classified items -- and I'll
be happy to consult with you about that -- schedule a '
time to do that. I anticipate that we will continue
public hearings as well tomorrow. We might conclude our
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public hearing tomorrow afternoon with a closed session
at that time if there are any classified matters.
SENATOR HECHT: I will have some of those questions
for you in a classified context. Thank you very much,
Judge Webster.
THE CHAIRMAN: Let me ask, Judge Webster, what you
would do if you were faced with a situation -- a
hypothetical situation in which your own values were
violated either in terms of the covert action that was
undertaken or in terms of failure to notify Congress.
Looking back at the concrete situation, our most
recent experience, a very damaging situation that
developed with the Iranian arms transfer and the failure
to notify Congress for a period of some ten or eleven
months.
If you had been the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency at the time that the Finding was
issued by the President for January, bearing in mind
consent to notify Congress was not given for several
months, what would you have done?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I would have to ask the Chairman to
understand that I am not possessed of all of the facts.
I only know --
THE CHAIRMAN: Just knowing what you have read in
the newspaper.
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JUDGE WEBSTER: And in the Tower Commission Report.
THE CHAIRMAN: What would you have done?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I would have insisted on revisiting
the decision not to tell the Congress on a regular and
5
frequent basis., And at the first opportunity when I
6
felt that those reasons that were important to the
7
President at the time that he Made the original order
8
were no longer as important as the need to preserve the
9
trust and confidence I would be coming down as hard as I
10
knew how to get the President to change his mind.
11
THE CHAIRMAN: Well in this specific situation, of
12
course, the President did not give authority for
13
notification. In fact, we were finally notified through
14
a newspaper in Beirut.
15
What would you have done?
16
Would you have remained as Director of Central
17
Intelligence Agency given this concrete situation? We
18
know exactly what occurred, we know from the Tower
19
Commission, from this Committee's report and from press
20
accounts. If you had been the Director of Central
21
Intelligence Agency, would you have continued to serve
22
in the Administration given the fact that approval to
23
notify Congress of this operation was not given?
24
JUDGE WEBSTER: I think, first, and I don't want to
25
evade your question.because I'm trying to really be sure
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that I know the answer to it what in my own mind what I
would do. I would have been arguing very strongly that
the use of Iranian nationals to assist in the release of
American hostages in Beirut in exchange for arms was an
ill-advised policy contrary to our stated public policy
and one which it was very important that Congress
understood and supported and if it did not understand
and support it, there was very little chance that it
would ever be so viewed by the American people as, as
the President said, making sense When it got on the
front pages of the newspaper.
It's a little difficult because there was an
13
important ongoing initiative which many people think had
14
some promise. Although others don't. And that is to
15
try to find a way to restore relationships with a
16
strategically important country when its hostile leader
17
should leave the scene which seems to be not in the too
18
far distant future.
19
That is a very sensitive type of thing. Any kind
20
of backchannel negotiation is very, very sensitive.
21
SENATOR COHEN: We understand Khomeini's
22
grandmother is still alive. I don't know what you've
23
based that on?
24
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I haven't been in that
25
situation. I explained earlier this morning, I've never
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seen a Finding until I saw the ones in this case. So
I'm not sure exactly how much of that was explored.
THE CHAIRMAN: But again, surely having just sat
back, not even as Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, but just an American citizen and now
you're reading the newspaper accounts. You would have
some feeling about now what woUld I have done if I'd
been sitting there as the Director of the Central
Intelligence Agency and I had argued against this policy
and I'd argued in favor of notifying Congress and I'd
been overruled month after month after month. Now
surely most of us can sit back and many of us perhaps
are arm chair quarterbacked too often. Most of us can
sit back and say if I were there I would have done such
and such.
Now, if you had been there, what would you have
done?
Would you have remained a part of the
Administration -- you talked this morning hypothetically
about well if I were confronted with the situation where
I felt it violated my standards or was just going too
far, I would have to leave. Or I would have to get out.
Or, I've forgotten the exact words, but you in essence
meant I would have to resign.
