YOUR CONFIRMATION HEARINGS- COMMENT, TIMELINE AND REFERENCE MATERIAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B00017R000500140015-9
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 71
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 20, 2013
• Sequence Number: 15
• Publication Date: March 4, 1987
• Content Type: MEMO

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OCA 87-0755
4 March 1987
MEMORANDUM FOR: DCI-Designate
VIA: Deputy Director
FROM: David D. Gries
Director of Congressional Affairs
SUBJECT: Your Confirmation Hearings - Comment, Timeline
and Reference Materials
Your nomination has been received positively at SSCI, though
it is obviously too early to reach any conclusions. During a
business meeting today the Committee is likely to vote to send
you its standard Questionnaire for Completion by Presidential
Nominees.
Since a full FBI field investigation must be submitted to
the White House before nominating papers can be forwarded to the
Senate, it is unlikely that your nomination will reach the SSCI
before 30 March.
SSCI rules normally require that 14 days elapse between
receiving the nominating papers and holding a hearing. However,
this requirement is often waived. Accordingly, your hearing
could be scheduled either at the end of the week of 30 March or
during the week of 6 April. The completion of NFIP budget
hearings on 25 March and the beginning of the Easter recess on
11 April point to these two weeks as a likely window.
Timeline:
Place courtesy telephone calls to Chairman Boren and
Ranking Minority Member Cohen
Avoid public discussion of your nomination
Begin courtesy calls on Members of Congress
Since you are a Presidential nominee, the White
House Congressional Affairs Office takes the
lead in arranging for your courtesy calls
Begin preparing nominating papers
Prepare Financial disclosure forms
Complete Questionnaire for Completion by
Presidential Nominees (CIA can help with this.
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Review draft of Opening Statement
(If you wish, CIA will prepare an initial draft
after discussion with you.)
Read reference materials
See attached list. These are available in folders
in the Office of Congressional Affairs for your
use at any time.
Other CIA and Intelligence Community elements are
also preparing reference materials.
Review O's & A's.
Attend pre-briefing sessions
At CIA
At White House
Review SSCI staff questions prepared for Members
Confirmation Hearing
The principle hearing is open; the SSCI will
determine later whether to follow up with a
closed hearing.
Committee Markup
Senate Floor Action
Swearing in Ceremony
Attachment:
(List of reference materials)
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/kr. / 11g0 "
SUBCHAPTER III?ACCOUNTABILITY FOR
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
50 U.S.C.A. 413 [? 501 of Nat. Sec. Act]. Congressional oversight "
(a) Reports to Congressional Committees of current and proposed
activities
To the extent consistent with all applicable authorities and duties,
including those conferred by the Constitution upon the executive and
legislative branches of the Government, and .to the extent consistent
with due regard for the protection from unauthorized disclosure of
classified information and information relating to intelligence sources
and methods, the Director of Central Intelligence and the heads of all
departments, agencies, and other entities of the United States involved
in intelligence activities shall?
(1) keep the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate and
the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of
Representatives (hereinafter in this section referred to as the "intelli-
gence committees") fully and currently informed of all intelligence
activities which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are
carried out for or on behalf of, any department, agency, or entity of
the United States, including any significant anticipated intelligence
activity, except that (A) the foregoing provision shall not require
approval of the intelligence committees as a condition precedent to
the initiation of any such anticipated intelligence activity, and (B) if
the President determines it is essential to limit prior notice to meet
extraordinary circumstances affecting vital interests of the United
States, such notice shall be limited to the chairman and ranking
minority members of the intelligence committees, the Speaker and
minority leader of the House of Representatives, and the majority
and minority leaders of the Senate;
(2) furnish any information or material concerning intelligence
activities which is in the possession, custody, or control of any
department, agency, or entity of the United States and which is
requested by either of the intelligence committees in order to carry
out its authorized responsibilities; and
(3) report in a timely fashion to the intelligence committees any
illegal intelligence activity or significant intelligence failure and any
corrective action that has been taken or is planned to be taken in
connection with such illegal activity or failure.
11-8
30 August 1984
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(b) Failure to inform; reasons
The President shall fully inform the intelligence committees in a
timely fashion of intelligence operations in foreign countries, other than
activities intended solely for obtaining necessary intelligence, for which
prior notice was not given under subsection (a) of this section and shall
provide a statement of the reasons for not giving prior notice.
(c) Establishment of procedures for relaying information
The President and the intelligence committees shall each establish
such procedures as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of
subsections (a) and (b) of this section.
(d) Protection from unauthorized disclosure
The House of Representatives and the Senate, in consultation with the
Director of Central Intelligence, shall each establish, by rule or resolution
of such House, procedures to protect from unauthorized disclosure all
classified information and all information relating to intelligence sources
and methods furnished to the intelligence committees or to Members of
the Congress under this section. In accordance with such procedures,
each of the intelligence committees shall promptly call to the attention of
its respective House, or to any appropriate committee or committees of its
respective House, any matter relating to intelligence activities requiring
the attention of such House or such committee or committees.
(c) Construction of authority conferred
Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authority to withhold
information from the intelligence committees on the grounds that
providing the information to the intelligence committees would consti-
tute the unauthorized disclosure of classified information or informa-
tion relating to intelligence sources and methods.
50 U.S.C.A. 414 [? 502 of Nat. Sec. Act]." Funding of Intelligence
Activities
(a) Appropriated funds available to an intelligence agency may be
obligated or expended for an intelligence or intelligence-related activity
only if?
(1) those funds were specifically authorized by the Congress for
use for such activities; or
(2) in the case of funds from the Reserve for Contingencies of the
Central Intelligence Agency and consistent with the provisions of
section 501 of this Act concerning any significant anticipated
intelligence activity, the Director of Central Intelligence has notified
the appropriate congressional committees of the intent to make such
funds available for such activity; or
11-9
30 May 1986
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(3) in the case of funds specifically authorized by the Congress
for a different activity?
(A) the activity to be funded is a higher priority intelligence or
intelligence-related activity;
(B) the need for funds for such activity is based on unforseen
requirements; and
(C) the Director of Central Intelligence, the Secretary of
Defense, or the Attorney General, as appropriate, has notified the
appropriate congressional committees of the intent to make such
funds available for such activity;
(4) nothing in this subsection prohibits obligation or expenditure
of funds available to an intelligence agency in accordance with
sections 1535 and 1536 of title 31, United States Code.
(b) Funds available to an intelligence agency may not be made
available for any intelligence or intelligence-related activity for which
funds were denied by the Congress.
(c) As used in this section?
(1) the term "intelligence agency" means any department, agency,
or other entity of the United States involved in intelligence or
intelligence-related activities;
(2) the term "appropriate congressional committees" means the Per-
manent Select Committee on Intelligence and the Committee on Appro-
priations of the House of Representatives and the Select Committee on
Intelligence and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate: and
(3) the term "specifically authorized by the Congress" means that?
(A) the activity and the amount of funds proposed to be used for
that activity were identified in a formal budget request to the
Congress, but funds shall be deemed to be specifically authorized
for that activity only to the extent that the Congress both
authorized the funds to be appropriated for that activity and
appropriated the funds for that activity; or
(B) although the funds were not formally requested, the Con-
gress both specifically authorized the appropriation of the funds
for the activity and appropriated the funds for the activity.
SUBCHAPTER IV?PROTECTION OF CERTAIN NATIONAL
SECURITY INFORMATION [NEW]
50 U.S.C.A. 421 [? 601 of Nat. Sec. Act]. Protection of identities of
certain United States undercover intelligence officers, agents infor-
mants, and sources
(a) Disclosure of information by persons having or having had access
to classified information that identifies a covert agefit
Whoever, having or having had authorized access to classified
information that identifies a covert agent, intentionally discloses any'
11-10
30 May 1986
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1.
TALKING POINTS
THE LAW ON REPORTING COVERT ACTION TO CONGRESS
?
Negotiations over 1980 Oversight Act
- Issue: timing of notice of covert actions
- Administration wanted to retain Hughes-Ryan
standard of 'timely' notice (i.e., after the fact)
- Intelligence committees wanted prior notice
- Compromise: statute drafted to require prior notice as
norm but to take account of Executive's claim to
constitutional authority to withhold prior notice
2. Intelligence Oversight Act: Section 501 of the National
Security Act
- Requires DCI to keep intelligence comittees 'fully and
currently informed" of intelligence activities,
including 'significant anticipated intelligence
activities"
--Hughes-Ryan amended to define covert operations as
significant anticipated intelligence activities
--Thus, prior notice of covert operations normally
required
?
- Two exceptions to prior notice requirement.
(incorporated in SSCI reporting procedures)
--501(a)(1)(B): limited prior notice to 'gang of
eight" in extraordinary circumstances
--501(b): if President withholds prior notice of
covert action, he must inform committees in a
"timely fashion" and give statement of reasons for
withholding prior notice
--Administration asserted constitutional
prerogative to withhold prior notice in
rare cases
--Congress did not accept this authority,
but chose not to use section 501 to do
battle over it.
preambular clause ("To the extent
consistent with applicable
authorities.") added to recognize fact
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the fact that Congress and the Executive
both have constitutional authorities which
cannot be changed by statute-question of
what the applicable authorities are was
left open.
---$01(b) added in recognition of Executive's
claim to authority to withhold prior notice
--Legislative history suggests that Congresr ray
hold view that the President may only withhold
prior notice when there is need for immediate
action and no opportunity to consult.
--But legislative history also recognizes that
particular constitutional authorities
cannot be spelled out in advance and rust be
worked out 'in a practical wanner".
--Further, there is precedent for withholding prior
notice due to concerns for secrecy/risk to life as
opposed to need for immediate action.
---in 1980, prior notice was withheld of
operation to rescue Americans in hiding
at Canadian Embassy in Tehran
2
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THE PRESIDENT
UNITED STATES
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES
Executive Order 12333
December 4, 1981
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59941
Federal Register
Vol. 46, No. 235
Tuesday, December 8, 1981
Presidential Documents
Title 3- ? Executive Order 12333 of December 4, 1981
The President United States Intelligence Activities
TABLE OF CONTENTS
[VII
Pagel
Preamble [599411
Part I. Goals, Direction, Duties. and Responsibilities With Respect to the
Notional Intelligence Effort
1.1 Goals [59942
1.2 The National Security Council [59942
1.3 National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Groups [59942
1.4 The Intelligence Community [59943
1.5 Director of Central Intelligence [59943
1.6 Duties and Responsibilities of the Heads of Executive Branch Departments and
Agencies [59944
1.7 Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community [59945
1.8 The Central Intelligence Agency [59945
1.9 The Department of State [59946
1.10 The Department of the Treasury [59946
1.11 The Department of Defense [59946
1.12 Intelligence Components Utilized by the Secretary of Defense [59947
1.13 The Department of Energy [59949
1.14 The Federal Bureau of Investigation [59949
Part 2. Conduct of Intelligence Activities
2.1 Need [59949
2.2 Purpose [59949
2.3 Collection of Information [59950
2.4 Collection Techniques [59950
2.5 Attorney General Approval [59951
2.6 Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities [59951
2.7 Contracting [59951
2.8 Consistency With Other Laws [59952
2.9 Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Within the United States [59952
2.10 Human Experimentation [59952
2.11 Prohibition on Assassination [59952
2.12 Indirect Participation [59952
Part 3. General Provisions
3.1 Congressional Oversight [59952
3.2 Implementation
[15599995522
3.3 Procedures
3.4 Definitions [59953
3.5 Purpose and Effect [69954
3.6 Revocation [59954
Timely and accurate information about the activities, capabilities, plans, and
intentions of foreign powers, organizations, and persons, and their agents, is
essential to the national security of the United States. All reasonable and
lawful means must be used to ensure that the United States will receive the
best intelligence available. For that purpose, by virtue of the authority vested
in me by the Constitution and statutes of the United States of America,
including the National Security Act of 1947, as amended, and as President of
the United States of America, in order to provide for the effective conduct of
United States intelligence activities and the protect-ion of constitutional rights,
it is hereby ordered as follows:
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59942 Federal Register / Vol. 46: No. 235 / Tuesday, December 8, 1981 / Presidential Documents
Part 1
Goals, Direction, Duties and Responsibilities With Respect to the National
Intelligence Effort
1.1 Goals. Te United States intelligence effort shall provide the President
and the National Security Council with the necessary information on which to
base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense
and economic policy, and the protection of United States national interests
from foreign security threats. All departments and agencies shall cooperate
fully to fulfill this goal.
(a) Maximum emphasis should be given to fostering analytical competition
among appropriate elements of the Intelligence Community.
(b) All means, consistent with applicable United States law and this Order,
and with full consideration of the rights of United States persons, shall be
used to develop intelligence information for the President and the National
Security Council. A balanced approach between technical collection efforts
and other means should be maintained and encouraged.
(c) Special emphasis should be given to detecting and countering espionage
and other threats and activities directed by foreign intelligence services
against the United States Government, or United States corporations, estab-
lishments, or persons.
(d) To the greatest extent possible consistent with applicable United States
law and this Order, and with full consideration of the rights of United States
persons, all agencies and departments should seek to ensure jull and free
exchange of information in order to derive maximum benefit from the United
States intelligence effort.
1.2 The National Security Council.
(a) Purpose. The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the
National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to the
integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national
security. The NSC shall act as the highest Executive Branch entity that
provides review of, guidance for and direction to the conduct of all national
foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, and special activities, and attendant
policies and programs.
(b) Committees. The NSC shall establish such committees as may be neces-
sary to carry out its functions and responsibilities under this Order. The NSC,
or a committee established by it, shall consider and submit to the President a
policy recommendation, including all dissents, on each special activity and
shall review proposals for other sensitive intelligence operations.
1.3 National Foreign Intelligence Advisory Groups.
(a) Establishment and Duties. The Director of Central Intelligence shall estab-
lish such boards, councils, or groups as required for the purpose of obtaining
advice from within the Intelligence Community concerning:
(1) Production, review and coordination of national foreign intelligence;
(2) Priorities for the National Foreign Intelligence Program budget;
(3) Interagency exchanges of foreign intelligence information;
(4) Arrangements with foreign governments on intelligence matters;
(5) Protection of intelligence sources and methods;
(6) Activities of common concern; and
(7) Such other matters as may be referred by the Director of Central Intelli-
gence.
(b) Membership. Advisory groups established pursuant to this section shall be
chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence or his designated representative
and shall consist of senior representatives from organizations within the
Intelligence Community and from departments or agencies containing such
organizations, as designated by the Director of Central Intelligence. Groups for
consideration of substantive intelligence matters will include representatives
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59943
of organizations involved in the collection, processing and analysis of intelli-
gence. A senior representative of the Secretary of Commerce, the Attorney
General, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, and the
Office of the Secretary of Defense shall be invited to participate in any group
which deals with other than substantive intelligence matters.
