INSIDE CIA THE STORY OF OUR SPY NETWORK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100080026-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: August 12, 1952
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT-
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/. Z A ?/f$'R.
By JOHN GUNTHER
INSIDE CIA
the story of
OUR SPY NETWORK
Will Russia launch a war this year? From all ayailablr
evidence. Washington dues not think so. Our defense effort
today is .geared to a gradual increase of strength. There is no
surge of activity of the kind that ;in ingnnding emergency
would demand. Pulicv makers appear certain that the Rus-
sians. on the whole. have no immediate incentive for war,
that the Soviets believe the punishment they would take
would imperil their regime; that Moscow expects to gain
more han we by marking time: that it has no hope of win-
ning it star in the near future and still believes the world nmy
he Russia', without the necessity of undertaking a war.
(low dues Washington reach these conclusions? Its rod
estimate almost certainly stems in large measure from a secret
but vital organization that has top responsibility today for
knowing what's going on in Russia and elsewhere in the world
-the Central Intelligence Agency. Such in organization can
determine the fate of America. For this reason. L(X)K recently
asked one of the country's best reporters to dig for all the pub-
lishable facts on the CIA and its associate agency. the Psycho-
logical Strategy Board. Here is his report.-TIIF FDITORS
CEASta.FSSt.v alert in Washington are two super hush-hush
organizations dedicated to preserving the security and
best interests of the United States against the Soviet Union.
Both are as silent as a man with adhesive tape strapped across
his mouth. They are like sunken watchtowers. like human
seismographs.
One is the Central Intelligence Agency and the other.
even less well-known. is the Psychological Strategy Board.
Each is autonomous. but they interlock. and their highly
"classified" ( secret) reports help form the basis for our
cold-war policy.
Upon the quality of their work, the future of the United
States vis-a-vis Soviet Russia may well depend.
Recently members of a well-meaning women's organiza-
tion in Washington wanted to pass a resolution publicly
commending the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency). The CIA
was sounded out. whereupon word went down to the women's
organization: "If you commend us for good work. you know
more about us than you should. And if you know that much
about us. we are not doing good work.'
The atmosphere around the CIA suggests-let us put it
mildly-certain precautions. Every visitor is checked in and
out of each office. but the words "Central Intelligence Agency"
do not appear on the slip of paper he must fill out.
Every official and employee of CIA. before being hired.
must undergo an exhaustive security check. On top of the
regular FBI and other checks. the CIA maintains a security
office of its own. for further top-secret investigation. Although
CONTINUED
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Under `Beetle'
CIA head. Gen. Smith, right, is es-ambassador to Russia. He talks here with a Soviet attache.
the CIA does not speak of it. some of its em-
ployees voluntarily take lie-detector tests. If
an employee engaged in particularly ".sensi-
tiv(." work marries. the prospect ire wife or
husband is carefully investigated.
Office trash is shredded and burned in the
CIA's own incinerator. When an official wants
to destroy confidential notes or work sheets,
he does not put them into the wastebasket.
They are carefully packed into big envelopes.
and then are actually put into his safe, to
await the daily collection. Even the ashtrays
are emptied by "classified" charwomen, and
stenographers are obliged to take their type-
writer ribbons out of their machines each
night and lock them in the ottice safe, if secret
documents have been typed and if the ribbons
are new.
If a CIA official is carrying important
documents even on such a short trip as to the
Pentagon, it is recommended that he go in a
Government car with a chauffeur trained to
know what to do in case of an emergency: for
instance. if there should be an accident. On
trips out of town. CIA officials themselves
never carry important documents, which are
transmitted by a special top-secret carrier
service.
If a CIA man should be hurt in a traffic
accident, or otherwise. wheels instantly move
within wheels and he is removed from the
jurisdiction of local hospitals or police. If a
CIA man should happen to blow up with ner-
vous strain, and have to he placed in some in-
stitution- it sometimes happens he will be
taken care of by the organization's own medi-
cal staff.
