CASEY AND HIS C.I.A. ON THE REBOUND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100050039-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 39
• Publication Date: January 16, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

u11
STAT
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71'?
LIZ;
The Director is
presiding over the
biggest peacetime
buildup in the
intelligence
community in 30
years, even as the
agency faces
continuing-
questions from
critics about its
intentions, integrity
and capabilities.
THE NEW YORK TIMES 1AGAZINE
16 January 1983
By Philip Taubman
illiam J. Casey, the Director
of Central Intelligence, sat at
the end of the mahogany con-
ference table in his office.
Outside, the late afternoon
sun played across the trees
that ring the Central intelli.
gence Agency's headquarters
in northern Virginia, filling the windows with a
fresco of autumn colors. A short stack of docu-
ments, some stamped SECRET. rested at Mr.
Casey's left elbow, and a yellow legal pad on which
he had penciled several notes was positioned to his
right. .
"The reason I am here is because I have a lot of
relevant experience and a good track record," Mr.
Casey said, alluding to comments that he was un-
qualified for the job and had been appointed only
because he was Ronald Reagan's campaign man-
ager. Mr. Casey. an imperious and proud man, had
been fuming over the criticism for months, accord-
ing to his friends, and now, in his first comprehen.
sive interview since taking office. he wanted to set
the record straight.
He flipped through the papers and extracted a
yellowing clipping from The New York Times that
extolled his record as chairman of the Securities
and Exchange Commission from 1971 to 1973. Next,
he provided several pages copied from a book about
Allied intelligence operations during World War II;
be had underlined a glowing assessment of his con-
tribution to the Office of Strategic Services. The
final clipping was a story that appeared in The
Washington Star in the summer of 1980, describing
Mr. Casey's role as Reagan campaign director.
The headline: "Casey, the Take-Charge Boss."
It was an oddly defensive performance for a man
who, according to classified budget figures pro-
vided by Government officials, is overseeing the
biggest peacetime buildup in the American intelli-
gence community since the early 1950's. Because
intelligence expenditures are secret, it is not widely
known that at a moment when the Reagan Admin-
istration is forcing most Government agencies to
retrench, the C.I.A and its fellow intelligence or-
ganirations are enjoying boom times. Even the
military services, which have been favored with
substantial budget increases, lag well behind in
terms of percentage growth, although military-run
intelligence agencies are growing almost as
quickly as the C.I.A. Spending figures for intelli-
gence agencies, including the C.I.A., are hidden
within the Defense Department's budget. With a
budget increase for the 1963 fiscal year of 25 per.
cent, not allowing for inflation, compared with 18
percent for the Defense Department, the C.I.A. is
the fastest growing major agency in the Federal
Government, according to Administration budget
officials-
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On its own terms, the C.I.A. is indisputably on the
rebound. The staff has increased and morale has
improved. A quarter of a million Americans, many
c` whom saw the C.I.A.'s sophisticated ("Wye May
Have a Career for You") recruiting ads in newspa-
pers and magazines, got in touch with the agency
about jobs last year. Ten thousand, most in their
late 20's with college degrees and experience in
fields that involve foreign affairs, submitted for-
mal applications and 1,500 were hired. The C.I.A.'s
work force, another figure the agency has kept se-
cret. now tops 16,000, according to intelligence offi?
cials, and is growing.
An increased number of intelligence estimates
and analytical reports are flowing to policy
makers, and they appear to be better timed to coin-
cide with policy debates. Overseas operations have
expanded. including covert actions intended to in-
fluence events in other countries, and President
Reagan has given the agency authority to conduct
operations in the United States. As part of a con.
certed effort to enlarge its focus of interest beyond
the Soviet Union and other traditional intelligence
targets, the agency is devoting new resources to the
i study of issues long neglected or ignored, including
economic and social developments in specific re-
gions around the world.
I But the C.I.A. is trying to overcome a legacy of
troubles and combat a corrosive undercurrent of
doubt about its intentions, integrity and capabil-
ities. Just as Mr. Casey has found it hard to shake
his image as a high-rolling financier and political
operative miscast as the head of a sensitive, nonpo-
litical_agency, the C.I.A. has found it difficult to,
shed the,reputation it gained in the mid-1970's as a
rogue agency guilty of swashbuckling abuses of
power.
