THE FBI OVERSEAS

Document Type: 
Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-01208R000100110015-5
Release Decision: 
RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 22, 2011
Sequence Number: 
15
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
June 1, 1974
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-01208R000100110015-5.pdf78.18 KB
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Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 CIA-RDP90 THE NATION 1 June 1974 (r xcERP i ) Meanwhile, the Director fought to retain and expand jurisdiction over intelligence. To begin with, the bureau's domestic counterintelligence jurisdiction rests on a foun- dation every bit as infirm as its intelligence mandate. During World War II Hoover acquired a foreign assign- ment (Latin America) which was implemented by a bureau unit, Secret Intelligence Service (SIS). In the fail of 1944 Gen. William J. Donovan submitted a ' secret memorandum proposing a permanent American foreign intelligence -service based on the' OSSand-reporting di- code which Hoover routed directly to the White House without coordinating with-~ either the CIA or the State : Department. According to insiders,. the intelligence that was sent was worthless, but Hoover was eager to expand' the bureau's foreign intelligence jurisdiction, and at the same time curry favor with the Administration by ascrib ing domestic unrest to a foreign-based plot, and to up- stage the CIA with which the FBI had ended its liaison in May of 1970. On can. only wonder what dreams of power, what drives for dominance, and what fears of rival authority led the aged Director (then 76) to claim a grossly ex- rectly ' to the- President. This memorandum became the ~ , aggerated importance in the foreign intelligence field and center of a : political storm when it was leaked to the then seek to usurp the operational jurisdiction of other press by the Director. The Chicago Tribune, one of Hoo-- agencies b$r expanding his, 'already useless andunproduc- ver's favorite press outlets, acquired a', copy of the top- tive network of agents abroad.. secret document and printed a series of articles by Hoo- ver's ally, Walter Trohan, denouncing Donovan's plan as a "superspy- system." This -maneuver ver succeeded _ in killing the proposal only, temporarily but Hoover'con- tinued to- fight incursions on his jurisdiction in Latin- America for as long as he could. According to a recent account, when the. transition came, "in some American embassies south of the border, FBI men destroyed their intelligence files rather than bequeath them to their CIA rivals. The.first.years of CIA's existence also saw Hoover busily promoting charges that'a sinister. Communist spy network had subverted OSS." But these rebuffs never discouraged Hoover's campaign to expand his intelligence empire. Initially a small corps of agents operated through foreign em assies as "legal attaches" and concentrated on law enforcement--prin- cipally the apprehension of fugitives. In 1970 Hoover demanded and received authorization to put the FBI in more than twenty-five foreign capitals. In.addition to their formal assignment to apprehend fugitives, they were authorized to collect intelligence and to transmit reports back to Hoover for the ultimate use of the White House. In 1971 Hoover proposed expanding his network into. another dozen capitals. President Nixon agreed, despite the fact that-the post-World War II Delimitations Agree- ment of government agencies involved in intelligence work forbade the step. This enlarged network, strongly op- posed by both the State Department and the CIA, was wholly intelligence-oriented and transmitted reports in Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP90-01208R000100110015-5