This isn't a hypothetical. It happened. If
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William H. Webster, if we confirm you to this post. If
you had been sitting there as the Director of the
Central Intelligence Agency, during that period of time,
what would you have done?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I must tell you in all candor,
would be asking -- one of the questions I'd be asking is
could this particular Committe.e keep that information
within the Committee? I don't -- I'm saying that
because I think it is a legitimate -- it influences your
decision in trying to balance the importance of it.
I think that I -- I'd like to think that I would
have prevailed on the President long ago
THE CHAIRMAN: The Director did not -- the
President did not notify Congress. It's not
hypothetical -- given the operation that was ongoing,
given the fact that we were trading arms to terrorists,
and you said that disturbed you greatly. It was at
variance with our public policy. Would you have
remained a part of the Administration? I believe as
strongly as you do about the responsibility of this
Committee and others to keep secrets as you know. We
have battened down the hatches. I don't think from the
current Membership of this Committee, those currently a
Member of this Committee since January of this year, I
don't think we have had any information inappropriately
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released. We don't even let it out of our space.
Documents or notes.
What would you have done?
JUDGE WEBSTER: If I can take that one as a given,
in that context, I would have insisted that there be
notification or I would have not been able to stay.
Now, at the exact point at which I would do, I'm
not -- today, I don't think I can pin that down, because
I don't know enough. But I'm confident during -- that
period was too long. And you should have been notified.
THE CHAIRMAN: At some time in that period after
you had attempted to change the notification policy or
the policy itself, you would have left. Is that
correct?
JUDGE WEBSTER: That's correct.
THE CHAIRMAN: Let me go back again to this logical
question that Senator Cohen raised. He said, and I must
confess the more I think about it the more difficulty I
have in understanding it. We have an investigation of
the Hasenfus matter. We have an investigation of
Southern Air Transport in terms of their operations in
Central America.
You have said that until November the 25th, that
you were like the rest of us in this country, you didn't
realize there was any connection, diversion of funds
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from the Iranian arms sale to the Central American
activity.
What was it? If you could recreate for us, first
of all, who was it, how did this request first come to
your attention and what did the person say to you that
delivered the message -- on October the 30th - that they
wanted that investigation suspended or delayed for a
period of time?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I received a telephone call from
the Associate Attorney General. That's Stephen Trott.
He's the number three man in the Justice Department, and
12
he is the person in charge of all criminal activities in
13
the Justice Department.
14
THE CHAIRMAN: And he called you himself?
15
JUDGE WEBSTER: He called me himself.
16
And I'm referring now to my memorandum as I talk to
17
you because I used almost verbatim language.
18
He called me on the secure line. Said he was
19
calling at the request of the Attorney General. And he
20
said the Attorney General would like to suspend for ten
21
days any nonurgent work on the Southern Air Transport
22
Neutrality Act investigation. He said that there were
23
apparently some sensitive hostage negotiations going on
24
that could possibly be prejudiced.
25
He told me that he didn't -- that the Attorney
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General did not want to do anything which would wreck
the investigation, but simply wanted to permit a good
climate for the negotiations to the extent possible.
And I said that I would check with our Criminal
5
Investigative Division and if there were no problems we
6
would go ahead and do it.
7
THE CHAIRMAN: Did you ask him anything else at
8
that point?
9
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, I did not ask him anything
10
else. I'm not sure that he knew anything else.
11
THE CHAIRMAN: Did you yourself wonder? In other
12
words, why is it that an investigation of something
13
going in Central America is related to the release of
14
hostages in --
15
JUDGE WEBSTER: He was referring to our activity at
16
the Southern Air Transport Company, in Florida. And I
17
knew from the report from Mr. Revell that Colonel North
18
had told him that that airline had been used to help the
19
project' in Iran.
20
THE CHAIRMAN: I understand. But even if Southern
21
Air was providing transportation, or had provided some
22
transportation for arms to Iran, why would the
23
investigation into Southern Air's involvement in Central
24
America, what kind of information and to whom could that
25
information -- in other words, if information continued
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to be put into an FBI file by investigators about, well,
here's what Southern Air is doing in Central America,
how could that jeopardize the hostages? Logically?