Some developments during the last two years
have not helped. Although the agency maintains
that its coven operations have limited objectives
and are carefully controlled, some American and
Honduran national security officials say that the
activities in Central America amount to a secret
campaign to overthrow the leftist Government in
Nicaragua, an objective that goes beyond plans ap.
proved by the White House and clashes with the de-
clared policy of the Government. Secretary of State
George P. Shultz and other top officials have said
that the United States hopes to resolve regional
problems through negotiations.
18 months of the Reagan Administration, have been
granted access to Mr. Casey and some senior offi-
cials. He gave his first extended interview to The
Times for this article. Mr. Casey, with one excep-
tion, declined to discuss personnel or budget mat-
ters.
O
While it has been popular to attribute the C.I.A.'s
problems to the hostility produced in the mid.1970's
by disclosures of past abuses, and the internal up-
heavals that followed, the C.I.A. was headed down-
hill long before the first stories were published
about assassination plots and domestic spying ac-
tivities.
Following a period of rapid and sustained growth
in the 1950's that was tied to the tensions of the cold
war, the C.IA. began to feel budget pressures in
the mid-1960's as Johnson Administration officials
turned a critical eye on the cost effectiveness of
agency spending. At the same time, the demands of
United States involvement in Southeast Asia acted
as a centrifugal force on agency resources, puil,ittg
more and more of the agency's budget and work
force into secret military and intelligence opera-
i
t
ons in Laos, Vietnam and Cambodia.
Meanwhile, vast sums of money were invested in
the technology of intelligence, including photo,
reconnaissance satellites, communications-inter.
cept stations, 'computers and other hardware. As a
result, the human intelligence gathming system
was allowed to decay. Finally, there were the reve-
lations about ditty tricks, assassination plots drug
experimentation with unwitting human subjects,
surveillance of American citizens and the long
string of other abuses.
The cutbacks were greater than generally recag-
Many career State Department officials believe
that Mr. Casey and company, eager to support
some of the Administration's tough rhetoric about
the Russians, have twisted intelligence estimates
to accommodate policy positions. The new author-
ity to conduct domestic covert operations, though
presented by the Administration as no threat to
civil liberties, opens the door to intrusive intelli.
gence activities in the United States.
To dispel some of the distrust, and to display
what they view as important accomplishments,
Mr. Casey and his aides have launched something
of a public-relations offensive in recent months.
Journalists, who were turned away during the first
I nixed. During the 1970's, according to Mr. Casey,
there was a 40 percent reduction in funding for in.
telligence agencies and a 50 percent cut in the work
force. In covert operations, where some of the
worst abuses had occurred, the contraction was
startling. Classified figures made available by for-
mer intelligence officials show that the number of
agents and staff devoted to these activities, which
primarily involve paramilitary and political-action
efforts to influence events abroad, dropped from
more than 2,000 in the mid-1960's to less than 2D0 by
the end of the Carter Administ ation.
TDe numbers alone, though dramatic, do not cap.
ture the turmoil and skidding morale that accom.
panied the C.I.A.'s declining fortunes. The image of
the C.I.A. as an elite service, cultivated by the
agency for decades and embraced by its employ-
ees, eroded. Hundreds of veteran analysts and
agents retired early. Directors were hired and fired
like baseball managers, with five different men
heading the agency between 1973 and 1977. In addi?'
tion, almost an entire generation of college stu.
dents,. disillusioned by the Vietnam War and the
behavior of the C.I.A., considered employment at
the agency a stigma, depriving it of fresh talent
and energy.
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Starsfield Turner, the Director of Central Intelli.
gence in the Carter Administration, aggravated the
morale problem when he ordered a massive house.
cleaning in 197 and 1975. Mr. Turner, claiming re.
pots about the changes were exaggerated, says he
reduced the staff by S20 positions, but actually fired
only 17 people. He says the rest were removed
through attrition and that morale improved as a re-
sult. The upheaval may have been a necessary
though painful way of laying the groundwork for a
revitalized C.I.A., but the impact of all this on the
agency's operations was tangible. In the all-impor.
tant area of analysis, the point at which trends and
insights are pulled out of the mountains of raw in-
telligence information and translated into reports
for policy makers, productivity slipped sharply.
National estimates, the intelligence- community's
j final word on important. international issues,
dropped from an annual average of 51 in the late
1960's to 12 a year in the late 1970's. Mr. Turner in-
sists that the slippage was intentional. "1 don't
think that national estimates are a very efficient
way of preparing finished intelligence," he said.
