HOW WE SPY ON THE RUSSIANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100070045-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 45
• Publication Date: December 9, 1979
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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STAT'
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{ARTICLE AYP"'
ON P3GB,Zqq
THE WASHINGTON POST MAGAZINE
9 December 1979
) fro s
3 erwater,ra with
j _ the field to
monitor Soviet compliance wit S
e .view fro m headquarters, in Langley;-Va::`:is superfi
dally: serener The director's private elevator whisks* the visi
rto the top` floors ;where a corridor runs along the north*'
e to his uarters. The assngewaYis warmly c
q P arpeted; the
walls are hung with abstract. paintings in elegant ...
ii~ old=leafed frames. BY
-the elevator door hangs a
display of medals the.. CIA awards its officers for especially
meritorious or valorous service.
J
To the left is'the airy office of deputy director Frank
bassador in revolutionary Portugal To the nght
. is the office of the director of the Central Intel
ligence. Agency Retired Admiral ~_.
Stansfield`:':Turner, who ' occa ZY~~ '
signally invites journalists:
o==~T`backgroun
3 .limrhPs hit w}in
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 declined to be interviewed for.
this article:- _?
`Turner has resisted` strong
White House: pressure... to..::
speak out on. behalf of - the
SALT treaty now before the
U.S. Senate.: He refuses be-
cause he says - that. - would
undermine "the objectivity" of
the CIA.
The occasional visitor,.: lin_
gering over - the -: admiral's.
sherry and filet mignon, gazes ,
and tulip poplars., that, mas
ras}o mxn -'theme George Wash-=
ington ;..Farkway.,::
doesn't seethe..trees; hesees
What worries him, as:wellas
others, is:: Will the. Russians
play' by the rules of the -new
SALT II .treaty? And if they'.-
don't,--will -U.S.. intelligence
catch them cheating ---?--
Reconnaissance satellites
and .other:':.high-technology
gadgetry, are she -CIA's cools
for monitoring Soviet. compli
ante.. Thus,.. it was a . routine
event, several years ago,.when -
a photoanalyst in the CIA's
National Photographic . Inter
tinizing a "close-look'.' satellite-
sile fields.' :7 Suddenly, he
noticed suspicious excavation.",
The, analyst paused,'-; then
consulted' his superior.-
first SALT pact froze strategic-
arsenals and clearly", prohibited
construction of new ::missile
silos. The superior suggested ;;
waiting for..: fu rther.'_- photo-=
graphic evidence before raising `'
the issue with higher authors
ties.: That corroboration took;
time coming.. because in,:the -;
next-weeks clouds masked -the
misaile.sites_ When new photos
undeniable. = -Thousands-r --c
cubic yards of earth were being.
removed:` In; the end, the, U LA
would identify 110 sites where
such work was underway:.,
Informed of this,.Henry Kis+
,singer, then President Nixon's
assistant for national security,
ordered a "hold" on the pho-
tographs. That meant the pic-
tures could not leave the can-
ter or be published in the pen-.-
-.odic "compliance-.m reports"
;:which : the. CIA- puta.:together.-
.for-?senior. ofticials:Kissinger..
'`",then asked for. an explanation,
from the Soviet ambassador.
;.= Aquiet internecine battle in
the`. =bureaucracy followed.
Lower officials, unware of Kis-.
singer's private talks with Am-
bassador Anatoly Dobrynin,
became concerned about- the
:administration's .: apparent
coverup:: They began-suspect-?
competence. Eventually some
one leaked to the media.
L =Mianwhile, Dobrynui=tol
-Xissinger that.the_"silos" were
not for missiles:They-were..
``command and'coi trol". sites,.
the' Russiain `said. Kissinger-:
protested- that the sites were",::
;identical to missile s~los.~
..-`You'll.sea they are differ-
ent,"" Dobrynin said."Wait:"-
-Eventually
'Eventually,.the CIA report
- the. Russians: were fitting
silos which
contained electrical cables for -
m~nds to missiles surrounding
the command. post:- The. ad- .