The main CIA building is not identified as
such. The gate carries the street number, noth-
ing more. It is, however. listed in the telephone
book, because nonlisting would defeat its own
purpose by making the organization more
rather than less conspicuous. For a time, em-
ployees calling at other Government bureaus
were forbidden to reveal that they worked for
the C'IA, but this had to be given up for the
same reason. But the badges CIA officials carry
land which they must show on entering and
leaving every installation) do not carry the
name of the organization.
One day I met an officer, whom I knew to
he it colonel, in civilian dress. I saw him again
the next day and he was in uniform. This was
because he had to attend a military meeting.
and for him to have been nit of uniform might
have groused comment. It is really something
when a military man wears his uniform its a
disguise.
"An intelligence officer who talks about
his business ceases to be an intelligence otti-
ct'r." Gen. Walter Bedell Smith, the director of
Central Intelligence, said recently. Indeed his
men are close-mouthed, and in something like
thirty years of journalism I have never en-
countered an organization so difficult to write
about.
Function of CIA Is Explained
Nevertheless the CIA--like the PSB -is
willing to treat the visitor with courtesy, and
say something. This, too, is as it should be,
because both organizations are supported by
public funds and owe a definite responsibility
to the public.
The Central Intelligence Agency cam,'
into being in 1947. Its function. informally
stated. is to collect. correlate. analyze, evalu-
ate and disseminate intelligence It co-operates
with other intelligence groups serving the
Government in particular those of the Army.
Vary, Air Force. Atomic Energy Commission.
State Department. and FBI and attempts to
make a clear pattern toy all in the field of na-
tional security. It has the right to inspect the
lilt's of the FBI and other organizations con-
cerned- to the extent recommended by the Na-
tional Security Council and approved by the
President, and it is responsible only to the
National Security Council itself, which means
tl-e President
The CIA protects the vital interests of the
United States outside the country, just as the
FBI works inside. The frontier between the
CIA and FBI is the coastal fringe of America.
The CIA has offices in more than 20 Amer-
ican cities. and foreign installations scattered
from Okinawa to Cyprus. In Washington alone
it occupies :t4 different buildings, but most of
these arc small. and they are widely separated
throughout the city.
One taboo subject is the number of eth-
ployccs. This figure is so secret that not more
than a dozen men in the CIA itself know it.
A guess might be 5.000. Another guess might
be 10.000
Another taboo subject is the budget for
intelligence. One estimate I heard was $75.-
000.000. 1 do not vouch for it. If that is all it is.
the CIA is cheap at the price. It costs $3,000.000
to build a single jet bomber these days, and
S200.000,000 to equip an armored division.
Not until the Office of Strategic Services
was set up under Gen. William J. (Wild Bill)
Donovan in World War 11 did the United States
possess an espionage structure on the national
level, centrally directed and systematically
organized.
Agency Succeeded Wartime OSS
The OSS broke up after the war, and its
remains were split between the State Depart-
ment and the Army. After several years of
agony and frustration. it became clear to the
people who count in Washington that some
new organization must be created. The need
was imperative. Hence at-use the CIA.
The CIA limped badly at first, and got
badly kicked around. Rival departments were
reluctant to give up or share their functions,
and hated the idea of a new autonomous or-
ganization. The State Department, in particu-
lar. zealously strove to keep all gathering of
political information in its own province.
IA?adership in the CIA was not forceful enough.
and good men melted away. Boners came in
the utilization of intelligence, for instance in
reference to Korea in 1950. and the CIA was
among the organizations blamed.
Two things then occurred. which ended
this unhappy situation.
First. a top-secret committee was ap-
pointed by Mr Truman to go over the affairs
of the CIA. and rake it from stem to stern.