"We did other kinds of estimates."
oon after moving into the director's ele-
gant but unostentatious seventh-Boor of-
fice at the C.I.A. complex in Langley,
Mr. Casey made his agenda clear: more
money, more manpower and more ag-
gressiveness. With the help of Adm.
Bobby R. Inman, Mr. Casey's top deputy
until last dune and a veteran of the
budget wars, the new Director quickly got White
House and Congressional approval for large spend-
ing increases, pushing the agency's budget toward
SI.5 billion. The current total exceeds that sum, ac-
cording to Congressional sources. Long-range plan-
ning calls for the C.I.A. to receive large annual in-
creases through the 1980's.
With more money guaranteed, Mr. Casey turned
his attention to the agency's actual operations.
"There's an image of Bill Casey as a tired, dodder-
ing, old man who's primarily interested in spying
on American citizens," Admiral Inman told a
group of retired agents earlier this year. -"The
image could not be further from the dynamo that I
worked with."
Mr. Casey, who is 69, is described by friends as
being a "voracious reader" and an amateur histo-
rian. Be has written several books about the Ameri-
can Revolution. His office desk is cluttered with I
stacks of recent volumes, and aides report that be
often startles intelligence analysts by citing infor-
mation from obscure books that they have not read.
For physical relaxation, Mr. Casey plays golf. He
blames improper footwear for a golfing accident
two summers ago that left him with a broken leg
and a badly bruised -
ego. Mr. Casey and his wife of I
40 years, Sophia, have a
daughter, Bernadette, who is
an actress.
Mr. Casey has not run the
C.I.A. by trying to forge a
consensus about goals. Nor
has he cared much for the
trappings of leadership, such
as ribbon cuttings, pep talks
to the staff and public pro-
nouncements. He prefers to
exercise authority directly,
succinctly and gruffly. Ac-
cording to aides, Mr. Casey
addresses problems by con-
sulting individually with
close associates in the C.IA
and a handful of outside
friends, including Leonard H.
Marks, a Washington lawyer
and former bead of the
United States Information
Agency; Charles Z. Wick, the
current head of the U.S.I.A.;
Maurice R. Greenberg, presi-
dent of the American Interna-
tional Group inc., a New
York financial-services com-
pany, and Senator Paul Ltix-
alt, the Nevada Republican
who is also a close friend of
President Reagan.
Mr. Casey, according to ?
aides, seeks the advice of old
friends because he feels that
intelligence specialists often
take too narrow a view of the
world. "He isn't dazzled by
the idea that people need all
kinds of expertise to under-
stand the political dynamics
of a foreign country," an aide
explained. "Casey believes
that too many agents get
caught up in the craft of gath-
ering intelligence and lose
sight of the big picture."
Mr. Casey makes decisions
quickly - even his critics
concede that be has a sharp,
penetrating mind - and most
often relays them to the staff
in terse instructions he dic-
taus early in the morning. On ?
more than one occasion. a
whole day's -schedule has
been disrupted when Mr.
Casey, dissatisfied with an in-
telligence estimate, canceled
his appointments and
produced a shower of stinging
instructions to his aides. His
temper and patience are no-
toriously short and his gruff,
no-nonsense style often
lapses into plain rudeness
that is a public-relations
man's nightmare.
While Mr. Casey has un
deniably gotten the C.I.A.
moving, there is some ques-
tion whether all. the motion
has been positive. From the
moment he was appointed,
there have been questions
whether he is the right man to
rebuild the C.I.A. A lawyer by
training, and a venture capi-
talist by inclination, Mr.
Casey is a self-made million-
aire from New York who
served. during the Nixon and
Ford Administrations as
Chairman of the S.E.C.,
Under Secretary of State for
Economic Affairs and head of
the Export-Import Bank. He
received his initiation in
spying during World War II,
when he directed Allied espio.
nage operations behind Ger.
man lines. Later, while prac.
ticing law in Manhattan, he
served as a member of Presi-
dent Ford's advisory board
on intelligence.
But Mr. Casey is also the
first Presidential campaign
director appointed to run the
C.I.A. By picking him, Mr.
Reagan, by design or not,
seemed to suggest that the di-
rectorship of Central Intelli-
gence was just one more pa.
tronage plum. (The Director
has the dual job of overseeing
the Government's foreign in-
telligence establishment, in-
cluding the National Security
Agency and the Defense In-
telligence Agency, while also
acting as head of the C.I.A.)