`ministration accepted the ex
_planation, although some off
cials: continuedto.worry that.
the. command-:'silos could be
converted to:: launch--_'
he flag over the so- ?
called":" 3X"_:: silos,
1 :ous aetivities,:Ied=to
s ~ the painful:..refine-:s
~_ ment of.a new mechanism for
monitoring SALT.:, Tile=? focal
point of they:"SALT-verifca-.1
=tion7.bureaucracy is a: CIA=a
committee .called ,the DCI's_
ence's);Steering Committee on ,
.Sr1LT~=Its Yobis.tolook;for
~p'oeaible SAL'I'~viola iion~= -
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Every day U.S. intelligence
agencies take in a raft of mate-~
ria1 on activities -'w'ithin th
Soviet Union and around the',
world. The Defense .Intelli.':
gents Agency assembles re-
ports on Soviet weapons Pro-;
duction. The National Secu--
rity Agency (created by secret
in-195?), k
residential directive
p
d* yes G'
at:. Fort Meader .Nl ., .ea _it
drops on Soviet military com j
naunications, missile tests and
-
11
radar impulses.. The' super
-:secret,:.:I`?iational.:.Reconn3is- '
lance Of-Lice (this Pentagon
ency is so secret official are'
not allowed, to, acknowledge it
'ems) runs the U.S. spy satel- life program. And.theCLA re-'
`
:: ceives reports :from ? agents in
Eastern:%,~= Europe;X-and . even
from inside the Soviet Union. if
committee and,
The steering
its Monitoring Working Group
sift through ,these .materiakl.'
The steer in- committee does
not label ambiguous activities
violations -'Declaring a
as.
ion- is -a poli
violat tical Judge
;anent thade only. at the White
ogniew .Brzezinslsi, Presi
`dent;Carter's national security
:,he
Paffairs' adviser,. .receives
1,DCI's reports.'and refers theii
to -the Cabinet-level Special
,ICoordination Committee of
the National Security Council
.This committee; in turn, refers j
j~them to the. SALT::Working
:.Group, and its- subgroup, the
SALT -Backstopping Commit=
",tee.'. Somewhere between the
g -and the Oval'
_.woxkin groups
Off ce a decision is made as to
whether a violation has been
detected, and what to do about
it..It is a mark of the end of
G_.Cold War that the two super.-
1 ~ ;,n aTG rrAAtA a 'mechanism i
to deal with compliance prootr
gems that might-.arise under i
the: first.,SALT agreement-
the'' : Standing ' .-.Consultative ~
Commission; also known ~Jag!:
:-twice a year in Switzerland to:..
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Russians, for example, s~ -- "C; ---
t, deceptively screen apicture or.zne
=that' the: United States was ? keep -it secr
it the e Baikonur Cos `--then- one.; Of. North America;
hiding something by covering :.naming
certain Minuteman- missile n:od.rome' after the town of then one of the Fast Coast,"'
sites : vYi:h, "environments:" I Baikonur, v nicb a a' o kuome she r--calls- "`Next the" showed
covers. They also. asked-why ters to the northeast.. Few for- _a picture of Manhattan-. They
clicked it down and you could.-
' were living in Atlas eigners have ever been allowed ity
squatters see Columbia Univers They;
.missile silos which were deac- to visit the false-"Baikonurf v d you
ain all
~;ated in 1965. Both sides feel whicli= c ontains- is -; launchers _ clicked it down ag
SCC has functioned sans- for-testing ICBMs. When via' could see the lettering ti on the.
like Archime-
th
e
Ilon lbrary names
werewi ,factorily: tors did come they .4-;,: ...:.:- i
it ha worked Q t. ! . - des. Then they clicked it down
I woui'i . say in at nigh ctually --
deception;'again, and You could a y,
th
i
e
up
well," says U.S., chief negot
a- ,= .To -keep- for Ralph Earle; who defended Soviet - o cials -passed`:-out- see a student on the -steps:of
;
es Butler Library reading a copy
di
nat
coor
daily be-
`the SALTII treaty false fore the Senate Foreign Rela= -for.:the center and"instructed of the .Columbia Spectator,.