1.4 The Intelligence Community. The agencies within the Intelligence Com-
munity shall, in accordance with applicable United States law and with the
other provisions of this Order, conduct intelligence activities necessary for the
conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the
United States, including:
(a) Collection of information needed by the President, the National Security
Council, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and other Executive Branch
officials for the performance of their duties and responsibilities;
(b) Production and dissemination of intelligence;
(c) Collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to
protect against, intelligence activities directed against the United States,
international terrorist and international narcotics activities, and other hostile
activities directed against the United States by foreign powers, organizations,
persons, and their agents;
(d) Special activities;
(e) Administrative and support activities within the United States and abroad
necessary for the performance of authorized activities; and
(f) Such other intelligence activitiesas the President may direct from time to
time.
1.5 Director of Central Intelligence. In order to discharge the duties and
responsibilities prescribed by law, the Director of Central Intelligence shall be
responsible directly to the President and the NSC and shall:
(a) Act as the primary adviser to the President and the NSC on national
foreign intelligence and provide the President and other officials in the
Executive Branch with national foreign intelligence;
(b) Develop such objectives and guidance for the Intelligence Community as
will enhance capabilities for responding to expected future needs for national
foreign intelligence;
(c) Promote the development and maintenance of services of common concern
by designated intelligence organizations on behalf of the Intelligence Commu-
nity;
(d) Ensure implementation of special activities;
(e) Formulate policies concerning foreign intelligence and counterintelligence
arrangements with foreign governments, coordinate foreign intelligence and
counterintelligence relationships between agencies of the Intelligence Commu-
nity and the intelligence or internal security services of foreign governments,
and establish procedures governing the conduct of liaison by any department
or agency with such services on narcotics activities;
(f) Participate in the development of procedures approved by the Attorney
General governing criminal narcotics intelligence activities abroad to ensure
that these activities are consistent with foreign intelligence programs;
(g) Ensure the establishment by the Intelligence Community of common
security and access standards for managing and handling foreign intelligence
systems, information, and products;
(h) Ensure that programs are developed which protect intelligence sources,
methods, and analytical procedures;
(i) Establish uniform criteria for the determination of relative priorities for the
transmission of critical national foreign intelligence, and advise the Secretary
of Defense concerning the communications requirements of the Intelligence
Community for the transmission of such intelligence;
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59944 Federal Register / Vol. 46, No.. 235 / Tuesday, December 8, 1981 / Presidential Documents
(j) Establish appropriate staffs, committees, or other advisory groups to assist
in the execution of the Director's responsibilities;
(k) Have full responsibility for production and dissemination of national
foreign intelligence, and authority to levy analytic tasks on departmental
intelligence production organizations, in consultation with those organiza-
tions, ensuring that appropriate mechanisms for competitive analysis are
developed so that diverse points of view are considered fully and differences
of judgment within the Intelligence Community are brought to the attention of
national policymakers;
(1) Ensure the timely exploitation and dissemination of data gathered by
national foreign intelligence collection means, and ensure that the resulting
intelligence is disseminated immediately to appropriate government entities
and military commands;
(m) Establish mechanisms which translate national foreign intelligence objec-
tives and priorities approved by the NSC into specific guidance for the
Intelligence Community, resolve conflicts in tasking priority, provide to de-
partments and agencies having information collection capabilities that are not
part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program advisory tasking concerning
collection of national foreign intelligence, and provide for the development of
plans and arrangements for transfer of required collection tasking authority to
the Secretary of Defense when directed by the President;
(n) Develop, with the advice of the program managers and departments and
agencies concerned, the consolidated National Foreign Intelligence Program
budget, and present it to the President and the Congress;
(o) Review and approve all requests for reprogramming National Foreign
Intelligence Program funds, in accordance with guidelines established by the
Office of Management and Budget;
(p) Monitor National Foreign Intelligence Program implementation, and, as
necessary, conduct program and performance audits and evaluations;
(q) Together with the Secretary of Defense, ensure that there is no unneces-
sary overlap between national foreign intelligence programs and Department
of Defense intelligence programs consistent with the requirement to develop
competitive analysis, and provide to and obtain from the Secretary of Defense
all information necessary for this purpose;
(r) In accordance with law and relevant procedures approved by the Attorney ?
General under this Order, give the heads of the departments and agencies
access to all intelligence, developed by the CIA or the staff elements of the
Director of Central Intelligence, relevant to the national intelligence needs of
the departments and agencies; and
(s) Facilitate the use of national foreign intelligence products by Congress in a
secure manner.
1.6 Duties and Responsibilities of the Heads of Executive Branch Depart-
ments and Agencies.
(a)The heads of all Executive Branch departments and agencies shall, in
accordance with law and relevant procedures approved by the Attorney
General under this Order, give the Director of Central Intelligence access to all
information relevant to the national intelligence needs of the United States,
and shall give due consideration to the requests from the Director of Central
Intelligence for appropriate support for Intelligence Community activities.
(b) The heads of departments and agencies involved in the National Foreign
Intelligence Program shall ensure timely development and submission to the
Director of Central Intelligence by the program managers and heads of
component activities of proposed national programs and budgets in the format
designated by the Director of Central Intelligence, and shall also ensure that
the Director of Central Intelligence is provided, in a timely and responsive
manner, all information necessary to perform the Director's program and
budget responsibilities.
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59945
(c) The heads of departments and agencies involved in the National Foreign
Intelligence Program may appeal to the President decisions by the Director of
Central Intelligence on budget or reprogramming matters of the National
Foreign Intelligence Program.
1.7 Senior Officials of the Intelligence Community. The heads of depart-
ments and agencies with organizations in the Intelligence Community or the
heads of such organizations, as appropriate, shall:
(a) Report to the Attorney General possible violations of federal criminal laws
by employees and of specified federal criminal laws by any other person as
provided in procedures agreed upon by the Attorney General and the head of
the department or agency concerned, in a manner consistent with the protec-
tion of intelligence sources and methods, as specified in those procedures;
(b) In any case involving serious or continuing breaches of security, recom-
mend to the Attorney General that the case be referred to the FBI for further
investigation;
(c) Furnish the Director of Central Intelligence and the NSC, in accordance
with applicable law and procedures approved by the Attorney General under
this Order, the information required for the performance of their respective
duties;
(d) Report to the Intelligence Oversight Board, and keep the Director of
Central Intelligence appropriately informed, concerning any intelligence activ-
ities of their organizations that they have reason to believe may be unlawful
or contrary to Executive order or Presidential directive;
(e) Protect intelligence and intelligence sources and methods from unauthor-
ized disclosure consistent with guidance from the Director of Central Intelli-
gence;
(f) Disseminate intelligence to cooperating foreign governments under arrange-
ments established or agreed to by the Director of Central Intelligence;
(g) Participate in the development of procedures approved by the Attorney
General governing production and dissemination of intelligence resulting from
criminal narcotics intelligence activities abroad if their departments, agencies,
or organizations have intelligence responsibilities for foreign or domestic
narcotics production and trafficking;
(h) Instruct their employees to cooperate fully with the Intelligence Oversight
Board; and
(i) Ensure that the Inspectors General and General Counsels for their organiza-
tions have access to any information necessary to perform their duties
assigned by this Order.
1.8 The Central Intelligence Agency. All duties and responsibilities of the
CIA shall be related to the intelligence functions set-out below. As authorized
by this Order; the National Security Act of 1947, as amended; the CIA Act of
1949, as amended; appropriate directives or other applicable law, the CIA
shall:
(a) Collect, produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelli-
gence, including information not otherwise obtainable. The collection of for-
eign intelligence or counterintelligence within the United States shall be
coordinated with the FBI as required by procedures agreed upon by the
Director of Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
(b) Collect, produce and disseminate intelligence on foreign aspects of narcot-
ics production and trafficking;
(c) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States and, with-
out assuming or performing any internal security functions, conduct counterin-
telligence activities within the United States in coordination with the FBI as
required by procedures agreed upon the Director of Central Intelligence and
the Attorney General;
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59946 Federal Register / Vol. 48, No. 235 / Tuesday, December 8, 1981 / Presidential Documents
(d) Coordinate counterintelligence activities and the collection of information
not otherwise obtainable when conducted outside the United States by other
departments and agencies;
(e) Conduct special activities approved by the President. No agency except the
CIA (or the Armed Forces of the United States in time of war declared by
Congress or during any period covered by a report from the President to the
Congress under the War Powers Resolution (87 Stat. 855)) may conduct any
special activity unless the President determines that another agency is more
likely to achieve a particular objective;
(f) Conduct services of common concern for the Intelligence Community as
directed by the NSC;
(g) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of
technical systems and devices relating to authorized functions;
(h) Protect the security of its installations, activities, information, property,
and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of appli-
cants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associations
with the CIA as are necessary; and
(i) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and
outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described
in sections (a) and through (h) above, including procurement and essential
cover and proprietary arrangements.
1.9 The Department of State. The Secretary of State shall:
(a) Overtly collect information relevant to United States foreign policy con-
cerns;
(b) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States
foreign poliCY as required for the execution of the Secretary's responsibilities;
(c) Disseminate, as appropriate, reports received from United States diplomat-
ic and consular posts;
(d) Transmit reporting requirements of the Intelligence Community to the
Chiefs of United States Missions abroad; and
(e) Support Chiefs of Missions in discharging their statutory responsibilities
for direction and coordination of mission activities.
1.10 The Department of the Treasury. The Secretary of the Treasury shall:
(a) Overtly collect foreign financial and monetary information;
(b) Participate with the Department of State in the overt collection of general
foreign economic information;
(c) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence relating to United States
economic policy as required for the execution of the Secretary's responsibil-
ities; and
(d) Conduct, through the United States Secret Service, activities to determine
the existence and capability of surveillance equipment being used against the
President of the United States, the Executive Office of the President, and, as
authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury or the President, other Secret
Service protectees and United States officials. No information shall be ac-
quired intentionally through such activities except to protect against such
surveillance, and those activities shall be conducted pursuant to procedures
agreed upon by the Secretary of the Treasury and the Attorney General.
1.11 The Department of Defense. The Secretary of Defense shall:
(a) Collect national foreign intelligence and be responsive to collection tasking
by the Director of Central Intelligence;
(b) Collect, produce and disseminate military and military-related foreign
intelligence and counterintelligence. as required for execution of the Secre-
tary's responsibilities;
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59947
(c) Conduct programs and missions necessary to fulfill national, departmental
and tactical foreign intelligence requirements;
(d) Conduct counterintelligence activities in support of Department of Defense
components outside the United States in coordination with the CIA, and
within the United States in coordination with the FBI pursuant to procedures
agreed upon by the Secretary of Defense and the Attorney General;
(e) Conduct, as the executive agent of the United States Government, signals
intelligence- and communications security activities, except as otherwise di-
rected by the NSC;
(f) Provide for the timely transmission of critical intelligence, as defined by the
Director of Central Intelligence, within the United States Government;
(g) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of
technical systems and devices relating to authorized intelligence functions;
(h) ProteCt the security of Department of Defense installations, activities,
property, information, and employees by appropriate means, including such
investigations of applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with
similar associations with the Department of Defense as are necessary;
(i) Establish and maintain military intelligence relationships and military
intelligence exchange programs with selected cooperative foreign defense
establishments and international organizations, and ensure that such relation-
ships and programs are in accordance with policies formulated by the Director
of Central Intelligence;
(j) Direct, operate, control and provide fiscal management for the National
Security Agency and for defense and military intelligence and national recon-
naissance entities; and
(k) Conduct such administrative and technical support activities within and
outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions described
in sections (a) through (j) above.
1.12 Intelligence Components Utilized by the Secretary of Defense. In carry-
ing out the responsibilities assigned in section 1.11, the Secretary of Defense is
authorized to utilize the following:
(a) Defense Intelligence Agency, whose responsibilities shall include;
(1) Collection, production, or, through tasking and coordination, provision of
military and military-related intelligence for the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, other Defense componen6, and, as appropriate, non-Defense
agencies;
(2) Collection and provision of military intelligence for national foreign intelli-
gence and counterintelligence products;
(3) Coordination of all Department of Defense intelligence collection require-
ments;
(4) Management of the Defense Attache system; and
(5) Provision of foreign intelligence and counterintelligence staff support as
directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
(b) National Security Agency, whose responsibilities shall include:
(1) Establishment and operation of an effective unified organization for signals
intelligence activities, except for the delegation of operational control over
certain operations that are conducted through other elements of the Intelli-
gence Community. No other department or agency may engage in signals
intelligence activities except pursuant to a delegation by the Secretary of
Defense;
(2) Control of signals intelligence collection and processing activities, includ-
ing assignment of resources to an appropriate agent for such periods and tasks
as required for the direct support of military commanders;
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59948 Federal Register / Vol. 46, No. 235 / Tuesday, December 8, 1981 / Presidential Documents
(3) Collection of signals intelligence information for national foreign intelli-
gence purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central
Intelligence;
(4) Processing of signals intelligence data for national foreign intelligence
purposes in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelli-
gence;
(5) Dissemination of signals intelligence information for national foreign intel-
ligence purposes to authorized elements of the Government, including the
military services, in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central
Intelligence;
(6) Collection, processing and dissemination of signals intelligence information
for counterintelligence purposes;
(7) Provision of signals intelligence support for the conduct of military oper-
ations in accordance with tasking, priorities, and standards of timeliness
assigned by the Secretary of Defense. If provision of such support requires use
of national collection systems, these systems will be tasked within existing
guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence;
(8) Executing the responsibilities of the Secretary of Defense as executive
agent for the communications security of the United States Government;
(9) Conduct of research and development to meet the needs of the United
States for signals intelligence and communications security;
(10) Protection of the security of its installations, activities, property, informa-
tion, and employees by appropriate means, including such investigations of
applicants, employees, contractors, and other persons with similar associ-
ations with the NSA as are necessary;
(11) Prescribing, within its field of authorized operations, security regulations
covering operating practices, including the transmission, handling and distri-
bution of signals intelligence and communications security material within
and among the elements under control of the Director of the NSA, and
exercising the necessary supervisory control to ensure compliance with the
regulations;
(12) Conduct of foreign cryptologic liaison relationships, with liaison for
intelligence purposes conducted in accordance with policies formulated by the
Director of Central Intelligence; and
(13) Conduct of such administrative and technical support activities within
and outside the United States as are necessary to perform the functions
described in sections (1) through (12) above, including procurement.
