GATES' NOMINATION TO HEAD CIA WITHDRAWN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B00017R000500120018-8
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 27, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 13, 2013
• Sequence Number: 18
• Publication Date: March 7, 1987
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/02/13: CIA-RDP90B00017R000500120018-8
Iran/Contra Affair - 11
Administration Tries Again With Webster:
Gates' Nomination to Head CIA Withdrawn
President Reagan finally has
found a candidate for the CIA direc-
torship who will accept the job and
can be confirmed by the Senate.
Reagan March 3 announced his
intention to nominate FBI Director
William H. Webster to be the new di-
rector of the CIA. Webster would suc-
ceed William J. Casey, who resigned
for health reasons.
The president a day earlier had
withdrawn his controversial nomina-
tion of Robert M. Gates to fill the
position. Currently the agency's acting
director, Gates had encountered grow-
ing opposition in the Senate because
of questions about his involvement in
the Iran-contra affair. Administration
and congressional sources said Gates
had asked that his nomination be
withdrawn to avoid a protracted battle
that could damage the CIA.
Webster said he hoped Gates, a
career CIA official, would resume his
former post as deputy director.
Reagan has not yet announced a
successor for Webster at the FBI.
The withdrawal of Gates and the
nomination of Webster both were
hailed on Capitol Hill. David L. Bo-
ren, D-Okla., chairman of the Senate
Intelligence Committee, commended
Gates for his "unselfish spirit"; Boren
and committee Vice Chairman Wil-
liam S. Cohen, R-Maine, praised Web-
ster in a joint statement as a man
widely respected for "high standards
of personal integrity as well as for his
professional ability." (Webster pro-
file, p. 419)
The committee leaders said con-
firmation hearings could be held as
early as the second week of March.
Reagan ran into trouble filling the
CIA post ? one of the most important
in the government ? in the weeks
after it became clear that Casey would
not recover sufficiently from brain
surgery to resume his responsibilities.
First, former Sen. Howard H.
Baker Jr., R-Tenn., said he did not
want to be considered for the job.
Once Gates was nominated, opposi-
tion snowballed to the point that Sen-
ate Republicans doubted he could be
confirmed. Then another retired sena-
tor ? John Tower, R-Texas ? re-
jected at least two White House re-
-By John Felton
PAGE 418?March 7, 1987
quests that he fill the post. Webster
accepted Reagan's offer March 3, after
asking for several hours to think about
it.
Baker on Feb. 27 accepted Rea-
gan's offer to be White House chief of
staff. In that position, he promoted
Webster for the CIA job.
From Gates to Webster
Like the choice of Baker for the
White House post, the selection of
Webster appeared to be intended as
much to shore up political support for
the president as to put a capable indi-
vidual in an important post.
In the four months since the Iran
arms sales became public knowledge,
throwing his administration into tur-
moil, Reagan has been able to take
only a few actions to demonstrate that
he is in charge. The nomination of
Gates ? a respected intelligence pro-
fessional ? was meant as one such
step. But Gates damaged himself dur-
"A lesser man might have
tried to hang on."
?Sen. David L. Boren, D-Okla.
ing confirmation hearings in mid-Feb-
ruary; senators said he came across as
a man more interested in protecting
his own career than in getting to the
bottom of CIA involvement in the
Iran-contra affair. (Background,
Weekly Report pp. 358, 309, 229)
Republican leaders told Reagan
Feb. 27 that the Gates nomination
could not be salvaged without a long
fight, and so the White House set out
looking for an alternative. Recognizing
political reality, Gates went to the
White House twice on March 2, first
to meet with Baker and then to ask
Reagan to withdraw the nomination.
Baker sought out Tower, who had
chaired the three-member commission
that issued a blistering indictment of
the administration's actions in the
Iran-contra affair. Tower refused the
CIA post, reportedly saying he wanted
to return to teaching in Texas, and so
Baker and Reagan turned to Webster.
The FBI director accepted the offer
shortly after 6 p.m. on March 3, and
the White House made an immediate
Copyright )987 Congrexsionar ?warred), Inc
Reprodechon prohibited in whole or in pan excep, by editorial chews
announcement in time for the evening
television newscasts.