he
_
ou could make out t
and -
li
y
ne:
-date
I
"The discus-
flogs Committee. =Soviet jousnabets~ tQ= w. -=
dlines." Vic
'=? r
- =_
~:'
h
n
'
'
~
...
ea
?d
rian
r
4
i%sto-ness on Sovie
signs there. have been : frank tha 4
, to = Tfie Air Force; asked to sup
rse, ke
,
r
and open; and every dispute ;mi$s~on Bai3onu for pu`u
' g do . ply these photographs
. cum
__., ent3;
has been resolved." rb the- SAL
tography has played such a =edged that"Tyuratanfris _a test- : headquar era
-no .one: who. remembered :tx-ati
crucial role in watching the ing site-,y
on however;
pers, Soviets; the Caner administra- Any astute
could have obtained a satellite- Rep., Lea -::Aspin= (D-Wis),
flog toyed with the idea of re
leasing some of the high-read- photograph of, the center -by` =chairman. of=the-House::sub
lotion photographs in its effort asking the . U.S. Geological committee=:
persuade the Senate ' intelligence
of U S: oversight, disclosed earlier this':.
Survey to supply coverage of '
ability- to. monitor the- agree the geographical coordinates, l year `the ..best U.S. satellites'
intelL-~ 63?4' I ? can clearl distinguish an:ob=
ment But' :- cautious. 45`6'_ North latitudes Y
genre:veterans- prevailed;=ands East longitude, the true posi= :jest one foot long from an alti
the bast work of the satellites tion of the "Baikonur- Cos-,: tude.-of lpp miles. P Bat'
were-kept under lock and key rnodrome " -That-: -Landsat.. control specialist "What it came down to," nett, arms con
: satellite photograph : of -,'the`: the Union of Concerned Scien_
says Leslie Gelb,. who until- re- center, if compared to a Soviet fists, says U.S. satellites may
cently was a key SALT advo-- map, shows clearly that "Balk ado. better than that,-defining:
the State Depart=' ds an. object 'as small as three or::I
onur's"geography correspon
cate-and ran four inches from 100 miles:
ment's Bureau of Politico-ivlil- convincingly with the Tyura- Satellite : photography _ bas
nary Affairs, `-'was thesIippery tam area which lies along the
Syr. Dar'ya River and' the rail-. made : remarkable ' strides in
-,-:,Slope-` M. you -released - some
photographs, youu. would be. way the-czars built to connect the.last 20 years. The U.S. Big
under pressure to release Orenburg in - the' -Urals=:with Bird satellite passes over the %
Seviel U every 90 min-
more, and there was no, tel3ina -.Tashkent. It .does not - corre-. scanning large swaths of
where it would ens' `' spored at all with the little utes,
-Some of the lower resolution "sheep town of Baikonur at the territory. On command, it can
photographs-.taken:` by,'U.S_- end of the railway line running zoom in fora closer look. It de;,-.
earth--resources satellites have _ west. from Karaganda 'and "livers its take by jettisoning up
para= ?
canisters of film by
-become available= and they built between the two World -to six chute. These are scooped up in'!,
ffal`s -unique opportunity-
S,yyhook C-1309
:lift the-secrecy surrounding a What the Tyuratam picture mid-air by ;?
number of Soviet installations,- _ cannot convey is the sharpness (see photos page 30) or he-
most notably the missile test:. of detail of the best reconnais- licopters, or are retrieved from,
center and-space headquarters - photographs Gloria the ocean by Navy ships..' .::
at Tyuratam- This canter `Is Duffey, a former research as= j The newest satellite, the
one of the Soviet strategic .LS : ` sistant to Brzezinski at Colum -KH-ii, is even -more sophisti-
bia University, recalls a briefer cated..Some of its capabilities
Bile test sites (the other is at-l
n aerial -and satellite.pho- i became known because of the
Plesetsk; 62?8' North latitude, g o
40?1' :East longitude}. =It: has tography she attended espionage .: trial : of Edward
also been the starting point for , March J 976 at the Strateo c . Kampiles, 93,'a disgruntled I
a
.all the- early ' Sputniks; all Air Command; Omaha, Neb._.I CIA employe who sold a KH=
1l manualtoaSovietagentin
manned flights; all planetary Ath
s
en
and lunar probes,. some com-
munications satellites and as-.