(c) Offices for the collection of specialized intelligence through reconnais-
sance programs, whose responsibilities shall include:
(1) Carrying out consolidated reconnaissance programs for specialized intelli-
gence;
(2) Responding to tasking in accordance with procedures established by the
Director of Central Intelligence; and
(3) Delegating authority to the various departments and agencies for research,
development, procurement, and operation of designated means of collection.
(d) The foreign intelligence and counterintelligence elements of the Army,
Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps, whose responsibilities shall include:
(1) Collection, production and dissemination of military and military-related
foreign intelligence and counterintelligence, and information on the foreign
aspects of narcotics production and trafficking. When collection is conducted
in response to national foreign intelligence requireynents, it will be conducted
in accordance with guidance from the Director of Central Intelligence. Collec-
tion of national foreign intelligence, not otherwise obtainable, outside the
United States shall be coordinated with the CIA, and such collection within
the United States shall be coordinated with the FBI;
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59949
(2) Conduct of counterintelligence activities outside the United States in
coordination with the CIA, and within the United States in coordination with
the FBI; and
(3) Monitoring of the development, procurement and management of tactical
intelligence systems and equipment and conducting related research, develop-
ment, and test and evaluation activities.
(e) Other offices within the Department of Defense appropriate for conduct of
the intelligence missions and responsibilities assigned to the Secretary of
Defense. If such other offices are used for intelligence purposes, the provisions
of Part 2 of this Order shall apply to those offices when used for those
purposes.
1.13 The Department of Energy. The Secretary of Energy shall:
(a) Participate with the Department of State in overtly collecting information
with respect to foreign energy matters;
(b) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence necessary for the Secretary's
responsibilities;
(c) Participate in formulating intelligence collection and analysis requirements
where the special expert capability of the Department can contribute; and
(d) Provide expert technical, analytical and research capability to other agen-
cies within the Intelligence Community.
1.14 The Federal Bureau of Investigation. Under the supervision of the
Attorney General and pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney General
may establish, the Director of the FBI shall:
(a) Within the United States conduct counterintelligence and coordinate coun-
terintelligence activities of other agencies within the Intelligence Community.
When a counterintelligence activity of the FBI involves military or civilian
personnel of the Department of Defense, the FBI shall coordinate with the
Department of Defense;
(b) Conduct counterintelligence activities outside the United States in coordi-
nation with the CIA as required by procedures agreed upon by the Director of
Central Intelligence and the Attorney General;
(c) Conduct within the United States, when requested by officials of the
Intelligence Community designated by the President, activities undertaken to
collect foreign intelligence or support foreign intelligence collection require-
ments of other agencies within the Intelligence Community, or, when request-
ed by the Director of the National Security Agency, to support the communica-
tions security activities of the United States Government;
(d) Produce and disseminate foreign intelligence and counterintelligence; and
(e) Carry out or contract for research, development and procurement of
technical systems and devices relating to the functions authorized above.
Part 2
Conduct of Intelligence Activities
2.1 Need Accurate and timely information about the capabilities, intentions
and activities of foreign powers, organizations, or persons and their agents is
essential to informed decisionmaking in the areas of national defense and
foreign relations. Collection of such information is a priority objective and will
be pursued in a vigorous, innovative and responsible manner that is consistent
with the Constitution and applicable law and respectful of the principles upon
which the United States was founded.
2.2 Purpose. This Order is intended to enhance human and technical collec-
tion techniques, especially those undertaken abroad, and the acquisition of
significant foreign intelligence, as well as the detection and countering of
international terrorist activities and espionage conducted by foreign powers.
Set forth below are certain general principles that, in addition to and consist-
ent with applicable laws, are intended to achieve the proper balance between
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59950 Federal Register / Vol. 46. No. 235 / Tuesday. December 8. 1981 / Presidential Documents
the acquisition of essential information and protection of individual interests.
Nothing in this Order shall be construed to apply to or interfere with any
authorized civil or criminal law enforcement responsibility of any department
or agency.
2.3 Collection of Information. Agencies within the Intelligence Community
are authorized to collect, retain or disseminate information concerning United
States persons only in accordance with procedures established by the head of
the agency concerned and approved by the Attorney General, consistent with
the authorities provided by Part 1 of this Order. Those procedures shall permit
collection, retention and dissemination of the following types of information:
(a) Information that is publicly available or collected with the consent of the
person concerned;
(b) Information constituting foreign intelligence or counterintelligence, includ-
ing such information concerning corporations or other commercial organiza-
tions. Collection within the United States of foreign intelligence not otherwise
obtainable shall be undertaken by the FBI or, when significant foreign intelli-
gence is sought. by other authorized agencies of the Intelligence Community,
provided that no foreign intelligence collection by such agencies may be
undertaken for the purpose of acquiring information concerning the domestic
activities of United States persons;
(c) Information obtained in the course of a lawful foreign intelligence, counter-
intelligence, international narcotics or international terrorism investigation;
(d) Information needed to protect the safety of any persons or organizations,
including those who are targets, victims or hostages of international terrorist
organizations;
(e) Information needed to protect foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
sources or methods from unauthorized disclosure. Collection within the United
States shall be undertaken by the FBI except that other agencies of the
Intelligence Community may also collect such information concerning present
or former employees, present or former intelligence agency contractors or their
present or former employees, or applicants for any such employment or
contracting;
(f) Information concerning persons who are reasonably believed to be poten-
tial sources or contacts for the purpose of determining their suitability or
credibility:
(g) Information arising out of a lawful personnel, physical or communications
security investigation;
(h) Information acquired by overhead reconnaissance not directed at specific
United States persons:
(i) Incidentally obtained information that may indicate involvement in activi-
ties that may violate federal, state, local or foreign laws; and
(j) Information necessary for administrative purposes.
In addition, agencies within the Intelligence Community may disseminate
information, other than information derived from signals intelligence, to each
appropriate agency within the Intelligence Community for purposes of allow-
ing the recipient agency to determine whether the information is relevant to its
responsibilities and can be retained by it.
2.4 Collection Techniques. Agencies within the Intelligence Community shall
use the least intrusive collection techniques feasible within the United States
or directed against United States persons abroad. Agencies are not authorized
to use such techniques as electronic surveillance, unconsented physical
search, mail surveillance, physical surveillance, or monitoring devices unless
they are in accordance with procedures established by the head of the agency
concerned and approved by the Attorney General. Such procedures shall
protect constitutional and other legal rights and limit use of such information
to lawful governmental purposes. These procedures shall not authorize:
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59951
(a) The CIA to engage in electronic surveillance within the United States
except for the purpose of training, testing, or conducting countermeasures to
hostile electronic surveillance;
(b) Unconsented physical searches in the United States by agencies other than
the FBI, except for.
(1) Searches by counterintelligence elements of the military services directed
against military personnel within the United States or abroad for intelligence
purposes, when authorized by a military commander empowered to approve
physical searches for law e,nforcement purposes, based upon a finding of
probable cause to believe that such persons are acting as agents of foreign
powers; arid
(2) Searches by CIA of personal property of non-United States persons
lawfully in its possession.
(c) Physical surveillance of a United States person in the United States by
agencies other than the FBI, except for:
(1) Physical surveillance of present or former employees, present or former
intelligence agency contractors or their present of former employees, or
applicants for any such employment or contracting; and
(2) Physical surveillance of a military person employed by a nonintelligence
element of a military service.
(d) Physical surveillance of a United States person abroad to collect foreign
intelligence, except to obtain significant information that cannot reasonably
be acquired by other means.
2.5 Attorney General Approval. The Attorney General hereby is delegated
the power to approve the use for intelligence purposes, within the United
States or against a United States person abroad, of any technique for which a
warrant would be required if undertaken for law enforcement purposes,
provided that such techniques shall not be undertaken unless the Attorney
General has determined in each case that there is probable cause to believe
that the technique is directed against a foreign power or an agent of a foreign
power. Electronic surveillance, as defined in the Foreign Intelligence Surveil-
lance Act of 1978, shall be conducted in accordance with that Act, as well as
this Order.
2,6 Assistance to Law Enforcement Authorities. Agencies within the Intelli-
gence Community are authorized to:
(a) Cooperate with appropriate law enforcement agencies for the purpose of
protecting the employees, information, property and facilities of any agency
within the Intelligence Community;
(b) Unless otherwise precluded by law or this Order, participate in law
enforcement activities to investigate or prevent clandestine intelligence activi-
ties by foreign powers, or international terrorist or narcotics activities;
(c) Provide specialized equipment, technical knowledge, or assistance of
expert personnel for use by any department or agency, or. when lives are
endangered, to support local law enforcement agencies. Provision of assist-
ance by expert personnel shall be approved in each case by the General
Counsel of the providing agency; and
(d) Render any other assistance and cooperation to law enforcement authori-
ties not precluded by applicable law.
2.7 Contracting. Agencies within the Intelligence Community are authorized
to enter into contracts or. arrangements for the provision of goods or services
with private companies or institutions in the United States and need not
reveal the sponsorship of such contracts or arrangements for authorized
intelligence purposes. Contracts or arrangements with academic institutions
may be undertaken only with the consent of appropriate officials of the
institution.
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59952 Federal Register / Vol. 46, No. 235 / Tuesday. December 8, 1981 / Presidential Documents
2.8 Consistency With Other Laws. Nothing in this Order shall be construed
to authorize any activity in violation of the Constitution or statutes of the
United States.
2.9 Undisclosed Participation in Organizations Within the United States. No
one acting on behalf of agencies within the Intelligence Community may join
or otherwise participate in any organization in the United States on behalf of
any agency within the Intelligence Community without disclosing his intelli-
gence affiliation to appropriate officials of the organization, except in accord-
ance with procedures established by the head of the agency concerned and
approved by the Attorney General, Such participation shall be authorized only
if it is essential to achieving lawful purposes as determined by the agency
head or designee. No such participation may be undertaken for the purpose of
influencing the activity of the organization or its members except in cases
where:
(a) The participation is undertaken on behalf of the FBI in the course of a
lawful investigation; or
(b) The organization concerned is composed primarily of individuals who are
not United States persons and is reasonably believed to be acting on behalf of
a foreign power.
2.10 Human Experimentation. No agency within the Intelligence Community
shall sponsor, contract for or conduct research on human subjects except in
accordance with guidelines issued by the Department of Health and Human
Services. The subject's informed consent shall be documented as required by
those guidelines.
2.11 Prohibition on Assassination. No person employed by or acting on
behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage
in, assassination.
2.12 Indirect Participation. No agency of- the Intelligence Community shall
participate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this
Order.
Part 3
General Provisions
3.1 Congressional Oversight. The duties and responsibilities of the Director
of Central Intelligence and the heads of other departments, agencies, and
entities engaged in intelligence activities to cooperate with the Congress in the
conduct of its responsibilities for oversight of intelligence activities shall be as
provided in title 50, United States Code, section 413. The requirements of
section 662 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (22 U.S.C. 2422),
and section 501 of the National Security Act of 1947, as amended (50 U.S.C.
413), shall apply to all special activities as defined in this Order.
3.2 Implementation. The NSC, the Setretary of Defense, the Attorney Gener-
al, and the Director ?of Central Intelligence shall issue such appropriate
directives and procedures as are necessary to implement this Order. Heads of
agencies within the Intelligence Community shall issue appropriate supple-
mentary directives and procedures consistent with this Order. The Attorney
General shall provide a statement of reasons for not approving any proce-
dures established by the head of an agency in the Intelligence Community
other than the FBI. The National Security Council may establish procedures in
instances where the agency head and the Attorney General are unable to
reach agreement on other than constitutional or other legal grounds.
3.3 Procedures. Until the procedures required by this Order have been
established, the activities herein authorized which require procedures shall be
conducted in accordance with existing procedures or requirements established
under Executive Order No. 12036. Procedures required by this Order shall be
established as expeditiously as possible. All procedures promulgated pursuant
to this Order shall be made available to the congressional intelligence commit-
tees.
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59953
3.4 Definitions. For the purposes of this Order, the following terms shall have
these meanings:
(a) Counterintelligence means information gathered and activities conducted
to protect against espionage, other intelligence activities, sabotage, or assassi-
nations conducted for or on behalf of foreign powers, organizations or per-
sons, or international terrorist activities, but not including personnel, physical,
document or communications security programs.
(b) Electronic surveillance means acquisition of a nonpublic communication
by electronic means without the consent of a person who is a party to an
electronic communication or, in the case of a nonelectronic communication,
without the consent of a person who is visably present at the place of
communication, but not including the use of radio direction-finding equipment
solely to determine the location of a transmitter.
(c) Employee means a person employed by, assigned to or acting for an
agency within the Intelligence Community.
(d) Foreign intelligence means information relating to the capabilities, inten-
tions and activities of foreign powers, organizations or persons, but not
including counterintelligence except for information on international terrorist
activities.
(e) Intelligence activities means all activities that agencies within the Intelli-
gence Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to this Order.
(f) Intelligence Community and agencies within the Intelligence Community
refer to the following agencies or organizations:
(1) The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA);
(2) The National Security Agency (NSA);
(3) The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA);
(4) The offices within the Department of Defense for the collection of special-
ized national foreign intelligence through reconnaissance programs;
(5) The Bureau of Intelligence- and Research of the Department of State;
(6) The intelligence elements of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps,
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Department of the Treasury, and
the Department of Energy; and
(7) The staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence.
(g) The National Foreign Intelligence Program includes the programs listed
below, but its composition shall be subject to review by the National Security
Council and modification by the President:
(1) The programs of the CIA;
(2) The Consolidated Cryptologic Program, the General Defense Intelligence
Program. and the programs of the offices within the Department of Defense for
the collection of specialized national foreign intelligence through reconnais-
sance, except such elements as the Director of Central Intelligence and the
Secretary of Defense agree should be excluded;
(3) Other programs of agencies within the Intelligence CommUnity designated
jointly by the Director of Central Intelligence and the head of the department
or by the President as national foreign intelligence or counterintelligence
activities;
(4) Activities of the staff elements of the Director of Central Intelligence;
(5) Activities to acquire the intelligence required for the planning and conduct
of tactical operations by the United States military forces are not included in
the National Foreign Intelligence Program.
(h) Special activities means activities conducted in support of national foreign
policy objectives abroad which are planned and executed so that the role of
the United States Government is not apparent or acknowledged publicly, and
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59954 Federal Register / Vol. 46, No. 235 / Tuesday, December 8, 1981 / Presidential Documents
[FR 81-35203
Filed 12-4-81; 4:09 pm)
Billing code 3195-01-M
functions in support of such activities, but which are not intended to influence
United States political processes, public opinion, policies, or media and do not
include diplomatic activities or the collection and production of intelligence or
related support functions.
