A U.S. INTELLIGENCE VACUUM?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100050004-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 25, 2011
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 8, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

.STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/25: CIA-RDP90-01208R000100050004-4
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he terrorist -inn o the
U.S. Marine headquarters
in Beirut and the unexpect-
edly large Cuban presence
that American forces found in Gre-
nada have raised major questions
about the performance of. our intel-
ligence agencies.
The .intelligence questions,
according to Reagan administra-
tion officials and members of Con
. gress, revolve around two.
immediate concerns: whether bet-,
ter intelligence information might
have helped prevent the attack on
the Marines in Beirut on Oct. 23.
and whether the American troops
that invaded Grenada two days
later were sufficiently informed
about the strength of Cuban forces 1.
on the island.
The officials said that fundamen-
tal questions also had been raised
about the mission and methods of
the nation's intelligence agencies,
including the issue of whether U.S.
spying had become too dependent
on sophisticated electronic surveil-
lance equipment instead of human
agents.
Military officers who com-
manded the invasion of Grenada
complain about an intelligence
vacuum that they say left assault
forces unprepared for the stiff
resisXance they encountered from
Cuban troops.
In Lebanon, U.S. officials report
that intelligence tended to lack the
specific information that would
enable the authorities to block
assassination plots or other terror-
ist activities. Three days before a
terrorist drove the truck filled with
tons of explosives into the Marine
headquarters in Beirut, killing 240
American servicemen, the Central
Intelligence Agency reported that
a pro-Iranian Moslem splinter
group appeared to be planning an
attack against the Marines. The
report was widely. distributed
among senior government officials,
including Marine leaders.
Defenders of the CIA cite the
report as evidence that the agency
provided at least some warning
?before.thebombing, even if it did
not give the time, target or type of
attack. Gen. Paul K. Kelley, the
Marine commandant, disputed that
WASHINGTON TIMES
8 December 1983
U.S.
inteffigemV, N Wn Of
11LA " BKOWNFE T directorship of Jtanstleld lbrner,
suggestion, telling members of the
House Armed Services Committee
that no one had given the Marines
the kind of detailed intelligence
they needed to prevent a suicide
..bombing attack. "I'm not talking
about those broad, vague, general
statements that they hide behind;'"
.Gen. Kelley said, in an apparent
reference to the Oct. 20 intelligence
report. "I'm talking about
specificity, about a truck."
Gen. Kelley, of course, protests a
bit too much. "Did he want the
license plate number as well?" one
'intelligence official asked. Rather
than denying any responsibility for
lax security, Gen. Kelley would
have done well to remain silent
until a thorough investigation had
been conducted. If the security was
indeed thorough, why was it that a
host of new security precautions
were implemented the day after the
bombing?
With regard to Grenada, Defense
Department officials said they
were su prised by both the number
of Cuban" combat forces and- the"
extent of Soviet and Cuban influ-
ence on the island. Intelligence
officials acknowledged that
detailed information on both sub-
jects was unavailable, but said that
.planning . for the invasion had
,moved so rapidly that there was
little time to prepare the tactical
intelligence normally required for
..a military assault. They also said
that the military services, not the
CIA, were responsible for the col-
lection of tactical intelligence.
Administration officials say the
CIA had little information about
political developments in Grenada.
As a result, they said, Washington
was caught by..-surprise when
Prime Minister Maurice Bishop
was ousted in the October coup
In both Grenada ' and Lebanon,
intelligence officials said, the infor-
mation that was lacking was of the
kind best obtained by human
agents rather than satellites, recon-
naisance aircraft or other elec-
tronic equipment. It was, we must
remember, during the Carter
administration - and the CIA
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agents were released from service.
"Human agents;' the Carter admin-
istration told us, were no longer
necessary in the new technological
age..Now we can see how wrong
that assessment was.
In Grenada, the CIA had no per-
manent presence and the State
Department maintained no perma-
nent diplomatic presence. As ?a
result, the United States had few
reliable sources of information.
The U.S. intelligence capability
has been permitted to decline dra-
matically. In 1981, an analysis of
the intelligence-gathering role of
the -CIA :concluded that, "The
American intelligence community
has routinely failed to predict
major political and .military devel-
opments before such developments
become irreversible and before
they become blatantly obvious,
even to the general public."
What the report called "massive'
and virtually, inexplicable intelli-
gence failures that occurred dur-
ing the last 15 years" include
failure to predict the massive
Soviet buildup of nuclear missiles;
failure to predict the major
improvements in accuracy of
Soviet ICBMs in the late 1970s; con-
sistent gross 'misstatement of
Soviet global objectives; general
failure to explain the characteris-
tics of Soviet conventional weapons
systems and vessels, for example,
the Soviet T-64 and T-72 tanks and
the new Russian guided-missile
cruisers; and the entire situation in
Iran.
One serious defect in U.S. intelli-
gence, critics charge, is the lack of
competitive analysis and any pro-
cess for quality review. Former
Defense Intelligence Agency
Director Daniel Graham has pro-
posed that analysis and estimates
should be carried out by competing
intelligence bureaucracies with
each having equal access to the
president and the chief intelligence
officer of the.United States, who
would-no longer be the director of
the CIA.
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