-
_,
sorted military vehicles.-'
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 wide-look and close-look func-
tions. It turns what it sees into
electronic impulses: which are
then transmitted to. earth..
The KH-11 is believed to. carry
an on-board computer capable
of comparing shots taken from
similar positions in space and
noting changes. Once'the KH--
11 images are transmitted to
earth, they are reconstituted
into viewable photos. - -
Scientists have found that
"false color" images : possess-
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advantages over ordinary color
or black-and-white.. By. .taking -
pictures . in different bands of
the^coioi`sp ,-_:photoan
alysts can-spot distinctive fee-'
turns. For example, the human..
eye cannot : distinguish be-:
tween green paint on a missile
silo and surrounding foliage of:'
trees. But. infrared photogra-
phy will _ turn foliage bright
? -
red, and green paint blue.'
"The satellite photographs,
are remarkably versatile," says
William Colby, former director
of the CIA "We've used them.
occasionally to check up on the
credibility of Soviet defectors.:
A defector might tell you'
something, and then you could
go photograph it and see if it_:
made sense. Or you could pho-
tograph his hometown, - then
quiz him about-the. layout of. ..
various buildings, and. so forth;'
and see how good a memory he: ,had, or how accurate his obser'
vations were..)
Colby.:. is an. international :
lawyer for_..the ,Washington - '
firm. of Reid and . Priest. '
strong advocate of SALT 11; he
stresses openness.
"The more the _` .United...
States and Soviet Union know'
about each., other, the better'.
off. we'll b,..:_he` says icily.
"That's what' T told Brezhnev
myself. t.
The Soviet- Union, Colby:;
says, is:'a closed society;:"de
spite its huge output in books,'.,
gazines and news reports. Fur-
thermore, the Soviet Union is
unlikely to become- as open as
the United States in the for-
seeable future. Therefore,
Colby says, the American espi-
onage effort must go on.
Military . . communication
satellites link.:-." Secret ' agents
with ? headquarters. ' . These
store/dump : ?:,;aatellitea ,
re-=-retransmitmessages which are fired'off in_
rapid bursts by agents and, it
is hoped, avoid detection- by
the -adversary's counterintelli-
gence.?.. -`-._
"Ferret" satellites listen to
the other side's ..electronic
emissions which reveal details
of air defense systems, disclose
heightened states of military
readiness, and provide data on ,
military-- operations..:: The tt'
United -States, for example, {
monitored the desperate com--
munications between ground
control at the Baikonur Cos-,
modrome and Cosmonaut -Via- '
_dimir Komarov, whose Soyuz- 1~
1 spacecraft -_ malfunctioned, _
killing him on re-entry..
Before Komarov was. or-
dered down April 24, 1967,
Soviet premier Aleksei Kosy j
gin- and.. Komarov's -wife were
-:patched through to the spaceman in distress for an extraor-.
':.dinary, and touching, ,.leave-
-The NSA refused to release
a transcript of the interchange,
or even= tb confirm --its exist-
ence, in response. to a Freedom
of Information--petition,--even
though-the London Daily:Tel.
egraph:-published'an account]
,.of incident in-1975-based
-ocean interview with the inoni.-
- The monitor said the Soviet'
ground command directed Ko-
marov to take certain manual
actions.
"I am doing it, but it doesn't
work," the cosmonaut replied
in frustration.
When it became - obvious
both the space -ship . and.-
Komarov - were . doomed,
Komarov's wife was patched
-through to the craft- - - -
"I love you, I love you," she
cried in great distress..'-
`.`I love you too,'..' he replied,
"and the baby,.and the baby.-
Go home now. Go home." `.' ?