JUDGE WEBSTER: My testimony on that this morning
5
was and is that this operation was so sensitive that
6
they -- everything had been done to minimize any
7
non-need-to know involvement. And it did everything
8
possible to operate in a covert manner and not have
9
people speculating when -- anytime -- I'm not trying to
10
put thoughts into the minds of the Attorney General or
11
even why I'm trying to explain why I didn't think it
12
was unusual. Anytime there is an FBI investigation,
13
people begin to focus on why is there an investigation.
14
We are -- we're there with numbers of people, and I am
15
sure that there was concern expressed somewhere to the
16
Attorney General which he felt was valid, and he passed
17
it through Mr. Trott to me.
18
I came at it looking at it from the standpoint of
19
is this request going to damage an ongoing
20
investigation"? Not whether the Attorney General's
21
judgment on this ought to be questioned. But whether or
22
not the investigation he wanted us to suspend would be
23
hurt by such suspension. And so I passed that question
24
to our career people who said that it would not.
25
And since the Attorney General had asked for it,
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had given a reason that I thought was reasonable, I
didn't second guess that and I don't now.
THE CHAIRMAN: Is it simply because the same firm,
Southern Air, was involved in Iranian arms
transportation and was under investigation in Central
America, is that the only logical -- I'm sort of puzzled
by why you didn't say to Mr. Trott, well what does that
have to do with the hostages? Or how on earth is there
any logical connection between suspending an
investigation of something going on in Central America
with whatever involvement these people may have had
elsewhere?
13
JUDGE WEBSTER: Mr; Chairman, I don't believe Mr.
14
Trott knew about the hostage negotiations. Only Mr.
15
Revell and I in the Bureau, only the Attorney General in
16
the Department, were aware of what the National Security
17
Council was doing.
18
THE CHAIRMAN: But you didn't ask him to call back
19
and say I'd like to talk to the Attorney General or know
20
why he --
21
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, because J talked to Mr. Clarke,
22
and he said it wouldn't affect our investigation.
23
THE CHAIRMAN: Wouldn't affect the investigation?
24
What about at the end of the ten day period? What
25
action did you take then in terms of reopening the
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investigation at the end of the ten day period?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I called back to Mr. Trott and
3
said, "The ten days are up. Can we begin?" And he
4
said, "I don't know. I'll get back to you.: He got
5
back to us on the 20th.
6
THE CHAIRMAN: ,And said it was all right to resume
7
the negotiations?
8
JUDGE WEBSTER: That's right. No restrictions.
9
THE CHAIRMAN: I want to go into the matter of the
10
Varelli situation, but I think our time is such that I
11
better not commence that.
12
Now, let me go on to Senator Cohen at this time.
13
SENATOR COHEN: Well, I think I should take umbrage
14
at one of the Chairman's last remarks. He said that I
15
asked a question, the logic of which could not escape
16
him. Part of that was that I asked questions of which
17
the logic does escape him --
18
THE CHAIRMAN: Let me correct the record. On this
19
instance, I understood the logic of the question but not
20
the logical connection between the two points being
21
raised.
22
SENATOR COHEN: We are trying to define exactly
23
what you see as the parameters for the timely
24
notification to the Congress. I think you made a
25
statement in response to Senator Boren that if the
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reasons that the President originally offered for not
notifying Congress were no longer as important as they
were at the time, then you would give consideration at
that point to insisting that notice be given.
5
I have a difficulty with that because it is still
6
very broad. For example, there are two reasons that
7
were offered for not notifying. Congress: number one,
8
this was a new strategic opening to Iran. That
9
strategic opening might take two years. In which case
10
Congress would never be notified during that two, year
11
timeframe.
12
Secondly, there was what involved the primary
13
motivation, and that was the return of the hostages.
14
Every time a hostage was about to be returned, that
15
would be justification enough not to notify Congress.
16
So you have a program, theoretically, that could be
17
carried on even under your interpretation of timely
18
notice for as long as two years -- or eighteen months as
19
it was in this case. And you really suggest to this
20
Committee that that is your understanding of what timely
21
notice would constitute in the meaning of the law?