The appointment immedi-
ately generated fears that the
C.I.A. would be used to jus-
tify and support the Adminis-
tration's foreign policies
rather than serve as a source
of neutral information.
Mr. Casey, undeniably, is a
political animal. In 1966, be
ran unsuccessfully for the Re-
publican nomination for Con.
gress in Nassau County on
Long Island. Though dropping
out of front-line campaigning.
after the loss, he remained
very active as a Republican
Party fund-raiser and behind.
the-scenes broker.
Professional intelligence of-
ficials fear nothing more than
contamination by political in-
terests. According to Admiral
roman, who was director of the
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1 National Security Agency
from 197 to 1961, the key is
finding a balance between ac.
ress to fr~licv makers and ac-
rommodation to policy. "If
you're completely discon-
nected from the policy process,
you're likely to produce intelli-
gence estimates that are ir-
rcievant," he said in an inter-
view. "But you have to breed
and train your people to be ex-
tremely independent so that
they don't let the demands of
developing and defending
policy influence their judg.
merits."
Mr, Casey's record on this
cricial issue is mixed. The
great majority of intelligence
reports produced during the
last two years have been neu-
tral and untainted by ideolog-
ical prejudices, according to
a wide spectrum of national
security officials, many of
whom are not Casey boosters.
In some areas, however,
where the political heat is
particularly high, the agency
has adopted a more partisan
tone. Central America is
cited most often as an area
where the C.I.A. has
stretched to support White
House policy. Mr. Casey
strenuously dei'sies that the
agency has twisted intelli-
gence to support policy.
.%Ir. Casey has, made signifi-
cant, unpublicized changes in
the intelligence division, which
is staffed with thousands of
analysis, including hundreds
with Ph.D.'s, who examine
data on matters as important
as Soviet military capabilities
and as esoteric as steel produc-
tion in Bulgaria. "We found
that estimates had been kick.
ing around for close to a vear,
going through different
drafts," Mr. Casey said during
the interview. "We set up a
fast-track s stem. Rather than
a lot of pulling and hauling and
papering over of differences
between agencies, we want to
highlight differences and give
policy makers a range of
views."
Historically, the perform.
ance of the intelligence branch
has been varied. Repeated pre-
dictions that the Soviet Union
would become a net importer
of oil in the early 1990's proved
incorrect. These forecasts con-
tributed significantly to fears
in the Caner Administration
that the Soviet invasion of Af-
ghanistan presaged an even-
tual move into the Persian
Gulf. The agency also failed to
anticipate the groundswell of
opposition to the Shah of Iran
that led to his overthrow in
1979.
But throughout the Viet.
_/nam War, the C.I.A. bucked
The production of intelli- the optimistic assessments of
least in the Pentagon and accurately
ence repor at au ed the strength
-n te-a
theory, is the most important gauged
g and
acgv of the Viongd
function of the C.LA_ Of the North Vietnamese. More re-
four main divisions of the cently, analysts reported that
agency, known internally as trade sanctions against the
directorates, intelligence is Soviet Union would not see-
the most important because it ously impede the construc-
is, in effect, the link between tion of a gas pipeline from Si-
the agency and the policy- beria to Western Europe.
making process. The other President Reagan recently
three divisions are science canceled the
and technology, which han- pipeline sanc-
tions he had imposed.
dies everything from the pro- Mr. Casey's first move was
1. cessing of data on Soviet mis- to reorganize the operation.
site tests to the research and The change was long overdue.
design of new surveillance Instead of a system where sub-
satellites; support, which jects were divided by disci.
deals with logistics, com- line, with experts on the
munications and security, pSoviet and operations. which directs - sep.,.raepcrted economy,
from m for experts on
s on
clandestine intelligence col. I Soviet politics, he restructured
lection abroad and conducts the operation along geographi-
coven activities. cal lines, putting together all
the specialists on a given coun-
try or region.
In addition, he tried to in-
crease communication with
policy makers, seeking criti-
cal feedback on intelligence
estimates. Every night, the
C.I.A. Prepares an intelli-
gence report for distribution
to senior Administration offi-
cials the next morning.