A: came
on the aii:_ - _
"You and.`your kind made
the'-greatest achievements in
Russian history," Kosygin said
- solemnly-_are_. proud of
you..'You-. will.:always : be
remembered." _...
The ship tumbled in orbit
-and neither ground control nor
Komarov was able to stabilize .
it. The main parachute- failed. -i
to open- properly and tangled
with the emergency parachute.
Just before ground control lost
.contact with Komarov,.:. he {
screamed: "You've got to do'
something. I don't want to die
ne of. the most dif-
ficult tasks of the.,
intelligence . com
munity is to keep
from-drowning in
.amass of raw data. The size of
A he Soviet Union--the world's
largest country, with 8.65
mil-=
lion square miles of territory--'
complicates the organizational
headache. The:. U.S.S.R. e'x-::
tends 6,000 miles from Easterri
.Europe -to - the - Pacific and;
arches through it time zones=
_It-._stretches 3,000._ miles from
north '_to south- - Knowing.:
where- to--look; and' what - to
:.look for, is the, key: to the pho-toanalysts'
O~~I~iU~9
esides taking pho-
tographs, satellites
do- numerous other
jobs in the spy busi-
!1000
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starting point. Unlike the
United States, the Soviet
Union does not. have a highly
developed road system, and 95 j
percent of its freight moves by
rail or inland water. Therefore,
since the balloon and U-2 spy
flights of the 1950s, intelli-.
gence experts have been scru-
tinizing railways.
The railways lead to many
interesting places-to tank
and munitions factories as well
as to the medium-range and
intercontinental missile fields.
'The fields, covering dozens of
square miles and containing 50:
cally located- near spurs off the:
main railroad line throughout::,
the central part of the Soviet==
Union..:.
Shipyards: 'are --:.relatively--_
easy to spot because they are
large installations near open.
water or. on. the .: Volga River
where much of the--work is
Although the 'Soviets have
begun covering over their'sub-.
marine yards, eventually the
boats slide down the ways and
tie up at docks where their
missile-launching tubes are
easily counted from space. .
' Naval intelligence looks for
other developments as well.-
Sometimes what is detected is
confusing and deceptive, such'
as arbitrary changes in hull
numbers. The Kiev helicopter
carrier, for. example,' changed
its hull number from: 860 in
1976 to 812 in 1978..
During the last 30 years, Air
Force ~- intelligence.:. ' has -. de-
ployed enormous resources to
identify Soviet aircraft facto-:_
ries and design bureaus as well
as to assess their potential and
actual production. History has
lent a helping hand.
In -1946;>the Russians dis=
mantled whole factories.-from
the Soviet-:zone ? of;:Germany
and 'signed. up thousands of
German technicians to work in.
the": Soviet.- : Union._- Knowing
German factory layout and.
work habits, Air Force. intelli-..
gence made detailed,. estimates.
of , Soviet- capacity-: They
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ponents to factories and devel-
oped an input-output formula
based on German experience
and tested in practice, to pre-
.dict Soviet aircraft output.
"In estimating aircraft pro-_
duction, says Ray Cline, CIA
deputy director "for. intelli-
gence from 1962 to 1966, "we
can often observe aircraft.
parked outside factories. Our
estimates may be as good as 1
percent. But what you worry
about is whether the Russians
will introduce a new factory
secretly that you haven't spot
".The.Ai Force_ha:identified
;:1.6-::major :aircraft --design
bureaus -which are associated
-with. one to three factories.-
Where possible the Air Force-'
I -I
has obtained photographs of .
these plants, . some . of them
snapped by cooperative tour-
ists or military attaches. U.S.--
- experts are now watching for
the appearance of at least two
to replace the TU-95 and
Myasishchev-4 which are
counted under terms of the.
SALT treaty.
Most Soviet weapons sys
. tems are derivatives of earlier
technology, which has helped
the intelligence community
enormously in following Soviet
missile development. The Rus-
sians, who were well-versed in
the physics of rocket propul-
sion, used .the German V-2 as
the . starting point for their,
first medium-range missiles.