22
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, I think that this is one reason
23
why that this particular hypothetical, even though we
24
may know more about it than we do in other
25
hypotheticals, is not as simple as it sounds because
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perhaps more justification could be made for a
diplomatic initiative over a sustained period of time
than for a hostage situation involving the exchange o
arms. And I don't really know that I know the answer to
that, but what I tried to say in terms of defining my
sense of timeliness -- because the statute doesn't do it
and I don't think can do it really -- is not just when
the reason was not as strong as it was in the beginning,
but when the corresponding need to keep the Congress
informed-- to have the support of the Congress through
the Intelligence Committees was more compelling than the
remaining reasons for keeping it secret.
SENATOR COHEN: Do you recall seeing Mr. Gates
testify before this Committee several weeks ago? Did
you have a chance to either watch or read about his
interpretation of timeliness?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I've only seen portions of Mr.
Gates' testimony, and I have read portions of it
SENATOR COHEN: With respect to timeliness, I think
he indicated that forty-eight hours was about as timely
as one could get within the meaning of that
interpretation. That beyond that time, he would start
to be very concerned, and would feel compelled to notify
Congress.
JUDGE WEBSTER: I haven't any problem with that.
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think he said several days would be his view of the
outside.
SENATOR COHEN: So you would confine timely notice,
then, to within several days, as opposed to several
months or in some cases several years?
6
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I would try to relate it to
7
the particular situation. And as I said in my
8
testimony, I have trouble imagining any situation that
9
is so sensitive and life threatening that the Congress
10
cannot be advised of it.
11
But one thing, not only do I believe the act makes
12
it clear that you're entitled to be informed, but also,
13
I think, that any project that cannot survive
14
Congressional notification is suspect from the
15
beginning.
16
SENATOR COHEN: You also indicated that one other
17
test that you would apply would be that you would have
18
to know wheter Congress could keep that secret. That is
19
not a condition in the statute.
20
JUDGE WEBSTER: I realize that. And I appreciate
21
your bringing that to my attention. But there are no
22
conditions in the statute. It says that the President
23
should give his reasons why and that he should notify in
24
a timely way. And I was trying to leave room for things
25
that I have said I cannot even imagine that would --
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where something was-so tight that they couldn't come. I
can't -- I really -- I'm a lot in the situation I was
when I stood before the Committee -- Judiciary Committee
to be Director of the FBI. I'm trying to leave myself
room for the unknown. But I'm telling you that I don't
know any situations where you shouldn't be promptly
advised.
SENATOR COHEN: I share your concern about not
wanting to disclose information that might possibly be
leaked and jeopardize lives, and Senator Boren and the
rest of us who sit on this Committee are certainly
dedicated to that.
But that qualification is not part of the law, and
it's one of the things that ended in this entire Iran
affair where you have 011ie North, for example, saying
let's not tell Secretary Shultz. If you tell the
Secretary of State, that's the end of the program. And
let's not tell all of the other people, and soon you
have a private foreign policy being carried out without
anyone's notice or knowledge beyond a select group
within the White House. And that's a very dangerous
situation
JUDGE WEBSTER: I agree with that. And it's one of
the reasons of leaking at the Executive branch and
leaking elsewhere. It's such a concern to people. If
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there was some history of rapid leaking, yspu can
appreciate how it could be for them.
SENATOR COHEN: I would suggest that if you have
concerns about the potential for leaks coming out of
this Committee or the House Committee, you ought to come
to the Committee and express those concerns.
JUDGE WEBSTER: I will. If I'm confirmed.
SENATOR COHEN: You also quoted William Stephenson
this morning and it was an excellent quote.
Stephenson also wrote that the enemy is not only at
our door, but inside our house -- and in practically
every room. I think Secretary Shultz has asked for the
creation of a Committee or Commission to investigate the
matter in Moscow. If it is determined that our Embassy
in Moscow is not fit for human habitation, and Mr. Orkin
can't fix it, would you recommend that the Soviets not
be allowed to occupy the residence that is attached to
the new Embassy on Mount Alto as well?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I would.