In a statement announcing the
nomination, Reagan said Webster "is
well known as a man of honor and
integrity" ? a prime qualification in
the wake of a scandal that featured
possibly illegal activities and failures
of duty by administration officials.
Immediate congressional reaction
to the nomination also focused on
Webster's reputation for integrity. Bo-
ren and Cohen, for example, referred
to Webster's background as a federal
judge, which, they said, "gives him a
deep understanding of the law and the
appropriate roles" of government
agencies.
Although he has headed the FBI
? the nation's most important do-
mestic investigative agency ? for nine
years, Webster has little experience in
foreign policy and intelligence gather-
ing. He currently is responsible for
counterintelligence and counterterror-
ism efforts in the United States, but
those matters have little direct bear-
ing on most CIA responsibilities.
In the past, Webster has taken
several stands at odds with more con-
servative administration officials.
He reportedly argued in 1981
against a White House proposal that
would have lifted many restrictions
President Carter had imposed on do-
mestic and foreign intelligence gather-
ing. In 1984, he publicly opposed a
proposal by Secretary of State George
P. Shultz that the United States cre-
ate secret military units to carry out
pre-emptive attacks against terrorist
groups; he issued a statement saying
the United States "cannot do things
that in a later, more sober, time will
appear reprehensible." And last year,
Webster reportedly opposed a CIA
and White House plan to have Reagan
authorize the CIA to kidnap terrorists
overseas and bring them to the United
States to stand trial.
Webster has not yet made known
his views on Reagan's most controver-
sial policies administered by the CIA:
supposedly "covert" aid to anti-gov-
ernment guerrillas in Nicaragua and
Angola. As CIA director, Webster will
be responsible for managing the re-
mainder of a $100 million contra aid
program and annual aid of at least $15
million to guerrillas in Angola.
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Iran/Contra Affair - 12
Congress Quick to Welcome Webster Appointment
From a congressional perspective, President Reagan
could hardly have found a better choice to head the CIA
than William H. Webster, the 63-year-old former fed-
eral judge who now runs the FBI.
Although Webster has had his disagreements with
some members of Congress, they uniformly praised him
after Reagan announced his appointment March 3.
The words most commonly used on Capitol Hill to
describe Webster were "integrity" and "intelligence,"
and they reflected the sense in Congress that he had
taken an agency tarnished by the Watergate scandal and
restored its sense of purpose and professionalism.
In addition, there was a recognitior
that during the last six years, Webster
opposed administration initiatives when
he believed they were unwise and un-
workable. (Story, p. 418)
Webster's successor had not been
named as of March 6. At a Senate Judi-
ciary Committee hearing March 4, Attor-
ney General Edwin Meese III said he had
just begun a search of nominees to present
to the president. He told senators, "If we
could clone Bill Webster, we'd be able to
have the person instantly."
Webster's successor will serve a 10-
year term; Webster's own tenure would
have expired next year.
In his years at the FBI, Webster
changed the emphasis from investigating
bank robberies and stolen car rings ? an interest of J.
Edgar Hoover ? to greater involvement in drug offenses
and political corruption.
It was in the latter area that Webster had run-ins
with Congress, particularly over the 1979-80 "Abscam"
sting investigation. Several members of Congress were
videotaped by the agency during the bribery probe.
(1980 Almanac p. 513; 1981 Almanac p. 383)
Many members and civil libertarians were angered
and accused the FBI of entrapment. But Webster de-
fended the agency's work, and six representatives and
one senator were subsequently convicted.
"We had our disagreements with him, chiefly on
stings and undercover operations," said Don Edwards, D-
Calif., chairman of the House Judiciary Subcommittee on
Civil and Constitutional Rights. The panel has oversight
authority for the FBI, and Edwards has had more contact
with Webster than virtually any other member.
Edwards said that Webster always had been "forth-
right" with the committee. "He understands due process
and civil liberties," Edwards added.
Although there has been an increasing concern
about terrorism, Edwards credited Webster with moving
carefully in this area to keep a "low profile" on govern-
ment activity. The result, he said, was
"no hysteria."
