THE PHOENIX PROGRAM A POSTMORTEM

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100180001-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 8, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1977
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

-STAY- I l it L I-I
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I fl;Y 24GR' __ _ APRIL-JUNE 1977
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With the possible exception
of My Lai, no aspect of the
American involvement in
South Vietnam has been the
subject of more controversy
than the Phoenix, or "Phung
Hoang," Program.
...it is of interest to note
that there were then some
17 different Allied intelli-
gence agencies in the
Saigon area alone.
infrastructure as being the
crux of the South Vietnamese
Insurgency. Destroy the infra-
structure, he maintained, and
the insurgency would col-
lapse. In illustrating Thomp-
son's emphasis on a coordin-
ated effort, it is of interest to
who gained fame. as . a
counterinsurgency expert
during the Malaysian Emer-
gency (1948-60), had correctly
diagnosed the Communist
The roots of Phoenix go
back to 1961 when Sir Robert
Thompson, serving with the
British Embassy in Saigon,
urged the South Vietnamese
Government to launch a coor-
dinated effort to seek out and
neutralize the Viet Cong Infra-
structure (VCI). Thompson,
note that there were 17 differ-
ent Allied intelligence agen-
cies in the Saigon area alone.
Clearly, coordination of effort
through a central intelligence
bureau was ;drastically need-
ed.
Unfortunately, little was
done until 1966, when U.S.
officials realized that a camp-
aign against the VCI was long
overdue. Furthermore,?- they
began to stress this in reports
to Washington. High-ranking
officials in Saigon were con-
vinced that the bulk of the
populace would never be won
over to the government's side
unless they could be protect-
ed against the reprisals of the
clandestine VCI apparatus. As
Ambassador Henry Cabot
Lodge noted at that time,
"Getting at the VCI is the
heart of the matter."
Some initial reorganization
was carried out and the
intelligence picture improved
slightly with the development
of the Intelligence Coordin-
ation and Exploitation Pro-
gram (ICEX), the forerunner to
Phoenix. ICEX . personnel
were, in part, trained. by U.S.
Army special forces and they.
worked closely with the
"Green Berets" and with U.S.
Navy, SEAL (sea-air-land)
teams.
However, the vital need for
closer coordination of intel~l-
igence was amply demon-
strated .by the Communist Tet.
Offensive of 1968. When this
nationwide assault was
launched in late January,-
South Vietnamese, as well as -
U.S. intelligence agencies,
were caught almost - com-
pletely unaware-despite var-
ious indicators pointing to{a
Communist build up. The Tet
Offensive dramatically illus-
trated that coordination of
intelligence resources, parti-
cularly at the sector and
sub-sector level, was of 'par'a-
mount importance.
Following the Tet Offen-
sive, President Nguyen Van
Thieu was persuaded to adopt
a' more coordinated intelli-
gence program in. which the
South Vietnamese would have
complete control from top to
bottom. The U.S. role would
be limited to providing advi-
sors and support, with the
approximate ratio of Vietnam-
ese to American participants
at 500 to 1. The U.S. officials
associated with the planning
and organization of this
undertaking were Robert W.
EI
i
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Komer, U.S. Ambassador. to
South Vietnam; William E.
Colby, then director of the
Central Intelligence Agency;
and the late John Paul Vann,
senior civilian advisor.
The result was the Phoenix
Program, called "Phung
Hoang"by the Vietnamese for
the mythical bird that brings
tidings of peace. Ambassador
Komer and President Thieu
launched the program prior to
Tet, but it had not developed.
any momentum due to the
offensive. Consequently, the
program was restarted, amid
considerable publicity, on 1
July 1968. Many media a^.-
counts, unaware of the pro-
gram's pre-Tet genesis,, date
Phoenix from 1 July 1968.
Despite the inherent dan-
gers in the creation of a new
bureaucracy, Phoenix was
seen as a step in the right
direction. All intelligence
would now be collated and
I analyzed by a joint Vietnam-
ese/U.S. team at each pro-
vince and district level head-
quarters, known as Province
Intelligence Operations Coor-
dination Center (PIOCCs)
and District Intelligence Op-
erations Coordination Center
(DIOCCs), respectively.