(i) United States person means a United States citizen, an alien known by the
intelligence agency concerned to be a permanent resident alien, an unincor-
porated association substantially composed of United States citizens or per-
manent resident aliens, or a corporation incorporated in the United States,
except for a corporation directed and controlled by a foreign government or
governments.
3.5 Purpose and Effect. This Order is intended to control and provide
direction and guidance to the Intelligence Community. Nothing contained
herein or in any procedures promulgated hereunder is intended to confer any
substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization.
3.6 Revocation. Executive Order No. 12036 of January 24, 1978, as amended,
entitled "United States Intelligence Activities," is revoked.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
December 4, 1981.
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Presidential Documents
Executive Order 12334 of December 4, 1981
President's Intelligence Oversight Board
By the authority vested in my as President by the Constitution and statutes of
the United States of America, and in order to enhance the security of the
United States by assuring the legality of activities of the Intelligence Commu-
nity, it is hereby ordered as follows:
Section 1: There is hereby established within the White House Office, Execu-
tive Office of the President, the President's Intelligence Oversight Board,
which shall be composed of three members. One member, appointed from
among the membership of the President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board,
shall be designated by the President as Chairman. Members of the Board shall
serve at the pleasure of the President and shall be appointed by the President
from among trustworthy and distinguished citizens outside the Government
who are qualified on the basis of achievement, experience and independence.
The Board shall utilize such full-time staff and consultants as authorized by
the President.
Sec. 2. The Board shall:
(a) Inform the President of intelligence activities that any member of the Board
believes are in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States,
Executive orders, or Presidential directives;
(b) Forward to the Attorney General reports received concerning intelligence
activities that the Board believes may be unlawful;
(c) Review the internal guidelines of each agency within the Intelligence
Community concerning the lawfulness of intelligence activities;
(d) Review the practices and procedures of the Inspectors General and
General Counsel of the Intelligence Community for discovering and reporting
intelligence activities .that may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or
Presidential directive; and
(e) Conduct such investigations as the Board deems necessary to carry out its
functions under this Order.
Sec. 3. The Board shall, when required by this Order, report directly to the
President. The Board shall consider and take appropriate action with respect
to matters identified by the Director of Central Intelligence, the Central
Intelligence Agency or other agencies of the Intelligence Community. With
respect to matters deemed appropriate by the President, the Board shall
advise and make appropriate recommendations to the Director of Central
Intelligence, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other agencies of the Intelli-
gence Community.
Sec. 4. The heads of departments and agencies of the Intelligence Community
shall, to the extent permitted by law, provide the Board with all information
necessary to carry out its responsibilities. Inspectors General and General
Counsel of the Intelligence Community shall, to the extent permitted by law,
report to the Board concerning intelligence activities that they have reason to
believe may be unlawful or contrary to Executive order or Presidential
directive.
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59956 Federal Registes / Vol. 46, No 235 1 Tuesday, December 8, 19,31 / Presidential Doctunents
Sec. 5. Information made available to the Board shall be given all necessary
security protection in accordance with applicable laws and regulations. Each
member of the Board, each member of the Board's staff, and each of the
Board's consultants shall execute an agreement never to reveal any classified
information obtained by virtue of his or her service with the Board except to
the President or to such persons as the President may designate.
Sec. 6. Members of the Board shall serve without compensation, but may
receive transportation, expense, and per diem allowances as authorized by
law. Staff and consultants to the Board shall receive pay and allowances as
authorized by the President.
THE WHITE HOUSE,
December 4, 1981.
IFR Doc. 81-35204
Filed 12-4-81: 4:10 poll
Rifling code 3195-01-M
crv-b-szck (29.-e-to
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latft
ADDENDUM TO PROCEDURES GOVERNING
REPORT
C 0 HE NA EL T MM
EN N ?VR A IN
TTEE
1. In accordance with Paragraph 10 of the Procedures
Governing Reporting to the SSCI on Covert Action, executed on
June 6, 1984, the SSCI and the DCI have jointly reviewed the
Procedures in order to assess their effectiveness and their
impact on the ability of the Committee and the DCI to fulfill
their respective responsibilities under section 501 of the
National Security Act of 1947.
2. The Committee and the DCI agree that the Procedures
have worked well and that they have aided the Committee and
the DCI In the fulfillment of their respective responsibilities
The Committee and the DCI also agree to add the following
Procedures set forth below:
11M. OPP
In accordance with the covert action approval
and coordination mechanisms set forth in NSDD 159,
the "advisory" format will be used to convey to
to the SSCI the substance of Presidential
Findings, scope papers, and memoranda of notifi-
cation.
Advisories will specifically take note of any
instance in which substantial nonroutine support
for a covert action operation is to be provided
by an agency or element of the U.S. Government
other than the agency tasked with carrying out
the operation, or by a foreign government or
element thereof. It is further agreed that
advisories will describe the nature and scope
of such support.
In any case in which the limited prior notice
provisions of section 501(8)(1)(B) of the
National Security Act are invoked, the advisory
or oral notification will affirm that the
President has determined that it is essential
to limit prior notice. It is further agreed
that in any section 501(8)(1)(B) situation,
substantive notification will be provided to
the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the SSCI at
the earliest practicable moment, and that the
Chairman and Vice Chairman will assist to the
best of their abilities in facilitating secure
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notification of the Majority and Minority leaders
of the Senate if they have not already been notified.
It is understood that responsibility for accomplish-
,ment of the required notification rests with the
Executive Branch.
It is understood that paragraph 6 of the Procedures,
which requires that the SSCI shall be kept fully and
currently informed of each covert action operation,
shall include significant developments in or related
to covert action operations.
The DCI will make every reasonable effort to inform
the Committee of Presidential Findings and signifi-
cant covert action activities and developments as
soon as practicable.
3. In accordance with paragraph 4 of the Procedures, the
DCI recognizes that significant implementing activities in
military or paramilitary covert action operations are matters
of special interest and concern to the Committee. It is agreed,
therefore, that notification of the Committee prior to implement-
ation will be accomplished in the following situations, even if
there is no requirement for separate higher authority or
Presidential approval or notification:
10,01?
11?1,1?1?
Significant military equipment actually is to be
supplied for the first time in an ongoing operation,
or there is a significant change in the quantity
or quality of equipment provided;
Equipment of identifiable U.S. Government origin
Is initially made available in addition to or in
lieu of nonattributable equipment;
There is any significant change involving the
participation of U.S. military or civilian staff,
or contractor or agent personnel, in military or
paramilitary activities.
4. The DCI understands that when a covert action operation
includes the provision of material assistance or training to a
foreign government, element, or entity that simultaneously is
receiving the same kind of U.S. material assistance or training
overtly, the DCI will explain the rationale for the covert
component.
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5. The DCI understands that the Committee wishes to be
informed if the President ever decides to waive, change, or
rescind any Executive Order provision applicable to the conduct
of covert action operations.
6. The Committee and the DCI recognize that the under-
standings and undertakings set forth in this document are
subject to the possible exceptional circumstances contemplated
In section 501 of the National Security Act.
7. The Procedures Governing Reporting to the SSC1 on
covert action, as modified by this agreement, will remain in
force until modified by mutual agreement.
airman, Cl
\jJune 10, 1986
Date
iV ce Chairman,?tSC1
June 5, 1986
bate
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TAB D
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STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES
NOMINEE TO BE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
17 FEBRUARY 1987
MR. CHAIRMAN; MEMBERS OF THE COMMITTEE:
THANK YOU FOR YOUR WORDS OF WELCOME AND THANK YOU SENATOR
WARNER FOR INTRODUCING ME. I AM DEEPLY HONORED TO HAVE BEEN
NOMINATED BY THE PRESIDENT TO THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR OF -
CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.
AT THE SAME TIME, I AM PROFOUNDLY SADDENED BY THE
CIRCUMSTANCES WHICH BRING ME HERE -- THE ILLNESS OF DIRECTOR
CASEY. I CANNOT LET THIS OCCASION PASS WITHOUT NOTING THE
GREAT DEBT OF GRATITUDE OWED BY THIS COUNTRY AND ITS
INTELLIGENCE SERVICES TO WILLIAM J. CASEY FOR HIS SUCCESSFUL
RESTORATION OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE. WITH THE SUPPORT OF THE
PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS, HE OBTAINED DESPERATELY NEEDED
RESOURCES TO RESTORE AND EXPAND OUR COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS
CAPABILITIES; HE FOSTERED AN UNPRECEDENTED DEGREE OF HARMONY
AND COOPERATION AMONG AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE ORGANIZATIONS; HE
MADE OUR ASSESSMENTS MORE REALISTIC AND HONEST IN PRESENTING
DIFFERING VIEWS; HE RESTORED OUR MORALE, OUR SENSE OF PURPOSE
AND MISSION; HE HELPED MAKE US MORE RELEVANT AND USEFUL TO
POLICYMAKERS AND THE CONGRESS; HE BROUGHT OUR SERVICES NEW
1
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RESPECT AND COOPERATION OVERSEAS; AND HE FASHIONED AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE ONCE AGAIN INTO AN INSTRUMENT FOR USE AGAINST OUR
ADVERSARIES -- WHETHER THEY BE DRUG DEALERS, THOSE WHO WOULD
STEAL OUR TECHNOLOGY, OR COMMUNIST GOVERNMENTS AT WAR WITH
THEIR OWN PEOPLE, FROM THE OSS AND RUNNING AGENTS IN
NAZI-OCCUPIED FRANCE TO THE WORLD OF COLLECTION SATELLITES IN
SPACE AND LASER WEAPONS, BILL CASEY HAS SERVED HIS COUNTRY LONG
AND WITH DISTINCTION. HE IS ONE OF THE LAST OF THAT GENERATION
OF GREAT AMERICANS WHO EMERGED FROM WORLD WAR II DETERMINED
THAT THE UNITED STATES PLAY A CRITICAL ROLE IN PRESERVING AND
EXTENDING THE FREEDOM THEY HAD DEFENDED AT SUCH GREAT COST --
AND HE HAS WORKED FOR OVER 40 YEARS TO FULFILL THAT OBJECTIVE.
MR. CHAIRMAN, IN THIS OPENING STATEMENT, I WOULD LIKE TO
ADDRESS BRIEFLY THREE SUBJECTS THAT I BELIEVE ARE OF INTEREST
TO THE COMMITTEE: MY INDEPENDENCE AND ACCESS, MY AGENDA FOR
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY, AND MY VIEW OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT, I AM THE FIRST CAREER OFFICER TO BE NOMINATED FOR
THE POSITION OF DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE IN NEARLY 15
YEARS AND ONLY THE THIRD SINCE THE POSITION WAS ESTABLISHED
FORTY YEARS AGO.
THE PRESIDENT'S INSTRUCTIONS WHEN HE OFFERED THE POSITION
TO ME WERE CLEAR AND DIRECT. HE TOLD ME THAT HE WANTS HIS
INTELLIGENCE UNVARNISHED -- THE GOOD AND THE BAD: IT MUST BE
PROFESSIONAL AND OBJECTIVE. HE ALSO SAID THAT HE EXPECTED ME
TO COME TO HIM DIRECTLY WITH INTELLIGENCE OR CONCERNS WHENEVER
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I THINK IT APPROPRIATE. I GAVE HIM MY ASSURANCES ON BOTH
COUNTS,
I CAN ASSURE YOU THAT I WILL HESITATE NEITHER TO PRESENT
UNWELCOME NEWS NOR SAY WHAT I THINK TO POLICYMAKERS OR TO
CONGRESS. NOR WILL I HESITATE TO MAKE WHATEVER PERSONNEL OR
ORGANIZATIONAL CHANGES ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE BOTH HIGH QUALITY
INTELLIGENCE AND ADHERENCE TO THE RULES.
WITH ALL THAT MR. CASEY ACCOMPLISHED OVER THE PAST SIX
YEARS, HE WOULD BE THE FIRST TO ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THERE REMAINS
A SIGNIFICANT UNFINISHED AGENDA FOR U.S. INTELLIGENCE. WE
CANNOT AFFORD TO STAND STILL OR BE CONTENT WITH CARETAKING.
THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE STRATEGY POINTS THE WAY TO
THE FUTURE BUT LET ME QUICKLY REVIEW WHAT I CONSIDER OUR AGENDA
FOR THE NEXT TWO YEARS AND BEYOND.
THE DEMANDS UPON US FOR COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS, ON A
DRAMATICALLY EXPANDING RANGE OF SUBJECTS HAS THE
POTENTIAL -- AND SOME WOULD SAY ALREADY HAS BEGUN -- TO
WEAKEN OUR EFFECTIVENESS IN HIGH-PRIORITY AREAS. WE
MUST BEGIN WORKING WITH POLICYMAKERS TO IDENTIFY THOSE
PROBLEMS WHERE INTELLIGENCE CAN MAKE A UNIQUE
CONTRIBUTION AND FOCUS ON THEM. WITH FINITE RESOURCES
WE CANNOT TRY OR PRETEND TO TRY TO COLLECT AND ANALYZE
INFORMATION ON EVERY CONCEIVABLE SUBJECT OF INTEREST TO
EVERY AGENCY OR OFFICIAL OF THE UNITED STATES
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GOVERNMENT; WE MUST PRIORITIZE BETTER, THIS IS
PARTICULARLY TRUE AS OUR WORK ON MORE TRADITIONAL HIGH
PRIORITY AREAS SUCH AS SOVIET WEAPONS PROGRAMS IS
BECOMING INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT AND MORE RESOURCE
INTENSIVE,
ANOTHER IMPORTANT PROBLEM FOR US TO DEAL WITH IS THE
AVALANCHE OF INFORMATION, BOTH THAT ACQUIRED THROUGH
TRADITIONAL INTELLIGENCE MEANS AND THAT WHICH IS OPENLY
AVAILABLE. IN SOME PARTS OF OUR COMMUNITY WE MEASURE
COMPUTERS BY THE ACRE AND STILL OUR ABILITY TO EXPLOIT
INFORMATION IS INCREASINGLY HARD-PRESSED. THE ANSWER
IS NOT LESS INFORMATION, BUT BETTER PROCESSING AND
EXPLOITATION. I AM CONVINCED THAT THERE IS ROOM FOR
OPEN COOPERATION IN THIS AREA BETWEEN AMERICAN
INTELLIGENCE AND AMERICAN BUSINESS AND UNIVERSITIES
THAT ALSO ARE TRYING TO COPE WITH THIS PROBLEM, BUT WE
MUST ALLOCATE THE RESOURCES NECESSARY TO ENSURE
EFFECTIVE EXPLOITATION OF WHAT WE COLLECT.