"From day one [the Reagan adminis-
tration] wanted to trace every act of ter-
rorism to the Soviets," Edwards said,
"and Webster would always say, 'No,
there are eight or 10 sources of interna-
tional terrorism that we are watch-
ing ' I think that's the star in his
constellation."
When President Carter picked him
for the FBI in 1978, Webster was a fed-
eral appeals court judge in Missouri. (He
still likes to be called "Judge.") He also
had served on the federal district court in
St. Louis, and prior to that, was a U.S.
attorney there.
While Webster has little foreign pol-
icy experience, members of Congress believe he will be
able to step into the CIA job without difficulty. Sen.
Orrin G. Hatch, R-Utah, a member of the Judiciary and
Intelligence panels, noted Webster's "extensive experi-
ence in the system that produces classified information."
A than of patrician bearing with a longtime fondness
for classical music, Webster demonstrated a lighter side
when, at the prompting of his children, he became a fan
of pop singer Olivia Newton John. More recently, he
discovered the Judds, a mother-daughter country duo,
and spent an evening with them during one of their
Washington-area visits.
FBI Director Webster
Questions for Webster
Webster likely will encounter
questions from the Senate Intelligence
Committee on his response to admin-
istration actions last fall when news of
the Iran arms sales was breaking.
The most controversial issue is
whether the Justice Department im-
properly sought last year to halt a bu-
reau investigation into aspects of the
Iran-contra affair. Attorney General
Edwin Meese III ? acting on a re-
quest by national security adviser Vice
Adm. John M. Poindexter ? asked
the FBI in late October to delay for 10
days its probe into Southern Air
Transport, an airline that was used to
supply privately purchased weapons
to the contra guerrillas.
A Justice Department spokesman
later said the request ? to which the
FBI agreed ? was made because
Southern Air was to be involved in a
"sensitive mission" to the Middle East
that was "critical to the release of
American hostages."
The request came about the time
the United States and Israel com-
pleted the final shipment of anti-air-
craft missiles to Iran, apparently using
Southern Air. A week after the ship-
ment, pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon
released an American hostage, David
Jacobsen. (Weekly Report p. 350)
Copyright 1987 Congressional Quarterly In,
Reproduction prohibited in whole or in pod except by editorial chents
The delay in the FBI probe of
Southern Air ended up lasting until
late November. Independent counsel
Lawrence E. Walsh now is investigat-
ing both Southern Air's involvement
in the contra supply network and the
delay in the FBI probe.
Webster also will face questions
about his agreement with Meese last
Nov. 21 that FBI agents were not
needed to conduct a preliminary in-
vestigation into the Iran arms sales.
Meese and Webster both have said
they agreed at that point that there
was no evidence of illegal activity.
Meese then conducted a four-day in-
quiry that uncovered evidence that
March 7, 1987?PAGE 419
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Iran/Contra Affair - 13
money from the arms sales might have
been diverted illegally to the contras.
The FBI entered the investigation
Nov. 26, the day after Meese an-
nounced the alleged diversion.
Appearing before reporters at the
White House March 4, Webster re-
fused to discuss either matter in de-
tail, saying the Senate "deserves the
first opportunity" for questions. But
he did defend the Nov. 21 decision not
to involve the FBI in an investigation,
saying Meese was merely trying at the
time "to reconcile various statements"
made by administration officials.
Gates has told the Senate Intelli-
gence Committee that Meese began
the inquiry after hearing CIA and Na-
tional Security Council (NSC) officials
dispute key facts about the Iran arms
sales. There also have been reports
that Shultz prompted Meese's inquiry
by complaining directly to Reagan
that congressional testimony being
prepared for Casey's use was not true
in significant respects.
Gates Refutes Charges
Despite his controversial actions
and statements, Gates won praise
from senators for his decision to with-
draw rather than face a prolonged po-
litical battle. "A lesser man might
have tried to hang on," Boren said.
Senate leaders also called Gates a
victim of circumstances: an official
who probably would have been con-
firmed had Congress and the adminis-
tration not been consumed by investi-
gations involving the agency.
Even before the Gates nomina-
tion started to fall apart, Boren said in
an interview that an outsider probably
would have had an easier time being
confirmed than an official who was
tainted by the Iran-contra affair.