Called the President's daily
briefing, or P.D.B., it covers
overnight developments
around the world and reports 1;
on important trends. Instead I
of turning the P.D.B. over to
White house aides to deliver
and discuss with senior offi-
cials, Mr. Casey arranged for
top-level C.I.A. analysts to
conduct the briefings and re-
port back to him every morn-
ing at 11 o'clock about their
comments and questions. "It
helps us determine and de-
velop the information and the
analysis they need for the
next day and for dealing with
issues on their forward agen-
da." Casey said.
To improve longer-range
management of intelligence,
Mr. Casey established a
weekly "watch". meeting of
top officials from the C.I.A.,
National Security Agency, De-
fense Intelligence Agency and
other segments of the intelli-
gence communit}'. In previous
years, such meetings were
held monthly. Mr. Casey also
approved the creation of two
new study centers, one to track
the flow of advanced American
technology abroad and the
other to examine the causes of
instability around the world
and to identify countries that
appear vulnerable to insurgent
movements..
"The idea is to assess
threats against other govern.
menu, particularly those of
close or special strategic in-
terest to us," Mr. Casey said-
'The Soviet Union has been
extraordinarily successful in
extending its influence world.
wide by destabilizing estab-
lished governments and in-
stalling and supporting new
ones which follow its line. In
recent years we have seen
some 10 countries taken into
the Communist sphere in this
way which are now being
used in efforts to take over
another 10 or so in much the
same way. This is a process
we work hard to spot and
measure and help friendly
governments avoid." Other
intelligence officials said that
countries on the agency's
danger list include Guatema-
la, El Salvador, Honduras,
Zaire and the Sudan.
He also encouraged the in-
telligence division to renew
the C.I.A.'s dormant relation-
ship with the American aca-
demic community in hopes of
injecting new ideas into the
intelligence system. "The ob-
ject is to keep the intellectual
juices flowing," Robert M.
Gates, the head of intelli-
gence, explained in an inter-
view. "Sometimes we don't
look enough at unorthodox
views. By sending analysts
out to the field, by sponsoring %
conferences and seminars,
and by consulting more
widely with outside experts,
we're trying to counter the
bureaucratic tendency to-
ward insularity and being
satisfied with the convert.
tional a-isdom."
Unquestionably, produc-
tivity has increased. The nuts.
her of national estimates; for
instance, has risen from the
-late 1970's average of 12 a year
to 36 in 1981. According to Mr.
Casey, the number will exceed /
60 this year. The subjects are
varied, and have included the
following: the balanceof
power in the Middle East,
Soviet strategic offersive and
defensive capabilities, the
strategic implications of Soviet
economic problems, Soviet de-
pendence on Western tech-
nology and trade for its mili-
tary buildup, the likely impact
and effectiveness of allied
trade sanctions against the
Soviet Union, the European
peace movement, the Mexican
financial crisis, the war 'be-
tween Iran and Iraq, intern- .
tional terism, Soviet and
Cuban involvementrro in Central
America, the prospects for
free elections in El Salvador.
the involvement of external
powers in the Salvadoran con-
flict. prospects for conflict in
southern Africa. .
But the quality of the re-
ports appears to vary consid-
erably. Soviet specialists : in
the Reagan Administration
say that evaluations of the
Soviet economy have in-
cluded impressive analyses
about raw-material prob-
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lens. capital shor?..ages and
other developments.
Donald Gregg, senior na-
tional security adviser to
Vice President Bush and a
former agency official, be-
lieves there has been an over.
all improvement in quality
and timeliness. "We're see-
ing a sharper focus on issues
now," he said. "Differences
of opinion between agencies
are highlighted, not sub-
merged the way they used to
be. and the estimates on spe-
cific issues are delivered in
time for consideration of
those issues by the National
Security Council."
J
Despite the general praise
for the agency's performance
from many consumers of in-
telligence in the Administra-
tion, the C.I.A. under William
Casey has shown a disturbing
tendency on some issues to
rally to the Administration's
rhetoric. State Department
and Congressional critics.
have accused the agency of
warping its analysis to ac-
commodate policy about Cen-
tral America. Early in the
Administration, for example,
Secretary of State Alexander
M. Haig Jr. charged the Rus-
sians and their allies with
supplying arms and money to
guerrilla movements in Cen-
tral America. When Mr. Haig
first made the accusation, in-
telligence officials privately
said. there was little informa-
tion to support it. The C.I.A.
hurriedly prepared a report
on the issue that indicated
there was heavy Soviet and
Cuban activity. Some offi-
cials contend the evidence
was thinner than the report
suggested. Wayne S. Smith,
until recently the head of the
American interests section in
Havana, has charged that the
evidence of Cuban support
was exaggerated.