Second. Gen. Walter Bedell (Beetlel Smith
was apisnnted to be director of Central Intel-
ligence in October. 1950. And he has done a
pub.
hells is something special. A smallish.
tough. tenacious man, he is the only four-star
gene r; l in the United States Army who never
went to West Point or any other military
school, He enlisted in the National Guard, in
fart. at the age of 15. spent seven years as a
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Smith, CIA counts on top-notch men for its hush-hush work
private and sergeant. He finally won a commis- departments. each with a deputy director-
sion and eventually rose to be Eisenhower's Covert Activities, Intelligence, and Organiza-
chief of staff in World War II. ambassador to Lion. The man handling Covert Activities is so
Moscow. commanding general of the First secret that his name is never divulged.
Army and finally boss of the CIA. The deputy director for Intelligence is
Several things help General Smith in the Loftus Becker. a youthful. dark-haired, slow-
CIA job: (a) He is a full general. and hence spoken New York lawyer and a graduate of
the Army respects him. On the other hand, the the Harvard Law School. He was an intelli-
Army has an ingrown habit of being, on occa- gence officer with the Ninth Army and then
sion. cool to any general who goes back to attended the Nuremberg trials as a specialist
(b) He knows well the art of on German military organizations.
ivilian life
ation
i
.
.
c
z
shopping for men. (c) He had three years of The deputy director for Organ
experience on the spot in Moscow. and knows Walter Reid Wolf, is the organization's busi- ing people who may be useful in 18135 and
the Russian temperament well. (d) Mr. Tru- nta' I anager, so to
2nd lto s e ak. He served Yale and later Tlte CIA doesn't talk about this area of its went to man likes and trusts him. .iperations, but it conveys the definite impres-
Above all. though he has been a military became a banker. y e my know
man all his life, he understands the civilian Then there is an official known as the in- hsion ow to that anlent t1ou phatoo~ough,
point of view. Before he took charge of the CIA spector-general. who is Stuart Hedden, aged Play p g
it contained a good many Army and Navy 53. He went to Wesleyan University in Con- To get and train a good man, we will go teacher
is in officers. most of whom were serving there on necticut and to Harvard. became a wealthy anywhere. W will ~o tIf Althe bes catraz` It is not unusu al lto have
routine short term assignments. Smith has businessman and then returned to Wesleyan
brought many more military men into the where he spent ten years as manager of its three or four "instructors," all experts in their
organization, but he uses them, by and large, finances. Hedden is the trouble-shooter for individual realms, teaching a single recruit.
as specialists rather than as managers. Also he General Smith, the private eye. His function Women-contrary to some belief-often make
;i,is brought in many civilians; in fact, all ex- is to go into any part of the organization, and excellent agents. agent is ever told necessary cept two of his chief assistants are civilians, shake it up. a bout
the his job event th s s capture and torture, so o will in of he
is and made it clear at all times that
ci- Other CIA Executives Listed have comparatively little to reveal.
CIA is and
vilian agency. ency. must remain fundamentally ly a ci- Novel Aids Help Train Agents
-g In the Intelligence Division one man who
The General has the power to smack heads deserves mention is Sherman Kent, the as- One fascinating item is the language
together, but seldom does so. His job is not to sistant director in the Office of National Esti-
affront the Army, the AEC. the State Depart- mates. Kent. the organization's chief theoreti- school. The CIA gives instruction in 68 lan-
ment or the FBI. but to get along with them all. cian. was for many years a professor of history guages, from French to Pushtu, and it can
Of course certain frictions still exist be- at Yale, who then worked for OSS during the teach an average student to read a Russian
tween the CIA and the Pentagon. despite war. He is the author of one of the few text- newspaper - Pravda, say - in a remarkably
Smith's best efforts. But on the whole the point books in the field. Strategic Intelligence. brief time, by use of novel gadgets and de-
has been reached-on intelligence-where the Still another figure in the organization is vices. Chinese takes two years and Arabic
Army has to have what the CIA has, more than a retired Air Force colonel. Matthew Baird. It something less. Another striking item is the
the opposite. Hedden is the private eye and Wolf the busi- optical laboratory, which I was also permitted
ness manager. Baird might be called the to see: this improves a student's reading habits.