SENATOR COHEN: Is it your concern perhaps that
they could use the residency with equal or comparable
ability to detect microwave signals coming out of --
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, I just believe that we have
to insist on a reciprocity and equivalency at every
level --
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SENATOR COHEN: Are they occupying the residency
now?
JUDGE WEBSTER: There is some -- I'm informed that
they are in the apartments but there are no offices.
SENATOR COHEN: Your recommendation would be, if we
do not move into the new Embassy, that they not be
allowed to occupy the apartmedt side as well?
JUDGE WEBSTER: I think I'm getting out in front of
my self and my obligation to express that kind of view
first through the National Security Council. But I
think I have already indicated my perception.
SENATOR COHEN: Were you involved or at least aware
of any sting operation pertaining to weapons sales to
14
Iran in a case that emanated from New York?
15
JUDGE WEBSTER: Was I aware of --
16
SENATOR COHEN: Was the FBI the one who was running
17
a sting operation in New York? Was that the Department
18
of Justice?
19
JUDGE WEBSTER: In New York?
20
There have been a series of investigations to try
21
to find arm peddlers. I'm not sure whether you are
22
talking about that or the hostage situation. Which one
23
are you referring to?
24
SENATOR COHEN: The arms ?sales.
25
JUDGE WEBSTER: I'm informed that that particular
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case is a Customs case and not ours.
SENATOR COHEN: Excuse me. As to covert.
operations, would you support a sunset provision so that
4
all covert Operations automatically terminate after a
5
specific period of time and would have to be
6
reauthorized and reviewed by you and others before they
7
could be continued?
8
In other words, you're stepping into a job in which
9
there are many covert operations that have been underway
10
for some time that you might not be fully familiar with,
11
and you will be stepping onto a moving treadmill rather
12
quickly.
13
Would you support a provision that would terminate
14
all covert operations periodically unless they are
15
reauthorized?
16
JUDGE WEBSTER: I'm not sure whether you are ,
17
proposing that each one be terminated after a p&rticular
18
time or they all come up for a single sunset date.
19
SENATOR COHEN: Well, that they each have some
20
specified period of time over which they run. The time
21
frame at which would differ depending on when they were
22
initiated but, in other --
23
JUDGE wEBSTER: But that would require some
24
recertification?
25
SENATOR COHEN: A formal review by you and others
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and by the Committee, as a matter of fact --
JUDGE WEBSTER: I would be very much surprised if
3
there isn't some internal procedure of that kind
4
already. There certainly should be.
5
SENATOR COHEN: No there is not. As a matter of
6
fact, Mr. Carlucci has only recently recommended that
7
that take place in order to avoid the kind of situation
8
where you may have an errant program under way of which
9
you are not fully apprised.
10
JUDGE WEBSTER: All of our undercover operations in
11
the FBI are subject to that kind of restraint -- of
12
review.
13
SENATOR COHEN: Are you aware of any intelligence
14
activity that might be unlawful or contrary to an
15
Executive Order which has not been reported to the
16
Intelligence Oversight Board or to the Attorney General?
17
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, Senator.
18
SENATOR COHEN: Well, I have some other questions
19
dealing not only with the Varelli case, but also with
20
the Catholic Bishop. I think we are going over our
21
time.
22
THE CHAIRMAN: Senator Specter?
23
SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
24
It's late in the day, and I have some questions on
'25
other topics too, Judge Webster, but let me turn to one
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which you and I have discussed and I think have a
general area of agreement on. And that relates to the
FBI activities on ABSCAM which I think are important in
4
terms of setting a tone of fairness. Certainly the
5
Director of the FBI has a critical position in that
6
respect. And perhaps the Director of CIA is even in a
7
more critical position because even more secret items
8
are done with the CIA and necessarily with covert
9
activities.