Sergei Korolyov (1907-1966)
who lived-under the secret title
of "chief `designer of rocket-
cosmic systems" for : many.
years, is the designer of the SS=
6, the Soviet-Union's first.in-
tercontinental ballistic rocket.&
This -ICBM first flew in Au
. gust-1957 from -Tyuratam and
developed .into the workhorse.
Vostok space booster:_which.is:-
One : of Korolyo'v's chief-'
rivals,.: M..- K.:;Yangel J191 1
Dne
etro
ro
d hi
9
..+?.
p
p
s
1) an
1
design bureau is credited with.1
developing the: major Russian,-1
strategic = missiles: - the'. SS-7,..
SS-9,... SS-17. and -the - SS-18; .
which can : deliver:-:,15,400
pounds of nuclear warheads. ;-
omei is the designer of the SS-
8, SS-11 * and SS-19 missiles;
V.N. Nadiradze is credited
with the SS-13, SS-16 and SS-
20s:.
To follow the capabilities of
these - missiles, the United
States monitors Soviet missile -j
tests closely. Electronic posts
near' the Soviet borders cap-
ture technical data which each
missile sends back to ground
controllers on 50 radio chan-
nels. The data .tell how- well j
the engines burn, rate. of fuel
flow, performance of pumps,.
separation of stages, guidance,
vibration:and-so-forth...; .
The--- National-::'- Securit
Agency operates posts at Ka-.
ramusel, Bexbasi,:. Princep,
Sinop and Diyarbakir in Tur- .
"key to follow medium-range.,
missile tests from Kapustin
Yar in central, Russia. These :
listening -posts are being up-
graded. to fix on strategic
rocket tests as well. Two posts
in Iran-Tacksman-I - and =
Tacksman-1I-acquired data -
from=the first stage engines of
long-range missiles. - The
United States lost these-posts
in the Iranian revolution and -
has not been able to replace
their functions entirely.
- To monitor:-the reentry of
warheads, the United States .
built an extremely sophisti- '
cated phased-array radar at
Shemya Island. in the Aleuti-
ans. Known -as Cobra Dane,
the radar is composed of 15;
360 active- radiating elements
- which can transmit pulses to
track 100 objects simulta
neously. Officials say. Cobra
Dane can detect an object the
size . of a basketball at 2,000
miles and help.identify a mis-
sile ; attack" 1 on the United
States .. coming o.-aeross the
-North Pole-,.,,--. 1'j,'
C~i~ - 1"o . S)
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 o'I don't believe we've
missed any major tests, and we.
were not surprised by them
first ICBM tests in 1957," says]
Herbert Scoville, who was as
sistant CIA director for scieni
title intelligence at the time.i
That is important because
most experts believe the Rus-'f
sians would not deploy a newt
rocket, or new warheads, with-1
out thoroughly testing them.
The likely development of
the next generation of Soviet
missiles is predictable, experts
say. The Russians,- - unlike
Americans,..-maintain perma
nen& desig bureaus...Their
products are: the. l"ogicat-devel .
opment of new technology ap-1
plied to earlier systems. U.S.
officials predict the Soviets
will -develop a mobile ICBM
(counterpart to.the-proposed
American MX) ivhich. will be
--icy fuel
ed
"I estimate they will be
using a basing.. mode already
familiar to them like the [me-.
dium-range) SS-20," says Dr.
William Perry, chief of 're-
search at the Pentagon. "The
SS-20 is solid-fueled and very.l
successful.
"They'll probably go road-
mobile. They have to limit
size, and, therefore; if mobile,
they will go small, even smal-
ler than our MX. Since they
don't have as many roads, they
will be limited in size and de-
ployment." ' . _ ...:
Perry believes the Russians
are also trying -to develop a
high-energy laser beam to in-
capacitate U.S., spy satellites.