Gunther Names Men Who Run CIA schoolmaster. He is director of Personnel and so that he can go through documents faster. an extra
nary No organizational chart of the CIA has Training, and as such touches on affairs clan- Stryranother only one o din kind a tronic in-world
ever been published, and the names of most destine in the extreme.
men working for it-even on top levels-are I talked to all these men, and there are a (full details may not be given) which auto-
unknown to the public. I have, however, per- dozen others I might mention. In Sherman matically selects and reproduces certain types
mission to print what follows, though several Kent's division are people like Raymond J. of recorded information by a photographic
of the names have hitherto been secret. Sontag. professor of history at the University process.
Immediately under General Smith is the of California; former ambassador to China Only a minor proportion of the CIA's work
deputy director. Allen Dulles. A brother of Nelson Johnson: at least one retired lieutenant is "covert." or. in the argot of the trade, "
John Foster Dulles, he is a well-known figure general and one retired vice admiral, and five." The work of secret agents-spies collect-
rn-
in his own right, though people know little of plenty of Ph.D.'s and intelligence-minded `nng in15 mfd iio in fee ndl can r n ri ndly to ram
ount
spe be pa
what he did in Switzerland during the war, business men.
when he headed the OSS establishment there. General Smith, it would seem, has licked necessity. but it is only a fraction of the whole.
His work in helping to bring about German one of the most crushing of all Washington In these days. the punched cards of Interna-
and Italian internal collapse was, it has been problems, that of getting really good men to tional Business Machines are apt to be more
soberly stated, worth a brace of allied divi- give up their private careers for service to the important than cloak or dagger. Relentlessly
sions. Government, The CIA. I heard it said, is the patient analysis of enormous quantities of
People sacrifice a lot to work for the CIA only organization in the capital that can still freely available data papers probably carries more
and Mr. Dulles is no exception. As a lawyer. get top-notch people. One reason is. of course, P a are his earnings were very substantial: he works that they are protected. Congress has little in- source eignfobroaatdca The CIA has important
of i. -
for the Government for a comparative pit- clination to go after them.
tance. On the lower levels, there are all manner cally placed listening posts in various parts of
Under Smith and Dulles are three main of personnel problems. A man, whether he is the world, and the total "take" phenomenal
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going to serve at a desk or out in the field as a
secret agent, needs a lot of training. One hush-
hush detail is that, by special act of Congress,
the CIA may import into the United States a
certain number of aliens every year. One diffi-
culty is, of course, money. No matter what its
budget is, the CIA cannot affore' to employ all
the brains and talent it needs.
Training may go on for years. and can in-
clude everything from advanced techniques in
electronics to how to pick a lock or undermine
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CIA gets intelligence from spies, other sources; PSB uses
I
-some three million words a day. which is four
and a half times longer than the Bible.
Another important source of information
is documents. Ceaselessly the CIA picks up
newspapers, magazines, technical journals, re-
ports of all kinds, from every corner of the
globe and microscopically scrutinizes what
they say.
A fundamental problem in intelligence.
one CIA expert told me, is "appropriate guid-
ance from the consumer." It simplifies the
work of the CIA immensely if it knows what
the "consumer" (Mr. Truman, the National
Security Council, or any interested body of the
Government) wants to know, and more why
it wants to know. Suppose a request comes for
an analysis of the coastline of Country X
Very good. But what is this analysis for? Mine-
laying? Beach assaults? Capacity to grow new
types of seaweed? The more refined and de-
tailed the request, the better the CIA can
operate. The CIA can deliver, if it gets proper
guidance.
These are some things, on various levels,
that the CIA might be called upon to find out:
What is current production in Mine
817 in the Czech uranium fields? Is this
better than last year? Any labor trouble
in this particular mine?
How many of the leading Japanese
Communists have been in China recently,
and what was their experience there?
How many atomic bombs has the
Soviet Union?
an oil man may be asked for an opinion. Fi-
nally, the report goes to a special (and ultra-
hush-hush) panel of top-flight civilians not in
the Government. The membership of this panel
shifts according to the problem involved.
