KEY C.I.A. ROLE SEEN IN BARRING OF NICARAGUAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-01208R000100040065-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 22, 2011
• Sequence Number: 65
• Publication Date: April 20, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP90-01208R000100040065-8
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policy in Central America.
Theoretical- ly,he officials said, the State Depart-
. ? C.I.A. meat now directs the development of
policy. Langhorne A. Motley, Assistant
Secretary of State for Latin America,
` en in Barring chairs an interagency committee that
formulates policy.
O !V' caraguarz In practice, however, the officials
said, the State Department often has
By PHILIP TAUBMAN
Special to The New York Times
WASHINGTON, April 19 - The
White House rejected Nicaragua's
Deputy Foreign Minister as the next
Ambassador to Washington at the
insistence of the Central Intelligence
Agency, Administration officials said
today.
They said the decision overruled a
recommendation made by Secretary of
State George P. Shultz and reflected
what they described as the dominant
role the C.I.A. has taken in determin-
ing United States policy toward Nica-
ragua.
The rejection, disclosed in Nicara-
gua on Wednesday, was confirmed by
the State Department today.
Nicaragua Sanctions Weighed
At the urging of the E.I.A., Adminis-
t:-aiion officials said, the White House
also considering imposing economic
sar,uti:o;:ts against Nicaragua, including
an embargo of banana imports and the
cancellation of landing rights in the
United States for Nicaragua's national
airline, Aeronica.
These measures have been opposed
by the State Department, theofficials
said. A final decision on the
sanctions
has not been made.
AA:other sign of the C.LA.'s ascend-
I aricy in shaping Nicaragua policy was
the mining of Nicaraguan harbors,
which Administration officials have
said was proposed. and encouraged by
the intelligence agency as part of its
three-year effort to harass the Sandin-
istas by supporting Nicaraguan rebels.
intelligence officials said the C.I.A.
objected to Nicaragua's choice for Am-
bassador, Nora Astorga, because of her
role in the 1978 murder of an officer in
the Nicaraguan National Guard who
was a key operative of the C.I.A. The
officials said that Miss Astorga lured
the officer, Gen. Reynaldo Perez Vega,
to her bedroom where he was slain by
Sandinista revolutionaries.
Administration officials said the
C.I 4.'s growing role in shaping policy
toward Nicaragua marked the latest
development in a series of internal
power struggles that have marked the
Administration's management of
little influence over final decisions,
with the Defense Department dominat.
ing policy discussions about El Salva.
dor and Honduras and the C.I.A. taking
the lead on Nicaragua.
The State
said, sometimes g~oess long with pentaS However, because the intelligence
gon or C.I.A. initiatives despite reser- ! agency has traditionally assumed a for vations to avoid -gaining a reputation background, support role in eign
for being soft on Soviet and Cuban in- relations, its current influence is
fortbeince in Central America, vieweda:th some alarm by other agen.
th-
particulary White House officials said major men t, where here many the officials State believe the
decisions about American policy in e
C.I.A.',.:
Central America are discussed at Na_ activist tendencies have
k
ewed American policy toward Nica.
tional Security Council meetin s
which are usually chaired by President mom'
Reagan and include the Secretary of Shultz, Shultz, partllyy ttlion because of what ofeiof w said de.
State, the Secretary they e-
of Defense, the scribed as his conciliatory s le and
Secretary of the Treasury, the Attor- ill partly because he does not eel as
ney General and the Director of Cen.,11
strongly about Central American
tral Intelligence. Final decisions, the issues as Mr. Casey or Secretary of De-
officials said, are made by Mr. Reagan fense Caspar W Weinberger, fre-
in consultation with the White House ouently does not present the State De-
national security adviser, Robert C. partment
McFarlane. position forcefully in Na-
tional Security Council meetings.
C.I.A. Support for Rebels The officials said, for example, that
from the agency's primacy in manag "11 was not emphatic and was sent to
ing support for the rebels, a maior Mr McFarlane, the White House na-
component of American policy. Rebel 1 tional security adviser, rather than di-
f
en eft
from .. ... __ ___ ru f1..? LR_ t1
orc
er
men, according to intelligence offi?
cials.
But they said the C.I.A.'s position,
enhanced by the close relationship be-
tween President Reagan and William gua. "The C.I.A.'s pushing that but
J. Casey, the Director of Central Intel- they aren't going to get it," a State De.
ligence, has expanded from that opera- 1 partment official said.
tional role to one of major influence They also said Mr. Motley remained
over Washington's relations with the main American representative in
Managua. discussions with Nicaragua about im-
proving relations.
The agency's influence, they said
,
has also been aided by the presence of
two former C.I.A. officials in key posi-
tion at the White House and Defense
Department. The former agency offi-
cials are Nestor D. Sanchez, the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Latin America, and Constantine r?
,
dent for Latin American affairs. making policy, not George Shultz."
It is unusual, although not unprece-
dented,
for the C.I.A. to become a key
player in policy development, the offi-
cials said, noting that the agency ex-
erted considerable influence over
American relations with the Shah of
Iran before he was ousted by Moslem
fundamentalists in 1979.
The influence of the C.I.A. has risen
and fallen over the years in response to
the relationship between the Director
of Central Intelligence and the Presi-
dent. The C.I.A. under Allen Dulles, for
example, had substantial influence in
the 1950's because he was on good
terms with President Eisenhower. In
addition, his brother, John Foster
Dulles, was Secretary of State. The
agency fell out of favor in the Nixon Ad-
ininistratioa, partly because of strains
between Richard Helms, the C.I.A. di-
ment officials said today that they did
not expect the White House to approve
economic sanctions against Nicara- i
Assessing the relative influence of
the C.I.A., Defense Department and
State Department, a senior Pentagon
official said, "If you look at actions,
h
w
ich are always the clearest expres-
sion of policy, you will find in Central
America, especially in Nicaragua
that
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/02/23: CIA-RDP90-01208R000100040065-8