Later, three Democratic
members of the Senate For-
eign Relations Committee, an-
gered at the quality of an intel-
ligence briefing on Latin
America, complained to Mr.
Casey in a letter that the brief-
ing "evidenced a rhetorical
tone and selective use of infor-
mation which bordered on
policy prescription rather than
a straightforward analysis of
available intelligence data."
Last September, the House
Intelligence Committee pub-
lished a report about Ameri-
can intelligence on Central
America which, while prais.
ing the overall quality, found
numerous instances of over-
simplification and exaggera.
tion. In a briefing on outside
interference in Central Amer.
ica given to the committee in
March, for instance, intelli.
gence officials stated that
''lots of ships have been
traced" from the Soviet
Union to Nicaragua. When
asked' how many. ships,: the
C.I.A. later responded that
there had been only "a few."
The committee report also
noted that the C.I.A., while
producing a large volume of
information about leftist
guerrillas in El Salvador, had
the intelligence community
that such outside interference
in Central American affairs
was continuing.
A related issue is the some
times aggressive way the
Reagan Administration has
used intelligence information
to justify its policies. Though
the practice is hardly a new,
one in Washington, one intel-
ligence official said this Ad-,
ministration has turned more
often than most to what he
called "a highly selective use
of information favorable to
the Government's position."
The political edge that has
slipped into some of the intel-
ligence reporting is much
more evident - and troubling
- in operations, the area
where Mr. Casey has made
the agency more assertive.
Despite his active involve
intelligence orations here
and abroad. The first order
was adoptet_ by President
Ford in the wake of revels.
tions about intelligence ex-
cesses. The Ford order, and a
subsequent one signed by
President Carter, set strict
'limits on C.I.A. operations,
prohibiting assassinations
and other extreme measures
abroad. The orders also ruled
out agency operations within
the United States to prevent
any recurrence of domestic
spying abuses. W. Casey and
Admiral Inman, while prefer-
ring to keep some resuaiats
that the white House wanted
removed, accepted an order
that removed several key re:
strictions. Officials of the
American Civil Liberties
Union call it "a grave threat
to civil liberties."
The most debated - and /
debatable -change contained
in the Reagan order is ap-
proval for C.I.A. operations in
the United States, if the focus
of such' activity is the collec-
tion of sig=stficant foreign.iatr3..
Iigence information: One of the
few specific prohibitions in-
cluded in the 1947 National Se.
provided almost none about /Mr. Casey's primary interest
right-wing terrorism in the J_ some colleagues say his
country. The report said that "tsassion" -- has been opera-
C.I.A. officials reported that tions. From the start be took
they had "not considered the personal command of the
subject of Salvadoran right- clandestine services, adding
est violence as a target for staff members and re-
collection." sources, and has worked to
On the subject of Saivaclo. 'rebuild the covert operations
ran efforts to reduce atroci-
ties by the military, the com-
mittee found that American
intelligence assessments cit-
ing improvements were
based largely on the official
statements of the Salvadoran
military. The report said,
"Intelligence displayed a
willingness to claim greater
certainty than warranted by
the evidence, and a compla-
cent acceptance of official
Salvadoran claims whose
limitations had already been
acknowledged."
staff, euphemistically known curity Act was the stipulation
within the C.I.A. as the inter. that the C -I.& --shall have no
national-affairs division. Police, subpoena. law enforce-
The changes started with ment powers or internal se-
the Presidential executive curity functions." In addition,
order that governs intelli- the legislative history of the
gene activities. The Na- act made clear that Congress
tional Security Act of 194% wanted the agency's activities,
which created the C.I.A., de- apart from headquarters
fined its powers and duties operations, to be confined out-
only in broad terms and of-, side the United States.
fered few specific guidelines Despite the ban, the C.I.A.
for C.I.A. activities. It did conducted extensive domestic
not, for example, include ex- spying during the 1960's and
plicit authority to conduct early 70's. Admiral Inman and
/ Mr. Casey noted that Admi- covert activities. In subse- Mr. Casey both said that the
quest years, Presidents filled Reagan order does not envis-
ral Inman resigned as a con- . the vacuum to some extent, age a revival of such abuses.