The original contributors are empowered
to comment on the finished product, and dis-
senting minority reports are permitted. Then
the documents go to the departments con-
cerned. the National Security Council and the
President, and become (in theory at least)
a solid basis of an overall, integrated national
policy.
Scene Shortcomings Criticized
These reports, though everybody concedes
that they are conscientiously and competently
done, have been roundly criticized on occasion
on three scores: (1) Since, by and large, so
many Government agencies sit in on their
production, they are likely to represent the
lowest common denominator of opinion. To
get agreement, everybody sacrifices something.
They are compromises, and compromise on
intelligence is bad. (2) The high level people
only begin to work after the junior experts
have paved the way, and these juniors-being
human - are not omniscient. The technical
staff at the bottom ought to be better. (3)
Even the wisest men are fallible on matters so
broad. Suppose we want to calculate the future
intentions of Mao Tse-tung toward India, or
of India toward Mao Tse-tung. Either cal-
culation will be quite a job.
Who decides what will go all the way up
to the President? Answer-the President. Mr.
Truman is interested in every aspect of the
CIA. and, quite aside from his role in supreme
decisions, he likes to keep his finger on every-
thing that is going on.
Should the CIA, instead of being co-
ordinator, be the boss? Should it in other
words, take over all other Government intel-
ligence functions? No. One reason is, that
neither the military nor the State Department
would agree. Another is that the CIA does
not want to be bothered with purely tactical
military intelligence. Another is that. al-
though it has a large scientific section, its
'unction in this field is primarily to be a co-
ordinator. since science is so specialized.
Does the present setup cause too much
duplication? Not necessarily. Duplication
means competition, which is good.
Can the CIA guarantee against another
Pearl Harbor? Certainly not. General Smith
has made this clear on several occasions. A
sneak attack from the air, or by sabotage,
is always possible; no radar screen, no intel-
ligence system, is or ever can be absolutely
fool proof. But the CIA thinks that it has
produced the focussing mechanism whereby,
if a sneak attack does occur, it can be countered
with the maximum of promptness and effi-
ciency.
"Intelligence is always an unfinished busi-
ness. We're never as good as we want to be,"
says General Smith. "We can't talk about what
successes we have achieved, because that
would give our hand away."
I met one high otikial in the Pentagon, an
old friend whom I trust. He talked about the
achievements of the CIA, and then said, "If
only I could tell you some of the things it's
done!"
Analysis *I Facts Is lasperiant
The CIA is an assembly line; it is not the
boss. For a large part of its intelligence, it
relies on other agencies. So a major question
is-How well does it evaluate?
On day-to-day issues, this is the province
of a special desk geared for quick action, and
its director works much like the city editor of
a big newspaper. Suppose a monitored broad-
cast, a news ticker, or the State Department
teletype reports that a West German Commu-
nist leader has made a cryptic, unexpected
speech saying such-and-such. Will this have
any effect on the American position in Berlin?
The report is reviewed by expert analysts-
who know German and Germany well. In a
matter of minutes, the first "flash" will be on
the appropriate desk; in a matter of hours, a
full report will be ready.
Every afternoon at a certain hour, the
day's entire grist of current information is
processed. The appraisals are worked over
during the evening and are ready for mimeo-
graphing by midnight: then they are delivered
to the customers the next morning. Some gq
straight to the President; some go to the Chiefs
of Staff.
On long-range matters, the procesas is
more complex. A series of "National Esti-
mates" is steadily in process of being written,
on every conceivable variety of topic dealing
with the country's interests. These are pro-
pared after elaborate consultation-not merely
within the CIA itself-but with representatives
of the various agencies who meet with General
Smith once a week, like the Office of Naval
Intelligence, the Army's G2, Air Force intel-
ligence and State Department experts. Out-
side people may be called in for consultation;
for instance, if a petroleum problem is at issue,
PSB C?operatas with CIA
Turn briefly now to the Psychological
Strategy Board-PSB-with which CIA works
closely. Just as CIA derives from the old OSS,
so-does PSB derive (in one sense) from the
old Office of War Information. The CIA, gen-
erally speaking, is an intelligence agency; the
PSB is concerned with cold-war strategy.