The goal of Phoenix was to
neutralize . the VCI, which
included certain members of
the National Liberation
Front's. (NLF) local organize-
tion, just as the Front had
systematically destroyed the
government's local apparatus
.-beginning a decade earlier. If
successful, Phoenix would
allow the South Vietnamese
to break the endless cycle,
whereby NLF main force units
were consistently rebuilt
through the efforts of the
"shadow government" work-
ing among the populace. It
Members of the local Viet Cong apparatus somewhere In the Mekong Delta
strike a convincing pose In this mid-1960's photograph. An aggressive and
determined foe, they routinely employed terror as a means of eliminating
the opposition.
would likewise have denied
the NLF the vital intelligence
and other related components.
essential to the insurgency
environment.
As the great majority of
U.S. personnel were unable to
read or converse fluently in
Vietnamese, let alone identify
.members of the infrastruc-
ture, U.S. planners correctly
felt that Phoenix should be a
Saigon-directed and adminis-
tered program. The* 400-500
advisors provided by the U.S.
were primarily young and
relatively low-ranking military
intelligence officers, along
with a small number of CIA
personnel.
...the first task of Phoenix
was to identify those indi-
viduals belonging ? to or
sympathetic to the Viet
Cong Infrastructure, esti-
mated to number some-
where between 65,000 and
80,000.
The U.S. decision to limit
the war to South Vietnam
posed additional problems,
as the enemy freely took
advantage of the sanctuaries
available in Cambodia, Laos,
and North . Vietnam. This
greatly interfered with Phoe-
nix efforts to monitor and
curtail VCI activity, particu-
larly in the border regions. A
number of VCI at the province
committee level even left the
country and operated from
Cambodia.. -
Additionally, the ' Allied
intelligence agencies pos-
sessed no order of battle on
the VCI; thus, the key element
of the insurgency was virtual-
ly unknown.
Accordingly, the first task
of Phoenix was to identify
individuals belonging to or
sympathetic to the VCI, esti-
mated to number between
65,000 and 80,000. At the
same time a central reporting
system was implemented. If a
VCI operative was killed, cap-
tured, or defected in Quang
Ngai or Can Tho, for example,
Saigon would be informed.
The actual implementation
of the Phoenix Program gen-
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erally fell to the national
police, the police field force,
and the provincial reconnais-
sance units (PRUs).
The national police were
usually found in the cities and
larger towns throughout
South Vietnam. They main-
tained a list of local VCI
members anQ sympathizers
and, when possible, kept
them under surveillance.
The police field force was a
special component of the
regular police; numbering
11,000 at peak strength.
Roughly comparable to light
Infantry platoons, they wore
brown camouflage uniforms
and berets and usually
worked locally and semi-cov-
ertly. They were occasionally
used in conjunction with the
PRUs and other units.
The PRUs- were the princi-
pal action arm -of Phoenix,
although their existence act-
ually pre-dated the Phoenix
Program. While the majority
were Vietnamese, the PRUs
also contained ethnic minor-
ities, such as Nungs or Cam
bodians from the border
areas. Some were deserters
from the Army of Vietnam
(ARVN), attracted by the
PRUs' higher pay, while
others had formerly served
with the special forces "Mike
Force" or civilian irregular
defense group (CIDG). Still
others were defectors from
the Communist ranks who
had come over to the Saigon
side through the "Chieu Hoi"
or "Open Arms" Program. All
were volunteers.
The PRUs constituted a
highly trained and mobile
force intended for use against
the Communist apparatus on
the basis of "hard" or
confirmed intelligence. Gen-
erally organized into small
Vietnamese soldier from Regional Force Company demonstrates captured
B-40 rocket.
teams of 10 to 20 men, they
carried the war into the Com-
munist bases in the country-
side. They used a variety of
Communist and U.S. wea-
pons and usually operated at
night. Moving stealthily
through enemy territory,-they
took prisoners, set ambush-
es, abducted prominent VCI,
gathered intelligence, and
maintained agent networks.