sultant to the House Intelli- With a series of directives' . As an example of what would
gence Committee in protest that authorized the C.IA. be
over what he considered to be Permitted ~~the '
the partisan tone of the re- among other things, to coin gnu order, Admiral Inman
diat~~ and politi- said. Intelligence agents could
'
I
l
rt
yo . genera
n
. W. Casey cal-action operations. But 1 interview Americans abort
insisted that the C.I.A. had neither the Executive Branch i their foreign travels withot t
not slanted intelligence re- nor Congress ever got around identifying themselves as
ports on Central America. to establishing a compreben-. C.I.A. operatives.
Noting that the Carter Ad- save charter for the agency. Officials of the American
.ministration had disclosed In the absence of such a char. Civil Liberties Union charge
Cuban and Nicara
u
g
an sup.
port for insurgents in El Sal.
vador, Mr. Casey said that
during his tenure there had
been a consensus among all
the separate components of
ter, the executive order is the that it opens the door to all
only source of guidelines for kinds of domestic operations,
provided they are conducted
under the pretext of gather.
ing foreign intelligence rotor-
mation. For example, there is
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oppose the Khomeini Govern-
ment in Teheran. In addition,
the agency has financed and
tned to unity Iranian exile
groups in France and Egypt
and has set up a clandestine
radio station to broadcast anti-
Khomeini propaganda into
Iran. In Africa, in an operation
that until now has remained
secret, the C.I.A. has trained
the personal security forces of
Liberia's leader, Master Sgt.
Samuel K. Doe, who seized
power in a bloody coup in 1980.
. Mr. Casey's enthusiasm for
covert operations - he has
the world, often in private
planes to avoid detection, to
take a firsthand look' at cur-
rent efforts - has cost him
dearly in several areas. One
was the loss of Admiral
Inman, who was widely re-
spected in the intelligence
community and in Congress.
Although . Admiral Inman
publicly attributed his resig-
nation to a long-standing de-
sire to work in the private
sector, there were other rea-
sons as well, according to his
friends, including alarm over
the heavy use of covert opera-
tions. During high-level strat-
egy sessions, according to na-
tional security officials, Ad.
miral Inman repeatedly
warned that covert activities,
particularly the use of Para-
military forces, could associ.
ate the C.I.A. with groups
that it could not control.
The turn toward covert ac.
tion also indirectly produced
the appointment of Max
Hugel as chief of clandestine
operations. Mr. Casey, who
now acknowledges that the
appointment was a mistake,
says be thought that Mr.
Hugel, a Reagan campaign
worker, eras resourceful and
innovative and would inject
new ideas into the operations
division. Mr. Hugel, of
course, never got to iruple-
went whatever ideas he had
because be quit in duly 1981,
less than two'months after his
appointment, when two for-
mer business associates as
cused him of violating securi.
ties laws. Mr. Hugel denied
the allegations.
Mr. Casey himself was
caught in the riptide, as irreg.
ularities in his own finances
attracted attention and the
Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence discovered that
he had failed to list all his
businesses holdings and legal
clients in a disclosure state- 1
ment filed before his nomiaa.
lion came up for confirma-
tion. A long investigation by
the committee ended with the
tepid conclusion that Mr.
Casey was "not unfit" to
serve as Director of Central
lntellligence, an assessment
that infuriated him.
Although the concept of
Congressional oversight does
not appeal to everyone in the
intelligence business, both
the Senate and House intelli.
genre committees provide a
vital form of public account-
ability for the C.I.A. and its
fellow agencies. The commit.
tees, in a way, are a symbol of
public trust in the C.I.A.
On most issues, the com-
mittees have supported Mr.
Casey's effort to strengthen
the agency. They approi ed
the big funding increases,
and went along'with the reor.
ganization of the intelligence
branch. They favored an ex-
pansion of intelligence collec-
tion overseas, and have en-
couraged the agency to let
some fresh air sweep through
its corridors. But the commit.
tees worry about the signs of
political contamination and
have great misgivings about
the expanded use of covert
operations. Until Mr. Casey
gains their trust an these cru-
cial issues, he will have a
bard time gaining the conh.
dence of be public, ^
Philip Taubman, n Washington correspondent for The
Times, writes frequentlyabo+n intelligence nutters. .
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