10
You were nice enough to come and visit me before
11
these confirmation hearings began. And I had raised
12
with you a concern which I had about the necessity for
13
some reason to target an individual. You had referred
14
to it as a predicate. You might call it some basis for
15
some proceeding. And it might be said that if someone
16
is a public official, there is no justification of
17
taking a bribe under any circumstance and a strong case
18
can be made for that.
19
The rules which have been defined traditionally
20
require probable cause when there ?is a search and
21
seizure. Requires somewhat less when there is a stop
22
and frisk and those are variations talking about drug
23
testing and so forth now.
24
But in the course of the ABSCAM investigation,
25
there were at least some instances where individuals
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were targeted for investigation. And they had some
notoriety because they were Members of Congress. One a
United States Senator, at least one Member of the House
of Representatives.
5
And I believe personally that the power to
6
investigate is a very great power. when I was District
7
Attorney of Philadelphia, I recollected it very well the
8
greater power, the prosecutorial powers or others
9
because you could investigate again, secretly, and I
10
believe that there really has to be some predicate, some
11
reason to proceed..
12
AndI would like your observations at the outset as
13
to your views as to what there ought to be before
14
someone is made subject for target for an investigation.
15
MR. WEBSTER. Senator Specter, I appreciate that
16
you noted that I use the word predication because I'm
17
trying to get law enforcement community to stop using
18
the word targeting when they're talking about people.
19
'It's all right to target a program and find out what's
20
wrong whether it's labor racketeering or organized
21
crime. But when you begin to use the word targeting, it
22
gives the impression that you've decided ahead of time
23
that you are going to develop a criminal case against
24
someone.
25
The predicate is really a better word conceptually
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because it means that we have some reason for opening an
investigation. That reasoning is not as strong as a
full probable cause requirement where we already have
the evidence, but it is at least some evidence that
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gives us reason to believe that a person has been or
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will engaged in crime.
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I believe that that type of predicate, although it
8
is not in my opinion required in law, is the responsible
9
way for an investigative agency to proceed. We looked
10
at the observations of the Senate Select Committee which
11
reviewed the ABSCAM and other undercover operations at
12
great length, and we took those recommendations very
13
seriously.
14
At the time that we were in the midst of the
15
Graylord investigation, in Chicago, I think in my
16
' opinion an even more important investigation and
17
certainly a sensitive a one because we were inside the
18
Cook County Judiciary investigating the judges in an
19
undercover capacity. And when the Senate came down with
20
this report, I asked that that report be laid alongside
21
our investigations in Chicago to see whether there was a
22
sufficient predicate as outlined in the Senate Select
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Committee report for those ongoing investigations.
24
And then we took the additional step of having all
25
the files brought back to Washington because the Senate
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Select Committee had recommended that these
investigations be reviewed at a higher level and they
were again reviewed for predication and returned.
And we have had dozens of convictions in Chicago in
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that investigation. I believe only one judge has been
6
acquitted. It has rendered significant service to the
7
country and to that community: And I have not seen one
8
word in print criticizing the techniques used in the
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Graylord investigation.
10
So, that's the difference between getting the
11
ABSCAM case off the ground in a very early seminal
12
long-term investigation and learning lessons and acting
13
on them for future investigations.
14
SENATOR SPECTER: Judge Webster, I'm not sure that
15
you are correct when you say that a predicate is not
16
required in the law. In preparation for this hearing,
17
had some research done and we found no case where a
18
conviction was upheld or there was not some reason for
19
the investigation to be initiated. That is not to say
20
there is a square holding where the absence of a
21
predicate or some reason to proceed led to a reversal.
22
But it seems to me that as of this moment it may be more
23
of an open question and one which candidly might be
24"
influenced by a statement by the Director of the FBI,
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former federal judge, at a Senate hearing.
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The Senate Select Committee was top on the FBI in
one particular I would like to read it and see if you
agree with it or disagree with it in terms of the use of
some of the middlemen. You and I had not talked about
5
this. I have seen this since the meeting but I would
6
like -- your response to it. This appears in the Senate
7
Select Committee report on Page 19, quote, "In some
8
cases, the FBI 'relied on the representations of a
9
middleman, no record of reliability for producing
10
corrupt public officials. In some cases the FBI
11
continued to rely on middlemen, even after they had
12
proved to be unreliable in this regard. As a result,
13
the FBI's unduly unquestioning reliance on middlemen at
14
least one, apparently more, clearly innocent public
15
official was brought before the hidden cameras", end
16
quote.