Neither makes policy, but the PSB has a hand
in developing policy.
"Psychological Strategy" really means
"Psychological Warfare." This, in turn, means
propaganda. The PSB works in all fields of
propaganda, both "black" and "white," but
most" of its activity is too secret for any de-
tailed mention. Both organizations are close-
mouthed, PSB only slightly less so than the
CIA. Shakespeare described their methods
well: "Seal up your lips, and give no words but
mum."
The PSB is housed in a smallish double
building in the middle of Washington, and
there is no name plate on the door.
The Presidential Directive (not Act of
Congress) which set up the PSB in 1951 has
been published only as a classified document,
Allen Belles, deputy director of CIA,
heads list of talented aides working for
Smith. During war. he served with OSS.
Leftas Broker beads CIA Intelligence
department. A New York lawyer, he was
wartime intelligence officer in (7ermany
Wa
oft
me
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it to map strategy
so
and few .n Washington know theorga isation's
reynphir resirresibiht s The name of the dt-
.ectur has liven pinted an a raaiun. but those
of his chid as.ntants are unswblslablr The
.ueanieainin is .mall. and its members are
haul-picked and slits They have to pass fair
drfl.?irnt ..run it% rhr?ka One of its sub-diree-
rur. u a writ-Itm-an professor of phibrophy.
.arc a n?w4.ap'rman with wide political ex-
giv.senn' in Europr and Asia and onw a diplo-
mat who. hap served in Moscow and Berlin
Dr Na' mind K Allen is director He s a
mdreal man 1wiih both M D and Ph D de.
trend who has a remarkable administrative
record fir has nest worked for the Govere-
mi-ni before. except on one brief job A North
Disk.-Ian. Dr Allen was barn in 1902. variously
he ha ben arratr dean of the Calker of
Physicians and Kurgn.ns as Columba Umver-
sity dean of the Wayne. University College of
Medicine. executive dean of the medical facul-
tin of Chicago College I t'nivrnrly of 111inois ).
pro sid eat of Ile Uneverxmy of Washington in
%raille. and ehanellw-draesnale of the Um.
virally of t'ahfurnia. Las Angeles Dr. Allen
is a forth.ighl. friendly man who wean heavy
slaws. has a drip voice, still keeps up with his
mrdreine and has plunged into his imsemst job
with great acumen and energy
glow the PRI Its So Up
The PSB is not "oprralanal " It has no
budget What money it nets it gets from other
Government departments Three mess. who
rnsutule its board give direction to Dr Allen.
and pass up their eeaofnaienndatuers to the Na-
ta-nai Security Council and the President The
three are David K L Bruce. in his capacity as
t'ndrrseerrlary of Slate. William C Foster. in
his capacity as Deputy SreMary of Defense.
and General Wolter Bedell Smith. head of the
CIA, who to chairman
The fromwn between CIA and PSB are
not altogether sharp But suppose. let us say.
that Country 74, a friendly state. has a trouble-
some Communist problem and wants help
frion us, The CIA will explore the situation.
tern it be..rrus IM funelion of the PSB to pee-
pare a plan This plan. when appeeved. s then
turned ever to the appropriate operating
agency of the Government The various P511
"plans' an far prepared and put in operation
are. of course, severely classified. and only a
fns Np-Right ts0rubts ever sea them Recently.
one had to do with proposals for the Integra-
law of West Germany into Western Europe
Partly. PSB was established to smooth
out wrangles ever spheres of influence between
the Pentagon and the State Department, and
to eliminate interdepartmental Jealousies The
sera chiefly responsible for setting it up were
Mr Truman himself. General Smith and Ad-
,",rat Kidney Sauces. former executive were-
larv of the National KrcurtlY Council.