WE MUST BUILD UPON THE CLOSER COOPERATION FOSTERED BY
MR. CASEY AMONG THE DIFFERENT ELEMENTS OF THE
COMMUNITY. AS WE CONFRONT A GROWING NUMBER OF PROBLEMS
WE SHOULD EXPLORE THE POSSIBILITY OF SOME DIVISIONS OF
LABOR WHILE PRESERVING NECESSARY COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS
ON CRITICAL SUBJECTS. FOR EXAMPLE, THE DEFENSE
INTELLIGENCE AGENCY HAS BEEN GIVEN THE RESPONSIBILITY
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110 =ID
ON BEHALF OF THE ENTIRE COMMUNITY FOR MAINTAINING DATA
BASES ON MILITARY FORCES IN THE THIRD WORLD.- I BELIEVE
THERE ARE OTHER SUCH AREAS WHERE WE CAN COMBINE BOTH
COMPETITION AND COOPERATION.
WE MUST FOSTER MORE ANALYTICAL COMPETITION, BOTH WITHIN
THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND OUTSIDE. OUR
INFORMATION IS OFTEN FRAGMENTARY OR AMBIGUOUS.
SIGNIFICANT INTELLIGENCE FAILURES IN THE PAST HAVE COME
WHEN WE OFFERED WITH FALSE CERTAINTY ASSESSMENTS THAT
PRESENTED EITHER AN ARTIFICIAL CONSENSUS OR FORECAST
ONLY A SINGLE OUTCOME TO COMPLEX DEVELOPMENTS. WHILE I
BELIEVE WE OWE POLICYMAKERS A CLEAR ESTIMATE OF WHAT WE
THINK WILL HAPPEN IN A GIVEN SITUATION, WE NEED TO BE
HONEST ENOUGH TO ADMIT THAT THERE ARE USUALLY OTHER
POSSIBILITIES AND TO DESCRIBE THEM. THE CANDID
PRESENTATION OF DIFFERING VIEWS AMONG INTELLIGENCE
AGENCIES IS IMPERATIVE.
WE NEED TO CONTINUE EFFORTS TO EXPAND AND IMPROVE OUR
HUMAN INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES. NOT ONLY ARE THERE
CRITICAL AREAS WHERE ONLY HUMAN AGENTS CAN GET NEEDED
INFORMATION -- FOR EXAMPLE, EARLY RESEARCH ON ADVANCED
WEAPONS -- BUT ALMOST ALWAYS THE ONLY INFORMATION WE
GET ON INTENTIONS COMES FROM HUMAN SOURCES. WE NEED
MORE CASE OFFICERS, WE NEED THEM OVERSEAS, AND WE NEED
THEM ASSIGNED TO AREAS WHERE THE REQUIREMENTS ARE MOST
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MID IMP
PRESSING. AT THE SAME TIME, WE MAY NEED TO TIGHTEN
FURTHER OUR COMMAND AND CONTROL. FINALLY, WE NEED TO
INTENSIFY CURRENT EFFORTS TO DIVERSIFY OUR OFFICER
CADRE, BRINGING IN MEN ANDAOMEN WHO CAN MOVE WITH EASE
AND UNOBTRUSIVELY IN ALL PARTS OF THE WORLD.
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE LAST FEW YEARS DEMONSTRATES THE
NEED TO REDOUBLE OUR COUNTERINTELLIGENCE EFFORT, BOTH
OVERSEAS AND IN OUR OWN GOVERNMENT. WE MUST DEVOTE
MORE RESOURCES TO REINVESTIGATIONS, TO SECURITY
EDUCATION, TO VIGILANCE, AND TO CLOSER COLLABORATION
AMONG THE AGENCIES WITH COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
RESPONSIBILITIES. CIA ALREADY HAS REDIRECTED WITHIN
THE LAST FEW MONTHS TENS OF MILLIONS OF DOLLARS TO
CATCH UP ON INTERNAL REINVESTIGATIONS. MORE NEEDS TO
BE DONE GOVERNMENTWIDE IN THIS AND OTHER AREAS,
WE NEED TO CONTINUE IMPROVING OUR MANAGEMENT OF COVERT
ACTIONS, MAKING THEM MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE,
SHORTENING THE GAP BETWEEN DECISIONS AND
IMPLEMENTATION, AND ENSURING THAT WE SEEK THE RESOURCES
WE NEED TO BE 'SUCCESSFUL. SIMULTANEOUSLY, WE MUST
ENSURE THAT NO COVERT ACTION IS UNDERTAKEN WITHOUT
PROPER COORDINATION AND PROPER WRITTEN AUTHORIZATION
AND ALSO THAT THEY ARE CONDUCTED IN FULL ACCORDANCE
WITH THE LAW AND OUR OWN REGULATIONS. MOREOVER, WE OWE
IT TO THE POLICY COMMUNITY TO ENSURE THAT THEIR
fi
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DECISION TO USE COVERT ACTION NOT BE UNDERCUT BY
SHORTCOMINGS IN OUR IMPLEMENTATION -- EITHER IN THE
FIELD OR WITH CONGRESS, FINALLY, TO THE DEGREE WE ARE
INVOLVED IN COVERT ACTION OR OTHER OPERATIONS IN
SUPPORT OF POLICY, WE MUST TAKE SPECIAL CARE TO PROTECT
AND ENSURE THE OBJECTIVITY AND QUALITY OF OUR
ANALYSIS,
WE MUST DO SOMETHING ABOUT UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURES,
WE MUST RESTORE DISCIPLINE INSIDE THE GOVERNMENT,
ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT-TO INTELLIGENCE SOURCES, -
TECHNIQUES AND ASSETS. THE FIRST STEPS ARE MORE
RIGOROUS INVESTIGATIONS AND THE APPLICATION OF FIRM
SANCTIONS AS WELL AS BETTER PROTECTION OF GENUINELY
SENSITIVE DOCUMENTS, RECENT STEPS BY THIS COMMITTEE IN
THESE RESPECTS ARE WELCOME AND ENCOURAGING. THE COST
TO OUR CAPABILTIES FROM LEAKS AS WELL AS SPIES HAS BEEN
CATASTROPHIC. BETTER COUNTERINTELLIGENCE WILL HAVE
LITTLE EFFECT IF THE SOVIETS CAN READ ALL ABOUT OUR
COLLECTION CAPABILITIES IN THE DAILY PRESS. WE MUST
ALSO HOPE THAT THE AMERICAN MEDIA UNDERSTANDS, AND WE
MUST HELP THEM TO APPRECIATE, THE RISKS TO THE NATION'S
SECURITY AND THE COST TO THE TAXPAYER OF PUBLISHING
INFORMATION ON INTELLIGENCE SOURCES AND METHODS LEAKED
BY THOSE WHO BETRAY THE COUNTRY'S TRUST IN THEM.
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41E.
WE MUST CONTINUE TO SEEK AND OBTAIN THE RESOURCES
NEEDED TO MEET CONSTANTLY CHANGING INTELLIGENCE
REQUIREMENTS. IN A FAST-CHANGING AND DANGEROUS WORLD,
QUALITY INTELLIGENCE CANNOT BE FUNDED ON-AGAIN
OFF-AGAIN; CONTINUED INVESTMENT IN NEW ".CAPABILITIES IS
ESSENTIAL, AT A TIME WHEN THERE ARE SEVERE PRESSURES
ON THE DEFENSE BUDGET, LOGICALLY RESOURCES FOR
INTELLIGENCE SHOULD RISE, NOT BE REDUCED, THIS IS A
PROBLEM BOTH THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH AND THE CONGRESS MUST
ADDRESS, QUALITY INTELLIGENCE REQUIRES SUSTAINED
SUPPORT.
IN THE YEARS AHEAD, WE WILL BE CHALLENGED TO RECRUIT,
DEVELOP AND RETAIN AN EXTRAORDINARILY DIVERSE, TALENTED
AND DEDICATED GROUP OF PEOPLE, WE MUST RECOGNIZE THE
SPECIAL BURDENS AND SACRIFICES OF PEOPLE IN THIS UNIQUE
WORKING ENVIRONMENT -- ESPECIALLY THOSE OVERSEAS:- AND
AGGRESSIVELY EXPLORE WAYS TO RECRUIT, RETAIN, AND
REWARD PEOPLE OF HIGH QUALITY.
FINALLY, BUT FIRST IN IMPORTANCE, WE MUST ACT PROMPTLY TO
STRENGTHEN THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
AND OUR CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES. OVER THE PAST TWO OR THREE
YEARS, IT HAS SEEMED LIKE ALL OF US INVOLVED HAVE WORKED TO
DEVELOP GREATER MUTUAL CONFIDENCE AND TRUST, ONLY TO HAVE SOME
NEW EVENT OR ACTION ERASE THAT PROGRESS AND FORCE US TO START
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OVER. WE MUST FIND A WAY TO AVOID VALLEYS OF MISTRUST IN THIS
RELATIONSHIP. I CONSIDER IT ONE OF MY HIGHEST PRIORITIES TO
HELP RE-ESTABLISH MUTUAL TRUST AND CONFIDENCE, I BELIEVE WE
ARE OFF TO A GOOD START. THE KEY, IN MY VIEW, IS BETTER
COMMUNICATION ON BOTH SIDES, CLOSE AND CONTINUING CONTACT
BETWEEN US, CONFIDENCE ON YOUR PART THAT WE WILL BE FORTHCOMING
-- THAT YOU DON'T HAVE TO ASK EXACTLY THE RIGHT QUESTION TO
LEARN WHAT WE ARE DOING, AND CONFIDENCE ON OUR PART THAT THE
NATION'S SECRETS WILL BE PROTECTED, REPRESENT THE MOST
PROMISING PATH TO A MORE STABLE AND SATISFACTORY RELATIONSHIP.
MR CHAIRMAN, MOST OF OUR CITIZENS DO NOT REALIZE THE
UNIQUENESS OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENCE
COMMUNITY AND THE CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES OR OF THE
GROUND WE ARE BREAKING TOGETHER FOR THE EFFECTIVE OPERATION OF
A SECRET INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD'S MOST OPEN
DEMOCRACY. INDEED, A PUBLIC HEARING SUCH AS THIS WOULD BE
INCONCEIVABLE IN ANY OTHER NATION IN THE WORLD.
AS I SAID LAST APRIL, THE CONCEPT AND PRINCIPLES OF
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT OF INTELLIGENCE ARE FULLY ACCEPTED
WITHIN THE AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY. NEARLY TWO-THIRDS
OF THOSE NOW SERVING IN CIA BEGAN THEIR CAREERS AFTER 1976,
WHEN OVERSIGHT AS WE KNOW IT BEGAN. THEY KNOW NO OTHER WAY OF
DOING BUSINESS THAN WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF CONGRESSIONAL
OVERSIGHT, AT THE SAME TIME, WE REALIZE THAT, ALMOST BY
DEFINITION, OVERSIGHT INVOLVES SKEPTICISM, CRITICISM, AND
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SUGGESTIONS FOR IMPROVEMENT. AND, OBVIOUSLY, NOBODY LIKES TO
BE ON THE RECEIVING END OF CRITICISM, BUT, WHATEVER FRICTIONS
RESULT ARE USUALLY TRANSITORY AND DO NOT AFFECT THE BASIC
PROCESS.
MORE IMPORTANT, THE COMMUNITY'S ACCEPTANCE OF OVERSIGHT IS
BASED IN SUBSTANTIAL MEASURE ON RECOGNITION OF THE BENEFITS TO
US OF THE PROCESS. WE REMEMBER, FOR EXAMPLE, THAT THE
REBUILDING OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE BEGAN IN THE LATE 1970's IN
THE CONGRESS. SUBSEQUENTLY, BOTH OVERSIGHT COMMITTEES HAVE
STRONGLY SUPPORTED OUR RESOURCE NEEDS. YOU HAVE ON OCCASION
DEFENDED US IN PUBLIC AGAINST UNJUSTIFIED ACCUSATIONS. YOU
HAVE BEEN INSTRUMENTAL IN INITIATING AND SPONSORING LEGISLATION
IMPORTANT TO OUR PEOPLE AND OUR WORK, INCLUDING THE IDENTITIES
PROTECTION ACT AND THE CIA INFORMATION ACT. OVERSIGHT HAS
CREATED AN ENVIRONMENT THAT FOSTERS ADHERENCE TO THE RULES AT
ALL LEVELS AND DISCOURAGES CORNER CUTTING OR ABUSES. THE
COMMITTEES HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO IMPROVING THE QUALITY OF OUR
WORK AND TO EFFICIENCY. AND, FINALLY, THE CONGRESSIONAL
COMMITTEES AND EXECUTIVE OVERSIGHT ORGANIZATIONS SUCH AS THE
PRESIDENT'S INTELLIGENCE OVERSIGHT BOARD AND THE PRESIDENT'S
FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY BOARD SHOULD GIVE THE AMERICAN
PEOPLE CONFIDENCE THAT THEIR INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IS
ACCOUNTABLE, CARRIES OUT ITS ACTIVITIES ACCORDING TO THE LAW
AND THAT WE ARE GUIDED BY STANDARDS AND VALUES ACCEPTABLE TO
THEM.
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IT WOULD BE NAIVE TO BELIEVE, GIVEN SEPARATION OF POWERS
ISSUES BETWEEN THE EXECUTIVE AND THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCHES AND
THE CONTRASTING CULTURES AND NEEDS OF A SECRET SERVICE ON THE
ONE HAND AND A FREELY ELECTED CONGRESS ON THE OTHER, THAT THERE
WOULD NOT BE DIFFICULTIES. YET, WITH THAT, I BELIEVE THAT
OVERSIGHT WORKS AND THAT, WITH OVERSIGHT, WE CONTINUE TO HAVE
THE FINEST INTELLIGENCE SERVICE IN THE WORLD. INDEED, WHERE
OTHERS MAY SEE SOME LIABILITIES IN OVERSIGHT, I SEE IMPORTANT
STRENGTHS. FOR EXAMPLE, BECAUSE PEOPLE KNOW, THROUGH YOU, THAT
WE ARE ACCOUNTABLE AND SUBJECT TO THE RULE OF LAW, WE HAVE
ACCESS TO THE BEST MINDS AND RESOURCES OF AMERICA -- IN
BUSINESS, THE UNIVERSITIES, AND SCIENTIFIC CENTERS, SOME
200-250 THOUSAND AMERICANS EXPRESS INTEREST IN JOINING CIA EACH
YEAR. MOST AMERICANS SEE OUR EFFORTS AS NECESSARY TO PRESERVE
OUR FREEDOM -- AND, BECAUSE OF OVERSIGHT AND THE LAW, NOT A
THREAT TO THAT FREEDOM.