17
Is that a fair statement, in your judgment?
18
JUDGE WEBSTER: I think it's a fair -- I think it's
19
a fair criticism. I think there was not a total absence
20
of predication. There was information. Where we are
21
today and our use of this important and sensitive
22
technique, we would not be as willing to rely on the
23
kind of middlemen representations as we did in ABSCAM.
24
That middleman term needs to be expanded. These
25
were individuals themselves under investigation who were
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charged and went to prison. These were not cooperating
witnesses.
3
SENATOR SPECTER: Well, some of them like Silvestri
4
were not charged, were they?
5
JUDGE WEBSTER,: Yes?, Joseph Silvestri was charged,
6
was convicted, was fined fifteen thousand dollars, and
7
went to jail for three years on a sentence for three
8
years.
9
SENATOR SPECTER: And he was all that there was t
10
act against the United States Senator and a Congressman?
11
JUDGE WEBSTER: Well, he introduced -- he brought
12
Congressman Thompson into the picture. Congressman
13
Thompson was convicted and went to prison. He did also
14
bring a United States Senator to the undercover scene
15
And that statement is correct.
16
SENATOR SPECTER: But the Senator walked out?
17
JUDGE WEBSTER: The Senator walked out.
18
SENATOR SPECTER: Without taking a bribe? Or
19
suggesting any willingness to take the bribe?
20
JUDGE WEBSTER: Nor was he offered a bribe.
21
SENATOR SPECTER: But he was moved in that
22
direction before he walked out?
23
He was moved in that direction by the questioning
?24
and comments in the townhouse in Georgetown before h
25
walked out?
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Was he not?
JUDGE WEBSTER: The Senator left the meeting
without having indicated that he was interested in
violating any criminal laws.
5
SENATOR SPECTER: Did you disagree with the Select
6
Committee's characterization of Silvestri when they said
7
on Page 72 of the report. that,. quote, "Joseph Silvestri
8
was the most unreliable of the ABSCAM middlemen",
9
unquote.
10
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, I don't think I disagree with
11
that.
12
SENATOR SPECTER: Now the time is running out,
13
Judge Webster, and I think it would be useful to see if
14
you agree with the specific standard. I think you have
15
already indicated that you have, but I think the future
16
proceedings, there would be some wait and some merit in
17
putting this on the record.
18
The Senate Select Committee articulated a number of
19
standards which they thought should be accomplished
20
through legislation. I believe that you said that you
21
adopted a standard which relates to predicate or
22
reasonable suspicion and I would ask if you agree with
23
this standard which appears at Page 28. This is one of
24
a number, but this is a relevant one here.
25
Quote, "No component of the Department of Justice
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may initiate, maintain, expand, extend, or renew an
undercover operation except, sub a, when the operation
is intended to obtain information about an identified
individual or to result in an offer to an identified
individual of an opportunity to engage in a criminal act
on a finding that there is a reasonable suspicious based
on articulable facts that the individual has engaged, is
engaging, or is likely to engage in criminal activity",
close quote.
JUDGE WEBSTER: I have no problem with that. I
think that that's substantially what is implied in
what's stated in our FBI undercover guidelines.
SENATOR SPECTER: A final question.
SENATOR COHEN: Would you yield for a moment?
Was that guideline applied to the Senator who was
invited to Georgetown?
As I recall, the FBI --
JUDGE WEBSTER: No, I don't -- I think probably
not. I think probably not. I would not -- you will
recall the circumstances, it was a short time frame
judgment. I made the judgment. I take the
responsibility. There were some in the Justice
Department who were of the opinion not to let him come.
Would have left open the fact that he was coming and we
wouldn't let him come. And he would, in fact, would
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have been out there unexplained.
I still think we could have found -- I still and
now think that we could have found a better way to
4
handle that situation without alerting the middlemari to
5
the fact that he was dealing with the FBI.