In d. slay -to-day workings, the chief cam-
plamis over Pei11 are that. as with the CIA. its
di+isam, rmbrdy Into much compranue, and
that it takes far ter long to march them It may
take PKB six msusths or even longer to get a
plan ready. because at agar dent must be
r-aelyd with all the agencies cn rrned. and
1b) the really vital decisions arc an such a
Himalayan level. It is one thing to work out a
plan for, let us any. combating communism in
Germany. 11 is quite another to work out one
an.uch a question a "What shall be the future
Amrrm?an approach to nationalism in the Med-
dle East or "What should be duce about Arab
aspratans in North Afr.ca.cnsidennt French
interests there'" To answer these. the entire
fu ctionint mechanism of the Government. an
an extreme long-range.hsgh level, has to be
called into play
Pva is new, and is working hard Nobody
talks about results as yet One of its top *Metals
told m? '.rwhr..-'s no Hooper rating for the kind
of stuff we monkey with'"
um we Kamw Almost Swills
The entire complex apparatus described
in this article would not. of curie. be neces-
sary at all of American relations with the Sp-
rat Union were formal. Congress would not
give our enlelligcnee and propaganda services
a, much its they get of it were not for the Rus-
sian threat Nerve, the taxpaying ciluen has a
right. above all. to ask what the CIA and PSB
are doing vis-a-vis the Soviets, how will they
are stocking up Information and producing
plans for the future and what they think of
Russian intentions now Do we really know
what the Us 3 R. is up to'
The Russians are inordinately hard to
crack They are much more impenetrable than
were the Germans or Japanese before or dur-
ing the war
This serves to make our intelligence work
Wailer 4Y Wag. hanker is in sharp- Stuart Bsdlem, as insprrbor-ge?n?ral of
.4 Organrialn-n 114-ad -d a third depart- CIA. is irwblr-sh..-ter for Gen Smith
-..ino lover AtUVdrs. can't be named 1k. an e11-bsaessi an. cdlrre trustee
on the Soviet Union inhumanly di$eult What
we rely on most is a fiercely tarp scrutiny of
the whole Russian economy. rat merely from
day to day. but tram month to month and year
to year Mainly the job is a slow, detailed, la-
borious. pdantic. dirty Job of meticulously
fitting together small bits of information.
The knowledge accumulated is then ap-
plied to the crucial problems that confront us-
for instance. Do the Russians intend to make a
aeneral war'
The CIA might set about analyzing this
problem as follows'
I No prohibitions against war exist in
Stalinist doctrine. war is recognized as an In-
strument in Russian national policy. There-
fore, on theory. the possibility of war cannot
be ignored.
2 The Russians are a severely realistic
people. and, before embarking on war, would
be certain to ask themselves if they would
gain or lase by such action.
3. To estimate their guesses on this, we
have to estimate how well they think they are
setting on with their present cold-war tactics.
Always we must work on two levels. (a) What
do they think, or. rather. what do we think
they think' Ib) What do we think'
4 It they think they are doing well with-
out war. war s unlikely. Moreover, they must
attempt to assess 1 a) what our response would
hr to aggressive action in Europe. lb) how vul-
nerable they are to counter attack. They know
will that the American Strategic Air Force
exists. and they probably have a toad idea of
what it could do. Will they make a war. it they
know that Moscow will be destroyed the next
morning'
S. A vast number of other, calculations
have to be attempted. For instance, the Rus-
sians might think that they could win a abort
war. But what about a long war. which would
brine into play the full power of American in-
dustrial production'
0 What about accidents? Could a blunder
start a war that no one wanted'
7 Could a civil war at Germany. if one
should occur. provoke a general war?
No human being can answer questions like
these with certainty or prepare exact plans to
take care of them. What the CIA and PSB are
trying to do is get the best possible consoli-
dated guess or estimate.
The American people can be sure they are
doing a first-class job
END
Rherman Kea. chief theoretician of the Dr. 4ymsmd B. Allen is
CIA. is assistant dirrctnr in 0111m .d Na. PSB head. works close to
tonal Estimates It.. an rx-OS-S man CIA in mid-war plans.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/22 : CIA-RDP9O-01208ROO0100080026-7