MR. CHAIRMAN, I CANNOT CONCLUDE MY STATEMENT WITHOUT PAYING
TRIBUTE, IN THIS PUBLIC FORUM, AS I DID LAST YEAR, TO THE BRAVE
MEN AND WOMEN OF AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE, MILITARY AND CIVILIAN,
WHO LIVE AND WORK IN DANGEROUS AND INHOSPITABLE PLACES OVERSEAS
AND UNDER ENORMOUS PRESSURES HERE AT HOME. WITH COURAGE AND
DEDICATION, THEY ENDURE PERSONAL SACRIFICE, INCREDIBLY LONG
HOURS, A CLOAK OF SECRECY ABOUT WHAT THEY DO THAT EXCLUDES EVEN
THEIR FAMILIES, A LACK OF PRIVACY, AND YET ANONYMITY. AS THE
PRESIDENT SAID IN 1984, "THE WORK YOU DO EACH DAY IS ESSENTIAL
TO THE SURVIVAL AND TO THE SPREAD OF HUMAN FREEDOM. YOU REMAIN
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THE EYES AND EARS OF THE FREE WORLD. YOU ARE THE TRIPWIRE.'
THE NATION CAN BE PROUD OF ITS INTELLIGENCE SERVICES AND, IF
CONFIRMED, I WOULD BE PROUD TO SERVE WITH THEM AS DIRECTOR OF
CENTRAL INTELLGENCE.
THIS CONCLUDES MY OPENING STATEMENT. I HAVE SUBMITTED FOR
THE RECORD ANSWERS TO THE COMMITTEE'S WRITTEN QUESTIONS BUT, IN
ADDITION, WITH THE CHAIRMAN'S PERMISSION, I WOULD LIKE TO
RESPOND ORALLY TO TWO QUESTIONS.
12
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NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
-UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF WILLIAM J. CASEY, TO BE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
TUESDAY, JANUARY 13, 1981
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. GOVERNMENT. PRINTING OFFICE
73-992 0 WASHINGTON : 1981
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Publications.
Tax Sheltered Investments: Lawyers Desk Book: Forms of Business Agreements:
Accounting Desk Book: Tax Planning on Excess Profits. How to Raise Money to
Make Money; How Federal Tax Angles Multiply Real Estate Profits, and others.
STATEMENT OF WILLIAM J. CASEY
Mr. CASEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of this committee, it is
an honor for me to be here today to meet with you and to discuss
my qualifications for the post for which President-elect Reagan has
nominated me.
I want to say at the outset that I believe it to be vital that this
Nation have a strong and effective intelligence organization with a
wide range of capabilities and with the flexibility to adapt and
focus them on whatever exterior threats or problems confront the
President, the National Security Council, Congress, the executive
branch, all of us.
I would like to assure ? the Senators who have spoken and ex-
pressed their views about the serious problems that confront the
intelligence community in times of rebuilding, performance, secu-
rity, that I am determined to correct these problems, improve
performance. And I believe that, with the support of this commit-
tee and the support of the intelligence community, we shall be able
to do that.
? At the outset, I? would also like to say that it may be.helpful to
outline the experience which has formed my views on intelligence.
In World War II, I was a naval officer. I had intelligence assign-
ments, first in Washington as an aide to Gen. William J. Donovan,
then a director of the Office of Strategic Services, and subsequently
in London as an aide to Col. David K. E. Bruce, the commanding
officer of that organization in the European theater of war with
General Eisenhower commanding.
?Ke?
WORLD WAR II ACTIVITIES
Our activities there consisted primarily of working with British
and French intelligence and supporting French resistance forces to
develop support for the Allied armies as they invaded and liberated
France. When it became clear in the fall of 1944 that the war
would not be won in France but that there would be hard fighting
in Germany, I became engaged in shifting what had been a French-
oriented organization to one that could function effectively in Ger-
many.
When we were surprised by the Hitler counteroffensive in the
Ardennes, in what became known as the Battle of the Bulge, I was
appointed chief of secret intelligence for OSS in the European
theater. In this capacity, I was charged with sending observers to
railroad and military centers in Germany to report on the move-
ment of German forces, on targets suitable to air attack, and
similar military information.
I would like to say that from that experience it was clear that
intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities that were brought
to bear against the enemy were worth many German divisions,
that they saved many lives and much time and much treasure,
much blood.
?
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It is also clear that America entered that conflict without any
significant intelligence capability, that it was able to perform--we
were able to perform?in the intelligence and counterintelligence
contributions to the conduct of the war in Europe were based
primarily on the long tradition, experience, the personnel that it
created, and on the British 'system, which was our tutor and our
mentor.
say that because today it is clear that the American intelli-
gence system occupies that role. It is a repository of many of the
capabilities which do not exist elsewhere. And that emphasizes in
my mind the absolute imperative nature of maintaining that capa-
bility as the best intelligence system in the world, building on it,
and constantly improving it.
Now, for a few years immediately after World War II, I worked
with General Donovan, with General Quinn who is here today,
other colleagues in wartime intelligence in urging that our Nation
needed a permanent central intelligence. And in studying how such
an organization should be organized and function.
CIVILIAN ACTIVITIES
Since that time I have spent my private working life as a practic-
ing lawyer, as an author, editor, and entrepreneur. All of these
activities involving somewhat the same kind of gathering, evalua-
tion, and interpretation of information which good intelligence
? work requires. I maintain an interest in foreign policy and national
defense. As a founding director of the National Strategy Informa-
tion Center, I worked on the establishment of chairs and professor-
ships in national security on some 200 campuses throughout the
United States.
During 1969 President Nixon appointed me to the General Com-
mittee on Arms Control, on which I served during the preparation
and negotiations for SALT I. This experience impressed upon me
the vital significance of good intelligence in establishing adequate
defense in negotiating arms control arrangements and in verifying
that those arrangements are being observed.
I became a consumer of intelligence in another capacity as
Under Secretary of State in 1973 and 1974. And as a member of the
Commission of the Organization of the Government for the Con-
duct of Foreign Policy, known as the Murphy Commission after its
chairman, Robert Murphy, a distinguished diplomat of long stand-
ing, I took a special interest in the organization of the intelligence
community and improving the relevance and quality of analysis
and developing a more effective relationship between producers
and consumers of intelligence.
In 1976 President Ford appointed me a member of the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board. There my special inter-
ests were a greater concentration in improving economic intelli-
gence and the experiment in competitive analysis of Soviet strate-
gic intentions, the potential capabilities of Soviet air defense, and
the accuracy of Soviet missiles, all of which I believe demonstrated
the value of some form of competitive analysis.
Now, there is no need for me to describe to this committee the
varied and complex challenges that confront our Nation, the com-
plexity of the political, military, and economic forces with which
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we must deal, or the importance of good intelligence to the formu-
lation and execution of effective policies.
GOALS AS CIA DIRECTOR
And if I am' confirmed for the position for which I have been
nominated, it will be my purpose to provide for our policymakers
in the Congress as well as the executive branch timely and accu-
rate information, analysis, and estimates on which they can rely in
establishing the defensive strength we need in seeking arms limita-
tions and developing and maintaining satisfactory relations with
other nations and in competing in an increasingly interdependent
and competitive global economy.
Our foreign .policies and defense strategies will lever be better
for long, than our intelligence capabilities. In an era of increasing
military vulnerability, effective intelligence is of far greater impor-
tance than it may have been some years ago when we had clear
military superiority. Anticipating potential problems and threats,
understanding the reasons behind events, and foreseeing all the
potential opportunities, both diplomatic and military, will be criti-
cal to successful international relations over the next decade. We
are in a period, I believe, where investments in intelligence capa-
bilities will yield major returns.
Generally, there was a poor public perception and understanding
of the value of the American intelligence community to the secu-
rity of the free world. The CIA, in Particular, suffers institutional
self-doubt. Many of its most competent officers have retired or are
about to retire. The morale of much of the agency is said to be low.
Too often, the agency has been publicly discussed as an institution
which must be tightly restrained, stringently monitored, or totally
reorganized. Little has been done in recent years to stress publicly
the critical role which the intelligence community has to play in
the formulation and execution of our Nation's foreign policies and
defense strategies.
Too many have worked to reduce the feeling of self-worth of
intelligence officers. Too few have worked to motivate the best
minds in the country to see the intelligence profession as one
which is desperately needed for our national security.
Now, while members Of the community realize they cannot re-
ceive public recognition for particular tasks well done, they right-
fully expect the support of the government which they serve. All
too often, their failures are widely publicized, but their successes,
by their very nature, are generally hidden.
We need to make it clear that while we work to improve the
intelligence community, it has our full trust and confidence, that
the intelligence profession is one of the most honorable professions
to which Americans can aspire, and that we have an appreciation
for the dedication and professionalism of its members. We should
call our young Americans to serve their country in intelligence
work. We should ask American scholars to Serve their country by
sharing their scholarship and insights with those in the community
who are responsible for preparing the analyses used to develop
foreign policy and defense strategy.
In the months ahead, this Nation will continue to confront major
international crises. This is not the time for another bureaucratic
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shakeup of the CIA. Instead, it is a time to make American intelli-
gence work better to become more effective and more competent.
and to make the members of this establishment respect it and
honor it.
INTELLIGENCE FAILURES
In almost every instance in recent years. so-called intelligence
failures have been the result of shortcomings in intelligence analy-
sis and sometimes in policy conclusions. The necessary relevant
information, the facts, were generally available. But frequently,
either good analysis or sound conclusions did not follow.
To be truly beneficial to consumers, the data collected must be
subjected to critical and insightful analysis, conducted by trained,
competent professionals with a rich background in the ?subjects
required. The issues with which we have to deal require the best
analytical capabilities applied to unclassified as well as classified
sources.
The attractiveness of intelligence analysis as a profession, part
time as well as full time, needs to be increased. We need to tap the
insights of the Nation's scholars in the effort to upgrade the qual-
ity of intelligence analysis.
We must search for new and better ways to get continuing input
from the outside world in order to gather information available
inside and outside of Government and to get the best analysis of .
the full range of views and data available. A revival of the Presi-
dent's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board can contribute substan-
tially to this.
And there are many other possibilities. When I was Chairman of
the SEC, I created a large number of task forces made up of
members of the SEC staff and people experienced in various phases
of the investment industry, assigned to report on regulatory needs
for new forms of investment and trading.
By minimizing paper .and regulatory burdens, on making invest-
ment analysis more widely available to public investors, and simi-
lar subjects, we were able to gather insight and perspective which
was just not available in Washington. And I believe that the same
opportunities exist in the academic community and in the business
community to make American governmental intelligence function
more effectively and come to more reliable and realistic conclu-
sions.
It's not enough, however, to have good information and accurate
assessments. The findings and the views of the intelligence commu-
nity must be forcefully and objectively presented to the President
and the National Security Council. I assure you that I will present
these views without subjective bias and in a manner which reflects
strongly held differences within the intelligence community. It will
be my purpose to develop estimates which reflect a range of likely
developments for which policymakers must prepare in a manner
which emphasizes hard reality undistorted by preconceptions or by
wishful thinking.
As we look back at the recent past, we should remember how
early intelligence reports on Soviet missiles in Cuba in 1962. on
Soviet divisions preparing to enter Czechoslovakia in 1968, on Arab
preparations to attack Israel in 1973, were obscured by judgments
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matters. As I complete and as I carry on and complete my evalua-
tion, I would plan to review my findings with you as soon as
possible to determine how we can build on our strengths and to
reduce areas of weakness.
That. Mr. Chairman. is my statement. I welcome any questions
that you and other members of the committee may have.
The CHAIRMAN. Before we start questioning you, it is necessary
for me to swear you in. Would you rise. please. and hold up your
right hand?
Do you swear that the answers you will give to the questions
asked will be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth,
so help you, God?
Mr. CASEY. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR BIDES
Senator BIDEN. Mr. Chairman, before we begin questioning. I
apologize for being late. I was questioning General Haig.
May I ask unanimous consent that the opening statement I had
be inserted in the record as if read, and explain to the chairman
that I will be in and out because we're still questioning General
Haig. But thank you for the indulgence.
The CHAIRMAN. I'll see you there this afternoon.
Senator B1DEN. You're going to testify. I'll certainly be there, Mr.
Chairman, when you testify and promise to ask no hard questions.
[The prepared statement of Senator Joseph R. Biden follows:]
PREPARED STATEMENT OF SENATOR BIDEN
Mr. Casey, I would like to add my congratulations on your nomination for the
Directorship of Central Intelligence. My statement will be brief because, after all.
the point is to hear from you today. But I would like to specify two items that I feel
are vitally important to the Senate's consideration of your nomination and ask that
you keep these two in mind as you phrase your observations and responses today.
As you might guess. and as we discussed in our meeting last week, the first item
is that of Congressional oversight of United States' intelligence activities Congres-
sional oversight greatly expanded under a Republican Administration?President
Ford's. The relationship between the Congressional intelligence committees and the
intelligence agencies is young and still fragile. It has been clearly beneficial in both
improving the agencies and in .protecting the civil liberties of American citizens.
The agencies now know that they must face scrutiny by representatives of the
American people. As these representatives, in turn, are held to increasingly strict
accountability by the electorate for expenditures of tax dollars. they are more
inclined to examine the agencies With a sharp eye for cost effectiveness and compe-
tence. This feature of Congr?...ssional oversight seems only to enhance the motivation
of the intelligence community to produce timely and useful information.
Equally important, however, is the incentive that Congressional oversight pro-
vides for the intelligence agencies to adhere strictly to the law and the Constitution
in respect to the civil liberties and privacy of Americans. The self-contradiction of
those who in the name of protecting American ideals would scorn and secretly
assault some of the most important of those ideals?I refer to civil liberties protect-
ed by the Constitution?is both obvious and worrisome. SUch..contradictory thinking
encourages only the replication of qualities of totalitarian societies. It portends
diminishment of those basic libertarian ideals of American life which distinguish
this country?and which the true conservative wishes to uphold. -
The Congressional oversight provision enacted into law last year requires that the
intelligence committees be kept fully and currently informed of all intelligence
activities and that they be furnished any information or material concerning those
activities. I support a strict interpretation of the Congressional oversight authorities
that the law now grants. I would not support a nominee for. Director of Central
Intelligence who did not recognize the role Congress must play in intelligence
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NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-FIFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL STANSFIELD TURNER TO BE
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
FEBRUARY22 AND 23, 1977
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
86-073
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1977
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Senator STEVENSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, my colleague Senator Percy could not be here this
morning, and has asked me to express his regrets and to also offer to
your record a statement. I.trust that statement will be entered in the
record.
The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered.
[The prepared statement of Senator Percy follows:] ?
Senator STEVENSON. Mr. Chairman, the last- time this committee
acted on a nomination for Director of Central Intelligence, it offered
its advice. This time, I believe,.is an occasion for consent.