At times they operated under
the tutelage of U.S. special
forces: and SEAL advisors
who accompanied them into
the field.
When necessary, PRUs
were consolidated into com-
pany-size units and used for
regular military tasks. Each
PRU contingent in the various
provinces had their own dis-
tinctive insignia; however
since many of the patches
depicted a skull, PRUs were
often tagged with the nick-
name "Skull and Cross-
bones." Additionally, corres-
pondents and authors have
referred to them as "CTs," or
"Counter-Terrorists," some-
thing of a misnomer. .
Of all the South Vietnamese
military and paramilitary com-
ponents, the . PRUs were
among the most effective and
suffered the lowest casual-
ties. Additionally, the type of
target attacked by the PRUs
was, considering the nature
of the war, strategically the
most significant.
Phoenix rapidly gained
momentum and.proved.to be
so successful that the Com-
munists launched a concerted
effort in late 1969 to reverse
the program's progress. Still
recuperating from the mas-
sive casualties they had
incurred in the Tet Offensive
some 18 months earlier, the
Communists now found their
position further imperiled by
the loss of numerous operat-
ives to Phoenix, forcing them
to react against the govern-
ment's pacification of the
countryside.
In January 1970, President
Thieu, in an interview with the'
West German magazine, Der
Spiegel, asserted that great
progress had been made in
pushing the Viet Cong out of
their rural strongholds. Inde-
pendent observers in Saigon
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at this time concurred that the
VCI had been seriously weak-
ened, and their influence had
.waned considerably.,,.
However, while Allied intel-
ligence had improved. greatly
under the aegis of Phoenix,
some impediments still exist-
ed, in the parallel U.S. and
Vietnamese chains of com-
mand. Some lack of coopera-
tion and aggressiveness was
noticed in . some ' local offic-
lals. But, in reflecting on the
program as a whole, it was
certainly , more productive
.,..than earlier efforts.
Unfortunately, the exploits
stood the nature of the war. "-,one,;: including his `;.closest
Forthright, aggresive,,. Wand :associates, had any inkling of
never afraid to admit he was his Viet~ICong' sympathies.
the Central Highlands' in 1972': Vann contended that.. there
was a tragic loss for : the., were no abuses:;; within :the
Republic of Vietnam as well- .~ program, both, emphatically
as the, U.S., He. was post stressed that it was not U.S_ .
humously awarded the Medal, policy' to participate; - in:_, or.,
of Freedom. condone such -:activity.,-. In-
Former Phoenix .advisors deed, both men had worked:.:;.,
are quick to point out that,.':' hard. toil prevent abuses and
contrary to. 'popular belief,, had protested loudly. when -
approximately 85-90 percent they, .. found. .,them.., As fora:
.were . "neutralized" 'in the neither knew of .a, .,single
course of Phoenix operations aocumentea case
either died or were captured
.of Phoenix are suffused with a on the battlefield, rather than- "Pharr JiVan Thao, leader. of
cnmhinatinn of -color and being .garroted in their sleep the peopies organization ...
.not only germinate myths- but' .pistol soot- to the head. A. -nalist short)v after the co)-
perpetuate them as w.ell.,:The number of former, Phoenix lapse of :South Vietnam In
popular media stereotype.of a-,. advisors were unanimous in.., 1975'tli'at, for ttie VCI; "...
CIA "spook" running a string.:.. their belief than small unit the wo' st period was dur
of, indigenou& murder squads. irefignts and, ?ambushes, ac- is
has been firmly implanted in counted for the great majority , ing ' 'Phoenix campaign.
the public mind;, and this:. of VCI casualties Dhis 1970 testimony,
erroneous concept, has proven ; Speaking before.the_Senate ' Colby ,-''emphasized that the
most difficult to eradicate Foreign' Relations. Committee "main. objective of.' Phoenix
Indeed, it may never be eradi