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SENATOR SPECTER: So if you had that to do over, .
7
you would not have brought that Senator in?
8
JUDGE WEBSTER: No. I would have wanted -- he was
9
a quick switch. I would have wanted to know more about
10
it.
11
We had an hour to make up our minds. I had put
12
protective provisions in place. One of them failed.
13
One of them succeeded. The one that succeeded was that
14
no money was to be offered until the Senator made a
15
criminal representation.
16
SENATOR SPECTER: And, in fact, you wrote him a
17
letter of exoneration?
18
JUDGE WEBSTER: I wrote him a letter that said that
19
when I made a statement on the air about only looking
20
for people who were willing to commit crimes that I was
21
not talking about him.
22
SENATOR SPECTER: A final question I have for you,
23
Judge Webster, is an inquiry which has been made by
24
Congresswoman Schroeder who wrote to you on March 13,
25
1987, and I tried to reach Congresswoman Schroeder
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earlier today and was unable to do so.
But have you had a chance to respond to her
inquiry? She apparently was listed in an FBI book, or
maybe I should ask the question, was Congresswoman
5
Schroeder among others who were listed in an FBI
6
publication denominated El Salvador's terrorism?
7
JUDGE WEBSTER: It is not 'a publication, Senator,
8
it is -- it's what we call our FBI Terrorist Photo Album
9
which includes photographs and biographical data.
10
She was not in our album. She has never been in
11
our album. The form which was given to her, came in to
12
her possession and which she showed to me is bogus.
13
It's spurious, and I have written to her and told her
14
both that it is spurious and that she is not nor has she
15
ever been in our album.
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SENATOR SPECTER: So you have had an opportunity
17
and have responded to her letter of March 13, 1987?
18
JUDGE WEBSTER: She has some additional questions.
19
I think, perhaps in another letter that we are trying to
20
get the answers to. But I had a hand search made of our
21
file so that I could give her unequivocal answer on that
22
point.
23
SENATOR SPECTER: Thank you very much, Judge
24
Webster.
25
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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THE CHAIRMAN: Let me-just ask one brief comment on
that.
Congresswoman Schroeder is not under investigation
by the FBI?
JUDGE WEBSTER: Absolutely not. And as I explained
to her in my letter, the photo album only contains
people who are subject to full: scale -- to full field
investigation. .
THE CHAIRMAN: Well, tomorrow we will have an
opportunity to go into some of these other matters. I
had hoped we might be able to finish today, but I am
informed that there are enough questions that Members of
the Committee want to continue to ask in open session.
This room is in use from noon until two o'clock
tomorrow. Then it will take them sometime to putit
-back into order for us to resume our hearings tomorrow
afternoon. So we will not be able to resume until
approximately three o'clock tomorrow afternoon in this
room.
At the end of that period, I will consult with the
Members of the Committee to see -if there are any other
questions that need to be raised in executive session or
in closed session. If so,. we would take those up right
at the end of that period.
I think it would be best to break at this point.
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We have questioned you about every, possible matter and
it is certainly not our position to test your physical
endurance in addition to the ordeal that we put you
through today.
As I said at the outset, I know that you understand
that all of these questions are offered in the spirit of
meeting our own responsibility and not from the point of
view of expressing any hostility toward you personally
or toward your qualifications for office. We are in a
situation in which the sensitivity of this particular
position is one of great importance. I think you
understand-that from the circumstances in which you
13
are nominated to the responsibilities of the DCI, this
14
Committee feels a very high degree of responsibility to
15
the Senate and to the country to explore every possible
16
avenue and ask every question that needs to be asked.
17
We appreciate your responsiveness to our questions today
18
very much and I know that you will look forward to being
19
with us again tomorrow.
20
We will resume at three o'clock tomorrow afternoon.
21
The Committee will stand in recess until that time.
22
(Whereupon, at 4:31 o'clock p.m., the Committee was
23
recessed to reconvene at 3:00 o'clock p.m., Wednesday,
24
April 9, 1987.)
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