It is a. great pleasure to introduce to this committee a distin-
guished Illinoisan. Adm. Stansfield Turner. Admiral Turner's eedu-
cational background, including a Rhodes scholarship. his thoughtful
publications, his energetic leadership of the Naval War College, and
his past professional experience with intelligence and policymaking
all suggest. the intellectual stature and the intellectual integrity this
most difficult office begs for.
Admiral Turner is a proven executive. He has served with dis-
tinction as. Commander of the 2d -Fleet, and as Commander in Chief
of Allied Forces, Southern Europe. Admiral Turner has the Presi-
dents confidence, it. would seem. His record in all suggests the for-
titude to tell the President. about the world as it is, and not as the
President might wish it to be. and an authority that. would command
access to all policymakers at. the highest possible levels..
The. Admiral's innovations at the Naval War College. his appetite
for intellectual combat suggest little patience for habit-, not all of
which is right in the inteilige.nce community. It would be possible
at. least for things to change: and fornew priorities to be established
in the intelligence community, to better reflect all of the requisites
of survival in a new era.
And, Mr. Chairman, as to his commitments to our national decency
and the rule of law, he, like anyone else, can only offer his assurance,
as I am certain he will, and also a record that is bereft of any evidence
to belie them.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Stevenson.
I am pleased to now welcome to the committee the nominee for the
Director of Central Intelligence, Adm. Stansfield Turner.
Admiral Turner, welcome sir.
Admiral TI-RICER. Thank you, sir.
The. CHAIRMAN. Please proceed in any manner you wish, sir.
STATEMENT OF ADM. STA.NSFIELD TURNER, U.S. NAVY, NOMINEE
' FOR DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Admiral Tr-RNER. Mr. Chairman. -members of the committee. I am
very pleased to be here this morning and to have the opporunity to
express to you some of my views on the conduct of our national in-
telligence activities, and on the President's decision to nominate me to
Senator Percy appeared later at the afternoon session and read his prepared statement,
spe page 37.
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the post. of Director of Central Intelligence. May I first, however,
thank Senator Stevenson for his very kind words, and Senator Percy
for his in absentia.
I would like, to start by noting that governments, no less than any
of us as individuals, depend upon accurate and timely information
to make- decisions. The collection, the evaluation, the dissemination
of information to protect our national security, and upon which to
base the foreigi policy, is essential for any sovereign state. And in this -
day when our state has such international responsibilities, a good
intelligence collection organization is absolutely vital.
Today, however, we are in an era of effort to reduce international
tensions, and in this era, the. United States, in my opinion, needs an
organization for intelligence of high quality and responsiveness per- F
haps more than any other time. The Congress itself has recognized
the fact that the success of our ongoing negotiations for SALT and
MBFR may very well depend in part on our ability to verify that
past. agreements are in fact being carried out.. Thus, our intelligence
will be one factor in developing that mutual trust which will be essen-
tial to further progress in this important area. If our intelligence is
faulty, we may misjudge; if it is inadequate, we may read the signals
incorrectly. 'Without good intelligence, we may simply miss oppor-
tunities to insure the world of peace. I believe, then, that we must
have the best intelligence agency in the world. I think we can do this
and still be fully consistent with American values and law.
At the same time today that we are working toward international
understanding. we are also witnessing the substantial investment of
the Soviet Union in their military forces. whether their forces are
larger or smaller than ours, stronger or weaker, better or poorer is a
subject that could?involve interminable debate. It does seem clear to
me, however, that we are going to require all of the leverage which
good intelligence can give to our military posture if we are going to
remain adequately strong in the future.
However, today there are more than military requirements for in-
telligence. Our intelligence must be acutely aware of foreign political.
economic, and social trends, as well as the military ones, and must be
able to relate these in assessing the prospects for our future.
There is no doubt in my mind that we possess the capability to
have the best. of all intelligence services in all of these areas. To do
that., though, we must insure that our intelligence resources are em-
ployed in an optimal manner.
In this connection. the President has within the last few days made
it expressly clear to me that he expects the Director of Central Intel-
ligence to be. able to insure him that our total national intelligence
effort is being conducted in accordance with established priorities and
?with minimal duplication of effort. He also wants to be certain that
the foreign intelligence work of all agencies of our Government is
being conducted strictly in accordance with law and with American
values. The President. indicated that. while he believes that existine.
law and executive orders encompass these objectives. he intends to
work closely with the Congress on any revisions of law or executive
orders that mar be desirable to assist. the Director of Central Intel-
ligence in fulfilling these charges.
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I believe that we can adhere to the President's guidance for greater
efliciencv and responsiveness within full legality while simultaneously
maintaining the individuality, the imaginative initiatives, and the in-
dependent voice of the various agencies of our national intelligence
structure. I appreciate the importance of maintaining a degree of In-
dependence in our subordinate national intelligence activities, as well,
of course, as in our tactical intelligence operations.
I have already discussed this question with the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of Defense and know that we all approach it
with open and cooperative minds. We all seek greater effectiveness
And efficiency from better direction and coordination. We all abhor
any thought of such a degree of centralization that alternative judg-
int:nts cannot be beard. and uncertainties discussed.
Again. the President stated that he feels that the decisionmakers in
Congress and in the executive branch will be better served if they
all work from the same foundation of intelligence. This is not, to say
that consensus among the various elements of the community need be
forced, or that dissenting opinion need be stifled. Contrary views
must be .presented. but in such a way that the rationale for such dis-
sent is clearly evident.
In fact. were the Senate to confirm me for this position. I would
look upon maintaining the objectivity which comes from considering
divergent viewpoints as my highest priority. Objectivity benefits both
the producer and the user of intelligence. the user obviously benefits
because he is given all reasonable alternatives. As a frequent user of
intelligence. I understand. I believe, the importance of approaching
decisions with a range of choices in hand, not simply one option. I
also believe that I am aware of the. dangers to military planning and
operations of intelligence estimates that are biased in one direction.
The producer of intelligence also benefits from an emphasis on ob-
jectivity because he. is not asked to sacrifice his intellectual or scientific
integrity to support an established position. but rather, he is asked to
lay out all sides of a case indicating the level of confidence he has in
the deductions be makes from the facts at hand. Objectivity simply
must continue to be the hallmark of our intelligence effort.
My second point of emphasis would be to insure that the work of
the intelligence community is conducted lawfully. I believe with my
deepest conviction, that the greatest strength we have as a world
i
power s our moral dedication to the rights of the individual. If any
part of our government is perceived to function outside of this funda-
mental American tenet. it can only bring discredit on the whole. I be-
lieve that it. is the solemn duty of every agency of the U.S. Govern-
ment to protect the constitutional rights of our citizens.
I also believe that there are valid national secrets and recormize
that the. Director of Central Intelligence is charge.d by law to prevent
the una.uthorized disclosure of intelligence sources and methods. Thus.
though American citizens can rightfully expect their government to
operate. openly, there must be a relatively small ATTIOLID1 of informa-
tion and activity whic.h is kept secret. As long as representativegToups
of elected officials such as this committee and the Chief Exe.eutive are
kept informed, and as long as they can act for the sojetv in reemlat-
mg the secret information and activities. I think that the difficult
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balance between necessary secrecy and an open. democratic society can
be maintained.
From the discussions I have enjoyed over the past 21 weeks, it ap-
pears to me that this committee has taken great and successful stride:,
in improving communications between the Congress and the intelli-
ge?ce community. I fully support this progress and philosophy. With-
in the limits of the constitutional prerogatives of the executive branch.
I would intend to do my part in insuring that Congress remains
a full and knowledgeable partner.
Similarly. I believe that it is incumbent upon the intelligence com-
munity to make a. serious and continuing effort to avoid the overclass-
ification of information and even to attempt selectively to publish
unclassified information which is. of high interest and value to our
citizens.
Even though the various disclosures of questionable intelligence ac-
tivities during the past several years were quite necessary. they have
had an adverse impact on the reputation of our intelligence commu-
nity. A third area of emphasis which I would suggest would be to
continue to rebuild this reputation. The intelligence community is. by
and large, composed of well-qualified, hard-working individuals who
are as dedicated to our national ideals as are any of us. As in any
organization. they need a clear understanding of what is expected
of them, and a clear recognition of the importance of the work that
they would do. I intend to make the realization of these goals my next
highest priority should I be confirmed in this office.
To achieve this, we must continue the work of restoring confidence
in the credibility of intelligence effort, and this can only be
done by actions, not by words. Redundant programs. parochial causes.
needless controversy within the community must be eliminated.
Everyone's full effort must be turned to producing intelligence infor-
mation and estimates of the highest. quality. That product will meas-
ure our intelligence community's worth. And coupled with good com-
munication with the Congress, maximum permissible disclosure to.
the public, we should be. able to create that measure of confidence and
credibility Which is vital to a successful intelligence program.
There is much work ahead. and if I am confirmed by the Senate. I
would be excited by the challenge. I have been in the service of our
Nation for 30 years. and I view this appointment as another oppor-
tunity to continue that service in an area of special importance today.
Since you have my biography, I would not want to detail further
my experience in managing large organizations or in the analysis and
rationalization of.defense programs.
I would like to conclude simply by reiterating that I do respect the
dedicated professionals in. bothour civilian and military components
of the. intelligence. organizations. I hope to encourage them to realize
their full capabilities, to be innovative, questioning and objective in
their approach to all problems. At the Same time. I believe that I also
understand the need for honest. rigidly accurate. intelligence assess-
ments if they are to be useful to the Congress and to the President..
If I am confirmed. I would work to re-establish the. full credibility
? of the community's work, to insure that a worthwhile contribution is
made in support of our deciSionmaking process, and to require that
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the gathering and dissemination of intelligence for the United States
is con,4istent with the ideals upon which this country was founded.
Mr. Chairman, if confirmed by the Senate, I would be proud to be
the Director of Central intelligence, and the Director of the Central
intelligence Agency. and to.work closely with this committee in help-
to provide this country with an intelligence service second to none.
hank you. sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Admiral Turner.
Before proceeding with the questioning by the committee, may I
. administer the oath, sir?
Admiral TURNER. Please.
The CnAtr.mAs. Do you swear that. the testimony you are about to
give is. the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth?
Admiral TURNIP.. I do.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, sir.
Because of the interest shown in this nomination. the Chair would
like to once again institute the 10-minute rule, and so I will begin
with the first 10 minutes.
Admiral Turner, as you know, one of the purposes of the creation
of the CIA in 1947 was to insure that U.S. intelligence would be
independent of military control.
Although the Department of Defense intelligence activities rep-
resent the largest part of the annual U.S. intelligence budget. I believe
that purpose still continues, and so the question I ask. sir. is whether
you might be able to better serve the intent of civilian control were you
to resign your commission prior to becoming the Director of Central
Intelligence?
How do you react to this issue, sir?
sTESTIMONY OF ADM. STANSFIELD TURNER
Admiral TuRNER. Mr. Chairman. I come to this nomination as an
active military officer. The law provides that an active officer may
serve as the Director of Central Intelligence. In fact there have been
11 military officers who have served either as Director or Deputy
Director. Ten of them served while on active duty. Six of those ten
returned to military service after completing their duty in Central
Intelligence.
Having thoroughly enjoyed serving my country in active military
service for 30 years, I am anxious not. to foreclose the possibility I
may follow in the footsteps of those six.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you .perceive any conflict of interest in your
serving with your commission?
Admiral TURNER. I do not, 'sir. To begin with, I am charged, or
would be charged by law. not to accept any responsibility to or carry
out any. responsibility with the military services while serving as the
Director of Central Intelligence. and I would intend to comply with
that law, not only to the letter, but in its spirit.
The CHAIRMAN. Have you discussed this relationship with members
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff?
Admiral TURNER. No, sir.
The CHAIRMAN. Or with the Department of the Navy?
-7
g
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NOMINATION OF ROBERT M. GATES
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT CONNITTEE ON LNTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-NINTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF ROBERT M. GATES TO BE DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
APRIL 10, 1986
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
g->
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
59-941 0 WASHINGTON : I9S6
For sale by the Superintendetv. of Docurnent.s. Conp-essional Sales Office
U.SGt,ernrnen: PrIntinF ?Mt's. Washingon. DC 20402
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STATEMENT OF ROBERT M. GATES, NOMINEE TO BE DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. GATES. I welcome the opportunity to appear before you today
on my nomination as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence.
I am honored by the President's decision to nominate me. I am
grateful to Director Casey for his confidence in me, the opportuni-
ties he has given me and his unwavering support. I am honored to
follow in the footsteps of two respected colleagues and friends,
Adm. Bob Inman and John McMahon, both of whom were es-
teemed for their sound judgment, managerial skill, and independ-
?ence of view. I cannot think of two finer role models for a Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence. And I certainly appreciate Senator
Warner's introduction.
CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT
I believe it would be useful and appropriate for me to speak at
the outset to the oversight process. I have addressed this in writing
in response to a question from the committee, but believe it worth-
while to summarize my views.
Every so often, the assertion is made that U.S. intelligence, and
CIA in particular, deeply dislikes oversight, resists keeping the
committees informed, carries out its reporting responsibilities
grudgingly and minimally, and would like to return to the so-called
good old days before oversight.
This public hearing affords me the opportunity to say that these
allegations are wrong. The concept and principles of congressional
oversight of intelligence are fully accepted within the American in-
telligence community. Nearly two-thirds of those now serving in
CIA began their careers after 1976; when oversight as we know it
began. They know no other way of doing business than within the
framework of congressional oversight. At the same time, we realize
that, almost by definition, oversight involves skepticism, criticism,
and suggestions for improvement. And, obviously, nobody likes to
be on the receiving end of criticism. But, whatever frictions result
are usually transitory and do not affect the basic process.
More important, the community's acceptance of oversight is
based in substantial measure on recognition of the benefits to us of
the process. We remember, for example, that the rebuilding of
American intelligence began in the late 1970's in this committee.
Subsequently, both committees have strongly supported our re-
source needs. You have on occasion given us?defended us in public
against unjustified accusations. You have been instrumental in ini-
tiating and sponsoring legislation important to our people and our
work, including the Identities Protection Act and the Informs-
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40
tion Act. Oversight has created an environment that fosters adher-
ence to the rules at all levels and discourages corner cutting or
abuses. The committees have contributed to improving the quality
of our work and to efficiency. And, finally, the congressional com-
mittees and executive oversight organizations such as the Intelli-
gence Oversight Board and the President's Foreign Intelligence Ad-
visory Board should give Americans confidence that their intelli-
gence service is accountable, carries out its activities according to
the law and that we are guided by standards and values acceptable
to them.