"They seem to have made a.
judgment that lasers. ought too
...be introduced --into--. weapons
technology," he says. '-'We are-
watching what they are doing
..very. carefully.'
o-nitori-ng-.
strategic born-.'
hers,' .nuclear
j
.
submarines,
missilesilos
.and technology. limited= by:7
SALT, of course,. is. only part'
.of the intelligence -communi==.
ty's effort against-? the Soviet'
Union. A major priority is
guarding, against a surprise ]P-
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clear ' attack:. If the Russians '
were to fire-their-giant SS-18s
a;ainst_ the .U.S.i Minuteman-
m: rile force;'= (eventually
against the 1~MX}' the United
States would get about a half
hour's warning.. Submarine-
launched missiles could wipe
out cities and industry in three
minutes or less.- No city could
-be warned in three minutes,
.'but a half 'hour's : ,warning
would give the White House
time to shift. its mobile mis-
siles about 'to avoid. destruc-
tion-or to fire them. r
To get that half-- hour- of
warning, the. United States has
-positioned -two= early-warning
satellites -above Panama, one
looking toward the Pacific, the
`other toward-the Atlantic. A.
third satellite is stationed over
the Indian Ocean and stares
'down at the Soviet land mass: .
:These satellites are parked at
an altitude of 22,300 miles in
-synchronous orbit,
"geo
which means they-: revolve at
-.,the same rate as the earth, al-
'ways hovering .over the- same. J
spot.
Each reportedly carries 12- 1
foot-long, infrared telescopes
that detect the searing -heat
of the exhaust plumes of flying
missiles. Should they detect a
launch, the satellites would
-immediately signal U.S. com-
mend headquarters. Tests
have shown that the infrared
,sensors are not perfect and oc
casionally do not discriminate'-
:between exhaust plumes and
? `: from
radiation _:..'-reflected,
-brightly lighted bigli-altitude
clouds. A- similar. problem last
September- plagued - the - Vela
satellite, .which detected a
flash: -of ? light in: the Indian-
.Ocean that appeared to he a
nuclear . explosion- set off. by
=South Africa.'But the satellite:.,
-was unable to positively ideas
' tiry itSome-experts think it
may have been a super-thun- j
~derbolt:= _=fir;.'--y-:? =`
I.n addition toearly-wanting
atellites,-the NAVY operates a
series =.of `ocean surveillance,
satellites=used_to`spot the de-n
parture-of Soviet submarines' _i
= from port and to keep track of '
surface== ships _ lying' the::
oceans.: An=ocean aurveillance-l
satellite-can-spot a submarine-.
1n.. clean'-water -. at.. - shallow-1
depths. Scientists are report-
edly working on a sensor to de-.
tect hot water discharged by a
nuclear sub from the cooling
?systern around th _ reactor
core. ,-. - I
'
? submarine
Once -a S oviet
-leaves port, the Navy tries to
keep track of its position at all
times, - although officers say
they frequently can determine
only its approximate location.
As'-_part of its anti.subma-
rine warfare - program, ' the
Navy - has drawn. on - 'hydro-
acoustics; the science of under-
water sound waves. It is a fact.
-of physics. that.: every moving
'hull makes its own distinctive
noise. The bow wave, the flow
of water along the hull, and
particularly, the rhythmic
thudding of the screw produce
a telltale "signature.';.
-
Oneof the reasons the Navy
- follows Soviet ships during sea
trials is to.record these sound
patterns on magnetic tape.
=The taxies are sent to the Na-.
tional Security Agency at: Fort
Meade, Md., where a catalogue
of Soviet ship sounds is main-
--tanned;
Underwater hydrophones,
-- helicopters =- with "dipping
sonar,'.' destroyers, attack sub-
marines - and 'reconnaissance .
-:aircraft= constantly- listen for
the sounds of Soviet. subma- !
nines,- and the Russians know.
it, as -evidenced by- erticles in
-'-their technical journals.' They i
are. presumably_ working on countermeasures, such - - as
blowing air bubbles around
the ship's hull to alter noise
ood surveillance
requires an ' inti-
mate knowledge- of
-Knowing how the
-Russians build their weapons
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helps in designing counter- 1
ma3ure6 aa'#ell as in building_
e[ e