In the days before withdrawing
his nomination, Gates made two last-
ditch efforts to shake off the persis-
tent charges that last fall he failed in
his responsibility to help unearth facts
about the Iran-contra affair. At Gates'
confirmation hearings, Intelligence
Committee members questioned his
diligence during the months before
and after the disclosure last Novem-
ber that the United States had been
selling arms to Iran.
Gates Feb. 25 sent the committee
a "supplement" to written answers he
had given a week earlier in response to
questions on his activities during the
Iran-contra affair. The supplement
dealt with Gates' actions the week of
Nov. 17-21, 1986, when the adminis-
tration was assembling its accounts of
PAGE 420?March 7, 1987
the Iran arms deals.
In the supplement, Gates told the
committee about several telephone
calls and meetings he had had that
week with NSC staff members. Most
of those contacts dealt with disputes
between the CIA and NSC aides over
historical details.
One major dispute, Gates said,
erupted over whether it was NSC aide
Lt. Col. Oliver L. North who had
asked the CIA in November 1985 to
supply a cargo plane to take Hawk
anti-aircraft missiles from Israel to
Iran. That dispute went all the way to
a White House meeting last Nov. 20
involving Meese and then-national se-
curity adviser Poindexter. Gates said
the CIA, which had insisted that
North made the request, eventually
won the argument. The point was im-
portant because the arms shipment
marked the beginning of involvement
by the CIA and by a network of pri-
Robert M. Gates
vate operatives hired by North ? but
it was apparent that U.S. officials
could not reconstruct the chain of
events leading to that action.
Throughout that important week
in November, Gates told the commit-
tee, "my primary role and overriding
concern" was to ensure that Congress
would be told "all the facts regarding
CIA's operational support role" in the
Iran program.
Gates' second approach to the
committee came just hours before he
asked Reagan to withdraw his nomi-
nation. In a four-page letter dated
March 2, Gates denied seven of what
he called "the most egregious allega-
Copyright 1987 Congressionol ?varierly Inc
Reproduction prohibited in whole or in port except by editociol clients
tions against me." Among other
things, Gates denied that:
? He had encouraged an adminis-
tration proposal for an invasion of
Libya in 1985. The Washington Post
reported Feb. 20 that Gates had
authored an intelligence paper sup-
porting a joint U.S.-Egyptian attack
on Libya, but that the idea was re-
jected because of State Department
opposition. Gates said an analysis
"prepared at my suggestion was the
basis for rejection of this policy." He
underlined the word "rejection."
? The CIA last Nov. 21 had more
information about possible wrongdo-
ing than was available to Meese. Gates
said neither he nor other CIA officials
had seen evidence "remotely resem-
bling" a memo by North, mentioning a
diversion of funds to the contras, that
Meese had uncovered.
? The CIA, in preparing Casey's
Nov. 21 testimony to congressional
committees, participated in a cover-up
of facts about the Iran-contra matter.
Some members have complained that
Casey's testimony was incomplete and
misleading, but Gates said a cover-up
charge is "particularly outrageous."
He insisted that he had urged Casey to
give Congress "all the known facts."
? He had acquiesced in the Iran
arms sale policy and had "turned a
blind eye" to evidence that money
from the sales was being diverted to
the contras in Nicaragua. Gates said
he had little knowledge about or in-
volvement in the Iran arms sales, ind
that he expressed concern to Casey
about the decision to keep the sales
secret from Congress. He also insisted
that he went in October to Casey and
other involved officials when he heard
"speculation" about the diversion.
"I should have argued harder for
notification [to Congress] and I should
have been more aggressive in Octo-
ber," he said. But, Gates added, "I
continue to believe that the steps I
took were reasonable, that the advice I
received was sound and that CIA's ac-
tions were proper."
? He lacks "independence." Gates
appeared to be responding to state-
ments by senators that he sought to
protect his career at the CIA and that
he and others had allowed intelligence
analyses to be slanted for political rea-
sons. Gates said he had made changes
that "challenged long-established
practice and attitudes" at the CIA.
And he insisted the Intelligence Com-
mittee had never brought to agency
attention a single instance of what
members believed was slanted.
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