The relationship between the congressional oversight committees
and the intelligence community is unique in the world?the first
attempt ever to conduct secret intelligence operations accountable
to the people and responsible to the law and to the Congress. While
the oversight process may occasionally lead to frictions in the gray
area resulting from the overlap between congressional authorities
and the duties of the executive, it has been the practice of both
branches of Government for 10 years now to try to resolve such dif-
ficulties in a spirit of comity and mutual understanding. This
unique relationship between us depends on mutual trust, candor,
and respect and I assure you I intend to conduct myself with this
in mind.
INTELLIGENCE IMPROVEMENT MEASURES
Twenty years have elapsed since I began my intelligence career
as an Air Force intelligence officer with a Minuteman missile
wing. You have before you the details of my career which I will not
repeat. There are three features, however, perhaps worth noting.
First, I've always believed that no matter how good U.S. intelli-
gence is?and it is in my view, quite good?it can always be im-
proved. I somewhat presumptuously first expressed dissatisfaction
with and suggested improvements in our analytical work on the
Soviet Union in an article published a short time after I joined the
Agency, Throughout my career, culminating in my present posi-
tion, I have endeavored to improve the quality of our work?its
substance, relevance and responsiveness to our leaders' needs. Be-
cause intelligence is secret and our Agency is closed to public scru-
tiny, I believe we must take the initiative to reach out to policy-
makers, the Congress, the private sector, and critics and experts of
all stripes for help in improving the substance of our work, our effi-
ciency and our effectiveness.
Second, I have spent a significant part of my career trying to
build a dialog between those of us in intelligence and the policy-
makers we serve. Intelligence must be relevant, timely, and respon-
sive to the real requirements of the policymaker if it is to be useful
and effective. And relevance can be insured only by a close, day to
day, working relationship. At the same time, intelligence must
remain independent. Our very existence depends upon a reputation
for integrity and for objectivity. Splendidly isolated, our independ-
ence is guaranteed but so is our irrelvance. While daily engage-
ment with the policymaker requires constant vigilance and sound
judgment to maintain our objectivity, this is the arena where we
must operate. This constant contact is imperative.
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Third, my years on the National Security Council staff opened
my eyes to the enormous cost imposed on the effectiveness of Gov-
ernment?including intelligence?by bureaucratic parochialism?
turf battles. As Deputy Director for Intelligence and Chairman of
the National Intelligence Council, I have worked to break down in-
stitutional barriers within CIA and within the intelligence commu-
nity. Only by cooperation and by combining the strengths of each
organization can we do our work effectively. The present harmony
that characterizes the American intelligence community is due in
significant measure to Director Casey's leadership in reducing
these barriers, and I look forward to helping him make further
progress in this area.
My career has been spent primarily on the overt side of CIA and,
specifically, at that point where the product of our vast collection
apparatus emerges in finished form to help warn and inform pol-
icymakers and to help them understand better a complex world.
The pace of change is accelerating; challenges to our security and
well being are multiplying; opportunities to promote our democrat-
ic values and to help others share our economic prosperity are in-
creasing. The contribution of intelligence in discerning and ex-
plaining these develupments is becoming more vital.
FUTURE INTELLIGENCE DEMANDS
We are entering an era when demands on the intelligence com-
munity are reaching beyond traditional areas into new worlds in-
cluding terrorism, narcotics, technology transfer, the proliferation
of chemical and biological weapons, and many other problems. We
must find the resources to support these new efforts while continu-
ing to place major emphasis on the collection and analysis of coun-
tries hostile to the United States.
Thanks to the rebuilding of the last several years and a policy
community willing to work with us, the American intelligence com-
munity in my view has never been in finer shape. Good intelli-
gence is a wise and necessary investment. It can, and has, saved
billions of dollars for the Department of Defense through informa-
tion we acquire on Soviet weapons and military plans. Even more
important, in analyzing, penetrating, and countering the shadowy
worlds of terrorism, narcotics, subversion, and other problems, we
save lives and help protect the Nation. But this investment in in-
telligence cannot be turned on and off like a faucet. It takes years
to train a case officer or a good analyst, and often a decade or more
to build a new technical collection system. Quality intelligence re-
quires sustained support. We have come a long way back in recent
years, but the challenges are multiplying and a continuing invest-
ment is required. Here, the understanding and support of the
President and of the oversight committees have been invaluable.
In closing, a rare public hearing such as this requires acknowl-
edgement of the brave men arid women of American intelligence,
military and civilian, who live and work in dangerous and inhospit-
able places overseas and under enormous pressures here at home.
With courage and dedication, they endure personal sacrifice, in-
credibly long hours, a cloak of secrecy about what they do that ex-
cludes even their families, a lack of privacy, and yet anonymity. As
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42
the President said to some of them in 1984, "the work you do each
day is essential to the survival and to the spread of human free-
dom. You remain the eyes and ears of the free world. You are the
tripwire." The Nation can be proud of its intelligence corps and, if
confirmed, I would be proud to serve with them as Deputy Director
of Central Intelligence.
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. While I'm some-
what unaccustomed to a public forum such as this, I would be
pleased to answer any questions that you or the members of the
committee may wish to ask.
rat--
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NOMINATION OF JOHN N. MeMAHON
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF JOHN N. McMAHON TO BE DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
MAY 26, 27, 1982
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on intelligence
17.13. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
95-3060 WASHINGTON: 1982
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I
TESTIMONY OF JOHN N. McMAHON, NOMINEE TO 33E DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
Mr. Mc. mAnoN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Members of the Select Committee on Intelligence, I am honored
to appear before you today to discuss my nomination to be Deputy
Director of Central Intelligence. I appreciate the President's expres-
sion of confidence in me, and I approach this new challenge with
enthusiasm and determination.
I have, as you know, served our Nation as an intelligence officer
for over 30 years. I feel fortunate to have had a varied, rewarding and
constantly challenging career, permitting me to serve in all phases
of intelligence, from operations to analysis, from research and devel-
opment of technical collection systems to administration. Let me
briefly review it for the committee.
I began my career with the Agency as a clerk in 1951. After serving
overseas for 5 years, I returned for basic training in the Army and
I then joined the 13-2 program. In 1965 I became Deputy Director
for the Agency's Office of Special Projects which was concerned with
applying the latest in advanced technology to major intelligence col-
lection problems. Later I served as Director of the Office of Electronic
Intelligence, and then as Director of the Office of Technical Service,
responsible for technical support to our overseas operations.
In 1974 I became Associate Deputy Director of CIA for adminis-
tration. I then served as Associate Deputy and as Acting Deputy to
the DCI for the intelligence community until being appointed Deputy
Director of CIA for Operations in January of 1978. In this capacity
I directed the Agency's overseas operations. In April of 1981 I be-
came Deputy Director for National Foreign Assessment, responsible
for directing analysis and production of intelligence. I served in that
capacity nntil January of this year .when I was appointed as the
Agency's Executive Director, responsible for the day-to-day manage-
ment of CIA.
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15
My assignments, many of which involved joint programs with the
military, have given me both a detailed knowledge of the Central
Intelligence Agency and a substantial appreciation of military re-
quirements and intelligence needs. My 2 years with the intelligence
community staff provided me with an in-depth understanding of all
national programs. military and civilian, the priority of intelligence
requirements associated with those programs. and the best means of
satisfying intelligence needs for the policymakers as well as our mili-
tary commanders in the field.
When I joined the Agency in 1951, Mr. Chairman, we lived in an
essentially bipolar world. In those days our adversary was obvious,
our mission was clear, and our efforts were focused accordingly. The
United States worked to build the democratic institutions and eco-
nomic capabilities of its friends while the Soviet Union strove to
subvert our efforts. The risk of atomic catastrophe was just then be-
ginning to become a factor in the struggle between freedom and totali-
tarianism. We focused intelligence resources on the Soviet Union and
its allies, and we analyzed world events mainly in terms of their effect
on the East-West balance of power.
As we move through the 1980's and beyond. it is clear that the in-
telligence mission must be geared to threats which are increasingly
varied, subtle, and complex. We can never take for granted our ability
to a?curately assess the military capabilities and intentions of our key
adversaries, and the Soviet Union must remain our first intelligence
priority. At the same time, we should also insure that we appreciate
fully the broad range of political, economic, social, and religious
forces whose interaction will shape world events and influence the
destiny of our country. Finally, we should never set aside the impor-
tance of more traditional causes of international conflict such as irre-
dentism and national pride.
The ability of the intelligence community to provide national policy-
makers with the timely, accurate. and insightful information they
need to advance American interests in the world requires that we
constantly strive to improve our capabilities to collect the right kind
of information, to analyze it effectively, and to present it in a relevant
and useful manner.
We are encouraged that the mutual determination of the President
and the Congress to restore the vitality of our Nation's intelligence
community is helping us translate these goals into reality. As we do
so, however. I would like to emphasize for the record that the activities
of the intelligence community involving Americans are and must con-
tinue to be limited, subject to strict standards of accountability, and
far removed from any abridgment of cherished constitutional rights.
I am firmly convinced that congressional oversight is beneficial both
for the American people and for the intelligence committee. The over-
sight system serves two key purposes. First, it assures the American
people that activities which are of necessity undertaken in secret are
being monitored by their elected representatives. Second, it assures
th2 intelligence officers who undertake those activities that the Con-
gress and the American people stand behind and support them in
their difficult and often dangerous assignments.
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? 16
Thi oversight arrangements which have developed and matured
over the past several years have also serve,l to enhance congressional
understanding of the intelligence mission and of the need for the '04
range commitment of resources to meet the-ehallenges which lie Rhea&
The cumulative impact of the annual authorization of appropriations
for intelligence activities by this committee and its counterpart in the
House of Representatives, the review sonducted in great detail by the 1
Appropriations Committees, and the statutory obligation to keep the $
two Intelligence Committees fully and currently informed has made
the Congress an active partner in our Nation's intellirrence activities.
This is as it should be, and I pledge to you that it confirmed I will
make every effort to foster and improve this vital relationship.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my prepaled remarks. I would be I
pleased to answer any questions which you and the members of the
committee may have..
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1
NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL B. R. INMAN
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON INTELLIGENCE
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-SEVENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
ON
NOMINATION OF ADMIRAL B. R. INMAN TO BE DEPUTY
DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
FEBRUARY 8, 1881
Printed for the use of the Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
74-227 0 WASHINGTON : 1981
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STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. BOBBY B. INMAN, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Irocor. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate very much the kind
words with which you have opened this session. I would not elect to
judge this committee's views on the subject of whether or not this
country ought to have a draft. But I did come to this table with some-
thing of the feel of a draftee.
I am grateful to have the committee's support, and I hope both of
us will feel at the end of 2 years that it was the right choice.
It is a distinct pleasure to appear before this committee on this
occasion. I have been nominated by the President to serve as the Dep-
uty Director of Central Intelligence. You are all generally aware of
my background and my most recent assignment. as Director, National
Security Agency. However, it might be useful for me to review that
background and experience in light of this nomination.
BACKGROUND AND EXPERIENCE
As a native of the State of Texas, I was educated and received the
degree of bachelor of arts from the University of Texas at Austin
in 1950. Shortly after joining the Naval Reserve in 1951 and being
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commissioned as an ensign in March of 1952, I joined the U.S.S.
Volley Forge. then participating in operations in the Korean area.
Later, I served in various administrative assignments inthe European
theater. ?
Following release from and then return to active duty 6 months
later with the Navy. I served in various shipborne operational assign-
ments and in several intelligence assignments functioning as an intelli-
gence analyst and as the assistant naval attache at the U.S. Embassy
in Stockholm.
Subsequent assignments included service as the fleet intelligence
officer on the staff of the commander. 7th Fleet; attendance at the
National War College ? executive assistant and senior aide to the
Vice Chief of Naval Operations; assistant chief of staff for intelli-
gence to the commander in chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet ;Director of Naval
Intelligence; and Vice Director for Plans, Operations, and Support
of the Defense Intelligence Agency.
As you know, since July 5, 197/7, I have had the pleasure of serving
as Director' National Security Agency.
Although my current assignment has involved me heavily in the
collection and production of intelligence information, the ma3ority of
my experience during 21 years of service in the field of intelligence has
been as an analyst and as a manager. The variety of my assignments
has provided me with a unique perspective on the need to balance the
production and analytic facets of the intelligence mission and to pro-
vide for the needs of the Nation's policymakers both in the executive
and the Congress, and the needs of the military forces.
I am in complete agreement with Mr. Casey in his statement to this
committee that it is vital that this Nation have a strong and effective
intelligence organization with a wide range of capabilities and the
flexibility to adapt and focus them on whatever exterior threats or
problems confront the Nation.
[The prepared statement of Vice Admiral Inman follows
STATEMENT OF VICE ADM. BOBBY R. INMAN, U.S. Narr
Mr. Chali-iaan and members of the committee: It is a distinct pleasure to appear
before this Committee on this ocemsion. I have been nominated by the President to
serve as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. You are all generally aware
of my background and my most recent assignment as Director, National Security
Agency. However, it might be useful for me to review that background and ex-
perience in light of this nomination.
As a native of the state of Texas, I was educated and received the degree of
Bachelor of Arts from the University of Texas at Austin in 1950. Shortly after
joining the Naval Reserve in 1951 and being commissioned as an Ensign in March
of 1952, I joined the USS VALLEY FORGE, then participating in operations in
the Korean area. Later, I served in various administrative assignments in the
European theater. Following release from and then return to active duty 6 mos.
later with the Navy, I served in various shipborne operational assignments and
in several intelligence assignments functioning as an intelligence analyst and as
the Assistant Naval Attache, at the U.S. Embassy in Stockholm.
Subsequent assignments included service as the Fleet Intelligence Officer on
the staff of the Commander SEVENTH Fleet; attendance at the National War
College; Executive Assistant and Senior Aide to the Vice. Chief of Naval Opera-
tions; Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence to the Commander in Chief, U.S.
Pacific Fleet Director of Naval intelligence; and Vice Director for Plans. Opera-
tions and Support, of the Defense Intelligence Agency. As you know, since 5 July
1977, I have had the pleasure of serving as Director, National Security Agency.
Although my current assignment has involved me heavily in the collection and
production of intelligence information, the majority of my experience during 21
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4
years of service in the field of intelligence has been as an analyst and as a man-
ager. The variety of my assignments has provided me wiels-a +unique perspective
on the need to balance the production and analytic facets of the intelligence
mission and to provide for the needs ?of the Nation's policymakers both in the
Executive and the Congress and the needs of the military forces.
I am in complete agreement with Mr. Casey in his statement to this Commit-
tee that it is vital that this Nation have a strong and effective intelligence
organization with a wide range of capabilities and the flexibility to adapt and
focus them on whatever exterior threats or problems confront the nation.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral.
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